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Contents Introduction PART I: TRUTH 1. Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction 1.1 Introduction 1.2 The Law of Non-contradiction (5b18¿22) 1.3 The Firmest of All Principles (5b22¿35) 1.4 Aristotle's Opponents 1.5 Demonstration by Refutation (5b35¿6a28) 1.6 First Refutation: Part I (6a28¿b34) 1.7 First Refutation: Interlude (6b34¿7a20) 1.8 Aristotle on Substance 1.9 First Refutation: Part II (7a20¿b18) 1.10 The Anscombe/Cresswell Interpretation 1.11 Some Modern Variations I: Talking of Objects 1.12 Some Modern Variations II: Meaning 1.13 Some Modern Variations III: Negation as Cancellation 1.14 Second Refutation: Eleatic Monism (7b18¿8a2) 1.15 Third Refutation: The Lem and Assertion (8a2¿7) 1.16 Fourth Refutation: An Argument by Cases (8a7¿34) 1.17 Fifth Refutation: The Truth-conditions of Negation (8a34¿b 1.18 Sixth Refutation: Part I, The Vegetable (8b2¿12) 1.19 Sixth Refutation: Part II, Action (8b12¿31) 1.20 Seventh Refutation: Teleology (8b31¿9a6) 1.21 Conclusion 2. Theories of Truth 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Deflationist Theory of Truth 2.3 The Semantic Theory of Truth 2.4 The Teleological Theory of Truth 2.5 The Pragmatist Theory of Truth 2.6 The Coherence Theory of Truth 2.7 The Correspondence Theory of Truth 2.8 Conclusion 3. Trivialism 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Seeing Contradictions 3.3 Perceptual Illusions 3.4 The Non-triviality of the World 3.5 The Consistency of the Empirical World 3.6 The Trivialist 3.7 Argument One: Evidence 3.8 Argument Two: Meaning 3.9 Argument Three: The Phenomenology of Choice 3.10 Conclusion PART II: NEGATION 4. Contradiction 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Negation or Negations? 4.3 Contradictories 4.4 The Laws of Excluded Middle and Non-contradiction 4.5 Truth and Falsity 4.6 Truth and Contradiction 4.7 Arrow Falsum 4.8 Reductio ad Absurdum 4.9 Conclusion 5. Boolean Negation 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Information and Augmentation 5.3 Boolean Negation by Proof Theory 5.4 Conservative Extension 5.5 Harmony 5.6 Boolean Negation by Model Theory 5.7 Explosion 5.8 Boolean Negation Negated 5.9 Curry Conditionals 5.10 Conclusion 6. Denial and Rejection 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Negation and Denial 6.3 Expressability 6.4 Denial and Paradox 6.5 Truth and Rejection 6.6 Rational Dilemmas 6.7 Game-theoretic Dilemmas 6.8 Objections 6.9 Conclusion PART III: RATIONALIT 7. Rational Belief 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The History of the Belief in Consistency 7.3 Is Consistency Mandatory? 7.4 Rationality and Consistency 7.5 The Rationality of Inconsistency 7.6 Conclusion 8. Belief Revision 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Background: The AGM Conditions 8.3 Inconsistent Belief 8.4 Paraconsistency 8.5 Multiple Criteria 8.6 Formal Models 8.7 The AGM Conditions Revisited 8.8 Conclusion 9. Consistency and the Empirical Sciences 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Inconsistency and Observation 9.3 Types of Inconsistency 9.4 Handling Inconsistency 9.5 Accepting Inconsistent Information 9.6 Inconsistency and Truth 9.7 Inconsistent Mathematics 9.8 Conclusion PART IV: LOGIC 10. Logic and Revisability 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Logics, Geometries, and Arithmetics 10.3 Non-Euclidean Geometry 10.4 Non-Standard Arithmetics 10.5 Models of the Inconsistent 10.6 Inconsistent Arithmetics 10.7 Empirical Applications 10.8 Revising Logic: The Case of Syllogistic 10.9 Quine and Meaning-variance 10.10 Rivalry 10.11 Quine in Defence of Classical Logic 10.12 Logic and Translation 10.13 Realism vs. Instrumentalism in Logic 10.14 Localism vs. Globalism 10.15 Conclusion 11. Validity 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Validity: A First Pass 11.3 Proof-theoretic Characterization 11.4 Model-theoretic Characterization 11.5 Filling in The Details 11.6 The Tarskian Account 11.7 Inductive Validity 11.8 Probability 11.9 Non-monotonic Logic 11.10 Consequences of This Account 11.11 Normativity and Information Preservation 11.12 Conclusion 12. Logical Pluralism 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Pure and Applied Logic 12.3 Theoretical Pluralism 12.4 The Canonical Application of Logic 12.5 Validity 12.6 Domain Variation 12.7 Context Dependence 12.8 Logical Constants and Variables 12.9 Classes of Situation 12.10 Instrumentalism 12.11 Under-determination by the Data 12.12 Inductive Inference 12.13 Conclusion 12.14 To Be and Not to Be¿that is the Answer References
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Truth.
Contradiction.
Logic.