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Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-464
The Army Lawyer (ISSN 0364-1287, USPS 490-330) is published monthly by The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia, for the official use of Army lawyers in the performance of their legal responsibilities. Individual paid subscriptions to The Army Lawyer are available for $45.00 each ($63.00 foreign) per year, periodical postage paid at Charlottesville, Virginia, and additional mailing offices (see subscription form on the inside back cover). POSTMASTER: Send any address changes to The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 600 Massie Road, ATTN: ALCS-ADA-P, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1781. The opinions expressed by the authors in the articles do not necessarily reflect the view of The Judge Advocate General or the Department of the Army. Masculine or feminine pronouns appearing in this pamphlet refer to both genders unless the context indicates another use.

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Articles may be cited as: ARMY LAW., [date], at [first page of article], [pincite].
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Lore of the Corps

The Trial by Court-Martial of Colonel William “Billy” Mitchell

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Regimental Historian and Archivist

On 1 September 1925, three Navy seaplanes flying from Los Angeles to Hawaii crashed into the Pacific Ocean. Two days later, the Navy dirigible USS Shenandoah fell from the skies—killing fourteen men, including its skipper. Constructed at a cost of $2.7 million, the Shenandoah was a “national treasure” and its destruction, and the death of so many men, was front page news.1 Americans everywhere asked how these air disasters could have happened and who was responsible for the loss of men and materiel.

On 5 September 1925, Colonel (COL) William “Billy” Mitchell invited six newspaper reporters into his quarters in San Antonio and handed them a nine-page single-spaced typewritten statement. This was Mitchell’s answer to the question on the lips of Americans everywhere:

I have been asked from all parts of the country to give my opinion about the reasons for the frightful aeronautical accidents and the loss of life, equipment and treasure that has occurred during the last few days. My opinion is as follows: These incidents are the direct result of the incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of our national defense by the Navy and War Departments.2

Mitchell’s incendiary words were read by millions of Americans. A headline in the Chicago Tribune screamed “[Mitchell] Brands Air Rule ‘Criminal.’” “Flyers Killed by Stupid Chiefs’ Propaganda Schemes, Col. Mitchell Charges” proclaimed the Washington Star.3 Since Mitchell was known as “a dashing war hero and unreserved advocate of airpower,”4 his criticisms of the Army and Navy were believed by many and public opinion was solidly behind him. In the War Department, Army leaders were “stunned” by Mitchell’s words, which they considered to be “outrageous”5—and insubordinate. Believing that his remarks had brought “discredit upon the military service” in violation of the Articles of War, the Army ordered COL Mitchell to Washington, D.C. to stand trial. What follows is the story of Mitchell’s court-martial and the judge advocates who played important roles in it.

Born in Nice, France, in December 1879, William Lendrum “Billy” Mitchell was the oldest of ten children. After his American parents moved back to their home state of Wisconsin when Mitchell was three years old, he lived a privileged life in a wealthy and politically prominent family.

When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, Mitchell dropped out of Columbian University (today’s George Washington University) and enlisted as a private in the infantry. Seven days later, he was a Signal Corps second lieutenant. He subsequently served in Cuba and the Philippines. In 1915, then-Captain Mitchell was assigned to the aerial section of the Signal Corps. The following year, he learned to fly—and began his remarkable career as the Army’s “first truly vocal supporter of airpower and its role on the battlefield.”6

After the United States entered World War I in April 1917, Mitchell was appointed air officer of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and promoted to lieutenant colonel. He later became the first U.S. officer to fly over enemy lines and the first to be awarded the French Croix de Guerre. In September 1918, now–COL Mitchell led a raid of 1500 airplanes against the St. Mihiel salient. A month later, after being promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general (BG), Mitchell led additional massed bombing raids against German units during the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

After the war, BG Mitchell returned to Washington, D.C., where he was assistant chief of the Air Corps. This position, which allowed him to retain his temporary one-star rank, also served as a platform for Mitchell to begin lobbying for an independent U.S. air force. Mitchell insisted that the next war would be fought in the air—not on the ground or at sea. Mitchell believed that success in future wars would come to those nations that adopted strategic bombing as their principal method of warfare. Moreover, as the corresponding development of military aviation meant that the Army and Navy would be vulnerable without airplanes as the first line of defense, only the unified control

2 U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, THE ARMY LAWYER 144–45 (1975) [hereinafter ARMY LAWYER].
3 WALLER, supra note 1, at 24.
5 WALLER, supra note 1, at 25-26.
of air power in a separate and distinct air force could provide the required defense. In Mitchell’s view, the only logical course of action was to establish an American air force akin to Great Britain’s Royal Air Force.

Mitchell proved that even large ships could be destroyed from the air (four captured enemy ships, including one battleship, were sunk in a demonstration off Norfolk, Virginia in 1921) and some senior Army and Navy leaders agreed with Mitchell that airpower had altered the nature of war. But Mitchell “was viewed by many as a vain, egotistical, self-publicizing grandstander, and his fiery temperament eventually alienated him from nearly all whom he hoped to influence.”

When Mitchell made his intemperate remarks in September 1925, he was serving as the air officer of the VIII Corps in San Antonio, Texas—and wearing eagles on his collar. This was because when Mitchell left his job in Washington, D.C., as assistant air chief—a one-star billet that permitted Mitchell to continue to wear stars as a temporary BG—and was sent to Fort Sam Houston, Mitchell reverted to his permanent grade of colonel. This is why Mitchell was wearing colonel’s rank when he appeared before a court-martial in Washington, D.C., on 28 October 1925.

While the War Department had hoped for minimum publicity, the Mitchell “trial was the biggest media event in the country. . . . press tables were jammed . . . with about forty reporters and photographers.” Additionally, some five hundred people lined up to get some of the few courtroom seats available for members of the public.

Due to Mitchell’s seniority, twelve generals had been chosen by the War Department to sit on the panel, including Major General (MG) Douglas MacArthur, who would later serve as Army Chief of Staff and achieve great fame in World War II and Korea. The “law member,” the forerunner of today’s military judge,9 was COL Blanton Winship, who had been decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star for combat heroism in 1918. Like MacArthur, Winship also had a bright future: he would serve as The Judge Advocate General from 1931 to 1933 and Governor of Puerto Rico from 1934 to 1939.10 These panel members all knew Mitchell, some personally (including Winship and MacArthur), and some had publicly expressed opinions on his airpower theories. They were hardly impartial or neutral in their attitudes. Two were excused for bias and one on a peremptory challenge—leaving nine general officers (plus COL Winship) to hear the evidence against Mitchell.11

The trial judge advocate was COL Sherman Moreland, a fifty-seven year old judge advocate who was “mild mannered and polite to a fault in a courtroom.”12 He was assisted by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Joseph McMullen, a Virginia lawyer who had joined the Judge Advocate General’s Department after World War I. Moreland and McMullen were joined later by Major (MAJ) Allen Gullion, who was “one of the most skilled and aggressive prosecutors” in the Army. Gullion, too, was destined for greatness as a judge advocate: he served as TJAG from 1937 to 1941 and as Army Provost Marshal General from 1941 to 1945. But Gullion was a bit of an eccentric. Though he played polo and enjoyed watching boxing matches, he smoked heavily (always with a cigarette holder) and thought exercise could be bad for his health. He read the newspaper in bed wearing white gloves so the print wouldn’t soil his hands. On car trips from Washington back to Kentucky, he would stop at each railroad crossing and order his son out to inspect the track both ways and then signal him to pass over it. . . . Officers who acted in an ungentlemanly or unprincipled manner deeply offended him. He came down hard on them in court—

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8 WALLER, supra note 1, at 46–47.

9 While the law member was indeed the forerunner of the military judge, his role and authority were markedly different in 1925. The law member was tasked with ruling “in open court” on all “interlocutory questions.” The 1921 Manual for Courts-Martial, paragraph 9a(5), defined “interlocutory questions” as “all questions of any kind arising at any time during the trial” except those relating to challenges, findings and sentence. But the law member’s rulings were only binding the court when the interlocutory question concerned the admissibility of evidence. On all other interlocutory questions, the decision of the law member could be overturned by a majority vote of the members. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES ¶ 99 (1917); see also Fred L. Borch, III, Anatomy of a Court-Martial: The Trial and Execution of Private William Buckner in World War I, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2011, at 1 n.1.

10 Winship is the only judge advocate in history to be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) while an Army lawyer. While serving as the Judge Advocate of the 1st Army, COL Winship was given command of the 110th and 118th Infantry Regiments, 28th Division. His DSC was for “extraordinary heroism in action near Lachaussee, France, November 9, 1918.” Headquarters, War Dep’t, Gen. Orders No. 9 (1923).

11 WALLER, supra note 1, at 53–60.

12 Id. at 51.
something he would now do with Mitchell.13

As for Mitchell’s defense team, he was represented by civilian lawyer and Congressman Frank R. Reid and judge advocate COL Herbert Arthur “Artie” White. Reid, a largely unknown representative from Illinois who was in his second term in Congress, agreed to defend Mitchell for free—chiefly because Reid knew the trial would quickly make him a national figure.14 White, a “soft-spoken Iowan,”15 had been serving as a judge advocate at Fort Sam Houston; the Army transferred White to Washington to serve as Mitchell’s military defense counsel. Rounding out the defense team were Frank Plain, an Illinois state judge and friend of Reid’s who was an expert on constitutional law, and William Webb, a young lawyer who did legal research and kept track of the thousands of pages of documents in the case.

Mitchell was charged with eight specifications of violating the Ninety-sixth Article of War, which made criminal “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline” and “all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.” The gist of the specifications was that Mitchell’s 5 September statement about the causes of the seaplane and Shenandoah disasters, and follow-up comments he made to the media on 9 September, constituted insubordination and consequently conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline in violation of Article 96.16 Trial began on 28 October, less than two months after the statements were made.

Mitchell’s lead defense counsel, Frank Reid, first argued that the entire case should be thrown out because his client’s statements were protected by the First Amendment. The law member, COL Winship, however, agreed with the trial judge advocate that Mitchell’s military status made the First Amendment inapplicable, and denied Reid’s motion to dismiss the charge and its specifications.17 After the panel members agreed with Winship’s ruling, the case moved to the merits. The prosecution case-in-chief took less than a day, and consisted simply of proof that Mitchell had made the statements and written the articles in question. On cross-examination, one government witness (the commander of VIII Corps) agreed that the publication of Mitchell’s statements had not caused any “lack of discipline or insubordination” in his command. The defense then moved for a finding of not guilty,18 claiming that the prosecution had not proven the statements were contrary to good order and discipline—that, for aught the evidence had shown, they were instead public-spirited efforts to benefit good order and discipline “by correcting the evils which [were] admittedly destroying it in the air service and in the War Department.” On Winship’s advice, the panel denied the motion.19

The same day the government rested its case, the defense presented the government with an extensive list of witnesses (more than seventy) and documents (thousands of pages) that it wanted produced. The court recessed for a week while witnesses and documents were gathered. The defense case then began—with Reid now arguing to the panel that Mitchell should be exonerated because his criticisms of the War and Navy Department were true. The court consistently declined to rule on whether this evidence was relevant on the subject of guilt, or only as mitigation.20

To prove that the military hierarchy was incompetent—as Mitchell had claimed—Reid called a number of prominent individuals to the stand, including then–MAJ Henry A. “Hap” Arnold and New York Congressman Fiorello H. La Guardia, both of whom had flown in combat in World War I.21 Both men testified about the large number

13 Id. at 222.
14 See id. at 37. Reid had served on the House Aircraft Committee, where he had seriously criticized the government’s handling of the aircraft industry, and had expressed strong support for Mitchell’s views on the need for an independent air force. Id. at 37–38.
15 Id. at 52. Born in 1870, White entered the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) in 1891 and graduated four years later; he ranked eighth in a class of fifty-two cadets. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in the cavalry, White served in a variety of locations, including China and the Philippines. After completing the Army War College in 1912, he transferred to the Judge Advocate General’s Department (White had previously received a law degree while stationed at Fort Myer, Virginia, as a cavalry officer). White and Mitchell had previously met each other at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1904 and, when he was ordered to Washington, D.C., to stand trial in 1925, Mitchell requested White as his defense counsel. “Artie” White retired in 1929 and then worked for a number of years for the United Services Automobile Association (USAA), first as USAA’s attorney-in-fact and later as the organization’s secretary-treasurer. White died at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in December 1947. He was seventy-seven years old. Herbert Arthur White, ASSEMBLY, Jan. 1955, at 45.
16 This punitive article, the forerunner of Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 134, permitted punishment “at the discretion of the court.” MCM 1921, supra note 9, ¶ 158c (providing for such motions). In modern practice, such a motion would be made under RCM 917.
17 Id. at 85.
18 See MCM 1921, supra note 9, ¶ 158c (providing for such motions). In modern practice, such a motion would be made under RCM 917.
19 WALLER, supra note 1, at 110–16.
20 Id. at 117, 261, 315. Under MCM 1921, findings and sentencing were decided at the same time; there was no announcement of findings in open court prior to deliberation on sentencing. MCM 1921, supra note 9, ¶¶ 294, 332a. Thus, the evidence would have been heard before findings regardless of how the court ruled on the question.
21 Henry A. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950) graduated from the USMA in 1907 and served as an infantry officer until transferring to the Signal Corps and learning to fly with the Wright brothers. He served on the Air Service staff in Washington during World War I, but his lack of combat experience in France did not harm his career: Arnold was appointed chief of the newly created Army Air Forces in 1941 and finished World War II as a five-star general. Fiorella H. La Guardia (1882–1947) served as an Army Air Service major on the Italian-Austrian front in World War I, where he
of fatal accidents in the Army Air Service and how “foreign countries” like France, Italy and Sweden were moving toward a “unified air force.” They also “testified to the unwarranted denigration of air power by the military hierarchy.”

Toward the end of the defense case, Mitchell took the stand himself, and was subjected to a full day of cross-examination. Questioned closely on specific details, such as the accident rates for fliers in different countries’ air services or the cost of his proposed reforms, Mitchell did not know the numbers. Major Gullion questioned Mitchell about a paper he had written on the “versatility of the Japanese submarine,” and his statement that such submarines could carry “any size” of gun for surface warfare. This exchange followed:

Mitchell: That was my opinion.
Gullion: That was your opinion?
Mitchell: That was my opinion.
Gullion: Is that your opinion now?
Mitchell: Yes.
Gullion: Then, any statement—there is no statement of fact in your whole paper?
Mitchell: No.

Mitchell’s credibility was severely damaged. To exploit the damage, the Government presented a three-week case in rebuttal, calling veteran fliers (including Arctic explorer Richard Byrd), surviving crewmen from the Shenandoah, the chief of the Army’s Air Service, and the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff to dispute Mitchell’s claims. In his closing argument to the panel, which was about to consider both findings and sentence, Major Gullion hammered home how Mitchell’s opinions reflected both his arrogance and unfitness to serve:

Is such a man a safe guide? Is he a constructive person or is he a loose-talking imaginative megalomaniac cheered by the adulation of his juniors who see promotion under his banner . . . and intoxicated by the ephemeral applause of the people whose fancy he has for the moment caught?

Is this man a Moses, fitted to lead the people out of a wilderness which is his creation, only? Is he of the George Washington type, as [defense] counsel would have you believe? Is he not rather of the all-too-familiar charlatan and demagogue type?

Sirs, we ask the dismissal of the accused for the sake of the Army whose discipline he has endangered and whose fair name he has attempted to discredit . . . we ask it in the name of the American people whose fears he has played upon, hysteria he has fomented, whose confidence he has beguiled, and whose faith he has betrayed.

At the end of a seven-week court-martial, COL Mitchell was found guilty of all specifications and the charge. His sentence: to be suspended from rank, command, and duty and to forfeit all pay and allowances for five years. Despite the result, the Mitchell court-martial stands alone, or nearly so, in court-martial history for the extent to which the defense was able to use the trial as a forum to debate policy questions and attack current military practice.

Crushed by the trial results, Mitchell resigned from the Army on 1 February 1926. Newspapers that had favored his cause cooled in their support or turned against him. The

22 WALLER, supra note 1, at 181.
23 ARMY LAWYER, supra note 2, at 145.
24 WALLER, supra note 1, at 245, 248.
25 ARMY LAWYER, supra note 2, at 145.
26 WALLER, supra note 1, at 260–314. Major General Mason Patrick, Chief of the Army Air Service and an airpower advocate in his own right, gave mixed answers, sometimes favoring Mitchell’s views and sometimes disagreeing. Id. at 300–04. By its nature this must have hurt Mitchell more than it helped; it showed him not as a speaker of truth to power, but as a man taking sides in controversies, and as such less justified in taking his case to the public.
27 See supra note 20.
28 ARMY LAWYER, supra note 2, at 146.
29 The result offers an interesting parallel to the case of Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer in 1867. Custer, like Mitchell, was a flamboyant wartime general returned to a lower rank after the war and accused of indiscretion. He was tried for purely military offenses—absence without leave from his command, and several specifications of “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.” And his sentence was a suspension without pay for one year. Unlike Mitchell, Custer did not resign his commission during his period of suspension, and went on to command troops in several Indian campaigns. See LAWRENCE A. FROST, THE COURT-MARTIAL OF GENERAL GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER 99–100, 246 (1968).
30 The usual fate of such efforts is complete failure. See United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 105–07 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (lawfulness of order to wear U.N. accoutrements was question of law for the judge; defense was not allowed to present any evidence on the subject to the panel in prosecution for disobeying that order); United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 114–15 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (accused attempted to defend against a desertion charge by contesting legality of the war; defense was not allowed to litigate that issue at trial); see also United States v. Rockwood, 48 M.J. 501, 507–09 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (accused claimed duty under international law to investigate human rights abuses at a civilian prison instead of being at his place of duty; trial court permitted expert testimony on the subject, but appellate court found this defense deficient as a matter of law).
public largely lost interest. Mitchell, who died in 1936, did not live long enough to see many of his ideas and predictions about the importance of airpower come to fruition. In the long run, however, he won his case in the court of public opinion—especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and American unpreparedness for it, fulfilled some of his prophecies. Men who had testified for him at trial won renown in World War II and in the (finally independent) United States Air Force.

Today, the public generally and American airpower advocates in particular laud Billy Mitchell as one of the greatest airmen in history. There has, however, never been any formal exoneration of him—but not for want of trying. In March 1956, William L. Mitchell Jr., encouraged by the Air Force Association, filed a petition with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records to “render null and void the proceedings, findings, and sentence” of his father’s court-martial. As Mitchell’s son put it: “I sincerely believe that a gross injustice was done to my father. History has vindicated him. I believe the United States Air Force cannot do less.” Apparently “top Army officials fiercely fought” this petition from Billy Jr., arguing in part that the Air Force was a separate service and should not reverse a thirty-year old Army conviction.

Despite the Army’s opposition, the Air Force Board recommended to Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas that COL Mitchell’s court-martial conviction be set aside. In March 1958, however, Douglas declined to follow this recommendation, and no further legal action has ever been taken to overturn the proceedings in his case.

More historical information can be found at
The Judge Advocate General’s Corps
Regimental History Website

Dedicated to the brave men and women who have served our Corps with honor, dedication, and distinction.

31 WALLER, supra note 1, at 328–29, 331, 334–35.
33 WALLER, supra note 1, at 358.
34 Roscoe Drummond, Where An Apology Is Due, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 11, 1958, at 18A; WALLER, supra note 1, at 358.
I. Introduction

The U.S. military’s court-martial system is a blue ribbon system of justice, exemplifying the best in the Anglo-American adversarial system while at the same time serving the interests of the military command in preserving good order and discipline.1 By presenting the story of the successful deployed court-martial experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom 10-11, this article demonstrates that the court-martial system, as a system of law and procedure, can function well in a deployed environment. In support, it relates the concrete experience of trying the entire range of contested general courts-martial (GCMs) and special courts-martial (SPCMs) in a deployed environment, both joint and single service, from novel “Spice”2 cases to a double premeditated murder case.

This article discusses in detail the general and special courts-martial tried by the U.S. Army III Corps’ deployed MJ team and assigned brigade trial counsel which were eighteen of the forty GCMs and SPCMs tried in theater that year, to illustrate successful deployed court-martial practice and the lessons to be drawn from it.3 Out of these eighteen cases, twelve were contested,4 seven were panel cases, five

1 Indeed, both the author’s own experiences and a thoughtful recent article support this contention. See Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2010). Military judges know the law and rules of evidence and are generally apolitical; trial and defense counsel are typically not overburdened with cases and are well-resourced; panel members are experienced decision-makers, intelligent, thoughtful, and compassionate; and, military court-martial procedures are highly due-process oriented. In fact, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) has even been criticized as overly due process-oriented. See, e.g., General William C. Westmoreland & Major General George S. Prugh, Judges in Command: The Judicialized Uniform Code of Military Justice in Combat, 3 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 6 (1980). General Westmoreland’s article was largely a criticism of what he viewed as the civilianization of the military justice system. These criticisms reflect a longstanding debate in the United States over the proper nature of military justice, one which typically intensified after major wars brought thousands of citizen-Soldiers into service. This dates back at least to the post-Civil War era. See LOUISE BARNETT, UNGENTLEMANLY ACTS 9-10 (2000) (contrasting views of Civil War Generals William T. Sherman and Alfred H. Terry on the subject); see also JOHN M. LINDLEY, “A SOLDIER IS ALSO A CITIZEN”: THE CONTROVERSY OVER MILITARY JUSTICE 1917–1920 (1990); Judge Andrew S. Effron, Military Justice: The Continuing Importance of Historical Perspective, ARMY LAW., June 2000, at 3, 4.

2 Although a particular brand name, the term “Spice” has become the generic name for a series of mood-altering substances, generally categorized as synthetic cannabinoids or synthetic marijuana. These substances are typically composed of plant material laced with foreign-produced chemicals that, when smoked, induce a “high” in the user comparable to that produced by the ingestion of marijuana. Since 1 March 2011, the chemicals used to produce Spice have been listed on Schedule I of the Schedule of Controlled Substances, thus rendering their sale, use, possession, and introduction violations of Article 112a. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Five Synthetic Cannabinoids Into Schedule I, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,075 (Mar. 1, 2011); UCMJ art. 112a (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2011). During the timeframe covered in this article, Spice was not scheduled, but was prohibited by U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF–I) General Order 1 and punishable as a violation of Article 92. See Headquarters, USF–I, Gen. Order No. 1 (22 Sept. 2010) [hereinafter USF–I GO #1] (on file with author). According to the Senior Trial Counsel for 10th Mountain Division, Kandahar, Afghanistan, Spice sale and use continues to be a prevalent crime in Afghanistan. Telephone Conversation with CPT Tokay Hackett, U.S. Army Judge Advocate, Senior Trial Counsel, 10th Mountain Div., Kandahar Airfield, Afg. (25 June 2011).

3 From 9 March 2010 through 9 February 2011, the author served as the Chief of Military Justice for USF–I and III Corps, a position that permitted him to directly supervise the courts-martial of dozens of Army Soldiers, as well as to coordinate and facilitate military justice dispositions on Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Civilians throughout the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA). These eighteen cases represent all the cases tried either entirely or partially under the supervision of the author and include cases referred by III Corps as well as by Special Operations Command (SOCCENT) and I Command Central (USOCCENT or SOCCENT). These eighteen cases represent all the cases tried either entirely or partially under the supervision of the author and include cases referred by III Corps as well as by Special Operations Command (SOCCENT) and I Command Central (USOCCENT or SOCCENT). This article was largely a criticism of what he viewed as the civilianization of the military justice system. These criticisms reflect a longstanding debate in the United States over the proper nature of military justice, one which typically intensified after major wars brought thousands of citizen-Soldiers into service. This dates back at least to the post-Civil War era. See LOUISE BARNETT, UNGENTLEMANLY ACTS 9-10 (2000) (contrasting views of Civil War Generals William T. Sherman and Alfred H. Terry on the subject); see also JOHN M. LINDLEY, “A SOLDIER IS ALSO A CITIZEN”: THE CONTROVERSY OVER MILITARY JUSTICE 1917–1920 (1990); Judge Andrew S. Effron, Military Justice: The Continuing Importance of Historical Perspective, ARMY LAW., June 2000, at 3, 4.

4 In the following list, one asterisk (*) denotes that the case was a contested judge alone case; two asterisks (**) indicate that the case was a contested panel case. The number in parenthesis indicates the number of days from preferral to trial on the merits. In all cases except for United States v.
were GCMs, and thirteen were SPCMs. This experience suggests four attributes of a successful deployed court-martial practice:

(1) Most cases arising in theater are best tried in theater;
(2) Counsel must be prepared to try any type of case in theater;
(3) Courts-martial can proceed to trial faster in theater than in garrison; and
(4) Ownership of cases is especially important in a deployed environment.

Because these cases represent a widely dispersed jurisdiction in a hostile-fire, deployed environment, arising out of a wide range of crimes, locations and types of units, their successful prosecution suggests the effectiveness of the deployed court-martial system as a whole and not just in Iraq during OIF 10–11. The lessons learned are not limited to a particular time, place, or unit. Based on these experiences, Part IV provides practical, experienced-based advice on the logistical aspects of trying cases in a deployed environment. While some practices based on Iraq-specific circumstances are now less relevant, most practices are transferable to Afghanistan or future deployed environments.

The deployability of the court-martial system does not turn entirely on the maturity of the theater, the location of the court-martial, or any particular command structure, but primarily derives from the portability of the system itself and the individual military justice (MJ) practitioner’s ability to marshal the assets, human and otherwise, to conduct trials in a deployed environment. A poor theater-wide MJ structure in an immature theater does not preclude the practice of MJ, but a good structure can facilitate it, so the appendices to this article discusses the theater-wide MJ structure extant in Iraq during OIF 10–11. It suggests that the creation of an echeloned, theater-wide MJ structure spearheaded by the U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF–I) Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) facilitated deployed court-martial success.

While the court-martial system showed itself to be fully deployable during this period, there is such a thing as deployed court-martial failure, and it has little to do with the number of cases tried in the deployed environment.8

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**United States v. CPT Bjork (I Corps):** Art. 118 x 2; GCM; Pref: 3 Nov. 2009, Trial 17 May 2010 (195 days)

**United States v. CPT Warren (SOCCENT):** Art. 120; GCM; Pref: 1 July 2010, Trial 14 Nov. 2010 (136 days)


* United States v. CW2 Brown (III Corps): Art. 83; GCM; Pref: 19 Aug. 2010, Trial: 18 Nov. 2010 (91 days)

* United States v. 1SG Pemberton (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 20 Dec. 2010, Trial 24 Jan. 2011 (35 days)

* United States v. SSG Morgan (III Corps): Art. 121; SPCM; Pref: 12 Oct. 2010, Trial: 13 Jan. 2011 (93 days)

United States v. SSG Anderson (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 9 Apr. 2010, Trial: 11 July 2010 (93 days)

**United States v. SGT Ferrer (SOCCENT):** Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 24 July 2010, Trial: 10 Sept. 2010 (48 days)

**United States v. SPC Shipley (SOCCENT):** Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 28 Aug. 2010, Trial: 17 Oct. 2010 (50 days)

United States v. SGT Moseley (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 21 May 2010, Trial: 10 July 2010 (50 days)

**United States v. PFC Halloran (III Corps):** Art. 107; SPCM; Pref: 10 Aug. 2010, Trial: 12 Sept. 2010 (33 days)

**United States v. PFC Ruffin (III Corps):** Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 6 Oct. 2010, Trial: 24 Oct. 2010 (18 days)

**United States v. PV2 Reese (III Corps):** Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 15 Dec. 2010, Trial: 12 Jan. 2011 (28 days)


*United States v. SPC Bennett (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 20 Nov 2010, Trial: 15 Jan. 2011 (56 days)

United States v. SPC Wright, L (III Corps): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 1 Mar. 2010, Trial 3 May 2010 (63 days)

United States v. SPC Wright, K (III Corps): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 1 Mar 2010, Trial 3 May 2010 (63 days)

United States v. SPC Kiger (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 13 June 2010, Trial 26 Aug. 2010 (74 days)

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**United States v. PV2 Reese (III Corps):** Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 15 Dec. 2010, Trial: 12 Jan. 2011 (28 days)


*United States v. SPC Bennett (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 20 Nov 2010, Trial: 15 Jan. 2011 (56 days)

United States v. SPC Wright, L (III Corps): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 1 Mar. 2010, Trial 3 May 2010 (63 days)

United States v. SPC Wright, K (III Corps): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 1 Mar 2010, Trial 3 May 2010 (63 days)

United States v. SPC Kiger (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 13 June 2010, Trial 26 Aug. 2010 (74 days)

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5 The SOCCENT cases arose out of the Combined Joint Special Operations Forces–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF–AP), a unit deeply engaged in combat operations. Also, several cases arose out of military police units and the theater aviation brigade.

6 The “maturity” of the theater refers to how long U.S forces have operated within the theater. Thus, upon the initial U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iraq theater was “immature” whereas during the period of time covered in this article, the theater was “mature,” with regularly-scheduled air transportation and well developed logistical channels. While the author asserts that the court-martial system can effectively function in even an immature theater, this is contingent upon there at least being sufficient military justice practitioners in theater to conduct courts-martial. One colleague who reviewed this article said that during his deployment as a brigade judge advocate during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), insufficient judge advocates were present in theater, the judge advocates that were present were focused on operational law, and that he himself served as the sole judge advocate for a command of five thousand Soldiers. Under these conditions, it is safe to say that—consciously or not—the command had made the decision not to deploy the court-martial system. The author, on the author hand, serving as a trial defense counsel during OIF III in 2005, participated in several contested courts-martial and found that by then, the situation had changed and a large number of military justice practitioners were present in theater. Others, including division SJA’s, have related to the author accounts of robust courts-martial practice within their units even earlier.

7 In a thoughtful article, Major Frank Rosenblatt, a U.S. Army judge advocate, compared the number of courts-martial conducted in a deployed environment with the number conducted overall in the Army to support his conclusion that the court-martial system is “non-deployable,” a term he borrowed from the description given to Soldiers who are not deemed able to...
 Deployed court-martial failure occurs when commanders or their legal advisors labor under the erroneous presumption that it is impracticable to conduct courts-martial in the deployed environment. Sometimes there are good reasons to try a case in the rear instead of in theater—but any advice influenced by the notion that the court-martial system is not fully and practically deployable is advice based on a deeply flawed premise.

II. The USF-I Military Justice Division in Theater Justice

On 1 January 2010, Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) were merged to form United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I). The USF-I Commander designated senior commanders and senior headquarters from each of the services (i.e., AFFOR, ARFOR, NAVFOR, MARFOR) as the senior service-specific military justice headquarters for the theater. III Corps, U.S. Army, assumed the job of ARFOR. USF-I and III Corps each had its own commander and OSJA, but the Military Justice Division (MJD) for III Corps did “double duty” for both commands, assuming a supervisory role over military justice not only for the Army units that fell under III Corps, but the rest of theater as well.

The MJD took several measures to facilitate military justice practice in theater.

1. Setting a Theater-Wide Tone for Military Justice Practice

With the creation of a theater-wide structure in support of military justice, a comprehensive military justice communication channel was opened for the first time on a theater-wide basis. With rapidly rotating units and the Army’s modular force structure, this structure was highly conducive to quickly establishing relationships and sharing deployment-specific experiences among many different units of difference services. The USF–I MJD established and kept updated an e-mail distribution list for both counsel and paralegals. It used this list to provide “Military Justice Sendouts” at regular intervals with all the latest military justice news from theater. These “Sendouts” included recent court-martial results and issues from around theater as well as announcement of training and practice tips. One of the immediate advantages to the USF–I Military Justice model was that it created a virtual podium from which to emphasize best military justice practices. The author’s impression from feedback received in theater suggests that the mere fact of counsel at remote Forward Operating Bases (FOB) knowing that cases were being tried elsewhere in theater emboldened them to try cases in theater—this in turn affected the advice they provided commanders. Throughout the deployment, the consistent message from both the USF–I and III Corps Staff Judge Advocates was that criminal activity that occurs in theater and is worthy of a court-martial can and should be tried in theater if the command supports it. This was not a directive from the USF–I or III Corps Commanders, but rather a tone set within professional JA channels regarding best legal practice. In conferences, advocacy training sessions, individual case AAR’s conducted either personally or remotely with the senior trial counsel or the chief of justice, monthly case reviews, and e-mail send outs, the USF–I MJD reinforced this theme.

2. Theater-Wide Training

One concern in the practice of military justice in a deployed environment is the vastly different levels of military justice experience among the TCs, most of whom the CoJ will never have met prior to deploying. An important challenge was instituting a military justice training program to give counsel throughout theater both the competence and confidence to try cases and to recommend cases for trial. Training military justice trial advocates is.
always a challenge, even in garrison. Yet effective training could and did occur in the deployed environment.

The USF–I OSJA MJD held regular training events, stressing simplicity in preparation and consistency. Each month, the USF–I MJD would conduct live training for available counsel at both Victory Base Complex (VBC) and Joint Base Balad (JBB). Attendance by video teleconference (VTC) for other installations throughout theater was often arranged, as necessary. In addition, both on the paralegal and TC side, USF–I conducted monthly theater-wide military justice training using Adobe Connect® on various topics, such as recent case after action reviews (AAR’s), the Military Rules of Evidence, and recent developments in case law. In June and December 2010, USF–I sponsored two theater-wide military justice conferences which brought together up to sixty TCs and paralegals from throughout theater. In January 2011, the USF–I Senior Trial Counsel designed and hosted a “Trial Counsel Bootcamp,” spending three days in both live and VTC training, teaching up to fifteen TCs all the basic tasks of TC work. While the form and substance of the training may vary from location to location, having theater-wide emphasis and cooperation in military justice training made it more likely that training would actually occur. In addition, the USF–I MJD was able to arrange for Army and Air Force counsel to sit as co-counsel in cases, for Air Force JAs to serve as Article 32 investigating officers on Army-referred cases, and for counsel of all service components to serve as assistant TCs on cases arising out of all the “training” components to serve as assistant TCs on cases arising out of Army-referred cases, and for counsel of all service components to serve as assistant TCs on cases arising outside their brigade-sized units. Out of all the “training” methods for litigation available, none is better than actually going to court and learning by doing. Some reserve component JA’s who had no predeployment experience with courts-martial tried their first military cases in Iraq as assistant TC and then went on to try cases as lead counsel. Feedback regarding the training from counsel from throughout the theater was uniformly positive.

The hierarchical technical structure also facilitated paralegal training, especially in the area of witness production. The USF–I military justice senior paralegal took charge of the training process, and asserted USF–I’s prerogative and responsibility to train paralegals throughout the theater. Not only did she provide live classes on witness production at both theater-wide military justice conferences but she also provided refresher training using Adobe Connect® and arranged for various paralegals to teach a number of classes on different subjects throughout the year. Without a formalized military justice structure putting the USF–I military justice senior paralegal at the top of the military justice wire diagram on the paralegal side, it would have been difficult for her to assert her prerogative to conduct the training.

3. Assisting Lower Echelon Military Justice Practitioners

Being a part of the USF–I OSJA, the USF–I MJD brought a new level of visibility and logistical support to lower echelon military justice practice. For instance, for two complicated military justice missions, one involving a complex trial with many moving parts involving several units, and one involving an in-country site visit for a pending stateside court-martial, the USF–I MJD drafted and submitted two Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) which were published by USF–I. The benefit of a FRAGO issued from the USF–I level was that whatever was contained in the FRAGO became the mission of the supporting units. In other words, with a higher headquarters’ FRAGO directing the support, the lower unit no longer saw support to the MJ mission as an additional burden on top of the mission, but as an integral part of the mission. Depending on what the
lower echelon’s mission consisted of, the USF–I MJD had the credibility as a part of the USF–I joint staff to formally and informally negotiate between units to support the lower echelon military justice mission. It could spread the logistical burdens of logistically-challenging courts-martial, and it was appropriately situated within the staff to draft and publish FRAGO’s formally effectuating this coordination. 18 USF–I also continued the MNC–I practice of providing court-martial travel priority directive. 19

4. Facilitating the Joint Experience

Notwithstanding its formal authorities, the USF–I OSJA MJD’s theater-wide effectiveness stemmed mainly from its ability to encourage, assist, and facilitate the practice of military justice by the various units themselves. Nowhere was this truer than in the case of joint justice. The five joint courts-martial conducted in Iraq during OIF 10–11 were all referred by Special Operations Command (SOCCENT). 20 At the time, the SOCCENT joint command billet was filled by an Army major general, and out of the five accuseds, two were Navy Sailors 21 and three were Army Soldiers. In these cases, once SOCCENT had committed to trying the cases in theater, the USF–I OSJA MJD provided assistance to facilitate the trials. This included provision of an additional trial counsel, court reporters, and courtrooms in three of the cases as well as coordination between the III Corps and SOCCENT commanders to make III Corps panel members “available” for panel selection by the SOCCENT commander. 22 The practice of joint justice in theater also included coordinating for Air Force trial counsel and Article 32 officers to serve on cases in which the accuseds were Army Soldiers and conducting the full range of military justice actions at the behest of the USF–I senior element commanders. Joint courts-martial were not limited to just OIF 10–11. In May 2011, in the case of United States v. HM3 Allen, NAVCENT transferred jurisdiction of a Sailor to an Army GCMCA in Afghanistan. It is the author’s understanding that the case was tried by an Army panel with Navy defense counsel, Army trial counsel, and an Army military judge. 23

III. Four Military Justice Observations from OIF 10–11

Having discussed the USF–I military justice structure, this article now turns to actual court-martial practice in theater. This part relies primarily on eighteen special and GCMs referred by III Corps, or referred by I Corps or SOCCENT but tried by III Corps panel members and under the supervision of the USF–I MJD. 24 From these eighteen cases, one gleans four observations regarding successfully deployed court-martial practice:

A. Most Cases Arising in Theater are Best Tried in Theater

It is the author’s opinion that crimes which occur in theater should be tried in theater. The author’s experience suggests that most commanders feel this notion instinctively. Trying cases in theater promotes deterrence and justice; maintains the will to prosecute; is practical; and maintains the credibility of the nonjudicial punishment (NJP) system.

1. Deterrence and Justice

Notions of specific and general deterrence work best when punishment is quick, fair and readily known in the community where the misconduct occurred. General deterrence also encompasses other important notions like respect for the command and for the law. Servicemembers expect the command to address criminal activity. If a serious crime occurs and the accused disappears from theater into a procedural black hole far from the unit, this naturally lowers the esteem of the command, offends the

18 USF–I FRAGOs were submitted to the Joint Operation Center (JOC) for staffing and publication. Judge advocates assigned to the USF–I OSJA also sat in the USF–I JOC, thus further facilitating the USF–I OSJA MJD’s role in assisting with the publication of military justice FRAGOs.


20 See supra note 3.


22 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 503(a)(3) (2008) [hereinafter MCM] ("A convening authority may detail as members of general and special courts-martial persons under that convening authority’s command or made available by their commander. . . .").

23 E-mail from Major Joshua Toman, Chief of Justice, U.S. Forces–Iraq, to author (June 28, 2011 2:04 AM) [hereinafter Toman e-mail] (on file with author); Telephone Conversation with Captain Tokay Hackett, U.S. Army Judge Advocate, Senior Trial Counsel, 10th Mountain Div., Kandahar Airfield, Afg. (25 June 2011) [hereinafter Hackett Telephone Conversation].

24 In addition to the eighteen cases discussed in this article, the three U.S. divisions and two Air Force wings combined tried approximately twenty general and special courts-martial during OIF 10–11. In addition, SOCCENT tried two SEAL cases, which the author did not include within this eighteen.
servicemembers’ sense of fairness, and leaves victims looking for justice.

An example of how deterrence and justice were bolstered by trying a case quickly in theater is the case of United States v. Pemberton. In Pemberton, a unit first sergeant (1SG) was accused of nonconsensual sexual misconduct with female Soldiers in his unit. He would ask his victims into his office on official business, close the door, and either expose himself or engage in inappropriate touching. The allegations surfaced in early December 2010. This was less than two months before III Corps’ redeployment date – much further from the brigade’s redeployment date – but the III Corps SJA had empowered the III Corps military justice practitioners to keep executing the military justice mission up until transfer of authority (TOA).

As soon as he heard the allegations, the brigade judge advocate (BJA) contacted the author (then serving as CoJ at USF-I). Over the next two weeks, the brigade TC and USF–I Senior Trial Counsel worked closely with the local detachment of the Army’s Criminal Investigative Command (CID) and the unit’s rear detachment at Fort Hood to thoroughly investigate the case. Once counsel had determined that there were at least two victims, both officers and both apparently credible, they reviewed the available evidence and immediately set to work drafting charges, even though CID was far from “finalizing” the criminal investigation. Because the CID investigation was still technically open, the trial counsel coordinated closely with CID to ensure that trial preparation interviews did not interfere with the investigation. Charges were finalized and preferred as soon as sufficient credible evidence was available. A strong, well-investigated case was ready for referral a few weeks after the misconduct surfaced.

On December 24, 2010, the case was referred to trial. A trial date was set for 24 January 2011. Despite emergency leave of important Government witnesses and defense delay requests, the accused was convicted following a fully contested trial on 22 February 2011. Not only was the requests, the accused was convicted following a fully leave of important Government witnesses and defense delay trial date was set for 24 January 2011. Despite emergency referral a few weeks after the misconduct surfacing.

25 This is a play on words of the term “deployment discount,” the notion the author borrowed from the clever phrase, “deployed discount” used by Major Rosenblatt in his article. See id. at 20–21. As originally used by Major Rosenblatt, the term suggests that commanders in deployed environments are willing to offer more lenient dispositions because of logistical difficulties of trying cases in theater.

26 With respect to prosecuting Reserve Component (RC) accused who are permitted to demobilize with the hope that they will be tried sometime in the future, the previous Chief of Military Justice for CJTF–I in Afghanistan put it best when he told the author, “If it’s not important enough to handle while the accused is on Title 10 status, it’s probably not important enough to address at all.” Telephone Conversation with Captain Brent Connelly, Chief of Military Justice, Combined Joint Task Force–1, Bagram, Afg. (2 July 2011).

27 This is related to the concept of “ownership” of cases which is discussed infra Part III.D.

28 Major Rosenblatt’s article cites AAR comments from counsel who said, not that they attempted to try cases in theater and failed, but that since trying cases in theater was so hard, they did not try. For instance, first the article notes that no courts-martial were conducted in Iraq before summer 2003. That fact shows merely that the decision was made not to deploy the court-martial system, not that courts-martial were nondeployable (this is true regardless of how sound the decision was). See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 16. One comment suggests that in 2009, just months before the OIF 10–11 period covered in this article, it was so difficult to get witnesses to Kuwait (Kuwait!) that it impeded court-martial practice. See id. at 17. Another notes that the 101st Airborne Division “made the decision not to try any general or special courts-martial in the deployed theater.” Id. Such a decision could very well be based on sound reasoning, so long as that reasoning did not include the presumption that the system would not function efficiently in a deployed environment.

29 This is related to the concept of “ownership” of cases which is discussed infra Part III.D.

20 This is related to the concept of “ownership” of cases which is discussed infra Part III.D.
United States v. Anderson provides an excellent example of a case that might have withered if sent back to a rear detachment for trial. Staff Sergeant Anderson was a National Guardsman serving in a military police unit, although he was not an MP himself. He was charged with buying alcohol from local nationals and selling it to fellow Soldiers, including subordinates, in violation of USF–I General Order Number 1 (GO #1).\textsuperscript{30} Alcohol offenses were usually disposed of through NJP, but in Anderson the sheer volume as well as the method of procurement (going off post for the purchase of alcohol) represented a flagrant violation of GO #1. The command forwarded the case to III Corps with a recommendation that it be referred to a special court-martial. Staff Sergeant Anderson eventually pled guilty at a special court-martial, was reduced, and spent nearly five months in prison. Not only was it important for the other Soldiers who knew of his activity to see that he was punished, but in light of the fact that all the witnesses were still located in theater and that alcohol possession is not even prohibited CONUS, the case may well have just lingered or resulted in a “garrison discount” if sent back CONUS for trial.

3. Most Cases Are More Practically Tried in Theater

When one reflects on the varied tasks, including actual combat operations, that take place in a combat environment, one might be tempted to reflexively conclude that it is just more practical to send cases to the rear for trial.\textsuperscript{31} The OIF 10–11 experience strongly suggests otherwise.\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, such a conclusion fails to consider the ill effects of pulling witnesses out of theater to send CONUS to testify. Indeed, the witness production difficulties stemming from worldwide military operations affect both CONUS and deployed courts-martial. For the overwhelming majority of the cases tried at III Corps during this period, the witnesses and evidence were located in theater at the time of trial.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{33}}

\textsuperscript{30} See USF–I GO #1, supra note 2.
\textsuperscript{31} See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 16 (“[C]ommanders . . . elected to use [their assets] to send cases away rather than convene courts-martial in theater”).
\textsuperscript{32} There will always be cases which are better sent back to the continental United States (CONUS) for trial. In one case during OIF 10–11, one deployed Soldier had stolen and distributed thousands of dollars in narcotics from the pharmacy where he served as the pharmacy technician. After being interviewed by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), he immediately referred to the combat stress clinic where he claimed to be suicidal, although he had never previously exhibited signs of mental health distress. The mental health provider recommended that the Soldier be evacuated immediately. By the time the Military Justice Division became aware that the Soldier was being evacuated, he had already left theater. Before III Corps could get the Soldier mentally cleared and get escorts to bring the accused back to theater for trial, the rest of his unit had redeployed, along with all the witnesses. That case, involving thousands of dollars in drug transactions and dozens of Soldier-purchasers, as well as the emergence of a redeployed conspirator, was serious enough that the rear detachment had ample will to try it. This case shows that circumstances dictate where the case should be tried.

Even in the few cases where some witnesses had already relocated CONUS and had to be brought back into theater for trial,\textsuperscript{33} inconveniencing CONUS units to send witnesses forward was far preferable to disrupting in-theater units by sending witnesses to the rear.\textsuperscript{34} The author had the opportunity to observe the far greater disruption caused by sending theater-based witnesses to the rear in one case in which a rear detachment requested in-theater witnesses for live testimony in a CONUS court-martial. This case caused far more disruption to the mission and consternation to the deployed commander (phone calls to the CoJ) than all the courts-martial III Corps conducted in theater.

A series of “Spice” cases\textsuperscript{35} prosecuted by III Corps again demonstrates how some cases which are relatively easy to try in theater become prohibitively impractical to try in the rear.\textsuperscript{36} These cases arose out of COB Adder (near An Nasiriyah, Iraq) towards the end of III Corps’ deployment. A group of Soldiers were involved in the sale and distribution of Spice and alcohol. There were approximately seven related cases, with two relatively serious cases of distribution and the rest minor distribution and use. Considered as a whole, the cases represented a breakdown in discipline and flaunting of GO #1.\textsuperscript{37} The company, battalion, and brigade were all National Guard (NG) units without extensive military justice experience, and the small Forward Operating Base (FOB) where the cases arose had scant military justice infrastructure.

Fortunately, the brigade TC, a NG JA with extensive civilian prosecution experience, had aggressively sought to educate himself on military justice procedures while in theater,\textsuperscript{38} and by the time these cases arose, was confident enough to recommend they be prosecuted in theater. This demonstrates the necessity of deployed training programs to ensure that all military justice practitioners are confident in their abilities to advise their commanders on the full range of dispositions. To an experienced prosecutor, these were simple cases: no drug tests were available for “spice” at the time, and most of the evidence consisted of testimony from witnesses located in theater at the unit.

\textsuperscript{33} For example, United States v. Bjork, where the crime had occurred in 2006. See infra Part III.B.
\textsuperscript{34} After all, the whole purpose of a rear detachment is to support forward operations. While some may suggest that it is not prudent to send military witnesses to a hostile fire zone solely for court-martial, the author suggests that temporary duty in a hostile fire zone in support of a mission—any mission—is part of a Servicemember’s job description.
\textsuperscript{35} See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{36} Out of the six related cases, the two that went to trial were United States v. Reese and United States v. Rounds.
\textsuperscript{37} See USF–I GO #1, supra note 2.
\textsuperscript{38} By the time these cases arose, this captain had already attended several USF–I-sponsored military justice training events and had served as second chair on another unit’s contested panel Spice case.
Out of the several cases, some were disposed of by discharge in lieu of court-martial and summary court-martial, but two cases went to contested trial, one judge alone and one panel. These cases, which required several Government witnesses each, simply could not have been tried practically at the rear detachment. Not only would the impact of the trial for use and distribution of substances which were legal in CONUS at the time have been diminished for CONUS personnel, but the cases would have probably been delayed so much that they would not have been tried at all. Finally, sending all the witnesses to the rear to conduct courts-martial would have been a great burden on the deployed unit.

4. Credibility of the NJP System

The UCMJ permits an accused facing NJP to demand trial by court-martial. Once an accused demands trial, it is up to the command to decide whether to actually try the accused. If there is no commitment to conducting courts-martial in the deployed environment, servicemembers will quickly figure out that turning down NJP can get them out of punishment, or better still out of theater. Indeed, a recent article cites some anecdotal statements from JAs arguing that servicemembers could turn down NJP with no consequences in the deployed environment. In light of the OIF 10–11 experience, these claims, if true, did not likely result from any failure within the UCMJ itself.

Logically, servicemembers’ refusal of NJP should increase where the possibility of court-martial is remote, and the recollection of two experienced TDS attorneys confirms this motivation. One said he advised clients to turn down NJP “up to ten times a month” and “more than in garrison,” while the other wrote, “I advised turning down Art [Article] 15s all the time in Iraq...” It was the deployed environment that caused such recommendations.”

Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 33. The danger with this type of response by trial counsel or defense blustering is that it leads some to suggest that an accused’s rights should be curtailed to remedy a spurious shortcoming of the UCMJ.

Based on experience from the author’s previous deployment to OIF III (2005) as defense counsel, it is certainly plausible that a legally and factually questionable Article 15 could be extensively challenged. But, in most cases where the nonjudicial punishment (NJP) was canceled, it was because, upon review following defense challenge, the Government ascertained that the facts did not support a court-martial. Because defense counsel have more time to investigate the facts in theater and make a more thorough challenge, it is possible that more NJP could be defeated in the deployed environment, but that is part of a normal system with competent defense counsel and does not make the court-martial system non-deployable. The solution is for the government to do a proper investigation and careful legal review before the commander initiates NJP proceedings.

Indeed, out of the between 50,000 and 24,000 Soldiers that fell directly within the III Corps’ GCMCA, there were only four instances in which a Soldier turned down a legitimate Article 15. All four cases were referred to courts-martial. In two cases, the accused later requested that court-martial proceedings be terminated and NJP reinstated. In one of these two, the accused was a NG Soldier who committed the misconduct right before his unit redeployed and turned down the NJP on the eve of redeployment. He was extended past his original redeployment date for four months pending trial (pursuant to defense requests for delay in the court-martial proceedings), and eventually asked to return to NJP. In the other two cases, the accused were tried, convicted, and punished by courts-martial. After these four cases, no other Soldier demanded court-martial after being offered legitimate NJP during OIF 10–11.

The case of United States v. Halloran demonstrates how a deployed JA can effectively deal with the turndown of a legitimate Article 15. Halloran involved a junior Soldier who had been rebuked for watching too much television at his workstation. After having been ordered to remove the TV and store it in his NCO’s office, he pulled the cable television feed to the building out of the drop ceiling and cut it, while saying something like, “If I can’t watch TV, no one can!” He was also disrespectful to an NCO in the execution of his duties. The company commander gave him notice of his intent to impose NJP. Private First Class Halloran demanded trial by court-martial. After the Soldier turned down a subsequent offer of a summary court-martial, the brigade TC, another reserve component JA with no previous court-martial experience but who had educated himself on military justice while in theater, had the confidence to recommend that the case be referred to SPCM. Less than a month later, after a fully contested panel case, PFC Halloran was convicted and his punishment exceeded what the company-grade commander could have imposed. In the other NJP turndown case, after a contested general court-
martial, the officer accused was sentenced to four months in confinement, a dismissal, and a significant fine.\footnote{United States v. CW2 Brown is discussed at length in the detailed discussion of depositions in Part IV.B.5, infra.}

Also, in the Spice cases discussed in the last section, the two courts-martial actually tried resulted in appropriate punishments for the offenders. The defense in the remaining cases requested alternate disposition (discharge in lieu of court-martial, or guilty plea at summary court-martial). The command’s demonstrated willingness to try the contested cases was an incentive for the defense to request and accept these consequences. What all these cases demonstrate is that without the real and palpable ability to try in-theater courts-martial, NJP would be less effective. Reviewing the theater-wide monthly NJP statistics from OIF 10-11, it appears that being prepared to court-martial Servicemembers who declined legitimate NJP influenced Servicemembers to accept NJP. For instance, throughout Iraq, from February 2010 through November 2010, Servicemembers accepted NJP well over three thousand times. Returning to the earlier claim of Servicemembers turning down NJP with impunity in the deployed environment, the author cannot recall even one instance where a Servicemember avoided discipline during OIF 10-11 by turning down a legitimate NJP offer from the command.

B. Counsel Must Be Mentally and Technically Prepared to Try Any Type of Case in Theater

Counsel should be predisposed to try cases in theater. The starting point for evaluating a case should be that it will be tried in theater. Only if overriding reasons exist should the thought process shift to sending the case to the rear. This does not diminish the commander’s prerogative to try cases either in theater or in the rear. Rather, this predisposition informs the TC’s thought process in advising the commander. Maintaining an initial predisposition to try cases in theater counters the human tendency to reduce one’s workload.\footnote{A properly functioning adversarial legal system will naturally require a lot of work on the part of the trial counsel and OSJA to secure a conviction, so the temptation to transfer the case and get on with “higher priority work” is omnipresent. Besides, at heart counsel are naturally anxious about trying cases and can easily persuade themselves (and their commanders) that the best course of action is transfer.} Obviously, some cases truly should be tried in garrison,\footnote{See supra note 32 (providing an example from OIF 10–11).} but that should be an ending point in the thought process rather than the starting point.

The OIF 10–11 experience suggests that nearly any case can be tried in a deployed environment without defense collaboration.\footnote{Not only should defense collaboration with the government be anathema to any practitioner committed to the theoretical correctness of the Anglo-American adversarial system, but anticipating defense collaboration as a facet of prosecution renders the government’s position weak.} The two most complicated cases tried by or with the assistance of III Corps during OIF 10–11 were United States v. Bjork and United States v. Warren. These cases demonstrate that nearly any case can be tried in theater if the will to do so is present. United States v. Bjork further demonstrates that some cases cannot practically be tried anywhere except in theater. To do justice, the deployed TC must be prepared to try cases in theater.

Captain Bjork was an active duty Army captain in charge of a police transition team (PTT) in Iraq in 2006. After completing his deployment, he redeployed to the United States. After his redeployment, allegations arose that he had ordered the execution of two Iraqi detainees that were in his custody in Iraq. An investigation showed that the evidence supported the accusations. Nearly three years had passed since the incident. Two potential Government witnesses were Iraqi nationals in the custody of the Iraqi Government—several potential defense witnesses were also Iraqis living in Iraq. Due to the impracticality of trying the case in the United States with Iraqi witnesses, the accused was redeployed to Iraq in late 2009 so the command could determine a proper disposition. Ultimately, charges were preferred against the accused in theater, an Article 32 investigation was held, and the I Corps Commander\footnote{I Corps was III Corps’ predecessor as the ARFOR–Iraq.} referred the case to GCM. After a fully contested panel case, in May 2010, the accused was convicted of negligent homicide and reckless endangerment.

The Bjork case was a hotly contested, partly classified trial before members, with extensive motions practice. Its verbatim record filled several thousand pages. The Government provided the defense an expert mitigation specialist.\footnote{The fact that the command appointed a civilian mitigation specialist in a non-capital case, and arranged to have this expert present in Iraq for the trial without significant difficulties, demonstrates the fact that due process protections available in theater can readily meet or exceed those available CONUS.} The accused was represented by two highly experienced civilian counsel\footnote{As discussed in Part IV.D, during OIF 10–11, the Government experienced no significant delay or logistical burdens due to the accused exercising his right to civilian counsel.} and an excellent TDS counsel. The case spanned the TOA between I Corps and III Corps, and was actually tried after the GCMCA (I Corps) redeployed, and this required long-distance coordination with the convening authority.\footnote{See infra Part IV.A (discussing GCMCA’s rotating out of the theater mid-trial).} The Government produced over two dozen witnesses for both sides, including civilian family members of the accused\footnote{See infra Part IV.B.5 (discussing civilian witness production).} and Iraqi nationals in Iraqi government custody. On top of all this, the defense requested and the Government granted a site visit,\footnote{In a “site visit,” typically one or both parties to a court-martial will request to return to the crime scene, sometimes accompanied by independent investigators or other experts. In another site visit coordinated
defense counsel could travel to the scene of the crime and interview villagers and Iraqi police, all in an active combat zone. Finally, in the middle of trial, the defense called, and the Government arranged production of, an Iraqi police officer from a distant province. Few cases come more complicated than *Bjork*, but the case had to be tried in theater, and the case was tried without significant difficulties. Judge Advocates and paralegals with standard JA training did the job the JAG Corps had trained them to do. If this case could be tried in theater, any case can be tried in theater. When a case like *Bjork* arises, MJ practitioners must be ready.

Another example is *United States v. Warren*. Captain Warren was a medical logistician assigned to a special operations unit in Iraq. He was accused of drugging and raping a PFC (E-3) in his containerized housing unit after inviting her over for an “evening drink.” Throughout the investigation, CPT Warren vigorously maintained his innocence. For military justice purposes, his unit was directly ADCON to SOCCENT, located in Tampa, Florida. The unit was further TACON to an in-theater higher headquarters which itself was OPCON to USF–I. The unit lacked any formal relationship with the III Corps Headquarters. The case took place in a very dynamic unit whose relatively small judge advocate cell was deeply committed to advising on ongoing combat operations. As the case proceeded, the defense vigorously challenged the Government with an intensive motions practice. The complexity and coordination involved with the court-martial was notable, even necessitating the court-martialing of two alleged co-conspirators at contested panel courts-martial, all in theater, prior to CPT Warren’s trial. The unit’s command judge advocate sought support from USF–I and III Corps, which ultimately made a second trial counsel, panel members, a courtroom, and the USF–I Senior Court Reporter available so the unit could successfully try its case. This alone is a great example of an individual military justice practitioner looking beyond his own unit to accomplish the military justice mission. Fortunately, the busy brigade judge advocate for the unit was also an expert in criminal law and provided close supervision of the joint trial team. Not only was the case completely successful with the accused convicted following a fully contested trial before members, but it represents an instance of deployed joint justice because the case was referred by the joint GCMA at SOCCENT and tried by a mixed Army-Air Force trial counsel team. The accused was convicted after a contested trial before members. Jurisdictional difficulties, the demands of military operations, and witness issues are all challenges in the deployed environment, but they can be overcome.

C. Courts-Martial Proceed to Trial Faster in Theater

The eighteen cases went to trial quickly. Across the eighteen cases, trial took place an average of sixty-six days after preferral, and this average is skewed upward by *Bjork* and *Warren*. When *Bjork* and *Warren* are taken out of the equation, the average drops to fifty-four days. The fastest case was *United States v. Ruffin*, discussed in detail below, clocking in at nineteen days from preferral to sentence despite being a contested panel trial. Even *Bjork* and *Warren*, the longest and most complex cases, went from preferral to sentence in less than six months apiece. *United States v. Pemberton*, though a sexual misconduct case, was preferred a few weeks after discovery of the misconduct and went to trial thirty-five days after preferral.

Contested SPCM went faster than the uncontested ones—37.5 days versus 72.6 from preferral to trial. Contested panel SPCM went faster than judge alone—35.4 days versus 41.59. Twelve out of the eighteen cases were

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57 See supra Part III.A.1.

56 The average time for contested SPCMs was 37.5 days:

*United States v. 1SG Pemberton (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 20 Dec. 2010, Trial 24 Jan. 2011 (35 days)
**United States v. SGT Ferrer (SOCCENT): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 24 July 2010, Trial 10 Sept. 2010 (48 days)
**United States v. PFC Halfonan (III Corps): Art. 107; SPCM; Pref: 10 Aug. 2010, Trial 12 Sept. 2010 (33 days)
**United States v. PFC Ruffin (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 15 Dec. 2010, Trial: 12 Jan. 2011 (28 days)
*United States v. PV2 Reese (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 15 Dec. 2010, Trial: 12 Jan. 2011 (28 days)
**United States v. PFC Rounds (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 15 Dec. 2010, Trial: 12 Jan. 2011 (28 days)
**United States v. SPC Bennett (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 20 Nov. 2010, Trial: 15 Jan. 2011 (56 days)

The average time for uncontested special courts-martial was 72.6 days.

United States v. SSG Morgan (III Corps): Art. 121; SPCM; Pref: 12 Oct. 2010, Trial: 13 Jan. 2011 (93 days)
United States v. SSG Anderson (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 9 Apr. 2010, Trial: 11 July 2010 (93 days)
United States v. SGT Moseley (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 21 May 2010, Trial: 10 July 2010 (50 days)
United States v. SPC Wright, 1L (III Corps): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 1 Mar. 2010, Trial: 3 May 2010 (63 days)
United States v. SPC Wright, K (III Corps): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 1 Mar. 2010, Trial: 3 May 2010 (63 days)
United States v. SPC Kiger (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 13 June 2010, Trial 26 Aug. 2010 (74 days)

50 The average time for contested panel special courts-martial was 35.4 days:

**United States v. SGT Ferrer (SOCCENT): Art. 134; SPCM; Pref: 24 July 2010, Trial: 10 Sept. 2010 (48 days)
**United States v. PFC Halfonan (III Corps): Art. 107; SPCM; Pref: 10 Aug. 2010, Trial: 12 Sept. 2010 (33 days)
**United States v. PFC Ruffin (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 6 Oct. 2010, Trial: 24 Oct. 2010 (18 days)
**United States v. PV2 Reese (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 15 Dec. 2010, Trial: 12 Jan. 2011 (28 days)
contested, and most were tried within two months of preferral. Based on the small sample size, these averages do not demonstrate a general rule, but they do show that contested cases can be tried speedily in theater. Not once were witnesses denied or discovery curtailed based on the deployed environment. Discovery practice was always complete and wide open, as required by Article 46, UCMJ, and Rule for Court-Martial (RCM) 701. This undercuts any notion that deployed courts-martial require defense collaboration to take place, or take place speedily. In fact, in Pemberton, the TC asked for the first available trial date in the electronic docketing request because he was ready for trial. The defense counsel objected and requested about two months of delay. The Government held its ground, pointing out to the court how the Government would facilitate whatever interviews or access to evidence the defense sought and that there would still be enough time before trial to produce whatever witnesses the defense was requesting. The judge denied the requested delay and the case went to trial thirty-five days after preferral. Defense cooperation was not required. The Government simply had to show its willingness to overcome the difficulties raised by the defense. By the same token, to make the cases move fast, trial counsel had to immediately make all discovery available to the defense, for example helping the defense to overcome CID’s objection to releasing part of a case file. Assuming the TC is complying with both the letter and spirit of discovery as set forth in Article 46, UCMJ, excessive delay on the part of the defense will seldom be justified or granted by the court.

There are several likely explanations for the rapidity of deployed courts-martial. In a deployed environment, those JAs assigned to military justice duties, including defense counsel, can focus exclusively on military justice, if their SJA and brigade superiors put a priority on these duties (the author is not suggesting that every JA be focused on military justice, but only that those judge advocates assigned to military justice duties be permitted to perform those duties). Also, diligent TCs realized that time was short, and that they had none to waste. As units are only in theater for a year, effective deployed military justice practitioners do not sit on their laurels but are constantly preparing for the next case. Also, personnel in a deployed environment typically work seven days a week and often late into the night without any family obligations, and this probably had a lot to do with the expedited timelines. As for particular practices during OIF 10–11, the author believes that III Corps’ trial-focused practice contributed to the expedited timeline.

During OIF 10–11, the III Corps military justice perspective was always focused on the contested trial. If III Corps referred a case, the working assumption among the TCs was that it would go to trial before members and that the defense would aggressively contest every aspect of it. III Corps was open to offers to negotiate and entered into pretrial agreements, but very seldom initiated plea negotiations with the defense. Counsel prepared for the contested case from day one, rather than getting into the contested mindset only after negotiations broke down. A trial-focused practice encourages decisiveness. It is a litigator’s nature to want as much information as possible. Without a self-imposed practical urgency, this compulsion for thoroughness can result in unwarranted delays and inefficiency. Often, a conviction and sentence on one charge earlier is better for good order and discipline than conviction and sentence on more charges later on. The trigger for referral should not be, “Do I know everything there is to know?” but “Do I have admissible evidence supporting both guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a sentence based on the gravamen of the misconduct?” This article does not suggest a reckless approach to charging, but a deliberate speed driven by competence and experience-based judgment.

Likewise, with trial-focused practice, decisions are never made based on perceived bargaining leverage. In a referral decision, a plea-focused approach might hold an unnecessary Article 32 and refer borderline misconduct to a GCM in the hopes of getting a deal for a SPCM referral. A trial-focused practice refers the case according to the sentence the Government hopes to get, regardless of what the defense might do, and if the right sentence is borderline between GCM and SPCM, favors SPCM referral because it is faster. This avoids abdicating control over the prosecution to the defense and discourages speculation and wishful thinking that can slow down the decision-making process. The trial-focused practitioner wants to get to trial as quickly as possible and anticipates a full contest before members.

As an example, consider the referral decision in United States v. Pemberton. The accused’s crimes were at the lower end of the sexual assault spectrum: offending officer and enlisted women by trying to kiss them, exposing his genitalia to female officers in his office, grabbing one woman’s hand and putting it on his genitalia, and fondling. He was a 1SG and eligible for retirement. This increased the effect of any punitive discharge, a point the panel would

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The average time for the contested judge alone special courts-martial was 41 days.

*United States v. 1SG Pemberton (III Corps): Art. 120; SPCM; Pref: 20 Dec. 2010, Trial 24 Jan. 2011 (35 days)
*United States v. SPC Bennett (III Corps): Art. 92; SPCM; Pref: 20 Nov. 2010, Trial: 15 Jan. 2011 (56 days)

60 The usual squabbles between defense counsel and CID sometimes occurred, such as CID’s refusal to provide a confidential source file to the defense, but after considering the arguments for confidentiality (especially since the source was already well known), the trial counsel obtained a court order from the judge requiring CID to comply with the defense request.

61 “Thus the presence of courts-martial in the combat zone was more a factor of an offender’s cooperation with the Government than an offense's impact on the mission.” Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 20.

62 See supra Part III.A.1 and infra Part IV.A.
doubtless consider, though it also increased his guilt. Some jail time was definitely appropriate, but probably no more than a few years. From a military justice perspective, the most important aspects of punishment were some jail time and a punitive discharge. Balancing all this, the decision was made to refer the case to SPCM. This avoided the need for an Article 32 investigation and shortened the timeline. III Corps referred the case to trial on 24 December 2010, less than three weeks after the misconduct first arose. Private Pemberton was both in jail and under sentence to a bad conduct discharge by 22 February 2011. A plea-focused approach might have held out for a GCM referral, waited until mid-January for an Article 32 investigation, suffered further delays from the Corps TOA, and not seen trial before April or May, by which time the accused’s unit and brigade would have also redeployed, possibly requiring the whole process to start over in the rear under a different GCMCA.

United States v. Ruffin further exemplifies both trial-focused practice and the speed it brings to trying cases in theater. In early October 2010, Ruffin’s brigade began investigating him for using and distributing Spice. This occurred at a FOB with only one brigade headquarters and hardly any law enforcement assets (primarily a couple of MP officers, one of who was later court-martialed). Fortunately, the brigade had a motivated TC, who actively ensured the investigation was completed both thoroughly and quickly. On 6 November, the command preferred charges against the accused. On 18 November, the case was tried. This was because the military justice practitioners involved stayed focused on the case, spent no time on speculative and compromising negotiations with the defense, quickly went from investigation to preferral and referral, and requested the next available trial date (to which the defense concurred). This shows the value of a strong investigation that might suggest to the defense that the facts will only get worse with time.

D. “Ownership” of Cases is Critical

Successful execution of the commander’s decision to court-martial a Servicemember depends largely upon the will of the individual TC. It is therefore imperative that a specific TC and a specific OSJA take ownership of the case. Loss of ownership is one of the problems inherent in sending cases to the rear for trial. Taking ownership of cases is especially important nowadays, at least in the Army, with modular headquarters and cross-leveled reserve component members. Trial counsel must be ever vigilant lest they fall into the trap of considering their own units’ cases as “organic” cases and down trace cases from the modular battalions as not their own, and so of lower priority. The deployed TC should be eager to take ownership of cases as well as try them.

Overlapping and shifting jurisdictions are common in a deployed environment but, properly handled, they do not impede effective deployed MJ. Any confusion in jurisdiction can be overcome through coordination between military justice practitioners to establish ownership of the case. United States v. 1LT Wilson illustrates this point. First Combat Aviation Brigade, or the Enhanced Combat Aviation Brigade (eCAB), as they were also known, was the only aviation brigade headquarters in Iraq from June 2010 through the departure of III Corps. Lieutenant Wilson was a mobilized National Guard MP cross-leveled to another National Guard unit for purposes of the deployment to Iraq. After cross-leveling and mobilization, he finally ended up serving as provost marshal for FOB Taji, a geographically large but infrastructure-poor FOB. As would later become apparent, making this criminally-minded Servicemember the provost marshal was like setting the fox to guard the henhouse. One night in November, a small retail store on the FOB, owned by Iraqis and operated by foreign nationals, was robbed. The perpetrators broke into the store and stole a flat screen television and three digital video projectors. The next morning, the store manager went to the Provost Marshal’s Office (PMO) to file a complaint. Lieutenant Wilson took the complaint and went to the crime scene to “investigate.” The manager thought it was odd that 1LT Wilson asked for window cleaner and proceeded to wipe the window clean. The accused would later admit that he and an NCO had broken into the store and stolen the goods.

First Lieutenant (1LT) Wilson had deployed with a unit that apparently felt little ownership over him, because he had been cross-leveled to their unit for the deployment and, once in theater, had been moved to a FOB far from the rest of them. This is not an uncommon in today’s reserve deployments. 1LT Wilson’s unit was only two weeks from redeployment when suspicion fell on him, and the PMO where he worked fell under 1st Armor Division while his NG brigade fell directly under III Corps. When the investigation began, without coordinating with the military justice personnel at III Corps or 1AD, the NG brigade reassigned him to its HHC, thus changing his MJ ADCON chain from 1AD to III Corps. The brigade then redeployed but left 1LT Wilson behind. The case was investigated partly by CID, partly by MPs, and partly by a 15-6 investigator.

The TC for the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) – which never owned the accused, but which was located near the scene of the crime on Taji—took control of the case, even though it fell outside his unit. He managed to coordinate between all the different parties to make sure the case did not fall through the cracks—in other words, he took ownership of the case, which was subsequently tried on the merits. By agreement with his own commander and the Chiefs of Justice for III Corps and 1st AD, Wilson was assigned to 1st CAB, but set to work at the Mayor’s Cell on

63 Formerly “First Sergeant.”
64 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Ownership and jurisdictional issues are of primary concern in joint justice. The five joint courts-martial conducted in Iraq during OIF 10–11 were all referred by Special Operations Command (SOFCENT).\(^{66}\) Out of the five accused, two were Sailors\(^{67}\) and three were Soldiers. Once SOFCENT had committed to trying the cases in theater, the USF–I OSJA MJD provided assistance. This included provision of an additional TC, court reporters, and courtrooms in three of the cases as well as coordination between the III Corps and SOFCENT commanders to make III Corps panel members “available” for panel selection by the SOFCENT commander.\(^{68}\) The practice of joint justice in theater also included coordinating for Air Force TC and Article 32 officers to serve on cases in which the accused were Army Soldiers and conducting the full range of military justice actions at the behest of the USF–I senior element commanders. In May 2011, in the case of United States v. HM3 Allen, NAVCENT transferred jurisdiction of a case to an Army GCMCA in Afghanistan. It is the author’s understanding that the case was tried by an Army panel with Navy defense counsel, Army TC, and an Army military judge.\(^{69}\)

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66 See supra note 3.
68 MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 503(a)(3) (“A convening authority may detail as members of general and special courts-martial persons under that convening authority’s command or made available by their commander . . . .”) (emphasis added).
69 Toman e-mail, supra note 23; Hackett Telephone Conversation, supra note 23.

III. Managing the Logistics of Deployed Court-Martial Practice

The remainder of this article focuses on logistical problems involved in deployed court-martial practice, and how these problems do not prevent effective deployed military justice.

A. Handling Modularity and Rapid Turnover of Units

Rapid turnover of units refers to the phenomena where unit headquarters and their subordinate units redeploy from theater (and demobilize in the case of RC units) on different time schedules. Modularity is the related concept whereby different Army unit headquarters and subordinate units are paired together for purposes of deployment only, thus they do not have any organic relationship prior to or after deployment.\(^{70}\) During OIF 10–11, despite the dizzying turnover of units, rapid unit turnover and modularity did not seriously obstruct deployed court-martial practice. The typical unit was deployed between ten months to a year. During this period, all Army GCMCA’s turned over at least once, including the Corps and all three division GCMCA’s. While this turnover of headquarters did require reasonable planning and communication, the effort required fell well within what is normally expected of competent military justice practitioners.\(^{71}\) It might be tempting to eliminate cases spanning the TOA of two units by setting a fixed date and declaring that past this date, the departing unit will no longer refer cases in theater. III Corps, however, continued to conduct courts-martial through TOA, referring the last case about two weeks before TOA, and trying its last case within a week of TOA. This approach proved successful and ensured there would be no backlog of cases for the incoming Corps headquarters.

United States v. Bjork and United States v. Pemberton demonstrate that even if a case ends up spanning a GCMCA’s TOA, it is not a serious impediment to court-martial practice. United States v. Bjork spanned the I Corps to III Corps TOA. When III Corps arrived in theater, the case had already been referred to a GCM by I Corps. Significant motions practice had already taken place and the military judge had ruled on several question. Withdrawing the case from I Corps and re-referring the case under III Corps would have meant starting over since III Corps was not a “successor” GCMCA to I Corps, but simply a different

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71 Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 18, argues that confusions over which command had UCMJ authority over a Soldier made deployed military justice practice difficult. In fact, as long as a valid GCMCA properly refers a case, the referral will withstand scrutiny, whether or not the accused was administratively controlled (ADCON) by that GCMCA. MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 601(b) cmt. In any case, the USF-I MJD updated the theater-wide organization chart as often as changes required, thus providing clarity on jurisdiction throughout the theater.
case to the XVIII Airborne Corps for possible referral minor complications, but waiting until the TOA to pass the their families. Before trial, not one but two important Government set to redeploy in February. Unexpectedly, a few days docketed. III Corps therefore referred the case to trial undoubtedly

Corps could not be considered a "successor" to I Corps in terms of RCM commander to refer case to court-martial convened by his predecessor). III Allgood, 41 M.J. 492, 495 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (upholding right of successor

the MNC–I Command was a successor to his predecessor. This situation changed when the numbered Army Corps took on responsibilities as the Army Force–Iraq (ARFOR) responsibility in January 2010. 151–51 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the ARFOR).

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72 See MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 601(b) (commander may refer charges to a court-martial convened by himself or a predecessor); United States v. Allgood, 41 M.J. 492, 495 (C.A.F. 1995) (upholding right of successor commander to refer case to court-martial convened by his predecessor). III Corps could not be considered a “successor” to I Corps in terms of RCM

Because 9 February was the scheduled TOA from III Corps to XVIII Airborne Corps as ARFOR-Iraq, a decision point had been reached. First, the Government could withdraw the case from the III Corps GCMCA, turn it over to the XVIII Airborne Corps and wish them luck. Like the prospect of withdrawing Bjork from I Corps, this would have started the entire process over, with potential defense delay requests. If the start of the trial had been delayed to wait for the witnesses to come back from emergency leave, it is quite possible that other Government or defense witnesses would then have to go on emergency leave. A second choice was just to start the case as scheduled and recess court to wait for the other witnesses to get back from emergency leave, with the likely result that the case would span the TOA’s of the two GCMCA’s. Because the remaining witnesses were present and a date was already on the docket, the Government decided to go ahead and start the case on 24 January, hear from the witnesses who were then available in theater, and request a continuance until 22 February to complete the trial. The military judge agreed. III Corps, but not the lead trial counsel, redeployed before the second session of trial, but the transition was seamless. XVIII Airborne personnel (including a new assistant trial counsel) supported the rest of the trial, which resulted in a conviction, and sent the record back to III Corps (now redeployed to Fort Hood, Texas) for post trial processing. Pemberton and Bjork demonstrate that rotation of higher headquarters need not delay or stop military justice actions. 73

B. Witness Production

One prevalent criticism of deployed courts-martial is that the burden of witness production precludes all but the

73 Citing AAR from deployed judge advocates, Major Rosenblatt suggested that modularity can serve as an impediment to deployed court-martial practice: “Modularity, a ‘plug and play’ concept that emphasizes interchangeability units rather than organic divisions and brigades, ‘makes all areas of military legal practice difficult’ because hierarchies and jurisdictions constantly shift as various units enter and exit theater.” Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 18 (citing an AAR from a deployed judge advocate). As suggested by the OIF 10–11 experience, upon a second look, modularity is not that significant in the overall scheme of court-martial practice. If, after reviewing the OPORD and unit taskings, military justice practitioners are still uncertain of the precise ADCON chain of the accused Servicemember, the involved military justice practitioners can simply coordinate with one another and their respective commands and execute an appropriate memorandum clarifying the ADCON chain in that particular instance. See U.S. DEPT OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE para. 5-2(b)(1)(3 Oct. 11) [hereinafter AR 27-10] (“When appropriate, Army units, activities, or personnel may be attached to a unit, installation, or activity for courts-martial jurisdiction and the general administration of military justice.”). Even if the memorandum is between the wrong parties, court-martial jurisdiction and the general administration of military

See supra notes 151–51 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the ARFOR).
most limited court-martial practice in a deployed environment.\textsuperscript{74} During OIF 10–11, this was far from true. Moreover, during his 2005 deployment to Iraq as a defense counsel, the author saw no dearth of CONUS witnesses testifying in theater, including expert witnesses and civilian family members. In no III Corps case during OIF 10–11 did the Government feel compelled to “bargain” with the defense to waive witness production.\textsuperscript{75} Out of the eighteen OIF 10–11 cases discussed in this article, only two of the twelve contested cases required extensive witness production from CONUS. These cases—\textit{Bjork} and \textit{Warren}—involved accused officers facing potential life sentences. For the other contested cases, the defense requested few if any CONUS witnesses. Because most of the cases were tried expeditiously, they involved mostly in-theater witnesses. Even in cases with significant CONUS witness production, like \textit{Bjork}, trials could and did take place.

Witness production in theater may appear daunting, but need not be.\textsuperscript{76} The TC may receive a long listed of requested witnesses from the defense and imagine that the court is actually going to order the government to produce them all. This idea paints a picture of the Government as operating at the mercy of the defense, a picture the defense is all too eager to encourage. It may pressure the TC into recommending alternate disposition to the command. In reality, while the witness production process provides far more due process to an accused than most civilian jurisdictions, it still places only a reasonable burden on the government to produce witnesses.\textsuperscript{77} If the command has the will to prosecute, it can meet that burden.

Furthermore, overseas witness lists often shrink drastically before trial. By the time the court-martial takes place, all sorts of reasons have usually coalesced to limit the number of witnesses actually required to be produced—this is not just a feature of the deployed environment, but rather a phenomenon that occurs in garrison trials as well. For instance, out of all the witnesses first requested by the defense in its initial enthusiasm (usually under the pressure of a deadline to submit the production request), some civilians will decline to attend trial in a combat zone, just as they sometimes decline to travel to Korea or Japan, and cannot be forced to come.\textsuperscript{78} In such cases, if there is an adequate substitute to live testimony, the defense must settle for the alternative or forego the testimony.\textsuperscript{79} Certainly in the case of “good Soldier testimony,” adequate substitutes will almost always be available for a witness who is truly unavailable. Sometimes the defense will have failed to speak with witnesses before requesting them, and once it does, decides not to call them after all.

\textsuperscript{74} “A subpoena may not be used to compel a civilian to travel outside the United States and its territories.” MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 703(c)(2)(A), discussion. The MJ practitioner should still try diligently to persuade the witness to agree to come, and should document all such efforts. Paralegals should keep a log of all their witness contacts. This documentation may be needed to litigate a defense motion challenging the Government’s efforts to produce the witness.

\textsuperscript{75} The CAAF gives a straightforward explanation of the applicable law.

\textsuperscript{76} “A trial may proceed in the absence of a relevant and necessary witness if that witness is not amenable to process.” United States v. Davis, 29 MJ 357, 359 (CMA 1990) (citing Mil. R. Evid. 804(a) and RCM 703(b)(3), Manual, supra). The issue as to whether the prosecution has satisfied its duty to produce under RCM 703 “is a question of reasonableness.’ The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness.” Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). Once the unavailability of a witness is established, RCM 703(b)(3) provides:

\begin{center}
\textit{Unavailable witness. Notwithstanding subsections (b)(1) and (2) of this rule, a party is not entitled to the presence of a witness who is unavailable within the meaning of Mil. R. Evid. 804(a). However, if the testimony of a witness who is unavailable is of such central importance to an issue that it is essential to a fair trial, and if there is no adequate substitute for such testimony, the military judge shall grant a continuance or other relief in order to attempt to secure the witness' presence or shall abate the proceedings, unless the unavailability of the witness is the fault of or could have been prevented by the requesting party.}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{77} In one or two cases, offers to pleading (OTPs) included a limitation on CONUS witnesses, but from listening to the providence inquiries, the author gathered that the defense had not intended to call any overseas witnesses in those cases, even without the waivers.

\textsuperscript{78} Whoever asserts that the due-process requirements of the current court-martial system precludes effective combat-zone practice, see, e.g., Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 1 (decriing the “civilianization” of the military justice system) is advocating for an anachronism. The extensive due process requirements of the modern system are appropriate to the way that America now wagers wars. One hundred years ago, Soldiers could not fly back from a Southwestern Asian combat zone to CONUS for two weeks of leave. Now, this is not only common, but expected as of right. Even servicemembers from the smallest combat outposts get two weeks of annual leave almost anywhere in the world, with transportation into and out of theater arranged for and paid by the government. In light of this demonstrated ability to readily move persons in and out of theater, it (rightly) becomes difficult to argue that the government cannot produce virtually any necessary witness who is willing to be produced. The point is that the world in which the modern UCMJ exists is not the world of the Articles of War. Given modern transportation and logistical systems, it is not only possible to meet the most stringent of witness production burdens, but it is entirely reasonable given the way America fights its wars.

\textsuperscript{79} See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 17.
2. Exercising Procedures to Clarify the Witness Production Requirement

An unreasonable witness request will not become manageable on its own. To get the benefit of the reasonable burdens imposed by the military justice system, the TC must be proactive. First, he must hold the defense scrupulously to rule-based and court-imposed deadlines. He must ask the defense for its production request instead of passively waiting for it. Upon receiving the request, the TC must immediately interview the witnesses, telephonically if necessary, and either grant or deny them.80 If the Government denies a requested witness, it must prod the defense to comply with the Rules for Court and either file a motion to compel production or concede nonproduction.81

By exercising due diligence to make rapid, best-judgment decisions on which witnesses to produce, the TC can greatly expedite the process of seeing who must really be produced. The TC should avoid both a reflexive reaction to deny production and an ambivalent impulse to approve all the witnesses. The TC must be thoroughly aware of the differences between the requirements for personal production of merits witnesses, sentencing witnesses, and witnesses on interlocutory matters. For merits witnesses, the TC should carefully consider whether the defense-proffered synopsis shows that the witness is relevant, necessary, and non-cumulative.82 If the TC’s interview with the witness establishes these things, it still may be better to go ahead and produce the witness instead of litigating the adequacy of the defense counsel’s summary. The predisposition should be to produce the witness. For sentencing witnesses, where there is no constitutional right to confrontation and the defense’s right to production of witnesses is less broad, alternative forms of testimony are likelier to be accepted by the court.83 For motions hearings, production of CONUS witnesses will almost never be required so long as an appropriate alternative means of testimony is available.84 During OIF 10–11, some civilian witnesses testified by VTC, some by telephone, some through affidavits and letters, and several even testified through Skype®.85

While cases should always proceed with a sense of purpose, it critical in a deployed environment to move them along expeditiously. Regardless of whether the Government has denied production of a witness and regardless of how the Government anticipates the judge will rule on defense motions to compel, the TC should initiate the process to produce the witness. This includes contacting the witnesses, arranging invitational travel orders (in the case of civilians), and taking all those steps which are more easily cancelled than initiated at a later date. A competent, proficient paralegal NCO knows how to do this. After the judge rules on any motions to compel, needless orders can be cancelled.

3. Logistics of Witness Production

Whenever a witness is being produced, whether from the same FOB or from CONUS, information flow between the MJ and the witness is critical. The practitioner should make early contact with the witness and keep him informed throughout the process.86 Most contact about travel and logistics should be conducted by military justice paralegals.87 The USF–I OSJA MJD created a standard informational brochure for civilian witnesses. It included a declassified map and information about Victory Base Complex. Such products already exist at J9 (Public Affairs) for civilian MWR visits and can easily be adopted for court-martial witness.88

Funding and country clearances are solvable issues for deployed witness production. Country clearances procedures vary from time to time but are usually straightforward. These Pentagon publishes these procedures on its website.89 Once in theater, military justice

80 MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 703(c)(2)(D) (“The trial counsel shall arrange for the presence of any witness listed by the defense unless the trial counsel contends that the witness' production is not required under this rule. If the trial counsel contends that the witness' production is not required by this rule, the matter may be submitted to the military judge.”).


82 MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 703(b)(1).

83 See United States v. McDonald, 55 M.J. 173, 177 (C.A.A.F. 2001); MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 1001(c)(2).

84 According to RCM 703(b), “[o]ver a party’s objection, the military judge may authorize any witness to testify on interlocutory questions via remote means or similar technology if the practical difficulties of producing the witness outweigh the significance of the witness’ personal appearance. . . .” MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 703(b); id. MIL. R. EVID. 104.

85 The Skype witnesses were Soldiers located in theater who were needed as witnesses for a sexual assault case taking place at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Washington. The JBLM trial counsel and Chief of Justice coordinated with the USF–I OSJA MJD to arrange video teleconference (VTC) testimony. Unfortunately, JBLM did not have secure VTC in the courtroom. The JBLM OSJA suggested using Skype. The deployed unit, eager to avoid sending additional Soldiers to the rear, sought and received an exception to policy from the J6 (information management) section to use Skype on the government network and plug a web camera into the USB port. The example demonstrates the resourcefulness and flexibility required of the deployed judge advocate. It also verifies the old adage, “Where there’s a will, there’s a way.”

86 If there are multiple witnesses, standard e-mails should be sent to each witness individually, not in a group, lest the witnesses all have one another’s names and e-mail addresses and start contacting one another.

87 Victim-witness liaisons, who often perform this service in garrison, are typically unavailable in theater.

88 These products also have the added benefit of already having been vetted for security purposes.

practitioners should ask their higher echelon JA’s for the most updated procedures. During OIF 10-11, it worked as follows: When clearance was requested, someone on the joint staff (for USF–I, in the J3 section), will send an e-mail to the sponsoring deployed point of contact (usually the CoJ, TC, or paralegal) and request the justification for the person to enter theater. During OIF 10–11, a simple explanation that the person was required as a court-martial witness was adequate. Even during these times of restricted travel (for example, during the Iraqi elections), all court-martial witness requests were approved.

Funding also was never a problem during OIF 10–11. Funding for witness travel typically comes from the GCMCA that referred the case to trial. All the cases tried directly under the III Corps GCMCA were funded through the USF–I J8. To secure a line of accounting for witness production required a request by an O-6 (the SJA) and approval by an O-7 (the Deputy Chief of Staff for USF–I). Early in the deployment, the USF–I chief paralegal for military justice coordinated with the J8 to arrange an alternative, streamlined procedure. Thanks to a letter of delegation from the deputy Chief of Staff, the USF–I CoJ could make the funding request and the III Corps SJA (an O-6) could approve it. Military justice practitioners in a deployed environment should consider similar steps.

A more detailed description of how witnesses were brought into theater during OIF 10-11 can be found in Appendix D.

4. Depositions as an Alternative to Personal Presence of Witnesses

As noted earlier, there currently exists no mechanism to compel civilians to involuntarily travel OCONUS for purposes of testifying at a court-martial, but the Government is only required to make reasonable efforts to get the witness to come to theater. Likewise, the Confrontation Clause precludes most substitutes for the personal presence of witnesses called by the government. A CONUS deposition may be the only option. In the three such CONUS depositions ordered during OIF 10–11, the Government found that they entailed neither excessive burdens nor extensive delays.

Rule for Courts-Martial 702 permits the taking of depositions. While the Government does not have subpoena power to compel a civilian witness to travel OCONUS for trial, the Government can compel a witness to attend a CONUS-based deposition. Depositions are easy to take, can be requested by either party, and can be ordered by the military judge or by any convening authority (including summary and special courts-martial convening authorities) who currently has the charges for disposition. In other words, the deposition can be ordered even before the case gets to the GCMCA. Procedurally, the ordering authority simply orders the deposition and appoints the deposition officer. If the TC is the requesting party, then the TC gives notice of the actual time, place, and date of the deposition to the defense and the deponent. The deposition should be audio and video recorded. Depositions require the presence of trial and defense counsel and the accused, unless waived by the defense.

A deposition is not admissible unless the deponent is unavailable to testify in person. To use a deposition, a party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it took reasonable steps to procure live testimony but was unable to do so. Thus, the military justice practitioner must document his efforts (and his paralegals’) to persuade a civilian witness to travel, using memoranda for record (MFR) and saving e-mails. Even after a witness has refused to come, the Government should still send invitational travel orders indicating that all transportation arrangements have been made. Military justice paralegals must be prepared to testify regarding unavailability. In both cases involving CONUS depositions during OIF 10–11, military justice personnel had to testify about their efforts to produce the witnesses. In both cases, the depositions were admitted over defense objections.

An example from OIF 10-11 is United States v. CW2 Brown. In that case, the accused turned down NJP. While reviewing the accused’s OMPF, the TC noticed discrepancies in the accused’s college transcript and e-mailed it to the university registrar. The registrar replied that the transcript was patently a forgery. The relevant officer in charge of warrant officer accessions confirmed

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90 See AR 27-10, supra note 73, para. 6-5(c) (requiring commanders to fund TDS travel in support of operational deployments).
91 Two in United States v. CPT Bjork and one in United States v. CW2 Brown.
92 MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 703(c)(2)(A), discussion (“A subpoena may not be used to compel a civilian to travel outside the United States and its territories.”), R.C.M. 703(c)(2)(B) (“A subpoena . . . may be used to obtain witnesses for a deposition . . . ”).
93 Id. R.C.M. 702(c).
94 Id. R.C.M. 702(b).
95 Id. R.C.M. 702(d).
96 Id. R.C.M. 702(e).
97 During OIF 10–11, the USF–I OSJAMJD coordinated with USF–I’s Public Affairs Office (PAO) for videotaping services for in-country depositions.
98 MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 702(g)(1)(A).
99 Depositions are admitted under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. Id. MIL. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). This exception requires a finding that the declarant, or deponent, is unavailable to testify in person.
100 See id.
that CW2 Brown had submitted this transcript as part of his warrant officer application packet. These facts supported a charge of Procuring an Appointment by Fraud.\textsuperscript{101} The TC needed the testimony of the university registrar to prove the charge. Confrontation rights generally preclude alternatives to live testimony for Government witnesses over the objection of the defense (contrast this with the compulsory production requirement for defense requested witnesses).\textsuperscript{102} Unfortunately, the civilian registrar, despite multiple e-mail invitations and phone calls, declined to come to Iraq. When dealing with an unavailable witness in a confrontation clause context (i.e., a Government witness), a deposition is likely the only means of securing the testimony for the court short of defense collaboration. This was just such a case. The process proved expedient and did not burden the command.

Despite the requirement that without a waiver, both defense counsel and the accused must be present at the deposition to satisfy the accused’s confrontation rights, the\textsuperscript{Brown} case demonstrated that this process was expedient and did not burden the command. The TC did not have to travel to the CONUS deposition location. Using the internet, he found the OSJA closest to the witness. He then called that office and spoke with a fellow JA who agreed to serve as deposition officer and provide a local TC for the deposition. The deployed TC worked with the witness over the phone, prepared a list of questions, and thoroughly briefed the CONUS TC. As for the defense, they had the choice to attend the deposition in person or waive personal attendance and their Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Counsel and accused elected to attend. Under Army Regulation 27-10, the convening authority paid for the travel expenses of the accused and defense counsel. Doing so was as simple as providing a line of accounting (LOA) to their DTS accounts.\textsuperscript{103} This took only two days (thanks to a skilled legal administrator) and the defense team was on a plane within five days. Within two weeks, less than the time it takes for one Servicemember to go on leave from theater and return, the entire deposition process was complete.

At trial, the defense contested both the authenticity of the deposition and the unavailability of the deponent. Fortunately, the Government had thoroughly documented its efforts to produce the witness, including an acknowledgement from the witness that he had received the Invitational Travel Orders and air travel reservations, but still refused to travel to Iraq. Over defense objection, the deposition was admitted, trial was not delayed, and the accused was convicted and sentenced to both confinement and a dismissal. A more junior accused may well have required an escort to ensure he made it to the right place. In such cases, the command may want to pair the accused with Soldiers traveling home on leave during the appropriate time period.

5. Unique Problems with Reserve Component Accused and Witnesses

One of the more curious sworn statements that came to the attention of the USF–I OSJA MJ D was written by a National Guard accused. According to this statement, his co-conspirator said something like, “We’re on Title 10 status, but once we get back to the states, I’ll be on Title 32 status and they can’t get me for [anything] I did when I was over here.” Less than forty days after making this statement, the declarant was sentenced in theater by a GCM to twenty-one months in confinement and a dismissal.\textsuperscript{104} There is no good reason why Reserve Component (RC) members who commit crimes while deployed cannot be court-martialed in the combat zone. Reserve component members, both NG and Army Reserve, can be extended on active duty and kept in theater with GCMCA approval. The unit simply needs to send up a request to the OSJA. The MJ D should process it through the GCMCA and Human Resources Command.\textsuperscript{105}

While extending on active duty any accused RC member in theater who is pending court-martial as an accused is easy, there is no clear authority to extend or recall RC members solely for witness duty.\textsuperscript{106} The discussion to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{101} See supra Part III.D (discussing United States v. Wilson).
  \item \textsuperscript{102} See U.S. DEPT OF ARMY, POLICY GUIDANCE FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS para. 11-13(h) (2011) [hereinafter DA POLICY GUIDANCE].
  \item \textsuperscript{103} According to the DA Policy Guidance:
    \begin{enumerate}
      \item RC Soldiers who are required witnesses for court martial proceedings cannot be involuntarily retained on active duty beyond their scheduled REFRAD date.
      \item Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 202 and 204 suggests that only an RC suspect may be retained on active duty for the purpose of court-martial. Although RC witnesses no longer on active duty may be subject to subpoena just like a civilian witness UP RCM 703, a subpoena may not be used to compel a person to travel and testify outside of the United States. Efforts should be made by the local trial counsel to stipulate expected testimony and seek alternatives means of testimony.
      \item DA POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 105, para. 11-13(h). One trial team extensively argued an analogous issue during OIF 10–11 at the trial court level. At issue was whether the deposition of a retired Servicemember could be introduced at trial. The Servicemember had declined to voluntarily travel to Iraq for purposes of testifying at trial and the government had taken his deposition CONUS. The defense contended that the deposition was inadmissible because the government could have involuntarily remobilized the member for witness duty and thus the member was not “unavailable” within the meaning of Military Rule of Evidence 804. The issue turned on the court’s interpretation of 10 U.S.C. § 12301 which permits involuntary activation of retired and demobilized reserve component members “in time of war or national emergency.” The court found the witness unavailable. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a) (2006). A
    \end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}
RCM 703(e)(1) states, “The attendance of persons not on active duty should be obtained in the manner prescribed in subsection (e)(2) [pertaining to production of civilian witnesses] of this rule.” In other words, treat demobilized RC members as civilians. If they refuse to travel as civilians or voluntarily remobilize, the Government has no practical method to make them return to theater or even stay there past their Boots-on-Ground (BOG) dates. A necessary and welcome change in the law would be amending 10 U.S.C. § 12301 to allow this. Unless the law is changed, however, other means can be used to get admissible testimony from demobilized RC witnesses.

Separate provision of the same statute provides some authority for a fifteen day recall:

(b) At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active status in a reserve component under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 15 days a year. However, units and members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor of the State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia National Guard, the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard).

10 U.S.C. § 12301(b) (2006). This authority, however, requires Secretary-level action and only permits recall of up to fifteen days. When using a deposition in lieu of live testimony from a demobilized reservist, the proponent of the deposition must exhaust all avenues of voluntary and involuntary remobilization and be able to present to the court that remobilization is truly not an option.

107 The Boots-on-Ground (BOG) date is the maximum amount of time involuntarily mobilized servicemembers can remain in theater. The current official BOG policy is as follows:

Effective 19 Jan 2007, RC units and/or individuals will not be involuntarily deployed to theater for more than 365 days. Unless a Soldier voluntarily extends, the 12-month BOG for RC Soldiers is no longer attainable under the new mobilization policy. RC BOG will be dependent on the amount of pre- and post-mob training a unit or Soldier requires. Therefore, RC BOG will vary by unit. Commanders shall ensure that RC Soldiers are released from theater with enough time remaining on their orders to account for travel from theater, out-process through the RC demobilization process, and to expend their accrued leave. Units/RC Soldiers should leave theater 39 days before their REFRA D/end date (which is the last day of the orders). The 39 days include travel from theater, days spent at the demobilization site, days at home station, and accrued leave. (See subparagraph 1-3b above.)

DA POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 105, para. 1-3(d). The BOG must account for the fact that orders can be cut for no more than 365 days and must include time to complete the demobilization process, including travel time from theater (1 days), time at the demobilization station (5 days), time at home state (3 days), and for the Servicemember to expedite up to 30 days of accrued regular leave. See id. para. 1-3(b).

Most problems with redeploying RC component witnesses are best resolved by trying the case before the witnesses redeploy. The TC must maintain awareness of the redeployment and BOG dates of all witnesses, but especially of RC witnesses. Keep in mind that the scheduled redeployment date is not necessarily the same as the BOG date. The BOG date, as things currently stand, is an absolute deadline by which the individual must be out of theater to be able to demobilize before his 365-day involuntary mobilization has run. The unit’s scheduled redeployment date may be weeks or months ahead of the BOG date. These two concepts are often muddled in theater, but the TC must understand and distinguish them. If a witness’ live testimony is required in relatively short order, trial counsel can often take advantage of the difference between the BOG date and scheduled redeployment date to hold the witness long enough for trial. This will often constitute enough time for the witness to testify at trial in theater or at least to complete a deposition. For instance, assume that a witness mobilizes on 1 January 2010 and is in theater by 3 March 2010, subtracting the 39 days allotted for demobilization and use of accrued leave, that would give a BOG date (the absolute final date by which the RC member must depart theater) of 23 October 2010 (236 days after arriving in theater). Although the BOG date is 23 October, for operational reasons, the unit may be scheduled to redeploy on 1 October 2010. If the trial is 15 October, the witness can be retained in theater for the trial until 23 October. Do not assume that the scheduled redeployment date is the same as the BOG date. It often is not. During OIF 10–11, the redeployment date could be as long as two months before the BOG date, more than enough time to try almost any court-martial. Even if the witness’ National Guard or reserve unit is redeploying, the witness can easily be reassigned to a different unit remaining in theater with appropriate duties pending redeployment. If there is resistance from the redeploying unit, as there often will be, the lower echelon military justice practitioner can coordinate with the higher echelon MJ office to address it.

If the case cannot reliably be tried before the BOG date, the TC should discuss with the witness the need for his testimony and discuss a plan to voluntarily remobilize the witness to return to theater for trial. During this discussion, the TC should get the witness’ civilian contact information. During OIF 10–11, state NG authorities enthusiastically worked with USF-I MJD to support voluntary remobilizations. It is also a good idea to take the witnesses’ depositions prior to their departure, just in case they become unavailable. The Government must not encourage a witness to think that the deposition makes his return to theater unnecessary; such statements by the Government could affect the court’s availability finding.

109 See id.

108 Reserve Component members may always voluntarily remobilize. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d).
Instead, the witness should be told that the deposition is not a substitute for his live testimony and that the Government expects him to return voluntarily for trial.

C. Availability of Military Judges

If you build it, they will come. Some have suggested that the unavailability of military judges is an obstacle to effective deployed practice. Operation Iraqi Freedom 10-11 did not reveal any difficulties with the availability of military judges. For the first six months, the Army judge was stationed in Germany but would schedule regular “court weeks” at monthly or bi-monthly intervals in Iraq and Afghanistan, just as Army judges do for Alaska and Hawaii. After the first six months and ever since, an Army military judge has been stationed in Kuwait at Camp Arifjan, and has traveled to both large and small FOBs to hold court in both established and makeshift courtrooms. Out of the eighteen cases discussed in this article, not one was delayed because a military judge was unavailable.

A military judge can preside over courts-martial of servicemembers outside his own branch of service. From 2002 to 2004 in Korea, it was not unusual for a Marine military judge to hear Soldiers’ cases referred by an Army GCMCA, and the Army judge in Kuwait has presided over a Sailor’s trial in Afghanistan. With several services conducting courts-martial in theater and the potential for Army practitioners to reach back to OTJAG and request additional judge support, military judge support will be no obstacle to deployed practice anytime soon. It is the author’s understanding that the U.S. Army Trial Judiciary intends to keep a military judge stationed in the CENTCOM AOR for the present.

D. Access to Defense Counsel

Accused have the right to defense counsel and must be able to communicate with them. During OIF 10–11, three civilian defense counsel represented accused in theater. USF–I experienced no significant problems with getting counsel into theater or ensuring that they could communicate with their clients before they came. Defense counsel issues did not cause any significant delays of court-martial practice during this period, and defense counsel consistently represented their clients zealously.

I. Military Defense Counsel

The presence of sufficient Trial Defense Service (TDS) counsel in theater to support a robust deployed court-martial practice was never an issue during OIF 10-11. As of June 2011, the consensus from Iraq and Afghanistan supported the notion that adequate defense counsel support was still the norm in theater. Six military defense counsel were located in Iraq at the end of February 2011. If each counsel could handle eight referred cases at once (depending on the individual counsel’s abilities and the types of cases, it could be many more than this), TDS attorneys could carry forty-eight referred cases at any one time; the eighteen cases actually tried were well within their capabilities. This robust defense capacity was evident in the fact that TDS assigned two or three counsel to nearly every court-martial, no matter how straightforward the case. The Government did the same, for training purposes. Often, TDS detailed two counsel per administrative separation board.

Naturally, the trial defense service assigns counsel to a particular geographic area based on perceived caseload. This means that if trial counsel are operating in an environment that has not seen much court-martial activity recently, defense counsel may initially be more scarce. Like the situation with military judge availability, this situation will likely correct itself if counsel engage in a robust court-martial practice. Keep referring cases and, if lack of defense counsel becomes an issue, raise it to higher technical JA echelons. For the Army, the US Army Trial Defense Service has the obligation to provide sufficient counsel to do the work, and the author’s experience has been that they provide them very effectively.

As for ensuring that counsel can meet with their clients, this is just something that needs to be worked out between the parties. It really is that simple. It is not unreasonable for the Government to ask that some consultation be done by telephone or VTC, though it is important to recognize that

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100 See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 18.
111 See MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 201(c).
112 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
113 E-mail from Major Joshua Toman, Chief of Justice, U.S. Forces–Iraq, to author (July 2, 2011 4:57 EST) (on file with author).
114 Two civilian defense counsel represented CPT Bjork and a third civilian defense counsel represented a Soldier at an administrative separation board.
counsel and client need some “face time” to develop rapport and prepare for trial. Rarely if ever will defense counsel flatly refuse to consult with a client over the phone. Rarely if ever will Government counsel refuse to facilitate in-person meetings between defense counsel and client. Any counsel who behave this way should seriously reevaluate their practice. If a problem develops, TC should try to work it out with the individual defense counsel, or if this fails, through his supervisory chain.

Finally, there is no reason why a deployed court-martial should be derailed by repeated defense delay requests. The defense does not unilaterally drive this process, and the Government should tailor its response to unsupported defense delay requests to facilitate the military judge’s decision to deny the request. This is not to say that defense requests for delay are not sincere, but often contain pro forma language which, when put in proper context by a well composed Government response, may not meet the preponderance standard. Perceptions to the contrary often flow from some defense counsel’s The lesson here is to take defense objections, carefully analyze them, and then respond in a meaningful way, as demonstrated in the Pemberton case discussed above. Most military judges are not going to just “automatically” grant delay. The two Army judges who presided over most of the courts-martial during OIF 10-11 held both sides to their burden to meticulously justify “reasonable cause” for continuances.

2. Civilian Defense Counsel

An accused has a right to civilian counsel, but not to indefinite delays to accommodate such counsel. Civilian defense counsel (CDC) can bring additional experience and maturity to an accused’s defense and are thus an important component of the military justice system. Most CDC who regularly represent Servicemembers have extensive experience with the military, in some cases having served for long periods on active duty themselves, or just having been around the system for a long time. Many CDC understand that courts-martial move quickly, especially in theater. Yet, some CDC have accepted representation of clients whose cases have already been docketed, only to immediately request delays to accommodate their own full trial schedules. If a case is docketed before a CDC accepts representation, assuming there is still enough time to prepare for trial (which is seldom more than a few weeks for an Army court-martial), the TC should hold the CDC tightly to his burden to show reasonable cause for delay. The CDC chose to accept representation, knowing that the trial was already scheduled; this indicates that his schedule could accommodate the trial on the docketed date, and makes it harder for the CDC to persuasively argue that his schedule precludes him from trying the case then. Even if a delay is granted, it is unlikely to be as long as a delay would be if no trial date were previously scheduled.

E. Courts-Martial Panels

Out of the eighteen cases discussed in this article, seven were panel cases. At least one author has suggested that panel selection may constitute an impediment to deployed court-martial practice. However, USF–I had no problems with panel selection during this time period. Consistent with normal garrison practice, III Corps maintained standing panels during OIF 10-11. III Corps followed the common Army method of seeking nominations along with the members’ records briefs from subordinate commands and then compiling them in a matrix for the GCMCA to select a standing panel, but this is just one way of facilitating the convening authority’s selections. The J1 / G1 / S1 (personnel sections at the various command levels) should be able to provide a list of members sufficient for the GCMCA to make his consideration. If the GCMCA would like to review additional information about the members, that additional information could be provided. The rule of thumb in panel member selection is simply that no group of members be improperly excluded.

Because the USF–I GCMCA did not exercise his military justice prerogative to refer cases during OIF 10-11, the USF–I OSJA MJD did not maintain a USF–I-wide standing court-martial panel. As the highest echelon Army-specific GCMCA in theater, III Corps (ARFOR) found little difficulty in maintaining two geographically-based standing panels, drawn from the post draw-down 25,000 Servicemembers directly ADCON to III Corps for military justice purposes. For the few panel members who actually had to travel to an off-FOB location for trial, the Court-Martial Personnel Priority Movement Memorandum facilitated air movement.

Practitioners should not feel compelled to maintain a standard panel even though Army practitioners are used to standing panels. Standing panels often make sense in terms

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private area for the client to use a Defense Switched Network (DSN) telephone or VTC.

119 See MCM, supra note 22, R.C.M. 506(a).
of obviating the need to go back to the GCMCA for a new panel selection in every case. Depending on deployed circumstances, however, maintaining a standing panel may be more work than it is worth. In the absence of a standing panel, the GCMCA will need to pick members on a case-by-case basis. A general court-martial only requires five members, and a special court-martial only requires three members.123 For good measure, it is best to select ten for each court-martial to make allowance for challenges and excusals, but generally speaking, it is simply not overly burdensome to identify ten Servicemembers in deployed commands often consisting of tens of thousands.

If a particular command lacks sufficient personnel to conveniently detail a panel, the convening authority can detail personnel from outside his own command.124 One of the unique aspects of a dynamic hostile fire environment like Iraq in OIF 10-11 was the number of different units and GCMCA’s, both located within and outside of theater, who had an interest in trying cases that arose out of their units conducting operations in theater. For these GCMCA’s without enough assigned personnel in theater to conveniently form a sufficiently large panel selection pool, the III Corps Commander, on four occasions, made panel members “available” by memoranda for selection by the out-of-theater GCMCA.125 For example, in the Bjork case,126 the I Corps commander redeployed before the case was tried, and therefore selected a new panel from members made available by III Corps in theater. In Warren127, SOCCENT, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, also selected members made available by III Corps. Practitioners should think broadly when it comes to member availability. Seldom, if ever, should a unit be unable to muster the three to five persons required for a panel.

F. Additional Considerations

1. Flexible Use of Trial Location

As suggested throughout this article, deployed military justice practitioners must remain flexible, keeping in mind all the resources they can draw upon. Large, established FOBs with semi-permanent courtrooms are not required for military justice.128 During OIF 10–11, the incoming USD-N (4ID) built an excellent courtroom with minimal effort and resources.129 On two occasions, counsel and accused flew to Kuwait, where the military judge was stationed, for hearings, using the locally available court reporter.130

Sometimes a case referred by a deployed GCMCA should be physically tried CONUS. Although the location of the trial may change, the deployed practitioner should not automatically equate this with withdrawal of the case from the deployed GCMCA and referral by the rear detachment convening authority. Depending on the posture of the case, it may be best to keep the referral under the original, deployed convening authority.131 Depending on circumstances, there can be several advantages to this approach. First, if the case has already been referred and motions have been argued in theater, it eliminates the delay and extra work entailed in closing out the first record and re-litigating the issues, as would be required if the case is withdrawn from the deployed convening authority and re-referred by the rear convening authority.132 Second, it preserves the link to the deployed command, the command with the real interest and will to prosecute the case.133

United States v. CPT H134 demonstrates well this approach of continuing to use the deployed GCMCA as the convening authority for a case which has been sent to the

129 Contingency Operating Base (COB) Speicher had been lacking a courtroom since the previous one had burned down over a year prior. When 4ID deployed to theater, one of the first tasks for their chief of justice was to construct a courtroom. One elevated 2 x 4 served as the “bar” of the courtroom, separating the “gallery” of folding chairs from the “well” of the courtroom. Another elevated 2 x 4 delineated the “panel box” of folding chairs. The judge’s dais consisted of a desk, chair, and flag, placed on top of a large rectangular structure made out of plywood. Counsel’s tables were merely regular folding tables with chairs. Put it all together and it looked like a courtroom. It could have been put together anywhere, even in a tent. Within weeks of 4ID setting up the courtroom, the military judge held the first trial. If you build it, they will indeed come.

130 Recently, the current USF–I Chief of Military Justice informed the author that this practice of going to Kuwait for select cases has continued with the recent trial of a guilty plea from Iraq in the Camp Arifjan, Kuwait courtroom. This again demonstrates the continued flexibility of deployed military justice practitioners, making common sense decisions of where to try cases. E-mail from Major Joshua Toman, Chief of Justice, U.S. Forces–Iraq, to author (July 2, 2011 4:57 EST) (on file with author).

131 In fact, 25ID, upon taking over from 1AD as USD–C late in OIF 10–11, made the decision to retain GCMCA authority over all military justice actions at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. While this appeared to dramatically increase the caseload of USD-C, their execution of all rear detachment military justice actions while in theater demonstrates the plausibility, in certain circumstances, of the deployed GCMCA retaining authority over select cases sent back to the rear.

132 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

133 As discussed earlier, once the case is referred, it is under the sole control of the military judge until action. However, the convening authority always retains authority to withdraw the case or enter into a pretrial agreement. For these reasons, it is accurate to say that it is still the will of the convening command that drives the case to its final disposition.

134 Because CPT H’s request for resignation in lieu of court-martial was accepted by Human Resources Command, the author has chosen to provide no additional identifying information.
theater. Captain H was a National Guardsman and commander of a Military Police company. Towards the end of his deployment, allegations arose that he had engaged in multiple acts of misconduct. Among other things, he was alleged to have provided alcohol to junior Soldiers in violation of USF–I GO #1,135 to have maintained a sexual relationship with an enlisted Soldier, to have acted improperly towards another enlisted Soldier, and to have improperly managed field ordering funds. The misconduct came to light right before the unit’s redeployment.

Once the allegations arose, the deployed practitioners did all the right things suggested by this article to set the case up for a successful in-country prosecution. First, the brigade trial counsel, a RC JA who had not yet had the opportunity to try a court-martial, contacted the CoJ. Next, the CoJ met with the trial counsel and assigned an experienced assistant trial counsel. Immediately, the trial team met and formed an investigative plan, backward planning from the date the unit was set to redeploy. The trial team immediately flew to FOB Delta, a postage-stamp-sized FOB, to interview all the potential witnesses. While the witnesses were being interviewed, the deployed military justice practitioners were concurrently drafting charges and having them reviewed, making arrangements for the Article 32 investigation, and setting up depositions for all the potential Government witnesses, just in case the trial date went beyond their BOG dates and they subsequently declined to voluntary remobilize to testify in theater. Thanks to these efforts, within three weeks, the case was fully investigated, charges were preferred, an Article 32 hearing was conducted (presided over by an Air Force judge advocate), and twenty-one witnesses had been deposed. The III Corps Commander referred the case to a GCM, and the advocate), and twenty-one witnesses had been deposed. The III Corps Commander referred the case to a GCM, and the military judge docketed the case for trial at VBC. The witnesses, all RC members, were actually reaching their BOG dates during the week following the Article 32 investigation, so there was no way to extend them in theater.136 The USF–I TC coordinated with the state NG headquarters to arrange for the voluntarily remobilization of the witnesses. Unfortunately, most of them declined to voluntarily remobilize for a trip back to Iraq. The Government thought it unwise to try a case entirely by deposition,137 but did not wish to accept the defense offer of a general officer article 15 followed by retirement. The solution was to arrange for trial at a CONUS installation close to where most of the witnesses lived. The trial counsel remained focused on trying the case, not allowing himself to get distracted in a negotiating process in which the defense obviously thought of itself as having a strong hand. As it was becoming obvious that the trial counsel could not try the case in theater, the trial counsel contacted the CoJ, CONUS Army installation, in close proximity to the general area where most of the demobilized witnesses resided, and arranged to hold the III Corps-referred court-martial at that location CONUS.

The stateside GCMCA made panel members available and the stateside OSJA sent the panel nomination matrix and officer record briefs to III Corps Commander in theater could make his panel selection. The III Corps SJA coordinated with the CONUS SJA and arranged to send a paralegal from Fort Hood for the actual trial, to lessen the burden on the CONUS installation. Once everything had been internally pre-coordinated within this huge, worldwide law firm that is the JAG Corps, the TC then filed a motion with the court to move the place of trial stateside. Over the defense’s objection, the judge granted the motion. Trial was set for only a month after the originally scheduled date. Within a few days, the defense submitted a request for resignation in lieu of court-martial, and CPT H received an other-than-honorable discharge.138

The CPT H case illustrates how being part of a worldwide law firm can bring tremendous assets to the table of the deployed practitioner, and also reinforces the value of fostering a trial-focused deployed military justice practice.139 The TC did not try blustering to the defense about how he could move the trial CONUS. He just did it, with the full intent to try the case. There was no reason for the accused to get leniency just because the case arose in theater. Deliberate, decisive action, bringing the full range of worldwide resources to bear—this is deployed military justice.

2. Pretrial and Post-Trial Confinement

There is only one military confinement facility for Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the Theater Field Confinement Facility (TFCF) in Kuwait. It is meant to be a temporary facility, with inmates preferably residing in the facility for thirty days or less.140 Over the past eight years, both Servicemembers and civilian contractors have been confined at the TFCF.141 Any stays longer than thirty days require an

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135 See USF–I GO #1, supra note 2.
136 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Captain H himself could be and was extended in theater, and assigned to the VBC Mayor’s Cell.
137 There is no bright line rule of how many depositions constituting the government’s case are too many depositions. Superficially, if the depositions were all properly taken, affording the accused full confrontation rights, then there seems to be no limit to the number of depositions permitted. As a matter of prudence, the author did not feel comfortable with the idea of trying the government’s entire case using fifteen or more depositions.
139 See supra Part II.C.
141 Although this article has primarily focused on military justice as it pertains to military members, the majority of persons currently supporting the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are civilian contractors. The USF–I OSJA MJD was also responsible for military justice action vis-à-vis
advanced request signed by the requesting GCMCA. During OIF 10–11, the Navy operated the TFCF. In addition to the TFCF, there may be additional detention cells (D-Cells) located in and around theater. For instance, VBC has a D-Cell at the Provost Marshall Office (PMO), meant for very temporary holding of prisoners en route. At least twice over the last eight years, Servicemembers have also been held in Detainee Internment Facilities, separately from the detainees. The latter is not an advisable practice and did not occur during OIF 10–11.143

To facilitate pretrial confinement, the USF–I MJd compiled a theater-wide list of military magistrates and published it to all the military justice practitioners in theater. Once a Soldier was ordered into pretrial confinement, unit escorts would escort him to Kuwait where he would be turned over to the TFCF Navy personnel. Just as in garrison, it was important that the accused’s possessions be inventoried prior to his confinement and that the confinement facility’s checklist be carefully followed to ensure the accused had all the necessary items in confinement.

During OIF 10–11, III Corps placed only one person into pretrial confinement, although USD-C (1AD) placed several Soldiers into pretrial confinement, including one Soldier accused of murder and another Soldier accused in a very well-known classified information leak case. In the III Corps case, the author personally walked the battalion commander through the process over the telephone. The process was not significantly harder in theater than in garrison. The unit did have to provide escorts for the accused’s flight to Kuwait, but this did not prove overly burdensome.

Post-trial confinement likewise posed no significant difficulties. Military justice paralegals coordinated with the units to make sure they inventoried the accused’s possessions prior to trial in a non-invasive and non-humiliating manner, and that the pretrial confinement checklist (provided by the TFCF) was largely complete. Once the sentence was announced, the convicted Servicemember was usually taken to eat and then to the D-Cell, if the trial took place at VBC. While at the D-Cell, two members of the unit were required to stay with the convict for continual watch. Within a day or two, the accused would be transferred to the TFCF in Kuwait, which would move the convicted Servicemember to a CONUS facility in a matter of weeks.144

3. Behavioral Health Issues

More than once during OIF 10–11, an accused Servicemember would go to a combat stress clinic (CSC) and claim to be suicidal or violent, especially right after charges were preferred. Instinctively they seemed to know what military justice practitioners sometimes forget: if the case gets transferred to the rear and the accused is identified as a patient rather than a suspect, the case may go away, especially for borderline felony/misdemeanor misconduct that affects good order and discipline more strongly in theater than in garrison. A “wounded warrior” accused of a GO #1 violation in theater is far less likely to be court-martialed in garrison.

Because of the sensitivity of this issue, mental health providers confronted with Soldiers claiming suicidal ideation often, and probably rightly, err on the side of caution and recommend immediate evacuation. This puts the commander in a difficult position: go against medical advice or let a possibly manipulative accused escape justice. III Corps faced this situation several times, as did MND-C. There is no simple way to address it. Automatically approving all such recommendations to evacuate could shut down military justice in the deployed environment. Automatically disapproving them could result in real tragedy. The best approach is to consider each case on its individual merits.

In deciding whether to keep the accused in theater, the command should work closely with the mental health provider to get as full a picture of the accused’s condition as possible.145 An important consideration is whether the

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142 See ARCENT TFCF Memo, supra note 140, para. 5(a)(1).


144 See ARCENT TFCF Memo, supra note 140, para. 5(a)(1).

145 See Major Kristy Radio, Why You Can’t Always Have It All: A Trial Counsel’s Guide to HIPAA and Accessing Protected Health Information, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2011, at 4, 7–9 (explaining when and how a TC can...
accused has a history of mental health issues (if this exists, it may be in the defense’s interest to share the relevant records with the Government). If the accused is kept in theater despite his claims of mental instability, certain additional actions can be taken to mitigate risk, such as taking the accused’s weapon,\footnote{During one of the Abu Ghraib prosecutions, the defense successfully obtained Article 13 credit by claiming the accused was stigmatized because he was deprived of his weapon. Afterwards, defense counsel frequently demanded credit when their clients were disarmed. See Major M. Patrick Gordon, Sentencing Credit: How to Set the Conditions for Success, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2011, at 7, 13 & n.65. One solution is to take the bolt while leaving the Soldier with the weapon; another is to refrain from advertising why the Soldier is disarmed (i.e., when the Soldier gets a memo to let him enter the dining facility, the memo should simply specify that the Soldier is authorized to be unarmed without saying it has to do with pending court-martial or suicide threats).} providing escorts, moving him into sanitized\footnote{By “sanitized,” the author means living quarters in which items which could potentially be used as weapons have been removed.} quarters, etc. Three times during OIF 10–11, after a careful consideration of all the factors, the command kept accused Soldiers in theater under these circumstances. In none of these cases did the accused end up hurting himself or anyone else.

If a case is transferred to the rear, the deployed practitioner still has options. He can coordinate with the rear for prosecution, being careful not to inject unlawful command influence into the process. Or the forward command can do as III Corps did in the CPT H. case, and refer the case itself, but have it tried in the rear with the assistance of stateside practitioners.

IV. Conclusion

The deployed court-martial success of OIF 10–11 demonstrates that when a proper emphasis is placed on military justice in theater by both the command and military justice practitioners, the court-martial system is a fully deployable system of justice which is not overly burdensome, meets the command’s disciplinary needs, and is highly protective of an accused’s rights. During OIF 10–11, the author found that most misconduct that occurred in theater was best and most practically tried in theater, that some cases simply had to be tried in theater, that courts-martial proceeded to trial faster in theater than in CONUS, and that ownership of cases was extremely important.

The logistics of deployed court-martial practice were not overly burdensome during this period. In fact, the same attributes that permit the modern US military to be highly expeditionary, such as impressive logistics and transportation support, make the UCMJ highly portable.

Although military justice practitioners in less mature theaters face different challenges, the author maintains that with appropriate command emphasis, courts-martial can be tried effectively even in immature theaters. This obviously requires a sufficient number of JAs assigned to military justice duties. Command emphasis and the will of the deployed TC are paramount. Especially important is the deployed practitioner’s ability to look beyond his own unit to resources available throughout the theater and in the wider world beyond theater. During OIF 10–11, this was facilitated by a well-developed, theater-wide military justice structure, but even without such a structure, military justice practitioners have access to e-mail and telephone communication to coordinate support with other units and JA’s, as demonstrated by the hundreds of cases successfully tried in Iraq before USF-I.

Finally, when considering whether the court-martial system set forth in the UCMJ can be effectively deployed, the mere fact that a commander decides to send some cases back to the rear or even not try any cases in theater has little bearing on the deployability of the court-martial system itself. The ready availability of efficient transportation may well make this the correct decision in a given case. But, for TC to give sound advice based on the actual capabilities provided by the UCMJ and the worldwide Judge Advocate General’s Corps, deployed JAs assigned to military justice duties must make military justice not the “fifth priority,” but their first.\footnote{See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 18.}
Appendix A

A Theater-Wide, Echeloned Deployed Military Justice Structure

A poor theater-wide MJ structure in an immature theater does not preclude the practice of MJ, but a good structure can facilitate it. The structure established by USF-I facilitated the practice of MJ in theater by all the services in OIF 10-11.

Those familiar with the strategic level command in Iraq prior to 1 January 2010, Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), will recall that it had no MJ division and did not exercise any military justice function. Instead, Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC–I) provided Corps-level military justice services for most Army units in theater and addressed civilian misconduct. Because in terms of military justice, MNC-I was largely an Army operation, it had no theater-wide military justice oversight role across the different services and units not assigned to it, although it did have such a role for its assigned separate brigades and divisions. Thus, prior to the merger of MNC-I into MNF-I resulting in the establishment of USF-I on 1 January 2010, there was no single MJ division with a theater-wide military justice mandate. With a large number of independent general and special courts-martial convening authorities (SPCMCA) of all the services spread throughout the theater, several of which did not fall under MNC-I, prior to the establishment of USF-I, even under the best leadership, there was no single, coherent military justice structure throughout the theater. Under these conditions, trial counsel's field of view could become limited to their narrow, vertical technical JA channels and their individual units. This situation deprived the senior commander situational awareness on the state of military discipline throughout the theater. It also inhibited the sharing of technical expertise and trend information among practitioners. Moreover, it made it difficult to set any professional tone of practice for the theater and reduced the likelihood of consistent, theater-wide, joint mutual training and assistance in military justice matters. During this period, under many excellent SJA's, MNC-I provided most of these military justice functions, but its mandate was limited primarily to its assigned Army units. As demonstrated by the hundreds of cases successfully tried in Iraq during this period, this potential inefficiency by no means precluded the practice of military justice.

In contrast to the situation described above, the USF-I Military Justice Structure established on 1 January 2010, may well represent the first time in the Afghanistan/Iraq era of conflict that a single theater established a clear, hierarchical, military justice structure with a single OSJA having both a formal interest in and visibility over military justice practitioners of all services throughout the theater. As shown on the attached wire diagram in Appendix B, , the creation of a linear, hierarchical structure, from the lowest echelon to the OSJA for the four star level-command, meant that for the first time, a trial counsel anywhere in theater, from any service, regardless of whether his unit was A DCON to the Corps, could look up from his position and see the whole array of professional MJ support available. This is not to suggest that prior trial counsel were previously blind to theater military justice practice outside their individual units, but that there previously existed no single office with a mandate to ensure that they were not. Because Iraq was a joint environment, military justice naturally assumed a joint flavor, from inter-service sharing of resources and personnel to joint courts-martial. The USF-I Military Justice Structure reflected these joint justice aspects in two ways. First, the Secretary of Defense designated the USF-I Commander as a GCMCA. As such, he had authority to court-martial any Servicemember in theater. Next, the USF-I Commander designated senior commanders and senior headquarters from each of the services (e.g., AFFOR, ARFOR, NAVFOR, MARFOR) as the senior service-specific military justice headquarters for the theater, with the vision that those headquarters would have highest level Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority over the Servicemembers of their individual services. After the deactivation of MNC-I, the numbered Army corps already deployed in Iraq (but serving under the identity of MNC-I Headquarters up until that point) was designated the Army Force – Iraq, or "ARFOR."

149 At the time MNC-I merged with MNF-I to form USF-I, MNC-I consisted of one joint general court-martial convening authority (GCMCA) at the MNF-I level, four Army GCMCA’s (the three divisions plus MNC-I), a Navy special court-martial convening authority (SPCMCA) (the Al Asad Base Command Group), and two additional Air Wing SPCMCA’s as well as nearly three dozen, Army SPCMCA’s. See Appendix A, Official USF-I Military Justice Chart (showing theater-wide convening authorities at the end of OIF 10-11).


151 Each of these senior service commanders concurrently served in a high level staff position on the USF-I joint staff. The Navy one star admiral was the J35 (force protection); the Air Force two star general concurrently served in the positions of USF-I Force Strategic Engagement Cell Director and as the Director of the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). The Army three star general (the Corps Commander) concurrently served as the USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Operations.

152 Thus, when MNC-I was deactivated, the deployed numbered corps again assumed its numbered identity as an active headquarters, but for military justice purposes only. In other words, the corps qua corps no longer exercised the full range of mission command (as it had when it was designated MNC-I), but now served as a headquarters with administrative control (ADCON) for military justice purposes only over all the USF-I separate brigades and the US Army Divisions. Lieutenant General Jacoby, the MNC-I commander at the time MNC-I was deactivated, would have taken GCMCA-level action prior to the merger under his title as "Commander, MNC-I," however, from 1 January 2010 on, he took GCMCA-level action over generally the same units, but now
During OIF 10-11, III Corps was the designated ARFOR for Iraq. Designating these senior service-specific headquarters did not negate the USF–I Commander’s statutory authority as a GCMCA to refer to court-martial cases involving any accuseds of any service, but as a matter of command discretion, that authority was not exercised during OIF 10-11 and military justice normally flowed through service channels following notification to and coordination through the USF–I OSJA in appropriate cases. The purpose of having a theater-wide military justice focus was not for one unit or service to “poach” another unit’s or service’s cases, but to assist and facilitate the prosecution of cases throughout the theater.  

Beyond a name change from MNC-I to I Corps, the USF–I SJA at the time of the merger advocated a broader military justice vision: military justice with a theater-wide, joint focus, something not previously institutionalized in theater. Given the parochial service-specific tendency of military justice, creating an IJOA-wide orientation required support from the top, formalized structures, and the right personnel. First, in the initial designation of senior element commanders, the SJA sought to formalize the position of the USF–I Military Justice Division by having the USF–I Commander direct the senior element commanders of the various services that they would receive their military justice advice from the USF–I OSJA, meaning primarily the USF–I Military Justice Division (MJD). The structure was then staffed with a theater-wide, joint focus in mind: first, an Army lieutenant colonel replaced an MNC–I-era Army captain (O-3) to become the first USF–I Chief of Military Justice (CoJ); an Air Force major, highly experienced in military justice, took over the position of USF–I Senior Trial Counsel; and out of the two USF–I trial counsel, one was a Navy Lieutenant (O-3), and one an Army Captain. Three paralegals, including a court reporter, initially supervised by an Army E-7, also rounded out the shop. Throughout most of OIF 10-11, both the Air Force and Navy senior element commanders were advised by Army judge advocates assigned to the USF–I MJD. These Army JA’s prepared at least a dozen actions for these highest-level multi-service commanders, including “Admiral’s Masts” (nonjudicial punishment (NJP)) and letters of reprimand and censure.

One must distinguish lest the word "hierarchical" conjure up the notion of unlawful command influence (UCI). While the USF–I MJD did provide theater-wide visibility on MJ to the USF–I SJA, the USF–I SJA never relayed the senior commanders' views on disposition of any individual case or category of cases to lower echelon practitioners. If the four star commander had disagreed with a subordinate commander's disposition to such an extent that he thought a different disposition appropriate, presumably he would have simply withheld the case to his level under his authority as an independent GCMCA, not suggested a disposition through MJ channels.

Due to the nature of a theater-wide practice involving multiple services and civilians, the USF–I OSJA MJD had several different sources and levels of authority. First, in its most conventional role, it served as the MJD for the III Corps SJA preparing actions for and providing advice to the III Corps Commander. In this capacity the USF–I / III Corps MJD exercised traditional military justice oversight authority over the USF–I separate brigade (“USF–I separates”), all of which

under his title as “Commander, I Corps,” notwithstanding that post-merger he exercised delegated aspects of mission command over most of those same units in his capacity as the USF–I DCG-O. Just as the same commander served as both the USF–I DCG-O and the numbered Corps Commander, so also did the USF–I Military Justice Division serve as the numbered Corps military justice division (e.g., the USF–I Chief of Military Justice also served as the III Corps Chief of Military Justice during OIF 10-11).

III Corps was preceded by I Corps and succeeded by XVIII Airborne Corps as the designated ARFOR-Iraq. Using the Corps as the Army Force (ARFOR) component headquarters in a joint task force is consistent with Army doctrine. “1-20. A corps headquarters primarily serves as an intermediate-level tactical headquarters. It can also serve as an ARFOR headquarters. . . .” U.S. DEPT OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL–INTERIM 3-0.1, THE MODULAR FORCE para. 1-20 (28 Jan. 2008).

Throughout the deployment, Air Force counsel served as trial counsel on five cases in which the accuseds were Army officers or enlisted Soldiers: United States v. Bjork, United States v. Ferrer, United States v. Shipley, United States v. Warren, and United States v. Bennett. Likewise, an Army counsel was designated to serve as second chair in a sexual assault case of a Soldier by an Airman, but the case terminated in an alternate disposition.

See, e.g., Memorandum for Rear Admiral Kevin Kovacich, U.S. Navy, subject: Designation of United States Forces–Iraq, U.S. Navy Element (30 July 2010) (on file with author). A similar memo appointed the Air Force Element commander. In practice, of course, the senior element commanders (and the USF–I Military Justice Division) coordinated closely with the various CENTCOM service component commands (e.g., AFCENT, ARCENT, MARCENT, NAVCENT).

In 2009, the Chief of Justice for MNC-I had been a captain (O-3). During previous rotations, both lieutenant colonels and majors had served as Chiefs of Justice.

See UCMJ arts. 1, 25, 37, 98 (2008); AR 27-10, supra note 73, paras. 2-7(b), 5-9(a)(1), 5-13(b), 18.5(a)(6), 27-5(g).

This would have followed coordination with the appropriate service component command (e.g., AFCENT, NAVCENT, ARCENT, MARCENT, SOCCENT).

Concurrently the USF–I Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for Military Law and Operations.

Concurrently the USF–I Deputy Commanding General–Operations (DCG-O).
were ADCON for military justice purposes to III Corps. Because III Corps was the second echelon GCMCA to the three Army divisions, the MJD possessed standard second echelon type authority. In other words, by virtue of the fact that the III Corps Commander could pull any of these cases to his level, the USF–I / III Corps MJD had a proprietary interest in such cases. Separate from its dual-hatted function as the III Corps MJD, the USF–I MJD performed a host of other functions, including facilitating and coordinating military justice actions between the various services; prosecuting cases which the USF–I commander retained at his level; providing advice to the senior element commanders of the various services; facilitating in-theater trials convened by convening authorities outside the theater; and processing civilian misconduct, including requests under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) and requests to prosecute cases under Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ. For these latter functions, the USF–I MJD operated under the guidance and supervision of the USF–I SJA.

While the greatest contribution of the USF–I MJD in terms of joint justice was likely the everyday coordination and facilitation effort, the greatest systemic contribution was the publication of the Notification and Coordination Memorandum (NCM), an initiative by the USF–I SJA to bring clarity to the practice of military justice in the joint environment. This binding document, appended at Annex B to this article, went through weeks of revisions and suggestions during the staffing process with all of U.S. Central Command’s service component command SJA’s (AFCENT, ARCENT, MARCENT, NAVCENT, SOCCENT) and all the various military justice practitioners in theater. This document was signed by the USF–I Commander and thereafter expressly applied to all military justice practitioners, whether or not their units were ADCON to USF–I. It specifically directed that all military justice practitioners in theater were required to report and coordinate with the USF–I Military Justice Division under specified conditions. Under this formal authority, the USF–I MJD served as a coordinating element for military justice issues among all units, even when it was not directly involved in advising the USF–I or III Corps GCMCA’s. Additionally, this model gave the USF–I SJA situational awareness of military justice throughout the theater. Upon the next revision of the USF–I OPORD, USF–I OPORD 11-01, the NCM was incorporated into the OPORD itself, thus solidifying its status as part of the constitutive structure of the overall joint task force and further normalizing the position of the USF–I OSJA MJD as a highest echelon MJ office, not just one of many military justice offices in theater.

161 |Administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON.

See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEP’T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 4 (15 May 2011) [hereinafter JP 1-02]. The other two terms are operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON). Those terms are also defined in JP 1-02. Id.

162 With the “USF–I Separate Brigades,” the USF–I MJD was the first level military justice supervisory section, with no intervening SJA. See supra note 3, and accompanying text. For the divisions, wings, and other units in theater, military justice for all of which were directly supervised by their respective SJA’s, the USF–I MJD’s authority stemmed from its position within the joint command and was formalized as set forth in this article. This difference in authority manifested itself in several ways. For instance, for the USF–I Separate Brigades, the USF–I MJD had a standing policy that no charges could be preferred without prior review at the USF–I/III Corps level, however, for other units, the USF–I MJD would offer to and often did review charge sheets prior to preferral, but such review was not mandatory.

163 The USF–I Commander did not exercise his UCMJ authority during OIF 10-11. See supra note 17, GL 19-20.


165 At one point, the USF–I MJD also engaged in training its Government of Iraq (GoI) counterparts in improving their internal security courts.

166 The memorandum was staffed with all the entities listed on the distribution line. See Annex B.

167 See supra note 153.

168 See Annex B (providing for the conditions and requirements of notification and coordination).

169 Within the USF–I command, this base document was referred to as an “OPORD.” The USF–I OPORD (Operational Order) was the basic blueprint or constitution for the whole joint task force. It was published under the authority of USF–I’s four-star commander. Throughout OIF 10-11, USF–I OPORD 10-01 was in effect. While referred to in theater as an “OPORD,” the document probably better meets the definition of an OPPLAN (operational plan). According to Joint Publication 5-0, OPPLAN is “a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater.” JP5-0, supra note 17, GL 19-20.
Appendix C

Notification and Coordination

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I) Policy on Notification and Coordination Requirements for Alleged and Suspected Misconduct within the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA)

1. REFERENCES.


   b. ANNEX U (LEGAL) To USF-I OPORD 10-01

   c. CENTCOM FRAGO 09-1619, ESTABLISHMENT OF USF-I, dated 22 Dec 09

   d. Memorandum, USF-I, 6 Jan 2010, SUBJECT: Designation of Commander, USF-I, U.S. Air Force Element (Enclosed)

   e. Memorandum, USF-I, 6 Jan 2010, SUBJECT: Designation of Commander, USF-I, U.S. Navy Element (Enclosed)

   f. Memorandum, USF-I, 6 Jan 2010, SUBJECT: Designation as MARFOR Authority for JOA (Enclosed)

   g. Memorandum, USF-I, 6 Jan 2010, SUBJECT: Designation as NAVFOR Authority for JOA (Enclosed)

   h. Memorandum, USF-I, 6 Jan 2010, SUBJECT: Designation as ARFOR Authority for JOA (Enclosed)

   i. Memorandum, USF-I, 6 Jan 2010, SUBJECT: Designation as AFRFOR Authority for JOA (Enclosed)

2. PURPOSE. The evenhanded administration of military justice within the JOA is of paramount importance. In addition to ensuring each servicemember is afforded due process and fairness, the imposition of disciplinary actions influences the discipline, morale, and good order of the overall force. Therefore, notification of senior personnel misconduct and other significant misconduct to USF-I is critical to ensure that the commander has a complete view of military justice as it affects force readiness within the JOA. This policy does not alter the inherent

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authority vested in the court-martial convening authorities, including my authority as a general court-martial convening authority (GCMCA), or the currently existing echelon convening authority structures.

3. APPLICABILITY. This policy applies to all servicemembers, Department of Defense (DoD) civilian employees, and DoD Contractors and subcontractors, and anyone serving with or accompanying the force throughout the IJOA regardless of branch or service component.

4. POLICY.

   a. For purposes of this policy, the “service-specific force commander” refers to those commanders designated by the Commander, USF-I, as the Army Force (ARFOR), Navy Force (NAVFOR), Marine Force (MARFOR), and Air Force Force (AFFOR) commanders pursuant to Reference C, paragraph 3.C.1.B and References D through I. For all servicemembers assigned or attached to SOCENT operating in the IJOA, notification and coordination may be made directly to USF-I Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) consistent with paragraphs 4.b through 4.f, below.

   b. The point of contact at the USF-I Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for notification and coordination under this policy is the USF-I Chief of Military Justice.

   c. The following notification and coordination requirements apply to all commanders within the IJOA with servicemembers under their command who do not fall under a service-specific GCMCA physically located within the IJOA:

      i. Any alleged misconduct committed by servicemembers in the grade of E-8 or above will be reported by the immediate commander to the senior service-specific force commander with a copy furnished to the USF-I OSJA within 48 hours of the unit receiving information of the alleged senior leader misconduct.

      ii. Any misconduct allegedly committed by a servicemember of any grade involving individuals of a different service, either as alleged accomplices or victims, will be reported by the immediate commander to the senior service-specific force commander under USF-I with a copy furnished to the USF-I OSJA within 48 hours of the unit receiving information to that effect.

      iii. Any servicemember of any grade pending potential special or general court-martial may not be transferred or redeployed out of the IJOA without at least 72 hours notice (absent exigent circumstances) to the service-specific force commander with a copy furnished to the USF-I OSJA. This will permit coordination and resolution should service-specific requirements be in conflict.
d. The appropriate level judge advocate will notify the USF-I OSJA after becoming aware of cases or allegations falling within the following two categories:

i. Any criminal case which has the potential to be high profile will be reported through judge advocate technical channels to the USF-I OSJA within 24 hours of receiving information to that effect. “High profile” cases are defined as those cases which, due to their subject matter or circumstances, have the potential to attract media attention or otherwise be tracked or inquired about by superior authority outside the IJOA.

ii. Any allegations of sexual assault, including any offense potentially punishable under Article 120, UCMJ, will be reported through judge advocate technical channels to the USF-I OSJA within 48 hours of receiving information to that effect. Any major changes in the status of the case will be updated to the USF-I OSJA.

e. When not otherwise prohibited by USF-I General Order Number 1, dated 1 January 2010, a general officer in command within the IJOA has authority to issue general orders and policies which apply geographically to all Department of Defense civilians, contractors, and servicemembers, regardless of branch of service, whose place of duty or quarters is located within that general officer’s area of responsibility. The disposition of any alleged violation of the general order or policy of a commanding general of one service by a servicemember of a different service must be referred directly to the alleged violator’s service-specific chain of command. The USF-I OSJA may assist with referral of the alleged misconduct to the service-specific chain of command.

f. In the case of alleged misconduct by civilians serving with or accompanying the force (e.g., Department of Defense Civilians, contractors, subcontractors), such misconduct may not be referred to the Government of Iraq (GOI) for prosecution without prior coordination with the USF-I OSJA. This requirement also prohibits informal coordination or discussion with GOI authorities about pending investigations on contractors without prior coordination with USF-I OSJA. It does not prohibit coordination to address law enforcement matters necessarily within the immediate purview of the GOI (e.g., coordination necessitated by the arrest of an American civilian off the installation) or as required by the Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence in Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, Article 12.
USF-I-CG

SUBJECT: USF-I Policy on Notification and Coordination Requirements for Alleged and Suspected Misconduct within the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA).

5. The point of contact for this action is MAJ. E. John Gregory, USF-I Chief of Military Justice, at DSN 318-483-5061 and eugene.gregory@iraq.centcom.mil.

6 Encls.

as

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
Commander, USF-I, Army Element (ARFOR)
Commander, USF-I, Air Force Element (AFFOR)
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Commander, USD-S
Commander, JFSOCC-I
Commander, 332d AEW
Commander, 732d AEW
Commander, 103rd ESC
Commander, 402d AFSB
OIC, USNAVCENT -Fwd-Iraq
OIC, USMARCENT-Fwd-Iraq
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SJA, MARCENT
SJA, ARCENT-Fwd
SJA, SOCCENT
SJA, JFSOCC-I
SJA, Al Asad Airbase (AAAB)
Appendix D

Witness Travel Arrangements for OIF 10-11

Witness transportation during OIF 10-11 presented no significant obstacles, though it required planning ahead, flexibility, and monitoring. While some of this information is dated (and for Iraq, obsolete), it may be useful by analogy to future deployments.

For the Afghanistan/Iraq area of operations (AO), witness travel from CONUS could be conceptually divided into three phases. First, the witness must travel from CONUS to the Kuwait International Airport (KIA). Second, the witness must travel from Kuwait to Iraq or Afghanistan. And third, the witness must travel to the pinpoint location of the trial within the combat theater. Getting to KIA is easy. The witness simply uses a commercial airline ticket to fly from their departure point to KIA. If the witness is military, the witness uses the Defense Travel System (DTS), to purchase the commercial ticket. If the witness is a civilian, the ticket is arranged by the Government as discussed below, along with his invitational travel orders (ITO). Once at KIA, there were two options available for witnesses to get to Iraq/Afghanistan. The first option was military air transportation (MILAIR). The second option, at least during OIF 10-11, was a fee-based commercial airline.

Unless extraordinary circumstances justified the significant additional cost of the commercial airline, witnesses would typically fly MILAIR from Kuwait into Iraq/Afghanistan. Assuming MILAIR transportation from KIA to Iraq/Afghanistan, once the witness arrives via commercial carrier to KIA, there were regular military ground shuttles and liaisons to get the military witness from KIA to the FOB Logistics Support Area (FOB LSA) located on the Ali Al Salem Airbase, Kuwait for further movement via MILAIR to Iraq or Afghanistan. The witness would spend from a few hours to a few days at FOB LSA in Kuwait, but billeting (tents) and food (at the Dining Facility or “DFAC”) were provided for all persons located on the FOB. If the witness needed to secure body armor in Kuwait, it could be arranged by coordinating with civilian personnel located at the “body armor warehouse” at the LSA on Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait. Although military personnel TDY in theater were not required to have weapons, on the few occasions that incoming military defense counsel asked for weapons, the USF–I MJD arranged for loaner weapons from the USF–I Special Troops Battalion (STB), which were then hand-receipted to incoming counsel, and could have just as easily been hand-receipted to incoming military witnesses. After stopping over at FOB LSA, the witness then flies via MILAIR (usually a C-130) to Baghdad or Sather Airbase located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP).

A. Considerations for Military Witnesses

Because an active duty military witness will rarely be considered unavailable to testify in person, if the defense carries its burden to demonstrate that a merits witness is necessary, relevant and noncumulative, the Government will have to produce the witness. The good news is that active duty witnesses are relatively easy to produce. When producing active duty witnesses, first, the deployed military justice practitioner should coordinate with the witness and the witness’ CONUS command. Next, the deployed unit should transmit a line of accounting (LOA) to the CONUS witness’ DTS account. In the Iraq/Afghanistan case, the military witness will usually make his own travel arrangements using DTS from home station to KIA. Once the witness arrives from Kuwait to one of the larger bases in Iraq or Afghanistan, the military justice paralegals should take steps, such as arranging travel by helicopter or ground convoy. The deployed practitioner must keep the military witness informed of these steps. Witnesses who are very junior Servicemembers may need some additional hand holding, but any E-5 or above should be able to take travel orders and independently travel to the place of trial. Of course, the supporting

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170 The Defense Travel System (DTS) is the official, web-based orders requesting and funding system for official travel in the department of defense. http://www.defensetravel.osd.mil/dts/site/index.jsp.

171 During OIF 10-11, the fee-based commercial airline was Gryphon® Airlines. http://www.flygryphon.com/. If the command is willing to fund the additional expense of funding this carrier, then witnesses can fly directly from KIA to Baghdad, Iraq or Bagram, Afghanistan and skip the LSA in Kuwait entirely. During OIF 10-11, although USF–I validated the use of Gryphon® by flying trainers from the Defense International Institute of Legal Studies (DIILS) into BIAP from KIA, USF–I did not utilize the contract airline to transport witnesses. While more expensive, the deployed practitioner may want to keep this airline in mind for witnesses that may require additional accommodation, such as older family members, where avoiding MILAIR may have some benefit beyond mere comfort and convenience.

172 During OIF 10-11, civilian witnesses were required to spend at least twenty-four hours at the define (LSA) in Kuwait.

173 During OIF 10-11, BIAP was divided into two sides, a “civilian side” in the “Red Zone,” open to civilian travelers to and from Iraq, and a “military side,” also called “Sather Airbase” which was located within the Victory Base Complex (VBC) perimeter.
MJD will provide the necessary information and assist with the arrangement of in-country transportation, but at the end of the
day, these are US Servicemembers who are trained to deploy.

B. Considerations for Civilian Witnesses

Production of civilian witnesses, while not overly complicated, could be tedious. It required more lead time and
organization because civilians are not required be ready for immediate deployment as Soldiers are. Still, arranging a
civilian’s ticket to Kuwait was no harder than arranging a servicemember’s. Army Regulation 27-10 empowers an OCONUS
JA to coordinate with the Clerk of Court, U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, to arrange invitational travel orders (ITO). During
OIF 10–11, the USF–I OSJA MJD did so several times and found the process both convenient and expedient. Once the
witnesses arrived in Kuwait, the deployed command (i.e., its MJ practitioners) had to ensure the witnesses reached the place
of trial. They did so by coordinating with their liaisons in Kuwait to ensure the witnesses got from KIA Ali al-Salem and
then onto MILAIR for transport to Iraq. Once at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), unit personnel met the witnesses and
transported them to billeting. Some installations had Distinguished Visitor’s Quarters (DVQs) which were sometimes
available for civilian witness lodging.

If there are a large number of witnesses or other logistical burdens, the brigade TC may want to ask the GCMCA to issue
a FRAGO covering all the logistical aspects of the court-martial and assigning definite responsibilities to particular units to
carry out specified tasks. This was done in the Bjork case. The FRAGO directed the USF–I Special Troops Battalion (STB)
liason at KIA to arrange for the witnesses to travel from KIA to BIAP. It directed the installation garrison command at VBC
to provide lodging, box meals for court personnel during the day, and dining facility access for all witnesses without
Department of Defense ID cards. The FRAGO also directed USD-C (1AD) to provide all the logistics for a site visit by
the defense counsel.

With civilian witnesses, the practitioner must be aware of host and transit nation visa requirements. Kuwait, for
example, requires a visa for non-DoD civilians, but the visa can be purchased upon arrival at KIA for US passport holders.
Iraq also required either its own visa or some other form of approval from its Ministry of the Interior. The USF–I DSJA-
FWD worked closely with the Ministry and could get such approval quickly. Addressing these visa requirements is
another function for which a TC should be able to rely on his higher echelon MJD.

C. Considerations for Civilian Defense Counsel (CDC).

During OIF 10–11, CDC typically arranged their own transportation into the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP).
They were subject to and personally responsible for the same Iraqi visa requirements as any other foreign civilians. Once
they arrived at the civilian side of BIAP, sometimes TDS and sometimes Government paralegals, would drive to the civilian
side of the airport (which was located outside of the VBC US-manned perimeter, but inside an Iraqi Army-manned
perimeter) and pick them up. The CDC could gain access to Camp Victory with an American passport. An alternate way for
civilian counsel to arrive in Baghdad (and Afghanistan) was by flying the available commercial fee-based airline out of
Kuwait. To do this, CDC would purchase commercial tickets to KIA and then purchase an additional commercial ticket from
KIA to Baghdad on the commercial fee-based airline. However CDC got themselves to Baghdad, once they were there,
USF–I military personnel assisted them to get to the required pinpoint location inside Iraq.

174 See MCM, supra note 22, para. 18-22a (empowering “a representative of the convening authority” to do this).
175 Depending on deployment location, there may be other minor considerations. For instance, during OIF 10–11, it was a theater-wide requirement that all
personnel on base wear reflective belts at night, presumably to avoid being hit by errant drivers.
176 It is important to note that this FRAGO did not come as a surprise to any of the supporting units. Both the requirements and actual draft FRAGO were
carefully vetted with the responsible judge advocates in those units, in close coordination with the units’ planning and operations staffs. The result was
100% “buy-in” to the FRAGO when it came time for mission execution.
177 Visa Services, GENERAL CONSULATE OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT–LOS ANGELES, http://www.kuwaitconsulate.org/#!services/vstc3=visa-services (last
178 During OIF 10–11, the “USF–I Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (Forward)” was located in the New Embassy Company (NEC) in the “Green Zone” and so
had closer access to and an established relationship with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. While coordinating permission with the GoI MoI for each witness
worked effectively for the III Corps team during OIF 10–11, the author recommends that future practitioners work with witnesses to secure regular Iraqi
visitor visas. Civilian defense counsel required a civilian visa to enter Iraq.
Well-developed, theater-wide military justice structure, but even without such a structure, military justice practitioners have access to e-mail successfully tired in Iraq before USF-I.

Finally, when considering whether the court-martial system set forth in the UCMJ can be effectively deployed, the mere fact that a commander decides to send some cases back to the rear or even not try and cases in theater has little bearing on the deployability of the court-martial system itself. The ready availability of efficient transportation may well make this the correct decision in a given case. But, for TC to give sound advice based on the actual capabilities provided by the UCMJ and the worldwide Judge Advocate General’s Corps, deployed Js assigned to military justice duties must make military justice not the “fifth priority,” but their first.
Training the Rules of Engagement for the Counterinsurgency Fight

Major Winston S. Williams

I. Introduction

Counterinsurgency is war, and war is inherently violent. Killing the enemy is, and always will be, a key part of guerilla warfare . . . But successful counterinsurgents discriminate with extreme precision between . . . combatants and noncombatants.1

Over the past few years, U.S. Armed Forces have struggled with achieving the goals of counterinsurgency while not undermining the right of self-defense.2 Though the objective of counterinsurgency is to garner the support of the local populace,3 the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) state that “[u]nit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or hostile intent.”4 The counterinsurgency objectives and the right of self-defense may force a commander to choose between protecting the Soldiers and the population. Can units garner support from the populace for the host nation government and not undermine the right of self defense?

Achieving counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives while effectively exercising the right of self-defense requires persistent and deliberate rules of engagement training. This article shows that the current ROE training methods do not sufficiently prepare leaders and Soldiers for the complexities of counterinsurgency. Adequate ROE training for the counterinsurgency fight can educate and prepare leaders and Soldiers for the challenges associated with counterinsurgency operations. Commanders, with the assistance of their judge advocates, must tailor rules of engagement training to meet the mission requirements of the counterinsurgency fight.

II. The Rules of Engagement in Counterinsurgency

A soldier fired upon in conventional war who does not fire back with every available weapon would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty; the reverse would be the case in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is to apply the minimum of fire.5

Counterinsurgency doctrine and the rules of engagement are inseparable at the tactical level. Soldiers at this level face an indistinguishable enemy who attacks these Soldiers from buildings or other areas populated with noncombatant civilians to provoke the use of force in self-defense.6 Major General Robert Neller wrote, “[t]hough the inherent right of self-defense will always remain paramount in a COIN environment the default reaction must always be to ‘not shoot.’”7 This proposition is a harsh reality for Soldiers and Marines at the tactical level.

The current SROE for U.S. Forces “establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all military operations . . . .”8 These rules set the foundation for

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2 DAVID KILCULLEN, COUNTERINSURGENCY 4 (2010).


4 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES app. A (13 June 2005) [hereinafter CJCISI 3121.01B].


the development of theater specific ROE in the form of mission specific ROE or supplemental measures. In fact, because the SROE are fundamentally permissive, all commanders have to notify the Secretary of Defense of any further restrictions placed on the SROE. The SROE provide definitions and procedures for the use of force in self-defense and encompasses proportionality. These concepts of self-defense and proportionality are at the heart of the friction between counterinsurgency doctrine and the rules of engagement.

The SROE have included the inherent right of self-defense since the first draft over ten years ago. The SROE describe the inherent right defense by stating that unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-defense. As such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their unit.

Under the current SROE, individual self-defense is not without limit and the unit commander regulates this individual right, which differs from the 2000 SROE. The previous definition separated unit self defense from individual self-defense and defined individual self-defense as the inherent right to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend oneself and US forces in one’s vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent is a unit of self-defense. Commanders have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective units understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense.

The difference between these definitions is important to the counterinsurgency fight for two reasons. First, this change allows the unit commander to control the use of force in self-defense. The commander has discretion to respond, or not respond, to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent by an insurgent that is designed to create civilian casualties. For example, a common tactic of insurgents in Afghanistan is to commit a hostile act “with the primary purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit . . . .” On one occasion, the Taliban held a wedding party hostage while engaging Soldiers in the hopes of provoking a violent response, which would have created civilian casualties. Contrary to the Taliban’s intent, the commander limited his troops’ use of self-defense to avoid civilian casualties, which is consistent with General Petraeus’ guidance. The second reason is the persistent, incorrect belief that the right of individual self-defense is absolute. The 2005 SROE clarifies the role and limits of individual self-defense as a subset of unit self-defense.

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9 CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 4, at 2.
10 Id. at I-1 (stating the “SROE are fundamentally permissive in that a commander may use any lawful weapon or tactic available for mission accomplishment, unless specifically restricted by approved supplemental measures . . . .”). The permissive nature of the SROE is a result of a finding by the DOD Commission on the Beirut Bombing, which stated: The Commission believes that for any ROE to be effective, they should incorporate definitions of hostile intent and hostile act which correspond to the realities of the environment in which they are to be implemented. To be adequate, they must also provide the commander explicit authority to respond quickly to acts defined as hostile. Only when these two criteria are satisfied do ROE provide the on-scene commander with the guidance and the flexibility he requires to defend his force.

11 CJCSA 3121.01B, supra note 4, at A-2, A-3. The SROE states, “[t]he use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent. Id. The SROE distinguishes between proportionality in self-defense and the law of war principle of proportionality by stating that “proportionality in self-defense should not be confused with the attempts to minimize collateral damage during offensive operations.” Id. at A-3.

12 Id. at A-2; CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES (13 Jan. 2000) [hereinafter CJCSI 3121.01A].
13 CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 4, at A-2.

14 CJCSI 3121.01A, supra note 12, at A-3.
15 FM 3-24, supra note 3, para. 1-152; Telephone Interview with Colonel Richard C. Gross, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Central Command (Jan. 13, 2011) (discussing a common Taliban tactic in Afghanistan where the Taliban would engage ISAF from a civilian dwelling to entice the unit to overreact with an airstrike on the dwelling, which often caused many civilian casualties).


17 Memorandum from General David Petraeus, to Soldiers et al., subject: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (27 July 2010) [hereinafter COMISAF COIN Guidance Memorandum].

18 See Rajiv Chandrasekran, Petraeus Reviews Directive Meant to Limit Afghan Civilian Deaths, WASH. POST (July 9 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070806219_2.html?sid=ST2010070905635 (quoting a Soldier who stated that the “rules of engagement provide an absolute right of self defense.”). See also JOHN J. MERRIAM, NATURAL LAW AND SELF DEFENSE (2011) (contending that self
Furthermore, any use of force in self-defense, whether individual or unit self-defense, must comply with the principle of proportionality. The SROE’s definition of proportionality, however, is often confused with the Law of War Principle of Proportionality, which mandates that the “loss of life and property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained.” The practical application of this principle in counterinsurgency is a paradox in itself. While Law of War’s Principle of Proportionality universally applies in any targeting decision, the SROE’s principle of proportionality only applies in self-defense. The SROE defines proportionality as follows:

The use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent. Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration and scope of force used should not exceed what is required.

Although unit commanders have control over the proportional response in self-defense situations, higher-level commanders have directed de-escalation in areas where civilians may be present.

One key component of the strategy in Afghanistan to reduce civilian casualties is the focus on an element of de-escalation, withdrawal, prior to employing airstrikes or other uses of force against residential compounds. Under this strategy, in responding to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent, Soldiers are required to consider other courses of action short of the use of force, including withdrawal. This type of de-escalation is consistent with General Petraeus’ statement that “[e]very Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause. If we use excessive force or operate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.” Although this strategy has had some success in controlling civilian casualties, some legal scholars have debated the

25 Id. at A-2.
26 See See Second Lieutenant Brendan Groves, Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations: Lessons Learned From the Azizabad Attacks, 65A.F. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (stating that commanders direct ground forces to consider withdrawal prior to authorizing unplanned airstrikes); Chandrasekaran, supra note 18; Oppel & Nordland, supra note 18 (asserting that commanders placed even more restrictions on the employment of force in residential compounds to avoid civilian casualties).
27 Withdrawal, as applied under the SROE’s principle of de-escalation allows the enemy, “when time and circumstance permit,” the “opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions.” CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 4, at 4. For the purposes of this section, the term is used consistent with the directives in Afghanistan, which requires ISAF to consider withdrawing to de-escalate rather than escalate force in residential areas. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
28 See Groves, supra note 26, at 5 (stating that commanders direct ground forces to consider withdrawal prior to authorizing unplanned airstrikes); Opel & Nordland, supra note 18 (contending that the tactical directive restricts the use of small arms fire where civilians may be present). See also Spencer Ackerman, New Afghan Air War? Don’t Count On It, General Says, DANGER ROOM (Aug. 10, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://wired.com/dangerroom (quoting Brigadier General Jack Briggs, “[i]f it comes to a point where [ground troops] cannot withdraw, if they cannot maneuver themselves out of a situation, that’s when air, and particularly our kinetic air [power], comes in and becomes sort of our choice of last resort.”). Brigadier General Briggs was the commander of the 455 Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan. Id.
effectiveness of the current rules of engagement and the law of war in a counterinsurgency. Applying the rules of engagement in a population-centric operation is not an easy task.

Leaders and Soldiers face a daunting task on the ground in Afghanistan. While commanders, legal scholars, and the general public debate the proper application of the concepts of self-defense and proportionality, many Soldiers are engaged in day-to-day operations in Afghanistan under the existing rules of engagement. In order to prepare leaders and Soldiers for the challenges in counterinsurgency, commanders have to use the existing concepts and develop training that complies with not only the rules of engagement but also counterinsurgency doctrine.

III. Counterinsurgency Rules of Engagement Training

Soldiers execute in the manner they train; they will carry out their tasks in compliance with the ROE when trained to do so.

The unique challenges of counterinsurgency require leaders to train Soldiers for a decentralized fight in a complex environment. The general trends in Afghanistan “indicate the need for decentralized positions, distributed operations, effective small-unit leaders, and well-trained small units that must bear the brunt of close combat.” Furthermore, the adaptability of the enemy compounds the challenges these small–unit leaders face. With these challenges in mind, leaders and judge advocates should focus counterinsurgency ROE training toward empowering small-unit leaders to make critical decisions on the application of force. In order to achieve this goal, the training must be rooted in principles and reinforced regularly.

A. Training ROE Principles for the Decentralized Counterinsurgency Fight

You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently and independently without orders.

In counterinsurgency, as in most conflicts, leaders and their Soldiers face situations where principle-based decisions are more effective than adherence to hard and fast rules. When these “principles conform both to tactical wisdom and to the relevant legal constraints on the use of force, then the larger system of ROE governing the ground component in a particular deployment will best serve military objectives and national interest.” The two relevant principles to the military objective in counterinsurgency, winning the local populace, are self-defense and proportionality. Judge advocates must develop training for small-unit leaders to educate their Soldiers on these two principles. To be effective, judge advocates should leverage Situational Training Exercise (STX) lanes as the primary forum for company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers to train their Soldiers.

1. Situational Training for Self-Defense and Proportionality

The best method for teaching the application of self-defense and proportionality to counterinsurgency is situational training. This type of training “focuses on one or
a small group of tasks—within a particular mission scenario—and requires that Soldiers practice until they perform the task to standard.”44 Decentralized ROE training requires commanders and judge advocates to establish a “uniform standard.”45 Thus, judge advocates should work with commanders to develop standards for ROE training far in advance of a deployment to a counterinsurgency operation.46 After establishing these standards, the judge advocate develops realistic ROE vignettes based on theater lessons learned.47

The most effective ROE vignettes are from the relevant theater of operations.48 Realistic ROE vignette training provides “a window into how [a] Soldier thinks” and gives the leader an “opportunity to train the Soldier and teach him a different way of looking at the situation.”49 Hence, ROE vignette training provides the proper forum for judge advocates to assist leaders with training Soldiers on the application of self-defense and proportionality in a counterinsurgency. At the completion of vignette development, the judge advocate should work with the small unit leadership to identify the proper trainers at the company and platoon levels, and plan to monitor the training, not run it himself.

2. Empowering Small Unit Leaders for Counterinsurgency ROE Training

Training a brigade combat team on the ROE is a difficult task for judge advocates because of limited legal assets at the brigade and battalion level. A recent AAR comment from Afghanistan shows that “[i]t is very hard for a brigade legal team to train and educate a 6,000 person BCT on . . . the rules of engagement on a regular basis.”50 To alleviate this burden, judge advocates should train the senior noncommissioned officers and company commanders and allow these leaders to train their Soldiers.51 Thus, the judge advocate is the primary trainer for the company commanders and the senior noncommissioned officers. These company level leaders will be the primary trainers for their Soldiers. The efficacy of this approach depends on timing; therefore, the training should start well in advance of a deployment.52

Many judge advocates in the field have insufficient time to properly train the ROE in advance of their deployments.53 and do not incorporate ROE into STX lane training. Even at the combat training centers, ROE training by the rotational unit is typically limited to a vignette driven briefing and not incorporated into STX lanes.54 These current ROE training trends show that units are not incorporating the ROE into their collective training events during their pre-deployment timeline—the Army Force Generation cycle.55

A unit’s timeline for deployment flows from the Army Force Generation cycle, which includes three distinct phases—reset, train/ready, and available.56 The critical

44 Id.

45 Captain Howard H. Hoege, ROE . . . also a Matter of Doctrine, ARMY LAW., June 2002, at 1, 5.

46 See Martins, supra note 8, at 83. The standards for counterinsurgency ROE training must require each Soldier to understand the right of self-defense, proportionality, and counterinsurgency objectives. See supra notes 45, 56, 64 and accompanying text.


48 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION AAR, supra note 47, at 18. The Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) is a good resource for theater ROE vignettes and lessons learned. See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, https://www.jagnet.army.mil/8252751d00557eff.

49 Cady, supra note 47, at 62 (highlighting the importance of understanding the Soldier’s thought process and tailor the training to adjusting that thought process to conform with the training standards).


51 See Hoege, supra note 45, at 3-5. Captain Hoege gives several reasons for empowering NCOs to train Soldiers on ROE. He rightly points out that training Soldiers is a primary task of NCOs, and that NCO leadership can identify the strongest trainers for ROE. He also notes that NCOs have knowledge JAs lack on the specific needs of the unit, and can integrate ROE training with the constant training they give the Soldiers. A point he does not mention is that Soldiers will take instruction from the leaders who will be with them in combat far better than from a staff officer whose duties do not lie there.

52 Martins, supra note 8, at 82.


54 Lund Interview, supra note 53 (stating that the pre-deployment priority for the brigade legal section is military justice and adverse administrative actions, which leaves little time for ROE training events); Johnson e-mail, supra note 53.

55 All brigade combat teams deploying to Afghanistan execute a Mission Readiness Exercise at one of the three combat training centers. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-0, TRAINING FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS para. 4-1 (12 Dec. 2008) [hereinafter FM 7-0).

56 Id. The Army Force Generation cycle provides combatant commands with forces that are ready to deploy to contingency operations. Units conduct all of their individual training and squad level collective training during the reset phase. This phase is the optimum time period for judge advocates to train commanders and senior noncommissioned officers. The train/ready phase usually involves a combat training center rotation where the unit executes higher level collective training.
phases for ROE training are the first two phases where the units conduct individual and collective training. Judge advocates should endeavor to conduct ROE individual training during the reset phase. The audience for this training is the company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers.

Early execution of the situational training for company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers will allow them to incorporate ROE vignettes into the squad level collective training, which also occurs in the reset phase. The judge advocate plays a supervisory role in the train/ready phase by getting feedback from the collective training and after-action reviews during the combat training center rotation. The benefit of this approach to ROE training is that it produces more trainers at the company level if practicable. The focus for the ROE training should be on the incoming commanders and senior noncommissioned officers. This approach to ROE training and after-action reviews during the combat training center rotation is indispensible to providing the necessary feedback for the unit to conduct ROE refresher training in theater.

B. Periodic ROE Reinforcement Training in Theater

Training counterinsurgents in ROE should be reinforced regularly.

The complex counterinsurgency environment often renders pre-deployment ROE training and planning ineffective upon the unit’s arrival in theater. Furthermore, this environment entails a “cycle of adaptation...” between insurgents and counterinsurgents; both sides continually adapt to neutralize existing adversary advantages and develop new (usually short-lived) advantages of their own. Victory is gained through a tempo or rhythm of adaptation that is beyond the other side’s ability to achieve or sustain. In order to keep pace with this cycle of adaptation, ROE training should be continuous throughout the deployment. Judge advocates should leverage the unit’s update briefs and the small-unit leadership to adjust ROE training to enemy tactics and distribute training resources to the lowest level. The small-unit leaders, who understand the ROE, will not only disseminate these training resources but also provide input on their relevance and effectiveness.

Most units in theater have some form of update brief on a daily or weekly basis, which provides the staff and the commanders with situational awareness. These update briefs will provide the requisite situational awareness to develop new ROE vignettes. The shift-change briefing is a briefing conducted by the staff, which includes significant enemy activity over a twenty-four hour period. During this briefing, the intelligence section briefs “significant enemy actions” and “changes in the most likely enemy courses of action.” This portion of the brief gives the legal team a snapshot of enemy activity, which will enable the team to identify trends and update the vignettes for periodic ROE training. While judge advocates use these briefs to gain situational awareness, they should also study the results of investigations related to the ROE and discuss these with their primary trainers—company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers.

Since the company leaders “bear the brunt” of the combat operations in counterinsurgency, these leaders are the subject matter experts on enemy tactics and trends. The company commanders rely on their company intelligence support teams to provide them with the updated enemy situation, analysis and trends. Consequently, prior to developing ROE refresher training in theater, judge advocates should endeavor to conduct training for the incoming commanders and other leadership positions. The focus for the ROE training should be on the incoming commanders and leaders if practicable.

64 See id. para 4-24.
65 Id. para 4-3.
66 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The small-unit leaders’ knowledge and understanding of the ROE is critical to the efficacy of refresher training development and dissemination.
67 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The small-unit leaders’ knowledge and understanding of the ROE is critical to the efficacy of refresher training development and dissemination.
69 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL-INTERIM 5-0.1, THE OPERATIONS PROCESS para. 2-76 (31 Mar. 2006) (C1, 14 Mar. 2008) [hereinafter FM 5-0.1]. Situational awareness is “knowledge of the immediate present environment including the knowledge of METT-TC.” Id. METT-TC is an acronym for Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time and Civil Considerations. FM 3-0, supra note 29, para 1-42. This acronym describes mission variables, which are “those aspects of the operational environment that directly affect a mission.” Id.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The small-unit leaders’ knowledge and understanding of the ROE is critical to the efficacy of refresher training development and dissemination.


See id.

See id.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The small-unit leaders’ knowledge and understanding of the ROE is critical to the efficacy of refresher training development and dissemination.


See id.
advocates should seek input from company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers. The input from these leaders will enhance the relevance and effectiveness of the training. After gathering all the input from shift change briefs, investigations, and company leadership, the judge advocate develops and disseminates updated ROE vignettes for refresher training.75

Small-unit leaders have multiple methods of conducting refresher training and reinforcing the ROE at their level outside of the standard classroom briefing. These leaders can incorporate the updated ROE vignettes in the unit’s rehearsals.76 For battalion level operations, company commanders can include the updated ROE vignettes in the unit’s combined arms rehearsal.77 For company level operations and below, squad leaders can update their battle drills and standard operating procedures in accordance with the latest vignettes.78 The integration of the ROE into these rehearsals provides the leaders with the necessary knowledge to adapt and continue to achieve the counterinsurgency objectives while not undermining the right of self-defense.

IV. Conclusion

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign — a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists.79

Counterinsurgency operations is still one of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces80 As long as these types of operations continue, leaders at all levels will struggle with the challenges of “winning the hearts and minds” of the local populace81 and exercising the right of unit self-defense. Unit predeployment ROE training and theater refresher training can assist leaders with clearing some of the “fog of war”82 related to applying the ROE in the counterinsurgency fight. Incorporating and co-opting as many leaders and noncommissioned officers into ROE training are vital to the Soldiers’ understanding of the application of the ROE in the counterinsurgency fight. These leaders will continually train their Soldiers in theater to adapt to the changing enemy situation and garner the support of the local populace.

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75 One method of disseminating the updated ROE vignettes is by fragmentary order (FRAGO). A FRAGO is an “abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order . . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 5-0, THE OPERATIONS PROCESS para. I-9 (26 Mar. 2010), [hereinafter FM 5-0]. The frequency of ROE refresher training will vary depending on METT-TC.

76 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24.2 TACTICS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY para. 4-132 (26 Mar. 2010). There are five types of rehearsals, “confirmation brief, the back brief, the combined arms rehearsal, the support rehearsal, and the battle drill or SOP rehearsal.” Id.

77 FM 5-0, supra note 75, para. E-3. This type of rehearsal is a synchronization tool for subordinate units and occurs after these units receive an operation order. Id.

78 Id. para. I-11. A battle drill is defined as “a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decisionmaking process.” Id. Battle drills are ingrained into every Soldier at the lowest levels and become an unthinking response to an enemy action. See generally id. Thus, the goal of the judge advocate is to incorporate as much of the ROE into these drills to ensure that the response to enemy action does not undermine the law of war or the mission objectives.


81 FM 3-24, supra note 3, para. A-26. “‘Hearts’ means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. ‘Minds’ means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless.” Id.

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Legal Reviews

Major Theodore T. Richard

Introduction

You are assigned as a contract/fiscal law attorney in Afghanistan and you are handed a file to review marked “LOGCAP.” You are told that this is merely a project validation, and not a final contract—no prices have yet been finalized. What information is necessary for you to complete a review of this file? This article will help you understand the LOGCAP validation process and the role of the legal advisor in that process.

LOGCAP validation results in U.S. military commanders committing funds for LOGCAP requirements. Commanders are entrusted with funds to pay for LOGCAP projects and have the statutory and regulatory duty to “[l]imit the obligation and expenditure of funds provided to the amount currently available at the time of the obligation or expenditure, enforce those limitations, and ensure that all personnel involved in administrative control and use of available funds are knowledgeable of such limitations.”1 Commanders must also “[r]igorously enforce compliance with all the provisions of the Antideficiency Act (ADA) and other specific laws that limit the obligation and expenditure of funds.”2

Commanders look to their judge advocates for independent legal advice, including on the legality of funding LOGCAP projects.3

LOGCAP uses rapid contracting authorities to undertake projects within fifteen days from the approval of the requirement by the task force commander.4 The speed of the process is “underpinned by the assumption that, for critical and dynamic wartime logistics requirements, there is not sufficient time to wait for a full proposal that can be analyzed and negotiated prior to the commencement of work.”5 Importantly, “rapid contracting authorities” allow for large LOGCAP projects to be started quickly, but proposals for such projects must still contain significant information before commanders and their staffs can validate them.

As will be explained in this paper, commanders and their staffs need answers to a series of questions and unredacted, detailed price estimates in order to validate LOGCAP projects. This information is necessary to ensure that LOGCAP projects conform to traditional fiscal law standards of purpose, time, and amount.6 Rapid contracting authorities do not allow government officials to bypass congressional fiscal limitations on contracting. According to the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the General Counsel, “contracts for obtaining logistics and engineering services and supplies under LOGCAP are not subject to special treatment under the law: they must be formed, funded, and executed in accordance with the laws and regulations governing government contracts generally.”7

The Afghanistan LOGCAP Process

In 1985, the U.S. Army established LOGCAP as a means to “preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime to augment Army forces.”8 LOGCAP contracts are intended to augment combat support and combat service support to military forces.9 They are not, however, intended to provide permanent support: “LOGCAP is designed for initial force deployment and employment support, it is not intended to be utilized for long-term sustainment support. It is Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) policy that all of the LOGCAP task orders [be] designed to be readily converted to competitive theater support contracts.”10

Multiple parties are involved in executing LOGCAP. The Army has a deployed team consisting of a LOGCAP deputy program manager, a planning team, and a LOGCAP Support Unit, to assist commanders by providing a single...

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1 U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate. Currently assigned as the Staff Judge Advocate, 71st Flying Training Wing, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

2 Id.

3 See U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Pub. 1-06, Money as a Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS–A) 123 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter MAAWS–A] (“A legal review is required for all LOGCAP requirements $10,000 and greater. At a minimum the legal advisor for the requesting unit will conduct a legal review so that he can identify any issues prior to review by an acquisition review board.”).

4 See id. at 120, 122, 124, 127 (describing the time goals and approval process).

5 Id. at 121.
orders. The ACO places each order after receiving a Notice of Proposed Construction and Acquisition to determine if projects exceed congressional funding thresholds. According to the MAAWS–A, “[a] legal review is required for all LOGCAP requirements $10,000 and greater. At a minimum, the legal advisor for the requesting unit will conduct a legal review to identify any issues prior to review by an acquisition review board.” 22 This legal review is required to ensure compliance with fiscal law requirements: the purpose, time, and amount of funds required to be committed. 25

LOGCAP IV, the current LOGCAP contract in Afghanistan, is a cost-plus-award-fee contract with two competitively awarded task orders that cover geographic sections of the country. 14 Contractors provide supplies, services and construction when the DCMA ACO in theater directs commencement of work using undefinitized change orders. 15 The ACO places each order after receiving a Not-to-Exceed (NTE) ceiling price estimate from the contractor, validation of the requirement, and associated funding. 16

The NTE estimate is also known as a Project Planning Estimate (PPE). The PPE is created by the contractor upon receiving a project planning request (PPR) from a DCMA Logistics Support Officer (LSO). 17 The PPR includes a letter of justification (LOJ) signed by the O-6 task force commander. 18 The PPE is not a formal proposal, but is an estimate containing enough information to allow for a technical evaluation to ensure that the Government and the contractor agree on the scope of the effort. 19 Although

commanders must obligate funds to cover full PPE amounts once undefinitized task orders are approved, PPEs do not represent definitive fair and reasonable prices, nor are the amounts contained therein what the Government will ultimately pay. 20 Normally each PPE has three components: (1) the detailed PPE, which is not provided to the supported unit per LOGCAP and DCMA policy; (2) the summary PPE, which is provided to the supported unit; and (3) the Project Schedule, which is also provided to the supported unit in its entirety. 21 Although some contracting personnel in Afghanistan have said that the PPEs “are not worth the paper they are printed on” or that the PPEs are like “darts thrown at a wall,” contracting personnel at Rock Island indicate that the PPEs regularly reflect a value very close to the final price. 22 The PPE also sets a not-to-exceed ceiling price.

Following standard operating procedures, LOGCAP management and DCMA previous withheld the detailed PPEs from Regional Command (RC) and USFOR–A–level reviewers during the validation process. 23 The problem is that the summary PPEs do not give sufficient details for validation. The validation process requires analysis of the proposed construction and acquisition to determine if projects exceed congressional funding thresholds. According to the MAAWS–A, “[a] legal review is required for all LOGCAP requirements $10,000 and greater. At a minimum, the legal advisor for the requesting unit will conduct a legal review to identify any issues prior to review by an acquisition review board.” 24 This legal review is required to ensure compliance with fiscal law requirements: the purpose, time, and amount of funds required to be committed.

11 Id. at B-5.
12 Id. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is the combat support agency responsible for ensuring major Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs (systems, supplies, and services) are delivered on time, within projected cost or price, and meet performance requirements. Id. at D-1. When authorized, DCMA’s major role and responsibilities in contingency operations is to provide contingent contract administration services to LOGCAP and Air Force Civil Augmentation Program (AFCAP) external support contracts, for selected weapons systems support contracts with place of performance in the operational area, and theater support contracts.
13 DEF. CONTRACT MGMT. AGENCY, LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE, vers. 1.0, at 4 (30 Oct. 2009) [hereinafter LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE].
14 The LOGCAP IV Afghanistan task orders are split into northern and southern areas. MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 118.
15 Undefinitized change orders are, by definition, orders placed so that performance may begin before the final price is agreed upon. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT para. 217.7401(d) (Oct. 2009). They are also known as undefinitized contract actions, undefinitized task orders, or unpriced change orders. See GRASSO, supra note 9, at 25 & n.100; MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 118.
16 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 118.
17 LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE, supra note 13, at 14.
18 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 124.
19 LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE, supra note 13, at 27.
20 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 119.
21 LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE, supra note 13, at 27.
22 A Congressional Research Service report described undefinitized change orders, and specifically referred to Kellogg, Brown and Root’s estimates in another LOGCAP contract:

[R]ecent DCAA audits have found that these undefinitized task orders have given KBR a significant cost advantage. Auditors have found that DOD contracting officials were more willing to rely on KBR’s costs estimates, estimates later found to be greatly inflated. According to DCAA auditors, DOD contracting officials rarely challenged these cost estimates. The estimates became the baseline from which KBR established their costs upon which to bill the government, which later increased their overall profit.

GRASSO, supra note 9, at 25.
23 LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE, supra note 13, at 27.
24 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 123.
25 Id. at 120.
Fiscal Law Reviews of Construction

For a construction project, a fiscal law attorney must first determine the scope of the project. A “military construction project” includes all work necessary to produce a complete and usable facility, or a complete and usable improvement to an existing facility. In other words, all costs required to complete the facility must be counted toward the legal funding threshold costs—these are referred to as the “funded costs” of a project. Splitting a single project into separate ones to reduce costs below an approved threshold is prohibited, even if each separate project is complete and usable. Construction projects may be treated separately so long as they do not result in mutually dependent facilities. On the one hand, facilities with a common support purpose, but which are not mutually dependent, may be funded as separate projects. For example, billeting for soldiers is not mutually dependent on recreation facilities. On the other hand, a new airfield includes runways, taxiways, ramp space, and lighting. These projects, even if built by different companies, are mutually dependent to accomplish the intent of the construction project: a complete and usable airfield. They must be funded as one project.

Thus, if the command wants to build twelve trailers to house personnel for a test and training range, these must be funded as one project. Providing housing for the range is a single requirement, and the construction of each trailer is mutually dependent on the others to accomplish that requirement. For another example, consider the construction of related structures on an installation. The facilities include a water well, a water distribution plant, an electrical power plant, an electrical distribution facility and an office building. The well and water distribution facility are mutually dependent in supporting the function for which they are constructed, i.e., providing water for the installation. They must be funded as part of one project. The power plant and electrical distribution facility are mutually dependent in supporting the function for which they are constructed, i.e., providing electric power for the installation. They, too, must be funded as part of one project. None of these facilities depends on the office building. Water and electricity may be needed in the building, but the function of the building is not to provide water or electricity for the installation. The dependence is not mutual. The office building may be funded as a separate project.

The second part of the fiscal law analysis of construction deals with work classification. Work classification definitions and rules apply to all work projects on real property facilities, also known as “facilities engineering work,” regardless of who performs the work or how it is funded. The work will be either construction or repair. “Construction” includes any construction, development, conversion, or extension carried out with respect to a military installation, whether to satisfy temporary or permanent requirements, to include all work necessary to produce a complete and usable facility or a complete and usable improvement to an existing facility (or to produce such portion of a complete and usable facility or improvement as is specifically authorized by law). “Repair” means to restore a real property facility, system, or component to such a condition that it may effectively be used for its designated purpose.

The distinction between construction and repair is important from a fiscal law standpoint because different funding thresholds apply. Construction projects are financed with operation and maintenance (O&M) funds as long as the project’s funded costs do not exceed $750,000 ($1.5 million if the project is intended solely to correct a deficiency that threatens life, health, or safety). Operation & maintenance funds may also be used for repair projects costing less than $5,000,000, but only if the repairs cost less than half as much as replacement would. Specified construction projects over the O&M threshold are known as military construction (MILCON) and are authorized by the annual National Defense Authorization Act and funded through the National Defense Appropriations Acts. According to the MAAWS–A, LOGCAP should not be used for construction over the O&M threshold. The limitation on LOGCAP applies to repair projects exceeding the O&M threshold as well.

27 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 420-1, ARMY FACILITIES MANAGEMENT para. 2-15a(2) (Feb. 12, 2008)
31 10 U.S.C. § 2811(c) (2006); DA PAM. 420-11, supra note 30, para. 1-6b.
32 DA PAM. 420-11, supra note 30, para. 1-6a.
33 AR 420-1, supra note 27, para. 2-12d. Congress also provides annual funding for Unspecified Minor Military Construction (UMMC) projects. The UMMC funds may be used to carry out military construction projects with funded construction costs of $2 million or less (up to $3 million if the project is intended solely to correct an immediate deficiency that threatens life, health, or safety), but such projects must be approved by the service secretary with a congressional notification waiting period. MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 35.
34 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 32–33. Note that in Afghanistan, Regional Command commanders may only authorize repairs up to $3 million. Id. at 55.
35 Id. at 34.
36 Id. at 124.
A critical component of work classification is distinguishing funded project costs from unfunded project costs. As described above, the O&M construction threshold is defined by the funded project costs. Funded costs include, but are not limited to, materials, supplies, services applicable to the project, installed building equipment, civilian labor costs, as well as demolition and site preparation costs. Unfunded costs are those that would have been incurred whether or not the project was executed. They usually have application to many undertakings. Examples of unfunded costs include troop labor and personal property. Personal property consists of equipment of a movable nature that has been fixed in place or attached to real property, but may be severed or removed from buildings without destroying the usefulness of the facilities. The movability of property, however, is not exclusively determinative of its classification because property may also be essential to the usefulness of facilities.

Fiscal Law Reviews of Major End-items

Tactical and support vehicles, major communication and electronic equipment, centrally managed items, or equipment/systems costing $250K or more must be paid for with “Other Procurement, Army” (OPA) funds. The OPA threshold is applied to the cost of a complete system rather than to individual items that, when aggregated, become a system. “A system is comprised of a number of components that are part of and function within the context of a whole to satisfy a documented requirement. In this case, system unit cost applies to the aggregate cost of all components being acquired as a new system.” A fiscal law review needs to examine the costs of items and systems of items to ensure that OPA funds are not required for purchases that would otherwise be made with O&M.

37 See DA Pam. 420-11, supra note 30, para. 1-4b.
38 DoDFMR, supra note 1, vol. 3, ch. 17, para. 170203; AR 415-32, supra note 28, para. 2-5a; AR 420-1, supra note 30, para. 2-17c. Installed building equipment includes items of real property affixed to or built into a facility that are an integral part of the facility. Id. para. 4-58.
39 DA Pam. 420-11, supra note 30, para. 2-9b.
40 Examples include laundry and photographic equipment. Id. para. 4-59. Equipment that is movable and not affixed as an integral part of the facility (such as office machines and wall clocks) is generally accounted for as personal property rather than real property. Id. para. 4-60.
41 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 31. The primary source for the OPA threshold is the annual appropriations act. For example, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Public Law 112-10 § 8031 states, “During the current fiscal year, appropriations which are available to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance may be used to purchase items having an investment item unit cost of not more than $250,000.” The Secretary of Defense may raise the “Other Procurement, Army” (OPA) threshold to $500,000 in overseas contingency operations. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Operations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 9010, 125 Stat. 38, 101 (2011).
42 DoDFMR, supra note 1, vol. 2A, ch. 1, para. 010201D.1.f.

If the contractor purchases equipment or constructs a facility for itself to fulfill a proper LOGCAP services order, the cost of that purchase will not be subject to the government’s monetary limits. For example, if LOGCAP is used to provide electrical power, reimbursed based on kilowatts provided rather than equipment purchased, and the government does not take title to the power generation or distribution equipment—OPA and construction thresholds do not apply. When reimbursement is based on the cost of equipment purchased or constructed, or title to the property vests in the government, the monetary thresholds apply. According to the MAAWS–A, LOGCAP should not be used to procure investment items over the OPA threshold.

The Challenge of LOGCAP Fiscal Law Reviews Without the Complete Detailed PPE

Detailed PPE are not critical for service contracts as long as title to property does not vest in the government.

Whether a particular LOGCAP [change] order in fact constitutes an order for services will depend upon the intent of the government, as evidenced primarily by the [change] order’s terms in the context of the contract under which it is issued, including the manner in which the contract allocates business risks between the government and the contractor.

A primary consideration for whether funding thresholds apply to service contracts involves the ultimate title to end-items constructed or purchased under the contract. Title to all property purchased by a contractor, which will be reimbursed as a direct item of cost, vests in the government upon delivery. “Other factors include the government’s intent, the type of performance required under the task order, and the manner in which business risks are allocated between the government and the contractor.” In other words, the funding thresholds apply when “the task order requires the contractor to deliver investment end items that must be funded from procurement appropriations, or construct facilities that exceed statutory ceilings on O&M-funded construction, or the contractor is entitled to be reimbursed for the costs of such items or construction as direct items of cost.”

43 DoD General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
44 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 124.
45 DoD General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
46 FAR § 52.245-1(e)(3)(i) (this contract provision is required for cost reimbursement contracts by FAR § 45.107).
47 DoD General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
48 Id.
Fiscal law reviews of LOGCAP contracts involving construction or the procurement of supplies cannot be meaningfully completed without detailed PPE information.49 The summary PPE is too basic: it simply contains the total change order cost with subtotals for total labor, equipment, materials, and broadly defined “other direct costs” and “other indirect costs.” The document cannot be used to determine property classification or even what particular property is being used. This means that a legal reviewer cannot determine whether a given cost is funded or unfunded, and thus whether it counts toward the thresholds. The reviewer also cannot determine if items belong to a “system” in order to see whether the cost exceeds the OPA threshold.

A price-redacted detailed PPE regularly accompanies the summary PPE for construction projects. Without prices, this document has little value other than alerting reviewers to miscategorized line item expenses. The redacted, detailed PPE includes a breakdown of all materials purchased and has line items for labor and freight. It also contains a column titled “property type” in which the word “personal” appears, presumably designating items as personal property and thereby not funded costs of the project. Detailed PPE seldom categorize funded and unfunded costs correctly.50 Inevitably, items of installed building equipment are marked as personal property, while general use items such as “hammers” are marked as funded construction costs. Particularly when projects are close to funding thresholds, reviewers need the line item prices for their fiscal law analyses. Furthermore, without the itemized cost details, no one can see if items or systems of items exceed the OPA threshold.

**Concern over Delays**

Some have expressed concerns that providing unredacted, detailed PPE will delay projects. The goal of the LOGCAP is to begin performance on LOGCAP projects fifteen days from the LOI.51 In the first half of 2011, however, the average lead time to start LOGCAP performance under a new change order was 127 days from the LOJ. The RC-East Contract and Fiscal Law attorneys regularly reviewed LOJs which were four to twelve months old in validation packages. Delays were occurring at the brigade level where engineers must balance workload priorities. Brigade packages typically lacked detailed PPE with pricing information. In other words, experience illustrates that delays are already significant and are not linked to the disclosure of detailed PPE prices. Of course, the detailed pricing may result in questions from commanders. Thus, disclosing detailed PPE might further impact the implementation timeline of LOGCAP projects. Any such delays, however, could be mitigated based on mission priorities and command emphasis.

Commanders have the inherent right to see the LOGCAP estimates before funding projects. The MAAWS–A, however, states, “Under the LOGCAP contract, no one in theater has the responsibility or the authority to determine what will be considered a fair and reasonable price for new work that was not pre-negotiated in the contract.” Although theater commanders do not have the authority to determine LOGCAP’s “fair and reasonable price,” they do have the right to see the estimates for projects that they are funding. Commanders also have the authority use such information as the basis for rejecting a proposed LOGCAP project. Commanders at the brigade, division, and major command level are experienced decision makers. Redacting pricing data to protect commanders from themselves is not an appropriate mechanism to facilitate mission accomplishment. Commanders, as both the LOGCAP customer and budgetary authority, must exercise sound business judgment to ensure that each acquisition results in the best value product or service to meet the mission needs.52 Asking commanders to ignore the price of the product or services they acquire is asking them to neglect their duty to exercise judgment and balance priorities.

**Concern over Protecting Proprietary Information**

A primary argument against releasing the unredacted, detailed PPE to military units is that these documents contain “contractor labor rates and specific and parts that are proprietary.”53 Protecting a government contractor’s sensitive information is an important goal. Unauthorized disclosures can erode the integrity of government operations and lead to situations in which that information is misused for private gain.54 The LOGCAP contractors can gain an unfair competitive advantage over each other if they know a competitor’s sensitive information.55 Detailed pricing information is undisputedly sensitive information.56 Experience with awarding the LOGCAP IV contract

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49 Unless the LOGCAP purchase is so small that no funding threshold would be exceeded.
50 See, e.g., Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Austin, Subject: Report of Antideficiency Act Violation, United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–A), ADA Case Control Nos. 11-01 and 11-02, para. 8.2.4 to 8.2.5 (Jan. 3, 2011) (on file with author). Afghanistan Regional Command-East attorneys and engineers also have frequent, first-hand experience with disputes over work classification.
51 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 120.
52 See FAR § 1.102(d) (stating as a general principle that all members of a federal Acquisition Team are to use such judgment).
53 LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE, supra note 13, at 27.
54 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-693, CONTRACTOR INTEGRITY: STRONGER SAFEGUARDS NEEDED FOR CONTRACTOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION I (2010).
55 FAR § 9.505-4(a).
56 See id. § 15.404-2(a)(5) (noting that field pricing information “may include proprietary . . . information”).
demonstrates the importance of protecting proprietary information: Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR) was disqualified from competing for the Afghanistan task orders because the KBR program manager improperly accessed a rival’s sensitive information. Indeed, the unauthorized disclosure of confidential or proprietary information by a federal government employee is a crime.

However, protecting a contractor’s proprietary information does not prohibit the government from distributing documents to authorized parties. First, the government may transfer a contractor’s sensitive information to “any department or agency within the Executive Branch if the information relates to matters within the organization’s jurisdiction.” In other words, DoD employees may transfer a contractor’s proprietary information to DoD organizations that require it. As previously explained, commanders and their staffs need the detailed LOGCAP estimates to validate the requirement. Second, government employees may provide one contractor’s confidential information to another contractor after imposing restrictions, such as requiring non-disclosure agreements. The fact that detailed prices need to be treated as sensitive information within the military does not prohibit commanders and their staffs from accessing the information they need to carry out their assigned responsibilities.

**Concern over Cost Analysis**

Some argue that theater commanders should not receive PPEs because these are only needed for “cost analysis,” which should not be performed by anyone in theater. However, a fiscal law analysis of the “purpose, time, and amount” of a LOGCAP change order is not a cost analysis. In government contracting, cost analysis is a technical term:

Cost analysis.

1. Cost analysis is the review and evaluation of any separate cost elements and profit or fee in an offeror’s or contractor’s proposal, as needed to determine a fair and reasonable price or to determine cost realism, and the application of judgment to determine how well the proposed costs represent what the cost of the contract should be, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.

2. The Government may use various cost analysis techniques and procedures to ensure a fair and reasonable price, given the circumstances of the acquisition.

The LOGCAP validation process does not require detailed PPEs to determine a fair and reasonable price or to determine cost realism. Instead, the validation process needs the detailed PPEs to examine how construction and supply costs have been classified and whether or not those costs exceed statutory fiscal thresholds.

**Contract and Change Order Clauses Do Not Prevent Liability**

The MAAWS–A attempts to prevent violations of O&M acquisition thresholds through clauses limiting liability. For example, each undefinitized task order must contain language notifying the LOGCAP contractor that the U.S. will not reimburse it for costs exceeding O&M funding thresholds without the express written authority of the ACO or procuring contracting officer. However, these clauses cannot succeed in their intended purpose. The threshold limitation clauses will not prevent the government from paying for the construction or products purchased under the contract. The government cannot enter into a contract, bypass its fiscal law review, then hold the contractor liable for the fiscal law violation. The government is getting a product and must compensate the contractor for the value of the product received, even if the contract was invalid. Moreover, the government cannot return conforming goods which are later found to exceed thresholds as remedy for the violation. If the government refuses to pay based on the limitations clause, the contractor can still file a claim and

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59 FAR, 52.203-13(b)(3)(ii). This contract clause is required for solicitations and contracts “if the value of the contract is expected to exceed $5,000,000 and the performance period is 120 days or more.” Id. 3.1004(a).
60 Id. § 9.505-4(b) (requiring a contractor whose duties require access to other contractors’ proprietary information to agree not to disclose it). The contractor SERCO has access to LOGCAP contractors’ detailed prices. LOGCAP IV AFGHANISTAN GUIDE, supra note 13, at 28.
61 Task force commanders in Afghanistan all have top secret security clearances. Military personnel on each commander’s staff have secret clearances at a minimum. Judge advocates, as lawyers, deal with privileged information on a daily basis. These personnel understand the importance of not disclosing sensitive information.
62 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 119 (“Under the LOGCAP contract, no one in theater has the responsibility or the authority to determine what will be considered a fair and reasonable price for new work that was not pre-negotiated in the contract.”).
63 FAR § 46, 15.404-1(c).
64 MAAWS–A, supra note 3, at 123.
65 See United States v. Amdahl, 786 F.2d 387, 393 (Fed.Cir. 1986); see also AT&T v. United States, 177 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When a contract or a provision thereof is in violation of law but has been fully performed, the courts have variously sustained the contract, reformed it to correct the illegal term, or allowed recovery under an implied contract theory; the courts have not, however, simply declared the contract void ab initio.”).
collect on a *quantum valebant* or *quantum meruit* basis.\(^66\) If the full value exceeds statutory thresholds, the government has violated the ADA, and a funding limitation clause cannot change that fact. The government cannot argue that construction or products delivered in excess of the threshold were gifts since the government is prohibited from accepting voluntary services except as expressly authorized by law.\(^67\)

In sum, the limitation clauses required by the MAAWS–A do not and cannot limit the government’s liability. The LOGCAP change order obligates the government. If the LOGCAP construction or product exceeds the applicable threshold, then the ADA may have been violated,\(^68\) but the government will still have to pay for the delivered LOGCAP product.

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\(^{66}\) *Amdahl*, 786 F.2d at 393 & n.6. Such compensation is under an implied-in-fact contract rather than the invalid written contract. It awards the contractor only the value of the goods and services actually provided before the contract was rescinded for invalidity, without regard to lost profits or other damages. (Traditionally, the term *quantum valebant* describes such payments when the implied contract is for the sale of goods alone, whereas *quantum meruit* describes payments in contracts for goods, services, or both.). See id.


\(^{68}\) See DoDFMR, *supra* note 1, vol. 14, ch. 2, para. 020202B.

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**Conclusion**

Without a proper fiscal law analysis of LOGCAP projects at the validation stage, commanders are unprotected from violating fiscal law thresholds. Withholding information from commanders and their staffs will result in fiscal law violations. The violations are easily preventable by providing information to the military personnel tasked with validating the projects. Contract and fiscal law attorney must thoroughly review and analyze the LOGCAP projects at the validation stage to protect their commanders.
A deployed wheeled vehicle mechanic goes home on Environmental Morale Leave (EML) from Afghanistan. He returns of his own accord, twenty-five days late. The company commander, well advised by his trial counsel, is waiting for him with DA Forms 31 and 2823. The Soldier waives his rights and explains his absence: he has spent the last month nursing his sick mother, babysitting his neighbor’s sick children, filling a critical shortfall at a local soup kitchen, raising money for a wounded Soldiers’ charity, and rescuing endangered animals from house fires. He always intended to come back once this noble work was done. The TC doubts the veracity of this tale, but is in no position to disprove it. The command decides on immediate court-martial. What crime should be charged?

The answer is desertion with intent to shirk important service under Article 85, UCMJ. This crime covers even short intentional absences from duty—if the culprit intended to shirk hazardous duty or important service. To prove this crime, the prosecution must clear three conceptual hurdles.

1. **First Hurdle: Definition of “Important Service”**

   The *Military Judges’ Benchbook* defines “hazardous duty” and “important service” as follows:

   Hazardous duty means a duty that involves danger, risk, or peril to the individual performing the duty. The conditions existing at the time the duty is to be performed determine whether the duty is dangerous, risky, or perilous.

   Important service means service that is more significant than the ordinary everyday service of members of the Armed Forces.

   Whether service is important or duty is hazardous is a question of fact, and a failure to introduce evidence of these facts will be fatal to the Government’s case. However, the *Manual for Courts-Martial* and case law flesh out these definitions far more than the *Benchbook* instructions.

   Training exercises, drill, ranges, and practice marches are not usually important service, but overseas duty or even training or embarking for overseas duty may be. Thus, the Court of Military Appeals held a resupply mission to bases in Antarctica to be important service, and a cook who fed the Sailors on that mission was performing important service. Combat zone deployments are important service. “Deployment of any unit or individual during wartime carries with it the inference that the mission of that unit or individual is important in the war effort.” Missions that support deployed troops are important service, even if the supporting Soldier is not himself deployed. A medic treating Soldiers evacuated from combat zones was performing important service, even though his assignment was in Germany. A Soldier who missed the preparatory train-up for a deployment was shirking important service, even if he intended to return to his unit in time for the actual deployment.

   On the bare language of the *Benchbook* instructions, the defense could argue that a wheeled vehicle mechanic in a combat zone was not performing “important service”—he was doing the same kind of vehicle maintenance he did every day back in the States. But the case law shows that an assignment supporting a combat deployment is “important” even if the work itself is commonplace. A deployed wheeled vehicle mechanic may have been performing hazardous duty—depending on just where he was. If he was supporting deployed troops, fixing their vehicles so they could carry out their missions, he was definitely performing “important service.” When he intentionally failed to return on time, he was shirking it.

   “Hazardous duty” cannot be assumed simply from the fact that the Soldier was serving in a designated combat zone or hostile fire area. The Army’s administrative determinations as to whether service in a given area is dangerous (or will entitle the Soldier to hostile fire pay) are insufficient to determine whether the service performed by a given Soldier is, in fact, hazardous. In *United States v. Smith*, the Court of Military Appeals reversed a conviction for desertion with intent to shirk because the Government

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   3 United States v. Merrow, 34 C.M.R. 45, 48–49 (C.M.A. 1963). The cook’s service was “important” because his duty “was closely connected to the general well-being of the officers and men.”


   5 Id.

failed to prove that the accused’s specific duties in Vietnam, during the Vietnam War, would have been dangerous. The Army’s designation of Vietnam as a hostile fire zone was, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish hazardous duty. \(^7\) When both hazardous duty and important service are present, as is frequently the case in combat zone desertions, \(^8\) desertion with intent to shirk important service should be the preferred charge, as it is the easier to prove. \(^9\)

2. Second Hurdle: Intent to Shirk vs. Motivation

The defense may wish to argue that the Soldier’s ‘intent’ was not to shirk important service, but to nurse the sick and do community service. However, case law distinguishes between intent and motive.

Thus, in United States v. Kim, the appellant missed several weeks of predeployment training, which counted as “important service.” Kim stated that he had gone to Korea to visit a sick relative, so that missing important service was not his true intent. The Army Court of Criminal Review upheld his conviction and explained its distinction:

Appellant contended that the reason he left his unit was to visit his dying grandmother and resolve a problem regarding his citizenship. He claimed his absence was intended to be temporary, as evidenced by his purchase of a roundtrip ticket to Korea with a return date prior to his unit’s departure for Saudi Arabia. The government contended the reason he left his unit was that appellant went to Korea to be with his girlfriend, a Korean woman married to an American soldier, and because appellant thought it unfair that he had to go to Saudi Arabia but could not reenlist. Appellant’s actual motivation for leaving his unit is unimportant, if as a consequence of that unauthorized absence appellant had reasonable cause to know that he would avoid important service. See United States v. Shull, 2 C.M.R. 83, 88–89 (C.M.A.1952).\(^10\)

The intent to stay away, combined with the knowledge that he was missing important service by staying away, was enough to establish his intent to shirk important service. The other things he hoped to accomplish, no matter what they were, were simply motives that could not negate this intent. As the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces later explained:

A person often acts with two or more intentions. These intentions may consist of an immediate intention (intent) and an ulterior one (motive), as where the actor takes another's money intending to steal it and intending then to use it to buy food for his needy family . . . . It may be said that, so long as the defendant has the intention required by the definition of the crime, it is immaterial that he may also have had some other intention . . . . The ultimate end sought . . . . is more properly labeled a “motive.”\(^11\)

A Soldier who intentionally overstays EML from a combat zone knows that he is missing deployed service in support of the war effort. He therefore has the intent to shirk, no matter how virtuous his motives may be.


\(^6\) Hazardous duty and important service exist independently of each other. Both may occur together, or either may occur without the other. Id. at 49.

\(^7\) The legal analysis had no bearing on the case, and she was guilty of desertion. See United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. at 113–14 (internal cites and quotes omitted).

\(^8\) Hazardous duty and important service exist independently of each other. Both may occur together, or either may occur without the other. Id. at 49.

\(^9\) If the prosecution also has evidence of desertion with intent to remain away permanently and chooses to charge this crime as well, it should be done in a separate specification. The crimes of desertion with intent to shirk and desertion with intent to remain away permanently are separate crimes and combining both charges in one specification is duplicitive. Kim, 35 M.J. at 554. While both crimes may both be proved in the same case for the same period of time, they have been held multiplicitous for sentencing purposes. United States v. Cuero, 41 C.M.R. 398, 399 (C.M.A. 1970) (the CAAF has now changed this concept to “unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to sentence,” U.S. v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19 (2012), but the practical result is likely to remain the same). The prosecution should avoid the temptation to charge the accused with one intent “or” (or “and/or”) another, as such pleading can render a specification fatally defective. See United States v. Woode, 18 M.J. 640, 642 (N.M.C.M.R. 1984).

\(^10\) Kim, 35 M.J. at 554–55. A defense may arise if the accused believed he did not actually have a duty to perform the important service. See United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 116 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (discussing United States v. Apple, 10 C.M.R. 90, 91–92 (C.M.A. 1953)). In Apple, the accused left his unit, which was engaged in hazardous duty in the Korean War, apparently because he believed his front-line service was over, and he may not have been guilty of desertion. In Huet-Vaughn, the accused knew she had important service to perform, but left her unit as a gesture of protest because she believed Operation Desert Shield was illegal. Her personal legal analysis had no bearing on the case, and she was guilty of desertion. Despite the broad language in Kim about “reasonable cause to know,” desertion is a specific intent offense, so that the accused must have actual knowledge of the hazardous duty or important service to be guilty. United States v. Lanier, No. 20080296, 2009 WL 6843586, at *2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2009).

\(^11\) Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. at 113–14 (internal cites and quotes omitted).
The Military Judges’ Benchbook does not make this distinction clear. It lists the element of intent and defines hazardous duty and important service, but does not explain how little intent is really required, or the irrelevance of motivation. This may allow the defense to sell (or the panel to invent unaided) a false notion of what “intent to shirk” really means.

3. Third Hurdle: “Desertion Is AWOL Plus Thirty Days”

Army Regulation 630-10 defines a “deserter” as a Soldier “dropped from the rolls of his or her unit . . . when absent without authority for 30 consecutive days.” In the minds of many Army leaders (and even a few Judge Advocates), this fact has been transformed into a myth: that a Soldier who has been absent for thirty days is a deserter within the meaning of the UCMJ, and that the difference between an AWOL Soldier and a deserter is determined by the length of his absence.

In fact, whether the desertion is with intent to remain away permanently or to shirk important service, the distinction between AWOL and desertion is the Soldier’s intent. The length of the Soldier’s absence may be evidence of his intent, but is not an element of the crime. The thirty-day myth is not addressed in the Benchbook instructions. If counsel do not address it in opening statements, a panel could spend the entire trial listening to the evidence in light of the myth, and ignoring or forgetting the evidence that really matters.

4. Custom Instructions

To make sure the panel clears these conceptual hurdles, trial counsel prosecuting this crime should request custom instructions from the military judge, along these lines:

**Important Service.** “Important service is something more than the everyday service performed by members of the Armed Forces. Important service may include service such as duty in a combat zone or other dangerous area, training in preparation for such service, or giving support to such service. Deployment of any unit or individual during wartime carries with it the inference that the mission of that unit or individual is ‘important’ in the war effort. Ordinary services such as drill, target practice, maneuvers, and practice marches are not usually ‘important service.’ However, servicemembers performing support roles such as medics and cooks are performing important service if the missions they support are important and their duties are closely connected with the well-being of the mission.”

**Basis:** M.C.M. Section IV, ¶ 9.c.(2)(c); United States v. Swanholm, 36 M.J. 743, 745 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (medic treating Soldiers evacuated from a combat zone was performing “important service” even though the unit was not present in the combat zone; “deployment of any unit or individual during wartime carries with it the inference that the mission of that unit or individual is important in the war effort” is a direct quote from this case); United States v. Kim, 35 M.J. 553, 554 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (training in preparation for Operation Desert Shield was “important service”); United States v. Merrow, 34 C.M.R. 45, 48-49 (C.M.A. 1963) (cook aboard resupply mission for Antarctic stations was performing “important service” because his duty “was closely connected to the general well-being of the officers and men”). The Military Judges’ Benchbook defines “important service,” but the Benchbook definition is too vague and may confuse the members under the facts of this case. [Counsel should explain why, in light of the facts of the specific case.]

**Intent to Shirk versus Motivation.** “Whether a Soldier intends to shirk important service does not depend on his
motivation for doing so, and the fact that the Soldier may also have had some other intention or underlying motive is no defense to a charge of desertion with intent to shirk. For example, if a Soldier intends to stay away from his unit in order to visit sick relatives, or to take care of personal legal problems, and knows that he will avoid important service by doing so, then he has the intent to shirk important service. This is true regardless of what else he intends to do or what motivates him to stay away, and even if he means to return to his unit later on.”


Desertion and Time. “Whether a Soldier who is absent without leave is also a deserter depends on his intent, and not on how long he has been away. In particular, whether he has been absent for thirty days does not determine whether he is guilty of desertion. A Soldier could be absent for only three hours, but if he intended to shirk important service or remain away permanently, he would still be guilty of desertion, even if he changed his mind or turned himself in afterwards. On the other hand, a Soldier could be gone for eight months, but if he never had the intent to shirk important service or to remain away permanently, he would not be guilty of desertion. You may consider the length of his absence as evidence of his intent to remain away permanently, together with the other circumstances surrounding his absence, but there is no specific number of days that converts an AWOL Soldier into a deserter.”

Basis: United States v. Thun, 36 M.J. 468, 469 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Williams, 10 C.M.R. 219, 222-23 (A.C.M.R. 1953); United States v. McCrory, 1 C.M.R. 1, 7 (C.M.A. 1951); M.C.M. Section IV, ¶ 9.c.(1)(a), (1)(c)(iii). The undersigned frequently encounters the myth that a Soldier only becomes a deserter, or enters “deserter status,” when he has been gone for thirty days (this is a distortion of the fact that a Soldier should be dropped from the rolls when he has been AWOL for thirty days). This myth is likely to cause confusion among the members, and prevent them from focusing on relevant evidence, if it is not explained to them. This is closely related to the instruction on DFR that appears on page 191 of the Military Judges’ Benchbook (namely, that being dropped from the rolls is a purely administrative matter that does not determine whether a person is a deserter); the government would like to have this point clarified for the members. The government would particularly like to be able to refer to this fact in its opening statement, so that the members will not be thinking about fictitious thirty-day time limits throughout the case, but will instead be concentrating on the relevant evidence.

By filing the requested instructions early and in writing, the TC may persuade the defense to move from a panel trial to trial by judge alone, and may change the state of plea negotiations. In a judge alone case, the TC can simply cite case law in closing argument.

5. Conclusion

The short-term deserter with a tale of woe presents apparent ambiguities to the trial court. The right instructions can strip away these ambiguities, and free the prosecution to explain the true state of the law right up front to the tribunal. The Soldier who intentionally overstays his leave from a combat zone can then be convicted and sentenced like the deserter that he is.
The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law

Reviewed by Major Andrew Kernan*

The NMTs pursued a variety of different goals, the most important of which were achieving retributive justice, educating the German people, creating a historical record, and contributing to the development of international criminal law. Some of those goals were achieved; others were not.²

I. Introduction

On 7 March, 2011, President Barack Obama issued an executive order directing the resumption of the trials of declared Al Qaeda members and affiliates before U.S. military tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.³ This order marked a significant shift for the administration, which had contemplated the possibility of ending the Guantanamo operation and seeking instead to prosecute the accused terrorists in U.S. federal courts.⁴ With this occasion, the mechanics of and justifications for military tribunals catapulted back into public debate. Undoubtedly, future discussion on the propriety of Guantanamo trials will involve reference to one of the most important events in the evolution of military tribunals and their application of international law: the U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMTs).⁵

In his 2011 book *The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Tribunals)*, author Kevin Jon Heller embraces the challenge of detailing the individual NMTs, placing them in the proper historical context, and asserting an NMT legacy of spawning critical advancements in international criminal law.⁶ As Heller notes in his introduction, the primary purpose behind *Tribunals* was to fill what he perceived to be an inexplicable void in the scholarly writing coverage of the NMT.⁷ Through painstaking detail, the author discusses the nuances of each of the thirteen cases and their handling of critical legal issues such as procedure, evidence, defenses, and sentencing. Clearly proud of his own work, the author goes so far as referencing a U.S. federal appeals case and its misinterpretation of an NMT principle—stating, a bit presumptuously, that “if this study had existed a few years ago, the court might have reached a very different conclusion.”⁸ Unfortunately, the book proves only a partial success. While succeeding at the pure information game, the book falls painfully short in terms of flow and readability, leaving all but the most committed readers likely to abandon the struggle. Ultimately, today’s Judge Advocates (JAs) may find select points to glean for professional development and satisfaction of historical curiosity, but this reviewer recommends that Heller’s book be placed on the reference shelf for occasional consultation—not in the JA’s critical kit-bag.

II. The Good: Details, Depth and a Dash of Applicability

Among the disappointments of *Tribunals* lie a few redemptive points. We should expect as much from Heller—an accomplished scholar, multi-published writer, and heralded blogger on the most current and controversial topics in international law.⁹ Accordingly, the reader will find a book meticulously researched and expansive in addressing the historical significance of the NMTs from all angles. The author arranges his 400-page work into five parts and sixteen chapters. Part I discusses the background and formation of the Tribunals, as well as a factual synopsis of each of the twelve trials. Parts II, III, and IV are the meat of the book—offering sophisticated analysis of

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¹ Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Student, 60th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.


³ Id. at 299.


⁵ Laura E. Jesse, *Hopping on Bus for “Hip” Hopeful*, SAN ANT. EXPR. NEWS, Nov. 18, 2007, at 1B.

⁶ The Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMTs) must be immediately distinguished from their more famous and publicized predecessors, the International Military Tribunals (IMTs), which also occurred in Nuremberg—but directly pursuant to the joint arrangements by and with the participation of all the Allied Powers following Germany’s unconditional surrender in World War II. The NMTs, by contrast, and although sanctioned by existing agreements among the Allies, were a purely American-executed event as part of the United States’ post-war duties in its role as occupier and transitional governing body of specific sections of Germany. While the IMT focused on the top-tier war criminals from Hitler’s Nazi regime, the NMTs focused on many of the supporting role players such as the doctors, financiers, industrialists, and lower-level Government leaders. *See War Crimes, War Criminals, and War Crimes Trials 9–13* (Norman E. Turov, ed., 1986).

⁷ Id. at 2.

⁸ Id. at 5 (referring to the court in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) and its apparently faulty reliance on the Nuremberg Trials for the proposition that aiding and abetting liability is conditioned on some kind of purposeful conduct).

both the substantive and procedural legal elements at issue throughout the trials. Heller concludes in Part V with a good faith effort to draw the reader out of the weeds and into a broader perspective, recounting the historical events immediately following the NMTs and then offering commentary on their legacy.

If the reader is looking for pure facts or confirmation of particular legal principle flowing out of the NMTs, then *Tribunals* is a gem. Written in textbook-like owner’s manual style, the middle portions of the book diligently grind through the legalese of the trials. Clearly the product of yeoman’s work, nearly every sentence in the factual sections contains a footnoted reference to the trial transcripts, evidentiary documents, or written opinions—the culling and digesting of which is truly impressive. Perhaps the greatest success of the book is the collective law-school seminar of chapters six, seven, thirteen, and fourteen, which covers the NMT’s implementation of legal doctrine in the areas of evidence, procedure, allowable defenses, and sentencing criteria. Here, Heller dons his professorial cap and relentlessly plies the reader with specific historical reporting, competing opinions from legal scholars over the last sixty years, and plenty of his own analysis on the legitimacy and wisdom of the judges’ decision-making. In this manner, *Tribunals* squarely accomplishes its stated objective of filling the educational gap surrounding the NMTs. Even the hungriest of scholars could likely feast here for second, third, and fourth readings.

In addition, *Tribunals* achieves a minor success in its smattering of applicable lessons for modern-day JAs. Among them is the author’s brief account of the role the Theater Judge Advocate General (JAG) played in the organization of both the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and subsequent NMTs. Here, we discover that the theater commander, General Eisenhower, looked to the theater JAG, Brigadier General Betts, to lead the entire U.S. Government effort in implementing the directives of the Joint Chiefs and the Truman administration. This assignment, with all it implied in the areas of leadership, creativity, problem-solving, and executive decision-making, echoes the expectations modern commanders have for their JAs. Consider, for example, the JAG Corps’ assumption of responsibility for non-expressly legal missions such as financial oversight and the Rule of Law in deployed environments. New JAs may draw inspiration from Heller’s book when assigned operational duties that have little to do with their three-year technical education. Further, JAs may also benefit from Heller’s thorough treatment of the inner workings of the NMT’s prosecution team headed by Brigadier General Telford Taylor. Chapter three outlines how Taylor handled the leadership challenge of assembling a thirty-five-man, all-civilian, all-volunteer team of attorneys and then directing their efforts to achieve success at trial. Given the joint, interagency, and multi-organizational environments that dominate the modern-day operational landscape, Taylor’s experience may prove tremendously informative.

III. The Bad: Absent Context and Under-Delivered Promises

Unfortunately, any praise of *Tribunals* requires almost immediate qualification. Heller begins with the enticing pronouncement that an explicit goal of his book is to “place the trials in their historical context . . . the (early) history of the Cold War.” Despite brief allusions to McCarthyism and the Korean War in the introductory paragraphs, the audience is dragged through the entirety of the book without meaningful follow-up. Not until the penultimate chapter, 300 pages later, does the author attempt to make good on his bold promise. That attempt, when it comes, is a perfunctory mention of various world events without in-depth discussion or analysis of their connection with Nuremberg. This missing context represents a missed opportunity for the author to temper the book’s dry, lecturing style with much needed perspective and entertaining relief.

Further, the title of the book promises to show the reader “The Origins of International Law”—a promise the

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10 See, Heller, supra note 1, at 372 (noting that the documentary product of the trials included written capture of 1300 witnesses, more than 30,000 documents admitted into evidence, and judicial opinions in excess of 3800 pages).

11 Id. at 157 (offering educated commentary on the fairness of the trials with respect to evidentiary rulings, alluding in part to the tribunal’s controversial decision to depart from the IMT practice of prohibiting the defendants themselves to conduct cross-examination). See also id. at 143.

12 Id. at 12.

13 Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Need for a New Strategic Paradigm, *Army Law.*, July 2007, at 45, 53 (discussing the Pentagon’s embrace of stability operations as a strategy and the implications for judge advocates as the spearheading the requisite rule of law activities).

14 Heller, supra note 1, at 43–49 (discussing the development of the overall trial strategy—and making reference to the motley crew recruited on Taylor’s behalf that is detailed on page 17).


16 Id. at 5–7.

17 Id. at 341, 349. In these few, isolated paragraphs, Heller merely mentions the increasing “fear of the Soviet Union” and the political pressure—in light of the burgeoning North Korea conflict—to kowtow to Germany as a means of enticing their involvement in the European Defense Community. Id. No further discussion of significance on these issues is offered.
author initially reinforces when describing the NMTs’ groundbreaking practice of issuing written judgments that specifically addressed substantive issues such as evidence and procedure. Nevertheless, Heller fails to elaborate on the substantial impact the tribunals may have had on international law. For this impact to have occurred, one would expect a broad acceptance of the NMTs judgments by the world community—something Tribunals fails to show. In fact, the author himself seems confused on this topic, and his confusion confuses the reader. The assertion-whiplash first occurs in chapter five’s discussion of jurisdiction. Following pages of argument for the true international quality of the NMTs (and therefore their basis for recognition), the author concedes in the chapter’s concluding remarks that modern courts remain reluctant to rely on the NMTs’ judgments because of their questionable legitimacy. Heller undermines the NMTs’ credibility throughout the book—but then in chapter sixteen claims that modern courts pay great respect to the NMTs’ judgments in numerous ways. This schizophrenic feel continues through the book’s final pages where, after being told that modern courts “have exhibited considerable uncertainty about [the NMTs’] authority,” the reader is told that modern courts “have exhibited considerable uncertainty about [the NMTs’] authority,”24 the reader is up.

Among the book’s chief deficiencies is its failure to provide the reader with the full context of the NMTs’ central characters, places, and events. For example, Heller spends his first three chapters walking his audience through the history of the NMTs, discussing in detail the various laws, ordinances, and orders undergirding the proceedings—but fails to give any biographical data of the myriad names that seem to appear from nowhere along the way. Some minimal comprehension of the basic facts can arise amidst the choppy presentation style in these sections, but one may be left wondering who these people were and what they were like, and what they had to do with one another and U.S. foreign affairs. In contrast, works like Joe Perisco’s Nuremburg: Infamy on Trial—although more focused on the IMT—present the human-interest side of the history that holds the reader’s interest and leads to remembering and comprehension. Without this critical element, Heller’s book generates a lot of deep breaths and head-scratching.

Finally, the author presents his material in a highly technical, textbook-like manner that was almost fatally difficult to follow. This is particularly true regarding the legal framework for the creation of and execution of the trials. Despite telling the NMT narrative at the beginning of the book in terms of the various international agreements and orders that the prosecution team relied upon, the author waited until chapter five—over 100 pages in—to actually explain how these documents related to one another and were critical to the proceedings. Despite making frequent references to these foundational documents between, Heller at no point provides a simple flow-chart—or even flow-paragraph—laying them out in logical order for the reader’s reference. Instead, all but the most well versed legal historians are left scurrying after the author with a pad and pencil, attempting to diagram and cross-reference in order to decipher the many interesting points the author does actually make. While rewarding at times, the overall process was exhausting.

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19 Id. at 3.
20 Id. at 107–37. In perhaps his most thorough and skillful argument of the book, the author presents his case that—based on the underlying authorities of the London Charter and Control Council Law 10—the NMTs were actually “inter-allied special tribunals” that applied international law. Id. at 137.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., id. at 229–30 (noting that much of the NMT jurisprudence was “very progressive” and later ratified by other judicial bodies, while significant other aspects were “problematic” in that the judges simply misapplied a solid legal principle). Id.
23 Id. at 368–97 (spelling out all the ways that international courts such as the Yugoslavian Criminal Tribunal and the International Criminal Court have relied on specific excerpts of the NMT judgments).
24 Id. at 375.
25 Id. at 400.
26 Id.
V. Conclusion

Ultimately, Kevin Jon Heller writes an important book in *Tribunals*, dutifully offering a detailed, scholarly accounting and analysis of an event largely avoided by other academics. This work can be a useful asset for practitioners and students of international criminal law. Nevertheless, digesting and making sense of *Tribunals* is far from easy. Lacking much personality, the book presents its dense material in an even denser manner, challenging the most disciplined attention spans and encouraging the reader to simply look elsewhere. While bright spots of analysis, key historical reporting, and lessons for modern application appear throughout, they are overshadowed by the book’s unwieldiness. An encyclopedic reference of an important event, *Tribunals* should be consulted in a pinch—but otherwise avoided in lieu of more engaging material.
1. Resident Course Quotas

a. Attendance at resident continuing legal education (CLE) courses at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army (TJAGLCS), is restricted to students who have confirmed reservations. Reservations for TJAGSA CLE courses are managed by the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), the Army-wide automated training system. If you do not have a confirmed reservation in ATRRS, attendance is prohibited.

b. Active duty service members and civilian employees must obtain reservations through their directorates training office. Reservists or ARNG must obtain reservations through their unit training offices or, if they are non-unit reservists, through the U.S. Army Personnel Center (ARPERCOM), ATTN: ARPC-OPB, 1 Reserve Way, St. Louis, MO 63132-5200.

c. Questions regarding courses should be directed first through the local ATRRS Quota Manager or the ATRRS School Manager, Academic Department at (800) 552-3978, extension 3307.

d. The ATRRS Individual Student Record is available on-line. To verify a confirmed reservation, log into your individual AKO account and follow these instructions:

   Go to Self Service, My Education. Scroll to Globe Icon (not the AARTS Transcript Services).

   Go to ATRRS On-line, Student Menu, Individual Training Record. The training record with reservations and completions will be visible.

   If you do not see a particular entry for a course that you are registered for or have completed, see your local ATRRS Quota Manager or Training Coordinator for an update or correction.

e. The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, is an approved sponsor of CLE courses in all states that require mandatory continuing legal education. These states include: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI, and WY.


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<td>7A-270A2</td>
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### ENLISTED COURSES

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<td>512-27DC7</td>
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<td>5F-F101</td>
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<td>5th Rule of Law Course</td>
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3. Naval Justice School and FY 2011–2012 Course Schedule

For information on the following courses, please contact Jerry Gallant, Registrar, Naval Justice School, 360 Elliot Street, Newport, RI 02841 at (401) 841-3807, extension 131.

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<td>Legal Officer Course (070)</td>
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<td>12 – 31 Aug 12</td>
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<td>0379</td>
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<td>Senior Officer Course (050)</td>
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### Naval Justice School Detachment
#### San Diego, CA

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<td>Legal Officer Course (050)</td>
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<td>Legal Officer Course (060)</td>
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<td>Legal Officer Course (080)</td>
<td>20 Aug – 7 Sep 12</td>
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<td>Legal Clerk Course (060)</td>
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<td>Legal Clerk Course (070)</td>
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<td>3759</td>
<td>Senior Officer Course (040)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>17 – 21 Sep (Pendleton)</td>
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### 4. Air Force Judge Advocate General School Fiscal Year 2012 Course Schedule

For information about attending the following courses, please contact Jim Whitaker, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, 150 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5712, commercial telephone (334) 953-2802, DSN 493-2802, fax (334) 953-4445.

### Air Force Judge Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, AL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Title</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 12-03</td>
<td>5 Mar – 24 Apr 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Justice Administration Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>16 – 20 Apr 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal Craftsman Course, Class 12-03</td>
<td>16 Apr – 1 Jun 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Preparation Paralegal Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>23 – 25 Apr 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 12-04</td>
<td>30 Apr – 20 Jun 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Course</td>
<td>Dates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber Law Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>24 – 26 Apr 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation and Appropriate Dispute Resolution Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>30 Apr – 4 May 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Trial Advocacy Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>7 – 11 May 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations Law Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>14 – 25 May 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS Trial Advocacy Course, Class 12-B (Off-Site)</td>
<td>14 – 18 May 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS Trial Advocacy Course, Class 12-C (Off-Site)</td>
<td>21 – 25 May 2012</td>
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<td>Reserve Forces Paralegal Course, Class 12-A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>11 – 22 Jun 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law Office Management Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>11 – 22 Jun 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will Preparation Paralegal Course, Class 12-B</td>
<td>25 – 27 Jun 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course, Class 12-C</td>
<td>9 Jul – 7 Sep 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paralegal Craftsman Course, Class 12-04</td>
<td>9 Jul – 22 Aug 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental Law Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>20 – 24 Aug 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trial &amp; Defense Advocacy Course, Class 12-B</td>
<td>10 – 21 Sep 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accident Investigation Course, Class 12-A</td>
<td>11 – 14 Sep 2012</td>
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</table>

5. Civilian-Sponsored CLE Courses

For additional information on civilian courses in your area, please contact one of the institutions listed below:

**AAJE:**
American Academy of Judicial Education  
P.O. Box 728  
University, MS 38677-0728  
(662) 915-1225

**ABA:**
American Bar Association  
750 North Lake Shore Drive  
Chicago, IL 60611  
(312) 988-6200

**AGACL:**
Association of Government Attorneys in Capital Litigation  
Arizona Attorney General’s Office  
ATTN: Jan Dyer  
1275 West Washington  
Phoenix, AZ 85007  
(602) 542-8552
ALIABA: American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education 4025 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104-3099 (800) CLE-NEWS or (215) 243-1600

ASLM: American Society of Law and Medicine Boston University School of Law 765 Commonwealth Avenue Boston, MA 02215 (617) 262-4990

CCEB: Continuing Education of the Bar University of California Extension 2300 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, CA 94704 (510) 642-3973

CLA: Computer Law Association, Inc. 3028 Javier Road, Suite 500E Fairfax, VA 22031 (703) 560-7747

CLESN: CLE Satellite Network 920 Spring Street Springfield, IL 62704 (217) 525-0744 (800) 521-8662

ESI: Educational Services Institute 5201 Leesburg Pike, Suite 600 Falls Church, VA 22041-3202 (703) 379-2900

FBA: Federal Bar Association 1815 H Street, NW, Suite 408 Washington, DC 20006-3697 (202) 638-0252

FB: Florida Bar 650 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300 (850) 561-5600

GICLE: The Institute of Continuing Legal Education P.O. Box 1885 Athens, GA 30603 (706) 369-5664

GII: Government Institutes, Inc. 966 Hungerford Drive, Suite 24 Rockville, MD 20850 (301) 251-9250

GWU: Government Contracts Program The George Washington University Law School 2020 K Street, NW, Room 2107 Washington, DC 20052 (202) 994-5272
6. Information Regarding the Judge Advocate Officer Advanced Course (JAOAC)

   a. The JAOAC is mandatory for an RC company grade JA’s career progression and promotion eligibility. It is a blended course divided into two phases. Phase I is an online nonresident course administered by the Distributed Learning Division (DLD) of the Training Developments Directorate (TDD), at TJAGLCS. Phase II is a two-week resident course at TJAGLCS each January.

   b. Phase I (nonresident online): Phase I is limited to USAR and Army NG JAs who have successfully completed the Judge Advocate Officer’s Basic Course (JAOBC) and the Judge Advocate Tactical Staff Officer Course (JATSOC) prior to enrollment in Phase I. Prior to enrollment in Phase I, a student must have obtained at least the rank of CPT and must have completed two years of service since completion of JAOBC, unless, at the time of their accession into the JAGC they were transferred into the JAGC from prior commissioned service. Other cases are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Phase I is a prerequisite for Phase II. For further information regarding enrolling in Phase I, please contact the Judge Advocate General’s University Helpdesk accessible at https://jag.learn.army.mil.

   c. Phase II (resident): Phase II is offered each January at TJAGLCS. Students must have submitted all Phase I subcourses for grading, to include all writing exercises, by 1 November in order to be eligible to attend the two-week resident Phase II in January of the following year.
d. Regarding the January 2012 Phase II resident JAOAC, students who fail to submit all Phase I non-resident subcourses by 2400 1 November 2011 will not be allowed to attend the resident course.

e. If you have additional questions regarding JAOAC, contact LTC Baucum Fulk, commercial telephone (434) 971-3357, or e-mail baucum.fulk@us.army.mil.

7. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

Judge Advocates must remain in good standing with the state attorney licensing authority (i.e., bar or court) in at least one state in order to remain certified to perform the duties of an Army Judge Advocate. This individual responsibility may include requirements the licensing state has regarding continuing legal education (CLE).

To assist attorneys in understanding and meeting individual state requirements regarding CLE, the Continuing Legal Education Regulators Association (formerly the Organization of Regulatory Administrators) provides an exceptional website at www.clereg.org (formerly www.cleusa.org) that links to all state rules, regulations and requirements for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education.

The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS) seeks approval of all courses taught in Charlottesville, VA, from states that require prior approval as a condition of granting CLE. For states that require attendance to be reported directly by providers/sponsors, TJAGLCS will report student attendance at those courses. For states that require attorneys to self-report, TJAGLCS provides the appropriate documentation of course attendance directly to students. Attendance at courses taught by TJAGLCS faculty at locations other than Charlottesville, VA, must be self-reported by attendees to the extent and manner provided by their individual state CLE program offices.

Regardless of how course attendance is documented, it is the personal responsibility of each Judge Advocate to ensure that their attendance at TJAGLCS courses is accounted for and credited to them and that state CLE attendance and reporting requirements are being met. While TJAGLCS endeavors to assist Judge Advocates in meeting their CLE requirements, the ultimate responsibility remains with individual attorneys. This policy is consistent with state licensing authorities and CLE administrators who hold individual attorneys licensed in their jurisdiction responsible for meeting licensing requirements, including attendance at and reporting of any CLE obligation.

Please contact the TJAGLCS CLE Administrator at (434) 971-3309 if you have questions or require additional information.
Current Materials of Interest

1. Training Year (TY) 2012 RC On-Site Legal Training Conferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Region, LSO &amp; Focus</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Supported Units</th>
<th>POCs</th>
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<tr>
<td>18 – 20 May</td>
<td>Midwest Region</td>
<td>Cincinnati, OH</td>
<td>8th LSO 91st LSO</td>
<td>CPT Steven Goodin <a href="mailto:steven.goodin@us.army.mil">steven.goodin@us.army.mil</a> (513) 673-4277</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th LSO Focus: Expeditionary Contracting &amp; Fiscal Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 – 17 Jun</td>
<td>Western Region</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>6th LSO 75th LSO 87th LSO 117th LSO</td>
<td>CPT Charles Taylor <a href="mailto:charles.j.taylor@us.army.mil">charles.j.taylor@us.army.mil</a> (213) 247-2829</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78th LSO Focus: Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 – 22 Jul</td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic Region</td>
<td>Nashville, TN</td>
<td>134th LSO 151st LSO 10th LSO</td>
<td>CPT James Brooks <a href="mailto:james.t.brooks@us.army.mil">james.t.brooks@us.army.mil</a> (615) 231-4226</td>
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<tr>
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<td>139th LSO Focus: Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 – 19 Aug</td>
<td>Northeast Region</td>
<td>Philadelphia, PA</td>
<td>3d LSO 4th LSO 7th LSO</td>
<td>MAJ Jack F. Barrett <a href="mailto:john.f.barrett@us.army.mil">john.f.barrett@us.army.mil</a> (215) 665-3391</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>153d LSO Focus: Client Services</td>
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2. Brigade Judge Advocate Mission Primer (BJAMP)

Dates: 4 – 7 Jun 12
Location: Pentagon
ATTRS No.: NA
POC: PDP@conus.army.mil
Telephone: (571) 256-2913/2914/2915/2923

3. The Legal Automation Army-Wide Systems XXI—JAGCNet

a. The Legal Automation Army-Wide Systems XXI (LAAWS XXI) operates a knowledge management and information service called JAGCNet primarily dedicated to servicing the Army legal community, but also provides for Department of Defense (DoD) access in some cases. Whether you have Army access or DoD-wide access, all users will be able to download TJAGSA publications that are available through the JAGCNet.

b. Access to the JAGCNet:

(1) Access to JAGCNet is restricted to registered users who have been approved by the LAAWS XXI Office and senior OTJAG staff:

(a) Active U.S. Army JAG Corps personnel;

(b) Reserve and National Guard U.S. Army JAG Corps personnel;

(c) Civilian employees (U.S. Army) JAG Corps personnel;
(d) FLEP students;

(e) Affiliated (U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard) DoD personnel assigned to a branch of the JAG Corps; and, other personnel within the DoD legal community.

(2) Requests for exceptions to the access policy should be e-mailed to: LAAWSXXI@jagc-smtp.army.mil

c. How to log on to JAGCNet:

(1) Using a Web browser (Internet Explorer 6 or higher recommended) go to the following site: http://jagcnet.army.mil.

(2) Follow the link that reads “Enter JAGCNet.”

(3) If you already have a JAGCNet account, and know your user name and password, select “Enter” from the next menu, then enter your “User Name” and “Password” in the appropriate fields.

(4) If you have a JAGCNet account, but do not know your user name and/or Internet password, contact the LAAWS XXI HelpDesk at LAAWSXXI@jagc-smtp.army.mil.

(5) If you do not have a JAGCNet account, select “Register” from the JAGCNet Intranet menu.

(6) Follow the link “Request a New Account” at the bottom of the page, and fill out the registration form completely. Allow seventy-two hours for your request to process. Once your request is processed, you will receive an e-mail telling you that your request has been approved or denied.

(7) Once granted access to JAGCNet, follow step (c), above.

4. TJAGSA Publications Available Through the LAAWS XXI JAGCNet

The TJAGSA, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia continues to improve capabilities for faculty and staff. We have installed new computers throughout TJAGSA, all of which are compatible with Microsoft Windows XP Professional and Microsoft Office 2003 Professional.

The TJAGSA faculty and staff are available through the Internet. Addresses for TJAGSA personnel are available by e-mail at jagsch@hqda.army.mil or by accessing the JAGC directory via JAGCNET. If you have any problems, please contact Legal Technology Management Office at (434) 971-3257. Phone numbers and e-mail addresses for TJAGSA personnel are available on TJAGSA Web page at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/tjagsa. Click on “directory” for the listings.

For students who wish to access their office e-mail while attending TJAGSA classes, please ensure that your office e-mail is available via the web. Please bring the address with you when attending classes at TJAGSA. If your office does not have web accessible e-mail, forward your office e-mail to your AKO account. It is mandatory that you have an AKO account. You can sign up for an account at the Army Portal, http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/tjagsa. Click on “directory” for the listings.

Personnel desiring to call TJAGSA can dial via DSN 521-7115 or, provided the telephone call is for official business only, use the toll free number, (800) 552-3978; the receptionist will connect you with the appropriate department or directorate. For additional information, please contact the LTMO at (434) 971-3264 or DSN 521-3264.

5. The Army Law Library Service

Per Army Regulation 27-1, paragraph 12-11, the Army Law Library Service (ALLS) must be notified before any redistribution of ALLS-purchased law library materials. Posting such a notification in the ALLS FORUM of JAGCNet satisfies this regulatory requirement as well as alerting other librarians that excess materials are available.

Point of contact is Mr. Daniel C. Lavering, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, ATTN:
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