

NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION


VOLUME VI

*Office of United States
Chief of Counsel For Prosecution
of Axis Criminality*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON • 1946

*II 804
G 42 A4
copy 3*



Sold in complete sets

by the

Superintendent of Documents

U. S. Government Printing Office

Washington 25, D. C.

CONTENTS

| | <i>Pages</i> |
|--|--------------|
| Document number 3313-PS through document number 3901-PS arranged numerically..... | 1- 798 |
| Document number C-2 through document number C-195 arranged numerically..... | 799-1023 |
| Document number D-39 through document number D-281 arranged numerically..... | 1023-1120 |

(A descriptive list of documents appears
at the end of the last volume.)

A Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials
Prepared by the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for
Presentation before the International Military Tribunal at Nurn-
berg, Germany, in the case of

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH RE-
PUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS,
JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM
KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROS-
ENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS
STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT,
GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, KARL
DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH,
FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN,
FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART, AL-
BERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS
FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the
Following Groups or Organizations to which They Respec-
tively Belonged, Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG
(REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN
LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUT-
SCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF
THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEIT-
ERPARTEI (commonly known as the "SS") and including
DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the
"SD"); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET
STATE POLICE, commonly known as the "GESTAPO");
DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly
known as the "SA") and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH
COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES all as de-
fined in Appendix B of the Indictment.

Defendants.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3313-PS

VON PAPEN, APPEAL TO THE GERMAN CONSCIENCE

[Appell an das deutsche Gewissen]

Oldenburg, 1933, page 66-68.

Address delivered at Stuttgart, March 3, 1933.

The principles of German federalism, as far as they have been incorporated in the Weimar Constitution, are thus of a dynastic nature. Therein, in truth, lies the crisis of federalism.

Whoever regards the states [Laender] simply as legal successors of the former states of the German union forgets the elimination of the dynasties (ruling houses). The yardstick to measure the vitality and the political as well as legal importance of a state has completely changed since 1918. Whoever does not want to recognize this fact, but deals with the states of today as if they were still the union-states of yesterday's, does condemn to death federalism as a legal and statebuilding principle. Either this great process of mediation continues until the unified state is accomplished, or one has to underpin the federalist principle anew. The slogan: "Back to Bismarck" really springs from a basically un-Bismarckian attitude, because Bismarck himself would never have tried to construct something for which the real political presuppositions were lacking.

It follows then that the federalist principle must be rebuilt legally and politically on a new basis. Its outstanding characteristics, it seems to me, point to two directions: for one to the legal constructions and for another to the administrative method. A construction of a state is a federalist one if it rests to considerable extent upon contract law, and upon the mutual recognition of living legal units which give birth, in a legal fashion, to an all-embracing political being. The principle of force will thus be limited to a minimum; force can only be applied to prevent a decay of unity in behalf of the basic right to live. In addition, federalism will protect us from centralism, that organizational form which focuses all living strength of a nation like a burning mirror onto one point. No nation is less adaptable to being governed centralistically than the German nation. Particularism, on the other hand, leads to a predominance of the members and to a centrifugal movement dismembering the total unit.

Such a centrifugal movement has been characteristic for the decay of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, the body of German folkdom, ever since the thirty years war, or even since

medieval times. Exactly here, in the centre of the southern German [alemamic] tribes, we feel lively, even tragically, the political tearing apart of a tribal unity which today still extends beyond the Rhine and the Swabian sea. We fully understand, therefore, the anxiety of all of those who wish to strengthen the power of the Reich and wish to prevent at all costs a further crumbling of the kernel of the German nation.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3314-PS

VON PAPEN'S ADDRESS, AS CHANCELLOR, delivered at
Muenster, Westphalia, 28 August 1932, Frankfurter Zeitung,
29 August 1932, Page 2.

The licentiousness emanating from the appeal of the leader of the National Socialist Movement does not comply very well with his claims to governmental power.

I do not concede him the right to regard the mere minority following his banner solely as the German nation, and to treat all our fellow countrymen as "free game".

I am advocating the constitutional state, the community of the people, law and order in government. In doing so, it is I, and not he, who is carrying on the struggle against the damination of parties, against arbitrariness and injustice, a struggle which millions of his supporters had been wholeheartedly longing for years to fight.

My government from the first day on, has pursued the aim to grant the opportunity of participating in the reconstruction of the Reich to that great patriotic liberation movement whose historical services to Germany everybody must acknowledge. I am loath to believe that this great German liberation movement will remain intentionally antagonistic forever toward the purposes of a government whose entire thoughts are devoted solely and exclusively to Germany's future.

I am firmly determined to stamp out the smoldering flame of civil war, to put an end to political unrest and political violence, which today is still such a great obstacle to the positive work representing the sole task of the State.

The conservative leadership of the State recognizes as its task, with few laws and in limiting itself to the chief aspects of National life, to create a framework within which the forces of the Nation can enfold themselves freely. This task can only be fulfilled by an authoritarian, independent government deeply conscious of its duties toward God and Nation.

VON PAPEN'S ADDRESS, AS CHANCELLOR,
Delivered in Munich on 12 October 1932, Frankfurter Zeitung,
13 October 1932, Page 2.

It is a historical falsification when it is claimed today that I, the Chancellor, had prevented National Socialism from taking over the responsibility. The offer of 13 August gave the NSDAP a share in the power in the Reich and in Prussia which would have assured it decisive influence. Hitler did not accept this offer because he believed that he as leader of a movement represented by 230 parliamentary mandates should claim the position of the chancellor. He made this claim on the principle of totalitarianism, of exclusiveness which his party adheres to.

* * * * *

The essence of conservative ideology is its being anchored in the divine order of things. That too is its fundamental difference compared with the doctrine advocated by the NSDAP. The principle of "exclusiveness" of a political "everything or nothing" which the latter adheres to, its mythical Messiah-belief in the bombastic Fuehrer who alone is destined to direct fate, gives it the character of a political sect. And therein I see the unbridgeable cleavage between a conservative policy born of faith and a national-socialist creed as a matter of politics. It seems to me that today names and individuals are unimportant when Germany's final fate is at stake. What the nation demands is this: it expects of a movement which has written upon its banner the internal and external national freedom that it will act, at all times and under all circumstances, as if it were the spiritual, social and political conscience of the nation. If it does not act that way; if this movement follows merely tactical points of view, democratic-parliamentarian points of view, if it engages in the soliciting of mass support using demagogic agitation and means of proletarian class struggle—then it is not a movement any more, it has become a political party.

* * * * *

And, indeed, the Reich was almost destroyed by the political parties. One simply cannot, on one side, despise mercilessly masses and majorities, as Herr Hitler is doing, and on the other hand surrender to parliamentarian democracy; surrender to the extent of adopting resolutions against one's own government together with the Bolsheviks.

* * * * *

In the interest of the entire nation we decline the claim to power by parties which want to own their followers body and soul, and which want to put themselves, as a party or a movement, over and above the whole nation.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3318-PS

VISIT OF VON PAPEN AS CHANCELLOR IN MUNICH, 11 October 1932. Commentary of "Frankfurter Zeitung", partly based on Bavarian sources such as the news service of the Bavarian People's Party, 12 October 1932, Page 1.

Von Papen claimed that it had been his aim from the very beginning to build a new Reich for and with the various states [Laender]. The Reich government is taking a definite federalist attitude. Its slogan is not a dreary centralism or unitarianism.

Wherever one did hear von Papen express himself in public, one did hear a chancellor who took special care to be regarded as an unconditional federalist.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3319-PS

Foreign Office
Inf. XIV
Anti-Jewish action abroad
Number 137 secret
1 enclosure

Berlin, April 28th, 1944
Am Karlsbad 8

SECRET

Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries.
In conjunction with wired circular [Drahterlass] Multex number 196 of February 17th, 1944.
To the German Embassy in Ankara, Madrid, Paris the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary for Italy, Fasano
the German Legation in Agram, Bern, Budapest, Bukarest, Helsingfors, Lisbon, Sofia, Stockholm
the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark in Copenhagen
the German Consulate General Tangiers
the Athens Office of the Special Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office for the Southeast
the Belgrad Office of the Special Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office for the Southeast
the Office of the Foreign Office in Brussels
the Representative of the Foreign Office with the staff of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories in The Hague
the VAA. at the Reichs Commissioner Eastland in Riga
—each separately—

1. The Reich Foreign Minister has ordered the creation of the Inf. Stelle XIV (Anti-Jewish action abroad under the leadership

of the Envoy I. K. Schleier). Its task is to deepen and to strengthen the anti-Jewish information in foreign countries.

This will be done by the collection of all experts of the departments and working units of the Foreign Office who are interested and take part in the anti-Jewish information in foreign countries. It will also be done in close cooperation with all offices which are engaged with anti-Jewish work, but are outside the Foreign Office, and with German missions in Europe.

Besides the co-workers who are directly assigned to the Inf.-Stelle XIV:

Commercial political department,
Cultural political department,
News and press department,
Radio political department,
Inland II

America-Committee,
England-Committee,
Deputy for the information system,

furthermore

one permanent representative of the Reich Main Security Office

one representative of the office of Reichsleiter Rosenberg and the provisional Director of the Institute for the Research of the Jewish problem, Frankfurt.

It is intended that other offices engaged or interested in anti-Jewish work will also send permanent representatives to Inf. XIV.

2. It is necessary for the execution of the task charged to Inf. XIV that the missions send on *all material available to them, about Jewish or anti-Jewish occurrences as completely as possible and by the quickest means*. Not only material from the concerned country is wanted, but special emphasis must also be put on the procurement of documents which concern the countries with whom Germany is at war. This material must and can be procured almost exclusively via neutral countries.

The material collected at Inf. XIV will be edited in an appropriate way and will be put at the disposal *of the missions for the best and greatest possible utilization*.

It is the duty of the missions to make use of the material they receive in any and every possible way:

as basis for discussions for the members of the mission,
in the press,

in the radio of the country concerned, with measures which are at the disposal of the current information. (Activ-Information)

3. Individual reports about certain incidents of Jewish or anti-Jewish nature which come in from foreign countries will be forwarded by Inf. XIV to the departments of the office which are concerned with suitable suggestions for the purpose of further propagation.

The press department utilizes this material as much as possible in the news agency reports, such as the German News Buro (DNB), TO-EP and National Press Service (NPD).

The radio political department utilizes the reports in German and foreign language news broadcasts directed to foreign countries.

It is the task of the press and radio consultants of the missions to check all material coming in to them in order to find out, whether there are any anti-Jewish reports and whether and how these might be utilized in the press and in the radio of their respective country.

Inf. XIV will draw the special attention of the missions to reports where special emphasis is put on their propagation; this will be done from time to time by wired circular.

Besides these current news reports over press and radio, the mission will, from time to time, receive a collection of the material which comes in from all missions and which has a certain value and possibility for utilization, beyond the present moment.

Besides reports about actual individual incidents, the missions will currently receive documents from Inf. XIV on certain subjects, either as unfinished documents or as finished comments and articles. This material is also to be utilized in the best possible way.

The missions are asked to report soon, how many copies of the material they want to receive each time, so that the material leaving by courier will be sent off from the beginning with the number of copies which are necessary for the practical work of the missions.

4. *Current reports are to be made about the practical utilization of the material in foreign countries; corroborating documents are to be enclosed, as far as this is possible.*

Special value is placed by the Reich Foreign Minister on this way of reporting.

5. In order to collect within the missions all questions connected with the anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, *a member of the mission is to be appointed consultant for Jewish questions; however, this should not be the consultant for culture, if possible.* (compare wired circular Multex number 196 of February 17th.) A wired report is requested as to, who has finally been appointed

consultant for Jewish questions of the mission. It is the task of the consultants for Jewish questions to put the material which arrives from Inf. XIV at the disposal of all those consultants of the missions who might be able to utilize it; furthermore, to take care of the collecting of the Jewish or anti-Jewish material in the domain of the mission and conveying it to Inf. XIV; as well as to supervise the collection and conveying of the reports and documents about the execution, and/or success to Inf. XIV.

6. An *archive* will be created at Inf. XIV, where all documents about Jewish and anti-Jewish happenings which are within reach of the Foreign Office and of the missions will be received, collected, and evaluated, according to plan.

It is a special duty of the missions to convey the complete material collected in their office district to the archive. Details about the material to be collected can be taken from the enclosure. Of course, the material collected in the archive is also to be utilized for the purposes of the missions. On the basis of the documents, Inf. XIV will send to the missions from time to time, evaluation reports about individual personalities or incidents.

7. Financial means necessary for the procurement of Jewish or anti-Jewish material must be taken from the funds put at the disposal of the missions.

8. The missions are asked to inform the consular authorities under them appropriately and to incorporate them into the work.

[signed] STEENGRACHT

Enclosure to decree number 137
(secret) of 28 April, 1944, Inf. XIV

Jewish and anti-Jewish archive of the Foreign Office.

(Inf. XIV, anti-Jewish action abroad)

I. The archive is organized in the following way:

1. Personnel archive: containing all documents about Jewish and anti-Jewish personalities, including articles and reproductions of speeches of these circles of persons.

2. Archive of objects: containing all incidents concerning the Jewish question, assorted according to individual incidents. The reports of the missions about the Jewish question and about anti-Jewish measures in the individual countries belong here; reports or documents about certain individual questions, for instance

Jews in economy,

Jews in cultural life,

Palestine White-book, and similar things.

3. Pictorial archive:

II. The following material may be used for this archive:

From the press: All newspaper and agency reports (the latter even then if not utilized in the press) about all incidents of Jewish and anti-Jewish nature.

Speeches of Jews and antisemites. General articles and reports about Jews. National measures against the Jews and against antisemites.

Jewish newspapers and magazines. Anti-Jewish newspapers and magazines.

Comic papers with anti-Jewish tendencies.

Pictures: Photographs (if possible, original copies with glossy surface, but reproductions from newspapers, magazines, and books, too, if necessary of Jews and antisemites. Photographs about incidents of Jewish and anti-Jewish nature (Jewish manifestations, celebrations, etc, anti-Jewish manifestations, demonstrations and others).

Radio: Listening reports of the national sender of the country concerned, as far as they touch Jewish or anti-Jewish incidents.

Cultural politics: All magazines, books, posters, leaflets, stickers with Jewish and anti-Jewish tendencies. Discussions of Jewish and anti-Jewish books and movie pictures, Jewish or anti-Jewish quotations from the literature of the concerned country with exact specification from which book and from which spot these quotations have been taken.

Besides these sources which are the most important ones for the procurement of material for the archive, the following might be taken into consideration:

Notes of members of the missions, of other Reich Germans and of foreigners about discussions which are about Jewish or anti-Jewish personalities or incidents; reports of other offices to which the missions have access about such occurrences.

Procurement of personal statements of Jewish and anti-Jewish personalities (complete life history, if possible). Incidents about Jews in the economical life of the country concerned.

Provided it is possible and not connected with special expenses, it is requested to send in *the material in at least two copies*.

However, reports and notes of the missions are to be sent in five-fold, so that the necessary working copies can be forwarded to the interested departments without any further loss of work and time.

Foreign Office
 Inf. XIV
 Anti-Jewish Action Abroad
 No. 73/74

Berlin W 8
 Wilhelmstr. 74-76.
 March 4, 1944.
 [Receipt stamp]
 German Legation
 17 March 1944

To the German
 Legation in Bucharest

Subject: Work conference of Consultants for Jewish questions
 and Aryanization advisers.

By direction of the Reich Foreign Minister (RAM), a work conference of the consultants for Jewish questions and Aryanization advisers will be held at Krummhuebel i. Rsgbg. at the beginning of April. The following messages have been wired to those missions to which no Aryanization consultant of the Reich Security Main Office [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] has been assigned:

On Feb. 17, 1944:

"In accordance with a special order, anti-Jewish information program abroad is to be strengthened by every means. For clarification of all questions connected with procurement of material and utilization of information, the holding of a work conference has been ordered. This will be arranged in collaboration with the RSHA, probably for 3 and 4 April. Place of conference will follow.

Request reply by wire as to which specialist there, who is familiar with the Jewish question in that country, will be sent to the conference.

Schleier."

And on Feb. 26, 1944:

"With reference to wireless directive dated 17 Feb., Multex No. 196.

Expert on Jewish questions must be prepared to give a brief report to the conference, lasting not over 10 to 12 minutes, on the effect of the anti-Jewish information program abroad thus far, possibilities for their intensification, possibilities for procurement and distribution of material, and to offer, as well, suggestions and proposals for the further work.

It is intended to exhibit during the work conference from 3 to 4 April as complete a display as possible of anti-Jewish propaganda material from all to the countries of Europe. It is therefore requested that a complete collection of all anti-Jewish propaganda material to be found in that country, whether of local,

German, or other origin, be sent to Inf. XIV. before 25 March. This includes books, periodicals, brochures, posters, handbills, stickers, post-cards and the like.

Schleier."

The Aryanization consultant at the local mission will be invited directly to the RSHA to participate in the conference.

It is requested that the Aryanization consultant be notified of the contents of the two wireless messages quoted above, that all material available there on the Jewish question be placed at his disposal, and that he be informed of all desiderata, proposals and suggestions for the intensification of the anti-Jewish information service abroad, so that he will be in a position to give a brief report at the conference.

I should like to request that the material needed for the exhibit planned for the conference be dispatched in time to be at Information Office XIV by 25 March at the latest.

By direction
[signed] v. Thadden

[Illegible initials]

| | | |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Foreign Office | [Receipt stamp] | Berlin W 8 |
| Inf. XIV | German Legation | Wilhelmstr. 74-76 |
| No. 118/44 | Bucharest | 20 April, 1944 |
| 1 Enclosure | 3 May 1944 | |
| | No. 2803 | |

Contents: Work conference of specialists for Jewish questions of the German missions on 3 and 4 April 1944.

There is enclosed for your information a copy of the minutes of the work conference of the consultants for Jewish questions of the missions which was held at Krummhuebel on 3 and 4 April of this year. On account of their secret nature, the statements made by Counselor of Legation v. Thadden and SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Ballensiefen of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) have not been entered in the minutes.

In accordance with Multex No. 246 of 28 Feb. 1944, most of the missions sent in for the conference, sometimes with request for their return, collections of anti-Jewish propaganda material from the countries concerned, such as books, periodicals, posters, handbills, etc. It is planned not to return this material, but, rather, to include it in the comprehensive Jewish archives that are being built up and that are also at the disposal of the missions. The archives are being set up in Krummhuebel in order to insure

their safety from war damage. In view of the importance to the anti-Jewish information work of a complete collection of all pertinent material, it is requested that the return of the material furnished by your office be dispensed with.

[signed] Schleier

To

German Embassy, Ankara
 Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich for
 Italy in Pasano
 German Embassy, Madrid
 German Embassy, Paris
 German Legation, Lisbon
 German Legation, Bratislava
 German Legation, Sofia
 German Legation, Stockholm
 German Legation, Zagreb
 German Legation, Bern
 German Legation, Bucharest
 German Legation, Copenhagen

Confidential

Work-session of the consultants on Jewish questions of the
 German missions in Europe

Krummhuebel, 3 and 4 April 1944.

Greetings by ambassador Prof. Dr. Six, who gives the chairmanship to *ambassador Schleier*. In his opening-speech he deals with the tasks and aims of the anti-Jewish action abroad. Ambassador Schleier points to the faith of the Fuehrer in the racial principle of the people. This means repudiation of all foreign influences, and therefore the fight of National Socialism against the disintegrating and destructive activity of Jewry.

The hatred of Jewry for us was the result of this fight. Ambassador Schleier commemorates the first victims of the fight of international Jewry against the German people, Wilhelm Gustloff and Ernst v. Rath. That fight represents a considerable part of the great struggle of the German people. The Fuehrer therefore gave instructions to take up the fight against Jewry at an intensified rate and to explain its part in the present war. He said, that roots of anti-Jewish tendencies existed in England and America.

The question was, what possibilities existed for the European German Missions for the conduct of anti-Jewish activity. The

work to be done would have to take place from the inside to the outside and vice-versa. Reports about the behaviour of Jewry in the country in question and about existing anti-Jewish tendencies in the country, would be necessary. Anti-Jewish propaganda in neutral countries was particularly difficult, but of the utmost importance, as there were possibilities that they might spread from there to England or America. The neutral countries, though, were also important as observation-posts. Press-excerpts, radio reports, notes about events in enemy countries and the Jewish camp, which are reported by subjects of the host-countries, as well as beginnings of anti-Jewish tendencies must be carefully collected and registered. Those reports must include all the spheres of life, which are influenced by the Jews.

This material would be collected and worked out by "Inf. XIV" and then handed over to the missions for exploitation through the press and radio, by handbills, pamphlets and through the channels of whispering-propaganda. The publication would be done by the Press, Radio and Culture-political department.

Ambassador Schleier then developed a few concrete projects. So, for instance, the idea was being entertained, to organize a travelling exhibition on rails or motorized. He planned, furthermore the publication of an anti-Jewish sheet-calendar, particularly for the States of South-Eastern Europe, as well as the creation of a great archive about all the problems of the Jewish question from the personal and factual viewpoint, which was to be accompanied by a collection of pictures.

Ambassador Six speaks then about the political structures of world-Jewry, which he explains as an ideological and historical result of social development since the French revolution. The figures available in 1933, showed 17,000,000 confessional Jews. The real source of strength of Jewry in Europe and America was the Jewry of the East. It constituted the starting-point of the migration-movement from the European to the American area. Eastern Jewry advanced slowly from the East to the West and showed in that connection not only a religious but also a social inclination. Jewry had ceased to play its biological and at the same time its political role in Europe. Jewry occupied a leading position in the countries of the enemy-powers in their fight against National-Socialism and against the German people. The Jewish question had not been accentuated in Soviet-Russia, we know, however, by experiences made in the conduct of war, that the Jew now as before plays an important part in the hierarchy of Bolshevism.

Jewish infiltration maintained itself in the Soviet Union.

The second important country in this connection was England. There Jewry played a traditional part. Because of the plutocratic structure of England it had been possible to place Jews within the leading class, which influenced to a large extent the policy of the leading class during the 19th century. That interrelation step was an important factor for the evaluation of the present situation.

The cooperation of English and American Jewry played a decisive part at the outbreak of the war. There are about 7,000,000 Jews in the United States. Their position was founded on an economic basis. The democratic ideology proved to be fertile soil for the progressive influence of Jewry. The strong Jewish infiltration into the leading classes of the 3 powers fighting against Germany, was a factor of the greatest importance.

Ambassador Six turns then to Zionism. Zionism meant the return of all Jews into their homeland and land of origin, Palestine. The idea was to assemble them there politically and biologically, the whole question of that return was, however, politically overshadowed by the Arabian question. The creation of a homeland [Heimstaette] had been promised to the Jews after the war by the Balfour-declaration of 1917. The Jewish element had spread itself in Palestine at the cost of the Arabs.

The physical elimination of Eastern Jewry would deprive Jewry of its biological reserves. Its present structure was characterized by its association with the three World-Powers. That association became obvious in the Soviet-Union through the ideological combination of Jewry and Bolshevism in England by the penetration of the leading class and in the United States by the occupation of decisive key-positions in high-finance. The Jewish question must be solved not only in Germany but also internationally.

Embassy-counsellor v. Thadden speaks about the Jewish-political situation in Europe and about the state of the anti-Jewish, executive measures. The speaker gave an outline why the Zionist Palestine solution or other similar solutions must be rejected and the deportation of the Jews to the Eastern-territories, carried out. Then he sketched the present state of anti-Jewish measures in all European countries.

The speaker then relates the countermeasures taken by world-Jewry against the German anti-Jewish measures in Europe.

The talks closed with the following request to the representatives of the missions:

1. Suppression of all propaganda even camouflaged as anti-Jewish, liable to slow down or handicap the German executive measures.

2. Preparation for the comprehension among all nations of executive measures against Jewry.

3. Constant reports about the possibility of carrying out more severe measures against Jewry in the various countries by using diplomatic channels.

4. Constant reports about signs of opposition actions by world-Jewry, in order to enable us to take countermeasures in time.

(As the details of the state of the executive measures in the various countries, reported by the consultant, are to be kept secret, it has been decided not to enter them in the protocol.)

SS Captain [Hauptstuormfuehrer] Dr. Ballensiefen, reports about experiences made during the execution of the anti-Jewish measures in Hungary in connection with the political events there.

Prof. Dr. Mahr, deals in his speech with the anti-Jewish action abroad conducted on the radio. He demands the intermingling of German radio broadcasts to foreign countries with anti-Jewish propaganda-material, as well as the influencing of radio installations of countries near to us or allied with us, in the same spirit; at the same time safeguarding the sovereignty of the countries in question. Good material must be procured for the internal German radio.

Miss Hauhsman, (Dr.) speaks about the anti-Jewish action abroad in the press and about the importance of press-pictures in the service of the anti-Jewish action abroad. The need of photographs for the press at home and abroad was great. The co-operation of the missions was necessary in the procurement of anti-Jewish pictures. Important was also the discussion of anti-Jewish films in the press. *Dr. Hauhsman* then points out the practical possibilities for publicizing anti-Jewish material in the foreign press, in which activity the main weight would have to be borne by the Press-consultants of the missions.

Dr. Walz, treats current anti-Jewish information. Real peace among the nations was impossible, as long as the Jewish problem was not solved, one way or the other. Information-activity had to take into consideration the prevailing mentality of the nations, which were to be influenced in an anti-Jewish sense. In the case of pamphlets, foreign examples should be initiated. Until now there was lacking an anti-Jewish film, which did not deal with known Jewish personalities, but which treated the little Jewish merchant and the Jewish intellectual in their daily activities.

Embassy-secretary (LS) Dr. Kutscher speaks about propaganda-theses within the frame-work of the anti-Jewish action abroad. Every propaganda must be ruled by certain directives. Those theses were to be considered as such directives for the information activity. They had to be adapted to the currently prevailing local circumstances. They were intended for internal use. LS. Dr. Kutscher then formulates a few fundamental principles: The Jews are the instigators of this war. They drove the nations into the war, because they are interested in it. The Jews are the misfortune of all the peoples. —A Jewish victory would mean the end of all culture (Example Soviet Union)—Germany does not only fight the Jews for itself, but for all European culture. —The Jew dug his own grave by causing this war. The aim of those phrases was to bring certain facts to the attention of the people until they were finally convinced of them.

Service leader Dienstleiter Haegmeyer, speaks about the international anti-Jewish congress and its tasks. His aim was to collect all the European Forces, which had occupied themselves with the Jewish question. The congress must be set up politically. The composition of the guests was a decisive factor. Particular value must be attached to the attendance of European scientists. The speaker asked the missions to help him select the guests, who should be invited to the congress.

Now follow the reports of the representatives of the various missions about the Jewish-political situation in their countries and the possibilities of a.) the procurement of anti-Jewish material, b.) the execution of anti-Jewish information by radio, press, general means of information (pamphlets, posters, leaflets, stickers, post-cards, whispering propaganda) and the executors of that kind of work.

Dr. Klassen (France) next presents a lengthy historical resume of the development of the Jewish problem and of anti-Semitism in France, and points out differences in the treatment of Jews in the Northern and Southern zones. In the Northern zone steps had been taken toward the Aryanization of Jewish concerns, and Jewish publications had been suppressed. According to French legislation for Jews, Jewish writers and actors were not forbidden to work but they could not own or manage a newspaper or a theater. Jews had vanished from Government positions. An Institute for Jewish Questions was founded in France in 1940. An anti-Jewish exhibition met with great success. Apart from a few anti-Semitic clericals, the Catholic Church gave far-reaching support to Jewry in the sense of the democratic ideology. A few anti-Semitic films had a discouraging effect. The film medium

should therefore be more widely used. The information activity must stem from the French tradition and be represented as the affair of the French. Useful starting points might be found among the followers of Diat and of French Fascism. The situation in French North Africa was well suited to exploitation.

Dr. Beinert (Spain) reports that in Spain the Jewish question is not regarded as of present consequence from a racial standpoint. After the expulsion of the Jews in the Fifteenth Century, the Jewish question was regarded as a closed historical problem. The scope of anti-Jewish information is very closely limited, therefore. It must not appear as German propaganda and can not appear as a large-scale campaign. It would be effective, on the other hand, to bring to the fore specific, impressive instances, especially with reference to economic aspects.

Dr. Matthias (Portugal), too, stresses the difficulties faced by anti-Jewish information activity in Portugal. There is no Jewish problem in our sense of the term, in Portugal. For one thing, the migration of the Jews from central Europe, which began before 1933 and was particularly strong after 1933 and during the French Campaign, did not essentially alter the picture in Portugal, since Portugal was primarily merely country of transit for the Jewish emigration. Secondly, the original Jewish problem, that is to say, the difficulties that resulted from immigration of Jews into Portugal in very early times, found its solution, in the course of centuries, in a way that does not represent a clearing up of the Jewish problem in our sense, but that wiped out the traces of Jewry as a racial component of the people.

The procurement of anti-Jewish material from the U.S.A. would be possible, but involved high costs.

Vice Consul Dr. Janke (Switzerland) points out that while the majority of all Swiss are anti-Semitic by healthy instinct, there is lacking a realization of the actuality of the Jewish question. The influence of Jews is much less than in the other countries under democratic-plutocratic regimes. An anti-Jewish information activity would have to be handled with great care and without revealing its German origin, in order not to challenge the severe statutory restrictions and evoke mistrust of Germany. The sharp censorship, also, must be taken into account. For this reason, the work must be camouflaged. Possibilities to be considered are anti-Jewish tracts, which should be constantly altered in format; also the exploitation of Jewish scandals, compilation of a list of all Jewish persons playing a leading role in the enemy countries, and the spreading of jokes about Jews. The inviting of Swiss

personalities to attend the anti-Jewish congress would meet with difficulties.

Consul Dr. Meissner recommends, in connection with the anti-Jewish information work in *Italy*, exposure of the strong Jewish participation in illegal transactions (black market, sabotage, etc.) stating that, for the rest, the activity should appeal to Italian intelligence and should have a serious basis. It might be effective to publish an illustrated pamphlet objectively presenting Jewry as the catalytic agent of decay. Consideration could be given to Preziosi and Farinacci for an invitation to the congress.

Mr. Delbrueck (Sweden) points out the difficulties of anti-Jewish information activity in Sweden. There had been no Jewish problem in this country before the campaign against the Jews in Denmark, and the resultant heavy migration of Jews to Sweden. The Jewish immigration had led, however, to a reaction of distaste. It could therefore be taken as the starting point for anti-Jewish information activity. Care would have to be taken, certainly, to avoid in this anything that would smack of German propaganda. Only a few pro-German newspapers were available. Anti-Semitic propaganda literature must be printed in Sweden exclusively. Placards could not be used because there are no organizations at hand for it. Nor could postcards with anti-Jewish witticisms be used. No anti-Semitic propaganda could be made over the Swedish radio. The participation of fanatic idealists in the congress was certainly feasible.

Mr. Christensen (Denmark) states that the collection of material is possible now without more ado. Pictorial material could be obtained from the Royal Library in Copenhagen. As concerns information activity, the press can be used for "press release" [Auflageartikel] articles. This would make it however obvious, that it was German propaganda material. The propaganda in Denmark must be carried out by the Danes and not by a central German agency.

Mr. Weilinghaus (Rumania) reports that the Jewish question in Rumania has been approached only from the economic and the general political standpoint, with the racial and ideological aspects consistently neglected. The Rumanian Government is taking a cautious attitude toward the Jewish question. It depends a great deal upon the military situation. It is therefore necessary for us to proceed cautiously with our work. The Rumanian Government has informed us that propagandistic handling of the Jewish question would be undesirable. So that the whispering campaign remains our chief tool. Because anti-Jewish articles are not accepted by the rest of the press "Porunca Vremii" remains our

only anti-Semitic organ. The material used in this newspaper is then printed separately in a large number of copies for distribution. There is, in addition, the possibility of falling back on old material that was approved before the more stringent censorship provisions went into effect. Finally, articles could be introduced in the provincial press, since the provincial censorship officials are generally less alert. The anti-Bolshevist propaganda which the Rumanians desire and support, furnishes an effective opportunity to it. In view of the present political situation, the speaker [Referent] does not recommend, for the present, the issuing of an invitation to Rumanians to attend the anti-Jewish congress.

Superior Govt. Councillor [Ob. Reg. Rat] *Dr. Hoffman (Bulgaria)* declares that the procurement of anti-Jewish material is entirely feasible. The information activity could not be based on ideological grounds. Bulgarians should be approached in regard to the Jewish question by appealing to their acquisitive instinct and their nationalist feeling. The Bulgarian Government has adopted a completely loyal attitude in the Jewish question. It is to be made clear to the Bulgarians that the Bulgarian Jews have no understanding of Bulgarian aspirations. The radio can be utilized to a limited extent. Leaflets should not arouse suspicion by too exaggerated a format. It is recommended that Sobranje deputy Andrejeff be invited to the congress.

Mr. Korselt (Slovakia) emphasizes that the anti-Jewish information activity can be continued only after resumption of the measures against racial Jews [Rassejuden], since otherwise the people would get the impression that the government was acting inconsistently. The anti-Jewish and anti-Bolshevist campaigns of enlightenment must be combined. Anti-Semitism must be employed to counteract the well-advanced Pan-slavism, by pointing out that not the Slav, but the Jew rules Russia. To the Slovak intellect the Jew appears as an intelligent and congenial representative of urban life. As a countermeasure, the international ramifications of Jewry must be demonstrated by means of convincing statistics and factual reports. It would seem to the purpose to depict the Jews in moving pictures and in children's literature. There is a possibility that a representative may be sent to the congress.

Mr. Posemann (Turkey): Early last year the Turkish Government carried out a blow against the Jews in connection with an attempt to solve the problem of minorities. Very vigorous procedures were used in the carrying out of this action. Suspicions of Allied circles that anti-Jewish measures alone were concerned

were countered by Turkey with references to simultaneous measures against the minorities. At any rate, Turkey abandoned further measures toward a solution of the problem of minorities and therewith of the Jewish problem. For this reason, no anti-Jewish propaganda can be carried on under our direction at the present moment, since it is not desired and would be a burden on Turkey present foreign policy. There are no anti-Jewish publications in Turkey, aside from caricatures and comic books about Jews. A dawning realization of the extent of international Jewish domination can be seen in the translation of the "Protocol of the Elders of Zion" and of Ford's book, *The International Jew*. The marketing of these brochures and their distribution has been promoted by the Embassy. For the time being, only work within this narrow range is possible, since, as has already been emphasized, anti-Jewish propaganda that was obviously German-inspired might give rise to unfavorable political complications for us. In closing, Mr. Posemann made reference to the increasing difficulty with which any foreign propaganda could be introduced into Turkey. It was entirely out of the question that a leading Turkish personage would take part in the projected international congress.

In conclusion *Dr. Schickert* discussed the topic, "Science and the Jewish Question". Propaganda alone, he said, was not enough. One must bring out facts that are not generally known. The Jewish problem must become, in its full seriousness and depth, a subject for discussion in polite circles. This was dependent upon a scientific treatment of the Jewish question. It is necessary that scientists abroad be influenced in that direction.

After the representatives of the missions had presented their reports, *Minister Schleier* gave a resume of the results of the work conference, making special reference again to the question of procurement of material and to the work of the experts on Jewish questions attached to the missions as distributors of material to the representatives of press, radio, education, politics and business. It was important for the work of Inf. XIV that all speeches and expressions of opinion of a fundamental nature concerning the Jewish problem be brought together. Such collected material must also include, among other things, anti-Jewish comic papers, photographs of Jewish personalities, pictures of events and publications and pictures of Jewish life. A regular reporting of success achieved and tasks accomplished was indispensable to assure control of the work and to stimulate it constantly. As concerned the anti-Jewish international world congress, the specialists on Jewish questions [Referenten] would

soon have to make up their minds about the question of inviting official and prominent representatives. A study should be made of the advisability of inviting outstanding foreign personages living in Germany.

Some words addressed to the specialists on Jewish questions:

Prof. Mahr suggests that duplicates of handbooks and reference books be obtained and sent to Krummhuebel for the projected archives. He recommends, further, the addition of lists of Freemasons of high degree, journalists, writers and business men who had Jewish relatives. Finally, he urges publication of a diplomatic handbook of Jewish world politics, which might also be published in the English and French languages. Consul Meissner alludes to the Jewish problem in Japan and East Asia, referring particularly to the numerous German Jews in Shanghai, and Minister Schleier adds a few supplemental observations and corrections. Legation Counsellor v. Thadden expresses three wishes to the missions: *a.* in making reports on the Jewish question, proper limits should be observed, *b.* reports are of no value unless they specify names and places, *c.* in regard to delivery of materials, all special desires must be made known. Vice Consul Janke expresses the wish that the list proposed by Prof. Mahr be limited to England, the U.S.A., and the Soviet Union. He also brings up the question of financing the anti-Jewish information work abroad. Mr. Hagemeyer desires to support the setting up of the lists, in particular with regard to the Soviet Union. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Ballensiefen suggests that the lists be supplemented by the inclusion of Jewish organizations. Mr. Posemann requests that anti-Jewish reports relative to Turkey be very carefully handled in the German press, in order not to break any political porcelain. Mr. Richter makes reference to the Union of South Africa and Australia as sources of material. Vice Consul Janke refers to the influence of Jews upon the International Red Cross in Geneva.

Minister Schleier speaks the final words and brings the conference to a close with a *Siegheil!* to the Fuehrer.

Inf. XIV

Anti-Semitic Work Abroad

WORKING CONFERENCE

of the Specialists for Jewish Questions With German Diplomatic

Mission in Europe on 3 and 4 April 1944

in Hotel Sanssouci, at Krummhuebel [Riesengebirge Mountains]

Daily Agenda

3 April:
0900 hours

Minister Prof. Dr. Six:

Welcome

Minister Schleier, head of Inf. XIV:

Opening of the conference

Mission and goals of anti-Semitic work
in foreign countries

Minister Prof. Dr. Six:

The political structure of World Jewry.

Legation Councillor Dr. v. Thadden:

The political situation in Europe with regard to
the Jewish question: a survey of the current
position with regard to anti-Semitic
governmental measures.

[Marginal note: HPTSTF. Ballenstein]

Prof. Dr. Mahr:

Anti-Semitic work in foreign countries by radio

Dr. (Miss) Haussmann:

a. Anti-Semitic work in foreign countries
through newspapers

b. Newspaper photographs as a means of
anti-Semitic work in foreign countries

Dr. Walz:

Information about anti-Semitic activity

Superior Legation Councillor (VLR) Tannenber

Economies and anti-Semitic work abroad

[Note of translator: this item has been crossed out]

Legation Secretary Dr. Kutscher:

Propaganda themes within the scope anti-
Semitic work abroad.

Dr. Colin Ross:

Anti-Semitic work abroad and in America

Dr. Berber:

Anti-Semitic work abroad and Great Britain

[Note of translator: the last two items have been crossed out]

Chief of Service [Dienstleiter] Hagemeyer:

The international anti-Semitic Congress and its Mission.

1300 hoursBreakfast together

1530 hoursReports of the specialists for Jewish

Questions with diplomatic mission about the
possibilities of

a. procuring anti-Semitic propaganda material

b. carrying out anti-Semitic propaganda via radio, news-

papers, general media of propaganda pamphlets, posters, leaflets, stickers, post cards, rumor propaganda, and the agents for carrying out this work.

| <i>Country:</i> | <i>Name:</i> |
|---|-----------------------|
| France | Dr. Klassen |
| Spain | Mr. Juretschke |
| [Note of translator: above name crossed out, and the following hand-written notation substituted: "Beinert, Head(?) of the German Labor Front, Madrid"] | |
| Portugal | Dr. Matthias |
| Switzerland | Vice-Consul Dr. Janke |
| Italy | Consul Dr. Meissner |
| Sweden | Mr. Delbrueck |
| Denmark | Mr. Vogler |

[Note of translator: above name crossed out and "Christiansen" substituted]

| | |
|----------------|---------------------------------|
| Rumania | Mr. Weilinghaus |
| Bulgaria | SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Bierman |

[Note of translator: above name crossed out and "O. R. B. Hoffman" substituted]

| | |
|----------------|--|
| Croatia | Prof Dr. Walz (President of the German Scientific Institute) |
| Slovakia | Mr. Korselt |
| Turkey | Mr. Posemann |

4 April:

| | |
|------------------|--------|
| 0830 hours | Movie: |
|------------------|--------|

a. Newsreel

b. Les Corrupteurs

(Place of movie show will be announced later!)

Immediately afterward

about 1030 hours.....Inspection of anti-Semitic propaganda
Material mailed by the diplomatic missions
in the various countries.

Immediately afterwards

about 1100 hours.....General discussion about addresses
delivered the previous day

Minister Schleier:

Final words and summary of the results of the Working Conference.

The afternoon will be available for individual Discussion between the Specialists of the Foreign Office, the guests and the Specialists for Jewish Questions of the Diplomatic Mission.

1930 hours Supper together
immediately afterwards comradely get-together

Miss Stein will be available at the hotel to participants in the conference for receiving telephone calls or other communications, and for making telephone calls out of town.

ROSTER OF PARTICIPANTS

I. *In charge of the Working Conference:*

1. Minister Schleier, head of Inf. XIV

II. *Inf. XIV:*

2. Privy Councillor Leithe-Jasper

3. Prof. Dr. Mahr

4. SS-Untersturmfuehrer Heuchert

5. KS.I. Hezinger

III. *Representatives of the Departments and Work Sections of the Foreign Office:*

Commissioner of Information 6. Legation Councillor
Dr. Kutscher

American Committee 7. Dr. Colin Ross

British Committee 8. Dr. Berber

Germany (Inland) II 9. Legation Councillor
Dr. v. Thadden

Department for Commerical Policy 10. Superior Legation
Councillor (VLR) Tannenberg

Department for Cultural Policy 11. Minister Dr. Six
12. Dr. Richter

Department of Information and Press 13. Dr. Walz
14. Dr. (Miss)
Haussmann

Department for Broadcasting Policy 15. Dr. Ahrens

[Note of translator: above name has been crossed
out and "Prof. Mahr" substituted]

IV) *Representatives of Diplomatic Mission:*

Country: *Name:*

Bulgaria 16. SS.Obersturmfuehrer Biermann

[Note of translator: above name has been crossed
out and that of Superior Government Councillor
(O.R.R.) Hoffmann substituted]

Denmark 17. Mr. Vogler

[Note of translator: above name has been crossed
out and that of Christiansen substituted]

originally intended to work on it here from a special point of view. For reasons of expediency, the material is now sent out in the enclosed form; we ask for a suitable evaluation in the corresponding channels. The material will be forwarded regularly in the future.

By order

Richter

May 2nd [in pencil]

Richter

To the
German Legation
Bukarest

To Mr. Geheimrat von Kantran [in pencil]
in this building

June 13th 1944

Pa/We

I. To the

Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service (SD)
— Attache group —

Berlin.

Subject: Decree of the foreign Office concerning anti-Jewish action in foreign countries.

Reference: None.

Enclosure: 1 (attached)

I am enclosing a copy of a decree of the Foreign Office concerning the creation of an information office XIV (anti-Jewish action abroad) and ask you to acknowledge it.

By order:

[illegible signature]

SS-1st Lieutenant
Criminal commissioner

2. To the file

3319-PS

Foreign Office

Number: Inl II 2777 [in pencil]

G1810/93 33/43

[in pencil]

Berlin W8, 12 October, 1943

Wilhelmstreet 74-76

SECRET

[Stamp] German Legation
Bukarest

Received: 18 October 1943

Diary Number G 1910/43

Answer——[illegible]

Copy

Sent to the
German Legation
In Bukarest,

— Please acknowledge —

By order :

n. Thadden

The Chief of the Security Police
and of the Security Service(SD)
IV B 4 b-2314/43 secret (82)

SECRET

Berlin 23 Sept. 1943

Special Delivery Letter

To

- a. All (administrative) offices of the state police.
- b. The commander of the Security Police, and the security Service, Central Office for the regulation of the Jewish question in Bohemia and Moravia, *in Prague*.
- c. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service, *in Prague*.
- d. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in the occupied Dutch territories, *in the Hague*.
- e. The commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service for the domain of the Military Commander in France, *in Paris*.
- f. The Deputy of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service for the domain of the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France, *In Brussels*.
- g. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service *in Metz*.
- h. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service *in Strassborg*.

- i.* The Commitment Command [Einsatzkommando] Luxembourg. *In Luxembourg.*
- j.* The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service, in *Oslo.*
- k.* The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in the General Government, in *Cracow.*
- l.* The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service East [Ostland] *in Riga.*
- m.* The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service Ukraine *in Kiev.*
- n.* The Chief of the Commitment group B, in *Smolensk.*
- o.* The Commanders [Kommandeur] of the Security Police and of the Security Service in Carinthia (Kaernten) and Carnioia (Krain) *in Veldes.*
- p.* The Commander [Kommandeur] of the Security Police and of the Security Service in Lower Styria, *in Marburg.*

By way of information

To

- a.* The Superior SS-and Police Leaders in the Reich and in Bohemia and Moravia.
- b.* The Superior SS-and Police Leaders with the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch territories in *The Hague.*
- c.* The Superior SS-and Police leader in France, *In Paris.*
- d.* The Superior SS-and Police Leader with the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, *in Oslo.*
- e.* The Superior SS-and Police Leader, State Secretary for the Security system, *in Cracow.*
- f.* The Superior SS-and Police Leader North (101) *in Riga.*
- g.* The Superior SS-and Police Leader Niddle (102), in *Minsk.*
- h.* The Superior SS-and Police Leader South (103) *in Kiev.*
- i.* The investigator of the Security Police and of the Security Service.

Subject: Treatment of Jews with Foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power.

Reference: Decree of 5 March 1943, wired decree number 53579 of 24 March 1943 and wired decree number 91535 of 18 May 1943 — IV B 4 b 2314/43 secret (82)

In agreement with the foreign Office, all Jews who remain in the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called home bringing action [Heimschaffungsaktion] and who have the citizenship of the following countries might now be included in the evacuation measures:

- | | |
|----------------|-------------|
| 1. Italy | 6. Sweden |
| 2. Switzerland | 7. Finland |
| 3. Spain | 8. Hungary |
| 4. Portugal | 9. Roumania |
| 5. Denmark | 10. Turkey |

Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet take place at the present time, a temporary stay is provided in the concentration camp Buchenwald for Male Jews over 14 years of age and in the concentration camp Ravensbruck for Jewesses as well as children.

The necessary measures are to be carried out on the following dates:

- a. For Jews with citizenship immediately,
- b. For Jews with Turkish citizenship on 20 October 1943,
- c. For Jews with citizenship of other countries mentioned above on 10 October 1943

Roumania
[in pencil on right side]

A special application for protective custody is not requested for the transfer to the concentration camp, but the concentration camp headquarters are to be notified that the transfer to the concentration camp is taking place in the frame of the evacuation measures.

The regulation of the above mentioned decree of 5 March 1943 are in force for the management of the property and for the taking along of baggage.

As far as the evacuation of Jews with foreign citizenship which has already been ordered in the decree mentioned above has not yet been carried out, it is to be made up for immediately.

Concluding I want to point out the fact that Jews who are married to spouses with German or German related (artverwandt) blood are to be excepted from all measures now as before. After the execution of all measures a final report is requested. (latest date November 1st 1943)

Additional remark for the commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service for the occupied Dutch territories:

Attention is drawn to the special regulation of the same day, as far as those Jews in Holland are concerned who have Roumanian citizenship.

By order
[signed] MULLER
[Stamp:] Foreign Office
Inl II 2777 Secret.
[in pencil]
Received October 5th 1943
Endorse

[Stamp:]
The ReichsfuehrerSS
and Chief of the
German Police
in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior

Certified:
[signed] RASENACK
Chancellery Clerk

Inl II 9947 Secret [in pencil]
The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service
VI B 4 b-2314/43 Secret (82) —

Berlin, October 2nd, 1943

To the
Foreign Office
To be delivered to
Legation Counsellor [Legationsrat]
von THADDEN
in Berlin W8
Wilhelmstreet.

Sent with request for acknowledgement. The individual exemptions which are thought to be necessary by your office will be treated separately, as agreed with the signer of this in earlier discussions.

By order:
Signed: HUNSCHE
Certified:
[signed] RASENACK
Chancellery clerk
Ra

[Stamp:]
The Reichsfuehrer SS
and Chief of the
German Police
in the Reich ministry
of the Interior

Copy

The Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern territories
No. I/602/41 Secret
DIII 238
To the Foreign Office
Berlin W8
Wilhmstr. 72-76

Berlin W35 Mar, 42
Rauchstr. 17/18
Secret!
Receipt stamp
Foreign Office
D III 260 g
Received 13 Mar. 42

Subject: Deportation of Rumanian Jews on the Bug.

With reference to the conference with Legationsrat Radem-
scher and Lieutenant Colonel [Obersturmbannfuehrer] Eichmann
and my expert Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Wetzel, I send you in the
enclosure a copy of the agreements of Tighina of 30 Aug 1941
with the request for acknowledgement. I point out especially
number 7 of the agreements. I have already taken a position in
my letter of 5 Mar. 1942.

By Direction
/s/ Dr. Draeutigam
Seal Authenticated
/s/ signature
Government inspector
Enclosure to Gen Qu II/1542/41
Top Secret

Copy
Secret

 COPY
Agreements

about the security, administration, and economic exploitation of
territories between

The Dniester and the Bug (Transnistria) and the Bug and the
Dnieper (Bug-Dnieper-territory).

The following serve as a basis for the *agreements*:

The Fuehrer's letter of 14 Aug 41 to Chief of State [Staats-
chef] Antonescu.

The answering letter of the Chief of State of 17 Aug 41.

The letter of the Chief of the German Army mission to the
Royal Rumanian General Staff of 24 Aug. 41.

To the mutual German Rumanian Agreements in the town hall
at Tighina and the necessity of examining all questions to be
treated from the viewpoint of the *Mutual* waging of the war which
was emphasized there as an introduction by Major General Hauffe.

1. *Determination of Responsibility*

The following are responsible:

a. In Transnistria Rumania for security, administration and economic exploitation; for traffic and communication system see number 3. The decision of the Fuehrer about the new Northern border suggested by Chief of State Marshal Antonescu is to be obtained through diplomatic channels.

b. in the Bug-Dnieper-territory:

Germany for administration and exploitation; Rumania for security.

2. *Rumania Security Troops*

Strength and organization of Rumania security troops are so measured that the planned missions can be fulfilled. Presumably the following will be employed for this:

One army high command (seat in Transnistria, probably Odessa) 2-3 Corps commands, in any case one of them in Transnistria and one in the Bug-Dnieper territory, some 7 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry brigades. The tactical employment as well as the entry of the Rumanian security will take place according to the directives of the Command of Army Group South [Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe Sued]. For this the assignment of the Rumanian billeting environs in the Bug-Dnieper territory by Army Group South is necessary in order to be able to start with preparations for communications lines and quartering.

An exact determination of the Northern border in the Bug-Dnieper territory is not possible because of the operations now under way; the Rumanian occupation will, however generally not be employed north of the line Uman Tescherkasy.

A special agreement about the tactical subordination of the Rumanian security troops in the Bug-Dnieper territory will follow. Fundamentally, however, the Rumanian troops there will be placed under the command of the Rumanian Corps Command with exception of emergency cases in which the local German agencies can requisition the nearest Rumanian troops directly.

The drafting of the civilian population in Transnistria for security and police service under the supervision of the Rumanians is desired; the units of this civilian police service shall, however if possible not be armed.

The "German liaison command" (DVK) remain as before with the Rumanian command authorities but they remain subordinate to the German Army Mission.

3. Traffic and Communications System in Transnistria.

a. Railroads and inland navigation.

Both traffic means are in the first place at the disposal of the mutual operational troops and of the occupation troops and are administered by a German transport commander.

Repair and administration of both traffic means is the affair of the German military agencies who can give responsibility for parts of the rail network to the chief of the Rumanian rail system. The Rumanian agencies will support the German agencies in construction and maintenance of the railroads.

A German transport command for Transnistria will be established in Odessa which will have a Rumanian liaison command for the protection of Rumanian interests.

In Odessa, Katowsk and Golta-Perwomajsk German railroad station commands will be established with one Rumanian liaison officer for each.

Single transports demand a report to the Transport command.

The following sections will be put into operation by the Germans:

Balta-Odessa which will be changed to normal gauge track by track.

Odessa-Wosanosensk (broad gauge)

Balta-Golta (broad gauge)

Repair (normal gauge) of the sections tiraspol Rasdelnaja and Rybniza-Balta on the part of the Chief of the Rumanian rail system is desired.

A special agreement for the material support for the repair of the Dniester railroad bridge at Tighina will follow.

b. Sea transports.

Sea transport on the Black Sea unites the allied navies of Germany and Rumania directly.

c. Highways and bridges.

Highways and bridges are maintained by Rumanian Agencies (including protection from snow drifts and ice). The highways important for operations will be made known shortly to the Royal Rumanian General Staff. A special ruling will follow about possible granting of German snow plows. Employment of improvised snow plows and anticipatory Rumanian troops and of the civilian population is necessary. The German Army mission will make its engineering officers available as advisors in all highway and bridge building problems.

d. Telephone communications.

Telephone communications are basically to be installed and operated by Rumanian agencies, operations communications are most urgently to be kept in mind. The construction of the line

Bacau-Odessa-Nicholajew and Odessa-Otschkow-Nicolajew has been determined by a special regulation (Colonel Stenzel—Lt. Col. Etschberger) on 28 Aug 41.

The communication officer of the German Army Mission is available for the regulation of mutual communications demands in Transnistria.

A special agreement will follow about possible supply of the Rumanian agencies with copper wire as well as making available a copper line from Chisinau via Balta to the Rumanian corps command in the Chisinau Bug-Dnieper territory.

e. The security of traffic routes and communication lines is the responsibility of the Rumanian occupation troops.

4. Administration and Economic exploitation in Transnistria.

The administration in Transnistria will be set up and directed by the Rumanian chief of administration; he is—in the interest of the mutual conduct of the war—bound in decisive questions by the directives of the military commander in Transnistria.

A higher German war administration official will be assigned upon request to the Chief of the Rumanian Administration of Transnistria for advice and support.

The economic exploitation of Transnistria is the affair of the Rumanian Agencies. A “liaison agency of the German Armed Forces in Odessa” will be set up for the protection of the demands of the mutual conduct of the war, the tasks of which are:

a. Care of German Troops in Transnistria for this purpose “German Armed Forces Garrison Commands”—presumably in Odessa, Katowsk and Golta-Perwomajsk—will be set up along side of the railroad station commands.

b. To support the Rumanian agencies for economic exploitation in the seizures and distribution of means necessary for mutual operations and to determine mutually the means necessary to conduct the war in accordance with the following directives:

The stocks of all sorts are to be determined mutually.

The Rumanian occupation troops the administration and the population will receive their portions. The remainder will be placed at the disposal of the mutual operations.

In case operative interests demand it, the demands of the operative troops have priority over the demands of the occupation troops the administration and the populace.

In this matter it is essential to save tonnage space, that is, to obtain stored property of all sorts from the operational areas as soon as possible and to harness industry etc. for the conduct of the war.

5. War Booty.

That which Rumanian troops have won remains Rumanian booty; that which German troops have won—German booty. 4 German booty camps in Transnistria will be given over to the trusteeship of Rumanian agencies. A part of the War booty in Transnistria has been given to the Buergeimeisters. They have a certificate for that. Also this booty is to be taken over in trusteeship by Rumanian agencies.

6. German agricultural officers in Transnistria. The German military special officers of the A.O.K. 11 for agriculture who are active in Transnistria are to be replaced by Rumanian agencies as soon as possible.

7. Deportation of Jews from Transnistria. Deportation of Jews across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore, be collected in concentration camps and set to work, until a deportation to the east is possible after the end of operations.

8. The Rumanian border line agreed upon remains on the Dniester. Army Group South takes over the closing of the Eastern and Northern boundaries of Transnistria.

9. Accounting of deliveries. The accounting of deliveries of all kinds from Transnistria will be clarified by the Rumanian and German agencies competent for this.

It is essential at present to register all achievements carefully and to request receipts.

For the Royal
Rumanian Grand
General Staff
/s/ Tatarnu
Brigadier General

For the High Command
of the German Army
/s/ Hauffe
Major General

File memo

According to information today from director General Lecca, 110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessarabia into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he could learn, this action is based upon an order issued by Marshal Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these Jews.

Bucharest, October 17, 1941

[Signature illegible]

1. To be discussed with Vice Minister President Antonescu.

Confidential

Bucharest, October 16, 1943

Consultant for Jewish Questions

1. To the Chief of the Economic office
of the Auslandsorganisation (AO) of the NSDAP
party member Musmacher
Bucharest.

Subject: Expulsion of Jews from firms owned by citizens of the
German Reich

Previous correspondence: known

Inc.: 1 To be returned.

1. With the request that it be returned, I am sending inclosed
herewith a statement prepared by the Government Commissioner
for Jewish Questions concerning Jews employed in firms owned
by citizens on the German Reich. At my instigation, the Reich
Commissar for Jewish Question has been undertaken, on the
basis of this list, to invalidate the labor books of all Jews working
for these firms.

Please return this list when finished with it.

[signature illegible]

(Richter)

SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer

2. forwarded 5, Nov.

[initial] W

carbon copy to SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Party Member Richter

 Confidential

Note for Landesgruppenleiter Party Member Kohlhammer

Bucharest, August 2, 1943

Subject: Removal of Jews from firms owned by citizens of the
German Reich.

In the sense of our understanding concerning the immediate
removal of Jews still employed in Bucharest firms owned by citi-
zens of the German Reich, I have determined, in collaboration
with Party Member Richter of the German Legation, upon the
following:

By referring to the lists at his disposal, Party Member Richter
will immediately demand, through the Rumanian authorities, the
withdrawal of the labor book from every Jew still active in Reich-
German firms. The action itself will be started by the Legation

and will thus be lent an official character and coordinated with the intentions of the Economic Counselor of the National Group [Landesgruppe].

[initialed]

M

/H. Musmacher/

Economic Counselor of the National
group [Wirtschaftsberater der Landesgruppe]

Carbon Copy from the
National Group in Rumania
SS-Hauptatunfuehrer Richter
German Legation, Bucharest

6 August 1943

National Group Leader
[Landesgruppenleiter]
Office II

(Strictly confidential)

of the organization of the NSDAP abroad [Auslands-Organisation
der NSDAP]

Dear Party Member Stempel,

I am forwarding to you, inclosing herewith, a confidential circular addressed to my closest collaborators and should like to ask that you bring it to the attention of Party Member Christian, also. I have given my Economic Counselor strict injunctions to desist unconditionally from the tolerance heretofore practiced and to take the sternest measures against German firms which still employ Jews. We have named these firms for years, now, and they always find ways and means to postpone the removal of the Jews. Upon my recommendation, the Consultant for Jewish Questions in the German Legation, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Richter, will cooperate very closely with my Economic Adviser, so that the goal may be reached as soon as possible.

The German Envoy, v. Killinger, is at any rate, one hundred percent in accord with my action and I hope that we can have the German firms free of Jews in Rumania within a very short time.

I greet you with

Heil Hitler

Yours Kohlhammer

[signed] Ludwig Kohlhammer

National Group Leader

[Landesgruppenleiter]

Inc, as mentioned

Copy

National Group Leader [Landesgruppenleiter]

Bucharest, Aug 5, 1943

For cognizance

To my colleagues of the Offices and to the ranking Party representatives in Temeschburg, Arad, Hermannstadt, Kronstadt, Galatz, Braila, Gzernowitz.

Subject: Removal of Jews from firms owned by citizens of The German Reich.

I pointed out at length, at last week's roll-call, that I no longer have any understanding, in the fourth year of the war and under total mobilization for war, for the case;

- a. if a German firm continues to employ a single Jew or
- b. if it requests from German agencies permission to continue to employ one or more Jews.

As a person well acquainted with economic conditions here, I can not think of a single case where a German firm would any way jeopardize its existence by an immediate removal of Jews. If a German firm did lose some business or other now through the immediate discharge of its Jewish employees, that is really a very small sacrifice compared to the tremendous difficulties overcome and sacrifices made by those firms who had to carry out the dismissal of Jewish employees during the Jewish era of King Carol-Lupescu.

In almost all cases actual experience has shown that the earlier and more thoroughly Aryanization is carried out, the more quickly a reliable and sound business development sets in.

I can only give the following advice to anyone who still employs a Jew: Make up your mind to this: your Yid either became very ill yesterday, or he was drafted for the labor service.

Do, now, that which you will have to do anyway.

Whoever fails to carry out the removal of Jews immediately can no longer claim, in the fourth year of the war, the right to be considered, treated, or addressed as the head of a German enterprise.

We dare not forget that untold thousands of our fellow Germans have lost all their property and become homeless because of Jewish criminal instincts and Jewish capital instigated, organized and are carrying out the despicable terror raids. We owe it to our sorely tried fellow countrymen in the heavily bombed regions to sever at once any connection we have with Jews.

Cases of so-called German firms which fail ruthlessly to get rid of the remaining Jewish connections within the next one or two months are to be reported to me.

Heil Hitler!

[signed] Ludkig Kohlhammer
National Group Leader

Top Secret

Ministerial Presidium
No. 311 256/R
Directorate of the
Section for Liaison
with the ministries

Bucharest, Nov. 25, 1943

Mr Commissar General!

With reference to your letter, no. 1126, of 24 November this year, we take pleasure in forwarding to you an extract from the stenographic record of the meeting of the council of Ministers on 17 November this year regarding the problem of the evacuation of the Jews from Transnistria.

Please be assured, Mr Commissar General, of our most favorable regard.

Secretary General:

By direction

signed Basarabeanu

To the Commissar General for Jewish Questions

Deputy Director General

by direction

Signed with signature.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3322-PS

ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP

[Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] 1940, Page 330.

OFFICE FOR RACIAL POLICIES OF THE NSDAP
and its Deputies

I. Mission and sphere of competence. The scope and competence of the Office for Racial Policies of the NSDAP are outlined in the decree of November 17 1933, which was given to its chief by the Deputy of the Fuehrer, as follows:

1. The mission of the Office for Racial Policies of the NSDAP is the unification and surveillance of all training—and propaganda—tasks concerning population—and racial—policies.

2. The Office for Racial Policies alone is authorized to regulate the training and propaganda regarding racial—and population policies, as well as making announcements to the press.

Accordingly, announcements concerning racial—or population policies, have to be cleared in each case through the Office for Racial Policies of the NSDAP.

3. The Office for Racial Policies of the NSDAP, as far as the NSDAP is concerned and in connection with the proper authorities, covers all measures relating to population—and racial policies. Accordingly, the Office for Racial Policies in the Nazi-Party Executive Board is constantly participating in all legislative measures of the government concerning this subject.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3323-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlandischen Gebiete,
Jahrgang 1941] part 2, page 19

Decree by the Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of the Netherlands concerning the obligation to register persons who are entirely or partly of Jewish race.

By virtue of article 5 of the Fuehrer's decree dated 18 May 1940 (RGI-1-page 77) relative to the exercise of governmental powers in the Netherlands I decree as follows:

Article 1

Persons who are entirely or partly of Jewish race and who are residing in the occupied territories of the Netherlands are to be registered in accordance with the following regulations.

Article 2

(1) In this decree a person is considered to be entirely or partly of Jewish race if he is descended from even one grandparent of full Jewish blood.

(2) A grandparent is automatically considered as being fully Jewish if he belongs or has belonged to the Jewish religious community.

Article 3

(1) If there should be any doubt as to whether a person should be considered to be entirely or partly of Jewish blood as given in article 2, the decision will be made, on request, by the Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of the Netherlands or the office indicated by him.

- (2) The following are entitled to make the request—
 1. every German office in the occupied territories in the Netherlands.
 2. the registration authorities
 3. the person in question
- (3) The decision referred to in article 1 is final.

Article 4

- (1) A person to be registered in accordance with articles 1 to 3, is compelled to register.
- (2) If the person who is to be registered is unable to deal with business matters or limited in his ability to deal with business matters, his legal representative or those who actually look after him are compelled to make the registration.

Article 5

- (1) The registration has to be made within four weeks after this decree becomes effective. If registration has to be made at the office of the mayor of the country of Amsterdam this time limit will be 10 weeks.
- (2) If the prerequisites for obligation to register are fulfilled after this decree becomes effective, registration has to be made within two weeks after the event which made registration necessary. However this time limit does not expire before the time limit set in para. one.

Article 6

The mayor or the chief of the State inspectorate of registers. [Hoofd der Rijksinspectie von de Bevolkingsregisters] is responsible for accepting registration (i.e. is the registration authority) as in those offices the register or residence records are kept in which the person to be registered has been or has to be entered.

Article 7

- (1) Registration must be made in writing
- (2) It must indicate
 1. First and last name of the person to be registered
 2. Place, date, month and year of birth
 3. Home or residence indicating name of street and number of house; persons who have immigrated into the European Netherlands territory after 30 January 1933 must also give their last residence within the present territory of the Great German Reich (including the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) or in the general government of the occupied areas of Poland.

4. His nationality and any nationalities he may have had previously
5. His religion
6. His profession or occupation
7. Whether single, married, widowed or divorced
8. How many of his grandparents are Jewish (article 2)

Article 8

(1) The registration authorities should make a note of the fact in their registration or residence records if the person registering is of Jewish blood.

(2) The mayor has to notify the chief of the State inspectorate of registers (Hoofd der Rijksinspectie von de Bevolkingsregisters) within one week of the entry referred to in paragraph 1, as well as of any changes and supplementary notes relative to the entries about a person who is registering which are made in accordance with the regulations in force in the Netherlands. The latter may extend the time limit.

Article 9

(1) The registration authorities will issue a certificate to the registered person, confirming that he has complied with the obligation to register in accordance with this decree.

(2) The registered person has to pay the registration authorities the fee of one Gulden in advance to cover the issue of the registration certificate. If the person is unable to pay this fee the local Jewish community to which he belongs is compelled to pay the fee. If the person does not belong to any such community the registration authorities may waive the fee entirely or in part. The fee may not be waived in any other cases.

(3) The person to be registered in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, is responsible in cases where the fee cannot be paid, the regulations given in the foregoing paragraph being used as appropriate to obtain payment of the fee, if he too is subject to the obligation to register.

(4) If the mayor is the registration authority he must remit half the collected fees to the chief of the State inspectorate of register.

Article 10

(1) Any person who is due to register and does not fulfil his obligation to register will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to 5 years.

(2) Actions mentioned in paragraph 1 are crimes. (under paragraph 1)

(3) Property of a person, punishable is subject to the terms of regulation number 33 (1940) relative to confiscation of property.

Article 11

(1) This decree comes into force on the 14th day after it has been announced.

(2) The general secretary of the ministry of the Interior will issue the regulations necessary for its execution.

The Hague, 10th January 1941

The Reichs commissioner for the occupied territories in the Netherlands.

Seyss-Inquart.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3324-PS

GERMANY IN THE FIGHT

Published by

MINISTERIALDIRIGENT A. J. BERNDT, Reichministry of
Propaganda

Lt. Col. Von Wedel

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Publishing House Otto Stollberg, Berlin W 9, First October
Issue No. 3, Pages 62-63.

FUNK on the organization of the war economy

14 Oct. 1939

Reichminister for Economy Funk, who stayed in Vienna for the opening of the first war fair [Kriegsmesse] of Greater Germany, spoke during a rally of the Eastern [Ostmaerkischen] Economy on the organization and tasks of the German war economy, and explained in his speech among other things:

* * * * *

Now I wish to explain to you a few facts about the organization and the tasks of the German war economy in order, that you will be able to understand the necessity and the goal of our war economic measures. Generalfeldmarschall Goering emphasized with special vigor in his great, policy-making speech of 9 September how much depends on the fact, that the complete employment of the living and fighting power of the nation be secured economically as well as otherwise for the duration of the war. Just as in military armament, we have also in economic armament a great advantage over our opponents. Not only the political and the military, but also the economic calculations of our enemies were wrong and these calculations were thrown into complete confusion

by the treaties made with Russia. It is known that the German war potential has been strengthened very considerably by the conquest of Poland. We owe it mainly to the Four Year Plan, that we could enter the war economically so strong and well prepared.

* * * * *

One can evaluate correctly what the Four Year Plan means for the economic preparation of war, only when one considers, that the Four Year Plan does not include only the food and raw material economy, only the entire industrial economic life, but that it also includes foreign commerce, money and foreign-exchange economy and finance, so that the entire economic life and production in Germany is authoritatively determined and executed by this plan. Although all the economic and financial departments were harnessed in the tasks and work of the Four Year Plan under the leadership of Generalfeldmarschall Goering, the war economic preparation of Germany has also been advanced in secret in another sector for well over a year, namely by means of the formation of a national guiding apparatus for the special war economic tasks, which had to be mastered at that moment, when the condition of war became a fact. For this work as well all economic departments were combined into one administrative authority, namely under the general plenipotentiary for economy, to which position the Fuehrer appointed me approximately one and a half years ago * * *

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3325-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen
Gebiete] Part 6, Page 99

Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories referring to Jewish students

In accordance with section 5 of the Fuehrer's decree referring to the exercise of governmental authority within the Netherlands, dated 18 May 1940 (R.GBl. I, S. 778), I decree that:

Section 1

This decree refers to:

1. Persons, who are entirely or partly of Jewish blood, and have to register according to Decree Nr. 6/1941 on compulsory registration; exempt are those who have only one grandparential ancestor of pure Jewish race in the sense of this decree.

2. Persons who adhere to the Jewish religious faith.

Section 2

The enrollment at Dutch universities and colleges of persons classified under section 1 is restricted by regulations which are issued by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Education, Science- and Cultural administration.

Section 3

A person, classified under section 1, who did not matriculate in a Dutch university or college can only be admitted for examination in these institutions after permission has been granted by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Education-Science- and Cultural administration.

Section 4

This decree takes effect on the day of its proclamation.
The Hague, the 11 February 1941.

The Reich Commissioner for the
Dutch Occupied Territories
signed Seyss-Inquart.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3326-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete]
Part 39, Page 785.

Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands Territories, whereby an order is put into effect, issued by the Reich Minister of Economics regarding the blocking of property within the country belonging to Jews, who emigrated to the Netherlands.

Pursuant to section 5 of the Fuehrer's decree concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of 18 May 1940, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1

The order printed in the appendix—issued by the Reich Minister of Economics, concerning the blocking of property within the country belonging to Jews who emigrated to the Netherlands, herewith takes effect.

Section 2

Proper Foreign Exchange Control Offices in the sense of this order are those which are considered proper Foreign Exchange Control Offices in the German Reich in accordance with the prevailing regulations.

Section 3

Failure to comply with this order will be punished, pursuant to the rules of point VI of the law of Dec. 12, 1938 (RGBl. I pg. 1733) dealing with the control of foreign exchange. It will be considered a punishable act in the sense of Section 2, paragraph 2, of the decree No. 52/1940, which concerns German jurisdiction over crimes in the sense of the decree No. 123/1941. The Hague, September 18, 1941.

The Reich Commissioner for the
occupied Netherlands territories
SEYSS-INQUART

Appendix

Order concerning the blocking of property within the country belonging to Jews who emigrated to the Netherlands.

Pursuant to section 60 of the Foreign Exchange Decree, I hereby order the following, to take effect as of Sept. 1st, 1941:

Jews, residing in occupied Netherlands territories, who emigrated from the German Reich after August 3rd, 1931, and who at that time were German citizens—can dispose their property—still remaining in parts of the German Reich—only with the consent of the proper Foreign Exchange Control office. Berlin, August 30, 1941.

For the Reich Minister of Economics
(s) Dr. Landfried

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3328-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete]
Part 44, Page 841.

198

Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories concerning the regulation of the professional activities of Jews.

By virtue of Article 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (Reichsgesetzblatt I S.778) I hereby order:

Article 1

The exercise by Jews of professional, industrial or other pursuits aimed at profits, may be made subject to permission or to conditions or may be prohibited by administrative orders. Ar-

rangements for the termination and liquidation of work contracts, to which a person affected by this administrative order is a party, can be made at the same time.

Article 2

1. The administrative orders will be issued by the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) or by the department, authorized by him. They may apply to groups of persons or to individuals.

2. Administrative orders, applying to groups of persons will be announced in the legal gazette [Verordnungsblatt] of the occupied Netherlands territories, unless in a special case a different way of announcement is ordered.

Article 3

Administrative orders, decreed by virtue of Section 2 of the decree No. 137/1940 concerning the regulation of the lawful and the financial situations of officials, employees and workers and certain persons under oath, remain untouched.

Article 4

The instructions of the implementation order (No. 9/1940) relating to the decree No. 8/1940 concerning the work restrictions, in the version of the decree No. 64/1940, do not apply to the discharge of a Jew.

Article 5

An employer can cancel a labor contract with a Jew, by giving three months notice on the first day of any calendar month, if the notice period is longer on the basis of a law or a contract, or if the contract would expire after January 31, 1942.

Article 6

The Secretary-General of the Ministry for Social Affairs may convert the claim of a Jew, his widow or his surviving descendants for a pension or survivor benefits against the employer in a claim for a payment of a lump sum to be paid in full settlement, if the employer requests it. The Secretary General may rule that the payment, in full settlement of all claims, shall be made in installments.

Article 7

1. If the labor contract of a Jewish employee terminates and, on account of this termination, the Jew or any other persons is entitled to claims against the employer, other than those outlined in Section 6, a compensation in lieu of these claims will then be paid in full settlement of all claims, computed on the basis of the

salary, to which the Jew was entitled in the last month of his activity. The compensation to be paid in full settlement of all claims, in case of an uninterrupted duration of the Contract, amounts to—

- (1) a maximum of 5 years—one month salary
- (2) over 5 to a maximum of 10 years—one and a half months salary
- (3) over 10 to a maximum of 15 years—2 months salary
- (4) over 15 to a maximum of 20 years—3 months salary
- (5) over 20 to a maximum of 25 years—4½ months salary
- (6) over 25 years—6 months salary.

2. The sum in full settlement of all claims is due at the time of the termination of the contract, if it does not exceed the triple amount of a month's salary.

In cases of part 1 No. 5 the balance may be paid in advance in two monthly part payments, in cases of part 1 No. 6 in three monthly part payments.

3. The instructions of part 1 and 2 do not apply, if the claim is lower than the compensation to be paid in full settlement of all claims. As far as the sum in full settlement of all claims consists of repeated performances, it is taken for granted—relative to the settlement in a sum for all claims—that the repeated performances would have been paid for a maximum of 3 years. Interests, accrued for the time in between, will not be considered.

Article 8

A Jew—in accordance with this decree—is a person, who, by virtue of the instructions of Section 4 of the decree No. 189/1940 concerning the registration of employers—is a Jew or is considered a Jew.

Article 9

1. The Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of the Netherlands (General Commissioner for Finance and Economy) will take the necessary measures for the execution of this decree. He may delegate his authority to others.

2. The Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General of Finance and Economy) in case of doubts resulting from the application of the instructions of this decree may make generally binding legal decisions.

Article 10

This decree becomes effective on the day of its publication.
Den Haag, October 22, 1941.

The Reich Commissioner for the occupied
Dutch territories

SEYSS-INQUART

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941.

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete]

Part 47, Page 901.

211

Decree of the Reichscommissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories, concerning the Netherlands Chamber of Culture [Kultur-kammer].

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of 18. Mai 1940 (RGBl I, p. 778) I order:

Chapter I

Task and aim of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 1

1. Persons, who are active in the field of the plastic arts including architecture and handicraft, music, literature, theatre, films and journalism, will be united in guilds. These guilds will form the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

2. It is the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture to promote the Netherland culture as it is represented by the people and country, by cooperation of its members, who are active in all of its spheres, to direct the technical, economic and social affairs of the cultural professions and to coordinate the different aims of the members of the various groups.

Article 2

The Netherlands Chamber of Culture is an incorporated public institution with rights and liabilities as defined in Article 152 of the constitution. Its domicile is in the Hague.

Chapter II

Membership in the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 3

Everyone who participates in production, reproduction, intellectual or technical arrangements, the distribution, the maintenance, sale or marketing of goods of cultural value, must be a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, unless his participation consists exclusively of a commercial, administrative, technical or mechanical activity.

Article 4

(1) Objects of cultural value in the sense of this decree are I/Every creation or performance of art if it is put before the public.

II/Every other intellectual creation or performance, which is put before the public by means of print, film, radio or recording.

III/Print, in the sense of article 1 No. 2 applies also to any kind of mass reproduction.

Article 5

The production of material necessary for the creation of an object of cultural value is not deemed to be production or manufacturing of an object of cultural value in the sense of this decree.

Article 6

Participation in the sense of Art. 3, exists, irrelevant whether the work was done:

1. with or without compensation
2. by corporations with own jurisdiction of public or civil code,
3. by non-corporate organizations of persons or by individual persons
3. by Netherlanders, Netherland Subjects or foreigners
4. by employers or by persons who are being employed.

Article 7

(1) The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture a rule that in cases where performance of the type of work, as meant in article 3, is only of minor importance or only occasional, membership to the Netherlands Chamber of Culture is not required.

(2) Persons, who wish to perform work of this kind, must be in possession of a certificate of exemption issued by the President. The president may rule that a certificate of exemption is not necessary for certain groups.

(3) The issuance of a certificate of exemption can be made subject to payment of a fee appropriate to the intended work. Article 19, second par. is applicable for the collection of this fee.

(4) Everyone, who in the sense of par. 1 is exempt from membership in the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, is, as far as his activities in the sense of article 3 are concerned, subject to the decrees and rules of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture to the fullest extent.

Article 8

An agreement, by which a person, who is not a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, is engaged for work which can only be done by a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, is valid only on condition, that such person is admitted as a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, unless art. 7 applicable.

Article 9

(1) Organizations of persons and foundations, which are members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, or which are obliged to be members, must coordinate their statute with this decree and the measures as stipulated in part IV and V.

As soon as the reorganization in matters of clubs or foundations has been concluded, the following orders have to be observed: Clubs and foundations with regard to the decree Nr. 145/1940 concerning the seizure of non-economic clubs and foundations as well as sections 1 and 2 and 4 to 9 of the decree Nr. 41/1941; the authorities of the commissioner named in Article 1, section 1, of the decree Nr. 41/1941 are then exercised by the president. Until this date, decisions, concerning foundations classified in Section I, are made by the above mentioned Commissioner in agreement with the president, who is entitled to make proposals pertaining to the above.

Article 10

1. Jews or persons with jewish relatives by marriage can neither be members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, nor of an organization of persons, which in turn is a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, or is supposed to be a member. It is further forbidden for these persons:

1. To found or to participate in the founding of an organization of persons, which is a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture or is obliged to be a member.
2. To credit or participate in the creation of a foundation and also to benefit directly or indirectly from the property of a foundation, if said foundation is a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture or is obliged to be a member.
3. To work for an organization of persons as mentioned under 1, or for a foundation as mentioned under 2, or to participate as a guest in the management of such organizations for persons or foundations.

(2) The Secretary-General of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Arts may permit in special cases:

1. That a jew or a person with jewish family ties become a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.
2. That organizations of persons or foundations, which must be a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, be exempted from the obligation to become

a member, if its members are exclusively Jewish, or if the foundation's property is used exclusively for the benefit of Jews.

Article 11

1. Jewish persons in the sense of this decree are—

1. Persons who have more than one Jewish grandparent.
2. Persons other than those mentioned under Nr. 1 who belonged to the Jewish religious community on May 9, 1940 or who have been accepted therein after this date.

2. Persons with Jewish relatives in the sense of this decree are such persons, who are married to a person as described under 3 or who live with such person in concubinary.

3. A grandparent is considered Jewish, if this grandparent has belonged to a Jewish religious community.

Article 12

The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may refuse admission of a person for membership in the Netherlands Chamber of Culture or expel a member from the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, if facts reveal that the person in question does not possess the trustworthiness or aptitude required in the exercise of his activities.

Chapter III

Management and administrative Structure of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 13

1. At the head of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture is the President.

2. The President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture nominates and discharges his substitute, the leaders of the guilds and the manager.

3. The President represents the Netherlands Chamber of Culture legally and out of court.

Article 14

1. The guilds of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture will be subdivided, according to need, in professional branches.

2. The leaders of the professional branches are nominated by the head of the guild in question, with the consent of the president.

Article 15

1. To accomplish the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, provincial offices may be established.

2. The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture can decide, that one provincial office shall be competent for several provinces.

3. The leaders of the provincial offices are nominated by the president, after consultation with the guild-leaders.

Article 16

1. The persons referred to in articles 13, par. 2, 14, par. 2 and 15, par. 3 will be sworn in before they take office.

2. The form of oath will be fixed by administrative order.

Chapter IV

Power of decree by the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 17

1. The Netherlands Chamber of Culture possesses power of decree in the sense of article 15 3 of the constitutional document within the framework of its task.

2. This power of decree is exercised by the president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 18

Decrees issued by virtue of art. 17, will be made known in the "Gazette of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture."

Article 19

1. An arbitration decree, issued in accordance with the stipulation in art. 17 can prescribe rules regulating controversies between members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

2. The arbitration decree can rule that no member may bring a civil suit against another member, or initiate action in cases where a law suit is only possible after complaint before the arbitration procedure is finished, unless a member should sustain a loss through lapse of period of grace. The judge will ex-officio investigate, whether a law suit brought before him is permissible in conformity with the arbitration procedure.

3. The arbitration procedure may order that the arbitration bureaus have final jurisdiction in civil law controversies between members.

4. The arbitration procedure may decide that par. 1 and 3 are applicable also for arbitration and decision of disputes between a member and a third party, if so requested by both sides.

Article 20

1. The amount of dues, payable by the members to the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, may be stipulated by an order issued in accordance with article 17, regulating contributions.

2. Contributions will be collected in accordance with an order of the President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, if not paid in time. This order will be executed immediately by virtue of an engrossment, as prescribed by the Civil Law Code, which engrossment bears the preamble "In the name of Justice".

Article 21

1. Fines up to a maximum amount of one thousand guilders can be levied in accordance with a decree, issued by virtue of article 17.

2. A fine can only be imposed after he, who has the power of imposition, has heard the accused member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

3. Article 20, par 2, is correspondingly applicable.

4. For the rest imposition of fines will follow the rules, which are laid down in an order issued in accordance with article 17, regulating the fines in cases of penal procedure.

Chapter V

Authority of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture to issue orders.

Article 22

(1) Both, the president and the executive organs of the Chamber of Culture, to which the President has granted license may render decisions in special cases regarding members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, within the framework of the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

1. Concerning their compulsory activities, within the Chamber.

2. Concerning their participation in the activities of the Chamber.

3. For the rest, as far as stipulated in an order, issued by virtue of article 17.

(2) The members of the Netherlands Chambers of Culture must obey regulations, issued in accordance with par. 1.

(3) Article 7, par. 4, will be applicable.

Article 23

(1) By virtue of art. 22, the president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may exercise specifically the following powers:

1. Formulating of rules for the opening, management and closing of enterprises which, according to their nature, must be members of the Chambers of Culture.

2. Issuing of directives about the contents of collective bargaining agreements, to be concluded between the separate professional groups will in the Chamber. The rules of decree Nr. 217/1940, concerning the regulation of wages, salaries and other labor conditions have to be left intact. The authority of the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Social Welfare is also kept inviolate; it will be exercised, after the president has been heard.

(2) Measures, taken by the president by reason of par. 1, constitute no claims for indemnity.

Article 24

All concerned will be notified of measures taken by reason of article 22. Publication in the "Gazette of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture", will also be regarded as notification.

Article 25

Everyone, who violates an ordinance, issued in accordance with article 22, may be punished by the one, who has issued the ordinance, by imposition of a fine of a maximum of one thousand guilders, if and insofar as this was specifically mentioned in the ordinance.

2. Par. 2 up to and inclusive par. 4 of article 21 have to be applied correspondingly.

Chapter VI

Joint rules for Chapter IV and V.

Article 26

1. The President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may hear witnesses or have them interrogated, insofar as it is necessary for the preparation of his decisions.

2. It is the duty of every person, summoned by order of the president as a witness or an expert, to obey such a summons and give testimony or serve as an expert. The paragraphs 217, 218, and 219 of the Penal Code have to be applied accordingly. The witness or expert, who does not appear, can be arraigned by order of the president.

3. The President can hear witnesses or may have them interrogated under oath, if they have attained the age of sixteen.

The witness is put under oath, to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, the expert is put under oath, that he will conscientiously fulfill his task. The witnesses and experts are compelled to swear this oath.

4. The decrees of the laws of July 17, 1911 (State journal Nr. 215) and of April 28, 1916 (State journal Nr. 174) have to be applied.

5. If a witness refuses to answer at his interrogation without full cause of law, the questions which are put to him or refuses to render the required oath, declaration or solemn promise, then the president may fine such a witness up to a maximum amount of one thousand guilders, if he deems it beneficial for the investigation. Section 20, § 2 is valid accordingly.

6. The witnesses and experts receive, if so desired, compensation from the Netherlands Chambers of Culture, to be determined by the president in accordance with paragraphs 51, 61, 65 and 66 of the table of rates for expenses and salaries of justice and judiciary civil affairs.

Chapter VII

Budget and expenses of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 27

1. In as much as the Netherlands Chamber of Culture cannot pay for its operation out of its own revenues alone these expenses will be paid by the State.

2. The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture sets up a yearly budget which requires the approval of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance. The president is responsible for the proper management of this budget.

3. The year's balance sheets must be submitted every year for auditing to the General Chamber of Control [Algemeene Rekenkamer]. The Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance gives his approval to the president on the basis of the report from the General Chamber of Control.

Chapter VIII

State Supervision.

Article 28

The Netherlands Chamber of Culture is under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Arts.

Article 29

1. Either at the request of a party concerned or ex-officio, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Arts may declare void an ordinance issued in accordance with article 17 or a regulation, based on article 22 or any other resolution of the president or of an organ of the Netherlands Cham-

ber of Culture, if there should be a contradiction with any rules in this ordinance or with other laws, or if the general welfare is endangered. For the same reason, the Secretary-General may declare temporarily void, at request of a party concerned or ex-officio a decision of the president or of an organ of the Chamber; however, this may not occur but once a year and this only for a certain period, which may not exceed one year.

2. A declaration as mentioned in par. 1 must be motivated and must be made public in the same way as the ordinance in question.

Chapter IX

Determination of cooperation of State authorities in the execution of the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 30

The President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may ask for copies, free of charge, from the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, concerning the penal register kept by this Department and from the court-clerk [griffier] at the district courts [arrondisse, ments-richtbank] concerning the penal register kept by this court. This request must be granted.

Article 31

The police authorities are obliged, to enforce adherence to ordinances of sections 3, 7, par. 2, and 32, par. 2, at request of the president, as well as to measures, taken by virtue of sections 17, 22 and 26.

Chapter X

Penal Code

1. Everyone, who is not a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, in disregard of the regulation of article 3, or, contrary to the regulation of article 7, is not in possession of a certificate of exemption, but who nevertheless exercises an activity within the jurisdictional authority sphere of the Chamber, will be fined up to five thousand guilders.

2. If an organization of persons, or a foundation which has to be a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, exercises an activity within the jurisdictional sphere of authority of the Chamber, without possessing a certificate of exemption, or being a member of the Chamber, then the members of the administration will be punished with such penalties as mentioned in paragraph 1; such a member is not punished, if the punishable act has been committed without his participation.

3. Punishable acts, as meant in Pars. 1 and 2 are considered misdemeanors.

Chapter XI

Transitory and final directions

Article 33

1. This ordinance has to be applied at the earliest moment to an activity, starting from the time of the creation of the competent guild.

2. Everyone, who wants to continue to work in the sense of article 3 after the creation of a guild in the sphere of his activity, must immediately file an application with the President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, to be admitted as a member, the latest within four weeks.

3. He may continue his activity, as long as a final decision on his application in accordance with par. 2 has not been reached.

4. In deviation from the rule in article 8, a contract of the kind as mentioned there, which is in force at the time mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, stays valid as long as the decision to be reached as mentioned in par. 3, has not been rendered. The contract becomes immediately void, if the request, made with reference to par. 2, is refused. Otherwise the contract will stay valid, even after expiration of such a period as mentioned in par. 1.

Article 34

1. With the date of the creation of the "Filmguild", the Decree Nr. 160/1940 concerning the organization of the filmindustrie becomes void.

2. Effective as of this date the property of the Netherlands Movietheatre-Organization [Nederlandsche Bioscoopbond] is transferred to the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, which also takes over all civil law claims and obligations of the Netherlands Movietheatre Organization.

Article 35

1. The date for the creation of the guilds will be named by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Arts, who will announce it in the "Nederlandsche Staats-courant".

2. The Secretary-General may create temporary institutions and, until the creation of the guilds is achieved, may entrust persons or organizations with the temporary work and the exercising of the authorities as guildleaders.

3. The Netherlands-Chamber of Culture is deemed to have come into being as soon as two guilds are in existence. This will be made known by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Arts by proclamation in the "Netherlandsche Staatscourant".

Article 36

This ordinance shall take effect as of the day of publication.
The Hague, November 22, 1941

The Reichscommissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories

SEYSS-INQUART

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3333-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1940

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete]
Part 33, Page 546.

189

Decree of the Reich commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories concerning registration of business enterprises.

In accordance with article 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer on exercise of governmental authority dated 18 May 1940 [Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 118] I decree the following:

Point 1

Enterprises Under Obligation To Register

Article 1

Definition of an Enterprise

Enterprises in the sense of this decree are:

1. Enterprises which, according to the law on Commercial registration of 1918 [Handelsregistergesetz - Handelsregister Wet 1918] must be registered in the General Commercial Register;

2. Enterprises of other associations of persons, furthermore enterprises of non-profit corporations, foundations and others formed for definite purposes insofar as they pursue economic objects;

3. Farm and forestry enterprises as well as horticultural and fishing enterprises, insofar as a commercial enterprise is connected with them;

4. Enterprises of craftsmen and peddlers are not included.

Article 2 Obligation to Register

Under obligation to register is every enterprise that on 9 May, 1940 corresponds or will correspond at a later date to the following definition

1. An enterprise which is operated by a person, if the owner is a Jew;

2. An enterprise which is operated by a company [Offene Handelsgesellschaft] or a corporation in which the liability is limited to one or more partners [Kommanditgesellschaft], if at least one personally liable partner [persoenlich haftender Gesellschafter] is a Jew.

3. An enterprise which is operated by a corporation or a stock corporation with limited liability.

a. if at least one of the persons appointed to the legal representation or at least one of the members of the board of directors is a Jew.

b. if Jews own essential interest in the capital or votes. It is considered to be an essential interest in the capital if more than a quarter of the capital belongs to Jews; it is considered to be an essential interest in votes, if the votes of the Jews reach the half-mark of the number of the total votes: do votes exist which contain preferential voting rights, it suffices if half of these votes belong to Jews;

4. an enterprise which is operated by an association of persons, a non-profit corporation formed for a definite purpose in the sense of article 1, section 2, if one of the definitions according to sections 2 or 3 of this article is applicable;

5. An enterprise, if it actually is under the controlling influence of Jews, the obligation to register will not be eliminated in case the property of the particular enterprise must be registered in accordance with Order No. 26/1940 concerning the treatment of enemy property.

Article 3 Branch Offices

1. Branch offices must be registered

1. if the enterprise to which they belong, must be registered itself;

2. if the enterprise to which they belong, doesn't have to be registered, but if at least one manager of the branch office is a Jew.

2. The regulations pertaining to the registration of enterprises apply to the branch offices mentioned in article 1.

Article 4

Definition of a Jew

1. A Jew is one who is descended from at least three racially pure Jewish grandparents.
2. As a Jew is also considered one who is descended from two purely Jewish greatparents and
 1. either belonged to the Jewish religions community on 9 May, 1940 or will be admitted to it after this date, or
 2. was married to a Jew on 9 May, 1940 or marries a Jew after this date.
3. As pure-Jewish is automatically considered a greatparent if he belonged to the Jewish religious community.

Point 2

Article 5

Execution of registration

Persons who are under obligation to register.

1. In case of an enterprise which is operated by a person, the owner and the person authorized to manage the enterprise, are under obligation to register; in case of enterprises in the sense of article 2, section 1, number 2-5, every person authorized to represent them.
2. Should all persons who, in accordance with article 1, are under obligation to register an enterprise, have their permanent or temporary residence in a foreign country or should they otherwise be prevented from executing their powers, all those persons who actually manage the enterprise also are under obligation to register the enterprise.

Article 6

Contents of the Registration

1. In making the registration, the total property—at home and in foreign countries—of the enterprise has to be stated, separated according to assets and debits. As property of the enterprise is also to be considered everything which is intended or suitable to serve, directly or indirectly, the purposes of the enterprise.
2. Enterprises which fall under the regulations of article 2, section 1, on May 9th 1940, must in making the registration base it upon the assets. Enterprises which fall under the regulations of article 2, section 1, at a later date, must state the assets as of the last balance set up before that date. The balance sheet in question is to be submitted upon registration.

3. Should a balance from the enterprise which is under obligation to register, not be regularly set up, the property must be appraised according to its general value, which it had on 9 May, 1940, or in case the enterprise came under obligation to register at a later date, the one which it had on this date. Upon request of the Economy Examination Agency [Wirtschaftspruefstelle] an appraisal by a certified appraiser must be added within a term set by said agency.

Article 7

Form of Registration

1. The registration must be submitted to the Agency of Economy Examining, Den Haag by 30 November, 1940 on an official form which will be available at the office of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce that has jurisdiction over the enterprise according to its location.

2. Insofar as an enterprise came under obligation to register only after the key-date named in article 2, section 1, the registration must be made within two weeks after the obligation to register was uncovered.

Article 8

Obligation to Give Information

1. Upon request, the Agency of Economy Examining must be given information on the enterprises which are under obligation to register; it can also be requested to submit books and other documents.

2. The Agency of Economy Examining may delegate the powers given by Paragraph 1.

Point 3

Regulations concerning Penalties

Article 9

Penalties

1. Who intentionally does not fulfill or not on time fulfill the obligation to register and give information according to the above regulations, will be punished with imprisonment or with one of these penalties, insofar the act is not subject to a heavier penalty according to another regulation.

2. Who, by negligence, does not fulfill or not on time fulfill the obligation to register or give information, will be punished with imprisonment not to exceed one year, or with a fine not to exceed ten thousand guilders.

3. The punishable acts, mentioned in articles 1 and 2, are crimes.

Article 10
Confiscation

Besides the penalty according to article 9, confiscation of the assets to which the punishable act applies, may be ordered by the court.

Point 4
Final Regulations
Article 11
Further Measures

1. The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories will take the measure necessary for the execution of this decree and will issue the regulations necessary for its execution or supplementation.

2. The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories may make general legally binding decisions on questions of doubt which may result from the application of the regulations of this decree.

He may delegate the powers mentioned in articles 1 and 2.

Article 12
Time for enforcement

This decree will become valid on the day of its promulgation.
The Hague
22 October, 1940

The Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories
SEYSS-INQUART

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3334-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH TERRITORIES, YEAR 1940

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete]
Part 42, Page 761.

231

Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch Territories concerning the employment of Germans in Jewish households.

By virtue of section 5 of the edict of the Fuehrer on the execution of governmental authority in the Netherlands of 18 May 1940 (RGBl. I. S. 118) I decree:

Section 1

(1) German Nationals of German or related blood cannot be employed in households of which a Jew is the head, nor in families

of which a Jew is a permanent or temporary member for a non-interrupted period of more than four weeks.

(2) In the sense of paragraph I are considered as Jews, those who according to the regulations of section 4 of decree Nr. 189/1940 concerning the registration of enterprises, are Jews or are considered as such. Employed in a household are those who, in order to work there, are entirely or partially temporarily or continuously a member of the household or those who perform daily household work or other daily work directly or indirectly connected with the household without being a member thereof.

(3) In exception to the regulations set forth in section I, employment based on an existing agreement is permissible:

- (1) from the time this decree becomes effective until 1 February 1941;
- (2) from the date on which occurs the fact confirming the regulation according to section 1 until the earliest date on which the employer can terminate the contract, however for a maximum of 30 days only.

Section 2

(1) Contracts are void inasmuch as they contain the obligation for employment forbidden according to section 1.

(2) The fact that the definitions of section 1 paragraph 1 can or will be applied to a contract, does not set forth an important reason for the employer in the sense of article 1639.P, section 1 of the Netherlands civil law.

Section 3

(1) Employment of German Nationals violating the law of section 1 will be punished with imprisonment up to one year and a fine up to ten thousand guilders or one of these penalties.

(2) The prosecution of a person not of German or Netherland nationality nor stateless requires the consent of the Reich commissioner for the occupied Netherland territories.

(3) Deeds according to section 1 are punishable offences in the sense of paragraph 2 section 2 of the decree Nr. 52/1940 of the German jurisdiction for penal cases.

Section 4

The Reich commissioner for the occupied Netherland territories may grant exemptions of the regulations of this decree.

Section 5

This decree becomes effective on the day of its publication.
The Hague, 19 December 1940

The Reich commissioner for the
occupied Dutch territories

SEYSS-INQUART

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1942.

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete]
Part 13, Page 289.

58

Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories, concerning the treatment of Jewish property values.

By virtue of article 5 of the Fuehrer's decree concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18th 1940 (RGI. 1, S. 778) I hereby order as follows:

Chapter I

Claims and other rights.

Article 1

Claims of any kind have to be registered in writing with the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., Amsterdam, if as on the effective date of this order or later, they belong wholly or partially to a person legally or really, who, according to the directives of article 4 of the decree No. 189/1940—concerning the registration of enterprises—is a Jew or has to be considered as a Jew. This does not concern claims of an enterprise that had to be registered by virtue of the decree No. 189/1940.

Article 2

- (1) With the registration has to be stated:
 1. Name and address of the creditor,
 2. Name and address of the debtor,
 3. Nature and extent of the claim
 4. Legal basis of the claim
 5. Due date
 6. Rates of interest
 7. Securities
 8. All other important and essential particulars concerning the claim.
- (2) Assets under writ of execution as well as promissary notes and other evidence have to be delivered with the registration.

Article 3

- (1) Obligated to register is:
 1. the creditor
 2. the debtor
 3. each person, who is entitled to represent the creditor or claims.
- (2) The fulfilment of the obligation to register on the part of the creditor or on the part of another person obliged to register

is useful to the persons, obliged to register according to paragraph I, number 2 and 3.

Article 4

The registration of such claims, which exist as of the effective day of this order has to be made until June 30, 1942. Claims which arise only after this order shall take effect, or which the person, who is obliged to register, has been informed of only after that time, have to be registered within one week.

Article 5

The rules of articles 1-4 are applied accordingly to other legal or real rights, belonging wholly or partially to the property value of persons, mentioned in article 1, which are no claims, especially concerning rights on real properties and tangibles, shares in corporations as well as in companies and other associations, rights of reversion, rights for the protection of trade, copyrights and trade licenses.

Article 6

The rules of articles 1-5 will not be applied:

1. to claims and rights dealt with in the order No. 148/1941 concerning the treatment of Jewish property values,
2. to such ownership of real property and such equal real property rights, rights of usufruct, let on lease or other rights of utilization, which have been properly registered in pursuance of article 2 of the Dejewfication order of Agriculture (No. 102/1941)
3. to such property like rights and mortgages which by virtue of article 3 of order No. 154/1941, concerning Jewish real property, have been duly registered; this also applies to the claims secured by mortgages.

Article 7

Disposals of claims and other rights, which have to be registered according to the rules of articles 1 to 6, made after the effective date of this order are void save the directives of par. 2 and 3; as disposals have to be considered especially cessions, pledges, the acceptance of claims as well as renunciations. Any engagement entered into after this order has taken effect, in order to undertake legal transactions, mentioned above, is void.

(2) Only the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., has the right of disposal of the claims and rights, mentioned in article 1. The rule of article 1, par. 2, does not apply to this banking firm. The debtor can only pay to the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co.; through such a payment he will have fulfilled his obligation.

(3) Measures, taken by distraint, especially the execution of arrests and other temporary judicial measures against the claims and rights mentioned in article 1 are permissible only with the consent of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) or of the office authorized by him. Measures taken without consent are void.

(4) The rules of par. 1-3 are applied correspondingly to property-values, which have to be paid in pursuance of article 1 of the order No. 148/1941, or have to be deposited, or have to be assessed. This is retro-active from the date, the order mentioned has taken effect.

Chapter II

Exemption limit for property value as well as claims and other rights.

Article 8

(1) The order No. 148/1941 will be changed as follows:

I

In article 1, par. 1, number 1, the second sentence is rescinded.

II

In article 1, par. 2, the second half sentence is rescinded.

III

Article 4 is rescinded.

(2) The property values not seized in pursuance of the above mentioned former rules concerning the exemption limits have to be paid in, deposited or assessed immediately, latest June 30, 1942, according to article 1 of order No. 148/1941.

Article 9

(1) Article 1, paragraph 1 of order No. 148/1941 in the final draft of article 8 of this order does not apply, if the total value of the cash-amount, checks, stocks, credit balances and deposits, belonging to a person of one household on the date, when this order has taken effect, does not exceed 250 Guilders. Article 1, par. 2 of order No. 148/1941 in the final draft of article 8 of this order does not apply, if the property values, falling to persons of one household, in addition to the property being in the possession of these persons at that time do not exceed 250 Guilders within the calendar month.

(2) Claims and other rights belonging to persons of one household, can be disposed of during one calendar month up to the maximum amount of 250 Guilders; article 7 does not apply in this case.

(3) Cash amounts and other property values falling to persons and exceeding the amount of 250 Guilders, have to be paid in, deposited or assessed immediately in pursuance of order No. 148/1941.

Chapter III

Collections, articles of virtue, articles made of precious metals and jewels.

Article 10

Collections of all kinds, articles of virtue, articles of gold, platinum or silver as well as cut or raw precious or semi-precious stones and pearls have to be delivered to the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., if they, legally or really, belong wholly or partially to a person, mentioned in article 1. This does not apply to the property of an enterprise, which has to register in pursuance of order No. 189/1940.

Article 11

(1) If a person according to the rules of article 4 of order No. 189/1940 is a Jew or being considered a Jew, is married to a person, which is neither a Jew nor that he can be considered a Jew in accordance to the above mentioned rules, then article 10 will not be applied in cases where such articles belong to:

1. the Jewish husband, if there are descendants of this marriage who are not considered as being Jews according to the above mentioned rules;

2. the Jewish wife in case of a childless marriage

(2) The rules of paragraph 1, number 1 are also valid, if the marriage does not exist any more.

(3) The regulations of par. 1 and 2 are not applied to marriages, which took place after May 9, 1940.

Article 12

Article 10 does not apply:

1. to individual wedding bands and the wedding band of a deceased husband or wife;
2. to silver wrist and pocket-watches being in personal use;
3. to silver-ware in use, with the consideration, that each person belonging to the household of the owner is entitled to keep 4 pieces, namely:
Knife, fork, table-spoon and tea-spoon.
4. to artificial denture, made of precious metals, as far as it is needed for personal use.

Article 13

(1) The articles, mentioned in article 10, have to be delivered also if they belong to a third person. Such rights have to be registered in writing with the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. within a month after the delivery. The consideration of rights which are claimed after the expiration of this time, can be refused without giving any reason.

(2) The banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. is responsible for claims, which are secured by rights as mentioned in par. 1. The person who is entitled to it can ask for an appropriate compensation for rights, which do not serve as the security of claims. The responsibility of the banking firm is limited to the extent of the selling value of the delivered goods.

(3) Legal security and executable measures which were ordered before this order has taken effect, are considered as being effective against the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. after the delivery has been made.

Article 14

(1) The obligation for delivery rests with the owner (article 10).

(2) Besides, the following persons are also obliged to deliver:

1. Whoever is authorized to represent the owner
2. whoever in the Occupied Netherlands Territories administers, possesses, keeps in custody or guards articles, which according to the rules of articles 10 to 12 have to be delivered.

Article 15

The delivery has to be made immediately, latest until June 30, 1942. If the articles have been acquired after this date, they have to be delivered immediately, latest within one week after the acquisition.

Article 16

Only the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. has the right of disposal of the articles, which have to be delivered according to the rules of articles 10-12. The provisions of article 7, paragraph 1-3 are to be applied accordingly.

Chapter IV

Obligatory Information

Article 17

(1) Whoever is asked for information by the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., which is charged to carry out the directives of this order or order No. 148/1941 has to answer the questions completely and truly.

(2) If requested, books, vouchers and other material of evidence have to be presented to the banking firm.

Chapter V
Horses, land and water vehicles
Article 18

(1) If horses, land or water vehicles belong legally or really to a person in article 1, they have to be registered with the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Amsterdam, until June 30, 1942.

(2) Only the Commissioner General of the Security Service has the right of disposal of the articles described in par. 1. The rules of article 7, par. 1-3 are applied accordingly.

Chapter VI
Penal code
Article 19

(1) Who purposely violates or evades the rules of this order or who purposely prevents property values, which are subject to seizure according to the rules of this order or order No. 148/1941, will be sentenced to prison or fined with an unlimited amount, or both.

(2) If the act was committed by negligence, the penalty is imprisonment up to one year or a fine of up to 100.000 Guilders.

Article 20

(1) In addition to this penalty a confiscation of the values, concerned by the punishable action, can be decided upon.

(2) If no certain person can be prosecuted or sentenced, the confiscation may be ordered independent of this fact.

Article 21

(1) The prosecution takes place only upon request by the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics, respectively in the cases of chapter V: Commissioner General for the Security Service).

(2) The sentence proposed can be revoked until it has been pronounced by the highest court without further appeal.

Article 22

The actions punishable according to article 19 are punishable offences in the sense of article 2, paragraph 2, of order No. 52/1940 concerning the German jurisdiction over criminal acts in the final draft of order No. 56/1942.

Article 23

(1) The values concerned by a criminal act according to article 29, may also be confiscated through administrative measures.

(2) In this case, the confiscation will take place by order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for the Security Service); it is valid by public announcement or by notifying the person concerned. If the confiscation concerns articles or rights which in pursuance of a legal order are registered in a public register, it has to be registered with this register immediately without charge upon request of the Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General for the Security Service).

(3) The Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) respectively in the cases of section V; Commissioner General for the Security Service will decide upon the use of the confiscated property values.

Chapter VII Final regulations

The obligation for registration or delivery as confirmed by this order—does also exist if the property values concerned have been registered in pursuance of order No. 26/1940 dealing with the management of enemy values, or in pursuance of other orders. Article 6 is not effected by it.

Article 25

(1) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherland Territories—Commissioner General for Finance and Economics, respectively in cases of section V. Commissioner General for the Security Service—takes the measures necessary for the execution of this order. He can permit deviations of the rules of this order. Furthermore he can make general legally binding decisions in doubtful applications of this order.

(2) The Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) can transfer the authority which was given to the banking firm of Lippman, Rosenthal & Co., in pursuance of the rules of this order, or in pursuance of order No. 148/1941. to another party.

Article 26

This order shall take effect as of the date of publication.
The Hague, the 21st of May 1942.

The Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories

Signed: SEYSS-INQUART

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlandischen Gebiete]

Part 8, Page 143.

Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied
Dutch Territories concerning Marriages of Male
Persons of German Nationality in the Occupied
Netherlands Territories, and Related Matters,
February 28, 1941.

In pursuance of Section 5 of the decrees of the Fuehrer concerning
the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands
of May 18, 1940 (RGBl, I, p. 778), I hereby order as follows:

Section 1

(1) The marriage of a male person of German nationality shall
have validity only if the marriage ceremony is performed by a
German official.

* * * * *

Section 4

(1) Upon the application of a female person of Netherlands
nationality intending to marry a German and requiring for such
marriage, in accordance with Articles 92-98 of the Netherlands
Civil Code, the consent of her parents, grandparents, guardian, or
guardians, the approval of the Reich Commissioner for the occu-
pied Netherlands territories (through the Commissioner General
for Administration of Justice) may be substituted for such con-
sent.

Section 5

On application of a female person of Netherlands nationality
intending to marry a German national, the Reich Commissioner
for the occupied Netherlands territories (through the Commis-
sioner General for the Administration of Justice) may grant dis-
pensation from the observance of the waiting period required in
accordance with Articles 91 and 103 of the Netherlands Civil
Code.

* * * * *

The Hague, February 28, 1941.

Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories
SEYSS-INQUART

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen
Gebiete] Part 8, Page 137.

First Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch
Territories concerning Extraordinary Measures of a
Constitutional and Administrative Nature,
March 1, 1941.

Pursuant to Section 3 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning
the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of
May 18, 1940 (RGBl, I, p. 778), I hereby order as follows:

Section 1

The following provisions shall apply to the Administration of
those communities for which the Reich Commissioner for the
occupied Netherlands territories shall deem their application
necessary.

Section 2

(1) The municipal Councils, the Joint Boards of the Mayors
and Aldermen, and all other municipal boards or commissions
shall be and hereby are dissolved.

(2) The powers, provisions, and duties vested in or imposed
upon the agencies dissolved in accordance with subsection 1 by
virtue of statute or contractual provisions and the official powers
and duties of the mayor shall be vested in a Government Com-
missioner.

(3) The dissolution of the Joint of the Mayor and Aldermen
shall not affect the remaining activities of the Aldermen within
the municipal administration unless it shall be otherwise pro-
vided in a specific instance.

Section 3

The Government Commissioner shall, with regard to his of-
ficial duties, be subject to the supervision of the Provincial Com-
mission and the Secretary General in the Ministry of the Interior
who may issue instructions binding on him.

Section 4

(1) Section I, No. 3, subsection I of Section 2, and Section 3
of Order No. 108/1940 (Fourth Order concerning certain Ad-
ministrative Measures) shall be made applicable to the appoint-
ment and dismissal of the Government Commissioner.

(2) The Government Commissioner, at his free discretion,
shall appoint and dismiss the aldermen. In provincial capitals

and in communities with more than 50,000 inhabitants the appointment and dismissal by the Government Commissioner shall be subject to the consent of the Secretary General in the Ministry of the Interior.

Section 5

The Government Commissioner shall appoint no less than four and no more than eight persons from among the inhabitants, who shall advise him in the fulfillment of his official duties. They shall be designated as "Advisors of the Government Commissioner."

Section 6

(1) The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories will by order, determine the municipalities to which the provisions of this order shall apply.

(2) Such order shall be published in the "Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete."

Section 7

Rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement of this order may be issued in the form of an administrative order.

Section 8

This order shall take effect as of the date of publication.
The Hague, March 1, 1941.

Reich Commissioner for the Occupied
Dutch Territories
SEYSS-INQUART

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3341-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen
Gebiete] Part 32, Page 622.

Third Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch
Territories concerning Certain Provisions in Connection
with Netherlands Nationality, August 8, 1941.

Pursuant to Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning
the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of
May 18, 1940 (RGBl, I, p. 778), I hereby order as follows:

Section 1

(1) A Netherlands national acquiring German nationality shall not be deemed to have lost Netherlands nationality unless he in person, or, if a minor, his legal representative acting on his be-

half, shall renounce by declaration Netherlands nationality within one year after acquisition of German nationality.

* * * * *

Section 2

A declaration made in accordance with subsection 1 of Section 1 shall take effect as of the date on which the declarant shall have obtained German nationality.

Section 3

This order shall take effect as of the date of publication. The Hague, August 8, 1941.

Reich Commissioner for the Occupied
Dutch Territories
SEYSS-INQUART

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3342-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, YEAR 1941

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die Besetzten Niederlaendischen
Gebiete] Part 33, Page 637.

Eighth Order of the Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories concerning Special
Measures Affecting Administrative Organization,
August 11, 1941.

Pursuant to Section 5 of the decrees of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl. I, p. 778), I hereby order as follows:

CHAPTER I—Provisions concerning the Function of
Representative Bodies and Agencies of Public Law

Section 1

(1) All functions of the Municipal Councils and Provincial States (Provinzialstaaten) shall be suspended; elections to these representative bodies shall not take place.

(2) The functions of the following bodies shall likewise be suspended:

1. The Joint Councils of Mayors and Aldermen.
2. The Provincial Councils.
3. The Council of the States-General.
4. The Election Boards (Articles 32, 33, and 58 of the Election Statute).

(3) The functions of the Municipal Council shall be suspended, as determined by the mayor; these of the Provincial Councils, as determined by the commissioner of the province.

* * * * *

CHAPTER II—Provisions concerning Local
Administration

Section 3

The powers and duties of the Municipal Council and the Joint Council of the Mayor and Aldermen shall be assumed by the mayor. The same applies to the powers and duties of those municipal boards which shall be suspended in pursuance of an order made in accordance with subsection 3, sentence 1, of Section 1.

Section 4

(1) The mayor shall appoint, for a term of six years, no less than two but no more than six aldermen as his representatives and agents in the administration of municipal affairs.

* * * * *

Section 5

(1) The appointment of an alderman shall be subject to ratification by the supervising authority.

(2) With the consent of the supervising authority the mayor shall be authorized to dismiss an alderman without notice. At the request of the supervising authority the mayor shall dismiss any alderman without notice.

* * * * *

Section 7

(1) The mayor shall appoint councilmen from among the Netherlands nationals domiciled in the community.

(2) The number of councilmen shall be determined in accordance with Section 5 of the Municipalities Act, subject, however, to a reduction by half of the number prescribed there and diminished by one.

* * * * *

Section 9

(1) The mayor shall report immediately to the supervising authority any appointment of a councilman that he may make.

(2) At the request of the supervising authority, the mayor shall without delay dismiss any councilman.

Section 10.

(1) It shall be the duty of the councilmen:

1. To advise the mayor and to submit to him suggestions on the administration of municipal affairs.
2. To promote understanding of his measures among the citizenry.

(2) The councilmen shall not receive any compensation for their activities.

* * * * *

Section 12

(1) The term of a councilman shall be four years.

(2) It shall terminate before that time: first, if the councilman removes his domicile from the community; secondly, if he is removed from office.

Section 13

(1) The mayor shall call a general meeting of councilmen in every instance in which, in accordance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act, a resolution of the Municipal Council is necessary.

(2) The mayor shall determine the agenda. The general meetings shall be public whenever the mayor so orders. Such order shall be made public.

(3) The several items of the agenda shall be discussed in the general meetings; no vote shall be taken nor any resolution adopted. The councilmen shall be required to state their opinion if it varies from that of the mayor; such statement shall be made part of the record.

* * * * *

Section 14

(1) The supervising authority shall see to it that the administration of the mayor conforms to law and furthers the public interest.

(2) The supervising authority may issue instructions to the mayor. The mayor shall be bound to follow these instructions.

(3) The Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior shall also be authorized to issue instructions in accordance with subsection 2 to mayors of communities mentioned in subsection 1, No. 2, of Section 15, except in matters relating to the Waterstaat; the Secretary General of the Ministry of Waterstaat shall exercise this authority in regard to all matters relating to Waterstaat.

Section 15

(1) The supervising power shall be exercised in all matters except those of the Waterstaat:

1. For the communities of the Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam, by the Secretary General of the Ministry Interior.
2. For all other communities, by the commissioner of the Province notwithstanding the authority of the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior vested in him by virtue of other provisions of law.

(2) The supervising power in matters of the Waterstaat shall be exercised in all communities by the commissioner of the prov-

ince notwithstanding the authority of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Waterstaat vested in him in pursuance of the law.

CHAPTER III—Provisions relating to Provincial Administration

Section 16

(1) The powers and duties of the Provincial States shall be assumed by the commissioner of the province.

* * * * *

Section 18

(1) The commissioner of the province shall be authorized to request information from, to submit suggestions and, in cases of emergency, to issue instructions to, all public authorities or agencies in the province unless the authority of such agencies shall extend beyond the limits of the province; the authority to issue such instructions, in case of emergency, shall exist notwithstanding the power of the central authorities concerned to issue such instructions.

Secondly, he shall be authorized to require information from, and to suggest to, all agencies whose powers shall extend beyond the limits of the province unless they constitute central authorities.

(2) The commissioner of the province shall have power to issue the instructions mentioned in subsection 1, No. 1, to officials of the Netherlands police force only if the commissioner takes measures within the usual scope of his official duties which these police officials are required to carry out. The commissioner of the province and the director general of the police shall provide each other with such information as they may require for the fulfillment of their official duties. They may submit suggestions to each other.

* * * * *

Section 19

(1) The commissioner of the province shall appoint, for a term of six years, no less than two but no more than six provincial administrators as his agents and representatives in the administration of provincial affairs.

* * * * *

The Hague, August 11, 1941.

Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Dutch Territories
SEYSS-INQUART

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3343-PS
SPEECHES AND ESSAYS OF HERMANN GOERING,
Munich 1939, page 102.

Speech delivered at the labor-meeting of the
Prussian State Counsel on June 18, 1934

The creation of the Secret State Police was also a necessity. You may recognize the importance attributed to this instrument of state security from the fact that the Prime Minister himself has made himself head of this department of the administration because it is just the observation of all currents directed against the new state which is of fundamental importance.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3344-PS
BEFEHLSBLATT [Journal of Orders] OF THE CHIEF
OF THE SECURITY POLICE AND THE SD, Berlin
7 September 1942, No. 39, page 249.

Already before the taking over of power, the SD had added its part to the success of the National Socialist Revolution. After the taking over of power the Security Police and the SD have borne the responsibility for the inner security of our Reich and have paved the way for a powerful fulfillment of National Socialism against all resistance.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3347-PS
SENIORITY LIST OF THE SS OF THE NSDAP AS OF
1st DECEMBER 1936, Edited by the Personnel Chan-
cellery of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Berlin 1936, Printed in
the Government Printing Office. Page 8.

| Current Number | Name | Given Name | Party-Membership Number |
|----------------|---------|------------|-------------------------|
| 1. | Himmler | Heinrich | 14,303 |
| 2. | Hess | Rudolf | 16 |

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3348-PS

DECREES, REGULATIONS, ANNOUNCEMENTS
[Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben], issued by the
Party Chancellery, published by the Central Publishing
House of the NSDAP, Munich, Vol. I, Pages
298, 299, 303.

YOUNG REPLACEMENT PROBLEMS
General

Order 99/37 of 11 August 1937

Admission of members of the Hitler Youth and of the League
of German Girls to the NSDAP.

The party is the union of the best National Socialists. Therefore, it considers its most important tasks to bring the best Germans into the movement and to form from them the political Leader Corps of the German nation. Only he who has proven in the Hitler Youth that he is brave, courageous, and faithful, that he can sacrifice and is willing to subordinate himself to the community; only he who sees his highest and most sacred duty in the tireless service for the nation, who never loses courage and never gets tired and who faces with hard will the storms of the time, is worthy to join the party * * *

Order 11/40 of 30 November 1940

Leader Replacement from the HJ. Leadership

To secure a full-time leader corps of the national socialist movement the necessary replacements—besides the training and readying of the leader replacements through the “Ordensburgen” of the NSDAP, and besides the supplementing from the ranks of the honorary subordinate leaders of the movement—properly qualified full-time HJ. leaders shall be used for the continuation of their political work in the party service, after having resigned from the HJ service.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3349-PS

ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
[Organisationsbuch der NSDAP], 1936 edition, published by the
Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher
Successor, Munich, Pages 452-453.

Press and Propaganda Office of the Hitler Youth

In the Press and Propaganda Office of the Reich Youth Leadership, the entire press and propaganda work of the Hitler Youth is concentrated. Means of propaganda are periodicals,

newspapers, pamphlets, moving pictures, short films, placards, leaflets, etc.

* * * * *

The editor's offices are connected with the Press and Propaganda Office of the Reich Youth Leadership.

The Reich Youth Leadership issues:

1. The "Reich Youth Press Service" [Reichsjugend-Pressendienst, RJP].
2. The Reich Journal, "The HJ", [Reichszeitung, Die HJ].
3. The Leader Organ of the National Socialist Youth, "Will and Power" [Das Fuehrerorgan der nationalsozialistischen Jugend "Wille und Macht"].
4. The periodical for social problems "The Young Germany" [Die Zeitschrift fuer soziale Fragen, "Das Junge Deutschland"].
5. The illustrated periodical "The Fanfare" [Die illustrierte Zeitschrift, "Die Fanfare"].
6. The periodical of the B.D.M. (Bund der Deutschen Maedels), "The German Girl" [Das Deutsche Maedel].
7. The periodical of the Young Folk [Jungvolk], "Tomorrow" [Morgen].
8. The periodical of the deaf HJ, "The Fountain" [Zeitschrift der gehoerlosen HJ, "Die Quelle"].
9. "The Glider Pilot", [Der Segelflieger].
10. "Music and Folk" [Musik und Volk].
11. The Periodical for Blind People, "The Reveille" [Die Blindenzeitschrift, "Der Weckruf"].

The districts [Gebiete] issue:

1. "The Fanfare", [Die Fanfare] (Districts: Middle Rhine, Kurhessen, Hessen-Nassau, West-Mark).
2. "The Young Elite" [Die Junge Garde] (District 5, Pommern).
3. "The Young Fellowship" [Die Junge Gefolgschaft] (District 18, Franken).
4. "The Outpost" [Der Vorposten] (District 25, Saarpfalz).
5. "Young Will" [Junger Wille] (District 16, Sachsen).
6. "North Borderland Youth" [Nordmarkjugend] (District 6, Nordmark).
7. "Reich-Storm-Flag" [Reichssturmflagge] (District 20, Wuerttemberg).
8. "The Storm Troop" [Der Sturmtrupp] (District 17, Thueringen).

9. "The Folk Youth" [Die Volksjugend] (District 21, Baden).
10. "Our Flag" [Unsere Fahne] (District 9, Westfalen).

The RJP. is issued daily in an issue *A* with the supplements "Youth Abroad" [Jugend im Ausland], "Culture and Entertainment", [Kultur und Unterhaltung], "Education" [Erziehung], "The School" [Die Schule], "The Student" [Der Student], "The Hitler Boy" [Der Hitlerjunge], "Young Folk" [Jungvolk], "The German Girl" [Das Deutsche Maedel], "H.J. Radio" [H.J. Funk], "Sport Service" [Sportdienst], "Social Work" [Soziale Arbeit], "Technique and Economy", [Technik und Wirtschaft] and, "Country Youth" [Landjugend].

A weekly edition *B* represents a summary of the daily editions. It is issued weekly on Wednesdays, and another edition, *C* is issued on the second and 4th Thursday of each month for smaller newspapers.

The work of the Section Young Folk is distributed to all fields of the office and serves the press and propagandistic representation of the problems of the Young Folk in the public by use of all available possibilities.

The main section, propaganda, is organizationally in permanent relation, through liaison officers, with the Reich Ministry for People's Enlightenment and Propaganda and with the Reich Propaganda Leadership of the NSDAP.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3352-PS

DECREES, REGULATIONS, ANNOUNCEMENTS
[Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben], issued by the
Party Chancellery, Published by the Central Publishing
House of the NSDAP, Munich, Vol. II, Pages 507-513.

MANPOWER [Arbeitseinsatz]

The Plenipotentiary General [Der Generalbevollmaechtigte] for
Manpower.

Appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower.
Circular 12/42 g, 22 March 1942

* * * * *

[Translator's Note: Above is quoted the decree appointing Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for Manpower in direct placement under the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, Goering. See Document 1666-PS.]

Party Comrade [Parteigenosse] Sauckel has suggested—and I have agreed—that the Gau leaders shall become active as his

plenipotentiaries within the Gaus. Hereby the cooperation of all forces of party, state, and economy will be guaranteed definitely.

By the leadership of the party in full appreciation of the competence of the corresponding Reich authorities, the highest efficiency in the field of manpower shall be guaranteed. This circular has solely the purpose of giving information. Orders for the execution of your work will be transferred to you through Party Comrade Sauckel shortly. It goes without saying that the party gives him the best support for his responsible work.

*Plenipotentiary General for Manpower
Executive Regulation*

Circular 14/42 g, 31 March 1942

In addition to circular number 12/42 g, 22 March 1942, about the appointment of Gau Leader Party Comrade Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for Manpower, I announce herewith the executive regulation of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan of 27 March 1942 as follows:

The REICH MARSHALL OF GREATER GERMANY,
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, 27 March 1942
In execution of the attached decree of the Fuehrer of 21 March,

I hereby order the following:

* * * * *

At the disposal of the Plenipotentiary for Manpower for the execution of his tasks is the right to issue orders to the supreme Reich authorities, their subordinate agencies, also the agencies of the party, its member organizations and affiliated organizations, to the Reich Protector, the Governor General, to the military commanders, and to heads of the civil administrations, as authorized by the Fuehrer. As to orders and measures of a principal nature, report has to be made to me in advance.

Decrees of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower
Order I. 53/712, 29 July 1942

The Chancellery of the Party submits herewith a list of the decrees issued to date by the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower.

* * * * *

Order Number 1 of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower About Appointment and Tasks of his Plenipotentiaries, 6 April 1942.

I herewith appoint the Gau leaders of the NSDAP as my plenipotentiaries for manpower within their respective Gaus.

A. Their tasks are:

1. Establishment of a harmonious cooperation of all agencies of the state, of the party, of the armed forces, and of the Economy, charged with problems of manpower and thus to create agreement between the different conceptions and requirements to obtain the highest efficiency in the field of manpower. (It has to be considered hereby that in the military districts it is up to the Reich defense commissar to guarantee the liaison between civil authorities and the agencies of the Wehrmacht in accordance with their tasks under the administrative order of 1 September 1939. (Reichgesetzblatt I, page 1565).

* * * * *

B. *Execution*

1. The president of the provincial labor offices [Landesarbeitsämter] and their staffs are herewith directed to be at the disposal of the Gau leaders for information and advice and to fulfill the suggestions and demands of the Gau leader for the purpose of improvements for manpower within the framework of the existing regulations, laws, and orderly business procedure. Concerning this, there will be special regulations.

2. The authorities of the general and internal administration, and of the economy as well, especially the agricultural offices and provincial food offices, are also to hold themselves at the disposal of the Gau leaders for cooperation concerning manpower, in agreement with the competent Reich ministers, and with consideration of their service regulations. Concerning this there will be special directives. The organizations of the professional economy also have to participate.

By the above-mentioned commission of the Gau leaders of the NSDAP, I intend to lead manpower utilization to the greatest success for the German armament economy, war economy, and food economy as far as concerns the responsibility of the agencies of the party, of the state, of the armed forces, and of the organizations of the economy in relation to their supreme authorities. For this purpose, I also intend especially to use the powerful internal forces of the national socialist ideology involved in the field of human care and human leadership.

Order No. 2 of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower about the guarantee of the unification of the execution of the tasks in the field of manpower and wage policy.

The fulfillment of the task given to me by the Fuehrer requires the greatest concentration of the agencies which are responsible for the direction of manpower and wage policy and their unified direction for the given goal. I have taken the required measures. In doing this, I have directed the attention of the above mentioned agencies expressly to the need for a closer and more faithful cooperation with the corresponding agencies of the party and the state as well as of the economy, and have issued corresponding orders. Further I have appointed the Gau leaders of the NSDAP as my plenipotentiaries for manpower within their respective Gaus and have conferred upon them as special tasks the establishment of harmonious cooperation with all agencies in charge of manpower problems. The conditions for an efficient and harmonious cooperation of all effective forces in the field of manpower and wage policy are thereby established.

Beyond this it is a prerequisite for the success of the task that from now on all those agencies of the party, of the state and of the economy, the heads of all other offices, institutions and persons who are not responsible for the direction of manpower and wage policy, refrain from any influence concerning the above mentioned tasks, except when they are expressly asked for cooperation.

* * * * *

Manpower Utilization of Eastern Workers. Leaflets for Factory Heads and Eastern Workers.

Circular 122/42, 4 August 1942

According to a demand of the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower, Gau leader Sauckel, I recommend that the "Bearers of Sovereignty" [Hoheitstraeger] inform themselves occasionally of the execution of the regulations issued for the utilization of Eastern Workers within the factories. This involvement of the "Bearers of Sovereignty" appears necessary to control the factory heads in the execution of the decrees issued by the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower, and on the other hand to avoid that the politically inept factory heads give too much consideration to the care of the Eastern workers and thereby cause justified annoyance among the German workers.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Robert M. W. Kempner, an expert Consultant of the War Department appeared before the undersigned attesting officer and having been duly sworn stated as follows:

In my capacity as Superior Government Counsellor and Chief Legal Adviser of the pre-Hitler Prussian Police Administration, I became officially acquainted with the criminal record of Martin Bormann, identical with the Defendant Martin Bormann now under indictment before the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg, Germany.

The official criminal record of Martin Bormann contained the following entry:

Bormann, Martin, sentenced on May 15, 1924, by the State Tribunal for the Protection of the Republic, in Leipzig, Germany, to one year in prison, for having been an accomplice in the commission of a political murder.

Robert M. W. Kempner

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of December 1945.

Normann A. Stoll

Captain, JAGD

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3357-PS

DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS

[Dokumente der Deutschen Politik]

Vol. I, page 158, Doc. No. 64.

"Exchange of letters between the Reich president, Adolf Hitler, and the Reichskommissar for Prussia, Franz von Papen, and Reichs Minister Goering, April 7 to 10, 1933, in connection with the recall of the Reichskommissar and the appointment of Goering to the post of Minister President of Prussia.

Papen to Hitler:

Very Honored Herr Reichschancellor—

With the draft of the law for the coordination of the states with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor, legislative work has begun which will be of historical significance for the political development of the German state. The step taken by the Reich Government, which I headed at the time, is now crowned by this new inter-locking of the Reich. You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German states with that of the Reich. Now that the new law enables you to appoint a Prus-

sian Prime Minister I ask you to inform the Reich President that I return to his hands my post of Reichs Kommissar for Prussia.

With excellent respect,

Your sincerely devoted,

/s/ Von Papen

Hitler to Hindenburg:

Highly honored Reichs President—

Vice-Chancellor von Papen has sent a letter to me which I enclose for your information. Herr von Papen already informed me within the last few days that he agreed with Minister Goering to resign on his own volition, as soon as the unified conduct of the governmental affairs in the Reich and in Prussia would be assured by the new law on coordination of policy in the Reich and the states [Laender].

On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of Reich governors [Reichs-Statthalter] was adopted, Herr von Papen considered this aim as having been attained and he requested of me to undertake the appointment of the Prussian Prime Minister, when at the same time he would offer his full time services in the Reich Government.

Herr von Papen, in accepting the commission for the Government of Prussia in these difficult times since 30 January, has rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of the idea of coordinating the policy in the Reich and the States [Laender]. His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the great help I shall thus receive.

With profound reverence,

/s/ Adolf Hitler

Hindenburg to Papen:

Dear Herr von Papen—

Your request to be released from the office of Reich Commissar for the State of Prussia has just been granted by me. I feel compelled at this occasion to thank you sincerely, in behalf of the Reich as well as my own, for the great meritorious contribution you have rendered toward the elimination of dualism between the Reich and the states [Laender] and for the realization of the

idea of a unified political leadership in the Reich and the states. That now your entire capability will be at the disposal of the Reich government I welcome with satisfaction.

With best greetings in true comradeship—

Yours sincerely,
/s/ Von Hindenburg, Reich President

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3358-PS

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 83-26 19/1 Ang. II

Berlin, 31st January 1939 .

Enclosed please find for your attention a circular which has been sent to the German authorities abroad on the subject of "The Jewish Question as a factor in German Foreign Policy in the year 1938".

By Order

Signed: Hinrichs.

To All Senior Reich Authorities and NSDAP Bureau
for Foreign Affairs.

to No. 611—39 secret, Foreign

Secret

Foreign
No. 611 39 Secret. Foreign If.

6.2.39.

Copy to:

Abw. I (Counter Intelligence I)
W.Stab.
Chief Dept. 3
Att. Gr. of the Army General Staff
OKM. Dept. 3. SKL
Ob.d.L. (Z A)
Ob.d.L. Dept. 5. General Staff.
Ausl. III

[Pencil note]
Chief W Wi.

attention is requested.

By Order
1 *Enclosure*

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
83-26 19/1

Berlin, 25th January 1939.

Contents:

The Jewish Question as a factor in German Foreign Policy in the year 1938.

1. The German Jewish Policy as basis and consequence of the decisions for the foreign policy of the year 1938.
2. Aim of German Jewish Policy: Emigration.
3. Means, ways and aim of the Jewish Emigration.
4. The emigrated Jew as the best propaganda for the German Jewish Policy.

It is certainly no co-incidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the "idea of Greater Germany", since the Jewish policy was both the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938. The advance made by Jewish influence and the destructive Jewish spirit in politics, economy and culture paralyzed the power and will of the German people to rise again more perhaps even than the power-policy opposition of the former enemy allied powers of the World War. The healing of this sickness among the people was therefore certainly one of the most important requirements for exerting the force which in the year 1938 resulted in the joining together of Greater Germany, in defiance of the world.

To All diplomatic and qualified consular representatives abroad.

The necessity for a radical solution of the Jewish question arose however also as a consequence of the foreign political development, which resulted in a further 200,000 Jews in Austria in addition to the 500,000 of the Jewish Faith living in the Old Reich. The influence of Jewry on Austrian economy which had grown to enormous proportions under the Schuschnigg Regime, made immediate measures necessary, with the aim of excluding Jewry from German economy and utilizing Jewish property in the interests of the community. The action carried out as reprisal for the murder of Legation Councillor von Rath accelerated this process to such an extent that Jewish shops—till then with the exception of foreign business—disappeared from the streets completely. The liquidation of the Jewish wholesale trade, manufacturing trade, and of houses and real estate in the hands of Jews, will gradually reach a point where in a conceivable time there will no longer be any talk of Jewish property in Germany. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that this is no seizure of Jewish property without compensation, as for instance the confiscation

of Church Property during the French revolution. On the contrary the dispossessed Jew receives Reich Bonds for his goods, and the interest is credited to him.

The final goal of German Jewish Policy is the emigration of all the Jews living in Reich territory. It is foreseen that already the thorough measures in the economic sphere, which have prevented the Jew from earning and made him live on his dividends, will further the desire to emigrate. Looking back on the last 5 years since the assumption of power, it is, however, obvious that neither the Law for the Reestablishing of the Professional Character of the Civil Service nor the Nurnberg Jewish laws with their executive regulations, which prevented any tendency of Jewry being assimilated, contributed to any extent to the emigration of German Jews. On the contrary every period of domestic political tranquility has resulted in such a stream of Jewish immigrants returning, that the Gestapo has been obliged to put Jewish immigrants with German passports into a training camp for political supervision.

The Jew was excluded from politics and culture. But until 1938 his powerful economic position in Germany was unbroken, and thereby his obstinate resolve to hold out until "better times" came. Indicative of the tactics of this "delaying" resistance is the programme of a Jewish Party recently formed in Poland, to fight against all Polish measures aimed at Jewish emigration. As long as the Jew can earn money in Germany, then in the opinion of World Jewry the Jewish bastion in Germany need not be given up.

But the Jew has underestimated the consequences and the strength of the National Socialist purpose. The powerful Jewish positions in Vienna and Prague collapsed in 1938 at the same time as the system of states in Central Europe created at Versailles to keep Germany down. Italy stood at Germany's side, with her racial Laws in the fight against Jewry. An expert on the Jewish question, Prof. Goga took over the Government in Bukarest with a programme aimed against Jewry, without however being able to carry it out because of overwhelming international pressure from Paris and London. Jewry in Hungary and Poland was subjected to special laws. Everywhere the success of German foreign policy now begins to shake Jewish strongholds which have been established for hundreds of years from Munich and in far off States, like the tremours of an earthquake.

It is also understandable that World Jewry, "which has selected America as its Headquarters" regards as its own downfall

the Munich Agreement, which in American opinion signifies the collapse of the democratic front in Europe. For the system of parliamentary democracy has always, as experience proves, helped the Jews to wealth and political power at the expense of the people in whose country they live. It is certainly the first time in history that Jewry must evacuate a secure position.

This resolution was first formed in 1938. It showed itself in the efforts of the western democracies particularly those of the United States of America, to put the now finally determined Jewish withdrawal from Germany, in other words Jewish emigration, under international control and protection. The American President Roosevelt "who it is well known is surrounded by a whole row of exponents of Jewry among his closest confidants" called a State Conference as early as the middle of 1938 to discuss the refugee questions, which was held in Evian without any particular results. Both of the questions, the answering of which is the first essential for organized Jewish emigration remained unanswered: firstly the question of *how* this emigration should be organized and financed and secondly the question: emigrate *to where?*

In answer to the first question, International Jewry in particular did not appear willing to contribute. On the contrary the Conference—and later the Committee formed by it in London under the direction of Rublee, an American—regarded its main task as that of forcing Germany by international pressure to release Jewish property to the greatest possible extent. In other words Germany was to pay for the emigration of her 700,000 Jews with German national property. It is at the same time to be doubted whether International Jewry ever seriously desired the mass emigration of their fellow Jews from Germany and other states at all, unless there was an equivalent of a Jewish State. The tactics hitherto employed in Jewish proposals, were in every case aimed less at mass emigration of Jews than at the transfer of Jewish property.

It goes without saying, that the transfer of even a fraction of Jewish property, would be impossible from the point of view of foreign exchange. The financing of a mass emigration of German Jews is therefore still obscure. Questions could be answered casually thus, that Germany for her part reckoned that International Jewry—particularly relatives of Jews who have emigrated—would support this emigration as vigorously as it made it possible for its destitute fellow Jews to immigrate to Germany, at a time when Germany was so weak that she could not stop the

stream of Jews from the East. It should be emphasized, however, that according to police and taxation records, the greater proportion of Jews immigrated to Germany without means and made money in a few years or decades, while the German people lost their possessions as a result of the reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles or joined the ranks of the unemployed. Consequently Germany for her part had no sympathy for the compassion, with which an ostensibly humanitarian world accuses Germany of illegally appropriating property which was taken away from the German people by Jewish business methods.

The second question, to what country should an organized Jewish emigration be directed, could similarly not be answered by the Evian Conference, as each of the countries taking part having announced that they were fundamentally concerned with the refugee problem, declared that they were not in a position to take large numbers of Jewish emigrants into their territory. After over 100,000 Jews even in 1933/34 had succeeded either legally or illegally in escaping abroad and establishing themselves in someone else's country either with the help of their Jewish relatives living abroad or circles sympathetically disposed from a humanitarian point of view, almost every State in the World has in the meantime hermetically sealed its borders against these parasitical Jewish intruders. The problem of Jewish emigration is therefore for all practical purposes at a standstill. Many States have already become so cautious, that they demand a permit made out by German authorities from Jews travelling in the ordinary way with German passports, saying that there is nothing against them returning.

The emigration movement of only about 100,000 Jews has already sufficed to awaken the interest if not the understanding of many countries in the Jewish danger. We can estimate that here the Jewish question will extend to a problem of international politics when large numbers of Jews from Germany, Poland, Hungary and Rumania are put on the move as a result of increasing pressure from the people of the countries where they are living. Even for Germany the Jewish problem will not be solved when the last Jew has left German soil.

It is even today an important duty of German policy to control and when possible direct the flow of Jewish emigration to be sure there is no incentive to cooperate with other countries such as Poland, Hungary and Rumania, who themselves are striving for the emigration of the Jewish sections of their population, in an attempt to solve this problem. From experience with this

procedure interests clash, although directed towards the same goal, and retard the realization of Germany's urgent claim for German Jews to be admitted into other particular countries.

It is true that the Rumanian Government sent an official appeal to the Reich Government in the name of human ethics and justice, to join with them in an international action to solve the Jewish question. On the other hand, Poland at the end of October last year issued a decree, the execution of which has made it practically impossible for 60,000 Jews of Polish Nationality residing in Germany to return to Poland. As is well known, the Reich Government had then to decide to deport to Poland 60,000 Jews of Polish Nationality who will be followed by their families, shortly before the Polish Decree came into force. The Hungarian Government, it is true, appreciates the German Jewish policy in so far as they themselves have in mind the "Aryanization" of Hungarian-Jewish businesses in Germany, that is, Jewish owners of firms will be replaced by Hungarians. In general, however, it is apparent that the States concerned are more egotistically interested in deporting their own Jewish elements than in any international solution. Germany will therefore take the initiative herself, in order next of all to find ways, means and destination for Jewish emigration from Germany.

Palestine—which has already become the slogan of world opinion, as the land for the emigrants—cannot be considered as the target for Jewish emigration, because it is incapable of absorbing a mass influx of Jews. Under the pressure of Arab resistance, the British Mandatory Government has restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine to the minimum. For the time being Jewish emigration to Palestine was helped to a great extent, as far as Germany was concerned, by the signing of an agreement with the representatives of Jewry in Palestine, which made it possible to transfer Jewish property in the form of additional exports (Haavara-Agreement). Apart from the fact that emigration was made possible by this method for a small number of wealthy Jews only, but not for the mass of *Jews without means*, [Pencil note: Are there such people?] there were fundamental considerations of foreign policy against this type of emigration: the transfer of Jewish property out of Germany, contributed to no small extent to the building of a Jewish State in Palestine. Germany must regard the forming of a Jewish State, as dangerous, which even in miniature would form just such an operational base as the Vatican for political Catholicism. The realization that World Jewry will always be the irreconcilable

enemy of the Third Reich, forces the decision to prevent any strengthening of the Jewish position. A Jewish State however would bring an international increase in power to World Jewry. Alfred Rosenberg expressed this idea in his speech in Detmold on 15 January this year as follows:

“Jewry is striving today for a Jewish State in Palestine. Not to give Jews all over the world a homeland but for other reasons: World Jewry must have a miniature State, from which to send exterritorial ambassadors and representatives to all countries of the world and through these be able to further their lust for power. But more than anything else they want a Jewish centre, a Jewish State in which they can house the Jewish swindlers from all parts of the world, who are hunted by the Police of other countries, issue them new passports and then send them to other parts of the world. It is to be desired, that those people who are friendly disposed to Jews, above all the Western Democracies who have so much space in all parts of the world at their disposal, place an area outside Palestine for the Jews, *of course in order to establish a Jewish Reserve and not a Jewish State.*”

That is the programme expressing the foreign policy attitude of Germany towards the Jewish question. Germany is very interested in maintaining the dispersal of Jewry. The calculation, that as a consequence boycott groups and anti-German centres would be formed all over the world, disregards the following fact which is already apparent, the influx of Jews in all parts of the world invokes the opposition of the native population and thereby forms the best propaganda for the German Jewish policy.

In North America, in South America, in France, in Holland, Scandinavia and Greece, everywhere, wherever the flood of Jewish immigrants reaches, there is today already a visible increase in anti-semitism. A task of the German foreign policy must be to further this wave of anti-semitism. This will be achieved less by German propaganda abroad, than by the propaganda which the Jew is forced to circulate in his defense. In the end, its effects will recoil on themselves. The reports from German authorities abroad, emphasize the correctness of this interpretation:

The press and official correspondents continually report anti-semitic demonstrations by the population of North America. It is perhaps indicative of the domestic political development in USA, that the listening-audience of the “Radio Priest” Coughlin, who is well known to be Anti-Jewish, has grown to over 20 millions. The Embassy in Montevideo reported on 12 December last

year "that the Jewish influx continues for months, week by week. It goes without saying, that anti-semitism is growing"—Salonica reported on 30 November 1938: "that forces are at work to stir up the hate against the Jews" and that at the same time Greek Freemasonry is endeavoring to stem the anti-semitic movement. In France, the Paris Town Council (Stadtversammlung) was in April of this year to discuss a proposal, by which the naturalization of Jews was in future to be refused. The meeting on the Jewish question ended with the speaker being beaten up—Lyon reported on 20 December last year: "The immigration of Jewish refugees has lately led to undesirable occurrences. The antipathy towards the new intruders based on business and competitive grounds, which is general throughout France, is unmistakable." This aversion has grown to such an extent meantime that a Jewish defense has already been organized against the anti-semitism in France (Report Paris dated 19 November last year). —The Embassy at the Hague reported on 30 December last year: "Under the pressure of countless immigrants from Germany, who make themselves objectionable particularly in Amsterdam anti-semitism is growing very much in Holland. And if this continues, it can easily come to pass that Dutchmen will not only appreciate Germany's action against the Jews but will also find themselves wishing to do the same as we." —The embassy at Oslo reported on 8th April last year: "While only a few years ago, the streets of Oslo were hardly marred by Jews at all, lately a great change has come about here. On the streets, in restaurants and above all in the coffee houses, Jews sit around in hideous cluster. The Norwegians are being crowded out, more and more. The Norwegian Press, which formerly did not understand the Jewish question at all, suddenly realized what it meant to have the Children of Israel invade the country like a swarm of locusts. It will be a very salutary lesson, which is being meted out to the Norwegians".

These examples from reports from authorities abroad, can, if desired be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation, that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews from German Lebensraum which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence would only be temporary and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned, what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew is to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the in-

terests of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated not by false compassion for the "United Religious Jewish minority" but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations.

By Order

Schaumburg

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3360-PS

Secret State Police
State Police Station Nurnberg-Fuerth
Teletype Substation

FS No.

Accepted

| Day | Month | Year | Time |
|-----|----------|------|------|
| 12 | February | 1944 | |

Space for Receiving Stamp

Inspector.....

Received 14 February 1944

No. 0544

from by

Transmitted

| Day | Month | Year | Time |
|-----|-------|------|------|
| To | By | | |

RSHA Roman 4 F 1 45/44

The border Inspector-general.

Urgent—Submit immediately. —

Treatment of recaptured escaped eastern laborers [Ostarbeiter]. By order of the RFSS all recaptured escaped eastern laborers without exception are to be sent to concentration camps, effective immediately. In regard to reporting to RFSS, I request only one report by teletype to section Roman 4 D.—(Foreign laborers) on 10 March 1944 as to how many of such male or female eastern laborers were turned over to a concentration camp between today and 10 March 1944. The usual monthly report, as per decree of 27 May 1943, concerning eastern laborers sent to concentration camps, to section Roman 4 D 5. Also as per decree of 15 December 1943—S-Roman 4 D (Foreign laborers)—479/42. Prescribed monthly statistical report of the fight against above file number. In addition, a report is to be made to me

quarterly—for the first time on 5 respectively 10 March 1944—for the first time by 10 March 1944 to the RSHA, of the total number of foreign laborers present in the border sector who as border commuters [Grenzgaenger] in the compass of small border traffic cross the border to their place of [work?] situated in the Reich.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3361-PS

The Chief of the Security
Police and of the Security Service (SD)
IV A 36—a—2474/44

To all Commanders of the Security police.
state Police—Main—Agencies [Staatspolizei-leit-stellen]
the Chiefs of the Security (police?)
the Task Force LUXEMBURG.

Through message centre

to the Inspectors of the Security Police and.....[?]
to the Department I (Organization)
to the Business Office IV (2 Copies)

Subject: Arrest of Plant Directors.

It has happened repeatedly that the arrest of plant directors of plants important for the war has not been reported promptly. In reply to the inquiries of Reich agencies, such as the Reich Ministry for Aviation, the Military Court for special purposes (z.b.V.) of the Air Corps, etc., about the facts of the case, no information could be given. Return inquiries, which wasted time, were necessary.

I therefore decree, that the arrest of plant directors of plants important for the war and the arrest of other leading persons of the armament industry, who are occupied with tasks important for the war, be reported at once by urgent teletype (BLITZ—FS) with the reasons mentioned. At the same time it is to be mentioned, whether it is a question of an armament plant of the aviation industry.

/s/ DR. KALTENBRUNNER

[Seal] Authenticated ROESEL
Chancellery Employee

Copy

Berlin, 21 September 1939

The Chief of the Security Police
PP (II)—288/39 secret
Special Delivery Letter

To *The Chiefs of all detail groups [Einsatzgruppen] of the Security Police.*

Concerning: The Jewish problem in the occupied zone.

I refer to the conference held in Berlin today, and again point out that the *planned joint measures* (i.e. the ultimate goal) are to be kept *strictly secret*.

Distinction must be made between

- (1) the ultimate goal (which requires a prolonged period of time) and
- (2) the sectors leading to fulfillment of the ultimate goal, (each of which will be carried out in a short term).

The planned measures require thorough preparation both in technique and in the economic aspect.

Obviously the tasks at hand cannot be laid down in detail from here. The following instructions and directives serve at the same time for the purpose of urging chiefs of the detail groups to practical consideration of problems.

I

The first prerequisite for the ultimate goal is first of all, the concentration of the Jews from the country to the larger cities.

This is to be carried out speedily. In doing so distinction must be made:

- (1) between the zones of Danzig and West Prussia, Poznan, Eastern Upper Silesia;
and
- (2) the other occupied zone.

If possible, the zone mentioned under item 1 shall be cleared completely of Jews, or at least the aim should be to form as few concentration centers as possible.

In the zones mentioned under item 2, there shall be established as few concentration points as possible so that future measures may be accomplished more easily. One must keep in mind that only such cities are chosen as concentration points which are located either at railroad junctions or at least along a railroad.

On principle, all Jewish communities *under 500* heads are to be dissolved and to be transferred to the nearest concentration center.

This decree does not count for the zone of detail group I, which is located East of Cracow and bounded by Bolanico, Jaroskaw, the new demarcation line and the previous Polish-Slovakian border. Within this zone merely an improvised census of Jews should be carried out. Furthermore, Councils of Jewish Elders as discussed below are to be set up.

II

Councils of Jewish Elders

(1) In each Jewish community, a Council of Jewish Elders is to be set up which, as far as possible, is to be composed of the remaining influential personalities and rabbis. The Council is to be composed of 24 male Jews (depending on the size of the Jewish community).

It is to be made *fully responsible* (in the literal sense of the word) for the exact execution according to terms of all instructions released or yet to be released.

(2) In case of sabotage of such instructions, the Councils are to be warned of severest measures.

(3) The Jewish Councils are to take an improvised census of the Jews of their area, possibly divided into generations (according to age)

a. up to 16 years of age,

b. from 16 to 20 years of age,

c. and those above and also according to the principal vocations—

and they are to report the results in the shortest possible time.

(4) The Councils of Elders are to be made acquainted with the time and date of the evacuation, the evacuation possibilities and finally the evacuation routes. They are, then, to be made personally responsible for the evacuation of the Jews from the country.

The reason to be given for the concentration of the Jews to the cities is that Jews have most decisively participated in sniper attacks and plundering.

(5) The Councils of Elders of the concentration centers are to be made responsible for the proper housing of the Jews to be brought in from the country. The concentration of Jews in the cities for general reasons of security will probably bring about orders to forbid Jews to enter certain wards of that city altogether, and that in consideration of economic necessity they cannot for instance leave the ghetto, they cannot go out after a designated evening hour, etc.

(6) The Council of Elders is also to be made responsible for the adequate maintenance of the Jews on the transport to the cities.

No scruples are to be voiced, if the migrating Jews take with them all their movable possessions, as far as that is technically at all possible.

(7) Jews who do not comply with the order to move into cities are to be given a short additional period of grace when there is good reason. They are to be warned of strictest penalty if they should not comply by the appointed time.

III

All necessary measures, on principle, are always to be taken up in closest agreement and collaboration with the German civil administration and the competent local authorities.

In the execution of this plan, care must be taken that economic security suffer no harm in the occupied zones.

(1) The needs of the army, should particularly be kept in mind e.g. it will not be possible to avoid leaving behind here and there some Jews engaged in trade who absolutely must be left behind for the maintenance of the troops, for lack of any other way out. In such cases, the immediate aryianization of these plants is to be planned for and the emigration of the Jews is to be completed later in agreement with the competent local German administrative authorities.

(2) For the preservation of German economic interests in the occupied territories it is self understood that Jewish war and ordinary industries and factories and those important to the 4-Year Plan must be kept going for the time being.

In these cases also, immediate Aryianization must be planned for and the emigration of the Jews must be completed later.

(3) Finally, the food situation in the occupied territories must be taken into consideration. For instance, as far as possible, real estate of Jewish settlers should be provisionally entrusted to the care of neighboring German or even Polish peasants to be worked by them in order to insure harvesting of the crops still in the fields, or cultivation.

In regard to this important question contact should be made with the agricultural experts of the (C.d.Z.).

(4) In all cases in which a conformity of interests of the Security Police [Sicherheitspolizei] on the one hand, and the German civil administration on the other hand, can be reached,

I am to be informed of the individual measures in question as quickly as possible before their execution and my decision is to be awaited.

IV

The Chiefs of the detail groups[Einsatzgruppen] are to report to me continuously on the following matters:

(1) Numerical survey on the Jews present in their territories (if possible according to the above mentioned classification).

The number of Jews who are evacuated from the country and those who are already in cities are to be listed separately.

(2) Names of cities which have been designated as concentration points.

(3) The time set for the Jews to be evacuated to the cities.

(4) Survey of all Jewish war and ordinary industries and factories or those important to the 4-Year Plan in their territory.

If possible the following should be specified:

a. Kind of factory (also statement on possible reconversion of factory to really vital or war-important factories or those important to the 4-Year Plan);

b. which factories should be most urgently Aryanized (in order to avoid loss); what kind of Aryanization is suggested? Germans or Poles, (the decision depends on the importance of the factory);

c. number of Jews working in these factories (include leading positions).

Will it be possible to keep the factory going after the Jews have been removed or will German or Polish workers respectively have to be assigned for that purpose? To what extent?

If Polish workers have to be used, care should be taken that they are mainly taken from the former German provinces in order to somewhat ease the problem there. These questions can only be solved by incorporation and participation of the labor offices [Arbeitsaemter] which have been set up.

V

For the fulfillment of the goal set, I expect the full cooperation of all forces of the Security Police [Sicherheitspolizei] and the Security Service [Sicherheitsdienst].

The Chiefs of the neighboring detail groups shall immediately establish contact with each other in order to be able to cover completely the territories in question.

VI

The High Command of the Army [OKH]; the commissioner for the 4-Year Plan, (c/o State Secretary Neumann) (Staatssekretär); the Reich Minister of the interior (c/o State Secretary Stuckart); the Reich Ministry for Food and Economy [für Ernährung und Wirtschaft] (c/o State Secretary Landfried); as well as the Chief of the civil administration of the occupied territories have received copies of this decree.

Signed: Heydrich

Certified:

signed: Schmidt

Office employe.

Responsible for
correct copy
signed: signature

Major on the General Staff (Major i. G.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3375-PS

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER,

South German edition, 4 November 1933, Page 10.

[Report on mass meeting held in Essen on 2 November 1933, election campaign for Reichstag election and referendum on Germany's leaving the League of Nations scheduled for 12 November. Chairman of the meeting Gauleiter Terboven, speakers Hitler and von Papen. Following is translation of von Papen's address:]

The appeal of Vice-Chancellor von Papen.

Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have tried to support with all my strength the work of the national socialist movement and its leader; and just as I at the time of taking over the chancellorship have advocated to pave the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on January 30 was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of our chancellor and Fuehrer into the hand of our beloved field marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the German people and all those who have kept confidence in me:

The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep distress a leader who will lead it, through all distresses and weaknesses, through all crisis and moments of danger, with the sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future.

When I had the honour last year to fight in Lausanne for the German interests to free Germany from the burden of the tributes, I said repeatedly and with greatest forcefulness to the then French and English Prime-Ministers: the problem of reparations is not only a material one but to a much larger degree a moral one. Germany at least wants to be free of all the discriminations which make it a second rate nation.

But those statesmen were not anointed with the oil of psychological perception, they did not understand at that time the meaning of the hour and they have not shown any understanding now in these days in Geneva. History has taken its course and the Fuehrer has put into action the knowledge of the fact that nothing can be gained for Germany on the floor of the disarmament conference and the League of Nations by withdrawing from it. The German people are grateful to him for this decision which clears up the situation.

The election of November 12 is the most democratic of all means to ascertain whether the German people agree with the policies of his government, and whether they have agreed to the development pointed out to them by national socialism.

And what could show better to the other countries the alliance between Fuehrer and nation but this election, this question about the confidence of the nation? Therefore it is necessary that all Germans understand: this time not parties or systems, not individuals or laws are at stake but simply Germany herself.

Therefore let me say a word at this hour to those who today are not among us, those who found it perhaps difficult to follow the development of the last few months because for a lifetime they might have gone the wrong way of adhering to a socialist ideology or shared the opinion of another party. Those Germans I remind that it is the desire and intention of the Fuehrer to weld the entire German nation, all its classes and sectors into a national and political unity.

The best proof of that is that he guaranteed to the churches the full freedom of their high spiritual function, that he was ready to grant them more for the exercise of their high mission than at any time any liberal government of the last century.

Here in the heart of an overwhelmingly catholic province I express the urgent request to my catholic fellow-citizens to reward this generous recognition of the Christian basis of the Third Reich offered by the Fuehrer with the fullest confidence in the future, and with giving their votes for him.

The Fuehrer desires—I know it—the reconciliation with all those who were not in his ranks during the years of the struggle for the great goal he bears in his heart. The catholic part of the people did sacrifice its blood on the battlefields with the same devotion like all other fellow-citizens. The catholic part of Germany—wherever it may have stood politically—will not stand back either on the 12th of November, when it will be the time to offer a profession on behalf of national honour and of confidence in the Fuehrer.

Let us in this hour say to the Fuehrer of the new Germany that we believe in him and his work.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3376-PS

THE ARCHIVE,

[Das Archiv] September 19, 1934, Vol. VI, Pages 767-768.

“Dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans”
[Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher].

The Reich-leadership of the Party announces the self dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans:

Since the Reich Party Leadership through its department for spiritual peace increasingly and immediately administers all cultural problems and those concerning the relationship of State and Churches, the tasks at first delegated to the Union of Catholic Germans are now included in those of the Reich Party Leadership in the interest of a stronger coordination.

Vice-Chancellor von Papen, up to now the Leader of the Union of Catholic Germans, declared about the Dissolution of this organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since the attitude of the National Socialist State toward the Christian and Catholic Church had been explained often and unequivocally through the leader and chancellor himself.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3385-PS

DECREES, REGULATIONS, ANNOUNCEMENTS
[Verfuegungen, Anordnungen Bekanntgaben] Part I of 1943,
IV Volume

Edited by the Party-Chancellery
Published by: Central Publishing House
of the NSDAP, Franz Eher, Successor,
Munich, Page 231.

Copy
Order No. 201/38
(Not to be published)

14 December 1938

Subject: Position of the Security Service [Sicherheitsdienst] of
the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) within the Party.

1

By my order of 9 June 1934, the Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS has been established as the sole political news and defense service of the NSDAP, its components and joint associations.

The SD-RF SS is also an establishment of the Party. The SS as a component of the Party is to keep up and carry on this establishment [Traeger dieser Einrichtung] as to its organization and personnel.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3387-PS

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, 24 March 1933, Page 1

[Hitler's Speech at second meeting of the Reichstag of 1933, on
23 March 1933, asking for the adoption of the
Enabling Act.]

While the Government is determined to carry through the political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating and insuring prerequisites for a truly religious life. The Government sees in both Christian confessions the most important factors for the maintenance of our folkdom. It will respect agreements concluded between them and the States. However, it expects that its work will meet with a similar appreciation. The Government will treat all other denominations with equal objective justice. It can never condone, though, that belonging to a certain denomination or to a certain race might be regarded as a license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government will devote its care to the sincere living together of Church and State.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3389-P5

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, 29 March 1933, Page 2

[Official announcement by the Arch-Bishop of Cologne, Cardinal Schulte, in behalf of the Bishops' Conference at Fulda, 28 March 1933.]

"The high shepherds of the dioceses of Germany in their dutiful anxiety to keep the Catholic faith pure and to protect the untouchable aims and rights of the Catholic Church have adopted, for profound reasons, during the last years, an oppositional attitude toward the National Socialist movement, through prohibitions and warnings, which was to be in effect as long and as far as those reasons remained valid.

"It must be recognized that there are official and solemn declarations issued by the highest representative of the Reich government—who at the same time is the authoritarian leader of that movement—which acknowledge the inviolability of the teachings of Catholic faith and the unchangeable tasks and rights of the church and which expressly assure the full value of the legal pacts concluded between the various German States [Laender] and the church.

Without lifting the condemnation of certain religious and ethical errors implied in our previous measures, the Episcopate now believes it can entertain the confidence that those prescribed general prohibitions and warnings may not be regarded as necessary any more.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3390-P5

[Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler]

Vienna, 25 Oct., 1937.

Dear Mr. Keppler!

Above all, I want to ask you for a mailing address to which I can from time to time forward a report to you quickly and safely. In my opinion the main problem is that our correspondence has to be handled with strict privacy towards third persons, in so far as depending on the content, the most important personalities are not to be bothered with the reports transmitted. It is contrary to our neutral intentions, that beyond that these letters bear the character of secret reports, because their content is always the result of conversations with the most important authorities and is always covered by the order, which we received from them. I personally should think it most appropriate, if I could in any case write to you at your private mailing address by airmail; I would

have to make sure only that the letters reach you personally and are not opened in the office.

I have had consultations with Zernatto and Schmidt. I have especially informed both gentlemen that the Berlin conference was concerned with the solution of the time factor as well. Both begin to show some understanding of this. The exerting of influence on the Chief might also be undertaken in this direction. I don't think it impossible that the latter's trip, undertaken a short while ago, is somehow connected with these communications. Perhaps one wishes to establish some connection between the time solution and the already existing plans of the Donau solution. In any case, I shall consider it very desirable if the matters per se come to a start in this direction.

I found special understanding for the necessity of a further step of intra-state nature in the fields of economy, the armed forces, and even the press. The gentlemen informed me in very frank discussions that the hindrances partly of a technical, partly of a political nature were extremely great here, but both gentlemen decided to support those propositions of mine, which I discussed with you in regard to this matter. I hope that at least the preparation for a solution of the personnel question can be paved in the military field also. It will also depend here above all on whether or not the negative impression of the last conversation between Gl.H. and the chief, which he held during my absence and about which I reported, has too strong after-effects. The two state secretaries [Staatssekretaere], however, were agreeably impressed by my suggestion to this effect and show a real interest in the continuation of these plans.

The press-matters fall into a larger category [Kombination], which takes time; however I should like to bring up even at this time several items, above all in the field of inner-political agreement.

As far as the question of the preservation of the national substance is concerned, which can thus be solved by way of the exclusion of the discrimination against the Nationals, I have received, in regard to the principle of the matter, important promises from Zer., which now are to be made concrete by means of appropriate formulation and official announcements. Even in this case the only possible line, which becomes ever clearer, lies in that field which we mentioned in our last discussion, just as I believe, that we will arrive at the time solution probably only by way of the "German Front," whereby I refer especially to the supporting framework [tragende Geruest], which, in this connection, also was the subject of our discussion.

Of the details I want to mention the following: Enclosed I am transmitting the copy of a letter from Langoth. I draw our attention especially to the last paragraph. I suggested to Langoth that he admit Schmidt, who is a personal acquaintance and probably a confidant of the captain into legal relief work [Hilfswerk] with the special task of controlling the expenses, i.e. of watching to whom the money goes, how it is used, and how the monopolies are [Regien]. He is also to watch that the relief-work machine does not begin to become politically active and that it does not become a second party-organization. This suggestion on my part has fallen on fertile ground, and can be activated. I don't feel I am able to furnish any better proof of the manner in which I work and in which I view my task than this proposal.

I now ask you to use all your influence toward the end that Langoth actually received S 30,000- [30,000 Schilling] by way of normal remittance. If S 20,000.- are added to that amount, that will certainly be very good, as since the sums are divided accordingly. In our conversation we have referred to the fact, that Langoth, in order to supplement his accounts, could use the means which were promised him by Bk. I have now received a confirmation of the fact, that the inclusion in this manner finds full protection. If Langoth drives out for this purpose, then he will receive an appropriate communication from me with reference to this statement of Bk. I ask you to accomplish if possible, that S 30,000 arrive by way of normal transmittal, that approximately S 20,000.- be brought in by Langroth, and if then the S 20,000.- are added to this, as mentioned here, then this is not to be rejected.

For the sake of completion, I want to report that our host [Unterstandsgeber] at Mondsee, as I hear, after a discussion with the captain, in any case with the latter's consent, is to call at Obersalzberg, in person to cause the SS to be subordinated to the captain's command. Furthermore, that industrialist, who in the affair of Vassenmeyer handed in an indictment, has called in various national economists and requested them to break off all connections with Vassenmeyer, because the latter had severely violated discipline and because proceedings had been initiated.

I have thought over our discussion in the Alpine affair and consider the steps in consideration as answering the purpose.

With the German salute,

Yours very sincerely,

1 Enclosure
 Esteemed
 Mr. Wilhelm Keppler,
 Berlin W 8
 Behrenstrasse 39 a.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3391-PS

[Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler]

Vienna, 30 September, 1938

My Fuehrer

We all are inspired by your solution of the Sudeten Germans question. A year ago, even a few weeks ago, I thought it was impossible that this question could be solved except by using full military force. Not until the last weeks did the directions of your leadership, which for the others is so inexorable and inevitable become apparent. I don't believe that one sane German exists today who does not consider himself more than fortunate if he can help you, my Fuehrer, to finish the job, even though his share in the work, objectively viewed, be very small. We from the Ostmark can hardly contain ourselves because of our twofold happiness and our pride.

The solution of this question and above all the nature of this solution could have been the strongest endurance test and could have made room for further planned action in the direction of the East and the Southeast. My Fuehrer, this letter of mine has actually a different purpose, but first of all I had to give my feelings free play.

I now believe, that after days of greatest strain the time has come again for the consideration of the more beautiful things in life and I beg you now to bring about a decision in regard to the question of the tapestries. I am already annoyed at the fact that men from foreign states were at the Fuehrerbau (Leader's building), at a time when the tapestries were not yet hanging on the walls.

We have in Vienna approximately 700-900 first-class tapestries which are for the most part in depots. We from the Ostmark will be happy and proud, if you, my Fuehrer, decorate your buildings with these tapestries; and it is hard for me, to make even a suggestion concerning the kind and the number. The best thing would be, that we hang up the most beautiful pieces and that you, my Fuehrer, make the selection on the occasion of your next visit to Vienna, which I hope will be soon.

I tried to select a few pieces and I have found two sets. I had pictures made of both. One set treats the history of Decius Mus.; the subject and the size of the tapestries is marked on the back of the pictures. This set is blue-green in tone and subdued in color. It was manufactured according to P. P. Rubens' designs, which can be found even today in the Vienna depots. These tapestries were made in Bruessels in the 17th century. Cross lines can be seen in the pictures. The tapestries were folded up in the

depots. If they are put up, these cross lines will disappear in a few days. The set is composed of 5 pictures and to complete it a sixth picture is added, representing a scene from Emperor Augustus' life, the fight of the Romans against the Germans, in approximately the same style as the Decius Mus. pieces.

The second set shows pictures of the history of Alexander the Great. There are eight tapestries. They are rich in contrast, marvelous in color, mostly red-green. Both sets are intended merely as samples and we don't want in any way to anticipate your decisions, my Fuehrer.

I have given instructions that rooms at the Hofburg, which are vacant because of the overthrow [Umbruch], be rearranged for the display of the collections. The rooms in the new wing of the Hofburg, from the balcony of which you, my Fuehrer, made the announcement about the accomplished return of the Ostmark to the German people, shall serve as display room for the most important parts of the tapestry collection together with a weapons collection which I believe to be equally unique.

I am sure that the harmony of the rooms, tapestries and most carefully selected weapons will form a museumlike exposition, the only one of its kind in the world, and that even Italy has nothing of the kind to compare with it. Excellent cellars, which I fixed up as rooms for protection against air raids for those and similar valuables are available in this building.

With this letter, I ask you, my Fuehrer, to consider the question of the furnishing of your Fuehrer-buildings with the Viennese tapestry collection as ready for a speedy solution and execution.

Heil, my Fuehrer

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3392-PS

[Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler]

Dr.S/K

3 Sept 1937

Require!

My Dear Mr. Keppler!

It is appropriate in my opinion that you, my dear Mr. Keppler, should remain well informed about details arising from between the action taken by me and the Teinfaltstrasse. In this respect I am keeping the result of the discussion at Mondsee in mind, and I am taking the thoughts of your last communication to heart. I therefore do not take any stand in regard to these individual incidents and above all I avoid any one reaction, insofar

as I do not request Dr. Jury to initiate a corresponding clarification.

I take it upon myself to transmit the edition of the "Austrian Observer" [Oesterreichischen Beobachters] of August as an enclosure, and draw your attention to the leading article "Here and There" whose contents probably are intended to be only personal and not objective, anymore.

I refer to the communication—Hitler "Mein Kampf" permitted!—and believe that I will not have to add anything here, since you are acquainted with the individual incidents which have occurred on the Saturday in question.

Finally I turn back to the report "Law for the Protection of Order" [Ordnungsschutzgesetz]. In this case the matter stands as follows. Minister Glaise has attempted to incorporate the emergency decrees [Not verordnungen] into a useful system ever since the first moment of his taking office, and to decrease them to a reasonable extent. When he came with his suggestion, Neustaedter-Stuermer, the comrade-in-arms of the Teinfaltstrasse, had a draft prepared by the Chief Management [Generaldirektion], which can only be considered as an aggravation of the conditions at that time, and which in the meantime has been overcome by the Law for the "Protection of Order" [Ordnungsschutzgesetz]. Minister Glaise, then had in turn, a counter-draft prepared by Dr. Mannlicher. In view of the resistance on the part of the Chief Management [Generaldirektion], the chances of the latter's success were little. In early April, when the Federal Chancellor [Bundeskanzler] was negotiating with me about the Bureau [Referat], I on my part made the condition that the draft by Mannlicher was to become the basis of the innovation. The Federal Chancellor [Bundeskanzler] accepted this request and negotiations took place on this basis. When finally nothing came of the Bureau [Referat] and the exchange of ministers took place, the Chief Management [Generaldirektion] again introduced its own suggestion, which did not contain anything new except the lessening of the extent of punishment and the introduction of the right of appeal. Dr. Mannlicher was full of despair because of the continuation of this action. In a renewed conference with the Federal Chancellor [Bundeskanzler] I insisted that the proposition by Mannlicher be accepted finally as the sole basis of the innovation, and that the latter be drawn to a close. Further negotiations on this basis led to an agreement between Minister Glaise, [and] Dr. Skubl under consultation of Dr. Mannlicher. After that I talked to the latter, who remarked that it would be

practical to add some further additions to the draft, which however, in view of the final conversation was considered hopeless by him. I now addressed a communication to the Federal Chancellor [Bundeskanzler], requesting that four (4) more additions to the draft which had already been discussed and in particular concerning the possibilities of appeal and complaints to the Federal Court [Bundesgericht] in cases of detention over a period of 3 months, the preservation of the secrecy of letters under normal conditions [Ordnungszustand], the rescission of the same under more acute conditions only in the course of criminal-procedure, etc.

The Federal Chancellor [Bunderkanzler] took up this suggestion, read my letter in the Council of Ministers [Ministerrat] and these additions were incorporated into the "Law for the Protection of Order" [Ordnungsschutzgesetz]. After the Welser incidents on the occasion of the conference at St. Gilgen, influences which called for the postponement of the publication of the "Law for the Protection of Order" until autumn, were predominant and the chancellor promised me to announce the law on approximately the 20 August 1937. And this actually happened.

My cooperation in the re-admittance of the book "Mein Kampf" and in the legislation of the "Law for the Protection of Order" is known to the Teinfaltstrasse: even though not in all its details. I cannot suppose that a responsibility for the incorrect contents of the "Observer" [Beobachter] should be refuted since in this case it would already have to deal with the defects of character mentioned by you.

In the meantime an order has been transmitted to Ing. Reinthaller to the effect, that the latter was not to call any meetings of the peasant-leaders without agreement of the political leadership and without consulting the same, and furthermore that the economic machine which is at the peasantry's disposal, and which in this case only deals with privately-owned economic institutions, as for example sales stores, etc., was to route its correspondence through official channels, only, in this case by way of the Bureau of the political organization or the Teinfaltstrasse.

My stand in this matter is clear. In the sense of keeping the action separate, orders are out of question in order to avoid self-reproach of having played two sides. I favor "sounding out" the situation [Fuehlungnahme] in order to remove misunderstandings if possible, and have recommended corresponding agreement on point 1 with Ing. Reinthaller. However, it is in no way possible to invite officials of the political leadership to

these conferences. That would be equal to the end of all these actions.

The request to route all correspondence of privately-owned economic institutions through the required channels is essentially and politically impossible.

This matter happens to be somewhat urgent. Leaflets are being circulated here with a strong stand against Ing. Reinthaller. I therefore ask you, my dear Mr. Keppler, for your point of view, and that, perhaps, in the nature of a telegram to Ing. Reinthaller, in which you acknowledge these statements and give expression to your consent.

One party-exclusion, which has already taken place is to be followed by others, whereby, in my opinion a separation line will be drawn with just that result, which causes the most worry to the Teinfaltstrasse.

In this connection I want to touch on the question of the "Vienna Latest News" [Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten]. I am not certain if the order in the last "Austrian Observer" [Oesterreichischen Beobachter] will have the intended success, but I understand that the paper's situation is extraordinarily difficult. It seems to have run out of money. Instead the commissioner and an acting Editor-in-chief are still there. At the time I have discussed in detail the question of the "Vienna Latest News" [Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten] in a conversation with Secretary of State [Staatsekretaer] Zernatte and found him willing in principle to join this paper to my action. It would now be necessary to receive corresponding information from the source acquainted with the financial condition [Ossa]. I suggest that the man considered for this be designated to me, as well as the possibilities of a discussion and I shall see to it that a corresponding trusted person will appear at these talks.

I request that the before-mentioned be acknowledged, and sign, remaining respectively,

with the German salute,
obediently,

P.S. Just now Ing. Reinthaller has informed me of orders and directives, which have just reached him. The bearer of this will take it upon himself to transmit them orally. In view of these circumstances the continuation of the action appears hardly possible without leading to very severe conflicts. I can take the responsibility for these only if the line discussed at Salzburg and

Mondsee is clear and safe-guarded. I therefore leave it to your consideration, if the moment of your personal intervention has not arrived.

D.O.

Mr. Wilhelm Keppler, Esq.
 Berlin W. 8
 Behrenstrasse Nr 39 a.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3395-PS

[Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler]

Most honored Mr. Keppler,

Thanks very much for your kind letter. I heard to my great satisfaction that you were able to hold the contemplated conferences and that you are satisfied with their results. I am especially happy to know that you are coming here on the 10th of this month. I would like to have a thorough discussion about the situation and ask you therefore, when you are in Vienna to join me for a simple supper in Dernbach, to which I am also going to invite Dr. Jury and Dr. Rainer. I believe that many things could be clarified and arranged in a subsequent discussion among us four. You don't write if Dr. Veessenmayer is coming along. If you bring him with you, he will of course be very welcome. When I last spoke to St.S.Schmidt, he expressed the desire to see you again when you come to Vienna. I would consider this very appropriate because a number of things are taking place about which one should get as much elucidation as possible. More about it orally. I believe however that those projects which take into consideration [translator's note: verb missing] an organization of the Danube territory [Donauraum] with the announced intention of negotiating matters with the Reich afterwards, are being fervently discussed with our immediate neighbors and are perhaps making some progress. I believe these intentions to be exceptionally interesting. In some way they may lead to new arrangements.

In the matter Alpine, vice president Eisenstock is going to Berlin tomorrow, Wednesday, to discuss the most urgent matters with Voegler. Some unrest seems to prevail here. I think it suitable not to have any prejudice during this conversation. I believe I should recommend urgently not to touch the question of the personnel section [Personal-referat] either in higher circles or directly. This should rather result from a new distribution of authority at the board of directors [Vorstand], which is frequently examined for technical reasons and will certainly

meet with the agreement of several gentlemen here, especially in connection with a transfer of the chief office [Zentrale] into the center of the factories. An idea which, as I hear, has been generally approved and put into execution by all industries within the Reich. In this connection some other matters, which encounter the greatest resistance if treated separately, especially the direction of personnel department and personnel section [Personal-referat] may be arranged at the same time.

The decision with regard to the different managers, of which one may be objectionable altogether, another partly, which have to be considered from the Reich—does not belong to the group of questions for which I recommended some caution. It should not be kept secret that this circumstance represents a heavy burden. For if the Reich compromises with this fact at least to a certain extent for the time being it represents a preliminary service which will permit a demand for certain compensation. In my opinion this latter fact could be stressed during the Berlin conferences, but should be mentioned as a situation the initiative for which apparently exists only in the Reich.

In the meantime, I remain very respectfully

Yours

Personal
Express
To the Hon. Mr. Wilhelm Keppler
Berlin-Charlottenburg
Ahornallee 34/35

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3396-PS

[Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Jury]

Vienna, on the 11th November

Dr. S/K

Dear Doctor!

Conversations carried on with Mr. Keppler today in complete quiet, were also extremely revealing. However, I don't believe that the matters have as yet been so fully investigated, as it seems to be the case on the National side and in the Reich; still I believe, that the future development, as long as unusual circumstances do not enter, are already beginning to become apparent. I should be pleasantly surprised, if initial solution were to take place here in the course of this year; I personally believe, that there will be no visible results until early next year. In the meantime, I have received an authentic report from Linz, that the well-known article in the "Tagespost" is not an official article

[Pflichtartikel] of the V.E. Please control your informants, whose reports are undoubtedly incorrect—I hope not incorrect to the extent of being prejudiced. The article is in a class of its own. I believe also, that this information is not entirely correct and I continue to be of this opinion.

I request you now in regard to the question of the “Volksbund” also to speak on the basis of the statements submitted to you, to the persons in authority, since this matter is in a certain sense urgent. At the beginning of next week anyhow we must see a result.

With the best wishes, I remain

Yours truly

Esteemed
Dr. Hugo Jury
St. Poelten, Wienerstrasse

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3397-PS

Berlin, 8 January, 1938

To State Councillor Dr. Seyss-Inquart
Vienna, Hof 5.
Through the Foreign Office

Very esteemed State Councillor.

Today I had a visit from Mr. Pl., who gave us a report of the state of affairs and informed us, that you are seriously considering the question of whether or not you are forced, to hand back the mandate entrusted to you.

I informed General [Generaloberst] Goering of the situation in writing, and G. has just had me informed, that I should try my utmost to prevent you or any one else from taking this step. This is also in the same vein as G.'s conversation with Dr. J. before Christmas at any rate. G. requests you to undertake nothing of this nature under any circumstances before he himself has the opportunity of speaking with you once more.

I can also inform you, that G. is furthermore making an effort to speak to Ll., in order that certain improper conditions be eliminated by him.

I am very sorry, that the situation has become so acute and I myself have the feeling, that the above-mentioned request is somewhat awkward for you at the present. However, I must tell you openly, that I really didn't expect any other attitude from G.

With the best wishes,

very truly yours
(sig.) KEPPLER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3398-PS

Vienna, 4 November, 1939

REICH FUEHRER!

A short time ago I asked you to bring about a settlement in the matter Buerkel. A new occurrence confirms me in my attitude and I therefore repeat my request.

When I was in Lodz, I was informed that a telegram from a secretary of Buerkel, named Trum, had arrived in Krakau in which I was requested to contact the Gauleiter instead of the Mayor of the city of Vienna in the future. The content of the telegram was completely unclear to me and I had Dr. Langoth of my staff ask Trum. Trum informed Langoth that Gauleiter Buerkel had intended to deport Viennese Jews to Poland, but that I had prevented this. Gauleiter Buerkel had added the remark that I (Seyss-Inquart) should not confuse personal and official matters.

I must protest most strongly against this supposition and therefore feel forced to demand the clearing up of the matter Buerkel, because I do not doubt but that he (Buerkel) will make similar remarks to other persons in order to create, in the way which I now know to be characteristic of him, the proper atmosphere.

To the subject itself I add that an expert [Referent] in Krakau informed me of the intention of deporting Jews from the Protectorate as well as from Vienna to Poland. Thereupon I gave instructions that such actions could be carried out only in agreement with the SD and through the SD, and that I could not permit wild actions.

I have also given such instructions to the Streckenbach's in deputy in Krakau or already to Harster.

I repeat my initial request and remain with a

Heil Hitler!

Your always obedient

(signed) Dr. SEYSS-INQUART

To the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police

Reich Leader HEINRICH HIMMLER,

Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albert-Strasse Nr.9

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3399-PS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Robert M.W. Kempner, as expert Consultant of the War Department appeared before the undersigned attesting officer and having been duly sworn stated as follows:

In the summer of 1930, when I was legal counsellor of the Police Division of the Prussian Ministry of Interior, I was officially

notified that the then Minister of the Interior of Thuringia, Wilhelm Frick, identical with the defendant Wilhelm Frick in Nurnberg, made attempts, by misusing his own official position, to secure a fraudulent naturalization for the then stateless Adolf Hitler.

As Minister of the Interior of Thuringia, Frick had jurisdiction to appoint civil servants. Such an appointment would have conferred automatically German citizenship to the appointee according to the German Citizenship Law of 1913, which was then in force.

The National Socialist Minister, Frick, together with other officials of his ministry took at that time the preparatory steps in order to secure German citizenship for the Party Leader, Adolf Hitler. This act was fraudulent because Frick himself and Hitler knew that the latter was not supposed to perform any functions of the office to which he was to be appointed, but that the whole maneuver was only done in order to naturalize Hitler and thus enable him to run for high office in Germany.

When this matter became officially known to the undersigned and his superior it was decided to intervene officially and to prevent the fraudulent appointment, by making these plans public. This was done and Frick did not succeed with his project.

Only a considerable time later the National Socialist Ministry of the German State of Brunswick succeeded in naturalizing Hitler by appointing him to the position of a government counsellor of the State of Brunswick, attaching him to the Legation of the State of Brunswick in Berlin. The importance of this whole maneuver became apparent when immediately thereafter the newly naturalized Hitler became able to run for the office of Reichs-President.

[signed] Robert M.W. Kempner
ROBERT M.W. KEMPNER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of December
1945

[signed] Norman A. Stoll
NORMAN A. STOLL
Captain, JAGD

Memorial about the meeting of 28 December 1918
[Found in the personal files of Seyss-Inquart.]

Place: Vienna I. Am Hof 5.

Present: The Organizers.

After thorough discussion of the available drafts those present agree to immediately take in hand the constitution of the planned Organization.

The name chosen is "Deutsche Gemeinschaft" ("German Association").

The present are in agreement regarding the following principles of the organization:

1. The *aim of the organization* is to liberate the German People from Jewish influences [written in: i.g. to fight Judaism with all suitable means].

2. *The organization is to be secret.* However, since it cannot be avoided that the organization comes forward publicly, this will have to be done under the pretense of harmless aims without making known its actual institutions.

3. The Association is split up into several *degrees*, of which the lower ones are subordinated to the higher ones. Their number and their sphere of activities is to be fixed at a later date.

4. In the lower degrees the Association is split up into individual *Subassociations* which in order to more easily draw into the Association politically like-minded people and in order to obtain increased effectiveness, may be politically colored but may also be neutral. The formation of such Subassociations in one and the same locality is not limited, but depends only upon the sanction of the leadership of the Association.

5. As members can only be accepted such people who are Germans, not Freemasons, and who are of Aryan descent and are not married to a Jewess and who make a vow the wording of which is to be determined.

The decision regarding admission to membership, which is always to take place in the lowest (1.) degree, rests with the Association. In case of compliance with requirements, which are still to be established promotion into a higher degree may take place.

6. All members are bound

- a. to secrecy regarding all institutions, persons and the aims of the Association not made known to the outside, as well as to the happenings inside the same. This applies as well to outsiders as towards members of the lower degrees;

- b. to obedience towards the instructions of organs to be appointed;
- c. to further the aims of the Association and to mutually support its members.

For further accomplishment the following has been decided upon:

The further founders of the Association represent the highest degree. They will create further degrees from those becoming members in the future, and will extend the highest degree.

Until the fixing of competence for decision concerning applications for membership, a unanimous vote of the founding members is to take place in resolutions regarding this question. They will also determine future institutions of the organization, insofar as they have not yet been stated above.

New Members will be admitted for the time being solely in the lowest (1st) degree of the Association, without more specific regulations by a Subassociation. Only after a greater number of members have been admitted will a splitting up into politically colored subassociations and the constitution of the remaining members of the 1st degree into neutral subassociations take place.

The present members are entitled to solicit members. The recruits, if suitable, may be informed:

that the Association is an organization for the protection of Aryan interests against Judaism, and has for its purpose the mutual advancement of its members,

that all members are bound to secrecy, to obedience and to furtherance of the aims, particularly to support of the other members (in the sense of Par. 6),

that the Association is a secret organization, the institutions of which are always only partially known even to its members, and that qualified organs are called upon to issue instructions.

that annual membership dues are to be paid, the amount of which is to be decided by the leadership,

that only applications can be accepted, but the decision regarding admission will have to be reserved,

that condition of admission must be non-Jewish descent, the applicant must not be married to a Jewess, must not be a Freemason, but a German, and by a solemn promise must admit conformity to these requirements and that he must vow to fulfill the above mentioned obligations.

It is not permissible to mention the names of members when applying for membership, nor is the admitted person authorized to inform third parties of those facts made known to him.

The person who summoned the meeting is charged with the drafting of the vow from membership admission into the lowest and highest degrees.

At the next meeting those present will on their part give the vow.

Next meeting to take place on Thursday, January 2, 1919.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3401-PS

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, May 24, 1934, Page 2

National Socialism and German Nationalism Abroad

NATIONAL SOCIALISM IS AN IDEOLOGY

It takes hold of our fellow Germans and strengthens them in holding fast to the German nature and customs.

It spreads out beyond the borders of the state and even beyond the space occupied by the German people; it has already taken hold of parts of foreign nations. Racially conscious communities on the earth which are proud of their type are the best guarantee of respect among the nations for each other's rights. National Socialism Renovates the World's Thought on the Subject of State and Nation, and thus will bring to our fellow Germans, too, in their difficult struggle, not only alleviation, but Salvation.

The place for the practical application of this principle is the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP which is directly subordinate to the deputy of the Fuehrer, Reichminister Rudolph Hess. During a visit to the individual sections of the Organization of- fice at Harvestehuderweg 22, its leader, Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, gave us, together with his individual co-workers, a survey of the duties and structure of the Foreign Organization, which has been working so hard in recent weeks and months that the echo of this persistent and conscientious work could even be clearly heard in Hamburg. The work of the Foreign Organization is literally extended over the entire earth, and the following slogan could with full justice be displayed in its work rooms on the Harvestehuder Weg in Hamburg: "My field is the world."

The Foreign Organization, under the leadership of Gauleiter E. W. Bohle, who is aided by a large staff of expert and qualified co-workers, today includes Over 350 National Groups and Bases of the NSDAP in All Parts of the World and in addition to this takes care of a large number of individual Party Comrades in the most varied places. The establishment abroad of local groups of

a Reich German political party was doubtless something new. It was possible to achieve such a beginning because of the fact that, since its beginning, this political party has had nothing in common with the usual concept of a party, but was rather a movement in the best sense of the world. In this connection it is worth noting that National Socialism began to establish its Foreign Organization almost two years before the seizure of power in the home-land, while Fascism did not set up its corresponding organization abroad until several years after the march on Rome. Just as today the *fascio all'estero* signifies the strongest asset of the Fascist state in its foreign work, the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP will have to pass through a corresponding further development, in order to transmit to all foreign countries the nature and goal of the National Socialist Reich.

Objection is frequently made that for decades there have existed in foreign countries German organizations of the most varied types, which make the presence of local groups of the National Socialist movement superfluous. This can best be refuted by the experiences which Germanism abroad had had so far since the National Socialist revolution. Without in the least wishing to detract from the value of many valuable organizations of Germans abroad, it must be unequivocally stated that these groups were not in a position to carry on successfully the struggle for the reputation of the present Germany just because of the fact that they lacked an emotional understanding of the Third Reich, just as they lacked a knowledge of the principles on which our present state is built.

(Additional articles to follow)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3418-PS

THE ARCHIVE [Das Archiv] Jan 1935, reference book for Politics Economy-Culture, edited by Alfred Ingemar Berndt, assisted by Ernest Jaenicke. Publisher: Otto Stollberg/Berlin W 9, Page 1605.

If international finance—Jewry inside and outside Europe should succeed in throwing the nations into another *World War*, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and thus the victory of Jewry, but the *destruction of the Jewish race in Europe!*

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3419-PS

THE PARTY CONGRESS OF FREEDOM
[Der Parteitag Der Freiheit], Central Publishing House
of the NSDAP, Munich 1936, Pages 258-259.

I now suggest to the Reichstag the acceptance of those laws which Party member Goering will read to you.

The first and second laws fulfill the program of the National Socialist Party in one important respect, and thereby pay a *debt of gratitude to the Movement* under whose symbol Germany has regained her freedom.

The second law constitutes an attempt to solve by legislation a problem, the final solution of which, if it should again fail, will then have to be referred by law to the National Socialist Party. All three laws are backed by the National Socialist Party and with it and behind it stands the German Nation.

I ask you to accept these laws.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3420-PS

Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 2
PW INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

No. 2/20

19 December 1944

Address Briefs and Requests to HQ, FID, MIS, APO 887

Extract

13. *Concentration Camp, Buchenwald.*

Preamble. The author of this account is PW Andreas Pfaffenberger, 1 Coy, 9 Landesschuetzen Bn. 43 years old and of limited education, he is a butcher by trade. The substantial agreement of the details of his story with those found in PWIS (H)/LF/736 establishes the validity of his testimony.

PW has not been questioned on statements which, in the light of what is known, are apparently erroneous in certain details, nor has any effort been made to alter the subjective character of PW's account, which he wrote without being told anything of the intelligence already known. Results of interrogation on personalities at Buchenwald have already been published (PWIB No. 2/12 Item 31).

* * * * *

In 1939, all prisoners with tattooing on them were ordered to report to the dispensary. No one knew what the purpose was. But after the tattooed prisoners had been examined, the ones with the best and most artistic specimens were kept in the dispensary, and then killed by injections, administered by Karl Beigs, a criminal prisoner. The corpses were then turned over

to the pathological department, where the desired pieces of tattooed skin were detached from the bodies and treated. The finished products were turned over to SS Standartenfuehrer Koch's wife, who had them fashioned into lampshades and other ornamental household articles. I myself saw such tattooed skins with various designs and legends on them, such as "Hans'l und Gret'l", which one prisoner had had on his knee, and ships from prisoners' chests. This work was done by a prisoner named Wernerbach.

There I also saw the shrunken heads of two young Poles who had been hanged for having had relations with German girls. The heads were the size of a fist, and the hair and the marks of the rope were still there.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3421-PS

**OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY**

16 November 1945.

CERTIFICATE

I, George C. Demas, Lieut., USNR, associated with the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, hereby certify that the attached exhibit, consisting of parchment, was delivered by the War Crimes Section, Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army, to me in my above capacity, in the usual course of official business, as an exhibit found in Buchenwald Camp and captured by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

NAME [Signed] George C. Demas
RANK Lieutenant, USNR
FILE NO. 301973

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3423-PS

**SEVENTH MEDICAL LABORATORY
APO 403, c/o PM, NEW YORK, N. Y.**

Section of Pathology 25 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Identification of Tattooed Skin Hides

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, Third U.S. Army)
(ATTN: JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL)

1. There were submitted to this laboratory section for examination three tanned pieces of skin by Lt. Col. Givin from Buchenwald Camp with office record designation of Case 81 T.J.A.

2. The description follows:

GROSS: Specimen consists of three pieces of skin, labeled A.B.C.
PIECE A: Measures 13x13 cm., is transparent and shows a woman's head in the center and a sailor with an anchor near the margin.

PIECE B: Measures 14x13 cm., is transparent and is a tattoo of several anchors resting on an indefinite black mass. To the right of this mass is a man's head.

PIECE C: Is truncated, measures 44 cm. at the base. The upper portion is 30 cm. long and the sides measure 46 cm. The skin is transparent and shows two nipples in the upper area. These are 16 cm. apart. From the nipple level to the umbilicus is 23½ cm. A large bird, with a wingspread measuring 28 cm., is present in the center of the skin, upper part. A black dragon, with fire coming from the mouth, measures 28 cm. in length and is present in the center of the skin. To the left of the dragon is a man in a coat of mail, with a sword being apparently stuck in the dragon. Man is approximately 22 cm. in length.

MICROSCOPIC: The tissue consists of bundles of collagen showing occasional epithelial and sweat gland remnants. Granular black pigment granules are seen between some of the bundles.

3. Based on the findings in paragraph 2, all three specimens are tattooed human skin.

For the Commanding Officer,

[signed] REUBEN CARES

Reuben Cares

Major M.C., Chief of pathology

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3425-PS

Dr. ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART

Nurnberg, 10.12.1945

I am a lawyer by profession. I passed my final examinations in law and received my Doctor Jurist degree in 1917. At that time I was serving as a commissioned officer in a Tyrolean Imperial [Kaiserjaeger] regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Army, in which I served from 1914 to 1918 in World War I. In 1921 I began my legal practice as lawyer in Vienna, Austria, where I finally built up a large clientele, including industrialists and Jews. I continued to practice my profession in Vienna until I was appointed Minister of Interior and Security of Austria on 16 February 1938.

In 1918 I became interested in the "Anschluss" of Austria with Germany. From that year on I worked, planned and collaborated

with others of a like mind to bring about a union of Austria with Germany. It was my desire to effect this union of the two countries in an evolutionary manner and by legal means. Among my Austrian collaborators were Dr. Neubacher, City Councilor Speiser, the University Professor Hughlmann and Dr. Wilhelm Bauer, Prof. Wettstein, and others. Later, during the rise of National Socialism, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, Dr. Jury, Glaise-Horstenau, Maj. Klausner, Dr. Muehlmann, Globotschnigg and others. I supported also the National Socialist party as long as it was legal, because it declared itself with particular determination in favor of the anschluss. From 1932 onwards I made financial contributions to this party, but I discontinued financial support when it was declared illegal in 1934. From July 1934 until the year 1936 I supported individual National Socialists as lawyer and in collaboration with the Welfare Work Langoth in Linz. From July 1936 onwards I endeavoured to help the National Socialists to regain their legal status and finally to participate in the Austrian government. During this time, particularly after the Party was forbidden in July 1934, I knew that the radical element of the party was engaged in terroristic activities, such as attacks on railroads, bridges, telephone communications, etc. I knew that the governments of both Chancellors Dolfuss and Schuschnigg, although they held the same total German viewpoint in principle, were opposed to the anschluss then because of the National Socialist regime in the Reich. I was sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and corresponding influence, because they were in favor of the Anschluss.

On the day of the unsuccessful "putsch", 25 July 1934, I was at my home in Stannern, near Iglau, Czecho-Slovakia. I learned later that the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on that day was the outcome of a "putsch" plan, in which SS circles were mainly involved, to arrest the Chancellor and put in an Austrian government with National Socialist participation. Eight or ten days before this unsuccessful "putsch" Chancellor Dolfuss sent for me. We discussed the disturbances and troubled state of affairs created in Austria by the radical element of the Austrian National Socialists. I advised Chancellor Dolfuss to make an arrangement with Hitler because the Austrian National Socialists and even this radical element would obey Hitler's orders. I conjectured—later I found confirmation—that these terroristic activities had a certain support from the Reich. Chancellor Dolfuss told me he would think the matter over and made a tentative future appointment for a further discussion. I informed other acquaintances whom

I knew had influence among the Austrian National Socialists, of this conversation. About one week later the Chancellor informed me that at the moment he had no time for further discussion. Without advising anyone I returned to my home.

Before the Anschluss I worked for the legal, political activities of the Austrian National Socialists under the conditions laid down in the Austrian constitution.

On 10 March 1938 I suggested to Chancellor Schuschnigg as a solution to the difficulties resulting from his plebiscite plan, that the National Socialists be appointed to the Cabinet, after I became, in May 1937, State Councillor and then on 16.2.1938 Minister of Interior and Security. After I became State Councillor I discussed several times with von Papen, the German ambassador, the possibilities of an understanding between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists, respectively the Reich. We did not talk of the anschluss as an actual program. However, we were both of the opinion that a successful understanding would bring about in the course of time the anschluss by evolutionary means in some form. The last time I spoke to von Papen was in January 1938 in Garmisch, where I met him by chance.

My appointment as State Councillor was the result of an agreement between Austria and Germany on 11.7.1936. My appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security was one of the results of the conference between Chancellor Schuschnigg and Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Dr. Muehlmann was also at Berchtesgaden, but not as a member of Schuschnigg's delegation. The Austrian National Socialists must certainly have taken my appointment as Minister of Interior and Security as an indication of their right to activity, still more, however, the contents of the agreement of 12.2.1938, allowed them to demonstrate their convictions. This right they utilized in more and more widespread demonstrations.

After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm Keppler, the German Secretary of State for Austrian affairs, arranged a visit for me with Hess and Goering. I explained my intentions and plans to them, namely the attainment of legal activity for the Austrian National Socialists, independent of the Reich party. Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other things: he regretted that I was not one of the original "old fighters". I believe that at that time Goering had already established direct connections with the Austrian State Secretary, Guido Schmid.

After my appointment as Minister of Interior and Security of Austria I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived in Berlin on

17.2.1938 where I was met by Keppler who took me to Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my program. Himmler wanted to talk over police matters, I informed him, however, that I was not conversant to speak about them. I did not follow the suggestions which he made. I greeted Hitler with raised hand—permissible after the agreement of 12.2.—advised him, however, immediately that as Austrian Minister my responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler my plans, namely: I had to be the living guarantee for Dr. Schuschnigg of the evolutionary way. The Austrian National Socialists must only conduct their activities according to the Austrian constitution and on those lines find their way to the Reich; they must not make any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle. The leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must be independent of the Reich and remain responsible to Austria. I would have as Minister of Security to oppose any kind of illegal activity. Against this the Austrian National Socialists would be permitted full freedom of activity to work for the closest co-operation of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my plans but expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would be willing to go so far. During my conference with Hitler, Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room of Hitler's office. Upon my return to Vienna I reported to Chancellor Schuschnigg the content of my discussion and begged him to make a decision about the Austrian National Socialist question. Then I attended rallies of the Austrian National Socialists, to inform them of the content of my conference with Hitler. This occurred with the knowledge of Chancellor Schuschnigg and Minister Zernatto principally in Graz and Linz. The Linz address was broadcast over the Austrian radio on 5.3.1928.

Chancellor Schuschnigg thereafter planned to hold a plebiscite on Austrian independence. I wrote a letter to Chancellor Schuschnigg and objected to the plebiscite because the way in which it was to be carried out would not allow the Austrian people to express their real desires. A copy of my letter to Chancellor Schuschnigg I gave to the National Socialist leaders according to the agreement of 12.2.1938 which made me liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists, respectively the Reich. This copy was given to Hitler in Berlin by Globotschnigg. I conferred with Chancellor Schuschnigg especially on 10.3. in the evening, and we were near to reaching a solution for overcoming the difficulties which had arisen. Thereupon I went to the Hotel "Regina", where I had been told Klausner was, to inform him of the result of my conversation with Schuschnigg. There I found 8-12 National Social-

ists, some of whom I knew. Klausner, Dr. Rainer and Globot-schnigg had a conversation in an adjoining room in which I did not take part, and about the substance of which I was not informed. When Klausner came in I wanted to advise him of the substance of my conversation with Chancellor Schuschnigg. Klausner showed little interest, and informed me that the Reich had rejected the plebiscite and that I should receive on the morrow a letter from Hitler which would inform me more exactly of the situation. He requested those present to be available the next day.

Glaise-Horstenau arrived early on 11.3 in Vienna by plane and informed me that Berlin was greatly excited and that military steps were in preparation. I received Hitler's letter by courier. It contained rejection of the plebiscite and demanded its postponement and a modified procedure. There were several erroneous statements in the letter which I corrected in my conference with the Chancellor. Further, Hitler gave expression to his belief that there would be disturbances in Austria if Dr. Schuschnigg did not relent, and that the Reich was prepared to come to the help of Austria if Austria demanded so. At 10 o'clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I went to the Bundes Chancellery and conferred for about two hours with Dr. Schuschnigg. We told him of all that we knew, particularly about the possibility of disturbances and preparations by the Reich. The Chancellor said that he would give his decision by 1400 hours. While I was with Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg I was repeatedly called to the telephone to speak to Goering. He informed me, (the demands of the Reich steadily increasing) that the agreement of 12.2. had been cancelled, and demanded Dr. Schuschnigg's resignation and my appointment as Chancellor. I delivered this information verbally to Dr. Schuschnigg and withdrew from the conference.

In the meantime Keppler arrived from Berlin and had a conference in the Bundes Chancellery, I believe also with President Miklas. The latter refused to concede to the demands and sought to find various other solutions. When Keppler arrived from Berlin he showed me the contents of a telegram which I, as leader of the provisional Austrian government was to send to Hitler in which I was to request sending of German troops to Austria to put down disorders. I refused as I did not want to establish myself as head of a provisional government, and there were no disorders in Austria. Keppler repeatedly urged me about the telegram. Around 6 p.m. I told him that he knew my standpoint and should do what he wished with Berlin. Keppler, as I have been able to confirm

from records available, understood my answer and did not send off the telegram at that time. Around 7.30 p.m. a frontier police post announced that German troops were crossing the frontier. Thereupon Dr. Schuschnigg gave his well-known farewell speech over the radio. Upon requests from various sides I followed with a speech over the radio, stating that I was still functioning as Minister of Interior and Security, requesting preservation of peace and order, and gave directions that no resistance should be offered the German troops.

As I am able to gather from the records available, I was again requested around 10 p.m. to give my sanction to another somewhat altered telegram, about which I informed President Miklas and Dr. Schuschnigg. Finally President Miklas appointed me Chancellor and a little while later he approved my list of proposed ministers.

During the morning of 12 March I had a telephone conversation with Hitler in which I suggested that while German troops were entering Austria, Austrian troops as a symbol should march into the Reich. Hitler agreed to this suggestion and we agreed to meet in Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same day. I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in Vienna from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall, and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain was now inoperative. On 13 March President Miklas resigned without any specific request from me and the function of Bund President became mine, according to the constitution. Before his resignation President Miklas had appointed Kaltenbrunner to State Secretary for Security. During the course of the day (13 March) the Reuniting Law was adopted in the Austrian Ministry Council; this adoption was constitutionally legal according to the law of 1.5.1934. I then drove to Linz and reported to Hitler regarding the adoption of the anchluss law. At a public demonstration on 15.3 in Vienna he introduced me as "Reich Statthalter for Austria." Hitler put me in charge of the Civil Administration of Austria, while political matters were to be handled by Gauleiter Buerckel. After a short time Buerckel was made Reich Commissar for the Anschluss, to whose directions I, in the Civil Administration, was obligated.

I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the German Reich had come at last after so many vain endeavours since 1918, because I was in favour of the anchluss of Austria with the Reich under any conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of the harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I was of the

3425-PS

opinion that these two German countries belonged together and that the German people should solve their own internal affairs and difficulties. I was convinced that the harshness of the National Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of the national aim—cancellation of discriminatory peace treaties and achievement of the right of self-determination—would in time be overcome.

[signed] Seyss-Inquart.

Nurnberg, 10 December 1945.

[signed] Dr. Gustav Steinbauer
Witness of the signature.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3427-PS

THE GERMAN POLICE

[Die Deutsche Polizei], 15 February 1943.

SS-Gruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner appointed Chief of the Security Police and of the SD.

Berlin, 30 January 1943

Upon suggestion of the Reichfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police, the Fuehrer has appointed SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Major General of Police Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and of the SD as successor of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of Police Reinhard Heydrich, who passed away 4 June 1942.

SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was up to the present active as Fuehrer of the SS-Oberabschnitt Donau (SS Region Danube) and as Superior SS and Police Fuehrer with the Reich Governors [Reichsstatthalter] in Vienna, Lower Danube and Upper Danube.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3428-PS

SECRET

Department II a No 2407/428

Seal

Eagle Swastika

Minsk, on July 31, 1942

The Commissioner General for white Ruthenia

Dept. Regional leader /G 507/42 g

To Reich Commissioner for the East Land

Regional leader Hinrich Lohse

Riga Fs 10/8/42 rec.

The Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territory

Journal No 1122/42

Secret

Seal of Reich Commissioner Ostland Chief dept.

7 August 1942.

II pol. II adm.

Re: *Combating of Partisans and action against Jews in the District General of White Ruthenia.*

In all the clashes with partisans in White Ruthenia it has been proven the Jewry, in the former Polish section as well as in the former Soviet sections of the District General, together with the Polish movement of resistance in the East and the Red Guards from Moscow, is the main bearer of the partisan movement in the East. In consequence, the treatment of Jewry in White Ruthenia, in view of the endangering of the entire economics, is a matter of political prominence, which should in consequence not be solved only according to an economic, but also according to a political viewpoint. In exhaustive discussions with the SS Brigadier General Zenner and the exceedingly capable Leader of the SD, SS lieutenant Colonel Dr. jur. Strauch, we have liquidated in the last ten weeks about 55,000 Jews in White Ruthenia. In the territory Minsk-Land [county] Jewry has been completely eliminated, without endangering the manpower commitment. In the predominantly Polish territory Lida 16,000 Jews, in Zlonin 8,000 Jews, and so forth, have been liquidated. Owing to an encroachment in the army rear zone, already reported thither, the preparations made by us for liquidation of the Jews in the area Glebokie, have been disturbed. The army rear zone, without contacting me, has liquidated 10,000 Jews, whose systematical elimination had been provided for by us in any event. In Minsk-City approximately 10,000 Jews were liquidated on the 28 and 29 of July, 6500 of them Russian Jews, predominantly aged persons, women and children—the remainder consisted of Jews unfit for commitment of labor who, in their overwhelming majority were deported to

Minsk in November of last year from Vienna, Bruenn, Bremen and Berlin, by order of the Fuehrer.

The area of Luzk too, has been relieved of several thousand Jews. The same applies to Novogrodek and Wilejka. Radical measures are imminent for Baranowitschi and Hanzewitschi. In Baranowitschi alone, approximately 10,000 Jews are still living in the city itself; of these, 9,000 Jews will be liquidated next month.

In Minsk City 2,600 Jews from Germany are left over. In addition to that all the 6,000 Russian Jews and Jewesses, who remained as employees with such units, which employed them during the action, are still alive. Even in the future, Minsk will still retain its character as the strongest center of the Jewish element, necessitated for the present by the concentration of the armament industries and the tasks of the railroad. In all the other areas, the number of Jews to be drafted for labor commitment, will be limited by the SD and by me to 800 at the most, but if possible to 500, so that after completion of future actions as announced, we will retain a remainder of 8,600 Jews in Minsk and of about 7,000 in the other 10 areas, including the jewless areas of Minskland [county]. The danger, that the partisans can rely essentially upon Jewry in the future, will then exist no longer. Naturally, after the termination of demands of the armed forces, the SD and I would like it best, to eliminate Jewry once and for all in the District General of White Ruthenia. For the time being, the necessary demands of the armed forces, which are the main employers of Jewry, are considered. Besides the fact of this unequivocal attitude toward the Jewry, the SD in White Ruthenia has in addition the grave task to transfer continually new contingents of Jews from the Reich to their destiny. This is an excessive strain on the physical strength of the men in the SD and keeps them away from their duties, which are awaiting them in the area of White Ruthenia proper.

Therefore, I would be grateful if the Reich Commissioner could possibly stop additional deportations of Jews to Minsk at least until the peril of the Partisan movement has been subdued conclusively. I need the SD in its total force (100% commitment) against the partisans and against the Polish Resistance movement, both of which are occupying the entire strength of the not overwhelmingly strong SD units.

After completion of the action against the Jews in Minsk, SS Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Strauch reported to me tonight with just indignation, that suddenly, without directives of the Reichleader SS, and without notification to the Commissioner General, a transport of 1000 Jews from Warshow has arrived for this air-force

administrative-command. I beg the Reich Commissioner (already prepared by telegram) to prevent transports of such a kind, in his capacity as supreme Plenipotentiary for the Eastern Territory. The Polish Jew is, exactly like the Russian Jew, an enemy of Germanism. He represents a politically dangerous element, the political danger of which exceeds by far his value as a skilled worker. Under no circumstances may administrative offices of the armed forces or of the air forces import Jews to an area of civil administration without the approval of the Reich Commissioner or from the Government General or any other place, as they will endanger the entire political work and the safeguarding of the District General. I fully agree with the commander of the SD in White Ruthenia, that we shall liquidate every shipment of Jews, which is not ordered or announced by our superior offices, to prevent further disturbances in White Ruthenia.

The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia

sig. Kube

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3429-PS

THE SS CALLS YOU

[Dich Ruft die SS] Pages 4-5, 18-19.

German Youth!

With this pamphlet the SS turns to you, our young comrades of the Front of tomorrow. You should be made even more familiar than before with the spirit that animates the Waffen SS, with the leadership, organization, equipment, and arms of these troops who are so especially close to the Fuehrer and who have taken such a proud part in the German victories in the West and East, in the North and South.

You know it is the duty of every German to be and prove himself to be a soldier. Those young Germans, however, who stand out in character and mien, desire to be more than soldiers! They will not want to wait until they are drafted, they will want to fight as volunteers.

The special missions of the SS require that unchangeable laws of selection be applied and thus gain the most valuable forces for the SS. The young German shall undergo the qualifying examination in confidence, to determine whether he is fit for the SS and physically qualified for the Waffen SS. In case of rejection, there still remain many possibilities to make oneself useful to the nation in the most worthy manner.

It is often said that the men of the Waffen SS are great "dare-devils". That is true, but never to the extent that the Waffen SS would be committed without preparatory planning and considered leadership. The leaders of the Waffen SS are throughout, in a hundred ways, proven, experienced, schooled men. The losses of the Waffen SS indicate the difficulties of its mission, but in percentage are neither higher nor lower than those of the other branches of the army.

If you answer the call of the Waffen SS and volunteer to join the ranks of the great Front of SS Divisions, you will belong to a corps which has from the very beginning been directed toward outstanding achievements, and, because of this fact, has developed an especially deep feeling of comradeship. You will be bearing arms with a corps that embraces the most valuable elements of the young German generation. Over and above that you will be especially bound to the National Socialist ideology. Your comrades come from all districts of Germany and from the racially German regions. In its ideological expansion, the Waffen SS also includes volunteers from the Germanic lands. This community-in-arms with SS comrades from Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Flanders, and the volunteers from Finland is a significant contribution to the realization of the new, destined community of Europe into whose spearhead, standard-bearer, and elite troop the SS has made itself.

The youth of the National Socialist Reich knows that he must himself initiate proceedings in order to be able to complete his military service in the Waffen SS. That so many young Germans have volunteered for the Waffen SS is a living testimonial to the confidence of today's young generation in the Waffen SS, its spirit, and, above all, its leadership. It is also, however, a proud demonstration of the ideologically sure attitude of this German youth that it has understood the import of the SS struggle and knows exactly why the Waffen SS is a community under special oath to the Fuehrer. So will be emblazoned on your belt-buckle, too, the motto that the Fuehrer himself on the 1st of April 1931 granted to his SS—"Loyalty is my Honor".

* * * * *

The Oath of the SS Man:

I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor, loyalty, and bravery. I vow to you, and to those you have named to command me, obedience unto death, so help me God.

* * * * *

The SS man is not only a soldier, he is the exemplary bearer of the idea of Adolf Hitler. He is characterized by experience in war, hardness, pride in the share of many victories, the consciousness of hardships and dangers endured, as well as the great legacy that the National Socialist idea has imposed upon him, since he has been fighting in the ranks of the SS.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3430-PS

FOUR YEARS IN HOLLAND, 1944

[Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden]

Reichminister Seyss-Inquart.

[Page 10]

We neither will oppress this land and its people imperialistically nor will we impose on them our political convictions. We will bring this about in no other way—only through our deportment and our example.

* * * * *

[Page 144]

Several times it has been held against me that I have let National Socialism come to the fore in all phases in public life. As far as I am concerned that is no reproach. *It is a historical mission which I have to fulfill here.*

* * * * *

[Page 124]

I will give my instructions. They must be executed by all. In the present situation a refusal to execute could be regarded only as sabotage. It is also clear, now more than ever, that every resistance which is directed against this fight for existence must be suppressed. Some time ago the representatives of the churches had written to the Wehrmacht commander and to me, and they presented their conception against the executions of death sentences which the Wehrmacht commander announced in the meantime. To this I can only say the following: The moment in which our men, father and sons with iron determination look towards their fate in the east and unflinchingly and steadfastly perform their highest pledge, it is unbearable to tolerate conspiracies whose goal is to weaken the rear of this eastern front. Whoever dares this must be annihilated. We must be severe and become even more severe against our opponents, this is the command of a relentless sequence of events and for us perhaps humanly hard, but our holy duty. We remain human because

we do not torture our opponents, we remain by annihilating them.

* * * * *

[Page 167]

I have given orders to suppress all appearances with a severeness corresponding to the brutality of the crime. If in connection with these measures Dutch citizens are affected and have to undergo difficulties and limitations of special nature, then they have to seek the cause therefore solely in these eruptions of the anarchistic mental attitude of a few culprits and the just-as-criminal-tolerance or apathy within their own circles.

* * * * *

[Page 57]

The Jews are the enemy of national socialism and the national socialistic Reich. From the moment of their emancipation, their methods were directed to the annihilation of the common and moral worth of the German people and to replace national and responsible ideology with international Nihilism. The fatal meaning of Judaism became completely clear to the German people during the years of the world war. It was really they, who stuck the knife in the back of the German army which broke the resistance of the Germans, and in the year 1918, it was they who wanted to dissolve and decompose all national tradition and also moral and religious beliefs of the German people. The Jews for us are not Dutchmen. *They are those enemies, with whom we can neither come to an armistice nor to peace.* This applies here, if you wish, for the duration of the occupation. Do not expect an order from me which stipulates this, except regulations concerning police matters. *We will beat the Jews wherever we meet them* and those who join them must bear the consequences. *The Fuehrer declared that the Jews have played their final act in Europe, and therefore they played their final act.*

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3433-PS

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 471

Decree concerning the Constitution of the German
Protestant Church, of 14 July 1933

The Reich Cabinet has adopted the following Decree, which is hereby promulgated:

Article 1

A new constitution for the German Protestant Church is ordained as of 11 July 1933. Together with the Introductory

Ordinance it is recognized by the Reich and published in the enclosure.

Article 2

(1) The German Protestant Church is a Corporation of Public Law of the Reich.

(2) The rights and obligations of the German Protestant Ecclesiastical League are assumed by the German Protestant Church.

Article 3

Should the competent agencies of a State Church refuse to include assessments of the German Protestant Church in their budget, the appropriate State Government will cause the expenditures to be included in the budget upon request of the Reich Cabinet.

Article 4

In the case of formal disciplinary action against church officials.

1. Church Disciplinary Authorities are authorized to administer oaths to witnesses and experts.

2. The Lower Courts must comply with requests of the Church Disciplinary Authorities for legal assistance.

Article 5

(1) The State Churches federated as the German Protestant Church will hold new elections on 23 July 1933 for those ecclesiastical agencies which are constituted by direct vote of church members on the basis of current State Church Law.

(2) Where further agencies are to be constituted by indirect vote on the basis of State Church Law, these elections will take place before 31 August 1933.

(3) The Supreme Administrative Authorities of the State Churches are authorized to promulgate by administrative decree the regulations necessary for carrying out the new elections. Electors absent from their local church will be authorized to vote by proxy. Where it is necessary for this purpose, or in order to adhere to the time limits prescribed in this article, deviations from the provisions of Ecclesiastical Law and Church Constitutions concerning the external mechanism of the electoral procedure are permissible.

(4) A Plenipotentiary of the Reich Minister of the Interior will supervise the impartial implementation of the provisions of this chapter.

Article 6

The carrying out of this decree is vested in the Reich Minister of the Interior.

Article 7

This decree becomes effective on the day of its promulgation.
Berlin, 14 July 1933

The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick

Enclosure

CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN PROTESTANT
CHURCH

At a time in which our German people is experiencing a great historical new era through the grace of God, the German Protestant Churches are combining to form a united German Protestant Church as continuation and consummation of the unity initiated by the German Protestant Ecclesiastical League.

It federates into a solemn league all denominations that stem from the Reformation and stand equally legitimately side by side, and thereby bears witness to: "One Body and One Spirit, One Lord, One Faith, One Baptism, One God and Father of All of Us, who is Above All, and Through All, and In All."

The German Protestant Church ordains the following Constitution for itself:

SECTION I

Article 1

The inviolable basis of the German Protestant Church is the Gospel of Jesus Christ as attested to us in Holy Writ, and as made manifest anew in the Confessions of the Reformation. The authority which the Church needs for its mission is thereby determined and delineated.

SECTION II

Article 2

(1) The German Protestant Church is composed of Churches (State Churches—Landeskirchen).

(2) Churches with related creeds may become affiliated. The nature of the affiliation will be determined by law.

(3) In matters of Dogma and Cult the State Churches remain independent.

(4) The German Protestant Church may issue by law uniform directives to State Churches for their constitutions, insofar as the latter are not based on dogma. It is incumbent upon it to promote and guarantee legal uniformity among the State Churches in the administrative and judicial fields.

(5) Ordination of leading officials in the State Churches will take place after the German Protestant Church has been consulted.

(6) When assuming office all Church Officials are to be pledged to the Constitution of the German Protestant Church.

SECTION III

Article 3

(1) The German Protestant Church regulates all legal aspects pertaining to the German Church.

(2) It settles [ordnet] its relationship to the State.

(3) It determines its position in relationship to other religious communities.

Article 4

(1) The German Protestant Church aims at equipping and committing German Protestant Christendom, which is united in it, for the fulfillment of the Divine mission of the Church. On the basis of Holy Writ and the Confessions of the Reformers it is therefore incumbent upon it to strive for a uniform attitude within the Church, and to prescribe goal and direction for ecclesiastical work.

(2) It devotes special solicitude to the German folk [Volkstum], particularly to youth.

(3) It takes under its helpful protection undenominational ecclesiastical work of importance to the entire Church, especially Home and Foreign Missions.

(4) It is incumbent upon it to preserve and strengthen connections with Protestant Germans abroad.

(5) It cultivates relations to friendly Churches in foreign countries.

SECTION IV

Article 5

(1) The Church is headed by the Lutheran Reich Bishop.

(2) The Reich Bishop will be assisted by an Ecclesiastical Council [Geistliches Ministerium].

(3) A German Protestant National Synod takes part in nominating the leading officials of the Church and in legislation.

(4) Advisory Chapters guarantee unhampered creative cooperation in the service of the Church to the talents active in German Protestant Folk [Volkstum].

Article 6

(1) The Reich Bishop represents the German Protestant Church. He is called upon to make visibly manifest the community of church life in the State Churches, and to vouchsafe uniform leadership for the work of the German Protestant Church. He takes the measures requisite to safeguard the Constitution.

(2) The Reich Bishop will familiarize the members of the Ecclesiastical Council with the functions of their office. He will regularly meet the leading officials of the State Churches for discussion and to take counsel. He will undertake the appointment and dismissal of the officials of the German Protestant Church.

(3) The Reich Bishop is authorized to officiate at all clerical functions, more especially to preach sermons, to issue proclamations in the name of the German Protestant Church and to institute Special Penitence and Festival Services.

Insofar as it is a question of preservation and cultivation of a denomination other than his own, this authority will be exercised by the competent member of the Ecclesiastical Council.

4. The Reich Bishop will be assigned a parish.

The official residence of the Reich Bishop for the handling of church administration is in Berlin.

5. The Reich Bishop is installed into his bishopric by the National Synod after nominations have been submitted to the National Synod by the leading officials of the State Churches together with the Ecclesiastical Council.

6. Details will be determined by law.

Article 7

1. Under the leadership of the Reich Bishop, it is incumbent upon the Ecclesiastical Council to guide the German Protestant Church and to issue laws.

2. It consists of three clergymen and one legal member. In appointing the clergymen, due consideration is to be accorded to the denominational structure of the German Protestant Church. In case of necessity the number of members may be increased. The members perform the functions of their office without supervision. They are responsible to the Reich Bishop for the Unity of the Church.

3. It is the special task of the clerical members to strengthen the spiritual ties between the State Churches and the German Protestant Church, to strengthen the community of members of

the same denomination and their relationship of mutual trust to the other elements of the German Protestant Church.

4. The Members of the Ecclesiastical Council are appointed by the Reich Bishop. The Clerical members will be suggested to the Reich Bishop by the leading officials of the State Churches. The Legal Member of the Administration of the Protestant Church of the Old Prussian Union. The position will be filled in agreement with the Reich Bishop. The occupants of this position must be qualified for the office of Judge or for the Higher Administrative.

5. The Legal member is the Reich Bishop's Deputy in legal matters; he is in charge of the German Protestant Church Chancery as the supreme ecclesiastical administrative authority.

6. Details will be determined by law.

Article 8

1. The German Protestant National Synod consists of sixty members. Two thirds will be delegated by the German Protestant State Churches from Synods and Church governing Bodies. The German Protestant Church will appoint one third from individuals who have conducted themselves well in the service of the church.

2. Appointment of the members of the National Synod will be determined by law. The tenure of office for members will be six years.

Whenever the National Synod is newly constituted, special consideration will be given to the integration of new forces.

3. The National Synod will be convened by the Reich Bishop at least once a year. At other times the Reich Bishop shall give due consideration to a request of the National Synod that it be convened. Place and date of the convention will be determined by the Reich Bishop. He will open the synod with Divine Service and will preside at the initial session until the chairmanship has been agreed upon. The Synod will establish for itself an order for business.

Article 9

1. The advisory Chapters will be called upon by the Ecclesiastical Council for continuous responsible work. They are entitled to render advisory opinions.

2. Members will be appointed by the Reich Bishop in agreement with the Ecclesiastical council.

SECTION V

Article 10

Laws of the German Protestant Church are decided on by the National Synod in collaboration with the Ecclesiastical Council, or by the latter alone. They will be signed by the Reich Bishop and promulgated in Legal Gazette of the German Protestant Church. They will become effective on the fourteenth day after publication in the Legal Gazette, unless a different date has been set.

SECTION VI

Article 11

1. An annual budget will list all receipts and expenditures. It will be determined by law before the beginning of the fiscal year.

2. A law is also requisite for any decision concerning the negotiation of loans or the assumption of obligations on behalf of the German Protestant Church.

3. Accounts of receipts and expenditures will be rendered to a Budget Committee to be designated by the National Synod. It approved the accounts.

4. The German Protestant Church raises its funds through assessing the State Churches.

SECTION VII

Article 12

1. The constitution may be amended by law if the provisions concerning Dogma and Cult are not affected thereby. The law must be approved by two thirds of the members of the National Synod present, or approved unanimously by the Ecclesiastical Council.

2. Approval of the National Synod is required for a law amending the Constitution of the structures or the executive agencies of the German Protestant Church are effected thereby.

Berlin, 11 July 1933

On behalf of the Protestant Church of the Old Prussian Union:
JAGER (also on behalf of all Prussian State Churches).

LUGWIG MULLER.

D. WINCKLER

D. ERNST STOLTENHOFF

D. ERNST HUNDT.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3434-PS

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 774

Law concerning procedure for decision in legal affairs of the
Protestant Church of 26 June 1935

The Reich Cabinet has resolved upon the following law which is hereby published:

Para. 1

Should the decision in a civil lawsuit depend upon whether measures taken in the Protestant State Church or in the German Protestant Church since 1 May 1933 are valid, and should the validity be doubted by a person involved in the case or by the court rendering the decision, then it must defer the case until a resolution has been made by the "Office for Decisions in legal matters of the Protestant Church" (Paragraphs 2, 3). This is set up in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Para. 2

(1) The Office for Decisions decides whether measures specified in Para. 1 are valid or not.

(2) The decision of the Office for Decisions is final and universally binding. It is to be published in the official gazette of the Reich.

Para. 3

The Office for Decisions may leave the decision up to the court.

Para. 4

The Reich Minister of the Interior publishes the legal and administrative measures necessary for the execution and supplementing of this law.

Para. 5

This law takes effect on 1 July 1935. The Reich Minister of the Interior decides the time of its abrogation.
Berlin, 25 June, 1935.

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3435-PS

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 851

First ordinance for execution of the law concerning procedure for decisions in legal affairs of the Protestant Church of 3 July 1935

On the basis of Para. 4 of the law concerning procedure for decisions in legal affairs of the Protestant church of 26 June 1935 (Reichsgesetzbl. 1, page 774) it is hereby ordained:

Para. 1

(1) The Office for Decisions in legal matters of the Protestant church makes decisions in a sitting of three members. The president and the associates must possess qualifications for the judgeship or for higher administrative service posts.

(2) The Reich Minister of the Interior appoints the members, including the president, and their alternates.

Para. 2

Following deferment of the case of court officially forwards the documents to the Office for Decisions in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Para. 3

(1) The Office for Decisions shall give to the parties in the lawsuit as well as to the State Churches which are involved and to the German Protestant Church an opportunity to be heard. It can disregard this if it leaves the decision to the court (Par. 3 of the law). It can order oral proceedings to which the parties are summoned. The parties may allow themselves to be represented by lawyers at the proceedings before the Office for Decisions.

(2) The Office for Decisions may on its own authority conduct further inquiries, particularly the interrogation under oath of witnesses and experts, to supplement the documents laid before it.

(3) The provisions of the rules for civil lawsuits apply, according to their sense, in the summoning of the parties and the production of evidence. The courts as well as the administrative offices of the Reich and the States are required to provide legal and official aid to the Office for Decisions.

(4) The Office for Decisions can request information and opinion from the highest state officials.

Para. 4

Fees will not be collected for the activity of the Office for Decisions. Witnesses and experts are entitled to recompensation rates established by the rules applying to the lawsuit. Other than

that payments are not authorized. Costs arise from the proceedings before the Office for Decisions do not belong to the costs of the lawsuit.

Berlin, 3 July 1935.

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3436-PS

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1178

Law for the Safeguarding of the German Protestant Church
of 24 September 1935

According to the will of the Protestant congregation the unification of the State Churches in a German Protestant Church has been accomplished and documented in a constitution.

Nevertheless, the Reich Cabinet has been obliged to observe with deep anxiety how a condition has later arisen through a conflict of church groups among and against each other, which destroys the unity of the congregation, prejudices the freedom of faith and conscience of the individual, harms the racial community [Volksgemeinschaft], and exposes to extreme dangers the stability of the Protestant Church itself.

The Reich Cabinet permeated by the desire to be able to turn over the regulation church which is internally settled, in accordance with its duty as a trustee, and in the knowledge that this task cannot be left to any of the conflicting groups.

To safeguard the stability of the German Protestant Church and to introduce an order which will enable the church to regulate its own questions of faith and creed in complete freedom and calm, has resolved upon the following law, which is hereby published.

The Reich Minister for Church Affairs, in order to reestablish a settled state of affairs in the German Protestant Church and in the Protestant State Churches is empowered to issue decrees with the legally binding power. The decrees will be published in the Reichsgesetzblatt.

Munich, 24 September, 1935.

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister for Church Affairs

Kerrl

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3437-PS

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1370

Fifth decree for execution of the Law for the Safeguarding of the German Protestant Church of 2 December 1935

On the basis of the Law for the Safeguarding of the German Protestant Church of 24 September 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I Page 1178) it is hereby decreed:

Par. 1

1. Insofar as, on the basis of the Law for Safeguarding the German Protestant Church of 24 September 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 1178) and the executive decrees, organs of church leadership have been formed in the German Protestant Church and the State Church, the exercise of church-authoritative and church-official powers by church association is not permissible.

2. To the functions not permissible in accordance with paragraph 1 belong particularly the filling of pastorates, the engagement of clerical assistants, the examination and ordaining of candidates of the Protestant State Churches visitation in church communities, the publishing of the banns, the collection and administration of church dues and assessments the imposition of alms and collections with reference to church community activities such as the summoning of synods.

3. The freedom of religious sermons and the care of the religious community by church associations and groups is not effected.

Par. 2

1. The Reich Minister for Church Affairs will announce the churches and church provinces to which the case of par. 1, no. 1 applies.

2. Organs of church associations or groups which continue to exercise church authoritative and church official powers in the sphere of the church or church provinces concerned after such an announcement may be dissolved.

Par. 3

After this decree becomes effective, the assumption of church authoritative and church official powers by organs of church associations or groups is not permissible. The provisions of Par 2 number 2 applies accordingly.

Par. 4

This decree takes effect on the day following its publication.
Berlin, 2, December, 1935

The Reich Minister for Church Affairs.

KERRL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3439-PS

1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 697,

30 June 1937

Fifteenth Decree

for the execution of the law for Security of the German
Protestant Church

25 June 1937

On the basis of the Law for Security of the German Protestant Church of 24 September 1935, (1935 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1178) for the unification of the laws governing the Finance Departments it is hereby decreed:

Par. 1

(1) The Reich Minister for Church Affairs establishes one Finance Department at the Chancery of the German Protestant Church and at the administration office of each of the German Evangelical provincial churches.

(2) The officials of the general ecclesiastical administration are obliged to accept the revocable charge of honor or chairmen or as members of the Finance Department.

(3) After previous consultation the Finance Department makes its decisions through the chairman.

Par. 2

(1) The Finance Department guides the property administration of the church in the district for which it has been established. It represents the church.

(2) The Finance Department sets up the budget and the tax assessment of the church. It determines the manner of raising the tax assessment and supervises the use of the budget funds.

Par. 3

(1) The Finance Department is obliged to see to it that a regular administration, corresponding to the public interest is guaranteed, that the utmost thrift is observed, and that state and ecclesiastical regulations are observed by all parties concerned.

(2) The Finance Department is responsible to the state for the proper use of government subsidies allowed for Protestant-ecclesiastical means, as well as for church tax funds.

Par. 4

(1) In the provincial churches the Finance Department exercises ecclesiastical supervision over the administration of property and church funds of the church communities and the church associations. If, in case of refusal or for other reasons, a decision of the competent ecclesiastical organs is not reached or in case

these organs act contrary to ecclesiastical or state order it is authorized to exercise their rights itself. The same holds true if it is doubtful or disputed what organs are competent for the administration of the property and the church tax funds.

(2) The right of the Finance Department of property and tax supervision also embraces the authorizations of ratification entrusted to the ecclesiastical supervisory authorities by constitutional documents and Church Laws. If the Finance Department itself looks after the rights of church communities or ecclesiastical associations, its decision at the same time includes the ratification of the ecclesiastical supervisory authorities.

(3) The Finance Department can appoint agents for the execution of regulations it has to set up in church communities and ecclesiastical associations. In the case of sentences two and three under Paragraph 4 (1) above the expenses will be put to the debit of the association or church community.

Par. 5

(1) The chairman of the Finance Department can transfer the dispatch of single matters to a member of the Finance Department. In case of temporary inability he can appoint a member as his representative. In case of extended inability the decision of the Reich Minister for Church Affairs is to be obtained.

(2) The officials and employees of the general ecclesiastical administration can be called upon for aid in dispatching the business.

(3) The Finance Department keeps a seal which reads "Church Authority" with the addition of "Finance Department." Statements of the Finance Department are to be signed and sealed by the chairman or his representative.

Par. 6

The Finance Department, within the limits of its authorization, can issue legally binding regulations. It can regulate in particular the salaries and allowances of officials of the general ecclesiastical administration, of the clergy, of the officials of the church community, and of the employees.

Par. 7

(1) The Finance Department is to stay in close touch with the competent church management.

(2) Regulations and measures of the church management and of the ecclesiastical administration authorities connected with financial operations require the approval of the Finance Depart-

ment. They are binding on the church only if this approval has been given and made known to all parties concerned.

Par. 8

(1) The Finance Department at the Chancery of the German Evangelical Church, through continuous contact with the Finance Departments of the provincial churches, has to see to it that the property administration of the provincial churches will be simplified and made more uniform. In the field of property administration it can issue legally binding rules to regulate the ecclesiastical legal life in its entirety for the domain of the German Protestant Church or the domain of several provincial churches.

(2) The Finance Department at the Chancery of the German Protestant Church can inspect the property administration of a provincial church, can demand information about it, and can make suggestions as to the management of the property administration.

(3) The Finance Department at the Chancery of the German Protestant Church can establish an accounting office for the property administration of the German Protestant Church. The verification of the property administration of the provincial churches can be entrusted to the accounting office.

Par. 9

(1) The Finance Department has to inform the Reich Minister for Church Affairs of the financial status.

(2) The approval of the Reich Minister for Church Affairs is necessary for legally binding regulations of a general nature.

(3) The decisions of the Church authorities on fixing the church tax requires the approval of the Finance Department.

(4) The Finance Departments have to see to it that the regulations issued by the Reich Minister for Church Affairs for the use of government subsidies and of church tax funds are observed.

Par. 10

The decree goes into effect on the day following publication. The Reich Minister for Church Affairs decides the time of cancellation. Contrary regulations are void for the duration of this decree.

Berlin, 25 June 1937.

The Reich Minister for Church Affairs

KERRL.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3440-PS

THE ARCHIVE [Das Archiv] November-December 1934,
Pages 1153-1154.

Speech of Goering on 11 December 1934 before Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Representatives of the World Press, and important Members of the Government, of the Army, and of the Party, entitled "The Victory over Communism in Germany" [Die Ueberwindung des Kommunismus in Deutschland].

We are firmly determined after assumption of power to hit the Communists so that in Germany they would never recover from our blow. For that we did not require a Reichstag fire! That has been one of the most important points on our program. In the former Weimar Republic the destruction of Communism was unthinkable. For the execution of these measures we needed the instrument of a thoroughly reliable, and to the highest degree, powerful police force. I have created this instrument through the reorganization of the field police and the formation of a Secret State Police. These organizations will be a continuous means for implanting fear in all enemies of the State such as a State needs if it wishes to defend itself for ever. When mentioning concentration camps the Minister President appeared to the representatives of foreign countries to ask themselves how their own countries would have dealt with people who had shown themselves in the most disastrous manner the sworn enemies of every public order. I would like to see the State which will assume the responsibility or permitting those people, who were the cause for the sacrifice of thousands of human lives to continue or renew their activity. If the assertion is made that concentration camps are places of torture, then I declare such assertions to be pure invention and maliciously conceived.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3441-PS

SPEECHES AND PAPERS, HERMANN GOERING:
[Reden und Aufsätze] by E. Gritzbach, Munich, 1939,
page 242.

I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a chorus of revenge. The enemy must have the feeling of being lost already before even having fought * * *.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3442-PS

THE ARCHIVE [Das Archiv] Vols. 4-6, Page 505.

Hitler's address to the Reichstag, July 13, 1934.

Meanwhile Minister-President Goering had already received my instructions that in case of a purge he was to take analogous measures at once in Berlin and in Prussia. With an iron fist he beat down the attack on the National Socialist State before it could develop.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3443-PS

CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIAL REPORT,
SUPPLEMENT NUMBER 5, 12 DECEMBER 1945

The Activities of the Defendant Wilhelm Frick

Wilhelm Frick, former Reichminister of the Interior, became in August 1943 so-called Reichsprotector in Bohemia and Moravia. Simultaneously with this appointment, Hitler also reorganized the position, duties and rights of the Reichsprotector. By virtue of this reorganization the Reichsprotector became in future the representative of Hitler in his character as Chief of the Reich. It was his duty to confirm the members of the so-called Protectorate Government, to nominate and dismiss German officials in the Protectorate and decide on their superannuation; his competence extended further to amnesty and abolition.

From the point of view of Czecho-Slovakia, Wilhelm Frick has also been guilty in his character as Minister of the Interior. Frick was already Minister of the Interior in January 1933.

Already the Decree of Hitler of 1.10.1939 (RGBl, I, page 1331) regarding the administration of the Sudeten-German territory bears inter alia Frick's signature. By the occupation of the frontier territory, the integrity of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was illegally violated. Paragraph 81 et seq. of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Arbitration Agreement between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and Germany of 16.10.1925 (Locarno Pact), which decided that all disputes between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and Germany, of whatever kind, must be brought before the Permanent International Tribunal, were thereby violated. Hitler's Decree, above cited, regarding the administration of the Sudeten-German territory, stipulated that *Frick himself, as Minister of the Interior, should be the main authority for the transfer of the Sudeten-Germany territory.*

Hitler's Decree of 16.3.1939 (VBIProt. Page 7) regarding the establishment of the so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Mo-

rovia bears Frick's signature. This Decree of Hitler not only violates at the same time the Treaty of Versailles and the bilateral Locarno Pact, but also the agreement of the four Great Powers, enforced by Hitler himself, regarding the cession of the frontier territory, of 29 and 30, September, 1938 (Munich Agreement).

Of the more important authoritative decisions for which Frick is responsible, we cite particularly his Decree of 5.12.1941 (VBl-Prot 1942, page 16 RGBL I, Page 750) regarding the introduction of certificates, so-called identity cards, in the territory of the so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, in the so-called Sudeten territory and in the Eastern territories. It is true that at first sight it might give the impression of being a simple regulation for the purpose of obtaining police evidence regarding the population; this regulation, however, had a much more profound basis and background. The object of this evidence was—in so far as it concerned the Bohemian countries—the germanising and expulsion of the majority of the Czech population (approx. 60%) from Bohemia and Moravia.

Another authoritative decision which may be charged to Frick's account is his Order of 10.7.1942 (RGBL I, page 466) regarding the introduction of the legal regulations for the Technical Emergency Service in the Protectorate. By the realization of this measure Frick contributed in a great degree to the increase of Germany's war potential and thereby to the prolongation of the war. Frick was also one of the signatories of the Order of 7.6.1939 (RGBL I, Page 1039) regarding the right of publication of legal regulations in the Protectorate.

To the sphere of Frick's Ministry of the Interior belong also the Concentration Camps established in the Reich, in which also Czech nationals were confined. The blame for the administration of these camps therefore also devolves on Frick.

Prague, 12th December 1945

Nurnberg, December 15, 1945

Supplement Nr. 5 to the Official Czechoslovak Report called "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia"

Presented by order of the Czechoslovak Government by Colonel Dr. B. Ecer, Plenipotentiary Minister, Czechoslovak Representative to the Commission of the United Nations for the Investigation of War Crimes in London, at present Chairman of the Czechoslovak Delegation to the Nurnberg Proceedings.

By order of my Government I submit Supplement Nr. 5 of the Czechoslovak Report in Accordance with Art. 21 of the Charter containing an official memorandum on the activities of the defendant Wilhelm Frick.

for Colonel Dr. B. Ecer
Capt. Dr. A. Hochwald

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3445-PS

GERMAN LAW

[Deutsches Recht] (Edition A), 1939 Vol. 2, Number 45/46, 23/30
Dec 1939, page 2121.

Speech by Hans Frank before Academy of German Law

Today we are proud to have formulated our legal principles from the very beginning in such a way that they need not be changed in the case of war. For the rule, that right is that which is useful to the nation, and wrong is that which harms it, which stood at the beginning of our legal work, and which established this collective term of *nation* as the only standard of value of the law—this rule dominates also the law of these times.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3446-PS

Reference:
RK 19694 B

Berlin 13 October 1938.

1. Note:

The Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police submits with letter of 10 August 1938, received here 26 September 1938, 7 inventories concerning property and objects of art confiscated and sequestered respectively in Austria, also 10 albums of photographs, 1 catalogue and 1 certificate. While the albums of photographs and the catalogue are available in the office, the inventories and the certificate are attached.

Of special importance is the *general inventory* named under 6 of the letter. This inventory lists a total of 162 cases of confiscation. For 49 of them the value is not listed. For the remaining 113 a value amounting to 93.366.358.24 marks is named. Among them are the following properties with a value of 500.000.00 marks and more:

1. Palace including grounds and forest of
the Jew Rudolf Gutmann. 33.000.000.00

| | |
|--|---------------|
| 2. 7 estates of the family property of the House Habsburg and Lothringen as well as 4 villas and 1 palace of Otto V. Habsburg. | 21.077.655.00 |
| 3. Property value of the National Front [Vaterlaendische Front] and its subordinate formations. | 8.505.500.00 |
| 4. Cash and valuables confiscated by the State Police Main Office in Vienna. | 3.902.319.24 |
| 5. Wholesale business of the firm Wm. Abeles & Co. (non-Aryan). | 3.500.000.00 |
| 6. Hotel "Metropole". | 2.000.000.00 |
| 7. Chemical factory of the Jew Dr. Ignatz Kreidel. | 2.000.000.00 |
| 8. Knitting and wool factory of the Jew Altmann. | 2.000.000.00 |
| 9. Sanitorium Edlach (former proprietors Louis and Marietta Rosen). | 1.800.000.00 |
| 10. Leather factory and villa, etc. of Jew Fritz Spiegler. | 1.500.000.00 |
| 11. Schwadorf cotton spinning works of the Jew Dr. Pollak. | 1.368.000.00 |
| 12. 1.700 automobiles. | 1.020.000.00 |
| 13. 2 hotels, etc. of Jew Stiassmy. | 1.000.000.00 |
| 14. Palace Leopoldskron (former proprietor Max Reinhardt). | 700.000.00 |
| 15. Cash confiscated by the State Police Office Eisenstadt. | 651.762.00 |
| 16. 140 drilling wells, Joch German Petroleum Co., etc. of Jew Poeller. | 658.410.00 |
| 17. 55 mountain lodges of "Bergfreunde" formerly "Naturfreunde". | 500.000.00 |
| 18. Villa of Jew Reitlinger. | 500.000.00 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 85.683.718.24 |

There are to be noted furthermore:

| | |
|--|---------------|
| 1. Cash and valuables of Alwine Dollfuss, valued at | 8.200.00 |
| 2. Villa of the former Austrian Minister Zernatto. | 120.000.00 |
| 3. Villa, etc. of the former Minister of Finance, Dr. Drexler. | Value Unknown |

The *art objects* sequestered in Vienna are included in the inventory described as Vienna album. Most of them are part of the Rothschild property, that is the numbers 1 to 56, 58 to 60, 62 to 69, 79, 112, 113, 119, 123 to 130, 132 to 137, and 139 to 149, while the others are the property of:

Viktor V. Ephrussi, No. 57, 71, 81-87, 116-118 and 120-122
 Schenker, No. 61, 74, 75, 80, 108 and 138.
 Schweiger No. 70 and 109-111 .
 Pollak, No. 72, 106, 107 and 131
 Thorsch, No. 73, 89-97 and 114
 Spiegler, No. 77, 78, 99-102, 104 and 105
 Fuerst, No. 150-161.

The art objects sequestered from Max Reinhardt, Palace Leopoldskron near Salzburg. Dr. Herz in Villa Herz near St. Gilgen, Moritz Bonn in Villa Bonn in Parsch near Salzburg and Dr. Hess in Bad Gastein are listed in special inventories.

According to the titles of the inventory the art objects are only *sequestered and secured*.

Confiscation has been made in favor of various offices: Austria, Reich Fuehrer SS, NSDAP, Armed Forces, Lebensborn and others.

In my opinion a decision of the Fuehrer concerning the confiscated property pre-supposes intensive preliminary work. An office will have to be given the task to make proposals for use. In that respect, 2 questions will need clarification:

- a. As a rule, should those offices in whose favor confiscation has been made retain the property assigned to them?
- b. Should all works of art which are only "sequestered" so far be confiscated?

Both questions are connected with the intended regulation of confiscation of property of enemies of the people and state in Austria.

2. Submitted to the Reich Minister. I may refer to the note to Rk 20323, submitted simultaneously, (draft of a decree concerning the confiscation of property of enemies of the people and the state in Austria).

[Initials illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3447-PS

To the Reichsstatthalter in Austria, Dr. Seyss-Inquart,
Vienna 1, Ballhausplatz 2.
Subject: Letter of 24 October 1938.
Reference: Z1, 43-762-Prot. 1/38.

My dear Reichsstatthalter:

The confiscation of property of enemies of the people and the nation in Austria is to be regulated by a decree to be issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior. The Fuehrer, to whom I have submitted yesterday the draft by the Reich Minister of Interior of a decree concerning the confiscation of property of enemies of the people and state in Austria, has no objections against issuing the decree. I therefore assume that the decree will be issued in the near future.

Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully,
Signed by: Reich Minister
[Green pencil] L.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3448-PS

RK 22393 B 30 Oct. 38

Vienna 1, Ballhausplatz 2, 23 Oct. 1938
Telephone U 24-5-20

Der Reichsstatthalter [Various notations]
File Reference Z1.43-763-Prot.1/38

My dear Reich Minister:

May I recall to you myself and the law concerning confiscation of property of enemies of the State? The administration of this sphere is in some disorder and I do not wish to create order with insufficient means since that is useless.

I believe that this law is almost completed and ready for the signature of the Fuehrer, and I hope that you, dear Reich Minister, will have occasion to obtain the signature soon.

With best regards I remain,

Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully,
(signed) SEYSS-INQUART

To: Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lam-
mers,

Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstrasse 78.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3449-PS

Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery,
BERLIN.

January 1939.

File No. RK 2222B

[various notations]

To the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8, SW 11

SUBJECT: Sequestration and confiscation of property, of enemies of the people and State in Austria.

Reference to letters of 10 August 1938 - S. V. 1 No. 2358/38 - 212 - 23 January 1938 - S. V. 1 No. 2358 IX/38 212 - .

Because of the decree which has been issued in the meantime concerning confiscation of property of enemies of the people and State in Austria of 18 November 1938 the Fuehrer after my presentation limited his personal decision of the use of the property objects confiscated in Austria to the confiscated *objects of Arts*, and left the decision regarding the other confiscated objects to the offices named in the decree.

On behalf of the Fuehrer I ask to submit the inventory, after completion of the preliminary work, which condenses all objects of Art *confiscated* so far and of those objects of art only sequestrated as yet the confiscation of which is intended and which is not subject to any legal or other objections. In your earlier letters the objects of Art were for the most part described as only "sequestrated" so that it was not clear if it would be subject to eventual confiscation. The Fuehrer then intends to have the objects of Art inspected by the expert, whom he will name, and to have him and the Reich Statthalter in Austria make proposals on their use in preparation of his decision.

(Signed by the Reich Minister)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3450-PS

Law of 18 November 1938 concerning the confiscation of property of enemies of the people and the State in Austria.

On the basis of Article 3 of the Law concerning the re-union of Austria with the German Reich of 13 March 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I p. 237) the following is decreed:

I

(1) The Reichstatthalter [Austrian Governor] in Vienna or the office empowered by him can confiscate for the benefit of

Austria property of persons or societies which have promoted efforts inimical to the people of the State, as well as articles and rights which were used or destined to promote such efforts. The Reich Minister of the Interior or office empowered by him to determine which efforts are to be considered as inimical to the people of the State. After conference with the Reich Commissar for the re-union of Austria with the German Reich and with the consent of the Reich Minister of the Interior, confiscation can also be made in favor of another person as defined by the law.

(2) The Reich Statthalter [Austrian Governor] in Vienna in consent with the Reich Commissar for the re-union of Austria with the German Reich disposed of the property confiscated in favor of Austria.

* * * * *

(7) Confiscations which were ordered by the Secret State Police before this decree took effect are considered confiscations in the sense of this decree. Instead of Paragraph 6, the rules of Paragraphs 8 - 15 are valid for these confiscations.

* * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3457-PS

THE ARCHIVE [Das Archiv] 1943-1944, page 720

Dr. Seyss-Inquart, President of the German Academy,
SP, 21 December 1943

The Fuehrer named as suggested by Reichsminister Goebbels, Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of The Netherlands, Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart, as successor of the late President of the Ministry Ludwig Siebert as President of the German Academy:

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3458-PS

THE THIRD REICH-THE THIRD YEAR 1935 [Das Dritte Reich] by Gerd Ruhle, Published by Hummel Publishers, 1936, Page 257.

Speech By Hermann Goering on 15 September 1935

God has created the races. He did not want equality and therefore we energetically reject any attempt to falsify the concept of race purity by making it equivalent with racial equality. We have experienced what it means when a people has to live in accordance with the laws of an equality that are alien to its kind

and contrary to nature. For this equality does not exist. We have never acknowledged such an idea and therefore must reject it also, as a matter of principle, in our laws, and we must acknowledge that purity of race which Nature and Province have destined.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3459-PS

CONGRESS OF GERMAN LAW, 1939 [Tag Des Deutschen Rechts, 1939] issued by National Socialistic Law Guardians League, [Nationalsozialistischer Rechtswahrerbund], Publisher: German Legal Publishing House, Page 489.

Meeting of the Reich Group of Young Law Guardians
[Rechtswahrer] on 19 May 1939

The Reich Group Administrator [Reichsgruppenwarter] of Young Law Guardians, Heinz Billig, at the beginning of his speech on the legal profession and its successors [Nachwuchs], made the demand that from the present Young Law Guardians the type of German law guardian should be formed. While the governmental educational organs in the first instance take care of purely technical education, it remains the task of the party and its organizations to exercise influence on the ideological conception of the Young Law Guardians A fine success was also noted in the collaboration of the Reich group with the Reich professional jurisprudence group [Reichfachgruppe Rechtswissenschaft] of the Reich Students Leadership [Reichsstudentenfuehrung] and with the racial-political [Rassenpolitischen] office of the NSDAP. Referring to the legal schooling within the Hitler Youth [Hitler Jugend], the speaker emphasized that the ignorance of the simplest legal principles and its results in wide circles of the nation could be fought best within the Hitler Youth. Therefore the legal education of the Hitler Youth is supported on the broadest scale. At the close of his address the speaker turned to problems of the establishment of the National Socialist education of the Young Law Guardians.

The second speech of the meeting was given by the head of the social office of the Reich Youth Leadership [Sozialamt der Reichsjugendfuehrung] Obergebietsfuehrer Axmann. "Reich Minister Dr. Frank", said Obergebietsfuehrer Axmann, "has created the Youth Legal Committee [Jugendrechtsausschuss] for the new establishment of Youth Law and has appointed me, as the head of the Social Office of the Reich Youth Leadership, chairman. Through this personal union the efficient collabora-

tion of the Academy for German Law [Akademie fuer Deutsches Recht] and the Hitler Youth is guaranteed in the best manner." Besides the Youth Labor Law the problems for the renewal of the Youth Criminal Law now have been taken in hand. As another field of work, the Obergebietsfuehrer mentioned legal guardianship, the task of which was the guarding of legal matters of the Hitler Youth as well as giving aid to its members in all legal matters. The third big field of legal work for the Hitler Youth should be legal schooling, where already efficient work could be done.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3460-PS

HERMANN GOERING, SPEECHES AND PAPERS,
[Reden und Aufsaeetze] by E. Gritzbach, Munich, 1938,
Pages 348-349.

I must address myself with a serious word to the city of Vienna. The city of Vienna can no longer rightfully be called a German city. So many Jews live in this city. Where there are 300,000 Jews, you cannot speak of a German city.

Vienna must once more become a German city, because it must perform important tasks for Germany in Germany's Ostmark. These tasks lie in the sphere of culture as well as in the sphere of economics. In neither of them can we, in the long run, put up with the Jew.

This, however, should not only be attempted by inappropriate interference and stupid measures but must be done systematically and carefully. As Delegate for the Four-Year Plan I commission the Reichsstatthalter in Austria jointly with the Plenipotentiary of the Reich, to consider and take any steps, necessary for the redirection of Jewish commerce, i.e., for the Aryanization of business and economic life, and to execute this process in accordance with our laws, legally but inexorably.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3461-PS

HERMANN GOERING: RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATION
[Aufbau einer Nation], Berlin, 1934, p. 91.

The solution of the Jewish question has not yet been reached. Whatever has happened so far has been a defensive measure in the interest of our people; it was a reaction against the ruin which this race has brought upon us.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
NURNBERG SUB-REGIONAL OFFICE

20 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:

Subject: Interrogation of Bertus GERDES

Re: Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Ernst KALTENBRUNNER

1. On November 19, 1945, the above-mentioned Bertus Gerdes former Gaustabsamtsleiter of Upper Bavaria gave himself up into the custody of the Counter Intelligence Corps at Nurnberg.

2. In the interrogation below, Gerdes outlines his contacts with Kaltenbrunner and defines Kaltenbrunner's responsibility for various extermination orders of Allied flyers, subjects of occupied nations, and concentration camp inmates.

-
1. Q. What is your name?
A. Bertus Gerdes.
 2. Q. How old are you?
A. 33 years.
 3. Q. Were you a member of the Hitler Youth?
A. Yes, in 1929.
 4. Q. Were you a member of the Nazi Party?
A. Yes, since 1930.
 5. Q. Were you a member of the SA?
A. Yes, since 1930.
 6. Q. What was your last position in the party?
A. I was Gaustabsamtsleiter of Upper Bavaria with office in Munich.
 7. Q. Who was your Chief?
A. Gauleiter Giesler.
 8. Q. Do you know Ernst Kaltenbrunner?
A. Yes.
 9. Q. Describe in detail all of your relations with Kaltenbrunner.
A. I met the former SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner for the first time in Weimar in the Hotel "Zum Elefanten" on the occasion of a conference of Gaustabsamtsleiters at which the Deputy Gauleiters were also present. That was in spring 1944. At that time Kaltenbrunner reviewed the relationship of the Gestapo and the SD to the Party. He said that the Gestapo was responsible to the Fuehrer mainly for the task of nipping in the bud unrest of any kind which could develop in connection with the war situation. He said that in connection with the SD the Gestapo had created an organization which had infiltrated into every

public office, every major enterprise and even into the smallest enterprise. He said further that there existed a countless number of confidential agents of whose existence the people in general, as well as the Party organization, had no knowledge. Kaltenbrunner said that it was the task of his confidential agents to register all incidents and particularly the state of mind of the people and report them to the RSHA. Kaltenbrunner appealed to the conference to furnish him with qualified and proven political leaders from among the ranks of the Party leadership, for this task in order to guarantee close cooperation in the Party. Kaltenbrunner further said that Gestapo and SD operated in a similar manner in occupied territories and that he was fully informed of activities throughout its areas. He cited as an example the Renault Works in France and described his organization in that armament works.

After the conference I had an opportunity to join Kaltenbrunner in a small circle. There were present besides myself Oberbefehlshaber Friedrichs (Party Chancellery in Munich) and the Gau Inspector Flemisch. Kaltenbrunner at that time remarked as nearly as I can recall: "Germany must take care that the eastern peoples and a major part of the Balkans and Danube States be compelled to die out through sterilization and annihilation of the leadership classes of these nations. However, in order to assure leadership by the German people and at the same time increase the German population, all German women married and unmarried up to the age of 35 must be compelled if they do not already have four children to produce at least four children by acceptable pure racial German men. It does not matter whether such men are married. Families which already possess four children must furnish their men for this action".

In December 1944 or January 1945, I had an opportunity to see a secret decree issued by Kaltenbrunner in the office of Gauleiter Giesler from a courier in my presence and after I had been permitted to read it it was destroyed in accordance with the classification to be destroyed after reading. The order which was signed by Kaltenbrunner read approximately as follows: "In agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS I have brought about and directed all higher police officers that all Germans shall go unpunished who in the future participate in the persecution and annihilation of enemy aircrews who parachute down".

Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant touch with him because he was greatly worried about the attitude of the foreign workers and especially inmates of concentration camps

Dachau, Muehldorf and Landsberg which were in the path of the approaching Allied armies. On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945, I received a telephone call from Gauleiter Giesler asking me to be available for a conversation that night. In the course of our personal conversation that night, I was told by Giesler that he had received a directive from Kaltenbrunner by order of the Fuehrer to work out a plan without delay for the liquidation of the concentration camp at Dachau and the two Jewish labor camps in Landsberg and Muehldorf. The Directive proposed to liquidate the two Jewish labor camps at Landsberg and Muehldorf by use of the German Luftwaffe, since the construction area of these camps had previously been the targets of repeated enemy air attacks. This action received the code name of "Wolke A 1" (Cloud A 1).

I was directed by Giesler to take up connections with General Galland regarding the execution of this plan. I had not met General Galland up to the time he stayed at the airport of Riem, therefore we invited him to dinner the next day at Soehaus (Kleinheseckloher See, Englischer Garten) together with a very small party of people. During the meal only questions of a general nature were discussed and the use of the new jet propelled fighter plane. On this occasion I was to agree on a date with Galland so that we could discuss the above mentioned operation. The conversation however never took place.

I attempted repeatedly to get in touch with men at the Fuehrer's Headquarters such as Walkenhorst, chief of the personal staff of Bormann, and Treitsch, go-between officer for Himmler and Bormann. I was finally able to make these calls although both were very brief. Walkenhorst informed me that he knew nothing of such an order by the Fuehrer, however, that he was going to make detailed inquiries and would call back. This second call did not materialize. The connection with Treitsch was very faint but he informed me that Kaltenbrunner was Himmler's deputy and that we had to comply absolutely with his directives.

Since I was not able to obtain the desired information from either of these two men, I tried to dissuade the Gauleiter from execution of this abominable plan. Finally Gauleiter Giesler informed me that I would have to let my conscience be my guide in the execution of this directive.

I was certain that I would never let this directive be carried out. As the action Wolke A 1 should have become operational already for some time, I was literally swamped by couriers from Kaltenbrunner and moreover I was supposed to have discussed the de-

tails of the Muehldorf and Landsberg actions in detail with the two Kreisleiters concerned. The couriers who were in most cases SS officers usually SS Lieutenants, gave me terse and strict orders to read and initial. The orders threatened me with the most terrible punishment including execution if I did not comply with them. However, I could always excuse my failure to execute the plan because of bad flying weather and lack of gasoline and bombs. Therefore, Kaltenbrunner ordered to have Jews in Landsberg marched to Dachau in order to include them in the Dachau extermination operations, and that the Muehldorf action was to be carried out by the Gestapo.

Kaltenbrunner also ordered an operation—*Wolkenbrand*—for the concentration camp Dachau which provided that the inmates of the concentration camp at Dachau were to be liquidated by poison with the exception of Aryan nationals of the Western Powers.

Gauleiter Giesler received this order direct from Kaltenbrunner and discussed in my presence the procurement of the required amounts of poison with Dr. Harrfeld, the Gau Health Chief. Dr. Harrfeld promised to procure these quantities when ordered and was advised to await my further directions. As I was determined to prevent the execution of this plan in any event, I gave no further instructions to Dr. Harrfeld.

The inmates of Landsberg had hardly been delivered at Dachau when Kaltenbrunner sent a courier declaring the action *Wolkenbrand* was operational.

I prevented the execution of the *Wolke A 1* and *Wolkenbrand* by giving Giesler the reason that the front was too close and asked him to transmit this on to Kaltenbrunner.

Kaltenbrunner therefore issued directives in writing to Dachau to transport all Western European prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into Oetztal (Tyrol), where the final liquidation of these prisoners was to take place without fail.

The Gauleiter informed me that Kaltenbrunner's office was literally enraged when I did not set upon the release of the code work *Wolkenbrand* and he informed me in the strictest confidence that I would have to be extremely careful, since the Gestapo was after me. It was clear to me from Kaltenbrunner's threats that my failure to execute his orders in regard to Operations *Wolke A 1* and *Wolkenbrand* would result in not only my personal extermination but also that of my wife and four children. Giesler insisted that I leave my home in Munich at once and stay in the un-

derground command posts of the Gauleiter under his personal protection.

On April 27, the Gauleiter made it possible for me to leave Munich under the pretext of official business in order to look after my family whom I unfortunately did not find again. I did not return to Munich.

10. Q. Did you have any further contact with Kaltenbrunner?

A. No.

/t/ JOHANNES IMHOFF

Special Agent.

I, Bertus Gerdes, being first duly sworn declare that I made the above statements voluntarily and that I was not under compulsion to make these statements. I furthermore declare that they are true and complete to the best of my knowledge and conscience and that they describe the facts such as they occurred.

/t/ Bertus Gerdes

Subscribed and sworn to before me

this 18th day of December 1945.

Captain A. Wulff, Infantry, AUS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3463-PS

DATES FROM THE HISTORY OF THE NSDAP, by Dr. Hans Volz (member of the cultural circle of the SA), 9th Unaltered edition, 1939, by H. G. Ploetz Berlin/Leipzig.

[The following are extracts from the inside of the front cover:]

No objections are raised by the N.S.D.A.P against the publication of this pamphlet.

Berlin 16th December 1938

(SGD)

The Chairman of the Official Party Commission for the examination and protection of NSDAP literature.

It is suggested that all organizations of the NSDAP, the institution "Strength through Joy" and all associated organizations should buy and recommend this publication.

Berlin 16th December 1938

Office of the Cultivation of literature with the plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for the whole spiritual and ideological education of the N.S.D.A.P.

[Page 41]

28th May [1932] In view of the imminent fall of Bruening at a meeting between the former Deputy of the Prussian Centre Party Franz von Papen and the Fuehrer in Berlin (First personal

contact in Spring 1932) ; the Fuehrer agrees that a Papen-Cabinet should be tolerated by the NSDAP, provided that the prohibitions imposed on the SA, uniforms and demonstrations be lifted and the Reichstag dissolved.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3464-PS

ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP

[Organisationsbuch der NSDAP], the Party Manual, 1936 and 1937 editions, edited by the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Page 262.

National Socialist Students League [NSD-Studentenbund]

The National Socialist German Students League is an organization of the NSDAP. It was established in 1926 by order of the Fuehrer.

The NSDStB [National Socialist German Students League] is the battle troop [Kampftrupp] of the National Socialist movement in the colleges and technical schools. The NSDStB replaces the outmoded forms of the former student education and of the former student community life [Gemeinschaftslebens] by educating students to become National Socialists who are closely tied to the people.

There has been conferred upon the National Socialist Students League by Party and State the high task of educating, ideologically and politically, all German students at universities and technical schools. From the entire group, those capable of and prepared for use will be accepted first as candidates, and after one or two terms of probation, as full members of the National Socialist Students League.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3465-PS

FRANK DIARY, 1940, Volume II, Pages 510 - 511

I am extremely glad, Mr. Reichscommissar and Reichsminister, to assure you in this hour of your departure that the months of our collaboration with you belong to the most precious memories of my life, and that your work in the Generalgovernment will be remembered forever in the building of the rising world government of the German nation. But, without that, your name, Mr. Reichsminister, is shining like a light through the history of the Third Reichs since you are the creator of the National-Socialist Austria, and the thought to have you here with us sounded all

the time like a beautiful symphony since we have to see just in you the representative of the Ostmarkic German National. My Party friend, Seyss-Inquart, without doubt you have to accomplish in your new great tasks a lot of duties in a broad frame. We know that you will do honor to the call of the Fuehrer through your personal efforts just as you did in the building up of your life. But we have a special right to you. We built up during the most difficult times of the fight of the Third Reich a beautiful friendly comradeship and successful collaboration. In the construction of the Generalgovernment your name will forever take a place of honor as an originator of this organization and this State system. I express our thanks, Mr. Reichsminister, for your collaboration and for your creative energy in the name of all officers, employees, and laborers of all SS organizations and the whole police force of the Generalgovernment, and in the name of the District Chiefs, the Gau and city leaders, in the name of all otherwise on the order of the Reichs and the Fuehrer her active persons * * * During the hard times the common work united us here in the East. But it is, at the same time, the beginning point for a gigantic power development of the German Reich. Its perfection will show the development of the greatest energy unit which there ever was in the history of the world. In this work you were placed by the Fuehrer very effectively in the most important position. Therefore, Party friend, Seyss-Inquart, your name will already today be immortal To prove my friendship I would like to give you, as my old friend and comrade, an old Germanic piece of ornament made from Polish soil.

Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart answered in the following words: * * * that I felt myself called to a task which had to be fulfilled in the East. You will understand if I say that, since my early youth, I was a part of the fight for the German Nation. Then came the transit time of the Higher Administration and Administration. I know that at that time somebody expressed the opinion it was impossible to place a Reichsminister under another office. When I heard this ridiculous rumor, I immediately told Party friend Hess, the representative of the Fuehrer, that I would of course go any place as a National-Socialist. Furthermore, it would be a satisfaction for myself if I could do that under Dr. Frank. A special memory connects Dr. Frank with us people from the Ostmark. It was at the time when the Dollfuss Regime started the fight against us. At that time Dr. Frank came to Vienna and in Austria his arrival was not expressly desired. For me it was at that time a special pleasure to welcome

Dr. Frank in the name of the Styrian Home Guard [Steirischen Heimatschutzes]. I think this was the last great demonstration. All the time after that we lived in the memory of this demonstration. For the whole period of our fight Dr. Frank was for us the conception of the National Socialistic will for leadership. Later, when the Anschluss came, Dr. Frank came to us as Reichsrechtsfuehrer and I was then happy that I was able to fulfill some tasks as a tool of the Fuehrer. I remember there a beautiful demonstration in Vienna. * * * At the time I was able to be here as representative of the Generalgovernment was one of great significance. I learned here a lot, many things which I did not understand before at all and mainly on account of the initiative and firm leadership as I saw them in my friend Dr. Frank. I always recognized this fact in the instinctive activities of the National-Socialist I will go now to the West and I want to be open to you. With a heart I am here because I am inclined with my whole attitude to the East. In the East we have a National-Socialistic mission; over there in the West we have a function; that may be the difference. * * * In the Third Reich I never found a better comradeship than with you. * * * I am glad that I have today still the opportunity on the occasion of your 40th birthday to tell you how close I felt with you * * * and you will always have me as your dearest friend.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3466-PS

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1029,
18 July 1935

Decree to Unite the Competences of Reich and Prussia
in Church Affairs 16 July 1935

The Church Affairs hitherto handled by the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior as well as the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education, and Training of the Population are transferred to Reich Minister without portfolio Kerrl.

Regarding the execution of this decree the Reich and Prussian Ministers concerned will determine a more specific stipulation.
Berlin, 16 July 1935

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

ADOLF HITLER

The Reich Minister for Science, Education and
Training of the Population

RUST

The Prussian Minister President

Acting for above

KOERNER

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3467-PS

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, NO. 57, PAGE 311

Law on the Limitation of Travel to the Republic Austria, 29 May 1933.

The Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung] has resolved the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Article 1

(1) A levy of 1000.— Reichsmark will be charged for every journey which is undertaken by a subject of the Reich with residence or permanent abode within Germany. The levy is to be paid before the start of the journey to the competent visa authorities, who will note the payment in the passport. The levy will go to the Reich treasury.

(2) The regulations of Section 1. do not apply to the small border traffic [kleine Grenzverkehr].

Article 2

A subject of the Reich, who crosses from the Reich territory into the territory of the Republic Austria directly or indirectly contrary to this law to the executory regulations to be published for it, will be punished with a monetary fine, not below 5,000 Reichsmark, or with imprisonment.

Article 3

The Reich Minister for the Interior will issue the regulations necessary for the execution of this law; he can permit exceptions for the regulations of Article 1, Section 1.

Article 4

The law comes into force on 1 June 1933.
Berlin, 29 May 1933.

The Reich Chancellor

ADOLF HITLER

The Reich Minister for the Interior

FRICK

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3468-PS

DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS

[Dokumente der Deutschen Politik]

1939, Part 2, Berlin, 1940, Pages 674-682.

129. First decree of the Governor General Dr. Frank of October 26, 1939 concerning the establishment of the administration of the occupied Polish territories.

On the basis of article 5, paragraph 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of October 12, 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories I decree:

Article 1

The General-Government for the occupied territories includes the territories occupied by German troops, insofar as they are not incorporated into the German Reich.

Article 2

The Headquarters of the Governor General is in Krakow.

Article 3

(1) The Chief of the Office of the Governor General and the Senior SS and Police Leader are directly subordinated to the Governor General and his deputy.

(2) Divisions for work on the various administrative branches will be formed in the office of the Governor General.

(3) The Commanders of the Police and the Commander of the SD are subordinated to the Senior SS and Police Leader.

Article 4

The General-Government is divided into four districts: Krakow, Lublin, Radom and Warsaw.

Article 5

(1) At the head of the districts is the District Chief. The District Chief directs the entire administration of the district in the name of the Governor General.

(2) The Chief of the office of the District Chief and the SS and Police Leader are directly subordinated to the District Chief.

Article 6

(1) The districts are divided into Landkreise and Stadtkreise. At the head of the Landkreise is the Kreishauptmann. He directs the entire administration of the Landkreis.

(2) Special regulations are issued concerning the administration of the cities and communities.

Article 7

The General-Government is the holder of special rights and obligations. It is represented by the Governor General and the authorities empowered by him.

Article 8

(1) The hitherto existing Polish law remains in effect, insofar as it is not contrary to the taking over of the administration by the German Reich and the exercising of military rights of sovereignty.

(2) The Law effected by the Supreme Commander of the Army and Offices empowered by him remains in force, insofar as it has not become void of application through establishment of the General Government.

Article 9

The official language in the General Government is German. The Polish language is permitted.

Article 10

(1) The decrees of the Governor General will be announced in the official gazette for the occupied Polish territories in the German and Polish languages. The German text is authoritative for the interpretation.

(2) The decrees go into effect, insofar as nothing else is defined, the day after their announcement.

130. Degree by Governor General Dr. Frank of 26 October, 1929 concerning the establishment of the judiciary in the General Government.

On the basis of Art. 5, Par. 1, of the decree by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 12 October 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territory, I decree.

Art 1

In the General-Government German and Polish court procedure exists,

Art 2

(1) The task of the German court procedure is to punish the attacks on the safety and reputation of the German Reich and its people, as well as on the lives, health, and the property of German national adherents.

(2) The German national adherents are subjected to German court procedure in their entire relations with judicial matters.

(3) The sentences of the German courts are passed in the name of the German people.

Art 3

Legally enforceable decisions of a Polish court may be subjected to an investigation by the German judges.

The German judge may hand the case over to the German court procedure by voiding the sentence.

Art 4

The courts shall assume their activity after the territorial borders of the General-Government have been definitely established.

Art 5

The rules necessary for the execution of these decrees are released by the executive of the judicial department in the office of the General Government.

131a. Decree of Governor General Dr. Frank of 26 October 1939, concerning the introduction of forced labor among the Polish population of the General Government.

* * * * *

(5) Through Art. 1 of the decree of 14 December 1939, concerning the execution of forced labor among the Polish population in the General Government. (Verordnungsblatt G.G.P.Sp. 224), the Chiefs of the district were authorized "to extend the forced labor among the Polish residents in the General Government to youths between the fourteenth and eighteenth year."

131b. Decree of Governor General Dr. Frank of 26 Oct 39 concerning the establishment of forced labor for the Jewish population of the General-Government.

On the basis of Article 5 Paragraph 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 12 Oct 39 concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories I decree:

Article 1

For the Jews domiciled in the General-Government forced labor, is established, to take effect immediately for this purpose the Jews are to be concentrated into Forced Labor Troops.

Article 2

The regulations required for the execution of this decree are issued by the Senior SS and Police Leader. He can fix territories east of the Vistula where the execution of this decree is not carried out.

134. Decree of the Governor General Dr. Frank as of 23 November 1938, concerning the markings of Jews and Jewesses in the General Government.

On the basis of Art. 5, Par. 1, by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor as of 12 October 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territory (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 2077), I order

Art 1

All Jews and Jewesses who are residing in the General Government and who are over ten years of age are required from 1 December 1939 on to wear on the right sleeve of their clothing a white band at least ten centimeters in width marked with the Star of Zion.

Art 2

These armbands are to be procured by the Jews and Jewesses themselves and marked with the corresponding sign.

Art 3

(1) Violations are punished by imprisonment.

(2) The Special Courts are competent for the trial.

The necessary rules for its execution are released by the executive of the Department of Internal Administration in the office of the General Government.

135. Decree of the Governor General Dr. Frank of 23 Nov 39 concerning the specification of businesses within the General Government.

Based upon Article 5, Par. I of the Decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor of 12 October 1939 concerning the administration of the occupied Polish areas (Reichsgesetzblatt I, pp. 2077) I decree:

Article 1.

Businesses whose owners are Germans have to be identified as German businesses. They may also carry Polish firm names.

Article 2

Businesses whose owners are Poles have to carry Polish firm names. They may also be provided with a German firm name.

Article 3

Jewish businesses are to be identified with the Star of Zion in such a manner that it will be plainly visible from the street; they are not allowed German firm names.

Article 4

(1) Violations will be punished by imprisonment.

(2) The Special Courts are competent for the trial.

AFFIDAVIT OF HANS FRITZSCHE

Nurnberg, 7 January 1946

I, Hans Fritzsche, at present a defendant before the International Military Tribunal, herewith declare and state the following after having consulted my defense lawyer:

1. My name is Hans Fritzsche. I was born on 21 April 1900, at Bochum, Westphalia. I attended the classical high school [Humanistisches Gymnasium] in Halle/Saale, Breslau, and Leipzig. Afterwards, I studied history, philosophy, and economics.

2. I started my practical work in 1923 as editor of the Prussian Yearbooks (Economic-Political Review) [Preussische Jahrbuecher] [Wirtschaftspolitische Rundschau]. I held this position for about one year. The publisher of this periodical was Dr. Walther Schotte.

3. I did not belong to any party, after I had resigned in 1923 from the German National Peoples Party [Deutschnationale Volkspartei] in which I had been a member for hardly a half year. In the years 1923 and 1924, that means before I joined the Telegraph Union International News Agency Company [Telegraphen-Union Internationalen Nachrichten G.m.b.H.], I did not write for other papers or periodicals.

My way from the so-called Hugenberg press to the Propaganda Ministry was as follows:

4. To my knowledge, the Alfred Hugenberg Enterprises consisted mainly of the following enterprises or groups of enterprises: Universal Film Corporation [Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA)]; Vera Publishing House Incorporated [Vera Verlagsanstalt GmbH]; Deulig Film Corporation [Deulig-Film A.-G.]; Telegraph-Union International News Incorporated [Telegraphen-Union Internationale Nachrichten GmbH]; (abbreviated "T.U." and commonly called the Telegraph Union; after the Wolff Telegraph Agency, the "T.U." was the most important news agency in Germany); The Foreign Company [Auslands-GmbH]; Foreign Advertising Company [Auslands-Anzeigen-GmbH]; Ala-Haassenstein & Vogler Company [Ala-Haassenstein & Vogler GmbH] Darlehens Mutual Newspaper Bank [Zeitungsbank Mutuum Darlehens A-G] (for investment in and credit for newspapers; this bank also exercised control over a great number of daily newspapers); Provincial Press Service [Wirtschaftsstelle der Provinzpresse] (Wipro) (For producing printed correspondence and ready-made printed mats); West End Publishing Company [Westend-Verlag GmbH]; German Picture Company [Deutsche Lichtbildgesellschaft]. The Hugenberg concern was by far

the largest and most influential press concern in Germany. Alfred Hugenberg was a member of the German National Assembly and of the Reichstag from 1920 until after the seizure of power in 1933. He was chairman of the executive committee of the German National Peoples Party [Deutschnationale Volkspartei] from 1928 until its dissolution in 1933. He became Reich Minister of Economics in the Papen government in 1932. He remained a member of the Hitler cabinet from 30 January 1933 up to the complete seizure of power in March 1933.

5. From 1924 until 1932 I was an editor with the Telegraph Union. The Telegraph Union belonged to and was controlled by the Alfred Hugenberg Enterprises. I worked there as chief editor of foreign letters, a service of foreign articles for German newspapers. Besides that, I wrote leading articles almost daily for several domestic services of the same publishing concern mostly dealing with the foreign political questions, frequently writing against the Treaty of Versailles. This treaty at this time was being discussed constantly in Geneva and other cities. The newspapers and periodicals which printed my articles belonged to all parties reaching from the Centrum [Zentrum] and to the National Socialist Party. Mostly, however, they belonged to the so-called "Generalanzeigertyp", a middleclass, national and moderate group of newspapers represented in almost all greater German provincial cities.

6. In the late summer of 1932, probably in August, the director of the Telegraph Union, Otto Mejer (Korvetten Kapitän a.D.), asked me whether I would like to take over the management of the radio news service of the so-called Wireless Service. Mejer had been asked by a member of the Papen government—whose name I do not know—to release me for this purpose, because the incumbent editor and chief, Dr. Josef Rauescher, was politically unbearable. After a first examination I rejected this offer. Subsequently, Dr. Rauescher, whom I had known for quite some time and who was already my predecessor as editor and chief for the foreign letters with the Telegraph Union, paid me a visit. He advised me to accept the assignment and promised to introduce me for some few months into a field which was entirely new to me. For my part, he asked me to help him to get a position as a German correspondent abroad. Now I accepted the offer, dissolved the contract with TU, with the condition that I could return after one year. I signed a new contract with the Reich Radio Corporation which managed the Wireless Service (the Reich Radio Corporation was owned by the Reich and was managed under the

supervision of a committee consisting of all parties). Dr. Rauer signed a contract as Paris correspondent with the democratic Berliner-Tageblatt which was owned by the Jewish publishing house Mosse.

7. In September 1932 I began to make broadcasts to the German people under the program called "Political Newspaper Review" over the following stations: Deutschland Sender, Stuttgart, Koenigsberg, Breslau, Koeln. My broadcasts were quotations of the opinions of the newspapers of all parties on current events. While I worked for the Wireless Service, I wrote only infrequently articles for the Telegraph Union.

8. In September 1932, assisted in a friendly way by Dr. Rauer, I took over my new office. I did not make a single change in the editor's staff or the other kind of personnel. Among the entire personnel of about 30 persons there were about five Jews and Jewesses.

9. I was acquainted with Dr. Goebbels since 1928. Apparently he had taken a liking to me, besides the fact that in my press activities I had always treated the National Socialists in a friendly way until 1931. Already before 1933, Goebbels, who was the editor of the "Attack" [Angriff], a Nazi newspaper, had frequently made flattering remarks about the form and content of my work, which I did as contributor of many "national" newspapers and periodicals, among which were also reactionary papers and periodicals.

10. On the evening of 30 January 1933, the radio chief Dressler-Andrees and his collaborator Sadila-Mantau approached me upon request of the National Socialists, the new government party. They declared that their superior, the propaganda chief of the party, Dr. Goebbels, was still angry at me on account of an essay under the title of "Potempa". In this article I had taken publicly a sharp position against Hitler, after Hitler had sent a telegram of sympathy to several Nazis sentenced on account of political murder. They said Goebbels was also still angry on account of my position against the Nazis concerning an organizational question, the explanation of which here would lead too far. They added that Dr. Goebbels respected my public success since the previous autumn on the radio, and that he would like to keep me if I would comply with several conditions.

11. I should dismiss immediately without notice the Jews and also dismiss the remaining employees by 1 April 1933 in order to replace all of them by party members. I refused the first by re-

ferring to contracts and to the fact that except for the Jewish editor Frank, all Jews were only technical auxiliary employees. Moreover, that personnel contracts were not signed by me but by the personnel division of the Reich Radio Corporation which was superior to me. As a matter of fact I succeeded in that not a single Jew was given notice. Nevertheless, during the following three months they were looking for other positions because the demand of the party was not kept a secret. A Jewish secretary went to London, three of them found employment with the publishing house Mosse, and Frank, through Ræuscher's help, found work in Paris. All of them got their salaries paid in full; several of them, for instance the wife of Mr. Frank, thanked me for the protection against this dismissal without notice. The dismissal of the other employees I had likewise refused. However, I agreed to the hiring of one National Socialist. This was Sadila-Mantau. After this I was left undisturbed for about two months with the exception of four to five assault-like [ueberfallartigen] visits by SA Troops. They always asked to give news through the radio which I prevented with some trouble. From 13 January 1933 until April 1933 I gave regularly radio broadcasts, at least once weekly. In my radio speeches, I supported the coalition government, at this time consisting of German Nationalists and National Socialists.

12. About the beginning of April 1933, Dr. Goebbels, who in the meantime on 17 March 1933 had become Minister for Peoples Enlightenment and Propaganda, called me. He proposed to take out the Wireless Service from the Reich Radio Corporation and to bring it into his new ministry. Deadline, the 1st of May. At another meeting we discussed the personnel which should be transferred into the ministry. After a long discussion, Dr. Goebbels agreed that almost all editors could come with me. I remember still the names Dr. Kuehner, Zentrum party, and Thormeier, member of no party, who were taken over. I became a member of the NSDAP on the 1st of May 1933 and remained an NSDAP member until the collapse in 1945. When I joined the Propaganda ministry I had to hire only two secretaries who were party members. The two secretaries whom I thereby had to dismiss, Misses Kiepsch and Krueger, I placed with the Reich Radio Corporation, where they were still in higher positions at the beginning of 1945. The editor Hartmann, a Social Democrat, I could place there likewise after a certain period, where he was still working until the end of the war. The editor Eckert, a Democrat, who had some

Jewish ancestors, I could not place immediately. For about one to two years he had to fight very hard as a free lance writer. Then, however, I could place him with the Transocean Agency, which was under my official supervision. At the collapse he was still there in a good position.

13. When at the end of April 1933 I reported to Dr. Goebbels that I had accomplished the reorganization, which was based on many technical and organizational changes, and when I asked him for his permission to return to my position with the Telegraph Union, or to be permitted to work as a free lance writer, he asked me to stay. My salary had to be reduced from 1500 marks monthly to 700 marks per month. Things like that happened in the ministry and one could not avoid it. But he wanted to add to my present work as editor a very interesting task, namely, the reorganization of the various small German news agencies such as the Transocean Company, Europa Press, Fast Service Company [Eildienst G.m.b.H.] which had nearly all gone to sleep. In view of this task, which to me as an expert was very interesting, I accepted his offer to join his ministry. Next, as head of the Wireless Service of the Reich Radio Corporation, I entered the press division of the Reich Ministry for Peoples Enlightenment and Propaganda with the greater part of my staff. This is an honest presentation of the circumstances under which I came into the propaganda ministry from the Hugenberg press. Many of my former colleagues from the Wireless Service were able to remain in their old positions or to find employment with the propaganda ministry. In some few cases I could assist them by virtue of my governmental position. My former colleagues from the Telegraph Union were almost without exception taken over in the Deutsche Nachrichten Bureau [D.N.B.], established by the fusion between Telegraph Union and the Wolff News Agency.

To clarify my functions and relations within the propaganda ministry I herewith submit the following statement:

14. The main division of the propaganda ministry for the spreading and control of news was the "Press Division of the Reich Cabinet" [Presseabteilung der Reichsregierung] which was headed by Dr. Otto Dietrich from the summer of 1938 until February 1945. This division was composed, since 1938, of three subdivisions, namely: "German Press Division" by far the most important and largest; "Periodical Press Division"; and "Foreign Press Division". Successive heads of the German Press Division were Privy Counsellor [Geheimrat] Walter Alexander Heide,

from about March 1933 until June 1933; Ministerial Counsellor [Ministerialrat] Dr. Kurt Jahncke, from June 1933 until about 1935; Ministerial Director [Ministerialdirektor] Alfred Ingemar Berndt, from about 1935 up to 23 December 1938; I myself, from 23 December 1938 up to 3 November 1942; Ministerial Counsellor Erich Fischer, from 3 November 1942 until February 1945; deputy heads of the German Press Division were successively: Ministerial Counsellor Werner Stephan, from 1933 until about 1938; Ministerial Counsellor Dr. Hans Brauweiler, from about the beginning of 1938 up to about June 1938; myself, from June 1933 up to 23 December 1938.

15. During the whole period, from 1933 up to 1945, it was the task of the German Press Division to supervise the entire domestic press and to provide it with directives by which this division became an efficient instrument in the hands of the German State leadership. More than 2300 German daily newspapers were subject to this control. The aim of this supervision and control, in the first years following 1933, was to change basically the conditions existing in the press before the seizure of power. That meant the coordination into the New Order [Neuen Ordnung] of those newspapers and periodicals which were in the service of capitalistic special interests or party politics. While the administrative functions wherever possible were exercised by the professional associations and the Reich Press Chamber, the political leadership of the German press was entrusted to the German Press Division. The head of the German Press Division held daily press conferences in the ministry for the representatives of all German newspapers. Hereby all instructions were given to the representatives of the press. These instructions were transmitted daily, almost without exception, and mostly by telephone, from headquarters by Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich Press Chief, in a fixed statement, the so-called "Daily Parole of the Reich Press Chief". Before the statement was fixed the head of the German Press Division submitted to him (Dietrich) the current press wishes expressed by Dr. Goebbels and by other ministries. This was the case especially with the wishes of the Foreign Office about which Dr. Dietrich always wanted to make decisions personally or through his representatives at the headquarters, Helmut Suendermann and chief editor Lorenz. The practical use [Auswertung] of the general directions [Ausrichtung] in detail was thus left entirely to the individual work of the individual editor; therefore, it is by no means true that the newspapers and periodicals were a monopoly of the German Press division or that essays and lead-

ing articles through it (German Press Division) had to be submitted to the ministry. Even in war times this happened in exceptional cases only. The less important newspapers and periodicals which were not represented at the daily press conferences received their information in a different way—by providing them either with ready-made articles and reports, or with a confidential printed instruction. The publications of all other official agencies were directed and coordinated likewise by the German Press Division. To enable the periodicals to get acquainted with the daily political problems of newspapers and to discuss these problems in greater detail, the “Informationskorrespondenz” was issued especially for periodicals. Later on it was taken over by the Periodical Press Division. The German Press Division likewise was in charge of pictorial reporting insofar as it directed the employment of pictorial reporters at important events. In this way, and conditioned by the current political situation, the entire German press was made a permanent instrument of the propaganda ministry by the German Press Division. Thereby, the entire German press was subordinate to the political aims of the government. This was exemplified by the timely measuring and the emphatic presentation of such press polemics as appeared to be most useful as shown for instance in the following themes: the class struggle of the system era [Systerzeit]; the leadership principle and the authoritarian state; the party and interest politics of the system era; the Jewish problem; the conspiracy of world Jewry; the bolshevist danger; the plutocratic democracy abroad; the race problem generally; the church; the economic misery abroad; the foreign policy; and living space [Lebensraum].

16. Finally there was a main section “Archiv und Lectorat” attached to the German Press Division. This main section employed about 30 people. Within this main section the basis was laid for the entire work of the division by production of newspaper clippings, excerpts from and condensing of the contents of domestic and foreign newspapers and periodicals. The material thus obtained was also put at the disposal to the highest Reich authorities regularly, and, if especially requested, also in single cases. In another working group “Room 24” all new information, inquiries, and counter-questions were centralized within a day and night service established for this special purpose. Here was the main nerve of the entire division. With this presentation of the organization and tasks of the German Press Division, I am now able to describe my own position within the propaganda ministry:

17. As mentioned before, I joined the Press Division of the Reich ministry on 1 May 1933 as head of the Wireless Service of the Reich Radio Corporation. At this time Dr. Goebbels suggested to me, as a specialist on news technique, the establishment and direction of a section "News" within the Press Division of his ministry, in order to organize fully and to modernize the German news agencies. In executing the assignment given to me by Dr. Goebbels I took for my field the entire news field for the German press and the radio in accordance with the directions given by the propaganda ministry, at first with the exception of D.N.B. I achieved this reorganization and modernization with the assistance of the following persons, methods and technical means: (1) Examination of the efficiency of the offices compared to foreign competition; (2) Improvement of their news supply; (3) Increase of the funds granted by the Reich to these bureaus from 400,000 to 4,000,000 marks; (4) hiring of good experts, for instance from the United Press; (5) speeding up the elaboration of news; (6) elimination of delaying censorship; (7) generous introduction of teletype and radio-writing [Schreibfunk]; (8) within the ministry for this purpose I had not one collaborator; (9) for Transocean I hired the chief editor von Homeyer, formerly in Cairo; for Europa Press I hired the chief editor Roesgen, formerly in Paris. The directions of the propaganda ministry which I had to follow were essentially the following: (1) increase of German news copy abroad at any cost; (2) No gratis offer to foreign newspapers in order to avoid suspicion of propaganda; (3) avoiding mutual competition at one and the same place abroad; (4) spreading of favorable news on the internal construction and peaceful intentions of the national socialist system. At a later period, about summer 1934, the fusion of the Telegraph Union and of the Wolff Telegraph Agency (WTB) (the most important news agencies) into D.N.B. was achieved by the then Reich press chief Funk. I was never chief editor of the news agency D.N.B. nor was I employed therein in another capacity. Chief editor, respectively director, of the German News Bureau (D.N.B.) was to my knowledge, from its establishment in about 1934 up to 1945, Dr. Gustav Albrecht, a former director of W.T.B.; the former director of the Telegraph Union, Otto Mejer, who at first was also general manager of D.N.B., resigned later on. Head of the radio division of the propaganda ministry were successively to my knowledge: Ministerial Counsellor Horst Dressler-Andress, Eugen Hadamovsky, Alfred Ingemar Berndt, Hans Gottfried Kriegler, Wolfgang Diewerge up to 3 November 1942; and later

up to 1945, I myself. As head of the "Section News" I extended the business of Transocean agency and erected several new modern short-wave senders. I intensified the activity of the Europa-Press agency and I put the economic news information within the Fast Service Company [Eildienst G.m.b.H.] on a new basis. The Transocean Agency was owned before and afterwards by the Reich; it was directed by chief editor Schredler. The Europa-Press was owned before and afterwards by the Reich and was directed by chief editor Fleischer. The Fast Service Company [Eildienst G.m.b.H.] was owned before and afterwards by the Reich and directed by Ministerial Counsellor Puhmann. Around 1937 I coordinated the work of these offices within the inland Europe and overseas foreign countries with each other and in relationship to DNB. With this office I conflicted the first time by establishing a wireless television radio. The task of the section, until that period, was therefore a purely journalistic, organizational one; actual political directives were only given by the head of the press division or by his delegate to the news agencies.

18. When I joined the ministry, the task was limited in time. It was, however, prolonged from year to year. For almost four years I refused to become a government employee of the ministry. I remained as a private employee with mutual right of notice. I remember having refused several times, in writing, an appointment as government counsellor and thus becoming a government employee as intended by Dr. Goebbels. Finally, however, I was so caught by the fine and free work which I could do in the field of organizing the news from 1933 to 1937, that I agreed to my appointment as superior government counsellor (Oberregierungsrat) and thus as a government employee, keeping the old field of work. So far as my income was concerned during my activity within the propaganda ministry, I take this opportunity to declare the following: After May 1933, as an employee in the ministry, I drew a salary of 700 marks monthly. Beyond this I had a monthly income of about 300 to 500 marks for my work with radio and from contributions to newspapers and periodicals. From 1937, after having become a government employee of the propaganda ministry, I drew, until 1945, a salary slowly increasing from 600 marks (as superior government counsellor) up to about 1500 marks (as ministerial director). Here has to be added the very greatly changing single fees averaging monthly about 1000 marks. After 1942 almost all such income ceased.

19. After having become head of the German Press Division, around 23 December 1938, I still had until about the middle of 1939 the possibility to comment freely on the daily paroles [Tagesparolen] in the press conference, while after the middle of 1939 I had to stick to the directions given by Dr. Dietrich. About the summer of 1939 I had established within the German Press Division a section called "Speed-Service" [Schnelldienst]. This "Speed Service" was under the direction of superior government counsellor [Oberregierungsrat] Walther Koerber with a personnel finally of 6 persons. At the start it had the task of checking the correctness of news from foreign countries. Later on, about the Fall of 1939, this section also elaborated on collecting materials which were put at the disposal of the entire German press. For instance, dates from the British colonial policy, from political statements of the British prime minister in former times, descriptions of social distress in hostile countries, etc. Almost all German newspapers used such material as a basis for their polemics. Hereby was achieved a great unification within the fighting front of the German press. The title "Speed Service" was chosen because materials for current comments were supplied with unusual speed.

20. In my position as head of the German Press Division, I was promoted three times within four years. To my knowledge: (a) from superior government counsellor to ministerial counsellor on 28 January 1939, (b) from ministerial counsellor to ministerial dirigent on 9 October 1940, (c) from ministerial dirigent to ministerial director on 16 October 1942.

21. I remained in my position as head of the German press division until 3 November 1942, though from March 1942 until the above mentioned day I belonged to the armed forces. During my service in the army I was in a loose connection with a propaganda company (P.K.) of the armed forces, as soldier with a fighting unit in the Eastern war theater until October 1942. During this period I made broadcasts only three or four times. The acting head of the German press division at that period was in the hands of my deputy, Erich Fischer. Fischer became my successor on 3 November 1942 as head of the German press division. As to the direction of propaganda concerning important foreign political events between 1936 and 1941 I am able to state the following:

22. Since a long time before the outbreak of the war, all instructions given to the newspapers were summarized daily in the so-called daily parole of the Reich press chief. Also the fast in-

structions [Eilanweisungen] issued in the meantime were always incorporated into the next scheduled daily parole, in order to guarantee its completeness. Copies of this daily parole were mailed to each Reich propaganda office. All leading papers received these directives which under the responsibility of the chief editor had to be locked up and kept.

23. In regard to the reoccupation of the demilitarized Rhineland, on 16 March 1936, no propaganda whatsoever was made in advance. I, then chief editor of the Wireless Service, learned of the expected action only on the eve of the invasion from Dr. Goebbels in the presence of Undersecretary [Staatssekretaer] Hanke, later Gauleiter of Silesia. Dr. Goebbels had me called around midnight, described the situation, and asked me to work out [herauszuarbeiten] over the radio as strongly as possible the Franco-Russian agreement as the foreign-political justification of the action. Besides that, he asked me to indicate that the Fuehrer did not consider the other treaties violated, and therefore had decided to keep them. For the press, similar instructions were received by the deputy head of the Press Division, Ministerial Counsellor Stephan, in my presence. The then head of the press division, Ministerial Director Alfred Ingemar Berndt, was already on his way to Cologne with some journalists whom he had called together very quickly. I learned that only in the ministry. Likewise on his way to Cologne, together with some radio specialists, was the then Reich broadcasting director Hadamovsky. Their current reports soon dominated press and radio. The action developed propagandistically [propagandistisch] on the next day without special instructions. I remember only that the question as to whether the French would march was not supposed to be mentioned and discussed in the press.

24. The propaganda in relationship to the Dollfuss Putsch, which took place on the 25 July 1934, is summarized in the following way: I learned at noon about the announcements which the rebels had spread over the Vienna radio. After a careful examination I gave them over the radio by quoting with reserve. Dr. Goebbels requested me to spread information about the extension and success of the rebellion, which was offered by the so-called Nazi state leader of Austria, Habicht. I refused this because I had recognized his first announcement as wrong and exaggerated. Subsequently, Dr. Goebbels relieved me from my office and installed Habicht as responsible for the radio news. He (Habicht) gave information over the German radio stations which was in-

tended to promote the Austrian rebellion movement. When by evening the Putsch was wrecked, I was picked up from my apartment and again took over my office.

25. The incorporation of Austria brought, however, some more complicated problems. Since the Putsch failed against Dollfuss, it was forbidden for the press, with some few exemptions, to occupy itself with Austria at all. Only shortly before the visit of Schuschnigg with Hitler in February 1938, this prohibition was lifted and single, but sharp articles appeared about the Schuschnigg government. The Schuschnigg government was reproached as being alien to the Austrian people, with cruelty in the Woelldersdorf concentration camp, and with reliance upon powers hostile to Germany. After the conversation there appeared friendly articles.

26. The news about the sudden setting of a national vote by Schuschnigg was at first withheld by the German News Agency (D.N.B.) by direction of Berndt. After a discussion with Dr. Dietrich, press chief to the Fuehrer, and with Privy Counsellor Aschmann, then press chief of the foreign office, Berndt, finally released information. In addition, however, he instructed all German newspapers to bring this information with big headlines, and to ear-mark it as a breach of agreement with the Fuehrer. All newspapers, which still appeared up to the beginning of the invasion, then brought details about the new fashioned fast vote of the Austrian National Socialists, etc. After the accomplishment of the invasion, which took place on the 13 March 1938, the newspapers and radio were full of the speeches which were held and with reports by eye witnesses. The reports came from some dozen journalists who had quickly been called together and who had been sent in airplanes and cars to follow the so-called Fuehrer column. A complete collection of all news issued in relationship to the whole action by the German news agency (DNB) has been published in book form by Frithjof Melzer. The end and summarization of the entire Austrian action was then presented in a report by Gericke, which was issued in the Berlin Illustrated Newspaper under the slogan "Thus it does not go, Mr. Bundeskanzler."

27. The most decisive issue was the role of German propaganda before the Munich agreement on the Sudetenland, which was occupied on 1 October 1938. This propaganda was directed by Berndt. The action, which at first did not appear to me as an action, started with the lifting of the prohibition, which existed for

years in the German press against occupying itself critically with Czechoslovakia. Since about the summer of 1938 the press was asked in the daily directions to busy itself with the problems of the different nationalities of the population of Czechoslovakia, another time with the anti-German orientation of the policy of this state, etc. Especially carefully studied was the entire foreign press, from the standpoint of whether and how it reacted to the same questions. If some useful headings appeared abroad, then by direction they were taken up by the entire German press; or if it appeared more correct, they were taken up by one or another of the well-reputed newspapers or writers. The mission of Runci-man offered especially good reason for this. Each time during a conference or discussion—Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, Muenchen—there was transmitted to the press instructions for the most sensational make-up of reports about the suppression or deprivation of the rights of Sudeten Germans, also about reports on current incidents. These latter represented a very ticklish chapter. They were personally made by Berndt and given to the German News Agency (DNB). He exaggerated minor events very strongly, used sometimes old episodes as new. There even came complaints from the Sudetenland itself that much of the news reported in the German press was untrustworthy. As a matter of fact after the great foreign political success of Munich in September 1938, there came a noticeable crisis in the confidence of the German people to the trustworthiness of its press. This was one reason for the recalling of Berndt in December 1938 after conclusion of the Sudeten action and for my appointment as head of the German Press Division. Beyond this Berndt, by his admittedly successful but still primitive military-like orders to the German press, had lost the confidence of the German editors.

28. The action for the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia, which took place on the 15 March 1939, while I was head of the German Press Division, was not prepared for such a long period as the Sudeten action. According to my memory it was in February that I received the order from the Reich press chief, Dr. Dietrich, which was repeated as a request by the envoy Paul Schmidt of the foreign office, to bring the attention of the press to the efforts for independence of Slovakia and to the continued anti-German coalition politics of the Prague government. I did this. The daily paroles of the Reich press chief and the press conference minutes at that time show the wording of the corresponding instructions. These were the typical headlines of leading

newspapers and the emphatic leading articles of the German daily press at that time: (1) The terrorizing of Germans within the Czech territories by arrest, shooting of Germans by the state police, destruction and damaging of German homes by Czech gangsters; (2) the concentration of Czech forces on the Sudeten frontier; (3) the kidnapping, deporting and persecuting of Slovakian minorities by the Czechs; that the Czechs must get out of Slovakia; (4) secret meetings of Red functionaries in Prague. Some few days before the visit of Hacha, I received the instruction to publish in the press very emphatically the incoming news on the unrest in Czechoslovakia. Such information I received only partly from the German News Agency (D.N.B.). Mostly it came from the Press Division of the foreign office and some of it came from big newspapers with their own news service. Among the newspapers offering information was above all the Voelkischer Beobachter which, as I learned later on, received its information from the SS Standartenfuehrer Gunter D'Alquen. He was at this time in Pressburg. I had forbidden all news agencies and newspapers to issue news on unrest in Czechoslovakia before I had seen it. I wanted to avoid a repetition of the very annoying results of the Sudeten action propaganda (Sudeten-Aktion-Propaganda) and I did not want to suffer a loss of prestige caused by untrue news. Thus, all news checked by me was admittedly full of tendency (voller Tendenz), however not invented. After the visit of Hacha in Berlin and after the beginning of the invasion of the German army, which took place on 15 March 1939, the German press had enough material for describing those events. Historically and politically the event was justified with the indication that the declaration of independence of Slovakia had required an interference and that Hacha with his signature had avoided a war and had reinstalled a thousand year union between Bohemia and the Reich.

29. The action against Memel, which took place on 22 March 1939, came somewhat later. It was such a surprise for me and for the press that some of the representatives of the press quickly dispatched by me were only able to see in Swinemunde the departure of the ship with which Hitler went to Memel.

30. Very complicated and changing was the press and propagandistic treatment in the case of Poland. Under the influence of the German-Polish Agreement, it was generally forbidden in the German press for many years to publish anything on the situation of the German minority in Poland. This remained also the case when in the spring of 1939 the German press was asked

to become somewhat more active as to the problem of Danzig. Also, when the first Polish-English conversations took place and when the German press was instructed to use a sharper tone against Poland, the question of the German minority still remained in the background. But during the summer this problem was picked up again and created immediately a noticeable sharpening of the situation, namely, each larger German newspaper had for quite some time an abundance of material on complaints of the Germans in Poland without the editors having had a chance to use this material. The German papers from the time of the minority discussion at Geneva, still had correspondents or free collaborators in Kattowitz, Bromberg, Posen, Thorn, etc. Their material now came forth with a bound. Concerning this the leading German newspapers, on the basis of directions given out in the so-called "daily parole", brought out the following publicity with great emphasis: (1) Cruelty and terror against Germans and the extermination of Germans in Poland; (2) forced labor of thousands of German men and women in Poland; (3) Poland, land of servitude and disorder; the desertion of Polish soldiers; the increased inflation in Poland; (4) provocation of frontier clashes upon direction of the Polish government; the Polish lust to conquer; (5) persecution of Czechs and Ukrainians by Poland. The Polish press replied particularly sharply. When the German press during August wanted to write with steadily increasing strongness against Poland, the material for this was only too easy to get. The Polish newspapers, especially the papers of the Polish Westmark Association, had made simple slanders before the German press. They wrote that Germany so far had not had a real opponent; that Poland, however, would remain tough and would show how the German armed forces could only win in "flower wars"; how Germany was only a giant on very slippery ground, and how there would be a victorious battle of annihilation before the gates of Berlin. The German press quoted all these Polish reactions and received the order to trace this strong Polish language to the influence of the open British promise of assistance, the so-called blank power of authority [Blankovollmacht]. The German press, at this time and also later, had the opinion that the Polish sharpness was directed at the small demands of Hitler for Danzig and for a road through the Corridor.

31. On 1 September, the day of the beginning of the battle against Poland, Hitler's speech in the Reichstag gave the instructions for the press, especially as to the ticklish problem of the attitude of the Western powers. On Saturday, 2 September 1939,

late in the night, I went home with the assurance given to me by Goebbels, by Dietrich, and by the representative of the foreign office, that there would be no war. By the intervention of Mussolini, the German armies were to stop their advance. Germany, England, and France had accepted the suggestion which should give time for conference. On Sunday I was called from my bed by a telephone call from Goebbels, hastened to the ministry, found there Dr. Goebbels before a microphone which was already turned on. Dumbfounded, I took the manuscript which he asked me to read. Only when reading it I noticed what was going on—the proclamations of the Fuehrer on the entering of the war by England and France. When I left the microphone I found numerous representatives of the press who were highly alarmed by the radio news just read by me. I had to hold a press conference. Quickly I tried to get some orientation from Dr. Goebbels or Dr. Dietrich, from the Fuehrer's house or from the foreign office. I received none. Thus, without information or instructions, I was forced to hold the first press conference in war time. Therefore, I restricted myself to giving some words of consolation, of courage, and of confidence in God to the press and highly perplexed journalists, and also to give some words of confidence in our cause which I at that time firmly believed to be just and conducted with a will for peace.

32. During the period immediately preceding the invasion of Yugoslavia, on 6 April 1941, the German press emphasized by headlines and leading articles the following topics: (1) the planned persecution of Germans in Yugoslavia, including the burning down of German villages by Serbian soldiers, also the confining of Germans in concentration camps, and also physical mishandling of German-speaking persons; (2) the arming of Serbian bandits by the Serbian government; (3) the incitement of Yugoslavia by the "plutocrats" against Germany; (4) the increasing anti-Serbian feelings in Croatia; (5) the chaotic economic and social conditions in Yugoslavia.

33. During the night from the 21st to the 22nd of June 1941, Ribbentrop called me in for conference in the foreign office building at about 5 o'clock in the morning, at which representatives of the domestic and foreign press were present. Ribbentrop informed us that the war against the Soviet Union would start that same day and asked the German press to present the war against the Soviet Union as a preventative war for the defense of the fatherland, as a war which was forced upon us through the immediate danger of an attack of the Soviet Union against Ger-

many. The claim that this was a preventative war was later repeated by the newspapers which received their instructions from me during the usual daily parole of the Reich press chief. I, myself, have also given this presentation of the cause of the war in my regular broadcasts.

34. In November 1942 a position, newly established by Dr. Goebbels, was conferred on me—plenipotentiary for the political organization of the greater German radio [Boauftragter fuer die politische Gestaltung des Grossdeutschen Rundfunks]. At the same time I was also given the direction of the “radio division” [Rundfunk Abteilung] in his ministry. I held both offices until the German military collapse.

35. Around the end of 1942, a growing importance was attributed to the German radio in securing support of the direction of the war by the broad masses. The radio appeared as the only instrument to fill the space behind the then far extended German fronts. Therefore a relatively independent position was granted to the radio within the Reich ministry for people’s enlightenment and propaganda. While my predecessors as heads of the “Radio Division” had to take into consideration, for example, the demands of the Propaganda, press, foreign and music divisions, I finally managed to drop such consideration. An exception was consideration for the press. After January 1943 I forced the press, by competition, to somewhat more realistic news information. However, in view of his superior position with the Fuehrer, the Reich press chief, Dr. Dietrich, kept a priority [Primat] over the radio. Finally in February 1945, Dr. Goebbels overthrew Dr. Dietrich. To an ever growing extent in the field of radio, I became the sole authority within the ministry. One after the other I eliminated those side-governments [Nebenregierungen] which had disturbed my predecessors. As plenipotentiary for the political organization of the greater German radio, I had authority only over the political domestic broadcasts. About six months later, in the spring of 1943, I also took over control of the foreign broadcasts which were under the direction of Dr. Winkelkemper. About another 6 months later I also took over control from the hands of Ministerialdirektor Hinkel, the musical part of the radio program. In spring 1945 I also had the intention of taking under my control those broadcasts in Eastern languages, which still were under foreign direction. However, this intention was not realized. In any case in my performance of the office as head of the radio in the field of radio publication, I was dependent only in my decisions and measures upon the following: the general political directions; the personal supervision

of Dr. Goebbels, sometime going into the details; the decisions of the radio-political division of the foreign office which claimed leadership in the field of transmission in foreign languages.

36. As far as my activity as head of the radio division is concerned, I attended to the following fields: (1) Planning and organization of the entire German radio and television system; (2) the issuance of corresponding decrees to the subordinate sections, the elaboration and submission of suggestions for the other agencies of the Reich cabinet. In order to execute these tasks the division was essentially organized as follows: (A) Radio-Command [Rundfunkkommandostelle], a section operating day and night, which received and transmitted orders to the various sections of radio, and which acted on its own decisions in case of sending or program troubles, etc. (B) The section Reconnaissance Service, organized according to working fields or countries of origin, which gave extracts from the gigantic quantities of material of the Radio-Listening-Service [Rundfunkabhoerdienst] with the name Seehaus. (C) Section Foreign Radio [Rundfunk Ausland], a small administrative unit with scimpy tasks, because the practical work was done by myself in daily conferences with the head of the foreign division of the Reich radio corporation [Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft]. During my time in office a special section for the organization of radio, in case of war, did not exist. Should it have existed before my time, in my opinion it could not have achieved anything. When I took over the radio division, the most important transmitters had to limit their transmissions to a few hours daily because of the lack of tubes. Only a few transportable senders had been developed in prewar times. During the war a few transportable senders, improved and smaller, were developed for the front. (D) Section Radio-Economy. This was in charge of construction and supply of radio receiving instruments. My office practically represented the high command of the German radio.

37. To my knowledge all of my predecessors, as head of the radio division, were also simultaneously head of the central radio office of the Reich propaganda directorate of the NSDAP [Reichsamtseiter Rundfunk der Reichspropagandaleitung der NSDAP]. Personally I never received this party job, because I was always considered politically unreliable. I had acquired my reputation and influence as an expert. The Reichsamtseiter of radio was S.A. Group Leader Schaeffer. I was unable to have my way as against him. Even more difficult for me was the fact that Dr. Goebbels gave ample power to Reich Main Office Leader [Reichshauptamt-

leiter] Corff, the officer in charge of culture in the NSDAP headquarters. This was allowed out of concern of the national socialist ideology in radio programs. Corff caused me the biggest difficulties until I ousted him after a scandal caused by him in the middle of all my collaborators. Dr. Goebbels sent him to Italy in November 1944 and did not name a successor. I then felt freer as to the organization of radio programs. Subsequently I reintroduced the church service on the radio which had been prohibited by my predecessors. This was done in a round-about way, by giving radio time for Catholic and Protestant services in churches near the front. My working field can be summarized as follows:

To spread as far as possible the conception of my government as to the cause, character and goal of the war in Germany, in the occupied countries, abroad and even in enemy countries as well. To organize a radio program as artistic and entertaining as possible, to revive the dwindling interest of the German people in radio and to grant them an opportunity to hear as many sendings as possible.

38. Upon my suggestion those directions and instructions which had been fixed by me daily in writing were transmitted by teletype to all Reich propaganda offices. Those Reich propaganda offices used those directions and instructions at their discretion and transmitted them frequently to their Gau leaders. This material consisted of: a) the so-called radio parole. This I worked out until 1943 or 1944 after the daily morning conference with Dr. Goebbels together with a representative of the foreign office and the head of the foreign division of the propaganda ministry. Afterwards it was given verbatim by Dr. Goebbels; b) the comments on this, which were worked out by one of my collaborators based on a comment which I gave orally at noon at the radio conference. Dr. Goebbels himself gave daily a highly confidential radio speech to the Gau leaders personally, which was spoken through a microphone and extended over special transmissions. In his absence, Undersecretary (Staatssekretär) Dr. Naumann acted for him. If he was absent, the radio speech was cancelled. Dr. Goebbels always rejected the suggestion made by the undersecretary that I should take over the representation. I acted frequently for him (Dr. Goebbels) in individual reports, such as with generals.

39. From fall 1932 until April 1945 I regularly made radio speeches. According to my memory until fall 1939 once weekly, until December 1939 daily, then three times, then twice and finally once weekly. In my instructions to the press and radio.

when head of the German Press Division, I was most strictly bound by the directions of my superiors. However, in my radio speeches I enjoyed a greater liberty. Dr. Goebbels once had tried to make me submit my texts before the speeches were given. I refused, indicating I dictated a brief speech just before speaking and hence spoke half-extemporaneously. Subsequently he renounced the submission of texts upon the condition that at least certain topics be discussed upon demand. The addresses formerly were called "Political and Radio Show"; later "Hans Fritzsche Speaks". In these addresses I discussed political and human problems of all kinds and reported on the general situation as well. According to my memory, I did not take any position on the Jewish question for many years. In my position as head of the German press division I had tried twice to forbid the appearance of "Der Stuermer" without success. Later, especially during the war and mostly upon request, I took a position concerning the statements of Jewish individuals and organizations against Germany. The sharpness of these polemics, as the sharpness generally of my polemics, remained less than the sharpness of the opposition publicists. I remember I stated that Jewish emigrants, already years before the war, referred to the necessity of a war against Germany. I also remember that I referred to the role of this Jewish propaganda in accomplishing an alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. According to my knowledge, this alliance was not supposed to have been established by the German declaration of war against Russia, but by an Anglo-Saxon secret treaty of 1940. The utilization of the productive capacity of the occupied countries for the strengthening of the war potential. I have openly and gloriously praised, chiefly because the competent authorities put at my disposal much material, especially on the voluntary placement of manpower. Where I made claims before the occupied territories, for instance 3 French radio transmitters for Spanish and Portuguese night sendings, I refused any sequestration and saw to it that private agreements were made with the owners of the transmitters. Moreover, I had the impression that many production shifts from the Reich had many advantages for the other territories and disadvantages for the Reich. In my field for instance, certain musical productions could only be made in Prague, to which flowed people, machines and money. All the factory equipment of the German recording industry came to Prague. A direct or indirect request for the ruthless utilization of occupied countries by me was all the more out of question as it would have meant a strike against my own

propaganda. The goal of it was to win the hearts of the population of the occupied countries.

40. In 1939 when I talked almost daily over the radio, I asked for a lump sum of 750 marks monthly, as far as I remember, for this work. When I took over the direction of the radio. Dr. Goebbels gave the instruction that the radio corporation should pay me the difference between my salary as a government employee (about 1500 Marks) and the salary as director of the Reich radio corporation (3000 Marks), thus I received an income in all of 3000 Marks (without deduction of taxes), namely 1500 Marks as government employee and 1500 Marks from the Reich radio corporation. From my other writing I earned until 1942 a yearly average of 5,000 marks as far as I remember. After taking over the radio this income ceased almost entirely.

41. While head of the German press division, according to my knowledge, I never took over the direction of the daily 11 o'clock conference in absence of Dr. Goebbels or Under-Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Dr. Naumann. Dr. Goebbels held this conference with his closest collaborators. I took this over several times, however, as head of the radio division and this only after 1943. On the average this was the case once weekly. In this case Goebbels gave his directions by way of transmitting his manuscript over the phone. All in all, maybe on 5 days, these directions did not come in. In these cases I myself initiated the necessary news.

42. In the beginning of 1942 while a soldier in the Eastern Theater, I saw that extended preparations had been made for the occupation and the administration of territories, reaching as far as the Crimea. Based on my personal observations I came to the conclusion that the war against the Soviet Union was planned already a long time before its outbreak.

The correctness of the above given statement is hereby assured by me under oath.

[signed] Hans Fritzsche

Nurnberg, Germany, 7 January 1946

As Witness:

[signed] Dr. Fritz
Defense Counsel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3471-PS

Central Office for the Organizations of National Economy of the
NSDAP
W. Keppler in charge
[Letterhead]

Berlin Behrenstrasse 39 A W 8
Fernruf: 16 58 61
21 February 1938

General Bodenschatz
Berlin W 9, Leipziger Platz 11

My dear General,

Enclosed I send you the notification which I gave to you by phone already concerning the activity for or of captain Leopold in Austria.

I further take the liberty to enclose also a copy of a report which was sent to me from Austria concerning the possible appointment of Major Klausner as Landseleiter.

Heil Hitler
Very truly yours
[signed] Keppler

2 enclosures

21 February 1938

Through information we received at this very moment by means of a long distance call from a man who has the confidence of Dr. Seyss-Inquart we learn that the following order was given to the functionaries of the party in Austria during Saturday or Sunday.

Leopold is supposed to have had a discussion of a few hours with General Field Marshal Goering and has received consent from him that he will return during the next few days to Austria with new authority. Furthermore, he makes it known that the attitude he took so far was considered correct and that now the activity in his own lines is to be increased as much as possible. Now Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart is to be attacked first; he is supposed to be overthrown in the first place in order to get a man as his successor who is an absolutely reliable instrument in the hand of Leopold.

Furthermore an article appeared in the "Reichspost" that Dr. Tavs does not even think of leaving Austria and that an order of that kind would mean an intrusion into the conditions of Austria proper.

SECRET

Copy

Berlin, 21 February 1938

The Reichsfuehrer SS
Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamtes
III 224/1 AZ. 1261/38
[Letterhead]
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Wilh. Keppler
Berlin W 8, Behrenstr. 39 A
Re: Appointment of the former Gauleiter Major Klausner as
Landesleiter.

Subject: *Long distance call of 20-2-1938*

In the following you are notified again in writing about information you received by phone on Febr. 2 1938:
By order of the Oberfuehrer K. the Gruppenfuehrer is to be informed as follows for notification of the Fuehrer:
The chiefs of all branches including SA-Obergruppen Fuehrer Lt. Lukesch—who is to be appointed—welcome the appointment of the former Gauleiter Major Klausner as Landesleiter.
The Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamts

by order

the Chief of the Abwehramtes

signed: Jost

SS-Oberfuehrer

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3472-PS

Berlin W 8 Behrenstr. 39a

Telephone: 165861

9 February 1938

[Pencil note]: Transmitted
to Mr. Keppler on 11 Feb 38

by Miss Cest (?)

[initial] G. 11 Feb 38

Central Office,
for the Organizations of National Economy
of the NSDAP

Chief: W. Keppler

[Letterhead]

To the Prime Minister, General Fieldmarshall Goering

Dear Generalfieldmarshall!

Yesterday information reached me to the effect that Landesleiter Leopold also on his part has started negotiations with

Chancellor [Bundeskanzler] Schuschnigg. Thereupon I have asked the Foreign Office to investigate the truth of this information and, in case it was true, to take care that such negotiations not be held because they would merely disturb the proceeding of the other negotiations.

Just now I get word from the Foreign Office that they received a report from the embassy in Vienna confirming the facts. I therefore would like to know whether it would not be more appropriate to forbid Landesleiter Leopold and the other members of the country's leadership [Landesleitung] to negotiate with Chancellor [Bundeskanzler] Schuschnigg as well as with any Austrian government authorities as to the execution of the pact of 11 July 1936 if it is not done after contacting and in agreement with the authorities in charge in the Reich.

Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours

(s) Wilh. Keppler

[Pencil note on margin]:

Agreed. Minister Hess or Mr. Bormann can give this order best! Keppler ought to ask therefor by telephone!

[Initial]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3473-PS

[Pencil note]

Phone: 165861 settled by tel. 7th Jan 37

[sign.] Limberger

Miss Grundtmann

Keppler should be told by telephone:

1. He should do everything to avoid the resignation of Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart and State-Minister [Bundesminister] Glaise von Horstenau. If some difficulties should arise, Mr. Seyss-Inquart should come to him first of all.

2. Mr. Leopold has already been ordered but has not received the permission to leave his country at the present. The General (der Herr Generaloberst) intends to receive him on the 14th or 15th of January, so that he can give him very definite instructions.

Carinhall, January 6th 1938

(signed) G. Limberger

Berlin W8, Behrenstr. 39a
Phone. 165861
6 January 1938

Main Office for the Organizations of National Economy of the
NSDAP

Prime Minister General Goering
Secretary General
(Stamp)
Arr. Jan 6 1938

Chief: W. Keppler

[Letterhead]

To: Minister President General Goering

Berlin W 8 Leipziger Strasse 3,

Most honorable General!

Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart has sent a courier to me with the report that his negotiations with the Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg have run aground, so that he feels compelled to return the mandate entrusted to him. Dr. Seyss-Inquart desires to have a discussion with me regarding this, before he acts accordingly.

May I ask your advice, whether at this moment such a step—entailing automatically, also, the resignation of the Federal Minister Glaise von Horstenau—appears indicated or whether I should put forth efforts to postpone such an action.

Furthermore, I have information to the effect that Landesleiter Captain Leopold deposed Dr. Jury, his deputy, while the latter was here in Germany.

Captain Leopold is attempting again and again to make his own policy which is in opposition to the wishes of the decisive authorities in the Reich, and continuously obstructs the pending negotiations carried on by Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Dr. Jury, and the consultants for national-political affairs (volkspolitischen Referenten).

I take the liberty to pass on to you a copy of a directive of military nature which incidentally came into my hands. It discloses further measures concerning the German border.

May I once more ask you, honorable General, for an audience in order to discuss my further activity in the field of economic politics.

Heil Hitler!

Your sincerely devoted
[signed] Keppler

Ministerpraesident
Generaloberst GOERING
Chef des Stabsamtes

Berlin W 8 Leipziger Str 3
Phone: A 2 Flora 6451.
2 December 1936.

Note for the files on the discussion on
December 2, 1936. 11 A.M.—12.05 P.M.

Present:

Generaloberst Goering
General der Flieger Milch
Generalleutnant Kesselring
Generalleutnant Rudel
Generalmajor Stumpf
Generalmajor Christiansen
Generalmajor Volkmann
Ministerialdirigent Fisch
Generalleutnant Witzlebeh
Generalmajor Kitzinger
Oberst Udet
Oberst Bodenschatz

Goering:

World press excited about the landing of 5,000 German volunteers in Spain. Official complaint by Great Britain; she takes up connection with France.

Italy suggests that Germany and Italy send each one division ground troops to Spain. It is, however, necessary that Italy as interested Mediterranean power issues a political declaration first. A decision can only be expected in a few days.

The general situation is very serious. Russia wants the war. England rearms speedily. Command therefore: Beginning today "hechste Einsatzbereitschaft"—regardless of financial difficulties. Goering takes over full responsibility.

Peace [Ruhe] till 1941 is desirable. However, we cannot know whether there will be implications before. We are already in a state of war, it is only that no shot is being fired so far.

Fieldmarshal v. Blomberg will be informed by the Fuehrer to-morrow, accordingly.

Beginning January 1, 1937 all factories for aircraft production run "moliblachungsmaesig".

More money is to be spent on aircraft, equipment, implements, supplies, less for extending barracks and airports.

Colonel Udet is asked whether the Expeditionary group Oberstleutnant v. Richthofen works satisfactory in Spain. *Udet* answers in the affirmative. Goering ordered that . . . is not burdened too much with correspondence. Goering recommends closest collaboration with Austria. Not too old and not too new supplies shall be given away. Austria will never fight against us. Austria ought to have pilots, engineers and fitters trained in Germany. Austria shall above all, extend her ground forces. Our interest must always be in the foreground. Goering wants to be informed shortly on the measures taken by the "Amtschef". Goering discusses the tasks of the various airplane types, furthermore the standardization of engines, purchase of foreign engines, questions of the budget, supplies, further extension of the anti-aircraft artillery.

(signed) BODENSCHATZ

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3475-PS

MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS, (1943)

[Taschenbuch fuer Verwaltungsbeamte] Pages 12-37.

II. *Reich Ministry of the Interior.* * * *

Reich Minister of the Interior: Dr. Frick.

Chief of the Bureau of the Minister: Dr. Draeger, Ministerial Councillor.

Adjutant: Radtke, Major of Gendarmerie.

General Councillor of the Minister: Dr. Draeger, Ministerial Councillor.

Legal Councillor: Dr. Rudmann, Ministerial Councillor.

First State Secretary: Pfundtner, deputy of the Minister.

At Special Disposal of the State Secretary: Keibel, Ministerial Councillor.

Public Relations Officer: Dr. Draeger, Ministerial Dirigent.

State Secretaries: Dr. Stuckart; Dr. Conti, Reich Health Leader.

Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior: Himmler.

Reich Labor Leader in the Ministry of the Interior: Hierl, Reich Leader.

Director of the Ministerial Bureaus: Weber, Superior Government Councillor.

Corporate Groups Administrator: Sevecke, Ministerial Councillor.

Under the Immediate Direction of the Reich Ministry of the Interior:

Reich Administration School in Pirna (Saxony). Further schools are being organized.

Central Division (Budget, Finance and Accounting Matters, Business Matters and Distribution, Cabinet Matters, Library, etc.)

* * * * *

State Secretary Dr. Stuckart.

In charge of Divisions I (Constitution, Legislation, Administration and Annexed Territories) and I R (Civilian Defense of the Reich and the Occupied Territories), also of the jurisdiction of the Chief of Staff of the General Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration.

Deputy: Ehrenberger, Ministerial Dirigent.

At Personal Disposal of the State Secretary: Kettner, Ministerial Councillor.

At Personal Disposal of the Ministerial Director: von Herder, Government Councillor.

Division I (Constitution, Legislation, Administration and Annexed Territories) with 7 sub-divisions.

Chief of the Entire Division I: Dr. Stuckart, State Secretary.

Permanent Deputy: Ehrensberger, Ministerial Director.

Sub-division I Organization (Constitution and Organization).

Sub-division I Administration (Legislation and Administrative Law).

Sub-division I Sta. R. (Citizenship and Race).

Sub-division I Southeast (New Order in the Southeast)

Sub-division I B M (Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia).

Sub-division I East (New Order in the East).

Sub-division I West (New Order in the West).

* * * * *

Division I R (Civilian Defense of the Reich and the Occupied Territories) with 3 sub-divisions.

Chief: Ehrensberger, Ministerial Director.

Sub-division R-V (Defense of the Reich)

Sub-division I R-W (Military Law and Policies)

Sub-division I R-S (War Damages)

* * * * *

Division P (Personnel Division)

Chief: Dr. von Helms, Ministerial Director.

Sub-division A (General Matters; Personnel Matters of the Political Officials and Aspirants).

Sub-division B (Personnel Matters of Other Officials in the Highest Bracket).

Sub-division C (Personnel Matters of Officials in the Medium High, Medium and Lower Brackets, as well as of the Employees and Wage Earners).

* * * * *

Division II (Civil Service and Reich Examination Board)

Chief: Ruediger, Ministerial Director

Sub-division A (General Law of Civil Servants, Civil Servants' Policies, Civil Service Aspirants, Education, Training and Advanced Training of Civil Servants).

Sub-division B (Pay, Extra-Curricular Activities, Travelling Expenses, Moving Expenses, Welfare of Civil Servants, Veterans, Matters of Employees and Workers).

Sub-division C (Welfare)

Reich Examination Board for the Higher and Medium High Civil Service.

President: Ruediger, Ministerial Director.

* * * * *

State Secretary Dr. Conti, Reich Health Leader

In charge of Divisions III (Veterinary Matters) and IV (Health Matters and Social Hygiene).

* * * * *

Division III (Veterinary Administration)

Chief: Dr. Weber, Professor, Ministerial Director.

Sub-division A:

* * * * *

Sub-division B:

Division IV (Health Matters and Social Hygiene)

Chief: Dr. Cropp, Ministerial Director

Sub-division IV A (Organization, Administration and Budget Matters)

Sub-division IV B (Personnel Matters)

Sub-division IV C (Heredity and Racial Welfare)

Sub-division IV W (Social Welfare)

Sub-division IV J (Youth Welfare)

* * * * *

Division V (Municipality Division)

Chief: Dr. Suren, Ministerial Director.

Sub-division I:

Sub-division II:

Under Section 16, sub-section 3 of the Statute Concerning the Constitution and Administration of the Reich capital Berlin, dated 1 December 1936, and according to section 11 of the Statute

Concerning the Constitution and Administration of the Hanseatic City of Hamburg, and according to section 5 of the First Supplementary Decree for the Carrying Out of the Statute Concerning Austrian Provinces, the following office comes within the jurisdiction of Division V:

Supervisory Board for Municipalities Established at the Reich Ministry of The Interior (Reich Capital Berlin, Hanseatic City of Hamburg, Vienna)

* * * * *

•*Division VI* (Germanism, Welfare Border Regions, Non-German Folk Groups, Archive Matters, Public Trusts, Colonial Problems, Colonial Schools, and Survey Matters).

Chief: Dr. Vollert, Ministerial Director.

* * * * *

Division VIII (Sports and Athletics)

Chief: vacant

* * * * *

Attached:

Reich Appraisal Board (Reichsfeststellungsbehoerde at the Reich Ministry of the Interior)

Chief: Dr. Sibeth, Ministerial Councillor.

Upper Chambers

First Lower Chambers

Second Lower Chambers

Third Lower Chambers

* * * * *

REICHSFUEHRER SS AND CHIEF OF THE GERMAN POLICE IN THE REICH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

Chief: Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS, Reich Leader, Prussian State Councillor, Member of the Reichstag, Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Folkdom.

A. Order Police [Ordnungspolizei]

Chief: Daluege, Colonel General of the Police, SS Colonel General, Prussian State Councillor, Member of the Reichstag.

General Inspectors:

* * * * *

Office of Administration and Law

Chief: Bracht, Ministerial Director, SS Major General.

Chief of Office Group I: Rheins, Ministerial Councillor.

Chief of Office Group II: Dr. Bader, Ministerial Dirigent, SS Brigade General.

Chief of office III: Scheidel, Ministerial Dirigent.
Group Leaders (Ministerial Councillors):

* * * * *

Command Office

Chief: Winkelmann, Major General of the Police, SS Major General.

Chief of Office Group I: Gruenwald, Brigadier General of the Police and SS Brigadier General.

Chief of Office Group II: Geibel, Colonel of Gendarmerie, SS Colonel.

Chief of Office Group III: Dr. Wenzel, General Surgeon of the Police, SS Brigadier General.

* * * * *

Fire Brigades Office

Chief: Schnell, Brigadier General of the Police

Office for Technical Emergency Service [Technische Nothilfe]

Chief: Weinreich, Major General of the Police, SS Major General.

Technical SS and Police Academy

Commander: Prof. Dr. Gerloff, Brigadier General of the Police, SS Brigadier General.

* * * * *

B. *Security Police and SD [Reichssicherheitshauptamt]*

Chief: Dr. Kaltenbrunner, General of the Police.

Division Chiefs:

- I. Streckenbach, SS Major General, Major General of the Police.
- II. Dr. Siegert, SS Colonel, Ministerial Councillor (temporary).
- III. Ohlendorf, SS Brigadier General, Brigadier General of the Police.
- IV. Mueller, SS Major General, Major General of the Police.
- V. Nebe, SS Major General, Major General of the Police.
- VI. Schellenberg, SS Colonel, Government Chief Councillor.
- VII. Dr. Six, SS General, Prof.

JURISDICTION

1. Reich Administration Court

By decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, dated April 3, 1941 (Reichgesetzblatt RGBL. I, p. 201) the Prussian Superior Administration Court, the Reich Disciplinary Court, the Reich Economy Court, the Administrative Court in Vienna, the Highest Arbitration Boards for Ame-

lioration and for Water and Land Groups, the Reich Claims Court, and the Reich War Damage Board have been merged into the Reich Administration Court as of May 1, 1941.

President: Dr. Hueber.

Vice President: Dr. Bach.

Division Presidents:

* * * * *

2. *Reich Board for Genealogical Research*

Chief: Dr. Mayer (Kurt), Dir.

3. *Reich Plenipotentiary for the Examination of Elections.*

Reich Plenipotentiary: Dr. Medicus, Ministerial Dirigent in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

4. *Reich Supervisor of Elections.*

Reich Supervisor of Elections: Godlewski, President of the Reich Bureau for Statistics.

5. *Reich Publishing Office.*

Chief: Dr. Hubrich, Ministerial Dirigent in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

6. *Reich Institute for the Combatting of Animal Epidemics.*

Chief: Prof. Dr. Gerlach.

7. *Reich Health Office.*

President: Dr. Reiter, Prof.

8. *Commissary of Voluntary Nursing.*

Commissar: Karl Eduard, Duke of Saxony-Coburg and Gotha.

9. *Robert-Koch-Institute, Reich Institute for the Fight Against Communicable Diseases.*

President: Dr. Gildemeister, Prof.

10. *Reich Institute for Water and Air Quality.*

President: Dr. Konrich, Prof.

11. *Reich Institute for Vitamin Tests and Vitamin Research in Berlin.*

President: Dr. Scheunert, Prof.

12. *Reich Plenipotentiary for Sanitariums and Nursing Homes.*

Reich Plenipotentiary: Dr. Linden, Ministerial Dirigent in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

13. *Reich Bureau for Emigration Matters.*

Director (Deputy): Dr. Mueller, Ministerial Councillor.

14. *Reich Archive, Potsdam.*
Chief: Dr. Zipfel, General Director of the State Archives.
15. *Reich Archive, Vienna.*
Chief: Prof. Dr. Bittner, Director.
16. *Reich Bureau of Surveys.*
President: Vollmar.
17. *Central Registry for War Losses and Soldiers' Graves.*
Director (Deputy): Weinholz, Privy Government Councillor, Ministerial Councillor.
18. *Reich Sport Office and Academy for Athletics.*
Reich Sport Leader: vacant.
19. *High Command (Reichsleitung) of the Reich Labor Service* (with 38 regional offices of the Reich Labor Service for men and 26 regional offices for the female youth).
Reich Labor Leader: Hierl, Reich Leader.
Chief of Staff: Dr. Decker, General Labor Leader.
20. *Finance Adjustment Office at the Reich Ministry of the Interior.*
Chief: Neefe, Chief Government Director.
21. *State Veterinary Bureau.*
President: Dr. Muessemeier, Professor, Ministerial Dirigent, Director in the Reich Health Office.
22. *State Health Council.*
President: vacant.
23. *Hygienic Institute in Landsberg (Warthe), Beauthen (Upper Silesia) and Saarbruecken.*
24. *Prussian State Institute for Food, Pharmaceutical and Forensic Chemistry.*
President: Dr. Prause, Prof.
25. *Board for the Examination for Physicians, Dentists, Pharmacists, etc.*
26. *Reich Board for the Examination for State Veterinaries.*
27. *Examination Board for the Higher Survey Administration Service.*
28. *Reich Research Institute, Island of Riems.*

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE REICH MINISTRY OF
THE INTERIOR:

1. *Organization of the German Municipalities* [Deutscher Gemeindetag]
Chairman: Fiehler, Reichsleiter, Chief Mayor, Munich.
Deputy: Dr. Weidemann, Prof., Chief Mayor, Halle an Saale.

2. *Academy for German Law*
3. *a. Reich Medical Association.*
Chief: Dr. Conti, State Secretary, Berlin.
Deputy Chief: Dr Blome, Professor, Berlin.
b. German Physicians' Court
4. *a. Reich Veterinary Association.*
Chief: Dr. Weber, Professor.
b. German Veterinary Court.
5. *a. Reich Pharmacists Association.*
Chief: Reich Pharmacist Leader, Pharmaceutical Councillor Schmierer, Berlin.
b. Pharmacists' Court.
6. *Reich Committee for Public Hygiene, Registered Association.*
Chief: Dr. Kropp, Ministerial Director.
7. *German Institute for Youth Help, Registered Association.*
Chief: Dr. Webler.
8. *German Red Cross, Office of the Chairman.*
President: Karl Eduard, Duke of Saxony-Coburg and Gotha.
Acting President: Dr. Grawitz, Professor, SS Major General, Major General of the Waffen SS, SS and Police Reich Physician.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3501-PS

I, Max Amann, after having been duly sworn, do hereby state as follows:

1. Since 1933, when the Nazi Party came into power in Germany, I held the position of Reich Leader of the Press [Reichsleiter fuer die Presse] and President of the Reich Press Chamber [Reichspressekammer]. In carrying out my duties and responsibilities, I became familiar with the operations and the organization of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment.

2. Walther Funk was the practical minister of the Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment and managed the Ministry. Funk was the soul of the Ministry, and without him Goebbels could not have built it up. Goebbels once stated to me that Funk was his "most effective man". Funk exercised comprehensive control over all of the media of expression in Germany; over the press, the theater, radio and music. As Press Chief of the Reich Government and subsequently as Under Secretary of the Ministry, Funk held daily meetings with the Fuehrer and a daily press conference

3501-PS

in the course of which he issued the directives governing the materials to be published by the German press.

3. I have read, I fully understand and I fully subscribe to, the foregoing statement.

[signed] Max Amann

Sworn before me this 19th day of December 1945.

[signed] Thomas S. Hinkel

Lt. Col. IGD.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3505-PS

WALTER FUNK: A LIFE FOR THE ECONOMY

By Dr. P. Oestreich, Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher, succ. Munich 1941.

[Pages 77-78]

The either or that has arisen out of these articles was no longer binding for Funk for quite some time. It was a concession to the tradition of the Boersen Zeitung to keep itself above the parties that advocated the national idea in one form or another. It was the last concession he made in his association with the Boersen Zeitung. On 31 December 1930 he resigned and became a member of the party of Adolf Hitler.

[Page 80]

The Fuehrer had made up his mind already. Immediately after Funk's connection with the Boersen Zeitung on 31 December 1930 was severed, he appointed him a member of the Reich leadership of the party and chose him as his personal economic adviser. This was proof of his greatest confidence.

[Page 81]

It was for Funk not only a very honorable but also a very important duty to be advisor and special official to the Fuehrer and he served enthusiastically with all his power and knowledge. In 1931 he became a member of the Reichstag. The document of his activity at the time is: "Economic construction program of the NSDAP" which was formulated by him in the second half of the year 1932. It received the approval of Adolf Hitler and was declared binding for all Gau-leaders, speakers on the subject and Gau-advisers on the subject and others of the party.

[Page 82]

Funk at the time gave the party speakers the following fundamental sentences on their way. We have sufficient national capital in Germany. We can furthermore by working produce new capital. Therefore our people can live and develop. We can and must forego international capital, and we have furthermore the duty to

liberate the German economy from the bonds of international capital. The German agriculture and the whole German economy can only be developed through the National State.

Only a Government which has the full confidence of the people can force through the necessary reconstruction of the German economy and can with ruthless consequence promote the national and socialistic principles which only the National Socialist movement of Adolf Hitler is calling its own.

[Page 83]

No less important than Funk's accomplishments in the programmatic field in the years 1931 and 1932, was his activity at that time as the Fuehrer's liaison man to the leading men of the German economy in industry, trade, commerce, and finance. On the basis of his past work his personal relations to the German economic leaders were broad and extensive. He was now able to enlist them in the service of Adolf Hitler, and not only to answer their questions authoritatively, but to convince them and win their backing for the Party. At that time, that was terribly important work. Every success achieved meant a moral, political, and economic strengthening of the fighting force of the Party and contributed toward destroying the prejudice that National Socialism is merely a party of class hatred and class struggle.

The public sees or knows very little or nothing about such activities. But the Fuehrer has made it quite evident that he was well satisfied with Walter Funk in these two years of the decisive battle before the ascendancy to power. In the most convincing form probably at the moment of victory. When he received on the historic 30th January 1933 in the evening the jubilant demonstration of the masses, standing at the window of the shortly before occupied Reich Chancellery he had in the brightly lighted windows beside him his most loyal disciples and one of them was Walter Funk who had greeted the Fuehrer together with the then Secretary of the Reich Chancellery later the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, at the entrance to the Reich Chancellery after the historic journey from the Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery in the afternoon of the 30th January 1933. In the late afternoon the first Cabinet Meeting took place under the Presidency of the Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler at which Funk already participated as Press Chief of the Reich Government. Since then there has not been any meeting of the Cabinet at which Walter Funk did not participate first as Press Chief and Secretary of State, later as Reich Minister.

[Pages 90-91]

The fact that Funk was appointed by the Fuehrer Press Chief of the Reich Government was not only in consideration that he was an experienced and shrewd journalist who knew the press and newspaper business extremely well. It is certain that the decision of the Fuehrer was influenced also by the consideration that he saw Funk as the man suited for the daily report to Reich President von Hindenburg. In fact, Funk has discharged this duty, especially in the first months of Adolf Hitler's government, very successfully and with merit. The veteran General Field Marshall had confidence in his East Prussian countryman from the beginning.

[Page 91]

Many times the Fuehrer entrusted Funk with a special task at the Reich President.

[Page 92]

On 13 March 1933 the press department of the Reich Government with a small personnel of approximately 30 persons was incorporated into the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, of which the propaganda leader of the party, Dr. Joseph Goebbels became Minister. Funk became his Under-Secretary. On this date there commenced a new and important part in the life of Walter Funk. His sphere of duties was multiplied even if the current importance of the position of Press Chief of the Reich Government may naturally diminish considerably behind the position of the new Minister for the press.

[Page 93]

For almost five years Walter Funk has been the Under-Secretary of this Ministry and naturally has decisively influenced its organization and work. In this task his singleness of purpose and his quiet considered judgment which were already proven when he built up the commerce section of the Berlin Boersen Zeitung was very useful to him. He knows how to organize without getting nervous and without making anybody nervous. But he had to accomplish besides quite a number of special duties which many times had a very strong economic colouring. In this way he became Vice President of the Reich Chamber for Culture, first member of the Senate for Culture, Chairman of the Board of the Reich Broadcasting Company, the Publicity Council of the German economy, the Film Bank, the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra and many other political, economic and social institutes. These

were not only positions of honor but many times difficult and patient reconstruction work had to be done.

[Page 94]

a. Besides Funk had as a special duty from his Ministry received the task to take care of the cultural life. In this position he organized quietly a tremendous concern which represented an investment of many hundreds of millions. In close co-operation with the Reich Leader of the press, Max Amann, the economic fundamentals of the German press were reconstructed according to the political necessities. The same took place in the film industry and in other cultural fields.

The very harmonious co-operation between the Minister Dr. Goebbels and his Under-Secretary which lasted almost five years, became visible before all the world in the success of the Ministry of which the influence and sphere of work grew from year to year.

[Page 106]

The change from the peace economy to war economy which Funk had to accomplish in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the Economy took place almost without a hitch. The methods of directing the economy which have proven so successful already during the last years of peace now proved themselves also in the war economy.

[Page 106]

The third task which was put up to the Reichsbank President Funk was accomplished through the new law concerning the Reichsbank of 15 June 1939.

[Page 110]

Adolf Hitler has done away with this Dawes Constitution by degrees the same as with many other shameful regulations of the enemies. He made the final decision when he gave the order to Reichsbank President Funk to organize the Reichsbank in accordance with the National Socialist principles. He should continue the process that was commenced already by a law in 1937 of changing the status of the Reichsbank under the Dawes Plan as an institution which was partly excluded from the sovereignty of the German Reich to an institution which was completely and unconditionally under the sovereignty of the German Reich.

The draft which Funk transmitted to the Feuhrer was made a law by him on 15 June 1939.

[Page 111]

As one can see the new Reichsbank law has fully reconstituted the German sovereignty over the Reichsbank. But it has done another very important thing. It has done away with gold and gilt edged foreign exchange in its governing position concerning the question of covering the currency circulation. Gold must not be any more the decisive part of the cover which automatically governs the amount of the lawful circulation of notes but it can be used by the bank as a means to cover and there should be kept a certain amount for the regulation of the currency exchange with foreign countries and for the consolidation of the currency. Gold, therefore, is according to the new German Reichsbank law formally what it already was for a long time in fact, that is, the international means of clearing. For the internal use of the countries over the whole world it is hardly employed to any worth while extent. Paper money has taken its place but in Germany the State determines the value of the money and not international powers.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3522-PS

Konrad Henlein

Hof in Bavaria March 17, 1938

Dear comrade!

It is not possible to express the feelings which the most fortunate turn of events has caused in us all. That you, dear comrade, as a born Sudeten German in one of the most decisive hours in German history, carried out so masterfully the mission given you by the Fuehrer fills us with pride.

I express herewith the gratitude which comes from the heart of the Sudeten Germandom. Your accomplishment, achieved in allegiance to the Fuehrer, will have its effect upon our situation in the next weeks.

I am looking forward to the day when after years I can come to our beloved free German Austria. I hope then to be able to congratulate you personally.

Heil Hitler!

signed your Konrad Henlein

To the Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart
Vienna.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3523-PS

29 Dec 1937

Your Excellency:

My most hearty wishes for the year 1938 to you and your Sudeten-German compatriots! May your way, accompanied by us with the warmest sympathy, be successful!

Yours always obedient

[Seyss-Inquart]

His Excellency
Konrad HENLEIN
Asch in Bavaria

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3528-PS

THE THIRD REICH [Das dritte Reich]
by Gerd Ruehle, Second Year 1934, Page 297.

NSDAP Community Schools

But the unity of all the National Socialist organizations was demonstrated particularly forcibly when at the suggestion of Reichsleiter and party member Alfred Rosenberg (whose whole task with regard to ideology and training we have already dealt with on January 24th in section 2) the following joint proclamation was issued:

We support the request of the Fuehrer's Commissioner for the supervision of the whole spiritual and ideological training and instruction of the NSDAP, Party member Alfred Rosenberg, to organize *community schools* of all organizations of the NSDAP twice a year, in order to show by this common effort the ideological and political unity of the NSDAP and the steadfastness of the National Socialist will.

Berlin, July 1934

signed: R. Walther Darre, Reich Farmers' Leader, Minister of the Reich.

signed: Konstantin Hierl, Reich Labor Service Leader, Secretary of State.

signed: Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfuehrer of the SS.

signed: Dr. Robert Ley, Director of the "P. O."

signed: Viktor Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA.

signed: Baldur von Schirach, Youth Leader for the German Reich.

DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS

[Documente der Deutschen Politik] Volume 5, Page 389.

69 b. Declaration on 17. January 1937 by Reichsleiter Dr. Ley and Schirach on the Adolf Hitler Schools.

2. Voelkischer Beobachter 19. January 1937.— As stated by Dr. Ley, Reichsorganisationsleiter, on 23. November 1937 at Ordensburg Sonthofen, these Adolf Hitler Schools, as the first step of the principle of selecting a special elite, form an important branch in the educational system of the national socialist training of future leaders (Voelkischer Beobachter dated 24. November 1937). * * *

The curriculum has been laid down by Reichsleiter Rosenberg together with the Reichsorganisationsleiter and the Reich Youth Leader. In the execution of this there are no certificates, no examinations, no sitting still. The pupil proves himself by his character and knowledge, or he is rejected.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3530-PS

THE GERMAN LEADER LEXICON

[Das Deutsche Fuehrerlexikon] 1934/1935.

ROSENBERG, Alfred.

Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, Delegate of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the ideological education of the NS movement.

Berlin, W 35, Margaretenstr. 17

Born: 12 January 1893 at Reval of a Baltic mercantile and artisan family. Education: until 1910 Secondary School [Oberrealschule] at Reval. Professional career: inter alia studied from 1910 architecture at the Technical College [Technische Hochschule] at Riga; after its transfer, at Moscow; in January 1918 completed his studies with a first degree diploma; return to Reval; in November 1918 first lecture on the Jewish question; then travels to Germany in order to enlighten the public regarding Bolshevism; 1919 collaboration with Dietrich Eckart; acquaintanceship with Adolf Hitler; from 1921 editor of the "Voelkischer Beobachter" until now; editor of the NS Monatshefte; 1930 Reichstag Deputy and representative of the foreign policy of the movement; 1931 diplomatic journey to London; 1932/33 to Rome and London; from April 1933 head of the Central Department of the National-Socialist Party for Foreign Policy; then appointed Reichsleiter; January * * * the Fuehrer assigns him the supervision of the ideological education of the NSDAP, of the German labour Front and all politically coordinated Associations;

is one of the oldest champions of the movement (1919); participant in the march to Coburg and the march to the Feldherrnhalle; member of the Academy for German Law. Special sphere of work, publications; foreign policy, ideological question; produced, as first publication of the movement, "Character, Principles and Aims of the NSDAP"; of approximately 16 publications the following can be stressed: "The World Policy of Freemasonry", "H.St. Chamberlain", "Characteristic Structure of National-Socialism", "The Myth of the Twentieth Century" (Edition 145-000). "Blood and Honour".

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3531-PS

NATIONAL SOCIALIST YEARBOOK 1938, Page 180-181

Office of the Fuehrer's Commissioner for all spiritual and ideological instruction and education of the NSDAP
Reichsleiter ALFRED ROSENBERG

The sphere of activity of the Fuehrer's Commissioner for all spiritual and ideological instruction and education of the movement, its organization, including the "Strength through Joy", extends to the detailed execution of all the educational work of the party and of the affiliated bodies.

The office, set up by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, has the task of preparing the ideological educational material, of carrying out the teaching program and is responsible for the education of those teachers suited to this educational and instructional work.

Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg
Director: Gotthard Urban, Berlin W 35, Margarethenstrasse 17, Tel. 229551
Administrative dept: Gregor Heil
Central archives main office: Dr. Herbert Gerigk.
Dept. for teaching and material planning: Hans-Wilhelm Scheidt
Dept. for ideological information and study group for German folk-lore: Dr. Matthes Ziegler.
Main Press Office: Karlheinz Ruediger.
Dept. for previous history: Prof. Dr. Hans Reinerth.
Dept. for art: Dr. Walter Stang.
Dept. for literature: Hans Hagemeyer.
Main Office for Science: Professor Dr. A. Baeumler.
Main Office for Nordic questions: Thilo von Trotha.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3532-PS

THE EDUCATIONAL LETTER [Der Schulungsbrief]
Reich Educational Office of the NSDAP and of the
German Labor Front.

Berlin, March 1934. Year 1, Series 1, Page 9.

“The New Task” by Alfred Rosenberg:

The focus of all our educational work from now on is the service for this ideology, and it depends on the result of these efforts, whether national socialism will be buried with our fighting ancestors or whether, as we believe, it really represents the beginning of a new era.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3533-PS

I hereby certify that I had the following positions and activities:

- (a) Member of the Nazi Party—1931-1945.
- (b) (Personal economic adviser of Hitler—1931) *did not exist.**
- (c) Chief of Division of the Central Nazi Party Directorate in charge of private economy, Munich. 1932. *only a few months.**
- (d) Chairman of the Committee of the Nazi Party on Economic Policy—December 1932 to January 1933.
- (e) (Deputy Chairman of the Reich Economic Council of the NSDAP—1931). *I don't know that.**
- (f) National Socialist Deputy to the Reichstag—July 1932-February 1933.
- (g) Press Chief of the Reichsregierung—30 January 1933 to 1937.
- (h) Under-Secretary of the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda—1 March 1933 to 1937.
- (i) Vice-president of the Reich Chamber of Culture—1933 to 1945.
- (j) Member (and vice-president) of the Reich Senate for Culture 1933-1945.*
- (k) Vice-president of the Film Cedit Bank—1933.
- (l) Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Board concerning Advertising by German Business—1933-1937.
- (m) Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Reich Broadcasting Company—1933-1937.
- (n) Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics—1938-1945.

- (o) Member of the Prussian State Council—1938-1945.
- (p) Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics—appointed 1938. *since December 1939 restricted to Ministry of Economics and Reichsbank.**
- (q) President of German Reichsbank—19 January 1939 to 1945.
- (r) Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Deutsche Golddiskontbank 1939-1945.
- (s) Member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich 1939-1945.
- (t) Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Continental Oil-Company—1941-1945.
- (u) Member of the Central Planning Board—September 1943 to 1945.

[signed] Sauter, lawyer

I can only sign this document with the deletions
and changes I made*
21 Dec.

[signed] Walther Funk

*the interlineations and comments were inserted by Defendant Funk; () indicates parts deleted by Defendant Funk

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3544-PS

Testimony of Walter Funk, taken at Nurnberg, Germany,
22 October 1945, 1430-1645, by Lt. Col. Murray Gurfein, IGD, OUSCC. Also present: Capt. H. W. Frank,
Interpreter and John Wm. Gunsser, Court Reporter.

COL. GURFEIN TO THE WITNESS:

Q. Remember we talked yesterday about the period just before the outbreak of the war with Poland, that is, the several months preceding?

A. Yes.

Q. And I called your attention to the fact that you had some discussion with Goering in that period, do you remember?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you said that you were going to think it over, and I want to ask you this afternoon what you thought about that.

A. Yes. I remember two things which are very important. First, that I wasn't in Berlin at all during July. In July I was undergoing treatment because of my diabetes in Kissingen. And as far as I remember I came back from there at the beginning of August, so that all these discussions could only have taken place

as late as August. Further, I remember the following: some time about the middle of August I lunched with the Fuehrer, together with a lot of other people. During the lunch, the tension with Poland was discussed. After the lunch the Fuehrer told me that he had put proposals to Poland regarding Danzig and the Corridor, and that he was under the impression that the Poles would accept these proposals. But that it was also possible that the Poles, under the protection of the British guarantee, would become more hostile towards us.

And during that discussion I briefly explained to the Fuehrer that in the event of such a war it would be important that prices and wages and finances were controlled in such a manner that the banks of issue would exert their influence by means of war taxes; and that it now became clear to me what the passage in this letter refers to, namely, that I had already talked with the Fuehrer about that matter. And that must have been before my birthday, that is to say, the 15th or 16th of August, since he did not set forth congratulations to my birthday in that letter. My birthday is on the 18th of August. Therefore I can imagine that I may have told the Fuehrer—although I cannot remember exactly that I proposed to talk to Goering about these matters, since he was responsible in that respect.

Since furthermore Goering informed me or had me informed that he discussed these matters with the Fuehrer, probably via Neumann, and that the Fuehrer was in agreement with my plans. It is probable, therefore, that the Fuehrer has discussed, probably in the presence of Neumann, these civil economic questions and particularly the points referring to prices, wages, etc. And furthermore, Goering would have reported to the Fuehrer on the subject and would have had me informed probably through Neumann that I should occupy myself with these questions. Any nomination for the plenipotentiary of economy did not take place before the 28th of August, something which I gathered from the indictment. Subsequently it is probable, and I seem to remember that I have had conversations with Goering on the subjects, and I remember one conversation during which Neumann was also present. And on that occasion Goering gave me the task to negotiate with my ministerial colleagues in accordance with my own proposals.

Q. So that just to clarify it, when you say Hitler, as you say, in the middle of August, Hitler told you if he could not succeed by negotiation with the Poles in effect that he would have to attack them; is that correct?

A. I wouldn't put it precisely like that, but in any case he must have expected the possibility of a war.

Q. And that is what he told you in effect, that you were to take part in the preparation of this war?

A. No, but that the proposals that I had mentioned to him referring to prices, wages, etc., should be discussed between Goering and myself.

Q. But when the Fuehrer told you that war was likely to come you volunteered the suggestion that you ought to get up a plan for the control of wages and prices; is that right?

A. That is correct, yes, and that is the explanation for the wording of the letter referring to my proposals. That refers to the conversation with the Fuehrer. That has now come back to me. That was about the middle of August, which was the last time I saw him before the actual outbreak of the war.

Q. So that you were a man who always felt that you could not successfully prosecute a war without internal control of the economy by way of price and wage regulations?

A. Yes, certainly. If a war was to break out, price and wage controls were necessary, and these things would have to be fixed to prevent the Reichsbank from having to meet considerable expenditure right away. These war measures had been prepared by the Minister of Finance separately from me already. He was proposing a simply colossal taxation for that event, which appeared quite unnecessary to me, and I said if he introduced it everybody would go bankrupt.

Q. How long before that were these tax plans made before the contingencies of war?

A. That was all around about the same time.

Q. And that was part of the program that you were coordinating for Hitler?

A. Yes, that was part of it; that was included in the points. And subsequently from that the Minister of Finance had made similar preparation, which in my opinion went much too far.

Q. So that in effect you were urging upon the Fuehrer a total preparation for war, and you were in effect preparing for the war itself within your own sphere?

A. Well, I don't know about total war; we are only concerned here with the war against Poland.

Q. You don't understand me. When I say total war I mean the total regimentation of the economy for war.

A. Yes; and the fact that I was against such far-reaching measures as proposed by the Minister of Finance can be explained from my conviction that I did not think that there would

be a world war, but that I was thinking simply of a war against Poland, because if one was of the opinion that a world war was about to break out the preparation would have been quite different.

Q. Yes, but that means that you thought that you could have a war against Poland without the other powers interfering; is that right?

A. Yes, certainly. And that was my personal conviction and everyone else's, that England would not start a war for the sake of Danzig.

Q. And also you did not consider it to be excluded that the Poles would resist any diplomatic attempt to get Danzig, and that it might be necessary to attack them?

A. Yes, but the Fuehrer said during that lunch that he thought that the Poles would accept those proposals regarding Danzig, which in fact were eventually made to the Poles.

Q. Yes, but also said that in the event he could not succeed diplomatically he would have to go into a war?

A. Well, he himself didn't say that, but it was my own personal opinion that in the event of failure of political efforts of war against Poland being inevitable; he himself never said that.

Q. Why did you think that?

A. Because the situation in Poland deteriorated from day to day, which was later on confirmed by people coming back from Poland. I myself had relations there, and the conduct of the Poles was unforgivable.

Q. So that you felt you would have to, if they did not agree peaceably, to force them by arms to get rid of this situation?

A. Yes, because the Poles carried things so far that we in Germany no longer had any other possible way. And after all, Germany at that time was already a very powerful country. You can't take just everything from the Poles.

Q. You mean you could not take insults from the Poles?

A. After all, Germany could only condone this sort of thing up to a point, and there were incidents at the frontier when Germans were massacred; they had their noses and ears cut off.

Q. You knew at that time that German propaganda said for a long time that it had been going on all summer?

A. Yes, but it was later on confirmed by Germans, in fact, by my own relatives who were living in Conetz in Poland, just how the Poles treated the Germans there and what dreadful things they committed against them.

Q. So you agreed with Hitler that the only thing to do was liquidate the Polish problem, and if it could not be done by diplomacy it should be done by force of arms; is that right?

A. Yes, but I didn't actually make the statement on the subject because I didn't have the authority to discuss that sort of thing with the Fuehrer. But it was my own conviction that that was the action which events would have to take.

Q. But the effect of the conversation that you yourself related with the Fuehrer, as you say, in the middle of August 1939 was to cause you immediately to tell the Fuehrer what economic preparations should be made for war?

A. Yes, because that was my duty. If war was about to break out then one had to make the necessary preparations.

Q. Yes, but you wouldn't have been afraid to tell the Fuehrer any such thing if the Fuehrer told you that he was going to get a peaceful settlement? How could you suddenly tell him you were going to prepare for war?

A. No, because one also had to tell him that certain preparations had to be made in the event of a war.

Q. But you just told us you couldn't speak about such matters with the Fuehrer.

A. No, but one had to tell the Fuehrer that in the event of an outbreak of war that these, that, and those measures had to be taken for such an emergency.

Q. But that means you felt that you were the one that decided that war was likely to come, and that Hitler gave you no such intimation. How could that be?

A. Well, no, I personally, and everybody else I knew, was convinced that the solution to the problem could be found in the diplomatic field, but if this should fail it was our duty and my personal duty to see to this, that should war break out that necessary economic preparations were made.

Q. But it wasn't for you to suggest to the Fuehrer, was it?

A. Well, no. If one discusses that sort of thing with the Fuehrer, and he suggests that the diplomatic effort would succeed whilst on the other hand the possibility of a conflagration cannot altogether be excluded, then it was the duty of the Minister of Economy to put before the Fuehrer such economic measures as I considered necessary.

Q. Only because you thought that war was imminent?

A. Not because I thought so, but because I visualized that possibility.

Q. And the possibility, as you said, was because the British might intervene?

A. No; because the Poles, under protection of British guarantee, refused to be reasonable and forced us into war.

Q. Now, in connection with the events I asked you about in 1941, put your mind back on that for a moment, will you. Do you remember you said that you knew about the likelihood of an attack upon Russia in June or July of 1941?

A. Well, the fact that there was a threat of war against Russia was known to me in May and June 1941.

Q. I want to ask you whether you didn't know it as early as the 20th of April 1941, when there was a decree by the Fuehrer appointing Rosenberg to take charge of eastern territory?

A. Well, that I don't know. I don't know whether I have seen that decree.

Q. Don't you remember appointing Schlotterer to be your secretary?

A. Yes, but I don't remember whether that was on that date.

Q. Don't you remember that it was several months before the attack on Russia?

A. That I don't know. I can't remember exactly when I detached Schlotterer for duty with Rosenberg, but it must have been after the nomination of Rosenberg. It also tallies with the date of my conversation with Hess towards the end of April. It was during the last days of April in Munich. It was then that Hess asked me whether I was aware of the fact that a war with Russia was threatening.

Q. What did you say?

A. I said, yes, that sort of thing is being talked about, naturally. And then Hess asked me, as I have told you before, how things stood regarding the Russian deliveries, and whether the loss of such deliveries would not be serious.

Q. I want to refresh your recollection. You make it very difficult sometimes. The Fuehrer issued an order on the 20th of April 1941 appointing Rosenberg as a deputy for a centralized treatment of problems concerning the eastern territories?

A. I don't know whether I saw that. Well, I don't know. I can't say that. You would have to ascertain whether this decree was passed on to the department. That wasn't so easy in our case.

Q. Isn't it a fact that this decree of the 20th of April 1941 by the Fuehrer was a very secret decree which was shown only to Goering, Funk and Keitel?

A. I don't know that. If you say so it must be correct. But I don't remember it; I don't know.

Q. Look, you keep saying that you knew nothing about high policy and that you were only a small man in effect.

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Now here we have a decree which is the first step towards the preparation of the war against Russia, and the only people in the Reich who were permitted to see it were Hitler, Lammers, that is the State Secretary, Keitel, Chief of the OKW, Goering, the delegate for the Four Year Plan, and yourself.

A. In that case it must have been that this decree was only sent to the ministers who were members of the Defense Council of the Reich, and I was one of them, and that is possible.

Q. But regardless of that, I want to ask you now whether you don't remember seeing the decree as early as two months before the attack on Russia?

A. Well, yes, if it has been ascertained that it has been sent to me I must have seen it, but I cannot now remember that. It is possible, but I cannot deny it; it is so long ago.

Q. In any event, based on this decree or based on this conference with Hess, and the other knowledge you had before that conversation, it is clear that in April 1941, you knew that a war with Russia was in contemplation?

A. That a conflict with Russia was threatening.

Q. And you knew that you had to mobilize your resources for an attack on Russia within a reasonable period of time?

A. Well, I didn't have any mobilizing to do in that connection. All I had to do was to place at Rosenberg's disposal Schlotterer and various other people when his ministry opened. I couldn't introduce any measures in economy in this particular case. All this could concern was the strengthening of armament, which was not under my jurisdiction; but it was Goering's and the OKW's concern.

Q. But it also had to do with the exploitation of the eastern territory after it was occupied?

A. Yes, but that was a task for the Four Year Plan.

Q. In which you appointed Schlotterer to cooperate with Rosenberg?

A. Yes. I delegated him to Rosenberg, and Rosenberg, as far as these parts were concerned, was also subordinate to the Four Year Plan; because the only department which could give orders in that connection on economic subjects was the Four Year Plan.

Q. But Schlotterer was put in there to be an economic adviser to the whole problem of the taking of properties out of the eastern countries, was he not?

A. Yes, but only so far as the east. And as far as Rosenberg was concerned, I tried to avoid that Rosenberg should open a new organization, which is what he was proposing to do.

Q. Why were you against that?

A. Because this would have created another ministerial competitor on economic questions. We had enough competitors. We had the Four Year Plan, and this would have introduced another one.

Q. So that you didn't want to give up the jurisdiction over economic matters in the eastern territories to Rosenberg; is that it?

A. Well, jurisdiction isn't right. I wanted to avoid yet a new organization, and the handling of the matter was Rosenberg's concern. Therefore I detached Schlotterer and various other people to Rosenberg's office, and they did of course retain their connections with my office.

Q. What kind of connections did they continue to have with you?

A. They concerned mainly the collecting of consumer goods, because the raw material questions and some such business was handled by the Four Year Plan, in particular Pleiger. It was together with Rosenberg that we created those firms in the east, that is to say, we took firms in the Reich who had to carry out business in the occupied eastern territories. They had to buy out of their own funds. But nothing much materialized because the Army had already collected a very considerable amount of things. And as far as the important materials were concerned, such as coal, oil, etc., that was already being handled by the Four Year Plan and taken out. And the only subject on which I cooperated with Rosenberg, as far as the eastern territories were concerned, was that of these firms. But matters of an important nature, such as the collection of factories, smelting works, electric works, etc., that was dealt with outside the Ministry of Economics and I believe also outside of Rosenberg's organization.

Q. But there is evidence, Funk, that every firm that got anything in the east had to go to you and Goering and get the agreement of both of you before they could do anything.

A. No.

Q. Now, in connection with consumer goods that you controlled, were coal mines included in that?

A. No. Raw materials from occupied territories came under the Four Year Plan.

Q. I am not talking about the occupied territory; I am talking about in general.

A. Oh, I see. In 1941, coal mines in Germany still came under the Ministry of Economics.

Q. When did you lose jurisdiction over coal?

A. It was the middle of 1943.

Q. That was at the time when you became a member of the Central Planning Board, was it not?

A. That was the compensation which I was given for taking away from me the production questions.

Q. But up to the end of 1943, when you say you were in charge of consumer industries, you were in charge of coal as well?

A. Yes, until 1943 the coal came under the Minister of Economics.

Q. So that requirements for coal miners, for example, were part of your responsibility?

A. No, I had nothing to do with miners; that was the concern of the Ministry of Work.

Q. Didn't you have to ask for enough miners to keep up the coal production?

A. Well, of course, if the mines were short of workers or had difficulty with the miners they could come to the Minister of Economy and tell him that they were in difficulty and the Minister of Economy then consulted with the Four Year Plan which in turn would settle the matter with the Minister of Labor.

Q. But you had the responsibility then to insure through the Four Year Plan and Ministry of Labor a steady flow of laborers to work the coal mines that were under your jurisdiction?

A. It wasn't my responsibility, but I had to intervene when the coal industry came to me and complained about the shortage of workers. In that connection I would have to take action.

Q. And what kind of workers did you get for this? Were they all German workers or foreign workers or were some prisoners of war or what?

A. What sort of workers eventually arrived in the mines was no concern of mine. That was decided by the Ministry of Labor and later on by Sauckel, and later on Speer claimed additional authority, but I was in no way connected.

Q. When did you first find out that foreign workers were being brought to Germany to work in the coal mines?

A. That is another very difficult question. I assume that when workers became available in Russia some of them were transferred to the German coal industry.

Q. I want to ask you: when did you first find out that the involuntary—that is, that foreign workers who came against their will were first brought to Germany to work in the coal mines?

A. I can't say that at all, because I have never concerned myself with that question.

Q. When did you first find out that foreign workers were being brought to Germany against their will in any industry?

A. I don't know at all that foreign workers were brought to Germany against their will. That wasn't a task for the Minister of Economy.

Q. I didn't ask you whether it was a task for the Minister of Economy; I asked you when you first knew about it. Do you want the record to stand as it is, that you were probably the only man in Germany that didn't know that workers were brought to Germany against their will?

A. That could have only been after Sauckel was nominated. It was his task. Before that I never heard that workers in large numbers were forcibly transferred to Germany.

Q. Were you ever present in any meeting where the task of Sauckel was defined?

A. No, not which were concerned with the nomination of Sauckel.

Q. I don't mean the nomination of Sauckel; I mean the discussions concerning Sauckel's functions and what the general program was going to be about labor.

A. I believe that the first time that I was present at such discussion was when Speer was already in office.

Q. What discussion are you referring to now?

A. Such as referred to the transfer of foreign workers on a large scale to Germany by Sauckel.

Q. You mean against their will?

A. Well, that I don't know. Sauckel never said during such conferences that they were brought in against their will.

Q. But you know? I just want to ask you. This is the first question: we will come to something important later. Certainly you knew that such a large number of people—millions—couldn't be brought to Germany voluntarily?

A. Certainly. Well, yes, but you are referring to the statement by Sauckel that they were transferred against their will. That they did not come voluntarily was something, certainly, one would have to assume.

Q. When you were asking for labor on behalf of the coal industry for the Four Year Plan from the Minister of Labor, you knew that among those who would be recruited for those mines would be many who were foreign workers brought involuntarily to Germany?

A. That's right; yes. But there is something else I must say in that connection, that is, that such questions on behalf of the coal mines were made directly by Pleiger to Sauckel and had nothing to do with the Minister of Economy.

Q. But you said a little while ago, did you not—I listened to you very carefully, and it is perfectly clear that you said—that first you had jurisdiction over the coal mines until late in 1943; second, that the coal mine owners came to you for a labor supply which you in turn would have to request from the Four Year Plan and the Ministry of Labor; is that correct?

A. Yes, until Sauckel arrived and until Pleiger became the chief of coal questions. After that it was done by Pleiger independently.

Q. Leave out the coal situation for the moment. You also required workers for the consumer industries which were under your jurisdiction; did you not?

A. The consumer goods industries were restricted more and more every year. In fact, it had to concede workers to more important industries.

Q. As a matter of fact, you were using German workers for security reasons in war production industries and therefore required a substitution of foreign workers in the consumer industries?

A. Yes; but certainly no foreign workers on a large scale were used in the consumer goods industry at the beginning.

Q. But later? What happened later? Didn't you finally use foreign workers in the consumer industry?

A. Yes, but the consumer goods industry was deprived of every worker they could spare. They were deprived of more workers than any other industry. I fought continually against having to lose these workers from the consumer goods industry.

Q. Wait a minute. When you went on to this Central Planning Board in the Fall of 1943 did you receive copies of the minutes after that?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact, you were present at many of the meetings, were you not?

A. I only joined the meetings of the Central Planning Board when I required something for my own small sector, that is to say, something to do with sport and consumer goods industries, for example, iron, and I had to fight on each occasion to get just a few thousand tons for my consumer goods industry.

Q. Yes, but during those meetings you attended you heard, did you not, discussions concerning foreign labor?

A. Oh, yes, I did.

Q. And you knew from those meetings that the policy was to bring in more and more foreign workers to the Reich against their will?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. And you never objected to that, I take it?

A. No. Why should I have objected? It was somebody else's task to bring those foreign workers in.

Q. Did you believe it was legal to take people against their will from their homes and bring them into Germany?

A. Well, many things happen in wartime which aren't strictly legal. I have never racked my brains about that. But there is another thing, and that is, that I tried my best to prevent the importation of too many workers from France, for instance, because we in the consumer goods section were interested to see their industry at home kept going.

Q. Yes, but what about workers from the East, from the Ukraine, for example; you were interested in getting them into Germany to work, were you not?

A. I personally, no.

Q. But you were in agreement with the general policy?

A. Well, that foreign workers should be brought into Germany from foreign countries, that I considered perfectly proper so that war production could continue and increase. But I was never aware that this was illegal.

Q. Do you remember that in France there were collected properties held by enemy property custodians?

A. That a custodian for enemy property existed, that is something I know, but I never concerned myself with the questions themselves.

Q. Do you remember that there was a decision made in 1943 to utilize the funds in French banks by taking the deposits and putting them into the Aero Bank?

A. Yes. Lange made a report on that to me. The vice-president of the Reichsbank, Lange, made a long report to me in which he explained to me that funds which were held under the jurisdiction of the custodian for enemy property were to be transferred to the Aero Bank so as to create liquid funds for war production.

Q. That is to say, these deposits stood in French francs, and the deposits were transferred to the Aero Bank, putting at the disposal of the German armament people French francs; is that right?

A. No, that is not how I understood it to be. The way I understood it was that these liquid funds which were under the supervision of the custodian for enemy property were to be loosened so that they would be at the disposal of the entire French economic system. In fact, Lange, who was working in France—I myself never went to France, in fact, I have never been to any occupied territory—reported to me that the French were extremely pleased with this suggestion.

Q. Don't you remember that the purpose was to obtain French francs which would be used to finance the armament industry in France?

A. That has never been reported to me in that way.

Q. Well, we have a letter from the military administration in France protesting against this transaction; and the Ministry of Economics that you were in favor of it.

A. Well, I didn't write that letter. The way it was described to me was that this concerned a transaction in the money market such as did not exist in France, and that the French were extremely pleased to see that such a transaction was being carried out, and nobody mentioned the armament industry in that connection, and a protest was not mentioned to me.

Q. You were buying a lot of goods in France at that time, were you not?

A. We? Who?

Q. You.

A. As far as I was concerned I was only interested in consumer goods.

Q. But you were also interested in money and exchange, because you were the president of the Reichsbank?

A. But that was done on the spot, and in conjunction with the Bank of France they had an official there whose name was Schaefer.

Q. But you also had something to do with the Reichsverechnungskassen as well?

A. Yes, but I don't know how they came into that transaction. That I don't know.

Q. But the fact is that you were in general charge of the following: the Reichsbank, the Reichskreditkassen, and the Reichsverechnungskassen?

A. Well, I wasn't chief of the Reichskreditkassen, but it is part of the money system.

Q. Well, the whole clearing arrangement, for example, was under your general policy supervision; was it not?

A. Yes, but I have never concerned myself with these matters in detail.

Q. But now, basically, you were in charge, were you not, of the whole execution from a policy point of view of the clearing arrangements?

A. Yes.

Q. And as such you had a general policy control over the Reichsverechnungskassen, which were the banks for the clearing?

A. Together with the Minister of Finance.

Q. So that the question of how much should be exported and how much should be imported was partly within your jurisdiction?

A. Yes, with reference to Verrechnungskassen. The jurisdiction of money matters was with the Minister of Finance and not me.

Q. But with respect to the amounts of the clearings you had something to do with that; did you not?

A. Yes, all this belongs into the problems of foreign trade, which now is handled by me alone, but was centralized and part of the Foreign Office. All departments which were interested in foreign trade were represented in the HPA, which is the trade political board. The chairmanship was held by the Foreign Office, and to this department the Armament Minister and the Minister of Food reported their claims; and the Minister of Finance was concerned with the execution of the program while the Minister of Economy and the Reichsbank were concerned with the technical execution of those matters.

Q. So that the question of how much Germany was indebted or should be indebted to these countries was a problem that came within your jurisdiction?

A. Not only my responsibility, but all those people concerned, including mine; but particularly the Minister of Finance.

Q. But in any event, during these years of the war the amount of debts owed by Germany to these occupied and satellite countries increased greatly; did it not?

A. Yes, the responsible person for this debt of the Reich was in the first place the Minister of Finance.

Q. Did you intend to pay back any of these credits after the war if Germany won?

A. Yes, certainly. I have always emphasized that. I have always stated that publicly.

Q. Don't you remember a meeting in 1944 in which you stated that it was unnecessary to consider that these debts would have to be repaid in the event of a German victory?

A. I don't know what that conference was, but it was my point of view that these clearing debts were genuine debts, and that Germany in the event of a victory would certainly be in a position to repay these debts by supplying goods. But that whenever foreign countries were concerned—and this is probably what you are talking about now—the question of reparations should have to be taken into consideration in this connection. But it was my idea that this whole problem of clearing debts would have to be included in the large reconstruction program in Europe.

Q. Didn't you tell Hitler in 1944 that there was no intention to pay back these debts in the event that Germany won the war?

A. No. How can Hettlager say things like that. Well, if for instance, these countries were to make reparations they could have been used to cancel these clearing debts.

Q. That means that you had a clear idea that if Germany won the war you were going to impose reparations on the defeated countries?

A. Yes; that they would have to pay some compensation.

Q. Do you remember how much you figured out these countries should pay in the event of a German victory?

A. I have never imagined any figures; that is quite impossible.

Q. Well, don't you remember, for example, that you put forward that England should pay a billion in gold?

A. No, I don't know about that.

Q. Well now, don't you remember having a meeting on the 22nd of July 1940 at which you presided, with most of the ministers present, at which time you made that suggestion?

A. Well, I may have said something like that jokingly, but no reasonable person could imagine that I could have said a thing like that as early as 1940 and be serious about it.

Q. As a matter of fact, you stated what you were going to do with this billion in gold, did you not?

A. Well, I don't know about that.

Q. Well, as a matter of fact you said that you would use it as a manipulation fund for the first imports, and that you would be able to discontinue rationing?

A. Whoever said that must have had a vivid imagination. I can't remember this. It is quite unthinkable that one would think anything like that as early as 1940.

Q. Don't forget that this was after the victory over France.

A. Yes, but this is certainly wrongly represented.

Q. Let me see. Weren't you told by Goering on the 22nd of June 1940 that you should do research on the problem of including into the greater German economy all annexed and occupied territory?

A. Yes, that is quite right.

Q. And immediately after that—

A. Yes, Goering gave me a task in that connection.

Q. Let me refresh your recollection further then. A month after this commission you received from Goering, didn't you call a meeting of the ministers to discuss these questions?

A. Yes, that is possible. That I imagine.

Q. Do you remember Ley, Darre and Gross?

A. I don't know about Ley.

Q. And Wagner, Popitz and Lammers?

A. Yes.

Q. You do remember the meeting, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And in that meeting, I ask you, didn't you make the statement that you mentioned before, that in the event of a German victory, a billion dollars in gold was to be paid to Germany by England?

A. Well, now, I don't recollect that at all. I can't remember what I said.

Q. Do you deny that you said it?

A. No, but I can't confirm it either.

Q. But if the minutes show it you are ready to accept that as true?

A. Yes, certainly, if the minutes say so.

Q. Let me ask you further. Didn't you also say this, that the solution of the foreign indebtedness question is necessary to regain freedom of currency?

A. Yes, that is quite probable, and it would be right too.

Q. And didn't you also say that upon termination of the war there will not be any indebtedness to England, France, Holland or Switzerland?

A. That I don't know any more.

Q. Yes, but that is what I asked you before, Funk.

A. Well, that I do not know any longer. I do not remember these details.

Q. These are not details. I asked you before whether in connection with the clearing of debts you had not made the suggestion that it would be unnecessary to pay them in the event of a German victory?

A. What I did say was that after a German victory, after the war, Germany would produce so many goods that they could be used to pay off these debts. After all, we couldn't ask Switzerland for reparations.

Q. That is exactly the point; you included Switzerland.

A. In that case this is being wrongly represented. That would mean that I was crazy. That is quite out of the question, and in that case I deny this because it is wrongly represented.

Q. Let me ask you something else: do you remember the gold that the SS was collecting from the concentration camps?

A. I have never concerned myself with that gold.

Q. Do you remember receiving gold into the Reichsbank from the SS?

A. Vice-President Puhl once reported to me that an account for the SS did exist in the Reichsbank, but I never assumed that the Reichsbank could make use of this deposit since it was an account established for the SS.

Q. Well, you know, Funk, that as a matter of fact, the Reichsbank sold that gold and converted it into money for the SS?

A. I do not know that.

Q. You know that at the beginning of the whole transaction you had a conversation with Himmler about it?

A. About these questions? No, I never discussed them with Himmler.

Q. The testimony is clear that you came back and reported to the Reichsbank directors of a conference that you had with Himmler before the gold was received.

A. That is a point which I would certainly remember if I had talked to Himmler about this sort of thing, and I have never talked to him about it.

Q. As a matter of fact, you came to people in the Reichsbank, Funk—see if you can remember this now—you came to people in the Reichsbank and you told them that you had a conversation with Himmler in which he told you that there was certain gold of the SS that they wanted to put into the Reichsbank, and you instructed that that SS gold be received?

A. No, that is not right. That is a wrong statement. I must deny that. I have no recollection of ever having discussed this matter with Himmler.

Q. With whom in the SS did you discuss it?

A. I have not discussed any such matter with anybody in the SS. Puhl merely made a report to me that such an account for the SS existed.

Q. What was the reason for such a report? What was strange about this account?

A. Puhl made that report to me together with other current reports, and I now remember exactly what he said. He said, we have also got a deposit from the SS, but I don't know what is in it.

It never occurred to me, however, that any such deposit could possibly be used by the Reichsbank.

Q. But how many deposits do you have in the Reichsbank? You must have had thousands.

A. Yes, certainly, but such deposits as this there was only one like that.

Q. Like what?

A. Well, a deposit which contained gold and foreign currency, although I don't know what was in them, really. The same question arose, for instance, when the problem arose where we were to take in gold from Holland. Once more my attitude was that this would have to be made a deposit which was not to get mixed up with the current accounts of the Reichsbank. And Puhl and Wilhelm will be able to confirm that.

Q. Yes, but the fact is this, that you knew there was gold in those accounts, didn't you—the SS accounts?

A. Yes, that was reported to me by Puhl.

Q. Puhl also told you, didn't he, that that gold consisted of gold teeth and other kinds of gold articles,—gold watches and all the gold that was taken from the people in concentration camps?

A. I don't recollect that Puhl told me anything like that. Puhl even told me, if I remember rightly, I don't want to know what is in that deposit.

Q. And were you in agreement that you didn't want to know what was in that?

A. We didn't generally look into the deposits, and that was a deposit of the SS. And that these things came from concentration camps Puhl certainly did not tell me.

Q. Why didn't you want to look into it?

A. Me?

Q. Yes.

A. I have never concerned myself with these matters in detail.

Q. What did you understand from Puhl when he said he didn't want to know what was in there?

A. Well, probably that he was of the opinion that as this came from the SS this was a matter we had better not concern ourselves with, and it remained in the possession of the SS and was not transferred to the Reichsbank; it was a deposit; it did not become the property of the Reichsbank.

Q. But Puhl came to you and asked your permission to retain this deposit; is that right?

A. No. He only told me that the SS was opening such a deposit in the Reichsbank. The question of retaining it or not retaining it never cropped up; he simply reported to me together with other current affairs that a deposit was being opened by the SS.

Q. But you knew that the account did not stand in the name of the SS, didn't you?

A. No; to the contrary, I understood that was in the name of the SS.

Q. You knew it was in the name of a person and not in the name of the SS?

A. No, I did not know that.

Q. That is what he was telling you, Puhl, didn't he?

A. No, he did not mention the name to me; all he told me was, this is a deposit from the SS.

Q. Why wouldn't it interest you?

A. Well, because it is not a common occurrence that a political organization opened a deposit in the Reichsbank, and Puhl must have considered that this was something he ought to inform me about.

Q. Returning for a moment to this question of the fine against the Jews that we discussed in 1938, Funk, you were a party to all the laws that were put into effect in November 1938 after the Cristar Week?

A. I was only participating so far as the legal rulings of the Jewish property was concerned. So far as the fine was concerned I had not participated in that. This was a matter for the minister of finance.

Q. All the decrees excluding the Jews from industry were yours, were they not?

A. Yes. We had to do this because otherwise Jewish property would have been free for everybody to loot, and we had to do something to protect it. And it was my proposal that the Jews should be allowed to retain any shareholdings, and that any property which they had to give over to other people would receive an interest from the recipient. And their retaining their shareholdings, their retention of their shareholdings, was refused by Goering during a meeting, and so far as the interests on their property was concerned that was later refused by the minister of finance. I must explain something to you in this connection. So far as my participation in this Jewish affair is concerned, that was my responsibility and I have regretted it later on that I ever did participate. The Party had always brought pressure to bear on me previously to make me agree to the confiscation of Jewish property, and I had refused repeatedly. But later on, when the anti-Jewish measures and the force used against the Jews came into force, something legal had to be done to prevent the looting and confiscation of all Jewish property.

Q. You know that the looting and all that was done at the instigation of the Party, don't you?

(Here witness weeps)

A. Yes, most certainly. That is when I should have left in 1938. Of that I am guilty. I am guilty. I admit that I am a guilty party here.

Q. Well, now, just to make the record clear, this law which prohibited Jews from operating retail stores and wholesale establishments and other things was a law that you drafted yourself, was it not?

A. Yes, because we had to make such legislation simply because if we hadn't done it the Jews would have been subjected to uncontrolled looting as had already been done. All that was a point as the result of which I should have resigned.

Q. As a matter of fact, you predicted as the result of these decrees and other things that the Reich would become the possessor of a half billion shares of capital stock?

A. Yes, that was my estimation of the Jewish property. But to start with—and this must be in the document—I demanded

at the beginning of this affair that the shares should not be taken away from them.

Q. Tell me, Funk, these measures against the Jews, weren't they taken at that time in 1938 partly as a preparation for the war, because you didn't want any important parts of the German industry to be under the control of Jews when the war came?

A. I had never thought at that time that a war could happen. After all, that was in 1938.

Q. In any event, with respect to the fine of a billion marks, you were present at the meeting where that was discussed, weren't you?

A. Yes. It came from Goering or the minister of finance, and the minister of finance carried it out.

Q. Well, now, just to come back to something that I was asking you about before, when you put Schlotterer into Rosenberg's ministry, how often did you see him after that?

A. Very rarely.

Q. But he was to report to you generally as your deputy, wasn't he?

A. But that was generally done by my state secretary, Landfriede. I personally received Schlotterer very rarely to make reports.

Q. In connection with the fixing of the occupation costs, you were concerned, were you not, as the president of the Reichsbank?

A. Yes. They were fixed by the minister of finance and the OKW. And this is another point: I have always advocated a reasonable figure for these occupation costs so as to prevent the overdrawing of the French, overburdening of the French currency. And these monies were used to buy in France.

Q. What do you mean by that, Funk, that the occupation monies were used? Levies were used to purchase goods in France; is that what you mean?

A. Yes, certainly. The army must have used it for that purpose. Where would they have gotten the money otherwise? How was it possible otherwise that the army formations and Luftwaffe could make these purchases whilst I was fighting a continuous fight against the arrangements?

Q. As a matter of fact, the plan was to buy goods on the black market in France, wasn't it?

A. Yes, and where would they have had the money from otherwise? It must have come from the occupation costs in France.

Q. That means then, that if they had no other money available, when they needed goods to bring into Germany they would have to use occupation money for the purchases?

A. Well, it wasn't as clear as that, but the separate army formations must have been in the position of financial means not controlled by us which they must have used for these purposes. My state secretary, Hiller, Puhl, and Landfriede, if you interrogate them, will back me up and confirm that I have always fought against exploitation and against the fact that these means would be used to buy out these foreign countries.

Q. Do you consider these men to be truthful men, Hiller, Puhl, and Landfriede?

A. Yes, I would. They will confirm that, and I sent dozens of letters on that subject to Goering, the Minister of Finance, Lammer, Bormann, and all these people, asking them not to break the financial system in these countries.

Q. Yes, but you know that purchases were being made through these various corporations, including the Roges Corporation, with monies obtained from occupation levies?

A. Yes, but Roges was a controlled affair. That I believe was controlled, and these were regular business matters.

Q. But where did Roges get the money to make his purchases?

A. They must have received these monies from the ministry of economy. That was a matter which was controlled. These monies must have been allotted to them for the purpose of making regular purchases.

Q. But I want to ask you, wasn't part of the money that they used monies which were obtained from occupation levies against the French?

A. So far as these normal purchases were concerned, certainly not; they were done via clearing. These were controlled purchases controlled by the Ministry of Economy.

Q. Well, the amount of the clearing purchases though was dictated by the Reich, were they not?

A. You can't say dictated; you can say granted.

Q. But the point is that the German Reich owed three accounts already, and weren't you in effect making these people give further credit to Germany?

A. Yes, but these purchases were part of normal business and something was supplied in exchange.

Q. But that is silly, because the net balance was always in favor of Germany?

A. Yes, always passive. But what I want to say is that any part of the occupation costs which were expended were used for the army formations and used by the buyers and crooks etc. We were always wondering where the financial means for these giant purchases were coming from.

Q. Well, did you ask anybody about them?

A. We always tried to find out where they came from, but in vain. We didn't know who was using them. It must have been the Minister of Finance.

Q. We will come back to this some other time, Funk. I want to ask you one thing. Do you remember that in your discussion in the spring of 1941 with respect to the war against Russia that there was a date fixed of the 15th of May as the date on which all preparations had been finished—as early as the time you were discussing it in April?

A. Nobody knew about a date.

Q. Well, didn't you ever see an order from Hitler as far back as December 1940, December 18, 1940, saying that all long-term preparations would have to be finished for the Russian war by the 15th of May 1941?

A. No, I have never seen such an order from Hitler.

Q. You still say that the first time you heard about the proposed war with the Russians was in April 1941?

A. Yes, approximately April 1941.

Approved:

/s/ W. Frack
(Interpreter)

/s/ John Wm. Gunsser
(Reporter)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3545-PS

FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG, 17 November 1938

Speech by Funk in Berlin on 15 November 1938.

The state and the economy constitute a unity. They must be directed according to the same principles. The best proof thereof has been rendered by the most recent development of the Jewish problem in Germany. One cannot exclude the Jews from the political life, but let them live and work in the economic sphere. The fact that the last violent explosion of the disgust of the German people, because of a criminal Jewish attack against the German people, took place at a time when we were standing just before the termination of the economic measures for the

elimination of the Jews from the German economy—this fact is a result of the other fact that in the last years we had not handled this problem sufficiently early and consistently. In any event, the basis of a complete elimination of the Jews also from the economy had already been laid by the decrees of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Field Marshal Goering who was the first to undertake the solution of this problem. In the meantime, by means of Aryanization performed under governmental supervision, the Jews had already been excluded completely from the stock exchanges and the banks and almost completely from the larger businesses and all important industrial enterprises. According to estimates, of the net property of approximately 7 billion marks, determined pursuant to the decree for the registration of Jewish property, 2 billion marks have already been transferred into German possession.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3552-PS

THE THIRD REICH [Das Dritte Reich]

by Gerd Ruehle, The Fourth Year, 1936, Page 21.

Education in the Ordensburg.

Those Party members, selected for training in leadership in accordance with such points of view (who must have completed their labor service and their military service satisfactorily) are to be taught in the Ordensburgen by the best teachers in history and science of race, philosophy and culture, economics and specialized training etc. To determine the ideological direction of this education, to choose suitable teachers and to train them, is one of the tasks of the Senior School of the Party [Hohe Schule der Partei] which is to be established in the near future and will be placed under the direction of the Reich Leader Party member Alfred Rosenberg in his capacity as Delegate of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the entire spiritual and ideological teaching and education of the NSDAP (See Vol. 1934, pp. 78 to 79.).

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3553-PS

A. ROSENBERG: MYTH OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
[Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts], Munich, 1934.

[Page 18] To the 150th Thousand

The "Myth" has today drawn deep, ineffaceable furrows into the emotional life of the German nation. Ever new editions are a clear indication that a decisive turning over of the spiritual soil

is growing into a historical event. Many things which in my book seemed to be a peculiar idea have already become a reality of state policy. Many other things will yet, I hope, materialize as a further result of this new vigour.

The College of the Inquisition of the Roman Church has ceremoniously put the "Myth" on the Index. This feeble protest will contribute its share to the wider dissemination of this work. I am in the best of company on the Index.

The state-political revolution has ended, the change of spirit, however, has just begun. In its service the "Myth of the 20th Century" now stands among the first.

Berlin, May, 1934.

A. R.

[Page 28]

The "significance of world history" has radiated out from the north over the whole world, borne by a blue-eyed blond race which in several great waves determined the spiritual aspect of the world * * *

[Page 479]

The essence of the contemporary world revolution lies in the awakening of the racial types. Not in Europe alone but on the whole globe. This awakening is the organic counter-movement against the last chaotic remnants of the liberal economic commercial imperialism, whose object of exploitation out of desperation had fallen into the snare of Bolshevik Marxism, in order to complete what democracy had begun, the extirpation of the racial and national consciousness.

[Page 452]

Thereby the new thought is sifted out in a palpable way. It puts nation and race higher than the actual state and its form. It declares protection of the nation more important than protection of a religious belief, a class, the monarchy, or the republic; it regards treason against the nation as a greater crime than high treason against the state.

[Page 642]

No "Central Europe" without distinction of race and nation, as one Naumann had proclaimed, no Franco-Jewish Pan-Europe, but a Nordic Europe is the watchword for the future, with a *German* central Europe. Germany as a racial and national state, as the central power of the main-land, as security for the South and the Southeast; the Scandinavian states with Finland as a second alliance for the security of the Northeast, and Great Brit-

ain for the security of the West and overseas at points where it is necessary in the interests of the Nordic peoples. That still requires comprehensive confirmation.

(Foot note: I do not wish here to go from the principle to single immediate European problems as they have already been dealt with in the clearest manner—See Adolf Hitler: “Mein Kampf,” Vol. 2, and my work “The Essential Structure of National Socialism”)

[Page 673]

After throwing off their worn-out basic ideas and the present purse proud conditions (i.e. the destruction of the New York idea), the United States of America, which all travellers with common accord regard as a glorious land of the future, have the great task of putting into being with youthful energy the new conception of racial states which a few awakened Americans have already foreseen (Grant, Stoddard): the emigration and settlement elsewhere of the Negroes and the yellow races, the cession of East Asiatic territories to Japan, work for the preparation of a colonization by the blacks of Central Africa, the emigration of the Jews to a territory where that whole “nation” can find room, in agreement with a future settled European policy in this direction.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3554-PS

BOOK NEWS [Buecher-Kunde] Number 11,
November 1942, Page 1.

The Myth of the 20th Century

In the midst of the German people's most violent struggle for its natural and cultural existence, we are celebrating the anniversary of a book, which, next to the Fuehrer's book, has contributed to a unique extent to the rise and to the spiritual and psychical development of this people. Twelve years after Alfred Rosenberg's “Mythus” first appeared, a million copies of the book have been published and circulated. If this large number is already a proof of the exceptionally great effect of this book, it is even far more so when we consider how many readers have been reached through these million books. We still recall the years after 1930 during which small gatherings met together in all parts of the Reich to promote a new ideology by means of the “Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts”. It is just through this book that during the time of struggle we have come again to know communal reading and discussions amongst the workers. We

are therefore not incorrect in assuming that many million Germans not only know the "Mythus" by name but have read it themselves.

The effect of a book is certainly not estimated only by the number of its editions and readers. This book, however, was bound to fulfill its revolutionary task, since it circulated among the best elements of the people, the fighters. By their attitude and in their own words, they passed on the basic ideas of Alfred Rosenberg to the many Germans who at first fought shy of reading a "difficult" book of this kind, and still do so. It must therefore be stated that the phrases coined by Alfred Rosenberg have passed into the consciousness of the whole people and it is just today that they are proving pillars of an ideological building whose completion is the purpose of the fight being waged not least today.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3557-PS

DATES IN THE HISTORY OF THE NSDAP, by Dr. Hans Volz, Berlin/Leipzig, 1939. 9th Ed., Unabridged, Pages 4-5.

Since December 7, 1918, Eckart publishes, with the collaboration since February, 1919 of the Baltic German Alfred Rosenberg (born on January 12, 1893 in Reval) and Gottfried Feder, the weekly, *In Good German*, which is oriented against the November Criminals, Jewry, and interest bandage. On September 12, 1919 Hitler visits in line of duty a meeting of the then yet completely unknown "German People's Party".

* * * * *

19.19. Early Period of the NSDAP (Fall 1919-July 1921). October: Hitler appears for the first time as speaker at a meeting of the NSDAP (at the Hofbraeuhauskeller, Innere Wiener Strasse 19) (for the first time this meeting is given recognition in a people's paper ("Munich Observer"; p. 7 f below) 111 persons attended the meeting.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3559-PS

ALFRED ROSENBERG,
THE MAN AND HIS WORK,
by F. Th. Hart, 5th Edition, Published I. F. Lehmann, Munich
Page 50.

The first man to receive the National Prize was Alfred Rosenberg at the Party Diet in 1937, with the following citation:

"Alfred Rosenberg has helped with his publications to lay the scientific and intuitive foundation and to strengthen the philos-

ophy of National Socialism in the most excellent way. His indefatigable struggle to keep National Socialist philosophy pure was especially meritorious. Only future times will be able to fully estimate the depth of the influence of this man on the philosophical foundation of the National Socialist Reich. The National Socialist movement, and beyond that, the entire German people will be deeply gratified that the Fuehrer has distinguished Alfred Rosenberg as one of his oldest and most faithful fighting comrades by awarding him the German National Prize”.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3560-PS

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 2042

Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Organization and Administration of the Eastern Territories, October 8, 1939

Section 1

(1) In the process of reorganization of the Eastern Territories the Reich Districts [Gau] of Western Prussia and Posen shall be incorporated as parts of the German Reich.

(2) The Reich District shall be administered by a Reich Governor [Statthalter].

(3) The Reich Governor in Western Prussia shall have his official residence in Danzig; the Reich Governor in Posen shall have his official residence in Posen.

Section 2

(1) The Reich District of Western Prussia shall be subdivided into the government districts of Danzig, Marienwerder, and Bromberg.

(2) The Reich District Posen shall be subdivided into the government districts of Hohensalza, Posen, and Kalisch.

Section 3

(1) For the organization of the administration in the Reich districts, the statute concerning the organization of the administration in the Reich District of the Sudetenland (short title “Sudeten Statute”) of April 14, 1939 (RGBl. I, p. 780), shall apply unless modified by this decree.

(2) All branches of the administration shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Reich Governor. The Reich Minister of the Interior shall decide, in agreement with the Reich minister concerned, upon the transfer of special branches of the administration to the existing Reich administrative agencies. Special agen-

cies for counties shall be subject to the jurisdiction of county commissioners until further notice.

Section 4

By including adjacent territorial parts in the province of Silesia the government district of Kattervitz, and in the province of East-Prussia the government district of Ziehenan shall be formed.

Section 5

(1) The boundaries of the Administrative Districts (Sections 1, 2, and 4) shall be determined by the Reich Minister of the Interior, in agreement with the Prussian President of the Cabinet, as far as the Administrative boundaries between the recovered territories and the adjacent provinces are concerned.

(2) The Reich Minister of the Interior shall regulate the formation of urban and rural counties insofar as it is required by the reorganization.

Section 6

(1) Residents of German blood or of racially related blood shall become German nationals in accordance with further provisions to be issued.

(2) Residents of German origin in these territories shall become German citizens in accordance with the Reich Nationality Code.

Section 7

The law heretofore in force shall continue in effect unless incompatible with the fact of incorporation in the German Reich.

Section 8

The Reich Minister of the Interior may, by means of general orders, and in agreement with the Reich minister concerned, introduce Reich law and Prussian law.

Section 9

For the territory of the former Free City of Danzig, the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Law concerning the reunion of the Free City of Danzig with the German Reich of September 1, 1939 (RGBl., I, p. 1547) remain unchanged.

Section 10

The Reich Minister of Finance shall arrange, in agreement with the Reich Minister of the Interior, the questions arising from the reorganization in the sphere of the adjustment of finances.

Section 11

(1) The Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Minister of Finance or the agencies determined by them shall order the

financial adjustments required by the reorganization as well as the measures herewith connected.

(2) Dispositions in accordance with (1) shall establish rights and obligations of those concerned and shall effect the transition, the restrictions and the annulment of real rights.

Section 12

(1) The Reich Minister of the Interior shall be the official chiefly responsible for the reorganization of the Eastern Territories.

(2) He shall issue the general rules and regulations required for the enforcement and execution of this decree.

Section 13

(1) This decree shall take effect as of November 1, 1939.

(2) The Reich Minister of the Interior may, for specified areas, declare the provisions of this decree to be in effect at an earlier date.

Berlin, October 8, 1939.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
GOERING, General Field Marshal, President of
the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich

FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior
R. HESS, Representative of the Fuehrer
DR. LAMMERS, Reich Minister and Chief of the
Reich Chancellery

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3561-PS

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 2077

Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning
the Administration of the Occupied Polish Territories,
October 12, 1939

In order to restore and maintain public order and public life
in the occupied Polish territories, I decree:

Section 1.

The territories occupied by German troops shall be subject to the authority of the Governor General of the occupied Polish territories, except in so far as they are incorporated within the German Reich.

Section 2.

(1) I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Frank as Governor General of the occupied Polish territories.

(2) As Deputy Governor General I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.

Section 3.

(1) The Governor General shall be directly responsible to me.

(2) All branches of the administration shall be directed by the Governor General.

Section 4.

The laws at present in force shall remain in force, except in so far as they are in conflict with the taking over of the administration by the German Reich.

Section 5.

(1) The Cabinet Council for Reich Defense, the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, and the Governor General may legislate by decree.

(2) The decrees shall be promulgated in the *Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten polnischen Gebiete*.

Section 6.

The Chairman of the Cabinet Council for Reich Defense and Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, and also the supreme Reich authorities, may make the arrangements required for the planning of German life and the German economic sphere with respect to the territories subject to the authority of the Governor General.

Section 7.

(1) The cost of administration shall be borne by the occupied territory.

(2) The Governor General shall draft a budget. The budget shall require the approval of the Reich Minister of Finance.

Section 8.

(1) The central authority for the occupied Polish territories shall be the Reich Minister of the Interior.

(2) The administrative decrees required for the implementing and supplementing of the present decree shall be issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior.

Section 9.

(1) The present decree shall come into force as soon as and to the extent to which I withdraw the order given to the Commander in Chief of the Army for the exercise of military administration.

(2) Authority for the exercise of executive power shall be the subject of special provisions.

Berlin, October 12, 1939.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
GOERING, Field Marshal General, President of
the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich and Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan
FRICK, Minister of the Interior
R. HESS, Deputy of the Fuehrer
KEITEL, Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces
von BRAUCHITSCH, Commander-in-Chief of the
Army
von RIBBENTROP, Reich Minister of Foreign
Affairs
graf SCHWERIN von KROSIGK, Reich Minister
of Finance
DR. LAMMERS, Reich Minister and Chief of the
Reich Chancellery.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3562-PS

TOP SECRET

Berlin, W. 8, Behrenstrasse 63, 1 June 1939.

THE CHIEF PLENIPOTENTIARY
FOR THE ECONOMY.

GBW 8/2669/39 g.Rs.

Replies to be addressed to Leadership Staff GBW attention of
Ministerial Director Sarnow or his deputy in the office.

TO:

- a. Under-Secretary Reinhardt, Reich Finance Ministry,
- b. Under-Secretary Dr. Landfried, Reich Ministry of Economics,
- c. Chief of Military Economic Staff, Major General Thomas,
- d. Under-Secretary Dr. Neumann, Prussian Ministry of State,
- e. Reichsbank Director Puhl, Directorate of the Reichsbank,
- f. General Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, attention of Under-Secretary Dr. Stuckart, or his deputy in the office.
- g. Ministerialdirigent Dr. Michel, Reich Ministry of Economics, Berlin,
- h. Councillor in the Ministry, Mr. Sussdorf, *here*.

Attached please find minutes of a conference of 30 May 1939 concerning war financing. As soon as the new proposals of the Reich Ministry of Finance have been handed to me I shall take the opportunity of again referring to the matter.

Represented by
signed Dr. Posse.

Certified:

[Seal of Reich
Ministry of Economics]

[signature illegible]

Justizsekretaer.

To be shown to the Minister
for his information.

[initial] 5/6

* * * Then a report was made of the contents of the "Notes on the Question of Internal Financing of War", of 9 May of this year (appendix to GBW 8/2179/39 top secret), in which the figures given to me by the Reichs Minister of Finance are also discussed. It was pointed out that the General Plenipotentiary for the Economy is primarily interested to introduce into the legislation for war finance, the idea of financing war expenditures by anticipating future revenues, to be expected after the war.
* * *

Undersecretary Newman, first, submitted for discussion the question whether the production would be able to meet, to the assumed extent, the demands of the army, especially if the demands of the army, as stated in the above report, would increase to approximately 14 billions in the first three months of war. He stated that, if the production potential of the present Reich territory is taken as a basis, he doubts the possibility of such a production increase. * * *

The demands of the army would probably be higher in the first three months of war than during the further course of the war.

TOP SECRET

Enclosure to GBW 8/2669/ g. Rs.

List of Persons Present at the meeting of 30th May 1939
concerning war financing

Dr. Landfried, Under-Secretary, Reich Ministry of Economics.

Dr. Holtz, Councillor in the Ministry, GBW.

Reinhardt, Under-Secretary, Reich Finance Ministry.

Dr. Neumann, Under-Secretary, Four Year Plan.

Dr. Kadgien, Regierungsrat, Four Year Plan.

Kreزشmann, Reichsbank Director, Reichsbank.

Tischbein, Ministerial Director, Supreme Command of Armed Forces.

Dr. Danckwerts, Ministerialdirigent, Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Jacobi, Oberregierungsrat, Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Sussdorf, Councillor in the Ministry, GBW.

Dr. Michel, Ministerialdirigent, Reich Ministry of Economics.

Thomas, Major General, Supreme Command of Armed Forces.

* * * * *

First, as concerns the scope of the total production, it is clear that the economic power of the protectorate and of other territories, possibly to be acquired, must of course be completely exhausted for the purposes of the conduct of the war. It is, however, just as clear that these territories cannot obtain any compensation from the economy of Greater Germany for the products which they will have to give us during the war, because their power must be used fully for the war and for supplying the civilian home population. It is therefore superfluous to add any amount for such compensation to the debt of the domestic German war financing. The question as to what labor forces, new products and other commodities in the Protectorate and in the territories to be acquired, can be utilized for us, and the question how these commodities can be obtained and, in a proper case, are to be paid by us, thus can be excluded from this investigation. Insofar as it should happen that, for political reasons, deliveries without any expectancy of compensation cannot be demanded of the "occupied" territories, to that extent one will be able to pay with debt certificates of the Reich and an answer to the question of settling those certificates must be found after the termination of the war It goes without saying that the question of cov-

ering the minimum requirements of the civilian population during the war in the countries coming into our scope of Government, will remain a domestic task of such countries.

* * * * *

[Page 14]

During the war the army can reckon, out of the economy of Greater Germany, substantially only with deliveries to the extent of that portion of production which in peacetime is attributed to the public expenditures—minus the minimum requirements of the civilian government agencies. In order to cover additional requirements of the Army the economic power of the Protectorate and of the territories to be acquired during the campaign, must be used.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3563-PS

Excerpts from German Publications Concerning Defendant Funk's Positions and Activities.

With respect to the positions and activities which are listed on Document 3533-PS, but to which Defendant Funk refused to stipulate, statements from relevant German publications are submitted below, with a request that the Tribunal take judicial notice of those publications:

“(b) *Personal Economic Adviser of Hitler*”

(1) A book published in 1932 by Edgar v. Schmidt-Pauli entitled “The Men around Hitler” [Die Maenner um Hitler] devotes a chapter to Funk (pp. 92-96) under the heading “Walther Funk—the Adviser on Economic Policy”. [Walther Funk—Wirtschaftspolitischer Berater]. It is stated on page 92 of this book:

“Walther Funk, today the personal adviser of Hitler on Economic Policy, the man, foremost, who establishes personal contacts between the Fuehrer of the NSDAP and the economic leaders in the Reich”.

(2) In the German “Who's Who” [Wer Ist's] published in 1935, the chapter on Defendant Funk (at p. 463) contains the following statement:

“Since 1931, Economic Adviser to Fuehrer of NSDAP”.

(3) In the German Fuehrer Who's Who, 1934/35 [Das Deutsche Fuehrerlexikon, 1934/35] published in 1934, it is stated with respect to defendant Funk (at p. 139):

“1 July 1916, editor of the “Berliner Beersenzeitung”; 1922, editor-in-chief till end of 1930; since then economic adviser to the Fuehrer of the NSDAP;”

The title page of that book states:

“No objections are raised by the NSDAP to the publication of this book; Munich, 15 June 1934”.

Moreover, the book’s preface, which was signed by the publisher and the editors, states (at p. 12):

“It would have been impossible for us to perform the task which we set ourselves if we would not have gone about the publication of the book by co-operating with the competent official authorities”.

(4) In a book by Paul Oestreich, entitled “Walther Funk, a Life for the Economy” [Walther Funk, Ein Leben fuer die Wirtschaft], 1941 (Document 3505-PS), published by the Central Publishing House of the Nazi Party, the following statement appears (at p. 80):

“The Fuehrer had made up his mind already, immediately after Funk’s connection with the Boersen Zeitung on 31 December 1930 was severed, he appointed him a member of the Reich leadership of the party and chose him as his personal economic adviser. This was proof of his greatest confidence.”

“(e) *Deputy Chairman of the Reich Economic Council of the NSDAP.*”

(1) The German Fuehrer Who’s Who 1934/35 [Das Deutsche Fuehrerlexikon, 1934/35], states (at p. 139):

“1 July 1916, editor of the “Berliner Boersenzeitung”; 1922, editor-in-chief till end of 1930; since then economic adviser to the Fuehrer of the NSDAP; main department leadership in Munich and chairman of the Commission for Economic Policy as well as deputy chairman of the Council for Reich Economy of the NSDAP”.

(2) The official National-Socialist Yearbook [Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch] 1933, published in cooperation with Reich leadership of the NSDAP, contains a description of the Reich Economic Council of the NSDAP, and states (at p. 350):

“Second Chairman of the Reich Economic Council: Walther Funk”.

“(j) *Vice-President of the Reich Senate for Culture*”

The “Reichsband”, the official encyclopedic reference work listing all offices of the Party, of the Government, and of the professional organizations, 3rd edition, 1941/42, states on page 9 of

its chapter or "Berufsorganisationen" (professional organizations):

"Member of the Reich Senate for Culture

Vice-Presidents: Reichsminister Walther Funk and Under-Secretary Karl Hanke".

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3564-PS

AFFIDAVIT

Oberursel, 27 December 1945

I, Otto L. Meissner, herewith declare under oath, as follows:

As former State Secretary, and later Minister of State and Chief of the Chancery of the President, I am familiar with the importance of the Reich Ministry of the Interior of which Wilhelm Frick was Chief for about ten years, from 1933 on.

Frick put through a measure requiring the approval of the NSDAP in every case of the appointment of an official; the same was true for the composition of local governments. It was his "accomplishment" that the governments of the Reich and of individual states were coordinated—a basic idea in Hitler's program. Frick, as a convinced National Socialist, had the confidence of the Party and of the Fuehrer, since he was an "old fighter" who had already supported Hitler during the November 1923 Putsch. The legislation against the Jews was drafted under Frick. Frick also, in collaboration with Klagges, Minister of Brunswick, succeeded in naturalizing Hitler as a German citizen in 1932 by having him appointed a Brunswick Government official (Counsellor of Government). This was done in order to make it possible for Hitler to run as a candidate for the office of President of the Reich.

Read to, signed, and sworn to.

/s/ Otto Meissner

Given, signed and sworn before me.

/s/ R. M. W. Kempner
Office of US Chief of Counsel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3565-PS

AFFIDAVIT

Oberursel, Germany

27 December 1945

I, Franz Ritter von Epp, after being duly sworn, state and depose as follows:—

I was Reich Governor of Bavaria from the spring of 1933 until the entry of American troops, May 1945. In this capacity the

Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick, was my superior until his appointment as Reich Protector of Bohemia. During these ten years Frick won credit for coordinating in Germany party and state along party lines. The Reich was centralized through the establishment of a Reich Statthalter (Governor) created by him, and totalitarian control by the Reich Government from Berlin was introduced through the abolition of the federal character.

Reich legislation, such as for instance racial legislation and legislation concerning civil servants, was drafted in this Ministry. Frick's knowledge and experience in the field of constitutional law and administration were of greatest value to the new Government which had come to power in January 1933. He had a position of supreme importance as Chief of the domestic state machinery (Executive). Hitler gave him this important post because as a party member of many years' standing he was a trusted co-worker; as far as I know, they already knew each other at the time of the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 in Munich.

/s/ Franz V. Epp

Given, signed and sworn before me.

/s/ R. M. W. Kempner

Office of the Chief Counsel

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3566-PS

Dated 31st December, 1945.

STATUTORY DECLARATION by Mrs. Olga Abrahams.

I, OLGA ABRAHAMS, of Bush House, Aldwych in the County of Westminster, married woman, solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I am and have for some time been employed by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office of Bush House, Aldwych, aforesaid.

2. On the nineteenth day of July 1945 I caused a copy (Reference No. P.I.D. Document Section A.10) to be made of extracts from the German file entitled "SD Hauptamt Abteilung Rundfunk."

3. The copy of the said extracts which is annexed hereto and marked A is a true copy.

4. The said file was obtained on loan from the Military Intelligence Research Section of the War Office, 40 Hyde Park Gate in the County of London in July 1945 and was returned to them in the same month.

I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the Statutory Declarations Act 1835.

Dated this thirty first day of December 1945.

[signed] OLGA ABRAHAMS

Before me: [signed] S. H. PITT
Commissioner for Oaths.

* * * * *

The most serious objections exist here against Glasmeier, which have already been stated in a report to RFSS. His appointment to the position of General Manager would make the chaos in the broadcasting even worse. A failure of Glasmeier (Handwritten note: Letter to be addressed to RFSS when such failure has materialized), which must be expected as absolutely certain, would amount to a serious encroachment upon the reputation of the SS.

[signed] SIGISMUND
SS—Scharfuehrer

26.2.37.

P.A.
V.A.
S.A.

3)
II 21

NOTE FOR FILES

Subject: General Manager of the German Broadcasting.

On 27 February 1937 Reg. Rat Weinbrenner was asked whether anything is known to him with respect to the planned office of General Manager of the German Broadcasting.

Weinbrenner made the following statement:

The probability that a General Manager would be named is very great. For approximately 14 days all the work of the department handling broadcasting in the Propaganda Ministry is practically at a standstill, which fact is clearly indicative of changes which are under way.

However, he stated, it is almost impossible to determine whom the Minister would name General Manager, since Dr. Goebbels reaches most of the important decisions only by agreement with Under-Secretary Funk. In most instances the fact is that the department handling the matter makes suggestions, but that it

thereupon does not hear anything for a considerable time as to the status of the matter until some day all of a sudden a change would be made by a direct order of the Minister and everybody would be of the opinion that the Minister alone handled the matter.

It was not known to Weinbrenner that Stueber and Glasmeier had been ordered to see Under-Secretary Funk. He, therefore, did not know anything as to the result of these conversations. In conclusion, it should be stated that information as to the appointment of a General Manager most probably can here be obtained only when Dr. Goebbels has already reached a decision and there are no longer any possibilities to express any doubts or to submit proposals to the RFSS.

(Signed) Sigismund

1.3.37.

II 2145

NOTE FOR THE FILES

Subject: General Manager of the German Broadcasting.

Reg. Rat Weinbrenner, Propaganda Ministry, advises that on 1.2.37 Glasmeier already had the second interview with Under-Secretary Funk. It is also stated that he negotiated with Dr. Goebbels during the latter's stay in Cologne.

Glasmeier thus seems to be considered increasingly seriously as a candidate for the possible position of a General Manager.

(Signed) Sigismund

2.3.37

II 2145

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3568-PS

Job No. 508

The Reichsfuehrer SS

Berlin W35 25.7.42

SS Main Office—Executive Office

Luetzowstrasse 48/49

P.O. Box No. 43.

III I(a)—Az : 9b—R/Br.

please quote above reference together with date in your answer.

Re: The Enrollment into the SS of Reichsminister Albert Speer, born 19.3.05.

Re: none

Enclosures: -1-

To The SS Head Office for Race and Settlement Berlin

Please find enclosed the family tree [Ahnentafel] of Reich Minister Albert Speer. It is requested that this be passed on for further attention and examination.

Reich Minister Speer was enrolled as an SS man on the Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS under SS No. 46,104 with effect from 20.7.1942, by order of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

The Reichsfuehrer SS does not desire that Reichsminister Speer should be registered at the moment because the documents for his enrollment are in themselves quite incomplete. It is therefore requested that the Records for the family tree [Ahnentafel] be applied for by the Office from the authorities in question (Registrar's Office etc).

Your communication is requested after the examination so that the SS-AV-Certificate can be forwarded to be made out.

By order
signed: [illegible]
SS Sturmbannfuehrer

Race and Settlement-Questionnaire
(Women: fill out where applicable)

Name and Surname of
the member of the SS
who is submitting the
questionnaire for himself,
or his fiancee or wife.

Rank..... SS No.
Sip. No.....

Name (write legibly): Speer, Albert
in SS since: Autumn 1932 Rank:..... SS Unit.....
Motor

in SA: from 1.3.1931 until Autumn 1932. in HJ from..... until.....
Membership Number in Party: 474,481. SS No.....
born on: 19.3.1905 in Mannheim. District.....
State: Baden. present age: 37. Religious Belief: believing in God.
non-confessional.

Present domicile: Berlin-Wannsee. Residence: Inselstrasse 18.
Profession and Position: Architect.

Have you any claim on Public Assistance?.....

Is there any prospect of change in profession?.....

Attainments and certificates other than professional (e.g. Driver's
license, Sports Badge or Certificate): Driver's license.

Nationality: German.

Honorary Positions: Senator of the Reich Chamber for Culture,
Praesidialrat of the German Chamber d.b.K.
member of the Pr. Arts Academy and the
Academy of Architecture.

Service in the old Army: Regiment..... from..... to.....
 Volunteer Corps.
 Reichswehr.
 Civil Police.
 New Wehrmacht.

Last rank.

Fighting at the Front..... to..... wounded.....

Orders and Decorations including Life-saving medals: Goldenes
 Ehrenzeichen.

Personal Status (single, widowed, divorced—since): married,
 since 28.8.1928

Of what religion is the applicant: believer in God, non-confessional
 the future fiancée (Wife)? : be-
 liever in God, non-confessional.

(In addition to all the conventional ones any other belief which is
 belief in God will be recognized.)

It is intended to have a church wedding as well as a civil wedding.
 Yes/No.

Was there a church wedding as well as a civil wedding? Yes/No.
 If so of what religious form?

Has a marriage loan been applied for? Yes/No.

To what authorities (exact address)?.....

When was the application made?.....

Was the marriage loan approved? Yes/No.

Is the marriage loan to be applied for? Yes/No.

To what authorities (exact address)?

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3569-PS

The Secretary of the Fuehrer, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann
 Fuehrer Headquarters
 29.4.45

Postal address Munich 33, Fuehrerbau.

Dear Admiral of the Fleet,

As, owing to the non-arrival of all divisions, our position ap-
 pears hopeless, the Fuehrer last night dictated the enclosed po-
 litical Testament.

Heil Hitler!

Your

[signature illegible, presumably Martin Bormann]

[Seal]
ADOLF HITLER

My Private Will and Testament

As I did not consider that I could take responsibility, during the years of struggle, of contracting a marriage, I have now decided, before the closing of my earthly career, to take as my wife that girl who, after many years of faithful friendship, entered, of her own free will, the practically besieged town in order to share her destiny with me. At her own desire she goes as my wife with me into death. It will compensate us for what we both lost through my work in the service of my people.

What I possess belongs—in so far as it has any value—to the Party. Should this no longer exist, to the State, should the State also be destroyed, no further decision of mine is necessary.

My pictures, in the collections which I have bought in the course of years, have never been collected for private purposes, but only for the extension of a gallery in my home town of Linz a.d. Donau.

It is my most sincere wish that this bequest may be duly executed.

I nominate as my Executor my most faithful Party comrade,
Martin Bormann.

He is given full legal authority to make all decisions. He is permitted to take out everything that has a sentimental value or is necessary for the maintenance of a modest simple life, for my brothers and sisters, also above all for the mother of my wife and my faithful coworkers who are well known to him, principally my old Secretaries Frau Winter etc. who have for many years aided me by their work.

I myself and my wife—in order to escape the disgrace of deposition or capitulation—choose death. It is our wish to be burnt immediately on the spot where I have carried out the greatest part of my daily work in the course of a twelve years' service to my people.

Given in Berlin, 29th. April 1945, 4:00 o'clock.

(Sd.) A. Hitler.

As Witnesses:
(Sd.) Martin Bormann
(Sd.) Dr. Fuhr.

As Witness:
(Sd.) Nicolaus von Below.

[Seal]
ADOLF HITLER

My political Testament

More than thirty years have now passed since I in 1914 made my modest contribution as a volunteer in the first world-war that was forced upon the Reich.

In these three decades I have been actuated solely by love and loyalty to my people in all my thoughts, acts, and life. They gave me the strength to make the most difficult decisions which have ever confronted to mortal man. I have spent my time, my working strength, and my health in these three decades.

It is untrue that I or anyone else in Germany wanted the war in 1939. It was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who were either of Jewish descent or worked for Jewish interests. I have made too many offers for the control and limitation of armaments, which posterity will not for all time be able to disregard for the responsibility for the outbreak of this war to be laid on me. I have further never wished that after the first fatal world war a second against England, or even against America, should break out. Centuries will pass away, but out of the ruins of our towns and monuments the hatred against those finally responsible whom we have to thank for everything, International Jewry and its helpers, will grow.

Three days before the outbreak of the German-Polish war I again proposed to the British ambassador in Berlin a solution to the German-Polish problem—similar to that in the case of the Saar district, under international control. This offer also cannot be denied. It was only rejected because the leading circles in English politics wanted the war, partly on account of the business hoped for and partly under influence of propaganda organized by international Jewry.

I also made it quite plain that, if the nations of Europe are again to be regarded as mere shares to be bought and sold by these international conspirators in money and finance, then that race, Jewry, which is the real criminal of this murderous struggle, will be saddled with the responsibility. I further left no one in doubt that this time not only would millions of children of Europe's Aryan peoples die of hunger, not only would millions of grown men suffer death, and not only hundreds of thousands of women and children be burnt and bombed to death in the towns, without the real criminal having to atone for this guilt, even if by more humane means.

After six years of war, which in spite of all set-backs, will go down one day in history as the most glorious and valiant demonstration of a nation's life purpose, I cannot forsake the city which is the capital of this Reich. As the forces are too small to make any further stand against the enemy attack at this place and our resistance is gradually being weakened by men who are as deluded as they are lacking in initiative, I should like, by remaining in this town, to share my fate with those, the millions of others, who have also taken upon themselves to do so. Moreover I do not wish to fall into the hands of an enemy who requires a new spectacle organized by the Jews for the amusement of their hysterical masses.

I have decided therefore to remain in Berlin and there of my own free will to choose death at the moment when I believe the position of the Fuehrer and Chancellor itself can no longer be held.

I die with a happy heart, aware of the immeasurable deeds and achievements of our soldiers at the front, our women at home, the achievements of our farmers and workers and the work, unique in history, of our youth who bear my name.

That from the bottom of my heart I express my thanks to you all, is just as self-evident as my wish that you should, because of that, on no account give up the struggle, but rather continue it against the enemies of the Fatherland, no matter where, true to the creed of a great Clausewitz. From the sacrifice of our soldiers and from my own unity with them unto death, will in any case spring up in the history of Germany, the seed of a radiant renaissance of the National-Socialist movement and thus of the realization of a true community of nations.

Many of the most courageous men and women have decided to unite their lives with mine until the very last. I have begged and finally ordered them not to do this, but to take part in the further battle of the Nation. I beg the heads of the Armies, the Navy and the Air Force to strengthen by all possible means the spirit of resistance of our soldiers in the National-Socialist sense, with special reference to the fact that also I myself, as founder and creator of this movement, have preferred death to cowardly abdication or even capitulation.

May it, at some future time, become part of the code of honour of the German officer—as is already the case in our Navy—that the surrender of a district or of a town is impossible, and that above all the leaders here must march ahead as shining examples, faithfully fulfilling their duty unto death.

Second Part of the Political Testament

Before my death I expel the former Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering from the party and deprive him of all rights which he may enjoy by virtue of the decree of June 29th, 1941, and also by virtue of my statement in the Reichstag on September 1st, 1939, I appoint in his place Grossadmiral Doenitz, President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Before my death I expel the former Reichsfuehrer-SS and Minister of the Interior, Heinrich Himmler, from the party and from all offices of State. In his stead I appoint Gauleiter Karl Hanke as Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police, and Gauleiter Paul Giesler as Reich Minister of the Interior.

Goering and Himmler, quite apart from their disloyalty to my person, have done immeasurable harm to the country and the whole nation by secret negotiations with the enemy, which they conducted without my knowledge and against my wishes, and by illegally attempting to seize power in the State for themselves.

In order to give the German people a government composed of honourable men,—a government which will fulfill its pledge to continue the war by every means—I appoint the following members of the new Cabinet as leaders of the nation:

President of the Reich: Doenitz.
 Chancellor of the Reich: Dr. Goebbels.
 Party Minister: Bormann.
 Foreign Minister: Seyss-Inquart.
 Minister of the Interior: Gauleiter Giesler.
 Minister for War: Doenitz.
 C-in-C of the Army: Schoerner.
 C-in-C of the Navy: Doenitz.
 C-in-C of the Air Force: Greim.
 Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police:
 Gauleiter Hanke.
 Economics: Funk.
 Agriculture: Backe.
 Justice: Thierack.
 Education and Public Worship: Dr. Scheel.
 Propaganda: Dr. Naumann.
 Finance: Schwerin-Grossigk.
 Labour: Dr. Hupfauer.
 Munitions: Saur.
 Leader of the German Labour Front and Member of the
 Reich Cabinet: Reich Minister Dr. Ley.

Although a number of these men, such as Martin Bormann, Dr. Goebbels etc., together with their wives, have joined me of their own free will and did not wish to leave the capital of the Reich under any circumstances, but were willing to perish with me here, I must nevertheless ask them to obey my request, and in this case set the interests of the nation above their own feelings. By their work and loyalty as comrades they will be just as close to me after death, as I hope that my spirit will linger among them and always go with them. Let them be hard, but never unjust, above all let them never allow fear to influence their actions, and set the honour of the nation above everything in the world. Finally, let them be conscious of the fact that our task, that of continuing the building of a National Socialist State, represents the work of the coming centuries, which places every single person under an obligation always to serve the common interest and to subordinate his own advantage to this end. I demand of all Germans, all National Socialists, men, women and all the men of the Armed Forces, that they be faithful and obedient unto death to the new government and its President.

Above all I charge the leaders of the nation and those under them to scrupulous observance of the laws of race and to merciless opposition to the universal poisoner of all peoples, international Jewry.

Given in Berlin, this 29th day of April 1945. 4:00 a.m.

Adolf Hitler.

Witnessed by

Dr. Josef Fuhr.

Martin Bormann.

Wilhelm Buergdorf.

Hans Krebs.

[Note: This document was not introduced into evidence because there was not sufficient time to verify its authenticity.]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3570-PS

EXCERPTS FROM INTERROGATION TESTIMONY OF
WILHELM STUCKART, FORMER STATE SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR, taken at OBERURSEL, 21 September 1945

* * * * *

[Page 3] The exceptions granted amount as far as I know to several hundred, probably to a few thousand. Special exceptions were made for the armed forces, which as far as I know were very numerous.

* * * * *

[Page 4] The case Milch was a rectification of descent based on a sworn affidavit of the Aryan mother or father and on other

proof that the natural father was not the Jewish husband but a man of German blood. Goering had requested that such procedure should take place.

* * * * *

[Page 6] As far as I know the officials for the new territories were selected by the personnel office according to their qualifications, their physical condition, and maybe also their knowledge of the language.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3571-PS

Report of U. S. Military Attache, Berlin
From: M. A., Berlin.

Date: May 24, 1939.
Report 16,682.

G-2 Report.

GERMANY (Combat)

Subject: Occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.

(Supplement to Report No. 16,520)

The following translated extract of an article which appeared in the "Wehrmacht" of March 29, on the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops on March 15, it is believed will be of some interest in throwing further light on the operation of the German army at that time:

"From Silesia, Saxony and Northern Bavaria and the East Mark, seven Army Corps moved on the morning of March 15 past the former Czech border. On the evening of March 14 parts of the VIII Army Corps and the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, under the command of the Commanding General of the VIII A. C., had already occupied the industrial centers of Witkowitz and Maehrisch Ostrau.

The troops of Army Group 3 under the command of General of Infantry Blaskowitz were to take Bohemia under their protection, while the troops of Army Group 5 under General of Inf. List were given the same mission for Moravia.

For this purpose parts of the Air Force (particularly reconnaissance planes and anti-aircraft artillery) as well as parts of the SS Verfuegungstruppen were placed at the disposal of the two army groups.

On the evening of March 14, the march order was received by the troops. On March 15 at 6 A. M. the columns moved past the border and then moved on with utmost precision. In spite of the snow and ice the most important cities of Bohemia and Moravia were in German hands on the evening of March 15, and the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the armed forces

was able to set up his headquarters in Prague under the protection of German troops.

He himself expressed his appreciation to the troops for their bearing on this march through snow and ice. Anyone who has himself been a soldier, will know what it means to march through snow and ice, particularly when the snow at times is up to a meter high, or to drive in column in such weather. Furthermore the fact must be taken into consideration that the troops were called in without previous mobilization and that the recruits had only received four months training.

On March 15 the Air Force also had to suffer from the bad weather conditions. The contemplated employment of large air units had to be waived in consideration of the snow storms prevailing. In spite of these weather conditions, however, the reconnaissance planes fulfilled their missions. As soon as the weather cleared up a little, on March 16, strong Air units of Air Fleet 1 (Commanding General; General of Aviation Kesselring) and 3 (Commanding General; General of Aviation Sperrle) and Air Command Austria (Commanding General; Lt. General Loehr) fulfilled their mission over Bohemia and Moravia, so that the strength of the German Air Force was also demonstrated in practice to the Czech nation.

On March 16 the first air squadrons landed on the Czech airfields which had previously been occupied by the army."

Percy G. Black,

Major, F. A.

Acting Military Attache.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3574-PS

TOP SECRET

W.A.

CI No. 141/38 *Top Secret, I East S*

Berlin, 2 February 1938

In triplicate—*Original*

Filing notice regarding the discussion between the Chief of the CI and the Chief of the Foreign CI on the 31 Jan., 38

1. At the beginning of October, 1937 Captain Leopold had himself announced to the Chief of the Foreign CI through his confidant Dr. Rauscher. Here he explained his position—one supported by general trust—as Chief of the NSDAP [National-Socialist German Worker's Party] in Austria and stated, that he had especially close relations to the officer's corps of the Federal Army [Bundesheer], from whom he could obtain any material whatsoever. Caution should be exercised, he said, against Zehner, Jansa and a Lieutenant-Colonel Bartel (un-

known here!). He also mentioned his bad relations to Ambassador von Papen, and criticized the latter's political attitude. Finally he made two requests:

a. Arrangement of a visit to the Field-Marshal.

b. Assurance that officers dismissed from the Austrian Federal Army because of their National-Socialist views be taken in the German Armed Forces. Both requests were declined.

2. At the beginning of December Captain Leopold suggested another meeting and conference with the Chief of the Foreign CI. The latter did not respond.

3. At the beginning of January the Chief of the Foreign CI, who at the time was vacationing in Braunlage was informed by telephone by Dr. Rauscher, that an Austrian Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Eckinger (alias Herrlitz) was on his way to see him. Shortly thereafter Eckinger appeared with a letter of introduction from Dr. Rauscher. He stated that he had been working in Leopold's Bureau since his dismissal from the Federal Army (1937), and that he had been ordered by Captain Leopold to inform the Chief of the Foreign CI of the "Plan for Rebellion" [Aufstandplan]. A copy of the plan was submitted.

He stated at that time, that General [Generaloberst] Goering had summoned Leopold by way of telegram and an urgent long-distance call to a conference in Berlin.

Several days later Dr. Rauscher informed the Chief of the Foreign CI that Captain Leopold had not been granted a travel permit. Dr. Rauscher and Eckinger, however, had been received by Colonel Bodenschatz.

The Chief of the Foreign CI handed over the plan of rebellion to the Chief of the CI and asked him to take over the relations to Dr. Rauscher, as the Foreign CI did not want to concern itself any further with this matter. The Chief of the CI agreed.

Jr S P

[s] CANARIS

1 Enclosure

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3575-PS

[Rubber Stamp] Submitted to the Minister
[Hand-written note] Dispatched 20 November
Berlin, 19 November 1938
TOP SECRET

Memorandum concerning the meeting of the Reich Defense Council [Reichsverteidigungsrat] on 18 November 1938

Chairman: Field Marshal Goering

All Reich Ministers and State Secretaries, with a few exceptions, were present, as were the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Reichsleiter Bormann for the Deputy of the Fuehrer, General Daluege, SS Major General [SS Gruppenfuehrer] Heydrich, the Reich Labor Leader [Reichsarbeitsfuehrer], the Price Control Commissar, the President of the Reich Labor Office, and others.

The meeting consisted solely of a three-hour lecture by the Field Marshal. No discussion took place.

These were the most important points raised at the meeting:

I. Organization of the Reich Defense Council
[Reichsverteidigungsrat]

The Reich Defense Council had already been created through decisions of the cabinet in 1933 and 1934, but never met. Through the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938 it was reactivated. The chairmanship is vested in the Fuehrer, who has deputized Field Marshal Goering as his permanent representative.

The Field Marshal termed it the task of the Reich Defense Council to correlate all the forces of the nation for accelerated building-up of German armament.

He stated that armament in the narrow sense of the term would remain the responsibility of the Departments of the Armed Forces, while integration of the economy would remain the task of the Plenipotentiary-General for the Four-Year-Plan, or in some other form.

As a rule only the Reich Ministers concerned in each case with the particular questions would be convoked, not such a large group as today. As a rule the Reich Ministers themselves should attend. Should they be prevented from attending, their representatives would have to be authorized to take part in binding decisions during the meeting itself. Ministers could bring their State Secretaries. Special consultants could be brought into the ante-chamber and would be summoned in each case when their

specialty was discussed. Particular questions could be referred for discussion to the Reich Defense Committee [Reichsverteidigungsausschuss] by the Reich Defense Council. The minutes of the former would then be returned to the Reich Defense Council for decision.

The terms "jurisdiction" and "sphere of authority" were unknown to him, the Field Marshal, and he did not care to hear them again. The agency best suited for a particular field of work would be entrusted with it in each case.

The Ministers represented in the Reich Defense Council would have to relegate to the background all individual wishes of their departments, however justifiable they might appear, if they did not serve the single purpose of arming the people, and they would have to make all decisions with a view to the general interest, not from the point of view of their departments.

Negotiations and decisions of the Reich Defense Council and Reich Defense Committee are absolutely secret and may be divulged, even within a department, only insofar as necessary to carry out the assignments.

II. The Physical Tasks

The assignment is to raise the level of armament from a current index of 100 to one of 300.

This goal is confronted by almost insuperable obstacles because already now there is a scarcity of labor, because factory capacity is fully utilized, because the tasks of last summer exhausted our reserves of foreign currency, and because the financial situation of the Reich is serious and even now shows a deficit. In spite of this, the problem must be solved.

The first task is to safeguard the basic food supply, the second task is to increase armament production, the third, equally important, a substantial increase of exports as a source of foreign exchange.

Organizational measures would have to be taken for the marshalling of manpower, for stockpiling of matériel, for expansion and exploitation of the producing plant and finally for finances and foreign exchange.

1. *Marshalling of Manpower*

By establishing a National Card Index [Volkskartei] (General Daluege) a complete survey of all Germans will be created,

which shall lead to planning of correct commitment of labor. Material already on hand at the Employment offices will be utilized.

Employment Offices, Labor Front, Industry and the Armed Forces must cooperate for this task.

It will be the responsibility of the Reich Defense Council to determine the importance of state offices and other organizations from the point of view of National Defense. Within the offices economy must be practiced; the enforcement of which is the duty of the Plenipotentiary-General for Administration. In fields in which the State has already assumed responsibilities it would be superfluous for other organizations to also devote themselves to the same questions. Basic simplification of the legal system would have to be accomplished by 15 February; the task of bringing the legal system closer to the people is connected with this at the same time. Substantial savings of manpower could be accomplished in fiscal administration by a radical simplification of tax legislation.

It is doubtful whether the Labor Service did not withdraw too much manpower from the task set. In spite of that he, the Field Marshal, was in favor of retaining it, primarily so as to have reserves for massed commitment in case tasks should suddenly arise.

The Women's Labor is to be expanded.

Measures to remedy the task of farm laborers.

2. *Materiel*

The Four-Year-Plan would have to be retained for our generation. The most important raw materials to be controlled are iron, steel, and cement; their allocation would take place through a Plenipotentiary-General.

The great building projects of the Fuehrer would be carried through because of their importance for morale and psychology. For everything else, strictest building restrictions. For this purpose a special agency, to be directly subordinate to the Field Marshal.

Basic changes in automotive matters by the Plenipotentiary-General appointed for this purpose. Economy through the most extensive standardization possible.

Reorganization of the Reich Railroads [Reichsbahn].

Determination of the priority of all projects. Special small commission with the Four Year Plan for this purpose.

Check of all manufacturing plants for essentiality.

Check of the working process acceleration of working speed.

Trade school education, retraining, etc.

Most intensive promotion of export industries.

Decision in each individual case whether the task of rearmament or the promotion of exports is more important.

No more supply of armament to foreign countries against political credits, but only against payment in foreign currency or, in exceptional cases, by taking into account the political relationship with the particular country, if vital raw materials are supplied.

Absolute prohibition of any destruction of real values, such as occurred in the case of the recent anti-Jewish manifestations or the manifestations against Bishops; expressly approved by the Fuehrer.

Continued expansion of national auto highway [Reichsautobahnen].

3. *Finances*

Very critical situation of the Reich Exchequer. Relief initially through the billion [milliarde] imposed on Jewry, and through profits accruing to the Reich in the aryanization of Jewish enterprises.

Prospect of a "National Thanksgiving Sacrifice" (without commitment to this term) in the form of a single surrender of property, which will represent many times the value of the Armament Contribution [Wehrbeitrag] of the pre-war era. No details about date and particulars. Its tasks is to secure armament production, on a large scale.

Strict economy measures at all points.

Additional task of the Reich Defense Council: new formulation of all war-time legislation.

Concerning foreign policy the Field Marshal mentioned that it would have to be conducted in such a way that the planned armament program could be carried out.

(Signed) Woermann

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3576-PS

Berlin W8, 19 February 1938
Behrenstrasse 39A
Tel. 165861

Central Office for the Economic-political Organizations of the
NSDAP

Director: W. Keppler
[Letterhead]

[Stamped] 'received' 19 Feb. 1938

To Minister President Field Marshal Goering.

Honored Field Marshal:

I am taking the liberty of enclosing herewith a brief report by my colleague, Dr. Veesenmayer, who returned this morning from Vienna. Also enclosed is a copy of a handbill (see p. 2, point 3).

Heil Hitler!

Yours very faithfully,
(Signed) Keppler

Report of Situation in Austria as of 18 February 1938, 19 o'clock

1. According to latest reports, Schuschnigg is being hard pressed by the Catholics as well as the Jews. The Jewish attack is carried on chiefly through the stock exchange, with the intention of exerting pressure on the currency. After the 17th of February 1938 there suddenly set in an extraordinarily pronounced flight of capital that led to an appreciable sinking of Austrian loan values in Switzerland and in London, as well as elsewhere abroad. Great quantities of schilling notes are smuggled over the border, so that since yesterday it has been impossible to make any quotations. This development is not unfavorable for the Reich just now, but great care must be taken to prevent the undermining of Austrian currency and, with it, the Austrian economy, from going too far. In this matter it appears probably only a matter of days now.

From the Catholic side, the Nuncio sharply attacked Schuschnigg yesterday afternoon, making use of Provincial Governor [Landeshauptmann] Gleissner, who is spoken of in opposition circles as the successor. Under this double pressure Schuschnigg himself again expressed intentions of resigning, yesterday evening, and informed the President of the Administrative Court, Mr. Dinghofer, that he eventually intended to take over his post. At the same time Schuschnigg urged the return of Minister Seyss-Inquart, probably in order, with his assistance, to remain in the

saddle. In my opinion it is clear that Schuschnigg's intention of resigning has been discussed, yet he apparently is still making efforts to retain his chancellorship if possible.

2. On the basis of four days of careful and extensive observation it must be confirmed that the breakthrough has succeeded completely and that it goes much deeper than is realized in much of the Reich. After Schuschnigg was left in the lurch by the foreign countries he experienced the blows of having his supporters up to now partly desert and partly fall out among themselves and wrangle violently over the succession to the post of Chancellor. In monarchist circle—where every hope has been abandoned chaos reigns. Jewish circles are convinced that it is only a matter of time until Austria will be politically and economically united with the Reich. The collapse is so total that, provided an acceleration of developments fits into the Fuehrer's foreign policy, it would be possible to gain a number of very important posts within the next few weeks by exerting a certain pressure from the Reich. The prompt removal of Kienboeck as President of the National Bank seems particularly necessary, since, as an outspoken friend of the Jews, he not only tolerates the present catastrophic policy of the Jews, but actually promotes it. This opinion is confirmed even by the Austrian Ministry of Finance. The appointment of Director Fischboeck as Counsellor of the Federal Ministry [Bundesministerium] was made in a wholly unsatisfactory manner. He himself showed me, on the afternoon of 18 Feb 1938, his certificate of appointment, which shows that he is to be consulted only in individual cases. Since he has no specific authority or other means of exerting influence, his appointment is worthless for the present.

3. The situation of the prohibited party has reached a crisis. Through the use of sensible intermediaries I succeed in inducing Mr. Leopold to leave for Germany on 18 Feb. 1938. He arrived in Berlin early on 19 Feb. 1938 and went to Hotel Fuerstenhof. On 17 Feb. 1938 a very unsatisfactory circular was again issued by the party, a copy of which has already been forwarded. Furthermore, reports telephoned from Vienna today state that large-scale demonstrations are being planned by followers of the prohibited party. According to information just received, Dr. Tavs, who was released yesterday, issued orders for the breaking of all windows of the German Legation in the course of this evening. One of the most important people around Captain Leopold, the engineer, Mr. Ruediger, went so far as to declare before a group of industrialists whom he had called together that even the Fueh-

rer had no reason to interfere personally in Austrian questions. It is further intended, through provocations, to force Minister of Security Seyss-Inquart to make new arrests, so that he can then be denounced as a traitor to the national cause. Under these circumstances Leopold's remaining would have been dangerous, and action had to be taken. On the other hand, it would have been unbearable for the movement had it been necessary later to remove him forcibly to the Reich, therefore, his departure yesterday was probably the only possible solution, as far as the time and manner of his going are concerned. Our reliable people in the Party and the SS have received exact instructions to prevent as far as possible any sort of demonstration, and it is to be hoped that this can be done.

4. It is to be gathered from numerous reports that Foreign Minister Guido Schmidt has played a scarcely gratifying role during the past few days. It is he, in particular, who has hindered the infiltration of nationalist personalities into the Government or has so weakened their position, at any rate, that no great value can be attached to the posts obtained to date. The motivation of his attitude is to be found in his very strong Catholic attachment as well as in a certain jealousy toward Minister Seyss-Inquart.

5. In the last few days, Minister Glaise-Horstenau has repeatedly expressed the intention of resigning, but the combined efforts of Minister Seyss-Inquart and myself have succeeded, so far, in preventing him from doing this, and there is a probability that he will remain in office for the time being.

6. A very bad role is played by State Secretary Skubl in the Ministry of Security and it can be expected that Minister Seyss-Inquart will have to get rid of him soon in order to bring the influence of his own position fully to bear.

7. The reports coming from the working class are most encouraging. A strong trend towards National Socialist cell organization in industrial enterprises has set in which is essentially genuine and only a slight fraction of which is due to the temporary situation.

8. Hardly any difficulty with the Reds need be feared.

(Signed) Dr. Veesenmayer

COPY [of Handbill]

The minority cabinet of Austria has again reconstituted itself. This reorganization did not deserve the fanfare with which it was

heralded in the press. Schuschnigg has again called into his cabinet only those men upon whom he relies. This clear fact can not be obscured by using the press, free of charge, to call one or the other of the Ministers "the representative of the national opposition." The national opposition and its leaders have sent no man possessing their confidence into the Cabinet.

It is with a certain regret that we see Minister Glaise-Horstennau leave the post of Minister of Interior. He has at all times shown an earnest desire to come to an understanding and has never subscribed to deceitful tendencies. We trust that the fact that he, in particular, has been recalled from his immediate sphere of activity may not be an evil foreshadowing of the last Cabinet reorganization.

The new Minister taking his place, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, comes from the Catholic side. He got in touch with national circles only relatively late. He has made no positive contribution in national matters since his appointment as Councillor of State [Staatsrat]. So it remains to be seen whether, following the advancement accorded him by Dr. Schuschnigg, he will see his opportunity to develop a more effective activity in the national sense.

Despite the experience of the last 1½ years, an excess of patience allows us to call upon the National Socialist majority of Austria also to regard this new minority Cabinet, which has been plumped down under its nose to the accompaniment of manifestations of State force, with cool calm and presence of mind and to await the next developments.

One thing is certain today, however: Now as before, Chancellor Schuschnigg still owes us the fulfillment of our natural demands that consideration be given to the inalienable rights of our people and of the National Socialist popular majority. Now as before, there reigns over our country a minority cabinet that is not an expression of the people's will, but an expression of despotism.

National Socialists! We shall continue, therefore, united and with closed ranks, undisturbed by tactical regroupings of the Cabinet to pursue our goal—a goal which is also that of the great majority of our people. We feel strong in the justness and worthiness of our cause and in our solidarity, willingness to sacrifice, and loyalty, tested in a long and difficult struggle. Comrades! This fight continues!

For honor and justice!
For freedom and bread!
For our people!

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3577-PS

Gauleiter Josef Buerkel, the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the Plebiscite in Austria

Vienna, 26 March 1938
I., Parliament Building
Telephone: R-50-5-60

To the Minister President General Field Marshal Hermann Goering
present address: Vienna

Most honored General Field Marshal

I refer to this morning's talk and would like to approach you with the following request:

1. A fund of about 2-3 million Reichsmarks will be made available for the removal of economic difficulties that arise during the time of the change-over.

2. A fund of about 20-30 million Reichsmarks will be made available for the dispossession of the Jews from business and trade.

By means of press and radio I have just given the order that only those Aryan stores which are in Aryan possession and under Aryan management may have the inscription "Aryan store" [arisches Geschaeft]. The carrying of all other inscriptions is forbidden. In this way, the inscriptions which have been in common use up to now, such as "This store is under Aryan management", "this store is administered by the NSBO", et cetera, will be caused to disappear at once.

It is pointed out emphatically in press and radio that a clear difference, visible even from the outside, has now been made between Aryan and Jewish stores. I was in a position to give that order after I had been informed that the Reich Minister of Interior and the Reich Labor Minister will, with your approval, publish this very day the regulations suggested by me concerning social-political questions. According to these regulations, very far-reaching protection is granted against the giving of notices, and the dismissal of Aryan employees and workers is made very difficult. It is to be anticipated that a renewed, very strong boycott movement will start against the Jewish stores, due to my order. In view of the uncertainty of the situation and in view of the declaration which you, my dear General Field Marshal, intend to issue today concerning the Jewish question, and which underlines the statements I made the day before yesterday, it can be anticipated that the Jews will be ready to sell their stores and companies at the cheapest prices. I think it will be possible, in this way, to bring a large part of Jewish property into Aryan

hands under the most favorable economic terms. The only task of the fund would be to simplify the financing of the change-over in business. No losses would be incurred by the Reich Treasury. It also seems to me that such a measure is necessary to protect the interests of the employees.

I should like to request that the emergency fund mentioned under point 1 be left to my administration and that there be appointed for the fund mentioned under point 2 a trustee who would work in the closest possible cooperation with me.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully,
[illegible signature]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3579-PS

SECRET REICH MATTER

10 copies
Copy 1.

W 4520/40 g Rs

MEMORANDUM

1. In the period from 24 August-12 September of this year negotiations have taken place in Moscow upon Russian request, in order to reexamine the state of the deliveries by both parties according to the Economic Agreement of 11 February 1940. The negotiations have shown that the German deliveries of the first half year fall short of the quota of the agreement by approximately 73 million Reichsmark. The Russians have transmitted proposals for the adjustment of this deficit, which fundamentally aim at a shortening of the period of delivery. The negotiations were interrupted on 12 September, in order to examine the Soviet proposals in Berlin and to draft German counter-proposals concerning additional deliveries to the Soviet Union. The Russians have sent information, that, according to the terms of the agreement, they would temporarily discontinue the deliveries, if neither their proposals nor our counter-proposals would bring about the fixed proportions of the deliveries.

2. The German delivery obligations for the next half year amount to—

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Until 11 February 1941..... | 233 million Reichsmark. |
| Until 11 May 1941 including the above mentioned deficit of 73 mil- lion Reichsmark | 311 million Reichsmark. |

To this must be added the German deliveries in exchange for Bessarabian grain and Bessarabian oil crops (40 million Reichsmark) and deliveries in exchange for the German raw material purchases

from the Baltic territories. The examination, carried out jointly with the Reich Economic Ministry and the OKW, has shown that the execution of the armament program ordered by the Fuehrer permits neither an adjustment of the existing deficit of 73 million Reichsmark nor the fulfillment of the remaining German quota within the time specified. There is furthermore the directive of the Reich Marshal to avoid deliveries to Russia which directly or indirectly would strengthen the Russian war potential. If these decisions remain in force, then we shall have to expect an interruption of the Russian deliveries to Germany within a short period.

3. This means that the large imports of raw materials, esp. of grain, mineral oil, cotton, rare metals and non-ferrous metals, phosphates will at least temporarily cease and at best will be resumed later upon a much lower scale and with great sacrifices in German deliveries. In the opinion of the Reich Food Ministry this would be especially serious in the case of the grain supply. To date Russia has delivered to us almost 1 million tons of grain. Russia is the only country which has a good grain crop and which therefore would be in a position to make further great deliveries. The Reich Food Ministry points to the fact that the national grain reserve will be used up during this grain production year [Getreidewirtschaftsjahr] so that we would start the next grain year without such a reserve.

4. The Reich Economic Minister, the Reich Food Minister, and the OKW have requested to ask the Fuehrer once more for a decision regarding the continuation of the economic relations with the Soviet Union. The raw material deliveries of Russia can only be approximately kept on the present level if the German deliveries to the USSR in the amount specified in section 2 (233 million Reichsmark, or 311 million Reichsmark plus 40 million Reichsmark of Bessarabian grain etc.) are made available and if they receive a priority as previously or at least a privileged equality with armament orders. Since it is principally a question of deliveries of machines, rolling mill products and coal, such an arrangement can only be made at the expense of the armament orders.

5. Probably as a reaction to the changed German attitude, the Russians have cancelled everything which in the economic agreement of 11 February 1940 had been planned at long range. That means that they do not want any processes, installations and equipment to be delivered over a long period, but that they want to restrict themselves to goods which will benefit their economy,

esp. their armament within the next 8-10 months. Therefore the conflict with our own military demands in the remaining small sector of deliveries of machinery and rolling mill products is still very much stronger than it used to be.

6. To date the Russian deliveries have been a very substantial support of the German war economy. Since the new economic agreements have become valid, Russia has delivered raw materials for more than 300 million Reichsmark; this includes grain for approx. 100 million Reichsmark. So far Russia has received an equivalent amounting to only approx. 150 million Reichsmark. The disparity existing at present between the German and the Soviet deliveries is caused by the fact that in the month of August there were Russian deliveries in the amount of 65 million Reichsmark as against German deliveries in the amount of 20 million Reichsmark. Our only economic connection with Iran, Afghanistan, Manchukuo, China, Japan, and beyond that to South America is the way through Russia, which is being exploited to an increasing degree for German raw material imports (soya from Manchukuo).

Berlin, 28 September 1940
(signed) Schnurre.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3581-PS

COPY

Berlin NW 40, 20 July 1934

The Reich Minister of the Interior

I 6110 a/ 12 July II. Note G.

The Chief of Army High Command [Heeresleitung]

No 246/34 secret, Chief Army Command 23.8. R.

[in handwriting]

18/8 [initials illegible]

[in handwriting]

P 20/8

SECRET

To the Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
in *Berlin*

Re: Unauthorized press releases about military matters.

Despite very frequent references made to this it has up to now been impossible to provide that those announcements in the press which may give the appearance of military activity of the S.A. and the S.S. be withheld. In a press report about a stadium inauguration by SS units, for example, mention was made of "Unit-champion in the throwing of hand grenades."

I respectfully request that you use all possible means in order that such announcements be prevented.

Furthermore I request that you see to it that until further notice any arbitrary announcement about German rearmament measures, which applies also to reports about enlistment in the Wehrmacht and to training courses, be withheld. As soon as there is the slightest doubt about the admissibility of such an announcement, a decision has to be obtained from the senior officer of the local military unit or from the respective army district command [Wehrkreiskommando].

signed PFUNDTNER
(acting for.....)

The Reich Minister of Defense [Reichswehrminister]
No 3332/34 J IIIc

Berlin, 15 Aug 1934
Tirpitz-Ufer 72/76

Please find above a copy of a letter of the Reich Minister of the Interior of 20 July 1934 for your information.

By order.
[signature illegible]

Distribution: Chief Army High Command
Chief M.L. [Navy High Command]
Army District Command I-VII
Navy Command Station of the North Sea
Navy Command Station of the Baltic Sea
Fleet Command

984-1

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3585-PS

The Chief of the Army High Command [Heeresleitung] to 300/34
g [handwritten]

Berlin W 35, 8 Oct 1934
Bendlerstrasse 14

[in handwriting]

1. Nov.

Bg

[other handwritten notes illegible]

SECRET

Presented to the Minister.

I believe, from the standpoint of national defense, that the salient point in the East Prussian question is this, that an emigra-

tion of the militarily most valuable elements must be prevented and that, beyond this, the size of the population must be made such that the East Prussian branch of the army can live off its own country as far as personnel is concerned.

All effective measures, striving toward this goal, will be welcomed by the Army High Command [Heeresleitung].

[Signed] Freiherr von Fritsch

[Handwritten Note]

Memorandum has been delivered to Reichsbankpresident Schacht by the Minister on 30 Feb.

Berlin, 30 Feb.

Service Command I [Wehrkreiskommando]

(First Division)

Dept. Wi. A. No. 40/34 secret

Koenigsberg Prussia, 29 Sept 1934

Cranzerallee 42/48

Telephone: Central Switchboard, 34201

For long distance only, 34208

[Rubber Stamp] The Chief of the Army Leadership No. 300/34g
Chief H.L. ab5/10

To the Reich Minister of Defense (Reichswehrminister) via the
Chief of the Army Leadership.

Berlin

Since the efforts up to now of various offices in East Prussia to carry out a planned, unified settlement of the East Prussian question have led only to partial results, since however a fundamental clarification and a unified execution is necessary for *military reasons*, the Service Command presents a memorandum on the subject with the request that it be submitted to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, with the consent of the Chief of the Army High Command and of the Reich Minister of Defense, and that the execution of the proposals be endorsed.

The measures proposed in the memorandum refer to *national defense* as well as to *economy*. Since the measures in the field of economy in East Prussia are in large part a prerequisite for the improvement of national defense, the economic proposals are therefore mentioned first in the memorandum.

The *military strengthening* is not possible without the *recovery of economy* in East Prussia; both of these together form the basis for a *policy directed toward the East*.

The immediate military goal is the increase of those capable of military service by means of enlarging the possibilities for existence in East Prussia.

The individual measures comply in many cases with proposals already made by other offices. The Service Command is not particularly concerned whether this or that individual measure is used, but it is concerned above all, that the necessity for the special favoring of Prussia be *recognized*, and that action be taken accordingly.

[signed] Von Brauchitsch

Enclosure: Memorandum about measures for the military and economical strengthening of East Prussia.

(Two copies) Further copies are available.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3586-PS

SECRET

COPY

Defense 580/9.34. III a g. Berlin, 16 October 1934
Chief of Army High Command [Heeresleitung]
Nr. 330/34 g. Chief H. L.

To all Counter Intelligence:

The new troop units to be activated may be listed in address and telephone books, provided that only the official camouflage designations are used.

I. V.

signed Himer

Distribution:

1. Chief HL.
2. Chief ML.
3. W. A.
4. L. S.
5. P. A.
6. T. A.
7. V. A.
8. Wa. A.
9. A. H. A.
10. Plan[ning Section].

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3587-PS

Berlin, 14 Nov., 1934

The Chief of the Military Personnel Office [Truppenamt]
The Chief of the Army High Command [Heeresleitung]
Nr. 3418/34 P A (3)

Nr. 361/34 g Chief H.L. v. P. [in handwriting,
Partly illegible] 0014/II

To the Chief of Staff :

Command Group [Gruppenkommando] 1 and 2.
Army District Command I-VII [Wehrkreiskommando].
Army Offices [Heeresdienststelle] Breslau and Kassel.
Inspector of the Cavalry.
Inspector of Motor-Vehicle Troups.

Officers Training Command T 1 - T 4

To be forwarded to:

Adj. Ch. H.L.

W A

P A

A H A

Wa A

It has been found necessary to avoid for the time being, the public use of the designation "General Staff."

I therefore request that the subordinate Officers of the General Staff be advised not to make use of the designation "General Staff" (as example Captain in the General Staff, etc.) in open correspondence, family notices and similar matters.

signed BECK

certified:

HOSSBACH

Major

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3588-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORIES, 1940

[Verordnungsblatt fuer die Besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete]
No. I, Pages 8-12

Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories concerning the Exercise of Governmental Authority in the Netherlands, May 29, 1940

By virtue of Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl, I, p. 778), I hereby issue the following order,

which shall remain in force for the duration of the occupation of the Netherlands territories by the German armed forces.

Section 1. (1) To extent required for the fulfillment of his duties, the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories assumes all power, privileges, and rights heretofore vested in the King and the government in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Netherlands.

(2) Should the interests of the Greater German Reich or the safeguarding of public order or life in the Netherlands so require, the Reich Commissioner may take appropriate measures, including the issuance of general orders. These orders of the Reich Commissioner shall have the force of laws.

Section 2. (1) The Netherlands law heretofore in force shall remain in force in so far as it is compatible with the occupation and not contrary to the provisions of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental functions in the Netherlands. The general orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army issued for the occupied Netherlands territories shall remain in force until further notice.

(2) All rules and regulations shall be submitted to the Reich Commissioner before publication. Publication shall not take place if the Reich Commissioner so requests.

(3) The Reich Commissioner hereby reserves the right of delegating the power vested in him by virtue of subsection 2 to the German authorities which are subject to his orders.

Section 3. (1) The Reich Commissioner will enforce his orders through the Netherlands authorities unless the German authorities which are subject to this order take direct action themselves.

(2) The Secretaries General of the Netherlands ministries, shall, within their respective jurisdictions, be responsible to the Reich Commissioner for the orderly supervision and administration of official business. They may, in compliance with subsections 2 and 3 of Section 2, issue rules and regulations implementing Netherlands statutes and orders of the Reich Commissioner.

Section 4. (1) The Reich Commissioner will exercise his authority through general commissioners, who will operate as members of his staff.

(2) The Reich Commissioner will further appoint commissioners for the several provinces. He will also appoint special commissioners for specified areas or purposes as the need may arise.

Section 5. (1) The maintenance of public peace, safety, and order shall be entrusted to the Netherlands police force unless the Reich Commissioner calls on German S.S. or police forces for the

enforcement of his orders. The Netherlands police forces shall be subject to the supervision of the German police force and shall be required to comply with its orders.

(2) The investigation and combating of all activities hostile to the Reich and Germanism shall be the concern of the German police force.

Section 6. (1) The judiciary shall be independent.

(2) Judgments shall be entered in the name of the law.

(3) The Reich Commissioner will determine which judgments are to be submitted for his confirmation before execution may be issued.

(4) The Reich Commissioner will designate by general order the crimes to be tried by special courts and the conditions under which Netherlands citizens are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the German Army or the German police force, respectively.

Section 7. Within such period as shall be determined by the Reich Commissioner, judges, officials, and employees who hold public office, as well as persons engaged in full-time or part-time teaching in public or private schools and universities, shall make a declaration in lieu of an oath that they will comply conscientiously with the general and other orders of the Reich Commissioner and the German authorities subordinate to him and that they will refrain from any action directed against the German Reich or the German armed forces.

Section 8. All German authorities, agencies, and officials, with the exception of those of the armed forces, shall be subject to the orders of the Reich Commissioner.

Section 9. General orders will be published in the Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten niederlaendischen Gebiete, which will be issued in the German and Dutch languages. The German text will be authoritative.

Section 10. This order shall take effect as of the date of publication.

The Hague, May 29, 1940.

SEYSS-INQUART

Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories

Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning the Organization and Establishment of the Office of the Reich Commissioner, June 3, 1940

By virtue of Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl., I, p. 778), I hereby decree:

Section 1. (1) For the fulfillment of his official duties the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories will act through general commissioners, who are members of his staff and who will head the following sections:

1. General Administration and Judiciary.
2. Public Safety (Superior SS and Police Chief).
3. Finance and Commerce (Economics).
4. Special Matters.

(2) The representative of the Foreign Office and the Custodian for the Netherlands Bank shall be directly subject to the orders of the Reich Commissioner.

(3) The Reich Commissioner will appoint commissioners for the several provinces. He will appoint a special commissioner for specific localities or purposes as the need may arise.

* * * * *

Section 3. (1) The general commissioners shall be authorized (within the scope of their official duties) to require information of all and every description from all Netherlands authorities, agencies, and establishments of a public or private character and to give them the necessary instructions for that purpose.

* * * * *

Section 4. The official duties of the Commissioner General for Administration and the Judiciary shall embrace all matters relating to:

1. General orders and legislation, constitutional law, and the Official Gazette for the Occupied Dutch Territories.
2. Planning.
3. Civil administration, especially the supervision of municipalities with the exception of municipal police forces.
4. The administration of justice with the exception of the Reich police forces.
5. The furtherance of culture (art, protection of public monuments, science, public education, etc.) as well as matters relating to schools and churches.
6. Public health, and the cultural and social welfare of juveniles.

Section 5. The Superior SS and Police Chief shall command the units of the military SS and the German police forces transferred to the occupied Netherlands territories, supervise the Netherlands central and municipal police forces, and issue to them the necessary orders.

Section 6. The official duties of the Commissioner General of Finance and Commerce shall embrace all matters relating to:

1. The Ministry of Finance.
2. The Ministry of Economics (Commerce).
3. The Ministry of Waterways.
4. The Postal Administration.
5. The Ministry of Public Welfare, with the exception of the matters enumerated in Section 4 (6).

Section 7. The official duties of the Commissioner General for Special Matters shall embrace all issues relating to:

1. The molding of public opinion, and to associations formed for purposes other than private gain.
2. Such duties as may devolve upon him by virtue of special orders of the Reich Commissioner.

Section 8. (1) The official duties of the commissioners for the several provinces, appointed by the Reich Commissioner, shall embrace—with the exception of the maintenance of public safety—all matters pertaining to public administration, economic welfare, and the molding of public opinion within the areas to which they are appointed. They may call, for the fulfillment of their duties, on members of the German police force, in accordance with general rules and regulations issued by the Superior SS and Police Chief.

(2) The Netherlands authorities, agencies, institutions, and establishments of a public and private character, and their officers and agents, shall be required, by virtue of a special order, to report to the commissioners appointed by the Reich Commissioner concerning certain matters without being requested to do so in every instance and to inform them about impending administrative action. Such action shall be suspended on request of the commissioner concerned.

Section 9. The authority of special commissioners appointed for specified areas or purposes shall be determined by the duties assigned to them.

Section 10. (1) The commissioners appointed for the several provinces by the Reich Commissioner shall have the same official residence as the commissioners appointed under Article 141 of the Constitution.

(2) The official residence of the special commissioners will be designated by the Reich Commissioner.

Section 11. The Reich Commissioner alone will establish or abolish German governmental agencies for civil administration and determine their official duties and jurisdiction.

Section 12. This decree shall take effect as of the date of publication.

The Hague, June 3, 1940.

SEYSS-INQUART.

Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3589-PS

Nurnberg, 7 January 1946.

Supplement No. 6 to the Official Czechoslovak Report called
"German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia"

Presented by order of the Czechoslovak Government by General
Dr. B. Ecer, Plenipotentiary, Czechoslovak Representative to
the Commission of the United Nations for the Investiga-
tion of War Crimes in London, at present Chairman
of the Czechoslovak Delegation to the Nurnberg
Proceedings

By order of my Government I submit No. 6 of the Czechoslovak
Report in accordance with art. 21 of the Charter the following
statement:

During the tenure of office of defendant Wilhelm Frick as Reich
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia from August 1943 until the
liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945, many thousands of Czecho-
slovak Jews were transported from the Terezin Ghetto in Czecho-
slovakia to the concentration camp at Oswieczien (Auschwitz) in
Poland and were there killed in the gas chambers.

Affidavits of eyewitnesses in the official files of the Czechoslovak
Government constitute the basis for this report.

for General Dr. B. ECER

Capt. Dr. A. Hochwald

MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURT
CHARGE SHEET

Dachau, Germany

2 November 1945

NAMES OF THE ACCUSED:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Martin Gottfried Weiss | Michael Redwitz |
| Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert | Wilhelm Welter |
| Josef Jarolin | Rudolf Heinrich Suttrop |
| Franz Xaver Trenkle | Wilhelm Tempel |
| Engelbert Valentin Niedermeyer | Hugo Alfred Erwin Lausterer |
| Josef Seuss | Fritz M. K. Becher |
| Leonhard Anselm Eichberger | Alfred Kramer |
| Wilhelm Wagner | Sylvester Filleboeck |
| Johann Kick | Vinzenz Schoettl |
| Dr. Fritz Hintermayer | Albin Gretsches |
| Dr. Wilhelm Witteler | Johann Viktor Kirsch |
| Johann Baptist Eichelsdorfer | Hans Aumeier |
| Otto Foerschner | Emil Erwin Mahl |
| Dr. Hans Kurt Eisele | Walter Adolf Langleist |
| Dr. Klaus Karl Schilling | Johann Schoepp |
| Christof Ludwig Knoll | Arno Lippmann |
| Dr. Fridolin Karl Puhr | Hans Bayer |
| Franz Boettger | Fritz Degelow |
| Peter Betz | Otto Moll |
| Anton Endres | Otto Schulz |
| Simon Kiern | Friedrich Wetzell |

are hereby charged with the following offences:

FIRST CHARGE: Violation of the Laws and Usages of War.

Particulars: In that Martin Gottfried Weiss, Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert, Josef Jarolin, Franz Xaver Trenkle, Engelbert Valentin Niedermeyer, Josef Seuss, Leonhard Anselm Eichberger, Wilhelm Wagner, Johann Kick, Dr. Fritz Hintermayer, Dr. Wilhelm Witteler, Johann Baptist Eichelsdorfer, Otto Foerschner, Dr. Hans Kurt Eisele, Dr. Klaus Karl Schilling, Christof Ludwig Knoll, Dr. Fridolin Karl Puhr, Franz Boettger, Peter Betz, Anton Endres, Simon Kiern, Michael Redwitz, Wilhelm Welter, Rudolf Heinrich Suttrop, Wilhelm Tempel, Hugo Alfred Erwin Lausterer, Fritz M. K. Becher, Alfred Kramer, Sylvester Filleboeck, Vinzenz Schoettl, Albin Gretsches, Johann Viktor Kirsch, Hans Aumeier, Emil Erwin Mahl, Walter Adolf Langleist, Johann Schoepp, Arno Lippmann, Hans Bayer, Fritz Degelow, Otto Moll, Otto Schulz and Friedrich Wetzell, acting in pursuance of a common design to commit the acts hereinafter alleged, and as members of the staff of Dachau Concentration

Camp and camps subsidiary thereto, did, at, or in the vicinity of Dachau and Landsberg, Germany, between about 1 January 1942 and about 29 April 1945, willfully, deliberately and wrongfully encourage, aid, abet and participate in the subjection of civilian nationals of nations then at war with the then German Reich to cruelties and mistreatment, including killings, beatings, tortures, starvation, abuses and indignities, the exact names and numbers of such civilian nationals being unknown but aggregating many thousands who were then and there in the custody of the German Reich in exercise of belligerent control.

SECOND CHARGE: Violation of the Laws and Usages of War.

Particulars: In that Martin Gottfried Weiss, Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert, Josef Jarolin, Franz Xaver Trenkle, Engelbert Valentin Niedermeyer, Josef Seuss, Leonhard Anselm Eichberger, Wilhelm Wagner, Johann Kick, Dr. Fritz Hintermayer, Dr. Wilhelm Witteler, Johann Baptist Eichelsdorfer, Otto Foerschner, Dr. Hans Kurt Eisele, Dr. Klaus Karl Schilling, Christof Ludwig Knoll, Dr. Fridolin Karl Puhr, Franz Boettger, Peter Betz, Anton Endres, Simon Kiern, Michael Redwitz, Wilhelm Welter, Rudolf Heinrich Suttrop, Wilhelm Tempel, Hugo Alfred Erwin Lausterer, Fritz M. K. Becher, Alfred Kramer, Sylvester Filleboeck, Vinzenz Schoettl, Albin Gretsche, Johann Viktor Kirsch, Hans Aumeier, Emil Erwin Mahl, Walter Adolf Langleist, Johann Schoepp, Arno Lippmann, Hans Bayer, Fritz Degelow, Otto Moll, Otto Schulz and Friedrich Wetzel, acting in pursuance of a common design to commit the acts hereinafter alleged, and as members of the staff of Dachau Concentration Camp, did, at or in the vicinity of Dachau, Germany, between about 1 January 1942 and about 29 April 1945, willfully, deliberately and wrongfully encourage, aid, abet and participate in the subjection of members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the then German Reich, who were then and there surrendered and unarmed prisoners of war in the custody of the then German Reich, to cruelties and mistreatment, including killings, beatings, tortures, starvation, abuses and indignities, the exact names and numbers of such prisoners of war being unknown but aggregating many hundreds.

OFFICER PREFERRING CHARGES:

David Chavez, Jr., Col, JAGD.

Army of the United States.

The above charges are referred for trial to The General Military Court, appointed by Par. 3, Special Order Number 304, Headquarters Third United States Army and Eastern Military Dis-

trict, dated 2 November 1945, to be held at Dachau, Germany, on or about, 15 November 1945.

By Command of Lieutenant General TRUSCOTT:

A. J. Fischer,

Capt., Inf.

Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.

I certify that on 2 November 1945 the foregoing charges and particulars were read aloud in English and in German to: Martin Gottfried Weiss, Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert, Josef Jarolin, Franz Xaver Trenkle, Engelbert Valentin Niedermeyer, Josef Seuss, Leonhard Anselm Eichberger, Wilhelm Wagner, Dr. Fritz Hintermayer, Johann Baptist Eichelsdorfer, Otto Foerschner, Dr. Hans Kurt Eisele, Dr. Klaus Karl Schilling, Christof Ludwig Knoll, Dr. Fridolin Karl Puhr, Franz Boettger, Peter Betz, Anton Endres, Simon Kiern, Michael Redwitz, Wilhelm Welter, Rudolf Heinrich Suttrop, Hugo Alfred Erwin Lausterer, Fritz M. K. Becher, Alfred Kramer, Sylvester Filleboeck, Vinzenz Schoettl, Albin Gretsche, Johann Viktor Kirsch, Walter Adolf Langleist, Johann Schoepp, Otto Schulz, Freidrich Wetzels, and that a copy of the foregoing charges and particulars were delivered to each of the above named accused on 4 November 1945.

I further certify that on 4 November 1945 the foregoing charges and particulars were read aloud in English and in German to: Johann Kick, Wilhelm Tempel, Emil Erwin Mahl, Arno Lippmann, Fritz Degelow, Otto Moll and Dr. Wilhelm Witteler, and that a copy of the foregoing charges and particulars were delivered to each of the persons named in this paragraph on the same date.

William D. Denson

Lt. Col., J.A.G.D.

Trial Judge Advocate

Dachau, Germany

12 December 1945

FINDINGS

President: It is the desire of this court to announce the findings, and, later on, the sentences, in open court. The court desires to caution the audience that it will tolerate no expressions of approval or disapproval. Will the accused and counsel arise? The court, in closed session, at least two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken concurring in each finding of guilty, finds Martin Gottfried Weiss, Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert, Josef

Jarolin, Franz Xaver Trenkle, Engelbert Valentin Niedermeyer, Josef Seuss, Leonhard Anselm Eichberger, Wilhelm Wagner, Johann Kick, Doctor Fritz Hintermayer, Doctor Wilhelm Witelner, Johann Baptist Eichelsdorfer, Otto Foerschner, Doctor Hans Kurt Eisele, Doctor Klaus Karl Schilling, Christof Ludwig Knoll, Doctor Fridolin Karl Puhr, Franz Boettger, Peter Betz, Anton Endres, Simon Kiern, Michael Redwitz, Wilhelm Welter, Rudolf Heinrich Suttrop, Wilhelm Tempel, Hugo Alfred Erwin Lausterer, Fritz M. K. Becher, Alfred Kramer, Sylvester Filleboeck, Vinzenz Schoettl, Albin Gretsche, Johann Viktor Kirsch, Emil Erwin Mahl, Walter Adolf Langleist, Johann Schoepp, Arno Lippmann, Fritz Degelow, Otto Moll, Otto Schulz, Friedrich Wetzel, of all particulars and charges, guilty.

Dachau, Germany

13 December 1945

SENTENCES

President: It is the desire of this court to announce the sentences in open court. We will do that only if the audience demonstrates ability to maintain complete silence, no exclamations of approval or disapproval.

This court desires to make certain comments before announcing sentences. The evidence presented to this court convinced it beyond a doubt that the Dachau Concentration Camp subjected its inmates to killings, beatings, tortures, indignations and starvation to an extent and to a degree that necessitates an indictment of everyone, high and low, who had anything to do with conducting and operating the camp. This court reiterates that although appointed by a conquering nation as a military government court in a conquered land it sits in judgment under international law and under such laws of humanity and customs of human behaviour that is recognized commonly by civilized people. Many of the acts committed at Camp Dachau had clearly the sanction of the high officials of the then government of the German Reich and of the de facto laws and customs of the then German government itself. It is the view of this court that when a sovereign state sets itself up above reasonably recognized and constituted international law or is willing to transcend readily recognizable civilized customs of humane and decent treatment of persons, the individuals effecting such policies of their state must be held responsible for their part in the violation of international law and the customs and laws of humanity.

The accused and the counsel will stand. The accused will present themselves individually in the order in which they are numbered before the bench.

Martin Gottfried Weiss, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Josef Jarolin, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Franz Xaver Trenkle, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Engelbert Valentin Niedermeyer, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Josef Seuss, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Leonhard Anselm Eichberger, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Wilhelm Wagner, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Johann Kick, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Dr. Fritz Hintermayer, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Dr. Wilhelm Witteler, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Johann Baptist Eichelsdorfer, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Otto Foerschner, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Dr. Hans Kurt Eisele, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Dr. Klaus Karl Schilling, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Christof Ludwig Knoll, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Dr. Fridolin Karl Puhr, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Franz Boettger, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Peter Betz, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to life imprisonment, commencing forthwith, at such place as may be designated by competent military authority.

Anton Endres, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Simon Kiern, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Michael Redwitz, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Wilhelm Welter, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Rudolf Heinrich Suttrop, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Wilhelm Tempel, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Hugo Alfred Erwin Lausterer, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to be imprisoned for a term of ten years commencing 13 December 1945 at such place as may be designated by competent military authority.

Fritz M. K. Becher, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Alfred Kramer, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Sylvester Filleboeck, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Vinzenz Schoettl, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Albin Gretsche, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to be imprisoned for a term of ten years commencing 13 December 1945 at such place as may be designated by competent military authority.

Johann Viktor Kirsch, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Emil Erwin Mahl, the court in closed session at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concur-

ring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Walter Adolf Langleist, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Johann Schoepp, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to be imprisoned for a term of ten years, commencing 13 December 1945, at such place as may be designated by competent military authority.

Arno Lippmann, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Fritz Degelow, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Otto Moll, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Otto Schulz, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Friedrich Wetzel, the court in closed session, at least two thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken, concurring, sentences you to death by hanging at such time and place as higher authority may direct.

Dachau, Germany

15 December 1945

I, Brigadier General John M. Lentz, President of the General Military Court appointed by paragraph 3, Special Orders No. 304, Headquarters Third U. S. Army and Eastern Military District, dated 2 November 1945, do hereby certify that the foregoing documents attached hereto and in this order: (1) Extract of orders appointing court, (2) Charge Sheet with certificate of service, (3) Findings of the court on the Charges, and (4)

Sentence of the court, are true and correct copies of the original documents used in the trial of the Dachau Concentration Camp case.

[Signed] John M. Lentz
JOHN M. LENTZ
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
President

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3592-PS

CERTIFIED COPIES OF THE
CHARGES,
SPECIFICATIONS,
FINDINGS, and
SENTENCE,

IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES vs. ALFONS KLEIN
AND OTHERS TRIED AT WIESBADEN, GERMANY, BEFORE
A MILITARY COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE COM-
MANDING GENERAL, SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY,
IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1945.

Charge: Violation of International Law.

Specification: In that Alfons Klein, Adolf Wahlmann, Heinrich Ruoff, Karl Willig, Adolf Merkle, Irmgard Huber, and Philipp Blum, acting jointly and in pursuance of a common intent and acting for and on behalf of the then German Reich, did, from on or about 1 July 1944 to on or about 1 April 1945 at Hadamar, Germany, wilfully, deliberately, and wrongfully, aid, abet, and participate in the killing of human beings of Polish and Russian nationality, their exact names and number being unknown but aggregating in excess of 400, and who were then and there confined by the German Reich as an exercise of belligerent control.

(Signature of accuser) Meade F. Griffin
/t/ MEADE F. GRIFFIN,
Lt.Col., Inf.

(Grade, organization, arm, or service)

AFFIDAVIT

Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases of this character, personally appeared the above-named accuser this 19 day of September, 1945, and made oath that he is a person subject to military law and that he personally signed the foregoing charges and specifications, and further that

he has investigated the matters set forth in specification of the Charge and the Charge, and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Charles H. Taylor
 (Grade and organization)
 /t/ CHARLES H. TAYLOR
 Capt., JAGD

(Official character, as summary court, notary public, etc.)

Upon secret written ballot, two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken concurring in each finding of guilt, as to each accused, the Commission finds the accused:

Alfons Klein

Of the Specification and the Charge: Guilty.

Adolf Wahlmann

Of the Specification and the Charge: Guilty.

Heinrich Ruoff

Of the Specification and the Charge: Guilty.

Karl Willig

Of the Specification and the Charge: Guilty.

Adolf Merkle

Of the Specification and the Charge: Guilty.

Irmgard Huber

Of the Specification and the Charge: Guilty.

Philipp Blum

Of the Specification:

Guilty, except the words "1 April 1945" and "400," substituting respectively therefor the words "23 August 1944" and "70," of the expected words "Not Guilty," of the substituted words "Guilty."

Of the Charge: Guilty.

The Commission, upon secret written ballot, two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote was taken concurring, as to each accused, sentences the accused:

Alfons Klein

To be hanged by the neck until dead.

Adolf Wahlmann

To be confined at hard labor, at such place as the reviewing authority may direct, for the rest of his natural life.

Heinrich Ruoff

To be hanged by the neck until dead.

Karl Willig

To be hanged by the neck until dead.

Adolf Merkle

To be confined at hard labor, at such place as the reviewing authority may direct, for thirty-five (35) years.

Irmgard Huber

To be confined at hard labor, at such place as the reviewing authority may direct, for twenty-five (25) years.

Philipp Blum

To be confined at hard labor, at such place as the reviewing authority may direct, for thirty (30) years.

The president announced the findings and sentence.

I certify that the foregoing three pages contain a true and accurate copy of the Charges and Specifications, the Findings as to each accused, and the Sentence as to each accused, in the case of United States v. Alfons Klein, et al.

/s/ Samuel Sonenfield
SAMUEL SONENFIELD,
Captain, JAGD,
War Crimes Branch.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3593-PS

Excerpts from the Interrogation of Hermann Goering, taken at Nurnberg, Germany on 13 October 1945, 1045-1200, by Dr. R. M. Kempner, OUSCC

[Page 4, line 16]

DR. KEMPNER TO THE WITNESS (DEFENDANT HERMANN GOERING):

Q. How could you tell your press agent, one hour after the Reichstag caught fire, that the Communists did that, without any investigation?

A. Did the public relation offices say that I said that?

Q. Yes. He said you said it.

A. It is possible when I came to the Reichstag the Fuehrer and his gentlemen were there. I was doubtful at the time, but it was their opinion that the Communists had started the fire.

Q. But you were the highest law enforcement official in a certain sense. Daluege was your subordinate. Looking back at it now and not in the excitement that was there once, wasn't it too early to say without investigation that the Communists started that fire?

A. Yes, that is possible, but the Fuehrer wanted it this way.

Q. Why did the Fuehrer want to issue at once a statement that the Communists had started the fire?

A. He was convinced of it.

Q. It is right if I say that he was convinced without having any evidence or any proof of that at this moment?

A. That is right, but you must take into account that at that time the Communist activity was extremely strong, that our new government as such was not very secure.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3596-PS.

[Covering Memorandum]

Deputy of the Chief Custodian of Army Archives attached to the Commander of the German troops in Denmark

(O.H.A.R. (Chief Custodian of Army Archives) Goes)

1. 6-page review of the troops to be sent to Denmark, with notes (copy).

2. Division of work by the Commander of the German troops in Denmark, with comments (copy).

3. 14-page report by Goes on the preparation and execution of the undertaking against Denmark (supplement to the War Journal (KTB) and enclosure of the Commander of the German troops in Denmark), dated 12 Aug. 1940, with comment by the Chief Custodian of Archives, dated 3 Sept. 1940, and map.

[Enclosure No. 3; Report by Goes]

12 August 1940

SECRET

Hq. A.P.O. No: 17632

Deputy of the Chief of the Army Archives attached to the Commander of the German troops in Denmark.

Notes of a conversation on 8 August 1940 between the Chief Custodian of Army Archives Goes and Major-General

Himer who until 31 May 1940 was Chief of the General Staff of Superior Command

XXXI.

In this conversation Major-General Himer gave the undersigned some glimpses into the preparation and execution of the undertaking against Denmark on 9 April 1940, which are not contained in the War Journal or in the War Documents. They are, however, of such great psychological importance for the

later writing of the history of the War that they should be retained in the following account.

Before the outbreak of the war Brigadier General Himer was the German Military attache in Warsaw and experienced the first German air attacks on Warsaw's military objectives. With the rest of the German Embassy, in the afternoon of 2 September he was moved out of Warsaw and after a 30 hours' railway journey via Bialystok, Grodno, Landwarow (west of Vilna) got away to Kowno. On this occasion he observed all rail movement on the Warsaw-Vilna main line, and also a greater part of the movement on the line from Survalki-Grodno in the direction of Warsaw, as well as the guard placed on the Polish railways and bridges. He then reported his observations from Kowno to Berlin.

In the Polish campaign the then Colonel of the General Staff Himer was Chief of Staff of the Kaupisch Corps (Frontier Guard Section of Command I), which had mopped up the northern corridor, established connection with the Danzig brigade and conquered Gdynia and Hel.

In the winter of 1939/40, the Kaupisch Corps, which meanwhile had received the designation of Superior Command XXXI, operated in the area of Ostrolenka—Pultusk—Modlin—Plock—Ortelsburg.

On 2 March 1940, the Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier General Himer, was ordered by telephone to Berlin through the operations department of the General Staff (Lieut. Colonel Heusinger of the General Staff) for a conference on 5 March 1940, and there initiated by General of Infantry v. Falkenhorst (Group XXI) into the proposed execution of an undertaking against Denmark. Whether the operation should be carried out and if so, when, was left open. The work regarding it had, however, to be carried out at once with the greatest speed. The strictest secrecy was essential for success.

On 5 March 1940 the senior officer of Superior Command XXXI, Lieutenant General of the Air Force Kaupisch, also arrived in Berlin and immediately after his arrival he was informed by General Himer of the work pending.

As Superior Command XXXI in Ortelsburg was to be replaced by Superior Command XXXV, which was scheduled to be formed, the Operations Section (Ia) and a part of the staff remained behind for the new formation of Superior Command XXXV (Translator's note: one X pencilled in).

Major Macher of the General Staff was transferred to Superior Command XXXI as the new Operations Chief (Ia), but he could not arrive in Berlin before 10 March. For the preparations, Quartermaster (Q) (Captain V. Witzleben), Intelligence Officer (I_c) (Major v. Heydebreck), chief operations officer (O) (Captain Trommer), Commissariat Officer (IV_a) (Commissariat Chief Dr Filitz), later Weapons and Equipment (W._uG.) and Field training Officer (O₂), were included by degrees.

According to orders the remaining Staff of Superior Command XXXI was, on 7 March, sent with the mass of troops from Ortelburg to Hamburg. As the result of heavy snowfalls and completely snow-blocked roads the march was considerably delayed, especially in East Prussia, at the crossing of the Volga (ferry at Koppelbuede) and in Pomerania.

The circle of officers which of necessity had to be informed of the undertaking which was being prepared grew gradually larger; keeping it secret became that much more difficult; every officer was bound to it by shaking hands. The orders and regulations were only allowed to be drawn up by officers, one of whom undertook the typing work and the preparation of dispatches.

At first only two small rooms were available in the building of the Supreme Command of the Army, Dept. L, in Berlin at Benderstrasse, until the Staff succeeded in having further rooms allotted. Work had to be done in the smallest space with the most simple equipment, produced literally from nowhere which made it very difficult.

The plan of deployment, the entry into Denmark as well as the transport of the troops across the sea, the co-ordination with the Air Force was all worked out to the last detail in collaboration with Group XXI and the experts for naval and Air Force matters attached to Group XXI. As it was not yet definite whether the undertaking would be carried out, the preliminary work of the whole operation had to be finished as soon as possible. Various possible deadlines were mentioned from time to time. As they were very limited, the work had to be intensified still more, which, as the result of lack of motor vehicles, columns, equipment and arms for individual formations, some of which were newly formed, made it particularly difficult.

The Commander of Replacement Army (B.d.E) gave the High Command splendid support in this. The difficulties that had to be overcome in this connection are illustrated by the following example: After the schedule of operations had already been set up, a different loading capacity was reported for certain of the

transport vessels, so that the schedules for troop shipments had to be revised only a short time before the undertaking was to begin.

On the afternoon of 1 April, the Commanders and Divisional Commanders, with their Chiefs of Staff and Operations Officers (Ia's) who were taking part in the Norway-Denmark enterprise, made their reports to the Fuehrer. The latter stressed the great importance of the undertaking and the necessity for secrecy concerning this "most bold and impudent undertaking in the history of warfare." If a word of it were to reach the public, it would be impossible to carry out, not to mention the effect on foreign relations. General [Generaloberst] Keitel concluded the conference with a discussion of single, particularly important operations involved and likewise emphasized the necessity of secrecy concerning the preparations.

The forces required for the undertaking were first assembled in the area about Pritzwalk (198th Div.), Magdeburg (11th Rifle Brigade), and Bremen (170th Div.). They were prepared for their tasks (removal of bridgeheads, assault troop operations, etc.) in an inconspicuous manner. The troops were moved into the staging area only a short time before "Weser Day." In order to keep them in complete ignorance of their coming assignment, Superior Command XXXI issued orders for what were apparently to be large-scale maneuvers in the Hamburg-Munsterlager-Hannover-Magdeburg-Rostock area. (Cf. War Diary).

The camouflage succeeded completely in its purpose. The troops were convinced that they were being assembled in Schleswig-Holstein, in order to start from here toward the South for reconnaissance and battle exercises on a large scale.

In the meantime, secret reconnaissance still had to be carried out in Denmark itself, in order to check and to complete the material on hand. Only a preparation of the operation thorough in every respect guaranteed success and saved unnecessary victims.

Superior Command XXXI was completely prepared for a serious fight. On the success of the operation against Denmark depended the success of the operation against Norway, because Denmark represents the connecting bridge to Norway which had to be taken first and had to remain in our hands firmly.

When 9 April, 5.15 AM was finally designated as the day to move into Denmark, the preparations had been finished.

First, the command staff proceeded to Hamburg on 6 April.

The Chief of the General Staff had received orders to proceed ahead to Copenhagen as plenipotentiary of the army in order to give to the plenipotentiary of the Reich (Envoy von Renthe-Fink)

the documents and information about the carrying-out of the occupation which were necessary for presentation of the demands of the Reich, intended for the morning of 9 April; and he was to support him effectively in the execution of his task.

For that purpose, a discussion took place in the afternoon of 6 April in the presence of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office von Weizsaecker, in which State Secretary Dr. Gauss (Foreign Office), General Himer, Lieutenant-Colonel of the General-Staff Pohlmann (Operations Section, Group XXI), Lieutenant-Colonel of the General Staff Boehme (Armed Forces High Command, Department L), Legation Secretary Dr. Schlitter as well as two other legation secretaries, took part.

On 7 April General Himer rode to Copenhagen as "Oberregierungsrat." His uniform pieces went as courier luggage with the Legation Secretary Dr. Schlitter, who had the order to give a strictly secret, sealed letter to the Envoy von Renthe-Fink on 8 April at 11 PM [note of translator: original 8 PM crossed out].

April 8th was reserved for urgent military reconnaissance which was carried out by General Himer together with Colonel Petersen (attache for the Airforce). The report on hand at the Superior Command up to that time that the harbor of Copenhagen was icebound turned out to be wrong, as an incipient west wind had made the port free of ice on the morning of 8 April. The "Long Line" [Lange Linie] was full of ships. A docking of the "Hansestadt Danzig" which was supposed to debark the 1st battalion of the 308th Regiment (I/308) in Copenhagen, on 9 April at 5.15 AM, was possible on one spot only, between other steamers, in case of necessity. However, the Attache for the Airforce, Colonel Peterson, was able to report to General Himer still in the morning that 2 steamers which were at the time on the Southern part of the "Long Line" would most likely set sail during 8 April. The reconnaissance of the neighborhood of the citadel confirmed the fact that it was possible to penetrate into the citadel without difficulties on the South-Eastern corner. This was the weak point. The results were immediately sent by coded telegrams to Group XXI for Superior Command XXXI. A truck had to be ready for the transport of the equipment of the heavy radio station which was attached to the 1st battalion of the 308th Regiment; this, too, had to be done without giving rise to suspicion. Under strictest obligation to keep it a secret, a German citizen in Copenhagen who was a reserve officer was told that a German boat, coming from a long voyage, would land in Copenhagen for a short time on the morning of 9 April, in order to un-

load some cases; for that purpose a truck would have to be on the "Long Line" on 9 April at 4 AM (Danish time = 5 AM German time).

The citadel, its approaches, and the possibility of taking them by surprise were reconnoitered by the commanding officer of the 1st battalion of the 308th Regiment, Major Glein, a few days ahead of time, after he had been briefed about the planned execution of the surprise attack in conjunction with maps at the Superior Command.

In the meantime, General Himer had taken up liaison with the German Envoy, Minister von Renthe-Fink. The Denmark-operation had to remain a secret even for him until 11 PM at night. Only then the Minister was informed about the military events which were about to start. Envoy von Renthe-Fink fitted himself into his difficult task quickly and in an excellent manner.

The few hours which were at the disposal of the Envoy as plenipotentiary of the Reich were filled out with the study of the memorandum and the military explanations and demands. The most important demands were put down on paper, in order to put the strongest possible pressure on the Danish Foreign Minister Munch at the coming talks. When General Himer had asked the State Secretary von Weizsaecker in Berlin whether he could be present at the presentation of the memorandum at 4 AM (= 5 AM German time), he had answered in the negative; therefore, General Himer had the Envoy, who wanted to take a Danish interpreter along, accompanied by Colonel Petersen to whom he had given detailed instruction for this mission before hand.

Thus, the Envoy von Renthe-Fink, as plenipotentiary of the Reich, presented the requests of the Reich at 4 AM (= 5 AM German time) and explained to the Danish Foreign Minister that the Germans were moving into Denmark in order to prevent an imminent British attack on Norway and Denmark [note of translator: last two words added in pencil]. They were coming as friends. Any resistance was useless and would be broken at once by armed force. The acceptance of the demands would have to take place immediately, as unnecessary losses would happen otherwise and the worst disadvantages would result for the State of Denmark.

In the meantime, the troops of Superior Command XXXI moved in several columns at 5.15 AM (German Time) into Jutland. Wherever resistance was offered by the Danes, it was broken immediately. The surprise occupation of the citadel of Copenhagen, Gjedser, bridge near Vordingborg, Korsoer, Nyborg, Little Belt bridge near Middlefahrt succeeded completely.

The [note of translator: "completely" crossed out] surprised Danish Government in Copenhagen could not agree right away on the acceptance of the German demands and probably tried to win time, too, in order to await developments. Under no circumstances could that be permitted. General Himer insisted on an immediate decision; otherwise the Danish Government would be made responsible for the victims resulting from the German measures, especially from a bombardment of Copenhagen from the air. The final decision—talks were under way with the King—was still not forthcoming. When a renewed telephone conversation of Envoy von Renthe-Fink with the Danish Government was answered in a delaying manner, General Himer, who due to the negligence of the Danish postal system, was in permanent telephone connection with Group XXI in Hamburg since 5 AM (German time) which was maintained until about 7 AM (German time) requested the appearance of the bombers over Copenhagen in order to force the Danes to accept. The officer sitting at the telephone in Hamburg received the request. On this occasion a misunderstanding which might have resulted in serious consequences virtually occurred, due to the fact that the talks had to be code. The officer at Group XXI said: "Well, then bombs are to be dropped right away!" General Himer answered: "For Heavens sake! They are only to appear [note of translator: (in pencil) "fly" crossed out], over the city, in order to lend the necessary pressure, because the Government is still hesitating. Dropping of bombs only at request by the prearranged signal of the troops from the citadel!"

When the German bomber formations roared over the Danish capital later on, they did not fail to make their impression: the Government accepted the German requests.

However, it claimed to be in no position to notify the Danish troops about the agreement that both sides were not to open fire. General Himer wanted to do that with the help of the radio. He personally asked Envoy Mohr (Danish Foreign Office) for it. Mohr tried to notify the radio station by telephone. He did not succeed, because the station, as it turned out, did not operate before 7 AM (Danish time). And up to that time 30 valuable minutes were lost. As reports about fighting between German and Danish troops had already come in, the order to stop these fights had to be made known to the troops immediately, especially, in order to avoid needless victims.

In the meantime, the Danish Postal Office had become aware of its carelessness with respect to the telephone connection between Copenhagen and Hamburg. It had cut off telephonic communica-

tion. But since the radio station was set up in the citadel, General Himer was able to transmit the German terms to the troops by wireless and to request them to send emissaries to the Danish troops, since the Government and the General Staff were not in a position to initiate such action themselves. Cessation of the fighting which had resulted in about 20 German and 30 Danish casualties was achieved. With these extremely small losses it was possible to bring all of Denmark into German possession.

Thanks to thorough preparations, the landing of German troops in Copenhagen and the occupation of the Citadel and vicinity were successfully accomplished. The guards of the Citadel were taken by surprise—the police at the harbor had already been disarmed—and in the process of securing the immediate vicinity of the Citadel the resisting soldiers of the Royal Bodyguard were put out of action. The Bodyguard lost several wounded men at this time. As the population of the Danish capital went to their work early in the morning Copenhagen was firmly held by the Germans. Posted decrees of the King and the government called for strict maintenance of peace and order. German leaflets also served this purpose.

The Chief of the Danish General Staff, Brigadier General [Generalmajor] Goertz, who was captured in the Citadel by the First Bn of the 308th Regt (I/308, was led before General Himer at around 6:30 (Danish time). General Himer expressed regret at having to make his acquaintance under such bizarre circumstances and told him that he was free, since his Government had just accepted the German terms. An auto had been placed at his disposal in which he might ride home. When asked if he, personally, had suffered annoyances and molestation when captured, he replied in the negative. General Himer then informed him that he had already requested that representatives of the Danish Armed Forces empowered to participate in the necessary negotiations appear at 10 o'clock.

Since a departure of the Danish King from the country had by all means to be avoided, General Himer believed it urgently necessary to get in touch with him as quickly as possible. He requested Minister von Renthe-Fink, to arrange an immediate audience with the King—the sooner the better!

General Himer was received by the King on 9 April, being introduced by the Reich Plenipotentiary, von Renthe-Fink. The seventy-year-old King appeared inwardly shattered, although he preserved outward appearances perfectly and maintained absolute dignity during the audience. His whole body trembled. He declared that he and his government would do everything possible

to keep peace and order in the country and to eliminate any friction between the German troops and the population. He wished to spare his country further misfortune and misery. General Himer replied that personally he very much regretted coming to the King on such a mission, but that he was only doing his duty as a soldier. It was Denmark's misfortune to be placed between the two great warring powers, Germany and England, and Germany wished to prevent England's plunging the country into war and devastation. We came as friends, etc. When the King then asked whether he might keep his bodyguard, General Himer replied—seconded by Minister von Renthe-Fink—that the Fuehrer would doubtless permit him to retain them. He had no doubt about it. The King was visibly relieved at hearing this. During the course of the audience, which lasted one half hour, the King became more at ease, and at its conclusion he addressed General Himer with the words: "General, may I, as an old soldier, tell you something? As soldier to soldier?: You Germans have done the incredible again! One must admit that it's magnificent work!"

On 9 April at 10 o'clock the Danish Chief of the General Staff, General Goertz, reported to General Himer as head of the Danish Armed Forces delegation, consisting of officers of the Army and Navy, including [translator's note: correction in script of "einschl." for "ausschl." in typewritten text] the Air Force. The first meeting began at 10:10 o'clock, under the chairmanship of General Himer. The parley was conducted smoothly and in very correct form. [In pencil: is true also of the subsequent conferences.] While all due respect was shown for Danish honor and the Danish representatives were treated with courtesy, they were not left in doubt as to the necessity for carrying out the demobilization rapidly and thoroughly, or regarding further German demands and desires. General Himer abstained *on principle* from making any written covenants with the Danes during these conferences, but only verbal ones. In this way he wished to avoid premature decisions on the German side in regard to definite points, numbers, etc. It also kept the Danes more completely in hand. Since the negotiations were supposed to be conducted in a consistently friendly, but very determined tone, it was really a matter of keeping the Danes in good humor and of gaining their confidence to a certain extent. This policy has stood the test of time very well. The Danes have faithfully carried out all that was demanded of them. They have also felt free to express their own special desires, some of which could be granted without

prejudice to German interests. General Goertz showed himself to be a very clever and cool negotiator. He represented Danish interests in a correct and objective fashion.

Seen as a whole, the undertaking against Denmark succeeded so well and at cost of such light sacrifices because it had been splendidly prepared for in every respect. The secrecy fundamental to success was perfectly preserved; knowledge of the undertaking was limited to the circle of those persons who had of necessity to share it. As the undertaking got under way, swift and independent action prevented heavy damage to the German troops as well as to the Danish Armed Forces and the population, thus promoting between the two countries good relations of great political importance for the future. Even though the events in Denmark are mentioned only twice in communiqués of the High Command of the Armed Forces, they should not for this reason be overshadowed, in the writing of history, by the battles in Norway, which, as such, were larger and more severe. They were the prerequisite for the smooth execution of the Norway undertaking and must be evaluated as such. The fact that they required such slight losses redounds to the glory of German leadership, from the political as well as from the military standpoint.

Certified as a true rendering:

(Signed) Goes,

Senior Archives Councillor, Deputy of the Chief Custodian
of Army Archives with the Commander of the German
Troops in Denmark.

(Written by an officer)

PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 3598-PS

INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY 1
AND DECEMBER 8, 1941

Printed for the Use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Congress, 1st Session)
United States Government Printing Office
Washington: 1945

[Pages 204-205]

SECRET

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941

#985. (Part 1 of 3)^a

Re: my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in

spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986^c). In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Army 25552

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

JD: 6943

^a Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553.

^b Not available.

^c See S. I. S. #25554, 25555.

SECRET

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941.

#985. (Part 3 of 3)

* * * * *

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation

3598-PS

to Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

Army 25553

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 3599-PS

INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY 1
AND DECEMBER 8, 1941

Printed for the Use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Congress, 1st Session)

United States Government Printing Office

Washington: 1945

[Pages 228-229]

SECRET

From: Rome

To: Tokyo

3 December 1941

#985

Re your message #985* to Berlin.

On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin.

Mussolini: "I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U.S. talks from the very beginning and therefore, am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.

"As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will

be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area."

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading. (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop).

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now."

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obliged to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point."

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador Makkenzen.

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

In the first part of this message, please correct "N-NKEN WA" to "KINKENSHA WA."

25833

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (W-TT)

* JD-1: 6943 (S. I. S. #25552-53).
 ** JD-1: 6944 (S. I. S. #25554-55).
 *** Not available.

INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY 1 AND
DECEMBER 8, 1941

Printed for the Use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Congress, 1st Session)
United States Government Printing Office
Washington: 1945

[Pages 245-246]

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
December 6, 1941
(Urgent)
#1003
Re 2 of your #1418^a.

1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985^b, we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question.

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

2. However, should Foreign Minister Ribbentrop insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a * * * statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly.

3. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 or 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone

the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind.

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later.

Army 25925

Trans. 12/8/41 (NR)

^a Not available.

^b Parts 1 and 3, S. I. S. Nos. 25552, 3; Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3601-PS

December 28th, 1945

AFFIDAVIT

Sidney Mendel, Doctor of Law, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that, until the end of 1938, he was a member of the Berlin bar and admitted as attorney-at-law to the German courts. His legal residence is now 85-20 Elmhurst Avenue, Elmhurst, L. I., State of New York.

In his capacity as attorney he handled numerous concentration camp cases in the years 1933 to 1938. He remembers distinctly that, in the years of 1934 and 1935, he approached in several cases Frick's Reichs Ministry of the Interior as the agency superior to the Gestapo for the release of concentration camp inmates. Frick's ministry had special control functions over concentration camps.

The deponent further states that he informed the ministry about illegal arrests, beatings, tortures and mistreatment of inmates. But the ministry declined the release and upheld the decisions of the Gestapo.

The deponent is able and willing to testify to these facts as a witness under oath.

[signed] Sidney Mendel.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at New York City, State of New York, this 28th day of December, 1945.

STATE OF NEW YORK }
County of New York } SS

Mary K. Costello,
Notary Public, King's County.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3602-PS

French Delegation with the Armistice Commission
Report on conversation (interview) between Mr. Hemmen and
Mr. de Boisanger, 4 October at 1100 hours

Mr. Hemmen—In our last conversation I indicated to you that the question of the line of demarcation could be considered settled. What concerns the foreign exchange [devisen] and the goods we shall surely find an accord. For persons and the postal service we are giving you great facilities.

In the question of commissars I likewise suppose we are going to reach an agreement. There is still a great difficulty regarding the control by the Italians. There remains the question of the payment agreement. What answer do you bring me?

Mr. de Boisanger—You yourself had to let me know about the outcome of your steps [demarches] concerning the rate of the mark.

Mr. Hemmen—I could not obtain any result. I did all I could; they did not listen to me. The rate of 20 francs must be considered final. One must not speak about it any more.

Mr. de Boisanger—This answer is very disappointing after all the efforts made in order to show you our desire of collaboration.

Mr. Hemmen—You must not come back to the question of the mark. If you now refuse to conclude the payment agreement [clearing agreement] we might just as well stop everything. I will let the Fuehrer know of it and you will have no facilities whatsoever.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3603-PS

French Delegation with the Armistice Commission.
Report on a conversation between Mr. Hemmen and Mr. de Boisanger, 10 October at 1600 hours, Page 4

Mr. Hemmen—This is an extremely serious difficulty. You are trying to make illusory the rate of the marks. I beg you to warn your government. We shall interrupt the negotiations.

I actually foresaw that you would not be able to prevent prices from rising. But now you are making them rise systematically with exports. We shall find quite other means to fulfill our aims. We are going to take the bauxite.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3604-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE

[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
und Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 37

Decree concerning rationing of industrial goods (Rationing
Decree) of 27 May 1940

1. Rationing for particular kinds of goods (coal, iron and steel,
oil etc.) will be introduced in the occupied territories of Belgium,
Luxemburg, and France.

2. The army groups will state the kinds of goods.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3605-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE

[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
und Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 37

Rationing decree dated 27 May 1940
Section 4

1. The Army Groups and the Goods Offices, within the scope of
the directives they received, can issue regulations concerning the
procurement, the distribution, the storage, the sale, the consump-
tion, and the obligation of registration. They can in particular:

a. Require any enterprise to sell goods to certain purchasers
or to purchase goods from certain suppliers.

b. Forbid or demand the processing of raw or semi-finished
material into certain semi-finished or finished products.

c. To make dependent upon their general or individual consent
the disposition or the procuring of goods.

2. General decrees of the goods offices require the consent of
the Army.

3. The plants concerned can file a protest against individual
decrees of the Goods Office with the Army Group. The protest
has no delaying effect.

4. The Army Groups can transfer the individual authorities
mentioned in the first sub-paragraph to other agencies if this is
necessary for the direction of production.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3606-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE
[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
und Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 38

Rationing decree 27 May 1940
Section 10

It is punishable by imprisonment and fine or one of these penalties to—

1. Violate by intention or through negligence an order issued in virtue of this decree, or in virtue of the regulation issued in execution or amendment of the above decree.
2. Make or use false or incomplete statements of facts to surreptitiously obtain for himself or any other person a permit, consent, pledge or other certificate which are issued in virtue of this decree, or in virtue of a decree of a goods office.
3. Violate the obligation for secrecy in accordance with paragraph 9, section 2.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3607-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE
[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
und Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 65.

Public Notice

The following decree issued by the Board of Directors of the Reichskreditkasse regarding the formation of the Board of Directors of the Reichskreditkasse of 9 May 1940 is herewith made public.

H.Q. 17 May 1940

The Commander in Chief of the Army

Publication regarding the formation of the Board of Directors of the Reichskreditkasse of 9 May 1940.

By virtue of the decree regarding the Reichskreditkasse of 3 May 1940 (RGBl, I Page 743) the Board of Directors of the Reichskreditkasse has been established in Berlin on 9 May 1940. The following have been appointed members of the B.o.D. by the President of the German Reichsbank:

Reichsbank Direktor Puhl, Member of the B.o.D. of the Reichsbank as Chairman.

Reichsbank Direktor Kretschmann, Member of the B.o.D. of the Reichsbank.

Banker Dr. Otto Chr. Fischer.

Further members of the Board of Directors are:

Ministerialdirigent in the Reichfinance Ministry Bayrhofer, Member of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank as representative of the Reichsminister of Finances.

Ministerialdirektor in the Reichministry of Economy Lange, Member of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank as representative of the Reichsministry of Economy.

Ministerialdirektor Dr. Tischbein as representative of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

The Board of Directors has appointed the following as members of the management of the Reichskreditkasse:

Reichsbankdirektor Scholz and Direktor of the Reichsbank Wilz as well as Direktor of a Reichsbank Branch Fiebach as deputy member of the management.

Berlin, 9 May 1940

Board of Directors of the Reichkreditkasse

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3608-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE

[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 119.

PUBLIC NOTICE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CLEARING SYSTEM BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE GERMAN REICH OF 10 JULY 1940

1. A clearing system will be established between Belgium and the German Reich (without the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia). The execution will for the present be handled in Belgium by the Banque Nationale de Belgique in Bruxelles, in the German Reich by the German Verrechnungskasse in Berlin.

2. All payments from debtors residing in Belgium to creditors in the German Reich must be made into an account: "Deutsche Verrechnungskasse Berlin" established with "Banque Nationale de Belgique, Bruxelles." The account will be carried in Belgas. The deposits must be made in Belgas. A special permission in accordance with the foreign exchange decree of 17.6.1940 (Off. Gazette of the Military Comm. No. 21, 2d ed.) is not necessary for these deposits.

3. The debtors residing in the German Reich (without the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) are to make the following payments to their creditors in Belgium into an account of the

Banque Nationale de Belgique, establ. with the German Verrechnungskasse, Berlin.

a. Payments for the import of Belgian goods into Germany. (Proof of country of origin not required.)

b. Payments for incidental expenses for the transport and transit, including the payments for transport insurance.

c. Processing costs.

d. Payments for immaterial performances such as patents, licenses, copyrights and film rentals.

e. Payments for relief, pensions, and similar matters insofar as a hardship exists.

f. Payments specially approved by the Reichsministry of Economics.

The account of the Banque Nationale de Belgique with the German Verrechnungskasse will be carried in Reichsmark.

4. The settlement of accounts will be based, until further notice, on the following exchange rates:

100 Belga—RM 40.00.

100 RM —Belga 250.00.

These exchange rates are to be used also at the conversion of liabilities of Belgian debtors into German currency and at the conversion of liabilities of German debtors into Belgian currency. If there are liabilities of Belgian or German debtors in a third currency, payment into an account can only be made if both parties have agreed about the conversion of the liabilities into Reichsmark or Belgas and about the rate of exchange.

5. The above regulation applies to all liabilities which have become due or will become due after the 31.12.39 and have not been paid in accordance with the previous payment agreement. It does not apply to liabilities incurred through the transit trade.

The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3609-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE

[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 295.

Decree for the execution of the rationing decree in Belgium
of 5 Nov. 1940

In execution and amendment of the seizure decree of 20 May 1940 (Verordnungsblatt (Official Gazette) of the Military Commander page 23) of the rationing decree of 27 May 1940 (Mil Vo

Bl. page 40) and the Forestry decree of 27.5.1940, (Mil Vo Bl. page 41) the following is decreed for Belgium:

The decrees and orders issued, or to be issued by the highest state authorities in Belgium with the consent of the Military Commander regarding the rationing of industrial, agricultural, forest and lumber products, as well as of food and fodder stuffs, furthermore regarding the quotas for working and processing of goods, the establishing of goods offices and rationing offices and their authority are considered also regulations issued in execution of the German decrees as per par. 3, fig. 2 and par. 8, fig. 2 of the seizure decree or par. 3 of the forestry rationing decree.

The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France
Chief of the Military Administration

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3610-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE
[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
un Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 599

Decree regarding Plant Commissars [Betriebsbevollmaechtigte]
of 29 April 1941

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Commander in Chief of the Army, I hereby order for Belgium and Northern France as follows:

Sec. 1

1. To safeguard the industrial production, the Military Commander or the agency authorized by him can appoint commissars [Betriebsbevollmaechtigte] for industrial plants. These commissars can only be individuals. They can be recalled at any time.

2. The commissars receive a certificate of appointment from the agency which appoints them, as well as directives for their task and are bound to conscientious execution of their duties and to secrecy.

Sec. 2

1. The commissar has to take care of starting or operating of the plant administered by him, for the execution of orders according to plan, as well as for all measures to increase the capacity of the plant.

2. The commissar has to decide also regarding visits of outside persons.

Sec. 3

1. The activity of the Commissar does not affect the responsible management and right of representation of the business management. The business management, however, is obliged to allow the Commissar examination of the plant and business activities and of the business records, to give all required information, and to follow his directions within the scope of his duties. The Commissar is entitled to attend all conferences of the business and plant managers.

2. The Commissar is not authorized to act as representative of the firm.

Sec. 4

All expenses caused by the appointment of the Commissar are borne by the firm, unless otherwise decided by the appointing authority. The compensation to be paid to the Commissar is determined by the appointing authority.

Sec. 5

Violations of this decree are punishable with imprisonment and fine or with one of these two, unless more severe penalties are incurred through other ordinances.

Sec. 6

This decree will be effective as of 1 February 1941.

The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3611-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE
[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
und Nordfrankreich] 1940-41, Page 620.

Decree on economic measures against Jews (3rd decree against
Jews) dated 31 May 1941.

Sec. 17

Special Regulations

The Military Commander can forbid the continuation of business to Jews and firms obligated to register. He can furthermore order Jews and firms obligated to register to shut down or sell their business as well as to sell shares or other assets. If these orders are not complied with within a period to be determined, the Military Commander can appoint a missionary administrator for the execution of the decreed measures.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3612-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE
[VOBL—Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
und Nordfrankreich] 1942, Page 986

Decree regarding the prohibition of the manufacturing of certain
products of 6 August 1942.

In virtue of the authority vested it is decreed for Belgium as
follows:

Sec. 1

If the general economic situation or the special requirements
of an individual industry make it necessary the production of cer-
tain goods can be prohibited or special demands can be made as
to production and sale. This can be done by individual instruc-
tions with reference to this decree. In the same manner disposi-
tions can be made regarding raw material, auxiliary material and
the use of machinery, tools and other means of production of in-
dividual plants.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3613-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THE OCCUPIED DUTCH
TERRITORY
[Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten niederlaendischen Gebiete]
No. 1, June 5, 1940, page 6.

Proclamation of the Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Netherlands Territories to the Netherlands Population,
May 25, 1940

On this day I have assumed supreme governmental authority
within the civil domain in the Netherlands.

It is due to the magnanimity of the Fuehrer and the power of
the German armed forces that within a few days after the
catastrophe brought about by the former leadership of the Neth-
erlands, an order of public life is restored which will interfere
with the usual and prevailing state of affairs only to the extent
demanded by the special conditions.

As Reich Commissioner I hold supreme governmental authority
in the civil domain in the Netherlands territories placed under the
protection of German troops, for the purpose of safeguarding pub-
lic order and public life. I shall take all measures, including those
of a legislative nature, which are necessary for the fulfillment of
this task. It is my will to leave unimpaired, as far as this is pos-
sible, the Netherlands law as heretofore in force, to avail myself

of the Netherlands authorities for the fulfillment of administrative tasks, and to preserve the independence of the judiciary. I expect, however, that all Netherlands judges, officials, and employees presently active in public service will conscientiously comply with my orders directed toward that objective, and that the Netherlands nation will follow this leadership with understanding and self-discipline.

The Netherlands soldiers have fought well in battle. The Netherlands civil population has adopted a satisfactory attitude toward the fighting troops. There is nothing which should prevent us from meeting each other on a plane of mutual respect.

Under their Fuehrer the German people are fighting a decisive battle for their survival or destruction, a struggle which the hatred and envy of their enemies have forced upon them. This struggle compels the German nation to exert all its strength and gives it the right to avail itself of all means within its reach. This compulsion and privilege will also necessarily affect the life of the Netherlands nation and its economy. It will, however, be my concern that the Netherlands nation, akin in blood to the German nation, shall not be subject to living conditions less favorable than those necessitated by the community of fate and the destructive intentions of our enemies at this time.

As Reich Commissioner I have to safeguard the interests of the Reich in the Netherlands territories placed under the protection of the German troops and I shall safeguard them. The Netherlands nation, in fulfilling the duties resulting from the common task, will be able to secure its country and its liberty for the future.

Headquarters of the Fuehrer, May 25, 1940.

SEYSS-INQUART

Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3615-PS

Frankfort/Main (Germany), 29 September 1945

To: Benedict S. Deinhard

From: Walter W. Ostrow

Subject: Examination of the Records of the Reichskreditkasse.

An examination of the records of the Reichskreditkasse in our possession shows that a large part of the occupation costs which Germany collected from France was used, in contravention of international law, for purposes other than actual occupation needs.

Contributions made by defeated France to cover the costs of occupation were used to pay for raw materials, foodstuffs, and other goods which were diverted from France to Germany. Special Government procurement agencies were created for such purposes.

Funds from this source were used also for the acquisition of securities, paintings, and other objects of art; for the purchase of radio equipment for Germany, of gold seized by the Germans in France, of Rumanian currency for the use of the Wehrmacht in Rumania, and books for libraries in the Reich destroyed by air raids. Occupation funds were used also to defray the cost of war risk insurance for exports to Germany, for the payment of support to dependents of laborers recruited in France for work in Germany, to finance the operations of the SS and the German customs and internal revenue service in France, and for propaganda purposes by the Foreign Office.

With respect to most of these charges the records of the Reichskreditkasse contain indisputable evidence. For the others, that is, for those cases for which the records offer only indications to this effect, confirmatory evidence was obtained through the interrogation of Anton Wilz, one of the two directors of the Reichsbank who managed the Reichskreditkasse in Berlin. A signed copy of a statement, prepared by Herr Wilz at my request, containing information with regard to the use of occupation funds for certain types of expenditures not related to the occupation is attached as inclosure No. 2.

According to a statement contained in a letter from the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs (p. 22; Note This and all following page references are to inclosure No. 1 containing excerpts from pertinent parts of the Reichskreditkasse records,) the French Government paid in occupation costs for the period from 25 June 1940 until 5 September 1944 the equivalent of approximately 31.6 billion RM converted at the official rate of 1 RM—20 frs. This was exclusive of the cost of providing quarters for German troops for which the French Government was held responsible (p. 8).

Until 10 May 1941, occupation costs were collected at the rate of 20 million RM per day. From then on until the Allied invasion of North Africa and the German occupation of all France which followed, that is, during the period when Germany sought to win the support of the French people, the rate was reduced to 15 million RM. From 11 November 1942 and until 5 September 1944, occupation costs were paid at the rate of 25 million RM per day,

making a daily average for the entire occupation period of 20.6 million RM (p. 22).

In the early part of the occupation, German expenditures from occupation costs funds were far below the actual payments. By the end of 1940, expenditures were somewhat more than one-third of the actual payments made by France. In the following year, expenditures were only slightly lower than the French payments. In 1942, they were far in excess of the payments. From then on and until the end of the occupation, French payments and German expenditures roughly balanced. By 31 August 1944, the unused German balance was only 276 million RM, a very small sum compared with the total French occupation payments of 31.6 billion (p. 23).

Incidentally, a comparison of the French occupation costs payments and the amount which Nazi Germany spent for rearmament in the prewar years, as well as the reparation amounts paid by Germany after World War I, shows that the occupation costs exacted from France were disproportionately large. When Hitler marched into Poland, he boasted that under the Nazi regime, Germany had spent in 6½ years 90 billion RM for rearmament. This corresponds roughly to an annual average of 14 billion RM compared with over 7 billion RM per year which Germany collected from defeated France and an average of only 1.5 billion RM which Germany paid in reparations under the Dawes and Young plans.

A brief analysis of French occupation costs payments and German expenditures from this source indicates that it was Germany's policy in the later years of the war to exhaust the occupation cost payments by diverting a large part of the funds from this source for purposes other than the occupation requirements. Since the actual occupation costs were much lower than the French payments, this policy tended to impoverish defeated France and to deplete its resources. (In this connection it should be pointed out that in addition to the 31.6 billion RM which Germany collected in occupation cost, it was heavily indebted to France in the Clearing. France was Germany's largest Clearing creditor. In September 1943, the German Clearing debt to France was 4.4 billions RM.) The available records of the Reichskreditkasse offer adequate evidence in this respect.

In his signed statement, attached as inclosure No. 2, Herr Wilz estimates, without citing specific instances, that approximately 6.3 billion RM. of occupation funds, covering different groups of expenditures, were used for purposes not related to the occupation army (besatzungsfremde Zwecke). This figure, correspond-

ing roughly to one-fifth of the total occupation costs paid by France, does not include amounts which may have been spent secretly by the German Army itself. Information on this point may be contained in the secret files of the Reichskreditkasse, which according to Wilz, are still in Berlin. Dr. Hollwich, the Chief Paymaster of the German Army in France, whose name appears often in the examined records, should also be in a position to supply information on this point.

The Reichskreditkasse in Paris maintained two sets of occupation costs accounts: Account A and its 10 subaccounts, into which payments were made on behalf of various Reich Ministries, certain Reich agencies, or for specified purposes; Account B into which payments were made for disposal by the Wehrmacht. The actual expenditures of the occupation army were made through Account B.

Funds in the main Account A were reserved for the Reich Minister of Finance. This account was opened, as soon as France began to make occupation costs payments, by the transfer of 1,140,000,000 RM from the Wehrmacht's occupation funds. From this account funds were transferred to the various subaccounts for purposes other than expenditures for actual occupation costs. Transfers into Account A I were made also from Account B (roughly 1,200,000 RM). The subaccounts were used to make payments for the following purposes (p. 33):

| | | June 1940 to end of 1943 |
|-------|---|-----------------------------|
| A I | Reich Minister for Economic Affairs. (Primarily for the buying agency, "Roges", also for the purchase of securities and Devisen.) | RM 1,518,000,000 |
| A II | Foreign Office (for propaganda purposes in France) | 27,000,000 |
| A III | Payment of support to dependents of laborers recruited in France for work in Germany. | 1,500,000 |
| A IV | Reich Minister for Transportation (Purchase of securities) | 2,500,000 |
| A V | Paris Agency of the Reichstierstelle (Reich Agency for Animals)—imports of meat and meat products. | 19,000,000 |
| A VI | Exchange by the Bank of France of RM notes for persons evacuated from Alsace-Lorraine. | 900,000 |

3615-PS

| | | |
|--------|---|------------|
| A VII | Financing purchases of raw sugar in North France by sugar refinery in South Germany. | 1,285,000 |
| A VIII | Compensation for war damage to Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche in France. | 8,500,000 |
| A IX | Sale of French francs to the Reich (Commodity imports into Alsace-Lorraine). | 66,000,000 |
| A X | Reich Minister of Education (Purchases for libraries in the Reich of books destroyed in air raids). [Explanations supplied by Herr Wilz.] | 1,000,000 |

The Chief Paymaster of the German Army in France, the German Armistice Commission, and the French Minister of Finance complained on several occasions against the large cash withdrawals from occupation funds. It appears that the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs and the Four-Year Plan were largely responsible for this development, as such funds were used by their agents in France to pay for purchases of certain goods in the black market for shipment to Germany. The Chief Paymaster, in particular, complained repeatedly that the use of occupation funds for such purposes threatened to deplete his own financial reserves.

In a communication from the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Office in Berlin, dated 4 May 1944, (p. 18) this problem was discussed at some length. The communication pointed out that the cash reserves for urgent demands in the event of an Allied invasion of France were being rapidly depleted through black market purchases and that it was imperative that the use of occupation funds for purposes not related to the Wehrmacht [*wehrmachtfremde Zwecke*] be curtailed as much as possible. Similar views were expressed in an earlier undated draft of a letter to the Foreign Office (written apparently in April 1943) suggesting drastic measures. Among these was a recommendation to make payments through the Clearing for "legal exports from France to Germany, which heretofore were paid from occupation funds," and to discontinue the use of such funds for black market purchases after June 30, 1943. (pp. 27-28).

On one occasion, when the French Minister of Finance complained to the German Armistice Delegation against the large cash withdrawals, the Reichskreditkasse in Paris, in response to a request for some explanation, compiled a list of the amounts paid

out by it in cash during January 1943. According to this compilation, 440 million RM were withdrawn in cash during that month. The various German officials concerned, including the Chief Paymaster of the German Army in France, after studying the submitted figures, came to the conclusion that of this amount approximately 300 million RM were required for purchases in the black market, leaving only 140 million RM for normal Army requirements (p. 29).

In another communication, this time to the German Military Commander, dated 9 November 1942, the French Minister of Finance declared that he had proof that French notes, paid as occupation costs, had been channeled to Brussels and to Berlin (p. 35).

The records of the Reichskreditkasse and supplementary information obtained from Herr Wilz, orally and in writing, show that the following German agencies figured prominently in connection with expenditures of occupation costs funds for purposes not related to the army of occupation.

Roges, Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft m.b.H.

Eichel

Pimitex

Reichsgesellschaft fuer Landbewirtschaftung m.b.H. (Reichsland)

Warenhandelsgesellschaft

Wirtschaftsstelle I. O.K.H.

Interkommerziale.

According to a German economic history of the war, Roges purchased in France for use in Germany primarily strategic materials such as,

| | |
|-----------------|---------------|
| metals | wool |
| leather | rubber |
| chemicals | oils and fats |
| precious metals | etc. |
| tobacco. | |

Roges also sold in Germany goods confiscated in France. For the payment of such goods, the owners were referred to the Paymaster of the Wehrmacht in France. According to the same source, the paymaster complained because Roges paid, after deducting its costs, only 60 to 70 percent of the invoice value of such goods and the Wehrmacht had to pay subsequently from the occupation account the difference between the actual proceeds and the invoice value. (See p. 121 of *Kriegsgeschichte Wehrw. Rue Frankreich II. Teil.*)

The records do not show clearly what amounts were withdrawn from occupation costs for Roges. According to Herr Wilz, the withdrawals were made from subaccount A I of the Reichsminister for Economic Affairs. The statement of occupation costs receipts and withdrawals shows that by the end of 1943 approximately 1.5 billion RM (1,518,139,424.49 RM) were paid out from this account (p.33), presumably mostly for Roges. According to the Reichsbankhauptstelle in Strassburg, Roges used only large denomination notes for black market operations in France (p.48).

Kurt Eichel was engaged in purchases of securities, gold, and Devisen for the Four-Year Plan (p.17). The records of the Reichskreditkasse offer little indication as to the amount of occupation costs spent by him for such purposes.

Pimitex, according to Wilz, was an agency of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions (Dr. Speer). It performed in Belgium and Northern France functions similar to those of Roges. Pimitex does not figure prominently in the examined records. A statement showing withdrawals from Occupation Costs Account B in April 1944 indicates that 20 million RM were withdrawn by Pimitex in that month (p.17).

Reichsland (p.17), as its full German name implies, is a Reich agency for land cultivation. Wilz states that it may have used occupation funds for imports into Germany of French agricultural products.

Warenhandels-gesellschaft, according to Wilz, was a purchasing agency operating in Belgium and Northern France under the jurisdiction of the German Military Commander in Belgium. Its functions were similar to those of Roges.

Wirtschaftsstelle I (O.K.H.) was a purchasing agency of the Supreme Army Command.

Interkommerziale, according to Wilz, was a Berlin firm which served as purchasing agent in France. It was presumably a subsidiary of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. In the first half of 1943 it withdrew from the Reichskreditkasse approximately 35 million RM (pp. 26/28/29).

Occupation funds were used also to defray the cost of war risk insurance for exports to Germany. Wilz estimates these payments at 50 million per calendar quarter. Since these payments were begun in the fall of 1942, the total amount used for this purpose is estimated by him at 400,000,000 RM.

The somewhat mysterious Account 1006, maintained by the Main Administration of the Reichskreditkasse at the Reichsbank in Berlin, was used in special cases. According to the Reichs-

kreditkasse, Berlin, Eugen Brueschwiler, Munich, used this account in January 1944 for the transfer of 110,000 RM to Rudolf Holzapfel, Paris. Wilz states that both parties to this transaction are art dealers. Delbrueck Schickler & Co., Berlin, transferred 200,000 RM to Prof. Hermann Voss in Paris. The latter is also an art dealer. These amounts were obviously used for the purchase of paintings or other objects of art. In the same month, the Deutsche Goldskontbank transferred 150,000 RM to Otto Wolff in Paris. This amount was used presumably for the purchase of securities (p.19).

The examined records show several withdrawals from occupation funds by Hermann Brandel. Wilz states that Brandel served as an agent for the purchase of paintings and other objects of art. In the second quarter of 1943 Brandel withdrew from the Reichskreditkasse in Paris, according to a letter to the Armistice Delegation (pp. 25 and 26), 120 million RM. In February 1943 he withdrew 122.7 million RM (p.28), in January 1943, 35 million RM (p.29), and in October 1942, 20 million RM (p.36).

According to the attached statement signed by Wilz (inclosure No. 2 and the English translation), Account 1006 was used to make payments for objects of art also by the Nazi Party Chancellery and by the Reichsbank itself.

For other instances of misuse of occupation costs, attention is invited in particular to the following:

1. Confidential letter of the Reichs Minister of Finance, dated 10 December 1940, relative to the 5 million RM fund established for the Reichs Minister of Transportation for the purchase through the German Gold Discount Bank, of certain securities in France (p.5). The statement of occupations costs receipts and withdrawals shows that by the end of 1943, approximately 2,500,000 RM were withdrawn for this purpose from Account A IV mentioned in that letter (p.31).

2. The account of the Luxemburg branch of the Deutsche Bank at the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels for the financing of commodity imports into Luxemburg from the occupied French area. Wilz explained that since the funds (150,000 RM) were withdrawn from Account A of the Reich Minister of Finance, they constituted occupation costs (p.5).

3. Confidential letter of the Reichs Minister of Finance dated 18 December 1940, relative to the transfer of 1,500,000 RM to Account A III "for the payment of support to dependents of laborers recruited in France for work in Germany" (p.6). This

account is mentioned also in the statement of occupation costs receipts and withdrawals on p.33.

4. The use of occupation costs for the payment of foodstuffs, purchased in Spain (letter from the Reich Minister of Finance, dated 3 August 1940). The amount involved is not given in this letter. Wilz suggested that it could be ascertained in the records of the Reich Minister of Finance (p.7).

5. Letter from the Reich Minister of Finance, dated 14 September 1942, relative to the payment for small arms obtained for the German Navy in Spain. Wilz explained, in this connection, that the German troops stationed in France comprised two categories: fighting units and occupation troops. For purposes of occupation costs, the Germans made no differentiation between the two categories (p.9).

6. Letter from the Military Commander in France, dated 1 September 1942, stating that the Organization Todt and the SS were receiving funds required by them from occupation costs (p.13).

7. Memorandum for the files relative to a communication from the Foreign Office that the Supreme Army Command did, or was supposed to, make available 25 million ffrs. to the Rumanian National Bank (p.13).

8. Letter from the Supreme Army Command, dated 22 May 1942, to the effect that the above amount was being made available from French occupation costs for the purpose of financing Wehrmacht expenditures in Rumania (p.14).

9. Memorandum for the files, dated 14 February 1942, showing that occupation funds were used to cover the expenditures of German customs guards in France, although it was admitted that their function included such tasks as "confiscation of flight capital of emigrated Jews" (p.15).

10. Letter from the Reichskreditkasse, dated 3 March 1944, explaining the use of Account 1006 (p.19). Wilz states that approximately 90 percent of the huge profits of German construction firms operating in France were transferred under a general license.

11. Report of the Reichskreditkasse of 30 October 1943 showing that 110 million RM from Account B were earmarked for purchases of wheat. Wilz admits reluctantly that this wheat was intended presumably for consumption within Germany (p.21).

12. Letter from Treibacker Chemische Werke, Vienna, relative to the purchase of 11,800 shares of Societe Miniere & Industrielle France Brésillienne", Paris (p.34).

13. Two letters from Reichskreditkasse to Reich Minister of Finance, written in August and July 1943 respectively, indicating that it purchased gold with French francs from the *Devisenschutzkommando* on behalf of the Reichsbank (p.25).

[signed] Walter W. Ostrow

Enclosure No. 1
to Memorandum prepared
by Mr. Ostrow for Mr. Deinhard,
dated 29 September 1945

Excerpt from Correspondence Contained in
BAND I (II/38)
Banque de France
Office des Changes
(Besetzungskosten Frankr.)

From Oberkommando des Heeres, Hauptquartier OKH 4.9.41 to Hauptverwaltung der Reichskreditkassen: The Reichskreditkasse in Paris is to be instructed to transfer from Occupation Account B 200 million ffrs. to Account No. 742 "Warenhandels-gesellschaft Berlin."

From Hauptverwaltung der Reichskreditkassen, dated Berlin 6 September 1941, to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Berlin, to the effect that the Tresor Public Francais paid on 30 August 1941 RM 150 million as occupation costs for the period 1 to 10 September, 1941.

Similar letter dated 29 August 1941 to the effect that Tresor Public Francais paid on 21 August 1941 RM 165 million as occupation costs for the period 21 to 31 August 1941.

From Der Reichsminister der Finanzen, Berlin, 6 August 1941 to Reichshapkasse, Berlin: The Reichsminister for Economic Affairs has advised that the authorization granted to the firm of Kupperbusch und Soehne A G, Gelsenkirchen, to pay 250,000 RM into Giro Account No. 742 "Warenhandels-gesellschaft" in the Reichsbank for the payment in Francs of the equivalent in ffrs. had been withdrawn. Accordingly, the Minister of Finance in-

structs the Reichskreditkasse to deduct the RM equivalent from the Budget for Extraordinary Receipts for 1941 under the heading, "Sale of French francs from occupation payments made by France (Special Account A I)."

From Hauptverwaltung der Reichskreditkassen, Berlin, 9 July 1941 to Reichshauptkasse, Berlin, to the effect that in general the Reichskreditkasse charged all green and green-red striped checks paid in France in the [p.2] currency of that country, to the Occupation Account B . . . If it was not intended to debit Account B, such amounts could be charged only to Account A as, otherwise, there would be no ffrs. available.

From Reichs Ministry for Economic Affairs, Berlin, 10 June 1941, to the Chief Mayor of Berlin to the effect that the arrangement authorizing the city of Berlin to purchase textile goods in France aggregating 6 million RM had been changed. The new authorization covered purchases only up to 5.4 million RM and provided that the remaining 600,000 RM should be transferred back to Germany.

From Reichsminister der Finanzen 19 April 1941 to Reichskreditkasse in Brussels, setting up a special account known as "Occupation Costs, France B R." This account pertained to redeemed requisition receipts and constituted a subaccount of Account B.

From Reichsbank Direktorium 16 April 1941 to Reichskreditkasse, Brussels, stating that the Reichskreditkasse had until that time sold ffrs. to the Reichsbank aggregating 78.1 million RM. Of this amount, approximately 66 million RM were used to pay for imports to Alsace-Lorraine, the remainder of approximately 12 million RM was made available to the Reichsbank for sale to members of the German Army and military finance offices. By virtue of an instruction of the Reichsminister of Finance, dated 19 February 1941, and in agreement with a letter to this effect from the Reichsbank, dated 6 March 1941, these amounts were withdrawn from Occupation Accounts A and B in Paris. The

Reichsminister for Economic Affairs, in a letter dated 21 February 1941, had approved this arrangement. The Reichskreditkasse, which at first advanced these amounts in French francs from its own cash holdings, charged 66 million RM to the account, "Occupation Costs, France A" of the Reichsministry of Finance and 12 million RM to the account, "Occupation Costs, France B", of the Supreme Army Command [p. 3].

From Hauptverwaltung der Reichskreditkassen dated Brussels 16 April 1941 to Reichskreditkassen, Lille, France: The withdrawals by green and green-red striped checks in March 1941 were 17 million RM lower than in February 1941. For purposes of camouflage the Reichskreditkasse is hereby instructed to withdraw from the Bank of France in Lille a special amount of 200 million ffrs. and to increase the cash on hand by a corresponding amount. This letter was marked *confidential*.

By a similar letter addressed to the Reichskreditkasse, Rouen, the head of that bank was instructed to make a special withdrawal of 200 million ffrs. Any surplus francs resulting from this withdrawal were to be transferred to the Reichskreditkasse in Paris.

Note: According to Wilz, these withdrawals were intended to camouflage German military operations in preparation for the then impending invasion of Russia.

From Reichsbank Director Reblin, Berlin, 10 April 1941, to Director Wilz advising the latter that Reblin had been informed by Reichsbank Director Jost on 1 April as follows:

"With reference to your letter of 27 March 1941, a copy of which has just been received here, I have the honor to advise you that the Bank of France carries the following accounts:

1. *Account N. 8.* "Administration Centrale des Reichskreditkassen (Frais d'occupation concernant le chef de l'administration militaire en France)."

"The amount of the account at present is approximately 2.6 billion RM. This is the RM account. In this account entries are made for all occupation costs and the RKK notes redeemed by the Bank of France.

2. *Account No./20* of the Reichskreditkasse, Paris. Present balance approximately ffrs. 850 million.

“This is a ffrs. account which is used for all other transactions between the Reichskreditkasse, Paris, and the Bank of France. For instance, in-payments through the [p. 4] German-French clearing, so far as they are intended for the Reichskreditkasse, are credited to this account whereas, on the other hand, the Reichskreditkasse in Paris makes transfers within the occupied area to the debit of this account.”

From Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Berlin, 21 February 1941 to OKH (Gen. Qu): The occupation costs represent receipts of the Reich over which the Reichsminister of Finance disposes for budgetary purposes. However, the Army retains authority over the entire *Account B* with respect to withdrawals by army finance offices. In addition, an amount of 1.5 million RM is reserved for the army from *Account A*.

The Reichsminister of Finance, on his own initiative, when these 1.5 million RM were recently made available from *Account A* for the recruiting of labor in France, again issued instructions to the Reichskreditkasse for the payment of this amount. It is requested that the Reichskreditkasse be notified accordingly, in order that no double payments should be made.

From the Reichsminister der Finanzen dated Berlin 19 February 1941 to Reichsbank, Berlin: I agree to an arrangement whereby the Reichsbank should acquire French payment media to satisfy its requirements for Alsace-Lorraine and its requirements for purposes of persons on military leave, so far as they cannot obtain French currency elsewhere, from occupation costs balances of the Reich with the Reichskreditkasse. These amounts should be charged for Alsace-Lorraine to *Account A*, for military leave purposes to *Account B*.

Letter of the same date from Reichsminister der Finanzen to Reichskreditkasse in Brussels: I request that the RM counter-value of the withdrawals in ffrs. from occupation costs which had already been made for the designated purposes be transferred to

the Reichshauptkasse and that these amounts be debited to the occupation costs *Account A* and *B* respectively.

I have also learned that, on the initiative of the Chief of the Civil Administration in Brussels, an account [p.5] in ffrs. has been opened in your bank in the amount of 150,000 RM for the Luxemburg branch of the Deutsche Bank to finance commodity imports into Luxemburg from occupied French area. In the event that the French payment media required for this purpose should originate from occupation costs' balances of the Reich, rather than from your own balances in free ffrs., I hereby subsequently approve the withdrawal to the debit of *Account A* and request that the countervalue in RM be transferred to the Reichshauptkasse with a suitable explanation of the case and that at the same time, occupation costs *Account A* be debited accordingly. Should, in the future, for such or similar purposes, disposal be made over French payment media from the occupation costs account of the Reich, I request that my approval be obtained in advance.

Memorandum of Hauptverwaltung der Reichskreditkassen concerning visit to Paris on 31 January and 1 February 1941 . . . On the afternoon of January 31, a conference took place with the head of the Reichskreditkasse in Paris concerning pending matters. At first was discussed the problem of camouflaging the money supply of the Reichskreditkasse in France on the basis of the letter received from the Reichskreditkasse, Nancy, of 20 December 1940 (ref.Tgb.Nr.269/41).

From Der Reichsminister der Finanzen to Reichskreditkasse in Brussels dated Berlin 10 December 1940, marked "confidential".

"Subject to approval within the scope of the foreign exchange control regulations by the Reichsminister for Economic Affairs, I have declared my willingness to make available to the Reichsminister of Transportation an amount in francs to the equivalent of a total of 5 million RM from payments made by the French Government for occupation costs (*Account—Occupation Costs, France A*) for the purchase of DOSAC bonds and ISG shares. The Reichsminister for Transportation will charge the German Gold Discount Bank with the task of carrying out the purchase and will obtain the RM countervalue so far as he may need it—at first to an amount of 500,000 RM—from the Reichshauptkasse.

I request the Reichskreditkasse in Paris

a. to issue instructions to transfer from the account, "*Occupation Costs, France, A,*" 5 million RM into a new special account to be set up under the designation "*Occupation Costs, France A IV.*" [p.6]

b. to authorize it to hold amounts in French francs at the disposal of the German Gold Discount Bank for the specified purpose, within the limits of the RM countervalue acquired by the Reichsminister of Transportation.

A further letter indicates that this instruction was carried out and that 5 million RM were paid into a new special account designated as "*Occupation Costs, France, A IV.*"

Reichsminister der Finanzen, Berlin, 18 December 1940 to Reichskreditkasse in Brussels.

"With reference to my letter of 10 October 1940 (F 4406 Waf (Fr)-55-GenB-) I request that a further amount of 100 million RM be transferred from the "*Account—Occupation Costs, France A*" with the Reichskreditkasse in Paris to a special separate account set up for purposes of the Reichsminister for Economic Affairs under the heading, "*Occupation Costs, France A I.*"

With regard to the disposal of this special *Account A I*, I refer to my letter of 10 October 1940 (same reference as above).

Reichsminister of Finance 18 December 1940 to Reichskreditkasse, Brussels, marked *Confidential*.

"I request that an amount of 1,500,000 RM be transferred from the account of the Reichshauptkasse with the Reichskreditkasse in Paris, "*Occupation Costs, France A*", into a separate special account to be set up for purposes of the Military Commander in France under the heading "*Occupation Costs, France A III.*"

"The Military Commander in France will have the right to dispose of this special account for payments of support to dependents of laborers recruited in France for work in Germany."

Note. This letter bears a notation to the effect that it was to be delivered personally by Reichsbank Director Waldnecker.

Memorandum containing the following:

Reference for File II/38 (Uns. Tgb. Nr. 4/40 g.)

Communication of the Reichsminister of Finance of 9 December 1940 (Nr. F 4406/Waf) concerning utilization of installment payments made for occupation costs has been placed in secret file (Geh.) [p. 7]

From Reichsminister of Finance to Supreme Army Command, Berlin, dated 3 August 1940. I request that, so far as the amount in Pesetas made available to the Spanish Government for the purchase of foodstuffs has been used, that the corresponding countervalues in RM without incurring losses of any kind to the Reich by conversion of exchange rates be diverted from the first installment payment to be made by the French Government and transferred to the Reichshauptkasse.

In making the transfer, it should be stated that it relates to a credit to the Spanish Government in connection with French occupation costs.

From Reichshauptkasse, Berlin, 15 October 1940, to Reichskreditkasse Brussels, concerning special account "Occupation Costs, France A I." Through your local representation, we shall send you our orders to the Reichskreditkasse in Paris to make payments for the above-mentioned special account * * * The officials mentioned in the inclosure have the right to sign for the special account "Occupation Costs, France A I."

Reichsminister of Finance, Berlin, 10 October 1940, to Reichskreditkasse in Brussels marked *Confidential*, concerning, "Utilization of installment payments made for occupation costs." I request that you transfer from the account of the Reichshauptkasse with the Reichskreditkasse in Paris, "Occupation Costs, France A.", 150 million RM to a special account to be set up for purposes of the Reichsminister for Economic Affairs under the heading, "Occupation Costs, France A I."

Disposal of this special account may be made only with my approval which you will receive from time to time through the Reichshauptkasse.

Pink slip of the Bank of France dated 11 September 1940 showing that the Tresor Public Francais paid 200 million RM for occupation costs into account N-8 of the Reichskreditkasse.

Note. This volume contains several other similar pink slips for various amounts paid into the occupation costs account.

From the German Armistice delegation for Economic Affairs, Wiesbaden, 8 August 1940, to the Chairman of the French Delegation of the same commission, General Huntziger [p. 8]

* * * In view of the impossibility of computing the costs exactly, it will be necessary, until further notice, to make daily installment payments of at least 20 million RM. These installments can be made in ffrs., RKK notes, or other payment media to be agreed upon. The conversion rate for the ffr., reserving the right to a subsequent revision is to be made on the basis of 1:20. This arrangement is effective for the period beginning 25 June 1940, and payments are to be made in advance for 10-day periods. The amounts accumulated this year are due immediately. The cost of providing quarters for German troops on French soil is not included in this arrangement. The persons supplying such quarters will be compensated by the French Government outside of the arrangement for installment payments.

The End

BAND I.

[p. 9]

BAND II (II/38)

Banque de France

Office des Changes

(Besatzungskoste Frankr.)

From Reichsminister of Finance, Berlin, 14 September 1942, to Foreign Office, Berlin.

Under the definition "Occupation Costs" come also expenditures for equipment and armaments. In this connection we maintain the standpoint *vis a vis* France that no differentiation must be made between costs for the operating army and those of the remaining occupation troops.

In consequence, the French Government must realize that payment for the small arms obtained for the German Navy in Spain with occupation costs francs should be made through the French-Spanish clearing. Any concession in the present case would constitute a dangerous prejudice for the interpretation of the concept of "occupation costs." Moreover, I must demand that in transferring the occupation costs francs in the French-German clearing that the countervalue be transferred in Germany, not to the German-Spanish clearing, but to the Reichshauptkasse and credited to the Spanish Civil War Debt. (Reference to the payment for foodstuffs purchased in Spain for occupation troops in France—letter of the Foreign Office of 4 July 1940, WII 4338 III/ff) [P.10]

The following list was compiled by the Reichskreditkasse.

Transfers to France during June 1942 of amounts
in excess of RM 50,000

| Reichskredit- kasse | Amount | By order of |
|------------------------|------------------------|---|
| Bordeaux | 100 000... | Rowak-Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin, |
| Paris | 50 000... | *Reichsmin. f. Volksaufkl. u. Prop., Berlin, |
| Paris | 500 000... | Roges Rohstoff-Handelsgesellschaft mbH., Berlin, |
| Paris | 100 000... | Reichsmin. f. Volksaufkl. u. Prop, |
| Paris | 252 711... | Schweizerische Gesandtschaft. Abt Schutzmachtangelegenheiten, Berlin, |
| Paris | 1 030 000... | Delbrueck Schickler & Co., Berlin, w/Auswartiges Amt |
| Paris | 278 918.34 | Kageler & Rolfs, Bremen, |
| Paris | 100 000... | Voemel & Co. K.G., Dortmund, |
| Paris | 80 000... | Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse Landkreis Saarbruecken, |
| Paris | 91 493.50 | Der Generalinspektor f.d.dt. Strassenwesen Org.Todt, Zentrale, |
| Paris | 210 000... | Reichsstock f. Arbeitseinsatz-Hauptkasse-Berlin, |
| Paris | 400 000... | Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD., Berlin, |
| Paris | 1 030 000... | Delbrueck Schickler & Co., Berlin, w/Auswartiges Amt |
| Paris | 50 000... | *Der Generalbauinspektor f.d. Reichshauptstedt, Berlin—Charlottenburg, |
| Paris | 1 030 000... | Delbrueck Schickler & Co., Berlin, w/Auswartiges Amt |
| Paris | 150 000... | Reichsstock f. Arbeitseinsatz-Hauptkasse-Berlin, |
| Paris | 90 000... | desgl. |
| Paris | 60 000... | Wehrkreisverwaltung IV, i.V.Dr. Selladitz Kriegsverwaltungsrat, Dresden, Koenigspl. 3, |
| Paris | 500 000... | Bank der Deutschen Luftfahrt A.G., Berlin- Schoeneberg, |
| | 500 000... | Reichsmin.f.Volksaufkl.u.Prop.,Berlin, |
| Paris | 300 000... | Deutsche Auslands-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft Interradio Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin, |
| Paris | 150 000... | Sponholz & Co. Bank-Kommanditges, Berlin w/Direktor Wellisch, Paris, Vertreter d. Kameradschaft d. Deutschen Kuenstler, |
| | RM 6 953 122.84 | |
| | RM 7 053 122.84 [P.11] | |

Transfers to France during July 1942 of amounts
in excess of RM 50,000

| Reichskredit- kasse | Amount | By order of |
|------------------------|------------|--|
| Bordeaux | 200 000... | Rowak Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin |
| Paris | 100 000... | Ernst Heinkel Flugzeugwerke, Seestadt, Rostock, |
| Paris | 290 000... | Reichsstock f. Arbeitseinsatz-Hauptkasse, Berlin, |
| Paris | 100 000... | Die Deutsche Arbeitsfront N.S.-Gemeinschaft Kraft durch Freude, Berlin, |
| Paris | 600 000... | Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD.- Kasse—Berlin, |
| Paris | 75 000... | Deutsche Reichsbank-Hauptkasse-, Berlin, |
| Paris | 282 692.55 | Schweizerische Gesandtschaft Abt. Schutzmacht- angelegenheiten, Berlin |
| Paris | 500 000... | Roges Rohstoff-Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin, |
| Paris | 210 000... | Reichsstock f. Arbeitseinsatz, Hauptkasse, Berlin, |
| Paris | 53 975... | Deutsche Reichsbank, Hauptkasse, Berlin, |
| Paris | 85 000... | Praesidialkanzlei, |
| Paris | 80 000... | Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgraeberfuersorge e.V., Berlin-Grunewald, |
| Paris | 143 500... | Reichsprop.Min., |
| Paris | 277 638.86 | Kageler & Rolfs, Bremen, |
| Paris | 150 000... | Sager & Woerner, Muenchen, |
| Paris | 60 001.60 | Reichsprop.Min., |
| Paris | 290 000... | Reichsstock f. Arbeitseinsatz-Hauptkasse-Berlin, |
| Paris | 56 264.40 | Der Chef d.Sicherheitspolizei u.d.SD.-Kasse- Berlin, |
| Paris | 130 000... | Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse Landkreis Saarbruecken. |

*RM 3 684 072.41 [P.12]

Transfers to France during August 1942 of amounts
in excess of RM 50,000

| Reichskredit- kasse | Amount | By order of |
|------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Bordeaux | 100 000... | Rowak Handelsgesellschaft mbH. Berlin, |
| Bordeaux | 200 000... | desgl. |
| Paris | 60 942.15 | Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD., Kasse, Berlin, |
| Paris | 500 000... | Der Reichsfuehrer SS u.Chef d.Deutschen Polizei SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt Waffen-SS-Kasse-, Berlin, |
| Paris | 364 650... | Schweizerische Gesandtschaft, Abt.Schutzmacht- angelegenheiten, |
| Paris | 340 743.05 | desgl. |
| Paris | 120 000... | Reichsmin.f.Volksaufkl.u.Prop., |
| Paris | 100 000... | Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse f.d.Landkreis Saarbruecken, |
| Paris | 210 000... | Reichsstock f.Arbeitseinsatz-Hauptkasse-Berlin, |
| Paris | 50 000... | *Reichspost-Fernseh-Gesellschaft mbH, Berlin, |
| Paris | 175 000... | Automobil-Verkehrs-Anstalt Wien, |
| Paris | 50 000... | *Schickofsky & Co., Voelklingen, |
| Paris | 420 065.33 | Kageler & Rolfs, Bremen, |
| Paris | 500 000... | Roges, Rohstoff-Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin, |
| Paris | 50 000... | *Dresdner Bank, Berlin, |
| Paris | 500 000... | Reichsmin.f.Volksaufkl,u.Prop., |
| Paris | 67 212.16 | Gutenhoffnungshuette Oberhausen, |
| Paris | 50 000... | *Reichsbankdirektorium |
| Paris | 50 000... | *desgl. |
| Paris | 100 000.. } 50 000.. } | Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse f.d. Landkreis Saarbruecken |

*RM 4 058 612.69

3 808 612.69

[*These items were scratched out in pencil in the original
German text.] [P.13]

From the Military Commander in France (Pay Master) dated Paris 1 September 1942 to the Reichskreditkasse, Paris.

From statements by the main administration of the Reichskreditkassen, and from various conversations, it could be learned that the RKK Giro transfer from France to Germany and vice versa up to now approximately balanced. Before the control and administration of occupation costs was put into effect, various agencies such as the OT and the SS received their funds through the Reichsbank Giro system. Within the scope of the new arrangement for supplying funds, these agencies now receive directly from occupation costs the funds required by them and approved here.

Memorandum for the files indicating that the following letter was filed under II 40 a :

"Copy of a communication of the Foreign Office, Berlin, showing that the Supreme Army Command did, or was supposed to, make available to the Roumanian National Bank 25 million ffrs."

Telegram from Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, to Banking Commissioner in Paris for Reichskreditkasse in that city, dated 17 July 1942.

On 6 July Reichskreditkasse spent without our instruction 20 million and on 7 July 15 million RM to the debit of *Account A I* for Roges, on 10 July, 35 million RM were spent in accordance with our telegram of 9 July.

Military Commander in France (Pay Master) dated Paris 7 January 1942 to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin.

* * * In comparing the reports received concerning changes, it may be assumed that the segregation is made, not according to the withdrawals by the separate army groups, but in accordance with other viewpoints. Please explain.

Reichsministry for Economic Affairs dated Berlin 27 May 1942 to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, (Reichsbank Director Wilz) concerning the placing of French francs at the disposal of the Reichsministry for Propaganda :

With reference to our telephone conversation of today, I request, as agreed, that you hold available an amount of 500,000 RM for the Reich [P.14] ministry of Propaganda in *Account No. 1006* payable in Paris. This amount has been set aside for the acquisition of radio equipment which should be purchased in France on the basis of instructions by the Fuehrer.

In addition, I would be grateful if you would advise me by letter or telephone no later than 15 June 1942, if a further installment of 500,000 RM in ffrs. could be made available in Account 1006 for the Reichsminister for Propaganda on or after 20 June 1942.

Supreme Army Command, Berlin, 22 May 1942 to Chief Pay Master of the German Armies in Bucharest. The Supreme Command of the Army is making available as an advance to the Special Deputy for Economic Problems, at his request, 25 million ffrs. from French occupation funds for the purpose of financing German Army expenditures in Roumania.

Reichskreditkasse, Paris, dated 4 April 1942 to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin. The Military Commander in France has requested from us by telephone the following information which he requires urgently in connection with forthcoming measures regarding the limitation of expenditures from occupation costs funds:

1. What payments were made in the months January to March, 1942 on the instructions of the Reichsministry of Finance or the Reichshauptkasse to the debit of special *Account A I*. The payee and the utilization purpose should be stated.
2. What large payments were ordered with the approval of the Reichsministry of Economic Affairs or the German Devisentellen in the months January to March, 1942, directly through the Reichskreditkasse, Paris, for credit or actual out-payments. Payee and utilization purpose should likewise be stated.

From the Reichskreditkasse to the Supreme Army Command in Berlin dated 18 March 1942 notifying the latter that the French Treasury made a payment on 11 March 1942 of 150 million RM for occupation costs covering the period 11 to 20 March. [P.14A]

The following list contains the names of participants in a conference with the Military Commander in France on 23 April 1942:

Direktor bei der Reichsbank Wilz
 Direktor bei der Reichsbank Dr. Schulte
 Reichsbankoberinspektor Strehlau
 Kriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Koebe } Mil. Bef.i.Fr.,
 Kriegsverwaltungsrat Nusche } Verw.Stab WI VIII
 Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Schwarzer, dto., Verw. Stab Wi V
 Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Druেকে, dto., Verw. Stab Wi IX
 Intendanturrat Dr. Hollwich, Intendant beim Mil.Bef.i.Fr.,
 Paris, Av.Kleber
 Direktor bei der Reichsbank Hartlieb, Waffenstillstandsdelegation fuer Wirtschaft, Paris, Av.d'Iena 16 u.
 Reichsbankoberinspektor Dr. Roesch
 Direktor bei der Reichsbank Muerdel, Reichskreditkasse Paris, 43, Blvd. des Capucines
 Direktor bei der Reichsbank Dr. Boettcher beim Deutschen Kommissar bei der Bank von Frankreich, Paris. [P.15]

Memorandum for the files, dated Paris 1 June 1944, concerning a conference with regard to the position of "Occupation Costs Account B." According to the memorandum, the Chief Pay Master's office of the German Army Command in France was concerned over the possibility that by June of that year available funds to cover the Army's requirements would be inadequate. The requirements for June were given as follows:

| <i>In Millions RM</i> | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Wehrmacht | 851 |
| Subsequent Claims | 30 |
| Exchange of RKK Notes | 35 |
| Eichel | 5 |
| Roges | 10 |
| Reichsland | 3 |

From Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, 1 June 1944 to its own book-keeping section instructing it to transfer, in accordance with an instruction by the Reichminister of Finance, dated 12 May 1944 RM 15,000,000 from "Occupation Costs Account France A" to special account "Occupation Costs France A I", which had been

set up for purposes of the Reichsminister for Economic Affairs. A copy of this letter was sent to the Reichskreditkasse, Paris.

A statement showing the position of "Occupation Costs Account B" in April 1944 shows withdrawals totalling 827 million RM. Under this heading are the following items:

| | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| Eichel (Four-Year Plan) | 10 million RM |
| Pimitex | 20 million RM |
| Warrick insurance | 14 million RM |
| Reich Maritime Commissioner | 2 million RM [P.18] |

German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs, dated Paris 4 May 1944, to Foreign Office in Berlin. The German "Occupation Costs" balance at the Bank of France amounted on 31 December 1943 to 679 million RM. On 31 March 1944 it was reduced by approximately 95 million RM to 584 million RM. The share of the Wehrmacht (so-called Account B) was 510 million RM * * * With regard to this item of 510 million RM, this communication contains a footnote reading as follows:

"The amounts in other accounts (Reichsministry of Finance, Reichsministry for Economic Affairs, Foreign Office, Reichsministry for Transportation) aggregating approximately 75 million RM are not included in the survey which follows."

In conclusion, this communication states that the developments with regard to the German balance in "Occupation Costs Account B" have been such that at the present rate of expenditures, it will be exhausted on the books after approximately 10 months and so far as the funds are concerned, even earlier. In these circumstances, there can be no mention of an actual reserve which should be available, especially with a view to possible urgent supplementary demands in the event of fighting on French soil. The considerable reserves which had been provided for this purpose previously were, as far as known, greatly used up through "S-Kaeufe" (black-market purchases). In consequence, care must now be taken even more than before, that only the requirements of the Wehrmacht are met and that the use of occupation costs funds for purposes not related to the Wehrmacht [Wehrmacht*fremde*] should be restricted as much as possible, especially in view of negotiations with the French Government

with a view to a further increase in occupation costs at the present moment.

Note. The underscoring of the last part of the word "Wehrmachtfremde" is given as it appeared in the original German text.

Memorandum of the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs, dated Paris 15 April 1944, in which the advisability of calling in notes of large denominations is examined, contains the following statement: [P. 19]

"Practically all orders, even in big industry, are paid today in cash, with the result that serious stoppages in payments unavoidable in an operation involving the exchange of such large quantities of notes could not remain without unfavorable effects on the armaments orders."

Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, 3 March 1944, to the Military Commander in France explaining the use of "Account 1006" as follows:

1. The Reichskreditkasse in France makes transfers through "Account 1006" to the Reich. These include transfers by German firms engaged in business in France, presumably in the interest of the German Army, under a general license; by military agencies without a license; and by other agencies which require a specific license for each transaction.
2. French payment media are never transferred through this account for purposes of German agencies in the Reich.
3. Transfers from the Reich to France are made through "Account 1006" with the approval of the Reichsministry for Economic Affairs or a Devisenstelle for the Swiss Legation in Berlin in connection with its work of protecting German interests in enemy countries; for the personnel of the German Foreign Office in Paris; and for other purposes.

The communication states that under the latter heading there might be also payments of a "noneconomic nature" and that information on this point could be obtained from the Reichsministry for Economic Affairs. In January, 1944, the following large transfers were made under this heading:

3615-PS

| <i>Amount</i> | <i>Ordered by</i> | <i>In favor of</i> |
|---------------|--|---|
| RM 105,000 | Gewerkschaft Saarsegen | Gewerkschaft Saarsegen, Paris |
| RM 110,000 | Eugen Brueschwiler Muenchen | Rudolf Holzapfel, Paris |
| RM 300,000 | Vereinigte Aluminumwerke A.G. Berlin | Dt. Beauftr. f. Leicht- met. in d. bes. Westgeb., Paris |
| RM 750,000 | Osram GmbH, Berlin | Alfred Dziurowitz, Paris |
| RM 200,000 | Delbrueck Schickler & Co. Berlin | Prof. Dr. Hermann Voss, Paris |
| RM 100,000 | Kanzlei d'Fuehrers d.NSDAP Berlin | Generalbevollm.f. techn. Nachr. Mittel Dienstst. Frenkreich Herrn Ma- jor Wutzler, Paris |
| RM 150,000 | Deutsche Gobdiskontbk, Berlin | Otto Wolff Koeln, Paris |

[P. 20]

The foregoing compilation was made at the request of the Military Commander in France as indicated by his letter to the Reichskreditkasse in Paris dated 27 January 1944. This letter contains the following:

“In particular, it is requested that information be supplied as to whether, and if so to what extent, cash in French currency was withdrawn from this account and brought to the Reich for purposes of German agencies. Are payments made to the debit of Account No. 1006 which are also of a noneconomic nature?”

From the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs, dated 19 January 1944, to the Foreign Office. This letter shows that since the 25 June 1940 and until 31 December 1943, the French Government made the following payments for “Occupation Costs”:

| | | |
|---------------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | 1940 RM | 4,000,000,000.00 |
| | 1941 | 6,075,000,000.00 |
| | 1942 | 5,475,000,000.00 |
| | 1943 | 9,698,300,000.00 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Total | | RM 25,248,300,000.00 |
| Expenditures during this period | | RM 24,569,658,770.32 |
| <hr/> | | |

Available balance on 31 December 1943 RM 678,641,229.68

Of this amount, 585 million RM are available for general "Occupation Costs" purposes, whereas approximately 41 million RM are available to the Reichsministry of Finance; approximately 27 million RM to the Reichsministry for Economic Affairs; approximately 23 million RM to the Foreign Office; and approximately 2.5 million RM to the Reichsministry for Transportation.

The expenditures were distributed as follows:

1. Through agencies of the Wehrmacht
in a broad sense [im weiteren Sinne] RM 20,381,143,547.85
2. Through redemption of RKK notes

| | |
|---------|------------------|
| 1940 RM | 635,985,580.00 |
| 1941 RM | 203,869,480.00 |
| 1942 RM | 448,790,000.00 |
| 1943 RM | 1,193,081,692.50 |

RM 2,481,726,752.50

3. For special purposes of the
Reichsministry for
Econom. Affairs RM 1,518,139,424.49
Foreign Office RM 27,000,000.00
Reichsministry for
Transportation RM 2,493,616.95
Reich Agency for
Animals (1941) RM 19,000,000.00
Supplying ffrs.
for Alsace-Lor.
'41 RM 66,000,000.00
Redeemed requi-
sition certifi-
cates RM 69,468,582.53
Miscellaneous RM 4,686,846.00
Total RM 1,706,788,469.97
24,569,658,770.32

[P.21]

Report of the Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, 30 October 1943 relating to conferences in France with regard to the repayment of French currency advanced for Wehrmacht purposes. The French payment media required for exchange transactions made by the Reichskreditkassen in France for the Wehrmacht and for similar exchange transactions of the German Reichsbank are taken by us at first from funds made available through occupation costs payments * * * In order to balance our franc account, it is necessary to deduct subsequently from "Occupation Costs Account B" the amounts thus withdrawn * * * Since June, no payments were received for this purpose as allegedly no funds could be made available from "Occupation Costs Account B". In consequence, the deficit from such transactions amounted by the end of September to 188 million RM.

In addition, the Army Pay Master, in accordance with a note of the Armistice Delegation, has to repay us from occupation costs funds a further amount of 50,790,600 RM which we advanced in ffrs. in order to expedite the transfer of savings from wages of French migratory labor until the method of transfer by checks went into effect. After the conversations, this amount has, in the meantime, been repaid. The Army Pay Master furnished figures to show that on 30 September 1943 the balance in his favor in "Occupation Costs Account B" was only 114 million RM. Of this amount, 110 million RM were earmarked for purchases of wheat from the 1942 harvest. On the basis of existing arrangements, it was assumed that this amount would be paid through the clearing account. However, it was learned that only beginning with the wheat shipments of the 1943 crop, payment would be made for this purpose through the clearing, therefore the amounts accumulated until the end of the old crop must still be paid from occupation costs. In consequence, the balance in "Account B" amounts to only 4 million RM, leaving the Wehrmacht without reserves and making it completely dependent on current payments which can cover the Wehrmacht's direct requirements only through an arbitrary reduction, at this time, of approximately 10 percent. [P.22]

From German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs (Reichsbank Director Hartlieb) Salzburg, 11 October 1944 to Reichsbank Director Wilz of the Reichskreditkasse in Berlin containing a statement showing receipts and expenditures in the

occupation accounts. The pertinent parts of this statement are given below:

I.

In accordance with Article 18 of the Armistice Agreement, the French Government has made occupation Costs payments for the period from 25 June 1940 to 5 September 1944* aggregating

RM 31,043,300,000 ✓

In addition, the French Government paid on the basis of an exchange of notes of 24/25 November 1943 (transfer of occupation costs installments to Germany formerly paid in favor of Italy),

RM.....550,000,000 ✓

Thus the total amount credited to the "Occupation Costs Account" of the Reichskreditkasse in Paris with the Bank of France was

RM 31,593,300,000 ✓

These amounts comprised the following installment payments for occupation costs:

| | | |
|---|----|------------------|
| From 25 June 1940 to 10 May 1941 per day, 20 million | RM | 6,400,000,000 |
| From 11 May 1941 to 10 November 1942 per day, 15 million | RM | 8,235,000,000 |
| From 11 November 1942 to 5 Sept., 1944 per day, 25 million | RM | 16,408,300,000** |
| | | <hr/> |
| | RM | 31,043,300,000 |

| | | |
|--|----|----------------|
| Advance payments originally intended for Italy from 1 September 1943 to 31 July 1944 per month, 50 million RM. (Payment for August 1944 was no longer made.) | RM | 550,000,000 |
| | | <hr/> |
| | RM | 31,593,300,000 |
| | | <hr/> <hr/> |

| | | |
|--|----|----------------------|
| Daily average for the period from 25 June 1944 to 5 September 1944 | RM | 20.6 million [P. 23] |
|--|----|----------------------|

*The last payment, amounting to 400 million RM was made 12 August 1944 as part payment for the installment of 815 million RM due on 21 August 1944. Through this partial payment, the installments up to and including 5 September 1944 were covered.

**The amounts to be paid totalled RM 16,625,000,000. However, they were reduced through the German contribution for the sup-

ply of quarters in Southern France (10 million RM per month from 11 November 1942 to 31 August 1944) by a total of 216.7 million RM.

II.

The French payments (installment payments and advances payable to Italy and transferred to Germany) and the German expenditures, compiled by calendar year and by daily average were as follows:

| Year | <i>In million RM</i> | | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | <i>French payments</i> | <i>German expenditures</i> | <i>Payments per day</i> | <i>Expenditures per day</i> |
| 1940 | 4,000 | 1,569 | 21.1 | 8.3 |
| 1941 | 6,075 | 5,205 | 16.7 | 14.5 |
| 1942 | 5,475 | 8,271 | 15.0 | 22.7 |
| 1943 | 9,698.3 | 9,524 | 26.6 | 26.1 |
| 1944 (up to 31 Aug.) | 6,345 | 6,748 | 25.5 | 27.7 |
| 1940-1944 | 31,593.3 | 31,317 | 20.6 | 20.5 |

The unused German balance [Computed on the basis of actual receipts and disposals by the Reichskreditkassen] showed the following developments:

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Millions RM</i> |
|------------------|--------------------|
| 31 December 1940 | 2,431 |
| 31 December 1941 | 3,301 |
| 31 December 1942 | 505 x |
| 31 December 1943 | 679 x |
| 30 June 1944 | 710 x |
| 31 August 1944 | 276 x |

Note. In the above tables the figures on German annual and daily expenditures were written in pencil, also the checks and x's. [P. 24]

III.

According to the foregoing compilation, the total German expenditure for the period 25 June 1940 to 31 August 1944 amounted to 31,317,778,252.81 RM distributed as follows:

| | | (in RM) |
|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Wehrmacht | | 27,032,279,120.27 |
| Redemption of RKK notes | | |
| 1940 | 635,985,580.00 | |
| 1941 | 203,869,480.00 | |
| 1942 | 448,790,000.00 | |
| 1943 | 1,193,081,692.50 | |
| 1944 | 23,639,556.00 | |
| | | 2,505,356,308.50 |

| | | |
|-------|--|-----------------------------|
| | Redemption of Requisition Certificates | 69,468,582.53 |
| A-I | Reichsminister for Economic Affairs | 1,554,063,585.94 |
| A-II | Foreign Office | 50,000,000.00 |
| A-IV | Reichsministry for Transportation | 2,493,616.95 |
| A-V | Reich Agency for Animals | 19,000,000.00 |
| A-IX | Sale of francs to the Reich (imports to Alsace-Lorraine of commodities purchased in France) | 66,000,000.00 |
| A-III | Support payments to dependents of French labor in Germany | 1,500,000.00 |
| A-VI | Exchange of RM by the Bank of France on behalf of persons in Alsace-Lorraine | 901,846.00 |
| A-VII | Financing of the purchase of raw sugar in Northern France | 1,285,000.00 |
| A-X | Reichsministry for Education | 1,000,000.00 |
| | Miscellaneous Payments (Account B) | 14,430,192.62 |
| | Total | <u>RM 31,317,778,252.81</u> |

[P. 25]

From Reichskreditkasse Berlin 26 August 1943 to Reichsminister of Finance, Berlin (Attention: Oberregierungsrat Dr. Bussman): From the day they were established until 31 July of this year, the Reichskreditkassen in France have purchased—in part through the intermediary of the Devisenschutz Kommando in Paris—and placed at the disposal of the Reichsbank the following:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Gold Coins and Bars Valued at | RM 4,774,684.13 |
| Foreign Notes and Coins Valued at | 903,284.36 |
| | <u>RM 5,677,968.49</u> |

The ffrs. required for these transactions were advanced by us from occupation costs owing to the lack of our own funds for such purposes. These amounts are now lacking as cover for the Giro balances maintained by the finance offices of the Wehrmacht. As a result, current money transactions and the making available of required French payment media are made more difficult. We consider it therefore necessary to make a final settlement in the occupation costs account and request that the countervalue be debited to "Occupation Costs Account A" and made available to

us by crediting the RM amount in the account "Reichskredit" maintained at our bank.

From Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, July 1943 (day of the month omitted) to Reichsminister of Finance. At the beginning of July of this year, the Devisenschutzkommando in Paris delivered to us gold valued at RM 4,117,582.10 for transmission to the Reichsbank. The gold accepted by our Administration in France since April 1941 for which payment was made in French francs has a total value of 4,517,728.34 RM.

Reichskreditkasse, Paris, to Armistice Delegation, Paris, dated 2 July 1943: Supplementing our letter of the 12 March 1943 and of the 7 April 1943, we submit below, in accordance with your request, a statement showing the cash withdrawals from our bank in the months of April to June 1943. [P.26]

| | 2 July 1943 | | |
|---|----------------------|------------|-------------|
| | <i>In Million RM</i> | | |
| | <i>April</i> | <i>May</i> | <i>June</i> |
| Organization Todt | 12.4 | 12.05 | 12.7 |
| NSKK Todt | 3.2 | 3.25 | 3.1 |
| SS | 8.8 | 12.4 | 7.- |
| Hermann Brandel | 30.- | 65.- | 25.- |
| Roges | 3.85 | -.7 | 2.95 |
| RM fuer Bewaffnung u. Munition | 3.6 | 2.25 | -- |
| Grossmarkentenderei Paris | 4.3 | 5.35 | 9.7 |
| Interkommerziale | 3.95 | 5.3 | 2.5 |
| Devisenschutzkommando Frankreich | -.75 | -.15 | -- |
| Deutsche Botschaft | -.25 | 1.4 | -.5 |
| Sonderstab HWK | -.45 | -.05 | 2.1 |
| Marine | 6.- | 4.85 | 5.45 |
| General der Luftwaffe | 1.6 | 1.55 | 1.3 |
| Heereshauptkasse | 3.95 | 3.75 | 2.3 |
| Aero-Bank | 3.8 | 5.95 | 13.2 |
| Hauptverkehrsdirektion | 1.15 | -.8 | 1.- |
| Luftgaukommando Westfrankreich | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.95 |
| Sonstige (Miscellaneous) | 62.73 | 55.57 | 90.93 |
| Total Cash Expenditures in Millions RM | 153.48 | 183.47 | 183.68 |

Note. According to Wilz, Hermann Brandel was engaged in purchases of paintings and other objects of art. Grossmarketenderei, Paris, is the equivalent of our PX supply. Interkommerziale was presumably an agency of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. Aero-Bank was Goering's bank in France.

From Reichsminister for Economic Affairs, Berlin, 19 May 1943 to Devisenstelle, Berlin, concerning the making available of funds for the establishment of recreation homes for soldiers [Soldatenheime] in France by the Nazi Party: I request that, effective immediately, the permit issued to the German Labor Front NS-Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch Fruede" by virtue of my E E of 20 August 1941—V Dev. 8B/24580/45 for the required French funds from occupation costs for the establishment and maintenance of soldiers' recreation homes in France be withdrawn immediately. Should the agencies of the Nazi Party or its affiliates request in the future further funds in France for the purposes stated above, the respective requests for transfers should be submitted to me each time through the Reich Treasurer of the Nazi Party in Munich. [P.27]

Copy of a draft of a letter to the Foreign Office (not dated) concerning occupation costs in France. This letter contains a statement showing expenditures and receipts up to the end of 1943. According to this statement, the estimated balance on 31 December 1943 was 108 million RM.

The letter then goes on to say that the Armistice Delegation would, therefore, welcome all measures intended to effect the greatest economy in the administration of occupation costs. The Chief Pay Master, [Der Leitende Intendant] of the Military Command in France, is even now endeavoring to channel in the future certain payments to the Wehrmacht, which were made heretofore from occupation costs funds, through the German-French clearing account, so far as such transfers actually represent exports from France to Germany and for which corresponding documents are submitted to the competent French agency (Office des Changes). This concerns primarily exports of agricultural products to Germany. The Delegation has no objection to such an arrangement. However, it is impossible to obtain the consent of the French Government to a supplementary global payment through the clearing account, unless the necessary supporting documents are submitted. It is difficult to obtain the approval of the French Government for such an arrangement, es-

pecially in view of the fact that the French Government had agreed on March 1943 to pay 510 million RM in occupation costs for the period 11/11 to 31 December 1942. Moreover, the balance in favor of France in the German-French clearing had already increased to approximately 3.5 billion RM. In this connection, it is pointed out that the first billion of indebtedness was reached in approximately 15 months, the second billion after 7 months, and the third billion after 5 months.

With regard to purchases on the Black Market, attention is called to the decree of the Reich Marshall of the Greater German Reich—deputy for the *Four-Year Plan*—of 2.4.1943. As already pointed out, 150 million RM were made available from occupation costs until the end of June 1943 as the remaining payment for Black Market purchases. (S-Kaeufe). The document concludes with the statement that, unless something unforeseen happens, it may be assumed that receipts and expenditures of occupation costs would balance by the end of 1943. However, steps should be taken to ensure that the remaining occupation costs balances are not completely exhausted by the end of the year. [P.28] In order to attain this, the following recommendations are made:

1. Greatest economy in the administration of occupation costs.
2. To make payment so far as possible for legal exports from France to Germany, which heretofore were paid from occupation funds, through the clearing.
3. Occupation costs should not be made available for Black Market purchases after 30 June 1943.
4. Effective restrictions on the illegal exports of RKK monies from Germany to France.

From Chief Pay Master [Intendant] of the Military Commander in France, Paris, 24 April 1943, to Reichskreditkasse in Paris to the effect that, on the initiative of the Reichsminister of Finance and in order to simplify procedure, "Subaccount BR" of occupation costs "Account B" should be discontinued after 1 April 1943. Inasmuch as entries in this account had already been made in April, the dissolution is possible only from 1 May 1943. It is therefore requested not to make any more entries in Account BR after 30 April 1943.

From Supreme Army Command, dated H.Qu. OKH 14 April 1943, to Chief Pay Master of the German Army in France. The Reichskreditkasse in Paris has been instructed by the Chief Army Pay Master to transfer its funds booked under "Sub-account BR" to the occupation costs "Account B" and to terminate "Account BR" effective 31 March 1943.

From Reichskreditkasse, Paris, marked *Confidential*, to Chief Pay Master of the German Armies in France, dated 12 March 1943, supplying the following information:

| | Million RM | | |
|---|---------------|------|-------|
| <i>Total cash expenditures in February 1943</i> | 382.4 | | |
| Organization Todt | 30.5 | | |
| National Socialist Motor Corps Todt | 4.7 | | |
| SS | 44.5 | | |
| Hermann Brandel | 122.7 | | |
| Roges | 23.3 | | |
| Reich Ministry for Armaments and Munition | 23.0 | | |
| Interkommerziale | 7.0 | | |
| Devisenschutzkommando | 1.7 | | |
| Sonderstab HWK | 0.7 | | |
| German Embassy | 0.8 | | |
| | 258.9 [P. 29] | | |
| Navy | 15.4 | | |
| General of the Air Force | 2.2 | | |
| Air Force Gau.W. France | 3.6 | | |
| Army Transfer | 4.0 | | |
| Withdrawals for Tunis | 25.0 | 50.2 | 309.1 |
| Remainder for payments to other Government agencies and for private purposes (Private). | 73.3 | | |

Memorandum for the files marked *Confidential*, dated Paris 5 February 1943, signed Muerdel, a director of the Reichsbank: The German Armistice Delegation (Reichsbank Director Hart-

lieb) advises me by telephone that the French Minister of Finance in a conversation with Minister Hemmen, head of the German Armistice Delegation, today complained about the high amounts of cash withdrawals by the Reichskreditkasse in Paris from the Bank of France. Such large cash withdrawals would make impossible all French efforts to stabilize the currency as well as to place the finances of the French State on sound basis. I have submitted the following data showing the amounts paid out in cash during January 1943.

In all, our bank paid out that month in cash 440 million RM distributed as follows:

| | In million RM | | |
|---|---------------|-------|-------------|
| Organization Todt | 27.0 | | |
| SS | 62.0 | | |
| Hermann Brandel | 35.0 | | |
| "Roges" | 135.0 | | |
| Reichs Ministry for Armaments and Munitions | 10.5 | | |
| Intercommerciale (This account is fed by G.B.K.) | 15.5 | | |
| Devisenschutzkommando | 3.0 | | |
| Sonderstab H W K | 3.0 | | |
| German Embassy | 1.0 | 292.0 | |
| | | <hr/> | |
| | | 292.0 | 440.0 |
| Navy | 10.0 | | |
| General of the Air Forces | 7.2 | | |
| Air Force Gau West France | 2.3 | | |
| Main Army Bank | 5.0 | | |
| Field Bank of the Military Commander | 2.5 | | |
| Withdrawals for Tunis | 60.0 | 87.0 | 379.0 |
| | | <hr/> | |
| Remainder for all other payments to Government agencies and to private firms and individuals (Private). | | | <u>61.0</u> |

From these figures it was inferred, and Dr. Hollwich, the Chief Paymaster agreed, that approximately 300 million RM were required for purchases in the Black Markets and that only the balance of 140 million RM was needed for normal Army requirements. [P. 30]

| Occupation Costs France A | | | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|--|--------------------------|
| Date | Receipts | | Withdrawals | | Surrendered RKK Notes |
| | | Transfers To subaccounts | | | |
| 1940 | 1,140,000,000.00 | A I | 250,000,000.00 | | |
| | | A II | 25,000,000.00 | | |
| | | A III | 1,500,000.00 | | |
| | | A IV | 5,000,000.00 | | |
| 1941 | — | A I | 45,000,000.00 | | 635,985,580.00 |
| | | A V | 19,000,000.00 | | |
| | | A VI | 901,846.00 | | |
| | | A VII | 1,285,000.00 | | |
| | | A VIII | 5,000,000.00 | | |
| | | A IX | 65,000,000.00 | | |
| 1942 | — | | — | | — |
| 1943 | — | A I | 15,000,000.00 | | |
| | | A II | 25,000,000.00 | | |
| | | A VIII | 3,500,000.00 | | |
| | | A X | 1,000,000.00 | | |
| | 1,140,000,000.00 | | 463,186,846.00 | | 635,985,580.00 |
| | | | | | 463,186,846.00 |
| | | | | | 1,099,172,426.00 |

[Note. In this space appears a penciled notation to the effect that the balance on hand at the end of 1943 was 40,827,574]

| Occupation Costs France A I | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------|------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|--|
| Date | From | Receipts | | Withdrawals | |
| | | Transfers | Reentries (Payments not made) | Payments | |
| 1940 | A | 250,000,000.00 | — | 70,343,285.31 | |
| 1941 | B | 85,000,000.00 | 17,920,773.23 | 191,605,992.31 | |
| 1942 | A | 45,000,000.00 | | | |
| 1942 | B | 1,150,000,000.00 | 27,702,249.27 | 1,190,516,911.04 | |
| 1943 | A | 15,000,000.00 | 2,897,095.05 | 114,193,353.38 | |
| | | 1,545,000,000.00 | 48,520,117.55 | 1,566,659,542.04 | |

| Date | Occupation Costs France A II | | Occupation Costs France A III | |
|------|------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|--------------|
| | Receipts | Withdrawals | Receipts | Withdrawals |
| 1940 | Transfers from A | Payments | Transfers from A | Payments |
| 1940 | 25,000,000.00 | 5,000,000.00 | 1,500,000.00 | |
| 1941 | | 12,000,000.00 | | 1,500,000.00 |
| 1942 | | 8,000,000.00 | | |
| 1943 | 25,000,000.00 | 2,000,000.00 | | |
| | 50,000,000.00 | 27,000,000.00 | 1,500,000.00 | 1,500,000.00 |

[P.31]

3615-PS

| Date | Occupation Costs France A IV | | Occupation Costs France A V | |
|------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Receipts Transfers | Withdrawals Payments | Receipts Transfers | Withdrawals Payments |
| 1940 | 5,000,000.00 | | | |
| 1941 | | 2,083,616.95 | 19,000,000.00 | 19,000,000.00 |
| 1942 | | 230,000.00 | | |
| 1943 | | 180,000.00 | | |
| | 5,000,000.00 | 2,493,616.95 | 19,000,000.00 | 19,000,000.00 |

Occupation Costs France B

Receipts

| Date | a. Occupation Costs Payments by the French Government. | | Repayments Army Ordnance and Supply |
|------|---|-------------------|--|
| | b. Transfers from A VIII. | | |
| 1940 | a. | 2,860,000,000.00 | |
| 1941 | a. | 6,075,000,000.00 | |
| | b. | 5,000,000.00 | 5,652,431.44 |
| 1942 | a. | 5,475,000,000.00 | 61,980,840.44 |
| 1943 | a. | 9,698,300,000.00 | |
| | b. | 3,500,000.00 | |
| | | 24,116,800,000.00 | 67,633,271.88 |

Withdrawals

| Date | Wehrmacht Withdrawals | Transfers to A I | RKK Notes Surrendered by | | Other Payments | Balance |
|------|--------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------------|------------------|
| | | | the Bank of France | | | |
| 1940 | 927,267,440.21 | | | | 1,392,185.25 | 1,931,340,374.54 |
| 1941 | 4,639,433,618.38 | 85,000,000.00 | 203,869,480.00 | | 13,038,007.37 | 3,075,651,700.23 |
| 1942 | 6,668,099,821.89 | 1,150,000,000.00 | 448,790,000.00 | | | 345,742,718.78 |
| 1943 | 8,269,014,329.16* | | 1,193,081,692.50 | | | 585,446,697.12 |
| | 20,503,815,209.64 | 1,235,000,000.00 | 1,845,741,172.50 | | 14,430,192.62 | |

Balances

| Date | Acct. A | Acct. A I | Acct. A II | Acct. A IV | Acct. B | Totals |
|--------|------------|---------------|------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|
| End of | | | | | | |
| 1943 | 40,827,574 | 26,860,575.51 | 23,000,000 | 2,506,383.05 | 585,446,697.12 | 678,641,229.68 |

*Including RM 69,468,582.53 for redeemed requisition receipts.

[P.32]

| Occupation Costs France A Withdrawals a. transferred to Sub-Ac- counts | | | Occupation Costs France A I (For Purposes of the ReichsMinister for Economic Affairs.) | | | |
|--|---------------|-----------------------------|--|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------|
| Date | Receipts | b. Surrendered RKK Notes | Balance | From | | Balance |
| | | | | Receipts Transfers | Withdrawals Payments | |
| 1940 | 1,140,000,000 | a. 281,500,000 | \$58,500,000 | A 250,000,000 | 70,343,285.31 | 179,656,714.60 |
| 1941 | — | a. 137,186,846 | | B 85,000,000 | | |
| 1941 | — | b. 635,065,580 | 85,327,574 | A 45,000,000 | 173,685,219.08 | 135,971,495.61 |
| 1942 | — | — | 85,327,574 | B 1,160,000,000 | 1,162,814,661.77 | 123,156,833.84 |
| 1943 | — | a. 44,500,000 | | A 15,000,000 | 111,296,258.33 | 26,800,575.51 |
| | 1,140,000,000 | 1,069,172,426 | " | 1,545,000,000 | 1,518,139,424.49 | " |

**Occupation Costs France A II
(For Purposes of the Foreign Office)**

| Date | Receipts | | Withdrawals | | Balance |
|------|------------|--------|-------------|--|------------|
| | Transfers | From A | Payments | | |
| 1940 | 25,000,000 | | 5,000,000 | | 20,000,000 |
| 1941 | | | 12,000,000 | | 8,000,000 |
| 1942 | | | 8,000,000 | | |
| 1943 | 25,000,000 | | 2,000,000 | | 23,000,000 |
| | 50,000,000 | | 27,000,000 | | " |

**Occupation Costs France A IV
(For Purposes of the ReichsMinister for Transportation,
Purchase of Securities)**

| Date | Receipts | | Withdrawals | | Balance |
|------|-----------|--------|--------------|--|--------------|
| | Transfers | From A | Payments | | |
| 1940 | 5,000,000 | | | | 5,000,000.00 |
| 1941 | | | 2,083,616.95 | | 2,916,383.05 |
| 1942 | | | 230,000.00 | | 2,686,383.05 |
| 1943 | | | 180,000.00 | | 2,506,838.05 |
| | 5,000,000 | | 2,493,616.95 | | " |

In addition, the following payments were made

| | | |
|---------------|---|-------------|
| Account A III | Support for Dependents of Laborers Re- cruited in France for Work in Germany | RM1,500,000 |
| Account A V | For Purposes of the Foreign Agency, Paris, of the Reichstierstelle (Reich Agency for Animals) | 19,000,000 |
| Account A VI | Exchange by the Bank of France of Reichsbank notes for Persons Evacu- ated from Lorraine | 901,846 |
| Account A VII | Financing the Purchase of Raw Sugar in North France | 1,285,000 |

3615-PS

| | | |
|----------------|---|---------------|
| Account A VIII | Compensation for War Damage to German Citizens and Racial-Germans in France | 8,500,000 |
| Account A IX | Sale of Ffrs. to the Reich | 66,000,000 |
| Account A X | For Purposes of the ReichsMinistry of Education | 1,000,000 |
| | | RM 98,186,846 |
| | | [P.33] |

Occupation Costs France B
Receipts

| Date | Occupation costs Payments | from A VIII Transfers | Repayments |
|------|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | | | Wehrmacht Ord- nance & Supply |
| 1940 | 2,860,000,000 | | |
| 1941 | 6,075,000,000 | 5,000,000 | 5,652,431.44 |
| 1942 | 5,475,000,000 | | 61,980,840.44 |
| 1943 | 9,698,300,000 | 3,500,000 | |
| | 24,108,300,000 | 8,500,000 | 67,633,271.88 |

Withdrawals

| Date | Wehrmacht | Transfers | | Payments |
|------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|
| | Withdrawals | to A I | RKK Notes | |
| 1940 | 927,267,440.21 | | | 1,392,185.25 |
| 1941 | 4,639,433,618.38 | 85,000,000.00 | 203,869,480.00 | 13,038,007.37 |
| 1942 | 6,668,099,821.89 | 1,150,000,000.00 | 448,790,000.00 | |
| 1943 | 8,199,545,746.63 | 69,468,582.53 | 1,193,081,692.50 | |
| | 20,434,346,627.11 | 1,304,468,582.53 | 1,845,741,172.50 | 14,430,192.62 |

| Occupation costs France A VI | | | Occupation costs France A VII | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| Date | Receipts | Withdrawals | Date | Receipts | Withdrawals |
| | Transfers from "A" | Payments | | Transfers from A | Payments |
| 1940 | | | 1940 | | |
| 1941 | 901,846 | 901,846 | 1941 | 1,285,000 | 1,285,000 |
| 1942 | | | 1942 | | |
| 1943 | | | 1943 | | |
| | 901,846 | 901,846 | | 1,285,000 | 1,285,000 |

| Date | Occupation costs France A VIII | | Occupation costs France A IX | |
|------|--------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Receipts | Withdrawals | Receipts | Withdrawals |
| | Transfers from "A" | Transfers to "B" | Transfers from "A" | Ffrs. for Alsace-Lorraine |
| 1940 | | | | |
| 1941 | 5,000,000 | 5,000,000 | 66,000,000 | 66,000,000 |
| 1942 | | | | |
| 1943 | 3,500,000 | 3,500,000 | | |
| | 8,500,000 | 8,500,000 | 66,000,000 | 66,000,000 |

| Date | Occupation costs France A X | | Occupation costs France BR | |
|------|-----------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | Receipts | Withdrawals | Receipts | Withdrawals |
| | Transfers from A | Payments | Transfers from B | Surrendered Requisition Certificate |
| 1940 | | | | |
| 1941 | | | | 7,154,161.68 |
| 1942 | | | | 45,209,249.03 |
| 1943 | 1,000,000 | 1,000,000 | 69,468,582.53 | 17,105,171.82 |
| | 1,000,000 | 1,000,000 | 69,468,582.53 | 69,468,582.53 |

[P.34]

Note. This volume contains also a table similar to the foregoing showing the entries in these accounts for the period December 1940 to December 1942.

Letter from Reichskreditkasse, Brussels, 2 February 1943, concerning circulation of RKK Notes on the English Channel Islands. This letter refers to Reich Director Cassar as the Bank Commissioner in charge of enemy banks, Paris.

From Treibacker Chemische Werke, Vienna, to Warenhandels-gesellschaft in Berlin, dated 8 January 1943. According to this letter, the Vienna firm was authorized by the Devisenstelle in Vienna by virtue of a separate decree of the Reichs Minister for Economic Affairs of 5 September 1942 (V Dev.27138/42) to purchase 11,800 shares of the Societe Miniere & Industrielle Franco Bresillienne, Paris, with nominal value of 1,180,000 ffrs. from the firm "Comira" Compagnie des Minerals et Meteaux rares i.L. Coubevois (Seine) through Compagnie Financiere d'Industrie et de Commerce (Cofinco)—Monte Carlo. The firm in Vienna was authorized to transfer up to 1,800,000 ffrs. to the last-named firm through "Account No. 742" of the Warenhandelgesellschaft, Berlin, maintained at the Reichsbank in Berlin.

The letter then goes on to state: Since our representative in Paris, Dr. G. Schmilinsky, of the firm Th. Goldschmidt A.G., 65

Avenue des Champs Elysees, Paris, has requested us to make the above amount available at the Reichskreditkasse in Paris, to enable him to make payment for the shares at the auction sale immediately, we request that you take steps to transfer this amount to the Reichskreditkasse in Paris in favor of Dr. Schmilinsky as soon as you receive notice that the amount was paid in at this end.

Memorandum for the files concerning complaints by Dr. Hollwich. The memorandum is dated Paris 10 December 1942 and was signed by Muerdel, Director of the Reichsbank.

Dr. Hollwich was concerned over the large transfers by Wehrmacht agencies to Germany. He said that was his intention to prohibit such transfers by the Navy and Air Force and to instruct them to make such payments to Germany, as was being done by the Army, through official banking agencies [P.35] domiciled in the Reich. In this manner, occupation costs funds would be saved and corresponding amounts in French francs would remain. When Muerdel pointed out that the amounts in ffrs. would remain in France also, if the old procedure were followed, he agreed. However, he pointed out that in that case, these amounts would enable the Reichs Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Devisenstellen to approve payments to France for purposes not related to the occupation costs [besatzungskostenfremde Zwecke]. He wished to prevent this at least to the extent that the francs in question accrued from payments by Wehrmacht agencies to the Reichskreditkasse. He was of the opinion that a way must be found whereby amounts in ffrs. from such transfers were again placed at his disposal, as he desired under all circumstances that the Reichs Ministry for Economic Affairs or other agencies should not have disposal over such funds without his approval.

Letter from the French Minister of Finance to the German Military Commander in France dated 9 November 1942: I have been informed that on 6 November the occupation authorities withdrew from the account set up for the Reichskreditkasse at the French Bank of Issue cash in the amount of 2,875,000,000 francs. This withdrawal—the largest up to now—constitutes a link in a chain of similar transactions the extent and frequency of which I must call to your attention. The total amount in cash withdrawn by the Military Administration, which fluctuated since

September 1940 between 4 and 5 billion monthly, has risen suddenly since May 1942 to 6,778,000,000 francs and in the last months soared to 8 billion and even more. The steadily increasing withdrawals in cash from occupation accounts do not seem to be justified by any difficulty in transferring the required amounts by other than cash payments * * * The wide distribution of the notes, as the result of such withdrawals as well as of the difficulty of watching over their utilization and of ensuring their return to the bank and to the Treasury within a short period of time, constitute a serious threat to the orderly operation of the entire monetary system. This danger would become especially great if—as is to be feared—the notes withdrawn from the Bank as occupation costs were taken abroad. The Bank of Issue has had occasion to obtain confirmation from the main Administration of the Reichskreditkasse itself that certain amounts in notes were channeled to Brussels and even to Berlin. [P.36]

From Reichskreditkasse, Paris, to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, 19 November 1942: Attached we transmit a copy of a note by the French Ministry of Finance to the Chief Military Administration in France. Our attention was called to this note through the fact that the Military Commander asked orally for an explanation for whom and for what purposes the large amounts in cash are necessary.

We explained that the constantly increasing monthly withdrawals were conditioned by cash withdrawals by Roges and a few other official agencies which were engaged in purchases on the so-called Black Market.

In October our bank paid out 318 million RM distributed as follows:

| | |
|--|----------------|
| 1. Roges, approximately, | 150 million RM |
| 2. Reichsfuehrer, SS, and Chief of the German Police Special Account, approximately, | 30 million RM |
| 3. Hermann Brandel, approximately, (Org.Otto—See our report of 16.6.42) | 20 million RM |
| 4. ReichsMinister for Armaments, Munitions (Special Account) | 13 million RM |
| | <hr/> |
| | 213 million RM |

For all other agencies of the Wehrmacht
authorities and private account owners 105 million RM

Memorandum for the files dated 28 October 1942 showing that correspondence relative to the transfer on the books of 100 million RM from "Occupation Costs Account B" to "Account A I" for Roges was filed under II-40A.

A similar memorandum for another transfer on the books of 100 million RM, on the behalf of Roges in the same file is dated 9 October 1942.

Memorandum for the files dated 9 September 1942 showing that 200 million RM were transferred for Roges from "Occupation Costs Account B" to "Account A I". A record of this transaction was filed under II-40 A. [P. 37]

Memorandum for the files dated 25 August 1942 showing that 40 million RM were transferred for purchases by Roges from "Occupation Costs Account B" to "Account A I". A record for this transaction was also filed under II-40 A.

Memorandum for the files dated 22 August 1942 showing that 60 million RM were transferred for purchases by Roges from "Occupation Costs Account B" to "Account A I."

Memorandum for the files dated Berlin 17 October (no year given) signed by Reichsbankoberinspector (signature illegible): The Supreme Army Command (OKW) is agreed that the Reichs-Minister of Finance should dispose of an amount in francs reserved for the OKW in "Account A" which at present is as follows: 200 million RM less 1,500,000 RM set aside for payments to dependents, leaving a balance of RM 198,500,000. In this connection, it is assumed that in the event of unexpected need, the ReichsMinister of Finance will again make available to the OKW any remaining amounts in francs in "Account A." [P. 38]

Transfers from France in June 1942 in Excess of 50.000 RM

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|---|---|
| Bordeaux | 55.103... | Daqua, Danneberg & Quandt, Berlin- Lichtenberg | Kriegsmarinedienst- stelle Bordeaux |
| Bordeaux | 136.222.32 | Zentralkasse Bayer- ische Volksbank e.G.m.b.H., Muen- chen | Kriegsmarinedienst- stelle Bordeaux |
| Bordeaux | 240.000... | Deutsche Bank, Koblenz, for Strassenbau, A.G. | Dienststelle Feldpost Nr. L 05 207 |
| Bordeaux | 71.513.20 | Kreissparkasse Heilbronn f. Gebr. Keitel | Gebr. Keitel, Cognac- Neckarsulm |
| Lille | 191.741.01 | Commerzbank, Berlin, f. Gottlieb Tesch GmbH., Berlin | Deinststelle L 31859 LgPa. Bruessel |
| Lille | 120.589.88 | Commerzbank, Berlin, f. Gottlieb Tesch GmbH., Berlin | Deinststelle L 31859 LgPa. Bruessel |
| Lille | 70.000... | Vereinsbank Muel- heim-Ruhr f. Her- mann Dohrmann, Muehlheim | Marine-Standortkasse Lumbres |
| Lille | 90.000... | Deutsche Bank, Berlin | Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ri-Dri-Ma-Mue |
| Nancy | 148.585.24 | Beuchelt & Cie., Abt. Beton u. Tiefbau, Berlin-Friedenau | Eisenbahnbetriebs direktion, Amts- kasse, Nancy |
| Nantes | 64.852.10 | Deutsche Bank, Ham- burg, for Andersen & Cie., Hamburg | Marine-Standortkasse Lorient |
| Nantes | 200.000... | Unger, Breslau | Marine-Standortkasse Lorient |
| Nantes | 59.109.33 | Deutsche Bank, Frank- furt/M. f. Vesper E. Lorenz | Marine-Standortkasse Lorient |
| Paris | 150.000... | E. Berger Tiefbau A.G., Berlin | I. Berger Tiefbau AG. |
| Paris | 59.814.82 | Conrad Gilderbrandt, Frankfurt/M. | Marine-Standortverw |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|---|--|
| Paris | 150.000... | Carl Brandt, Dueren | Carl Brandt, Bruyere |
| Paris | 117.538.39 | Hauptzollamt Muenchen | Grossmarketenderei Luftflottenkom- mando |
| Paris | 130.000... | I. C. Pflueger & Co., Bremen | I. C. Pflueger & Co. Paris |
| Paris | 100.000... | Voemel & Co. KG., Dortmund | Voemel & Co. KG. Dortmund |
| Paris | 270.000... | I. C. Pflueger & Co., Bremen | I. C. Pflueger & Co. Paris |
| | | [p. 39] | |
| Paris | 80.270.48 | Goerlitzer Eisenhandel u. Verzinkerei GmbH., Goerlitz | Marine-Standortverw Paris |
| Paris | 85.000... | Jurid Vertriebs GmbH., Coswig | Jurid Vertriebs GmbH., Paris |
| Paris | 1.000.000... | Luftgaukommando Westfrankreich Wiesbaden | Luftgaukommando Westfrankreich |
| Paris | 260.000... | Faber-Niemann & Co. Bremen | Faber-Niemann & Co. Paris |
| Paris | 96.276.43 | Staatstheaterkasse, Berlin | Deutsches Institut, Paris |
| Paris | 221.502.18 | Deutsche Bank, Straßburg | Kurt Eichel, Paris |
| Paris | 100.000... | Carl Brandt, Dueren | Carl Brandt, Bruyeres |
| Paris | 1.000.000... | Luftgaukommando Westfrankreich, Wiesbaden | Luftgaukommando Westfrankreich |
| Paris | 200.000... | Gebhard Hinteregger, Bregenz | Gebhard Hinteregger Paris |
| Paris | 54.349.75 | L. Spoerle, Frank- furt/Main | Marine Standortverw - Paris |
| Paris | 90.000... | Amtskasse des Ober- kommandos der Wehrmacht, Berlin | Siemens France AG, Paris |
| Paris | 53.000... | Faber-Niemann & Co., Bremen | Faber-Niemann & Co. Paris |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|---|---|
| Paris | 50.450... | Reichsbank Berlin- Devisenabteilung | Reichskreditkasse Paris |
| Paris | 57.500... | Luxemburger Baumaterialien | Marine Standortverw Paris |
| Reims | 300.000... | Dipl. Ing. Hermann Moll, Reims | Bauunternehmung Bernh. Moll, Muen- chen thru Bankhaus Merckh Fink & Co., Muenchen |
| Rennes | 100.000... | Bank der Dt. Arbeit. W. Elberfeld, z.G. Philipp Epple, W.- Elberfeld Kloeckner & Co., Duisberg | Philipp Epple |
| Rennes | 51.901.18 | | Marinestandortkasse Brest |
| Rennes | 134.566.35 | Deutsche Bank, Ko- blenz z.G. Strassen- bau AG., Berlin- Friedenau Braun- schweigische Staats- bank, Blankenburg, z.G. Kurt Eiser- mann, Thale Dresd- ner Bank, Berlin, for Polensky & Zoellner, M.A.N. Maschinenfabrik, Nurnberg | L 31713, Lgpa. Paris |
| Rennes | 51.961.39 | | Marinestandortkasse Brest |
| Rennes | 300.000... | | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rennes | 61.039.44 | | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| | 6.772.886.49 | | [p. 40] |

Transfers from France in July 1942 in Excess of 50.000 RM

| | | | |
|----------|------------|--|------------------------------------|
| Bordeaux | 250.000... | Bankhaus Merck, Finck & Co., Muen- chen, F. Leonhard Moll | Hermann Moll, Bordeaux-Muenchen |
| Bordeaux | 108.000... | Kto. 64/82 Reichsbk. Nurnberg | Kriegsmarinewerft, Bordeaux |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|---|--|
| Bordeaux | 300.000... | Strassenbau AG., Bln.-Friedenau | Dienststelle L 05207. |
| Lille | 165.000... | Julius Berger AG., Bln.-Grunewald | Marinestandortkasse Lumbres. |
| Lille | 78.258.34 | Fleischwarenfabrik Karl Schrader, Hamburg | Marinestandortkasse Lumbres. |
| Lille | 60.000... | Duerener Bank for Hermann Bock, Dueren | Marinestandortkasse Lumbres. |
| Lille | 100.000... | Heereskleiderkasse Berlin | Heereskleiderkasse Lille. |
| Lille | 153.522.33 | Centralkasse Bayer. Volksbanken, Muen- chen, for Emil & Erich Mueller, Nurnberg | Marinestandortkasse Lumbres. |
| Lille | 127.249.78 | A.E.G., Berlin | Marinestandortkasse Lumbres. |
| Nantes | 308.192.58 | Deutsche Schiffsmas- chinenbau AG. Werk AG. "Weser", Bremen | Marinestandortkasse La Rochelle, Stand- ortverwaltung. |
| Nantes | 135.888.74 | Deutsche Schiffsmas- chinenbau AG. Werk AG. "Weser", Bremen | Marinestandortkasse La Rochelle, Stand- ortverwaltung. |
| Nantes | 95.000... | Postscheckkonto Nurnberg 3900 M.A.N. | Marinestandortkasse La Rochelle, Stand- ortverwaltung. |
| Paris | 66.917.09 | Treuverkehr Dt. Treu- hand Ag., Berlin | Treuverkehr, Dt. Treu- hand AG., Paris. |
| Paris | 170.000... | Carl Brandt, Bauun- ternehmung, Dueren | Carl Brandt, Bruyeres. |
| Paris | 90.000... | E. Haack, Berlin- Lichtenberg | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 250.000... | Philipp Holzmann AG., Frankfurt/ Main | Philipp Holzmann AG Paris. |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|---|--|
| Paris | 217.858.55 | Deutsches Propa- ganda-Atelier GmbH. AG., Berlin- Lichterfelde | Deutsche Ausstellung Paris 1942 Bauburo, Rueckueberweisun- gen, w/Abbruch der geplanten Ausstel- lung |
| Paris | 70.965.25 | Andersen & Co., Hamburg | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 1.000.000... | Luftgaukommando Westfr. Wiesbaden [p. 41] | Luftgaukommando Westfr. Amtskasse. |
| Paris | 75.595.99 | Bauhag Wilhelms- haven | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 80.000... | Bauuntern. Herm. Behrens, Nurnberg | Hermann Behrens Paris |
| Paris | 100.000... | Dt. Zentralgenossen- schaftskasse, Strassburg | Soc.Gen.Commerciale de l'Est, Paris |
| Paris | 151.591.43 | Dt. Zentralgenossen- schaftskasse, Strassburg | Kurt Eichel, Paris |
| Paris | 53.169.15 | Dresdner Bank | Kurt Eichel, Paris |
| Paris | 64.133.50 | Dresdner Bank, Ber- lin, for Sudeten- quell | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 250.000... | Philipp Holzmann AG., Frankfurt/ Main | Philipp Holzman AG. Paris |
| Paris | 1.000.000... | Luftgaukommando Westfr. Wiesbaden | Luftgaukommando West-Frankreich |
| Paris | 51.680.38 | Inh. Fischer & Cie., Duesseldorf | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 267.590.80 | E. Hoyer & Cie. KG., Berlin | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 303.890... | E. Hoyer & Cie. KG., Berlin | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 138.179.28 | Bauhag Baustoff AG., Wilhelmshaven | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 80.939.68 | Conrad Hildebrand, Frankfurt/Main | Marinestandortverw. |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|---|--|
| Paris | 58.468.04 | L. Spoerle KG. Frankfurt/Main | Marinestandortverw. |
| Paris | 170.000... | Zollkasse Bresancon | Oberfinanzkasse Paris |
| Paris | 150.000... | Zollkasse Martean | Oberfinanzkasse Paris |
| Paris | 75.000... | Zollkasse Gex | Oberfinanzkasse Paris |
| Paris | 1.000.000... | Deutsche Golddiskon- tbk. Berlin | RKK.-Rueckueber- weisung |
| Paris | 100.000... | Gebr. Arenz, Bonn | Gebr.Arenz.Stuetzp., Paris |
| Paris | 361.516.21 | Industrie-u. Strassen- bau GmbH., Berlin- Lankwitz | Dienstst. L 34705 LgPa.Bruessel. |
| Paris | 150.000... | Philipp Holzmann AG., Frankfurt/ Main | Philipp Holzmann AG. Paris |
| Paris | 100.000... | Stahlschalung Lucht- erhand KG., Neu- stadt/Weinstr. | Marinestandortverw. |
| Reims | 137.900... | Friedrich Wasser- mann, Koeln- Braunsfeld | Friedrich Wassermann Baubertrieb "Wasser" Amifontaine/Aisne, |
| Rouen | 84.000... | Deutsche Bank, Ham- burg, for Andersen & Co., Hamburg | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre. |
| | | [p. 42] | |
| Rouen | 330.000... | M.A.N. Masch. Fab- rik, Nurnberg | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rouen | 76.276.12 | Friedr. Krupp, AG., Rheinhausen, Uerdingen | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rouen | 89.283.38 | Friedr. Krupp, AG., Rheinhausen, Uerdingen | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rouen | 300.000... | Dresdner Bank, Ber- lin, for Stammhaus Berlin-Charlotten- burg | Polensky & Zoellner, Le Havre |
| Rouen | 100.000... | Dresdner Bank, Ber- lin, for Stammhaus Berlin | Schoettle & Schust AG., Le Havre |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|---------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Rouen | 124.262.82 | Staetische Sparkasse, Nurnberg, for Emil Erich Mueller, Wurstfabrik, Nurnberg | Mainestandortverw. Le Havre |
| | <u>9.770.329.44</u> | | [p. 43] |

Transfers from France in August 1942 in Excess of 50.000 RM

| | | | |
|----------|------------|--|---|
| Bordeaux | 150.000... | Dresdner Bank, Bres- lau, for Ferd. Unger KG. | Ferd.Unger KG., Bordeaux-Breslau |
| Bordeaux | 60.000... | Nassauische Landes- bank, Ruedesheim, F. Valentin Schlotter | Valentin Schlotter, Bordeaux-Ruede- sheim |
| Bordeaux | 70.000... | Nassauische Landes- bank, Ruedesheim, for Valentin Schlot- ter | Valentin Schlotter, Bordeaux-Ruede- sheim |
| Lille | 81.199.40 | Deutsche Bank, Berlin | Arbeitsgemeinschaft, Ri-Dri-Ma-Mue |
| Lille | 60.000... | H. Muehlenbruch, Hannover | H.Muehlenbruck, Lille |
| Lille | 78.400.15 | W. Zimmermann, Malerei u. Glaserei- Grossbetrieb, Nurnberg | Marinestandortkasse, Lumbres |
| Lille | 170.000... | Vereinsbank Hamburg, fuer Firma Asphalt Comp "Hansa" Hamburg 26 | Marinestandortkasse, Lumbres |
| Lille | 238.000... | Dresdner Bank, Berlin, for Julius Berger, Bln.-Grunewald | Marinestandortkasse, Lumbres |
| Lille | 53.018.65 | Stadtsparkasse Gel- senkirchen for Fa. W. Freienstein Nachf. Gelsen- kriehen | Marinestandortkasse, Lumbres |

3615-PS

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|---|--|
| Nancy | 110.230.55 | Beuchelt & Co. Abt. Beton-u. Tiefbau, Berlin-Friedenau | Eisenbahnbetriebsdi- rektion-Amtskasse Nancy |
| Nantes | 66.634.11 | Eichhorn & Cie., Breslau | Marinestandortkasse Lorient, |
| Nantes | 60.061.28 | Commerzbank AG., W.-Barmen for Koester & Adolphs, W. Naechstebreck | Marinestandortkasse Saint-Nazaire |
| Paris | 150.000... | Dt. Zentralgenossen- schaftskasse, Strassburg | Soc.Gen.Commerciale de l'Est, Paris |
| Paris | 70.000... | Bewa Bewachungsge- sellschaft Hilde- brandt, Osnabrueck p. 44] | Marinestandortver- waltung |
| Paris | 88.154.80 | Gebr. Roechling, Eisenhandelsges., Ludwigshafen | Gebr. Roechling Eisen- handelsges. |
| Paris | 125.000... | Kontropa Wien | Kontropa Paris |
| Paris | 154.091.23 | Gerichtskasse Leipzig | Oberfinanzkasse |
| Paris | 100.000... | Gebr. Arenz. Bonn | Gebr.Arenz., Paris |
| Paris | 211.420.32 | Deutsche Bank, Strass- burg | Kurt Eichel |
| Paris | 75.000... | Fritz Zervos, Koeln | Fritz Zervos, Paris |
| Paris | 100.000... | Karl Brandt, Dueren | Karl Brandt, Bruy |
| Paris | 76.007.89 | Krupp-Eisenhandel, Essen-R. | Marinestandortverw. Paris |
| Paris | 241.977... | E. Hoyer & Cie. Komm-Ges. Berlin | Marinestandortverw. Paris |
| Paris | 169.450... | Franz Brehme, Walsrode i.H. | Marinestandortverw. Paris |
| Paris | 70.200... | Mechan, Spinnerei u. Weberei Hermann Biederlack & Co., Greven | Marinestandortverw. Paris |
| Paris | 53.212.08 | Otto Ulrich Tuch- fabrik, Werdau/Sa. | Marinestandortverw. Paris |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|--------------|--|--|
| Paris | 100.000... | Gebr. Arenz, Bonn | Gebr. Arenz, Paris |
| Paris | 54.000... | Verkaufsabt. d. Luft- waffe, Berlin | Verkaufsabt. d. Luft- waffe, Zweigst. Paris |
| Paris | 170.000... | Befehlsstelle d. Zoll- grenzschutzes (Zollk.) Besancon | Gebr. Arenz, Paris Verkaufsabt. d. Luft- waffe, Zweigst. Paris |
| Paris | 80.000... | Befehlsstelle d. Zoll- grenzschutzes (Zollk.) Gex. | Gebr. Arenz, Paris Verkaufsabt. d. Luft- waffe, Zweigst. Paris |
| Paris | 140.000... | Befehlsstelle d. Zoll- grenzschutzes (Zollk.) Morteau | Gebr. Arenz, Paris Verkaufsabt. d. Luft- waffe, Zweigst. Paris |
| Paris | 131.904.12 | Deutscher Zementver- band, Metz | Marinestandortver- waltung, Paris |
| Paris | 157.409.63 | Bauhag, Wilhelms- haven | Marinestandortver- waltung, Paris |
| Reims | 80.000... | Friedrich Wasser- mann, Koeln- Braunsfeld | Friedrich Wassermann Bau-Betrieb "Was- ser" Amifontaine (Aisne) |
| Rennes | 57.207.05 | Dt. Effekten-u. Wech- selbank Frankfurt/ Main, for Konrad Hildebrand, Frank- furt/Main | L 17 523 Lgpa. Paris |
| Rouen | 50.786.80 | Old. Landesbank AG., Wilhelmshaven, f. Karl Lonecke, Zetel | Amstkasse L 07201 |
| Rouen | 300.000... | Dresdner Bank, Berlin, for Stammhaus Berlin | Polensky & Zoellner, Le Havre |
| | | [p. 45] | |
| Rouen | 560.000... | M.A.N. Masch. Fabrik, Nurnberg | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rouen | 133.000... | M.A.N. Masch. Fabrik, Augsburg | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rouen | 55.000... | Krupp Stahlbau, Duisburg-Rhein- hausen, Uerdingen | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |

| Reichs- kreditkasse | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|------------------------|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| Rouen | 99.961.23 | Bank d.Dt. Arbeit, Hamburg, f. Dyck- erhof & Widmann AG., Hamburg | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rouen | 72.000... | M.A.N. Masch. Fabrik, Nurnberg | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| Rouen | 140.000... | Krupp Stahlbau Duisburg, Uerdingen | Marinestandortverw. Le Havre |
| | <u>5.263.326.29</u> | | [p. 46] |

Reichskreditkasse

Bordeaux, September 23d, 1942

STATEMENT

of Transfers to the Reich in the Period June—August 1942
of amounts in excess of 50,000 RM

| Date 1942 | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|--------------|--------------|---|--|
| June 2 | 97.384.87 | Reichshauptkasse fuer Heeres stand- ortkasse Metz, Abr. Int. XII Wiesbaden | Armeemarketenderei Bordeaux |
| June 6 | 104.000... | Reichshauptkasse | Feldkasse l.Armee |
| June 9 | 55.103... | Daqua, Danneberg & Quandt, Berlin- Lichtenberg, Post- scheck Berlin Nr. 12299 | Kriegsmarinedienst- stelle Bordeaux |
| June 22 | 249.838.03 | Reichshauptkasse fuer Heeres stand- ortkasse Metz, Abr. Int. XII Wiesbaden | Armeemarketenderei Bordeaux |
| June 22 | 136.222.32 | Zentralkasse Bayer- ische Volksbank eGmbH., Muenchen | Kriegsmarinedienst- stelle Bordeaux |
| June 23 | 90.195.94 | Reichshauptkasse fuer Heeres stand- ortkasse Metz, Abr. Int. XII Wiesbaden | Armeemarketenderei Bordeaux |

| Date 1942 | Amount RM | Recipient | By order of |
|--------------|--------------|---|--|
| June 23 | 240.000... | Deutsche Bank, Koblenz, fuer Strassenbau A.G. | Dienststelle Feldpost-Nr. L 05 207 |
| June 30 | 71.513.20 | Kriessparkasse Heilbronn, for Gebr. Keitel | Firma Gebr.Keitel, Cognac-Nekarsulm |
| July 3 | 50.000... | Deutsche Bank, Dueren, for Carl Brandt | Firma Carl Brandt, Bordeaux-Muenchen. |
| July 11 | 250.000... | Bankhaus Merk, Fink & Co., Muenchen, for Firma Leonhard Moll | Hermann Moll, Bordeaux-Muenchen. |
| July 15 | 50.000... | Commerzbank, Dortmund, for Firma Hans Matzdorff & Co. | Hermann Moll, Bordeaux-Muenchen. |
| July 20 | 395.249.68 | Reichshauptkasse fuer Heeres standortkasse Ulm, Abr. Int. V Stuttgart | Armeemarketenderei Bordeaux |
| July 22 | 108.000... | Konto 64/82 Reichsbank, Nurnberg | Kriegsmarinewerkt, Bx. |
| July 30 | 300.000... | Strassenbau AG. Berlin-Friedenau | Dienststelle L 05207 |
| August 6 | 150.000... | Dresdner Bank, Breslau, for ferd. Unger KG. | Ferd.Unger K.G. Bordeaux-Breslau. |
| August 14 | 60.000... | Nassauische Landesbank, Ruedesheim, for Firma Valentin Schlotter | Valentin Schlotter, Bordeaux-Ruedesheim |
| August 24 | 50.000... | Deutsche Bank Dueren, for Fa. Carl Brandt | Carl Brandt, Bordeaux Dueren. |
| August 25 | 70.000... | Nassau. Landesbk., Ruedesheim, for Valentin Schlotter Reichskreditkasse | Valentin Schlotter, Bordeaux-Ruedesheim |

[p. 47]

BAND IV

Banque de France
Office des Changes
(Besatzungskosten Frankr.)

Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, 9 January 1945 to branch of the Deutsche Bank in Pforzheim. This letter relates to a deposit in French Notes on the basis of confidential decree No. 44 of 27.10.44. The Deutsche Bank was requested to transmit to the Reichsbankstelle in Pforzheim for the account of the Reichskreditkasse 14 million ffrs. deposited by the Army through "Sonderfuehrer" Welz.

Letter from Deutsche Bank, Branch in Pforzheim, dated 28 December 1944 to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, stating that the Army (Feldwirtschaftskommandentur 9 Freiburg, in Brsg.), through Sonderfuehrer Welz, deposited on behalf of the firm Roges, Rohstoff Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. Berlin C 2, 40 million francs in French notes which this bank, in accordance with instructions contained in a letter by Roges dated 18.12.44, was to place at the disposal of the Reichskreditkasse in Berlin.

Telegram from Deputy for the Niederlaendische Bank in Amsterdam to Reichsbank, Berlin, for Reichskreditkasse in Amsterdam, dated 16 December 1944: I request that you open the pouch deposited for my account containing 125 million ffrs, and credit the amount to an account of the Vermoegensverwaltungsund Reten-Anstadt, Amsterdam. At the Reichsbank in Frankfurt I deposited at one time another pouch containing 55,-949,383 ffrs. in notes for my account, I request that you open also this pouch and credit the amount to the account of the Vermoegensverwaltungsund Renten-Anstadt, Amsterdam. I would be grateful if you could credit these amounts prior to 31.12.44.

A similar telegram of the same date contains a request to the Reichskreditkasse in Brussels that it transfer the balance of Belgian francs, 3,125,000 to the Vermoegensverwaltungsund Renten-Anstadt.

Telegram from Reichskreditkasse, Strassburg, 15 November 1944 to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, to the effect that the balance of the Roges firm was at that time 254,801,626 ffrs [P. 48]

Reichskreditkasse, Paris, which had transferred its seat to Nancy and then to Strassburg, dated Strassburg 30 October 1944, to Reichskreditkasse in Berlin to the effect that the Reichsbank branch in Muelhausen received a telegram from the Reichsbank in Berlin requesting it to hold available on behalf of Roges a further 100 million francs in French notes for Feldwirtschaftskommando 9—Muelhausen. The telegram stated that Miss Margot Hoffmann and Oberzahlmeister Dr. Goebbels, each in his own right, could dispose of this amount and that these persons would prove their identity by means of a passport or some other form of identification. The Reichsbank branch in Meulhausen was instructed, in case its supply of French notes was inadequate, to obtain them from the local Reichskreditkasse.

From ReichsMinister for Economic Affairs to Reichsminister of Finance dated 9 October 1944: My intention to recall 50 million ffrs. from the 100 million ffrs. credit granted in 1941 to the Aero Bank, the Paris subsidiary of the Deutschen Luftfahrt A.G. Berlin, in order to transfer it, with your assent, to "Account A I" can no longer be carried out owing to the military events which have taken place in France. The letter which I was to write to the Aero Bank was not sent.

From Reichskreditkasse, Nancy, (formerly Paris) 19 October 1944: As we had already informed Reichsbank Director Wilz today by telephone, the amount of 480 million ffrs. deposited with us will be withdrawn by Herr Weiss in the near future. Herr Weiss asked today Director Kraney of the Roges to cause to be paid in a further sum of 10 million RM. The local branch of Roges still requires these funds. The amounts are to be credited, as heretofore, to the transfer account maintained with us. In compliance with instructions, we transferred back yesterday through the miscellaneous account 220 million ffrs. which we took over from the Reichsbank.

From Reichsbankhauptstelle, Strassburg, dated 18 October 1944 to the Reichsbank (Devisen Section) Berlin: According to the Reichskreditkasse in Paris, Roges G.m.b.H. requires only notes of large denominations. Of such notes, we have available: [P. 49]

16,500,000 ffrs. in 5,000 franc notes
 8,400,000 ffrs. in 1,000 franc notes
 3,400,000 ffrs. in 500 franc notes

If necessary, we could use also the 66 million francs in French-notes of the Reichsbankstelle in Karlsruhe (cash shipment of 25 September 1944) which are stored in Offenburg. Among these are 48 million ffrs. in large denominations.

Management of the Reichskreditkasse, Berlin, 3 October 1944 to the Board of Directors of the Reichskreditkasse, Berlin: The Military Commander in France, on the basis of the decree of 7 September 1944, caused to be confiscated a part of the cash lying in the various branches of the Bank of France. This confiscation was based on the grounds that the French Government failed to pay the second September occupation costs installment of 8,300,000,000 ffrs. which fell due on 21 August. This action yielded French currency aggregating 2,931,000,000 francs, representing RM 146,500,000.

This action was taken without consulting us. It was not necessary in order to ensure the military supply for Wehrmacht troops still on French soil. Our holdings amount to approximately 11 billion ffrs., or 515 million RM, which are still adequate for this purpose.

Military Commander in France to field commander in the cities listed below: O.U.* 7 September 1944: The French Government has thus far failed to pay the second September installment for occupation costs which came due on 21 August. In order to ensure the monetary supply for the Wehrmacht on French soil, I hereby order the following: The field detachments mentioned below will confiscate immediately the cash holdings of the branches of the Bank of France in their districts, and will take steps to transport these funds under military guard to the following Reichskreditkassen: Belfort, Colmar, Muelhausen, Strassburg, Saargemuend, and Saarlautern. According to the statement as of the end of July, these branches of the Bank of France had the following amounts in cash:

| | <i>Million ffrs</i> |
|-----------|---------------------|
| Belfort | 698 |
| Besancon | 642 |
| Epinal | 853 |
| Luneville | 93 |
| Nancy | 1,411 |
| Nevers | 1,016 |
| Saint Die | 181 |
| Vesoul | 227 |

[P.50]

In addition, the safes of the Bank of France in Nancy or Epinal contained 2 billion ffrs. in 1,000 franc notes which were transported from Paris to Nancy in the middle of August. These 2 billion ffrs. must likewise be confiscated and removed.

signed,

Kitzinger

General of the Air Force

Commander of the Security Police and of the SD in Nancy, dated Nancy 13 September 1944. This is a protocol concerning the confiscation of currency of the Bank of France in Nancy. By order of the Commander of the Security Police and of the SD in France, in accordance with radio message Fraize No. 91 of 11 September 1944, 15:35 hours, it was ascertained that 1.2 billion ffrs. were stored in the Bank of France in Nancy. In view of the lack of transportation facilities, only 880 million ffrs. could be transported. The remainder, 320 million ffrs., was blocked by virtue of an order to the director of the bank not to touch this amount until further orders * * *

The protocol was signed by an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer and by an Army Officer.

Reichsbankhauptstelle, Mannheim, 9 September 1944 to Reichsbank in Berlin: This is to advise you that a military transport which arrived here from Nancy asked us to take into custody on behalf of the Field Command, Nancy, (Militar—V.O.R. Roller) and for the account of the Pay Master of the Military Commander in France, 174 pouches sealed by the Bank of France containing 1,250,000 ffrs. The Reichsbank in Saarbrucken, which could not accept the notes because of shortage of space, referred the shipment to us. Inasmuch as our vaults are also completely filled up,

and since we could not assume that in other places such as Frankfurt am Main adequate space was available, we endeavored to find a secure place elsewhere—if only because of the constantly existing danger of air bombardments—and we placed the funds mentioned above in a section of the vault which was made available to us by the branch of the Deutsche Bank in Mannheim in the building of the former Sueddentsche Disconto [p. 51] Gesellschaft, which now belongs to the Deutsche Bank. This space has been made available to us for an emergency, in the event that our own vaults may be damaged.

Reichskreditkasse, Strassburg (formerly Paris and then Nancy), 19 September 1944, to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin. The last statement showing the position in "Account N-8" (Occupation Costs) of the Reichskreditkasse with the Bank of France was handed to us on 16 August 1944. It shows a balance of 195,120,352.69 RM. From this balance, 150 million RM were withdrawn in ten circular checks of 10 million RM each; and 40 million RM in four circular checks of 10 million RM each. In addition, 5 million RM were transferred through Giro to "Account L 120". Making allowance for the Giro transfer made by us on 11 August 1944 in the amount of 7,842 RM—for which up to the 16 August 1944, we were not debited by the Bank of France—the remaining balance in "Account N-8" is 112,510.69 RM.

Our contact with the Bank of France, Paris, continued normal until the evening hours of 18 August. On this day, at approximately 1730 hours, an official of the Bank of France appeared at the Reichskreditkasse with the request that we transmit the letter addressed to the Bank of France in Nancy concerning the transfer of "Account N-8" to Nancy to the Director of the Bank of France in Nancy * * * On the 19 August, the Bank of France in Paris was already closed. From that date on, all contact with the bank was interrupted * * * According to a letter of acknowledgment in our possession, a check for 440 million RM, that is 8,800,000,000 ffrs., was handed to Pay Master Roesch in accordance with an instruction of the Chief Pay Master of the Military Commander in France. This check was intended as an instrument for withdrawing from the Bank of France occupation costs installment payments which might be received until the middle of September. In the course of a telephone conversation between Nancy and Paris, Pay Master Roesch

was instructed to take the check along during the withdrawal from Paris.

From Sonderstab "F" in the ReichsMinistry for Armaments and War Production, Berlin, dated 21 September 1944, to Reichskreditkasse, Berlin. The Sonderstab [Special Staff] "F" had a Giro account with the Reichskreditkasse in Paris consisting of funds of the ReichsMinistry for Armaments and War Production which was augmented by an intermediary credit amounting to 1.5 million RM. [p. 52] These funds were made available by the Chief Pay Master in France as an advance in order to carry out the production program and must be refunded to the Wehrmacht. At the time of the evacuation of Paris, the amount in this Giro account was 23,347,438 ffrs., representing 1,167,371.90 RM.

The Special Staff has been transferred to the Reich and is continuing its production. In order to meet the commitments as they come due, the Reichskreditkasse, Paris, at present situated in Strassburg, was requested to transfer the amount in RM equivalent to a new Reichsbank Giro account of the Nebenstelle Ratingen Krs. Duesselldorf. This request could not be fulfilled as, according to information from the Reichskreditkasse, Paris, all balances in French currency are to be transferred to the Reichshauptkasse in Berlin. Accordingly, on 16 September 1944, the Reichskreditkasse in Paris was instructed to transfer the above-mentioned amount in the account to the Reichshauptkasse in Berlin to the credit of the ReichsMinister for Armaments and War Production.

German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs, dated Paris 16 August 1944, to the Chairman of the French Delegation of the same commission notifying him that beginning 23 August 1944, jurisdiction over the occupation costs account of the Chief of the Military Administration in France, maintained at the Bank of France, had been transferred from the Reichskreditkasse, Paris to Reichskreditkasse Nancy.

Memorandum for the files II/38 dated Berlin 30 August 1944, signed Waldhecker: v. Fuerstenberg reported that Lange, of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Maschinenbau [Economic Group Machine

Construction] has received an order to bring back machines from the endangered areas of Northern France and Belgium. For wages, transportation costs, etc., 50,000 RM each are required in French and Belgian francs.

End of Band IV

[P. 53]

KONTO
BESATZUNGSKOSTEN
FRANKREICH
B

From 1.7.42 until—

Copy of a statement by the Reichskreditkasse, dated 18 July 1944, addressed to the Reichsminister of Finance in Berlin showing that, in accordance with instructions from the Reichsminister of Finance, 20,827,574 RM were transferred to occupation costs "Account B" from occupation costs "Account A".

Similar letter dated 26 March 1943 showing that, in accordance with a letter from the Chief Pay Master of the Military Commander in France, dated 24 March 1943, "Account B" was credited with 3,500,000 RM. This amount represented compensation paid through occupation costs account "A VIII" to Reichs-Deutsche and Volksdeutsche for war damages in occupied France.

Similar communication dated 11 December 1942 showing a transfer from occupation costs "Account B" to "Account AI" in the amount of 150 million RM to the credit of Roges, in accordance with a letter from the Chief Pay Master in Paris dated 8 December 1942.

Similar letter dated 25 November 1942 showing that 200 million RM were transferred from "Account B" to "Account A I" in accordance with a letter from the Chief Pay Master of 25 November 1942.

Similar letter of 30 October 1942 showing that 100 million RM were transferred from "Account B" to "Account A I" in accord-

ance with a letter from the Chief Pay Master in Paris dated 29 October 1942.

Similar letter of 15 October 1942 showing that 100 million RM were transferred from "Account B" to "Account A I" in accordance with a letter from the Chief Pay Master in France dated 9 October 1942.

Similar letter of 14 September 1942 showing that 200 million RM were transferred from "Account B" to "Account A I" in accordance with a letter from the Chief Pay Master in France dated 9 September 1942.

Similar letter dated 27 August 1942 showing that 40 million RM were transferred from "Account B" to "Account A I" in accordance with a letter from the Military Commander in France (Pay Master) dated 25 August 1942.

Similar letter dated 24 August 1942 showing that 60 million RM (1,200,000,000 ffrs.) were transferred from "Account B" to "Account A I" in accordance with a letter from the Military Commander in France (Pay Master) dated 22 August 1942.

Similar letter of 6 July 1942 to the effect that 200 million RM (4 billion ffrs.) were transferred from "Account B" to "Account A I" in accordance with instructions from the Military Commander in France (Pay Master).

The End [P. 55]

ENCLOSURE No. 2

to Memorandum prepared by Mr. Ostrow
for Mr. Deinhard, dated 29 Sept. 1945

Reichsbank Director Wilz Frankfurt, 27 September 1945

- I. For what purposes was "Account 1006" used?
- II. From what accounts were payments made for shipment of goods from France to Germany?

III. To what extent were included in these payments goods and services for purposes not related to the occupation [besatzungs-fremde Zwecke]?

I.

"Account 1006" was the Reichsbank Giro account of the Main Administration of the Reichskreditkassen. All payments received by the Main Administration in Germany were entered in this account; all payments which the Main Administration had to make in Germany were paid from this account.

From this account, in the transfer procedure France-Germany and Germany-France, the amounts were paid out in RM which, on instructions from the Military Commander in France, were paid into the Reichskreditkassen in France in ffrs. for transfer to Germany. Through this transfer procedure, amounts in RM were paid into the account, which, on instructions of the Reichs Minister for Economics, were payable in France in ffrs.

II.

Payments for commodity shipments from France to Germany were made

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|------------------|
| (a) from occupation costs | | |
| "Account A" and its | | |
| subaccounts | | |
| Original Amount (Dot- | | |
| terierung) | RM 1,140,000,000 | |
| Used for the redemp- | | |
| tion of RKK Notes | RM 700,000,000 | |
| | <u>RM 440,000,000</u> | |
| Subsequent transfers | | |
| from "Account B to | | |
| A I" (Roges) | RM 1,200,000,000 | RM 1,640,000,000 |
| (b) From "Account B" | | |
| for the redemption of | | |
| RKK Notes brought to | | |
| France illegally after | | |
| resumption of occupa- | | |
| tion costs payments | | RM 2,000,000,000 |
| Carried forward | | RM 3,640,000,000 |
| (c) From "Account B": Through direct allo- | | |
| cations by the Army Pay Master to pub- | | |
| lic and private agencies. | | RM 1,250,000,000 |

Through conversion of RM for members of the Wehrmacht who entered France, within the scope of the payment regulations for the Wehrmacht. The greater part of this amount was used for purchases of goods which were taken to Germany.

RM 1,000,000,000

(d) Through transfers from Germany in "Account 1006"

RM 400,000,000

From this account, the ReichsMinister for Economic Affairs ordered payments to be made which, in general, were not regarded by France as eligible for the clearing, or which were not related to the occupation (besatzungsfremde). The Main Administration kept a record of all payments in excess of 50,000 RM (several hundred items) which must be among the seized documents. The utilization purposes were manifold. The chancellery of the Nazi Party paid through this account for objects of art, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft for Roumania payment media for purposes of the German Wehrmacht in Roumania. The Gold Discount Bank transferred amounts to France for purchases of securities. The Roges also was among the organizations which made such transfers. Finally, the Reichsbank itself on various occasions acquired through this account, objects of art.

Accordingly, in all the following amount was paid, outside of the clearing, for shipments of commodities, including securities, gold and for Devisen purchases, from France to Germany, in other words, for purposes not related to the occupation [besatzungsfremde Zwecke].

RM 6,290,000,000

III

Payments for services are, according to my observations, not included in this amount. However, the Pay Master withdrew from occupation costs the amounts for war risk insurance premiums. They amounted, as far as I can recall, to 50,000,000 RM per calendar quarter. Since these payments began in the fall of 1942, the amount utilized for this purpose may be estimated at

RM 400,000,000

IV

With regard to those who were authorized to dispose of the amounts in the separate accounts, I should like to add the following:

The account set up with the Bank of France into which French occupation costs payments were made was designated as "Hauptverwaltung der Reichskreditkassen wegen Militärbefehlshaber in

Frankreich Besatzungskosten." The Reichskreditkasse did not have the right to dispose of this account. In accordance with an exchange of notes between Germany and France in July 1940 (copies of which may be found in the files of the Bank of France) only the Reichskreditkasse in Paris could dispose of this account. The German beneficiaries, vis a vis the Reichskreditkasse, Paris, were the following:

The ReichsMinister of Finance disposed of the amounts made available for "Account A", the ReichsMinister for Economic Affairs of amounts in "Account A I", while "Accounts A II to A X" were reserved for recipients designated as such to the Reichskreditkasse by the ReichsMinister of Finance. The Wehrmacht, represented by the Pay Master of the Military Commander in France, disposed of the amounts transferred on our books through "Account B".

For transfers under (d) French payment media were available which German agencies in France (predominantly construction firms) had paid into the Reichskreditkassen, on instructions of the Military Commander, for payment of the RM countervalue in the Reich. The Reichsminister for Economic Affairs disposed of these amounts by instructing interested parties to pay RM amounts into "Account 1006" accompanied by instructions to the Main Administration to make available in return ffrs. in France. The Main Administration always watched and sought to prevent the Reichsminister for Economic Affairs from disposing of more francs than actually accrued in France. As a result, the disposals of the Reichsminister for Economic Affairs remained, according to my recollection, 30,000,000 RM below the proceeds in France. Exact figures should be found in the seized material.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3616-PS

OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE

[VOBL-Verordnungsblatt des Militaerbefehlshabers in Belgien
und Nordfrankreich] 1942, page 865.

Decree on the prohibition to establish and enlarge enterprises and
on shutting down enterprises of 30 March 1942.

Section 2.

The chief of military administration may regulate, if the general economic situation or the special needs of a specific branch of economy demand it, the extent and manner of the exploitation of existing enterprises and plants as well as order that industrial enterprises and plants are to be shut down completely or partially.

Report of the U. S. Military Attache in Berlin, dated 20 March
1939

GERMANY (Combat)

Subject: The Occupation of Czechoslovakia

I. Evaluation

The following report, which has been hastily compiled from notes and memorandums taken during the last week, is far from complete and can be considered only as a preliminary report on the situation as it appears today. It is believed, however, that a chronological account of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany and the events immediately preceding it, will be of value.

The military and economic sections of this report are of necessity at the present moment incomplete, but are submitted in order to round out the picture as seen at the moment in Berlin.

II. Summary

A chronological account of the events leading up to the occupation of Czechoslovakia begins with Thursday, March 10th, when President Hacha dismissed the Slovakian Cabinet. Friday the 11th saw demonstrations and disorder in Pressburg. On the 13th Father Tiso, accompanied by Durzcansky, visited Berlin, where he interviewed the Fuehrer. On Tuesday the 14th, the Slovakian Cabinet met in secret session and declared the independence of Slovakia, naming Father Tiso as Minister President. Continued disorders in Pressburg were suppressed by the Czech army. On this date Hungarian troops crossed the frontier and commenced their occupation of the Ukraine. On Tuesday the 14th President Hacha was summoned to Berlin for a consultation with the Fuehrer. That same evening German troops of the VIII Corps crossed the frontier into Moravia and occupied Maehrisch Ostrau. Wednesday the 15th the Fuehrer issued a proclamation calling for the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops. The occupation commenced in the early morning hours and by 9 a. m. Prague was in possession of the German army. The Hungarians continued their advance into Ruthenia. On the 16th Hitler issued a proclamation setting forth in 13 articles the status of Bohemia and Moravia. At the request of the Slovak government, Germany took over the military protection of Slovakia and commenced the movement of German troops into Pressburg. On the afternoon of the 16th the Fuehrer entered Prague where he reviewed his victorious army. Hungarian advanced guards reached the Polish frontier in Ruthenia.

III. Narrative Account

The events leading up to the annexation of Czechoslovakia have moved with such speed and the action of Germany has been so swift and overpowering that it is difficult to clearly trace the steps by which the fait accompli was brought about. Practically no warning was obtainable from the press or other sources of the intentions of the Reich, yet in retrospect it is quite obvious that this coup had been planned well in advance by the German government.

The dissatisfaction of Slovakia and Ruthenia with their status after the Munich agreement was a matter of common knowledge as well as the fact that Nazi agents were working within these states to provoke a separation movement. The economic feature of their relations with the Czechoslovakian government appeared to be the chief cause of dissatisfaction, as Prague was apparently expected to foot the bill, while at the same time grant a measure of autonomy quite out of proportion to the economic dependency of the two governments.

That Germany, also, was dissatisfied with the attitude of the Prague government was quite evident, both in its foreign relations and in its economic and diplomatic relations with the Reich. However, there appeared to be no insurmountable difficulties in the path of eventual settlement of these differences. The final act of the drama, it is believed, came as a complete surprise not only to foreign observers but to the majority of the Germans themselves.

A brief synopsis of the events leading up to the annexation follows. During the preceding week the Slovak separatist movement under the leadership of Father Tiso, Prime Minister of the Slovak Diet, Mr. Sane Mach, Chief of the Propaganda Office, and the radical leader, Dr. Tuka, had gained such headway that the Prague government was forced to take strong and immediate action.

Early on the morning of Thursday, March 10th, President Hacha dismissed Father Tiso and the rest of the Slovak Cabinet, except Mr. Teplansky and Mr. Sider, appointing Sider as Minister President of Slovakia in place of Father Tiso. The Klinka Guard was disarmed and martial law proclaimed in Pressburg and other Slovak cities, which were occupied by Czech troops.

Father Tiso sent a telegram to Berlin requesting aid from Germany, while Durcansky, who had escaped to Vienna, the headquarters of the separatist movement in Germany, in a radio address refused to recognize the legality of Prague's action in dismissing

the Cabinet, proclaiming that he was the legal representative of the Slovak government.

Some ten thousand Germans in Pressburg under their leader Karmasin staged a demonstration against the Czechoslovakian government.

During Friday night and Saturday disorders and demonstrations continued in Pressburg. A delegation of the Slovakian Diet arrived in Prague, headed by Dr. Sokol and his deputies, Dr. Maderli and Stane, to interview the Czechoslovakian President.

On Sunday, March 12th, the German Memorial Day, Admiral Raeder in his speech in the Staatsoper, declared that whenever German blood was spilt either within or without the Reich, Germany would act swiftly and with force to protect her nationals.

On Monday, March 13th, the Berlin papers carried screaming headlines "In Bruenn German Blood Flows Again." From Sunday on events moved with amazing rapidity. The deposed Slovakian Minister-President, Father Tiso, accompanied by Dr. Durcansky, arrived by special airplane in Berlin where they conferred with Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop.

Tuesday, March 14th, saw the beginning of the end of the drama. At 9.00 a. m. the Slovak Cabinet met in secret session at Pressburg, under the chairmanship of Sider. There were present Tiso, Mach, and Durcansky. The Cabinet prepared a statement which Sider read to the Diet at 10:15 a. m. The statement closed with the resignation of the Sider Cabinet. Thereupon Tiso took the floor, describing the results of his trip to Berlin. After a short recess, the representatives of the Diet reassembled and approved by unanimous vote Father Tiso's declaration of independence of Slovakia. After another short recess, the Diet reassembled at 12:20 p. m. to elect the President of Slovakia and Minister President, Tiso; Minister of Defense, Tuka; Minister of Education, Zatos; Minister of Interior, Sider; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Durcansky; Minister of Justice, Fritz; Minister of Finance, Pencinski; Minister of Propaganda, Mach.

At the same time that the Slovak Diet was in secret session, Hungarian Gendarmerie had crossed the Hungarian Ruthenian frontier. The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Czaky, issued an ultimatum to the Ukraine Minister President, Wolesschin, demanding that he turn over the government of Ukraine to the advancing Hungarian army and giving him until 8 p. m. to reply.

While Hungarian troops were marching into Ukraina, Count Esterhazy, leader of the Hungarian national group in Slovakia, issued a proclamation proclaiming the joy of the Hungarians over

the independence of Slovakia. The Slovakian government, however, apparently viewed the Hungarian advance and the concentration of Polish troops on the Slovakian frontier with alarm, ordering the mobilization of five Slovak classes.

It was rumored that during the noon hours Polish troops had occupied Alt Lubau, in Slovakia, but later had withdrawn.

During the 14th the Hungarian advance was meeting a certain amount of resistance from Czech troops and Ruthenian irregulars.

During the night of the 14th, the Czech government at the request of the Ruthenian government at Chust, capital of Ruthenia, answered the Hungarian ultimatum, politely stating, that while the personal safety of Hungarian subjects and their property rights would not be infringed upon, the main demands of the Hungarian government could not be fulfilled and denying the right of Hungarian subjects of Ruthenia to organize armed formations. At the same time withdrawal of Czech troops from the Carpatho-Ukraine was announced.

While these events were taking place in the south, Hitler summoned Dr. Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, and his foreign minister, Chavalkewski, for a conference in Berlin. They arrived in Berlin about 11:00 p. m. and were received with the utmost courtesy by the German Foreign Office. As a result of their conference with Herr Ribbentrop and Hitler, Dr. Hacha officially requested German aid to restore and maintain order in Bohemia and Moravia.

Actually, at the same time that President Hacha and his foreign minister were in the train on their way to Berlin, German troops were crossing the frontier. At 6:00 p. m. under command of the Commanding General VIII Army Corps, troops of the VIII Corps and the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler crossed the Oder bridge at Kenechau, moving down the road to Maehrisch-Ostrau which was occupied by 7:00 p. m.

On Wednesday morning, the 15th, the Fuehrer issued a proclamation calling for the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the German Army, followed by another proclamation to the Army ordering them to overcome all resistance. At the same time the Prague government issued orders to its troops that no resistance be offered. (For the text of the Fuehrer's Proclamation, see app. A.)

On the morning of the 15th, German troops commenced the systematic occupation of all Moravia and Bohemia. At 9 a. m. German advanced elements had entered Prague.

Also on the 15th, the Magyar National Holiday, Hungarian regular troops commenced their advance into Ruthenia in three col-

umns, advancing on Nagyzoelloes (Sevljis) in the sector of Munkacs, in the upper section of the Latorezt Valley, north of Szolyva, and in the Hungarian sector, 5 km south of Perecseny. Some opposition was encountered. It was reported from Pressburg that heavy fighting had occurred between Slovaks and Hungarian irregulars in the Lower and Upper Metzenseifen.

Another press dispatch from Pressburg announced that it was reported from Chust that the Ukrainian people have opposed with all their might the Hungarian occupation. They not only have to fight against the enemy from the outside, but against the Czechs as well. One thousand well armed and determined Slovak guardists under the command of the former police head, Bolay, are opposing the Hungarian troops.

On March 16th, Hitler issued a proclamation setting forth in thirteen articles the status of Bohemia and Moravia, as a protectorate under the German Reich. (For text of Proclamation see app. B.)

On the same day Germany took over the protection of the new Slovak nation in an exchange of telegrams between Hitler and Tiso as follows:

Tiso's telegram to Hitler:

"With strong confidence in you, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of the Greater German Reich, the Slovak nation puts itself under your protection. The Slovak nation requests you to undertake this protection.

Tiso"

Hitler's reply:

"I acknowledge receipt of your telegram of yesterday and hereby take over the protection of the Slovak nation.

Adolf Hitler"

In the afternoon of the 16th Hitler made his triumphal entry into Prague, where he reviewed the German troops from the ancient castle. Leaving Prague that same day, Hitler visited Bruenn and Linz on the 17th, arriving in Vienna, Saturday the 18th.

On March 16th Minister President Count Teleki made the following speech in the Hungarian Parliament regarding the occupation of the Carpathe-Ukraine.

"Yesterday and today the Carpathe Ukrainian population and their leaders requested the Hungarian government to immediately occupy the Carpathe Ukrainian territory with its army, in order to protect the life and property of the Carpathe Ukrainian people and to reestablish peace and order as quickly as possible. The Hungarian government complied with this request. The Minister President stated that the Hungarian army would occupy the entire area of the Carpathe Ukraine.

"Through the occupation the Carpathe Ukraine which has belonged to Hungary for a thousand years and to which Hungarian interests are attached, will be reunited with its old mother country. Within the Hungarian nation the people of the Carpathe Ukraine will be granted self-government which, as it is stated, will afford autonomy in administration and cultural life."

At 3:30 p. m. on the 16th, advance elements of the Hungarian troops which had crossed the border at Muncacs and advanced via Szelyva had reached the town Petensevics on the Polish border. Another column starting from Szelyva reached Voloe on the railway line between Muncacs and Lavoczne about 10 km from the Polish border at the same time.

On Saturday, March 17th, the German troops commenced their occupation of Slovakia and it is believed that by now Slovakia has been completely occupied.

Bohemia and Moravia have been incorporated in the German Reich as a Protectorate to be occupied and controlled by German troops. Herr von Neurath has been appointed Reichs Protector for the States of Bohemia and Moravia with station at Prague, retaining his former position of Reich Minister President of the Privy Council. In addition the Deputy Gauleiter of the Sudetenland, Herr Frank, has been appointed State Secretary and Curt v. Bergdorf has been appointed Ministerialdirektor of the Reich Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. The exact status of Slovakia is not yet definitely determined.

IV. Military Aspects of the Occupation

Rumors of German troop movements began to reach Berlin on Monday, March 13th, and on Tuesday had been definitely confirmed. Since at this time of year, the training period had only just reached the stage of company training in garrison, and since so many interruptions to training had occurred during the past year, any movement of troops which would interrupt the normal training cycle could only mean that the army was to be used for a serious purpose and immediately, in other words, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was under way.

Reports reached Berlin of troop movements between Dresden and Breslau, and between Munich and Vienna. It was learned that a part of the Regiment General Goering and the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler left Berlin on Monday. The 3rd Light Division from Cottbus was reported on the road near Zwickau, moving south. The 4th Division was reported moving through Dresden. It was learned that Schuetzen Regiment 1, at Weimar, had been unable to participate in the Sunday Memorial Service. Reconnaissance of the Berlin area revealed that a part of the 3rd Armored Di-

vision had left their barracks. A report reached Berlin from Hamburg, that the barracks of the 30th Div., mot., at Luebeck were empty. The consul at Breslau reported troop columns on the road Breslau-Beuthen moving east.

From these reports and from other fragmentary information picked up through the press and from individual reports, it is believed that the following units took part in the occupation, forming part of the 3rd and 5th army groups under Generals von Blas-kowitz and List, respectively.

In Silesia, under command of Commanding General VIII Army Corps, the following troops are believed to have entered Northern Moravia:

8th Infantry Division
18th Infantry Division
28th Infantry Division
5th Armored Division
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler

From the north, by way of Dresden and the northern Sudeten-Deutsch area:

4th Division
14th Division
46th Division
Standarte Sachsen

From the west over Pilsen:

1st Armored Division
3rd Light Division
2nd Light Division
30th Div. (mot.)
29th Div. (mot.)

From the west between Nurnberg and Passau:

17th Division
10th Division
1st Mtn Division

From Vienna north:

2nd Armored Division
4th Light Division

From Vienna into Slovakia through Pressburg:

44th Division
45th Division
7th Division
Standarte Deutschland, Munich
Standarte Vienna.

This makes a total of 11 infantry divisions, 2 motorized infantry divisions, 1 mountain division, 3 light divisions, 3 armored divisions and 4 SS Standarten, which it has been fairly definitely established participated.

Other troops not yet identified also may have been present. The strength of this force is approximately 300,000 officers and men.

No extensive mobilization measures such as were evident in September were put into effect for this operation, and it is believed that only the active units brought to approximate war strength by the addition of unit trains were employed.

It is significant to note that the 20th Div. (mot.) stationed at Stettin on the eastern frontier which took part in the September concentration, was not moved. In fact, except for the troops of the VIII Corps, it is believed that no troops along the Polish frontier were engaged.

In connection with the movement of the VIII Corps, a slip in one of the newspapers indicates that some of the troops were concentrated opposite Michalowitz on the Polish frontier. In other words, in this operation Germany did not denude her eastern frontier of troops as she did in September last.

The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia progressed smoothly in spite of heavy snow and bad weather. No opposition was encountered.

All Czech troops were disarmed and are confined to the barracks.

The military and strategic advantages which Germany has gained by the occupation of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia are enormous. Strategically Germany has placed herself between Poland and Hungary and definitely and forever prevented joint Polish-Hungarian action against her.

Further, in case Germany desires to move against Poland, she now commands the gateway to Krakow, Limburg, and the Russian Ukraine. Her new position now places her armies on three sides of Poland, poised for a quick and telling blow.

With respect to Hungary, Germany also threatens Budapest from the north and west and her armies are in a position to march directly into the fertile plains of Hungary or through Hungary to Roumania. The occupation of the mountainous Ruthenia by Hungary becomes unimportant in the light of Germany's new strategic position.

In addition to the strategic advantage gained, Germany has taken over a large store of artillery of all calibers, including much valuable antiaircraft material and heavy guns and howitzers from the Czechs.

Once again the German army has achieved a bloodless triumph. Once again the efficiency of her troops has been demonstrated, and once again her ability to stride swiftly and without warning has been demonstrated.

V. Economic Aspect

The attached short article (app. C) on Slovakia and her economic position, from the Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe of March 16th, 1939, is included in this report as it shows more eloquently than could be presented in any other manner the impossibility of Slovakia remaining an independent state. Her separatist movement from Prague could only have succeeded if she would have fallen in the hands of a strong and more powerful neighbor. Strategically Slovakian economic dependence lay with Hungary and Poland and the swiftness of German military action and the thoroughness of German political activities within the Slovak state may be accounted for from the fact that from a military point of view it was vital to Germany not to allow Slovakia to be occupied by either Hungary or Poland.

In this connection it can already be stated that German economic gain in Bohemia and Moravia is practically nil. The export markets which the former state of Czechoslovakia enjoyed, will now be closed to German goods. Little or no gold remains in Prague and financial experts are of the opinion that after her debts and credits have been balanced, little monetary advantage will accrue to Germany.

The agricultural products of Bohemia and Moravia are at present barely sufficient to sustain her own population and the former Czechoslovakian state existed primarily through her export trade. A part of this export trade will naturally be absorbed by Germany, but she cannot compensate for the loss of markets which will inevitably follow the annexation.

It is possible that Germany may obtain a small immediate monetary advantage from the Czech banks, but it is not believed that this is sufficient to make any substantial difference in Germany's economic position.

Percy G. Black,
Major, F. A.
Acting Military Attache.

Report of the U. S. Military Attache in Berlin, dated 19 April
1939. Report 16,596
GERMANY (Combat)

Subject: Occupation of Czechoslovakia. Supplement to Report
16,520.

Since the supplement to report 16,520 was written on March 31 (16,531) additional information has been obtained on the occupation of Czechoslovakia which it is believed will be of interest to G-2.

Comments made by a German officer:

The following comments were made by a German officer who had been attached to the staff of Army Group 3 from March 12 to April 12, at a lecture to his section in Kriegsakademie:

He stated that since the 3rd Army Group Headquarters is a territorial rather than a tactical organization, some minor difficulties were encountered in the tactical employment. Units under the command of the 3rd Army which were involved in the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia were all on a peace time rather than a war basis and lacking most of their supply service were much smaller than they would be in time of war. For this operation in which the German army was not placed on a war footing, various nonarmy units were employed to fill deficiencies in the peacetime army organization and for relief measures to the population. Of these units the N. S. V. (National-Socialistische Volkswohlfahrt—National Socialist welfare organization) was employed to distribute food and render assistance to the local population. The N. S. K. K. (National Sozialistischer Kraftfahr Korps—) was also represented and members of the S.A. were used to provide a guard for the army H.Q.

The army staff was assembled at Dresden on the night of the 14th. On the 15th the headquarters was moved to Prague, stopping en route at Leitmeritz early on the morning of the 15th until assurance was received that everything in Prague was proceeding satisfactorily.

For the movement of the army into Bohemia and Moravia all supply arrangements were made by the army staff alone for the sake of secrecy rather than in the normal manner of requisitioning assistance from nonmilitary personnel.

Heavy snow and slippery roads greatly hindered the movement of the troops forcing the tank units to move in low gear. The resulting gas consumption was just about double what had been estimated. One motorized division of the XIII Corps was com-

pletely without touch with its corps headquarters for 24 hours. (This was probably the 29th Division moving north along the border between Bohemia and Moravia.)

In the VIII Corps it was considered necessary to occupy Maehr, Ostrau on the evening of the 14th before the general movement actually began, in order to insure that the large iron factories and steel works in this place would not fall into Polish hands.

Upon the occupation of Prague the Czech archives were at once seized. These archives yielded much valuable information not so much in regard to the Czech army itself as to the former allies of the Czechs. It was stated that the Czech military authorities themselves were unable to state the size or the exact condition of their army.

No accurate accounting of Czech equipment was possible, particularly because a large part of it had been taken home and hidden by individual soldiers.

The size, output, and advanced technique of the Skoda and Bruenn works was a great surprise to the Germans as were the technical secrets and manufacturing methods which fell into German hands.

Prague did not give the appearance of a captured city. Everything seemed to be running smoothly and the majority of the people, after slight natural hesitance, were very friendly to the German troops.

20,000 inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia were deported to Germany proper.

Hitler issued an order that within four weeks after the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia all war material found in Czechoslovakia should be transported to Germany.

The German General Staff had feared that large strikes would occur in Czechoslovakia and provisions had been made against this contingency. However, no strikes of a serious nature occurred. The German method of dealing with any trouble which occurred in Czechoslovakian business or factories has been to remove the owners or managers and to replace them by other Czechs selected by the German authorities.

In commenting on the troops employed in the occupation, he stated that although the recruits had received practically no training beyond the school of the soldier, this lack of training apparently had no detrimental effect upon the conduct of the operation.

A map is attached showing the zones of advance allotted to the various Army Corps.

Percy G. Black,
Major, F. A.,
Acting Military Attache.

Berlin, 1 October 1938

RM 256

This forenoon, I had a telephone conversation with Ciano, following the Polish ultimatum to Czechoslovakia and the news that the French, English and Italian ambassadors in Warsaw, appealing to the Munich Pact, had taken emphatic steps to hinder military intervention by Poland. Ciano said that he had not commissioned the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw to take steps, but that he had directed him to convey to the Polish Foreign Minister in the form of a conversation that the Italian government does not expect Poland to take arms merely because of the few days which might be involved.

I thereupon presented our conception to Ciano and told him that on the basis of our experience with the treatment of the Sudeten Germans, we had great sympathy and understanding for the Polish point of view. I said that 240,000 Germans have already been expelled from the Sudetenland. In Poland 200,000 people are involved who have, in part, already undergone a similar fate or are awaiting it. We are informed about the terrible circumstances in the Teschen area. He, Ciano, would understand why under the above circumstances we did not use the same language in Warsaw as Italy.

I thereupon at the same time declared the following to the Polish Ambassador regarding the step undertaken by our Ambassador in Warsaw toward the Polish Foreign Minister Beck:

1) We have a complete understanding of the Polish point of view;

2) We hoped that military intervention would not become necessary; the prerequisite appears to be that Prague should immediately accommodate itself to the Polish demands and in the shortest possible time meet the wishes of the Poles;

3) In case of an armed conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia, it is self-understood that we would take a favorable attitude;

4) Should the Soviet Union take military action against Poland, which I deem impossible, an entirely new situation would arise in the whole Czechoslovakian question as far as Germany is concerned.

Signed: Ribbentrop.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3663-PS

The Reich Minister
For the Occupied Eastern Territories

Berlin W 35, 31 October 19

Rauchstrasse 17/18

Telephone: 21 95 15 and 39 50 46

Cable address: Reichsministerost

No: I / 2591 /41

It is requested to refer to this
number and the subject matter in
future correspondence

[Stamp:]

Reich Commissioner East

5 November 1941

Main Division IIa

To the Reich Commissioner for the East (Ostland)

in Riga

Hermann Goering Street 26

The Reich and Security Main Office has complained that the Reich Commissioner for the East has forbidden executions of Jews in Liepaja (Libau). I request a report in regard to this matter by return mail.

By order

Signed: Dr. Leibbrandt

certified

[illegible signature]

Regierungsinspektor

[Stamp:]

Reich Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern
Territories

SECRET

The Reich Commissioner for the East
IIa 4 M 219/41 secret

Riga 15 November 1941

1) To the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin

Rauchstr. 17/18

Re: Executions of Jews

District of Erlau 31 October 1941 I/2591/41

Reporter: Reg.Rat[Trampedach?]

I have forbidden the wild executions of Jews in Liepaja because they were not justifiable in the manner in which they were carried out.

I should like to be informed whether your inquiry of 31 October is to be regarded as a directive to liquidate all Jews in the East? Shall this take place without regard to age and sex and economic interests (of the Wehrmacht, for instance in specialists in the armament industry)?

[note in different handwriting:] Of course the cleansing of the East of Jews is a necessary task; its solution, however, must be harmonized with the necessities of war production.

So far I have not been able to find such a directive either in the regulations regarding the Jewish question in the "Brown Portfolio" [Brau Mappe] or in other decrees.

Tr. 8.11.

2) Resubmit 1.12.41 Submitted 1.12.
[initialed]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3666-PS

[pencilled note] 28

The Reich Minister of the occupied Eastern Territories

Berlin, W 35, 18 Dec. 1941

Rauchstrasse 17/18

Telephone: 219515 and 395046

Cable Address: Reichsministerost

[illegible initials] 12/I

Received 22/12 [illegible initial]

V a

J.. 9 I.

Ma 23/1.

TOP SECRET

No. I/1/157/41 Top Secret

Please use this business sign and
subject in further correspondence.

Journal No. 394/41

[stamp] TOP SECRET

[pencilled note] A

6 J 1

1.) To the Reich Commissioner for the East [Ostland]

Riga / Leitort Tilsit

Adolf Hitler Street

Subject: Jewish Question re correspondence of 15 Nov. 1941

Clarification of the Jewish question has most likely been achieved by now through verbal discussions. Economic considerations should fundamentally remain unconsidered in the

settlement of the problem. Moreover, it is requested, that questions arising be settled directly with the Senior SS and Police Leaders.

By order
[signed] Braeutiger [?]

2.) Filed II. a 4 Ma 26./1.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3688-PS

U.St.S.-D.-Nr. 6862

I have instructions [in longhand
and unidentified]
Berlin, 24 September 1942

NOTICE

The RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) has instructed me today by telephone to hasten as much as possible the evacuation of Jews from different countries in Europe since it is certain that Jews incite against us everywhere and must be made responsible for acts of sabotage and attacks. After a short lecture on the evacuations now in process in Slovakia, Croatia, Rumania and the occupied territories, the RAM has ordered that we are to approach the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Danish Governments with the goal of getting the evacuation started in these countries.

In respect to the regulation of the Jewish question in Italy, the RAM has reserved further steps to himself. This question is to be discussed personally either at a conference between the Fuehrer and the Duce or between the RAM and Count Ciano.

Herewith

Mr. State Secretary v. Weizsaecker
presented to you with request to acknowledge it.
Any steps to be taken by us will be presented
to you in advance for authorization.

Signed: Luther.

Copies:

Herrn U.St.S.PW.
Herrn U.St.S.R.
Herrn Dir.HaPol
D II
D III

Copy

At present Lindow — Mark, 3.11.

Dear Reich Marshal,

By way of inter-office communication I received for cognizance the draft of your decree concerning the conscription of 15-year-old students for the Auxiliary War Service. As you know, since the end of 1937, I have been only nominally a Reich minister without portfolio. There have been no cabinet meetings since 1938. I have no longer been invited to any meetings of ministers. I live in the country, and in complete retirement. For several months, I have even been expressly forbidden to listen to foreign broadcasts, so that my entire knowledge of the military, economic and political situation comes from no other source than that available to any other thinking German, whose number, however, should not be underestimated, even in the so-called rank and file. Since I am not a member of the Reich Defense Council, I am under no obligation to participate in the compilation of this draft. Although I am absolutely free of any responsibility, my conscience and the wish not to be guilty of any negligence are driving me to write these lines.

May I say in advance that I have always maintained before responsible authorities that we were not sufficiently prepared economically for a *long* war. But anybody familiar with the Anglo-Saxon mentality was bound to know that the war would be a long one, after England made known her decision to regard a German attack upon Poland as a *casus belli*. In the beginning of 1940, I proposed to the Fuehrer that I go to the United States in order to attempt to slow down America's assistance to England in the matter of armaments, and in order, if possible, to prevent America becoming involved in the war more deeply. The Minister of Foreign Affairs refused this offer, which the Fuehrer viewed sympathetically. A further suggestion which I made to the Fuehrer in the fall of 1941, the high point of our successes, was without effect.

It may be militarily necessary to conscript the 15-year-olds, but it will be a heavy burden on the fighting morale of the German people. The facts, as the German people see them, are as follows:

1. The original promise of a short war has not been fulfilled.
2. The promised quick victory over England by the Air Force did not materialize.
3. The public statement that Germany would remain free of enemy air raids has not been fulfilled.

4. The repeated announcements that the Russian resistance was definitely broken have been proved to be untrue.

5. Allied supplies of arms to Russia and the manpower reserves of Russia have, on the contrary, been sufficient to bring continuous heavy counter-attacks against our Eastern front.

6. The original victorious advance into Egypt has been halted after repeated attempts.

7. The landing of the Allies in North and West Africa, declared impossible, has nevertheless been accomplished.

8. The extremely large amount of shipping space which was required for this landing has shown that our U-boats, in spite of their great successes, did not suffice to prevent this movement.

In addition, any person of German extraction can see the reductions in the civilian supplies, in the traffic, in armaments, and in the availability of manpower. The conscription of the 15-year-olds will increase the doubts concerning the termination of this war.

I am taking the precaution of forwarding this letter through State Councillor Gritzbach, under seal, in order to prevent misuse.

Heil Hitler!

[signed] Dr. Hjalmar Schacht.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3701-PS

Translation of Document from the Archives of the Catholic Bishops' Conference, Fulda, given by Secretary of the Bishop of Fulda to Dr. Edmund Walsh in December, 1945

PROPOSAL FOR REICHSLEITER BORMANN

Concerning: Speech of the Bishop of Muenster on 3 August 1941.

Enclosed I submit the draft of a proposal by the Division Chief for Propaganda, Ministry for Propaganda, for Dr. Goebbels, in which, at the same time, he transmits the speech of the Bishop of Muenster of 3 August 1941.

The proposal of the Propaganda Division to start an enlightenment campaign regarding the Euthanasia question is, in my opinion right—at least for the territories concerned—but under no circumstances is it sufficient.

If against the lies of the bishop (that we are putting the wounded to death), more severe measures are not taken than an information and a probable arrest, this counterpropaganda will continue without a chance for us to offset it successfully.

to disprove the charge of disturbing the unity of the people by claiming that it is only the Gestapo which is destroying the unity of the people.

After such attacks against official organs of the state, stronger in form and tenor than the earlier mentioned, more hidden accusations, the Bishop of Muenster on 3 August in a sermon to his diocesans came out with the most severe attack against the leadership of the German government ever made during the past decades. After first dealing again with the closing of those religious houses and convents he turns against the execution of measures concerning Euthanasia for incurable cases of feeble-mindedness. He first sets forth the argument against Euthanasia and then goes so far as to claim the following:

“Yes, citizens of Muenster, wounded soldiers are being killed recklessly, since they are, productively, of no more use to the state. Mother, your boy will be killed too, if he comes back home from the front wounded.” He closes with the remark that the inhabitants of Muenster had not understood God’s vengeance which came in the form of English air attacks and he incites the faithful to open opposition, even if they should have to die for it.

For your information I enclose the original text of the sermon.

The allegation of the Bishop of Muenster that wounded soldiers are threatened by measures of Euthanasia was spread by several broadcasts of the London radio. The attitude of the bishop is treason of a definite quality.

It is to be feared that this sermon and the utterances of the bishop will get around by propaganda of mouth and will be believed in wide circle of the Reich, especially among the Catholic population. Moreover it is to be feared that those treasonable accusations will find their way to the Protestant population, especially among families who have relatives at the front.

Measures taken by the state police against the bishop can hardly be successful, because in case of an arrest and judgment the bishop would be made a martyr by the Church, and other bishops and priest would repeat his claims anew. The most suitable measure would be the enlightenment of the population concerning our measures in reference to Euthanasia; I realized, however, that the present times are very unfit for that. The manner and the means by which the bishop prepared this action makes one fear that he will not relax with his attacks, unless we effect a fundamental change of attitude particularly in the Catholic population.

I inquired at the Reich Ministry for Church Affairs as to how

they regard this matter over there. I was answered that the authentic text of the sermon unfortunately was not yet known in that Department. The sermon was on 3 August.

I beg the Reich Minister to decide whether or not the Fuehrer shall be asked by group leader Bormann whether the camouflage of Euthanasia thus far in practice ought to be modified so that a defense against the treasonable claims of the Bishop of Muenster can be inaugurated by launching a campaign of popular enlightenment.

Heil Hitler!

Enclosure.

SECRET

PROPOSAL FOR REICHSLEITER BORMANN:

Concerning: Sermon of the Bishop of Muenster.

After the conference of Ministers, Dr. Goebbels discussed with me the sermon of the Bishop of Muenster. He could not say what effective measures could be taken at the moment.

I explained to him that in my opinion there could be only one effective measure, namely, to hang the bishop and that I already had informed Reichsleiter Bormann accordingly.

Thereupon Dr. Goebbels said that this was a measure upon which the Fuehrer alone could decide. He feared, however, that the population of Muenster could be regarded as lost during the war, if anything were done against the bishop, and in that fear one safely could include the whole of Westphalia.

I pointed out to him that it would only be necessary to expose properly that very vulgar lie through propaganda channels. In that way it ought to be possible not only to bring the population there to an understanding of that measure but to create among them rebellion against the bishop.

To that Dr. Goebbels answered again that the Fuehrer himself would certainly come to a decision in that question.

After that he observed that it would have been wiser, in his opinion, not to challenge the Church during the war but to try only to steer them according to our interests as far as possible. For that reason he had ordered the interview with party comrade Gutterer. But then he had not followed up the matter in this way because the Chancery of the Party had chosen the way of uncompromising refusal and open breach. As much as it was for him—(in contrast to other Reich's Leaders)—a matter of course to suppress the press of the Church, because in that regard he had proof

and excuse concerning the Church. This preserved appearances. He maintained the stand, however, that it would have been better during the war to preserve appearances as far as the Church is concerned. It is permissible always to attack an opponent only if one is in a position to answer properly at the decisive counterattack of that opponent. But this was extraordinarily difficult in the case of the counterattack of the Church during the war, yes, nearly impossible. One should not enjoy a revenge with heat but coldly. In politics one should know how to wait. This the Fuehrer clearly and distinctly had proved again in the case of Russia. If he would have had his way one would have pretended during the war as if

[the following line at end of page is missing].

I explained to him that the procedure employed so far had nevertheless accomplished this much, that the Church had opened up and in doing so played into our hands by documents valuable after the war for the struggle against it.

Dr. Goebbels said that in his opinion those measures would have been possible after the war, even without the documents, whereas the effect of the Church documents on the attitude of the people was extraordinarily troublesome now. In any case it is necessary now to establish an absolute and clear rule as to the road to be followed. In the deliberations which have to take place in this connection we should not allow ourselves to be guided by the heart but by completely cold logic.

I personally retain the viewpoint that, if the Fuehrer should agree with my proposal to hang the bishop, we could safely still continue along the lines used so far. However, should the Fuehrer reject this proposal and postpone a reckoning, and defer action in the present case also, until after the war, I herewith request that it be considered whether Dr. Goebbels should not try, as far as might be possible, to pursue the course he suggested.

Berlin, 13 August 1941.

Tiessler.

Ti/Hu-

Headquarters of the Fuehrer, 13 August 1941

Bo/Fu

Documentary remark for party comrade Walter Tiessler, Leader of the Reichsring for National Socialist Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, Berlin W. 8, Hotel Kaiserhof, Room 117.

The several speeches of Bishop Count Galen are known to me. Also the Fuehrer has been given an over-all picture on the atti-

tude of the bishop. He ordered me to undertake first an exact investigation of the bishop's complaints concerning the closing of cloisters in favor of the NSDAP. This was done; but so far I have not been able to report to the Fuehrer. Concerning the effects of the speeches of the Bishop I am being continuously informed through the Gau Leader as well as by the Secret State Police.

What kind of steps the Fuehrer will take against the bishop, however, is yet to be decided. A death sentence certainly would be appropriate; considering the state of the war, however, the Fuehrer hardly will order such a measure.

The Fuehrer also will have to decide whether enlightenment concerning the Euthanasia matters should be started. So far the Fuehrer has declined to adopt this measure.

In your proposal for Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels a decision is requested whether or not the Fuehrer should be asked by one of the adjutants if the camouflage of Euthanasia so far in effect could be modified. I request you to clarify in your office that questions of this kind are not reported to the Fuehrer by the adjutants but through me as the Leader of the Chancery of the Party. This too is precisely one of the reasons, why I should accompany the Fuehrer steadily, in order that all such matters may be reported to the Fuehrer through me.

Bormann

Proposal for Reichsleiter Bormann!

In consequence of your documentary remark of 13 August I informed the Propaganda Division that questions of that kind will not be reported to the Fuehrer through the adjutants but through you. The office thereupon gave me the information that there had been a regrettable misunderstanding. It was Group Leader Bormann, yourself, they meant, not the adjutant. I have been asked by the office to beg your pardon on their behalf.

Tiessler

Berlin, 16 August 1941
Ti/Hu

STATEMENT

Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshal von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.


Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State).

The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commander-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This was in effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

[signed] HALDER

CHART
[Initialed] H.



CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General Franz Halder, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language with amendments initialed by him and an attached chart initialed by him, and swore that the same, including the attached chart, was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

[Signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV.
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3703-PS

STATEMENT

Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State, who prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshal von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.

Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the OKW and were presented by them to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State).

The members of this group were vested with full authority to prepare for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as might be undertaken by troops in the field.

Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in

the chart. In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.

[signed] von BRAUCHITSCH

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Paul A. Neuland, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

[signed] Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major, QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3704-PS

STATEMENT

From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr, and Memel.

I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule.

Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler since he produced the results which they desired. After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment. However they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions.

Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience

and diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de bureau. As far as I know he was never named commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a "Chief of Staff" under Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegminister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth.

As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler's measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler's hands for every one of his decisions.

He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.

[signed] v. BLOMBERG

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Paul A. Neuland, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

[signed] Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major, QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3705-PS

STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him as amended by a change which he desired.

After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two Commanders of the army groups and the five Commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details in order to hear their desires and recommendations.

After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the Commanders-in-Chief of army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters as well as by telephone, teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact it was the accepted policy and common practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate Commanders-in-Chief and to maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff communicated with army groups and, through them as well as directly, with armies; through army groups on strategical and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and the administration of conquered territory occupied by these armies. An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a relatively small staff which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the Commander-in-Chief of the army and not of the army group who exercised jurisdiction.

[signed] von BRAUCHITSCH

SUPPLEMENT TO MY STATEMENT OF 7 NOVEMBER 1945

When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.

Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the OKW began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved. Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the Commanders of the army groups and armies and with the Chiefs of Staff of these Commanders.

During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the Commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them. In the war against Russia the

Commanders of army groups and of armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation.

Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups and for all matters concerning supply and territorial jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.

[signed] von BRAUCHITSCH

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, to me known who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung vom 7. November 1945" (statement of 7 November 1945) consisting of two pages in the German language, and who in my presence also signed the attached "Ergaenzung zu meiner Erklaerung vom 7. November 1945" (supplement to my statement of 7 November 1945) consisting of one sheet written on both sides in German script, and swore that the same was true on the 7th day of November 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3706-PS

STATEMENT

From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Saar and Ruhr, and Memel.

I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff and front officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the political and economic loss resulting from the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity.

The at first (1933-35) secret and later unconcealed rearmament of Germany was welcomed by me. All officers of the army shared this attitude and therefore had no reason to oppose Hitler. Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.

After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Pol-

ish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact we felt that, if political negotiations came to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself, but also with the Western Powers.

When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer's speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations, participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic, and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during the planned Polish campaign.

During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he, as well as the Fuehrer, visited my headquarters. In fact it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype, or wireless, as well as by personal recalls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field so that the positions shown in the chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces.

[signed] BLASKOWITZ

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Paul A. Neuland, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 10th day of November 1945.

[signed] Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major, QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3707-PS

STATEMENT

The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff—in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military affairs they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff.

The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the "National Defense" Section and was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high-ranking officers described in my Statement of 7 November (in the Army: "General Staff of the Army"; in the Air Force: "General Staff of the Air Force").

Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not worked out by the "Great General Staff" but by the Naval Staff.

[signed] FRANZ HALDER

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Robert Benson, Flight Lieutenant, Royal Air Force, 85862, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel General Franz Halder, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 13th day of November 1945.

[signed] Robert Benson
ROBERT BENSON
Fl. Lieut. RAF
85862

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3708-PS

BERND VON BRAUCHITSCH

NURNBERG

16.11.45

SWORN STATEMENT

Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial jurisdiction.

They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation "Befehlshaber" and from then on that of "Oberbefehlshaber." This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities which they previously had.

[signed] BRAUCHITSCH

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel Bernd von Brauchitsch, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 20th day of November 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3710-PS

SWORN STATEMENT

In the middle of May 1943, as far as I remember, the Chief of Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about questions connected with the operations of the SIPO and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send another representative. I was at that time Chief of Section E in Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was selected by Wagner because of my experience in matters of protocol to be sent to Heydrich for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD. I discussed the problem of this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met

with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941.

The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer's command, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign.

The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail:

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) In front-line areas: | In complete subordination to the Field Army, tactically, functionally, and administratively; |
| (2) In rear operational areas: | In merely administrative subordination to the Field Army, but under the command and functional control of the RSHA; |
| (3) In rear Army areas: | Arrangement as in (2); |
| (4) In areas of the civil administration in the East: | Same as in the Reich. |

The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification.

The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network.

This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my presence. Wagner signed it either "acting for" or "by order of" the OKH.

After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both

of them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete privacy the Fuehrer's command, which was apparently known in advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once more just to say goodbye.

Today I read the "Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941)," as well as the "Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941." The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews, Communists, and other elements of resistance. It is also clear from the above-cited "Comprehensive Report," which embraces no more than the first four months of these operations, that the cooperation of the respective Oberbefehlshabers with Combat Group A was "in general good and in individual instances, for instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoepfner, very close, in fact almost cordial" (page 1). From an inclosure to this same report, bearing the title "Summary of the Number of Executed Persons," particularly from the figures arranged according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as to fully carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and authenticity of both of the above-cited reports. Therefore I must today express my firm conviction that during the secret oral discussion between Wagner and Heydrich the extensive future activity of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos within the combat elements of the Field Army was obviously discussed and delineated so as to include even planned mass executions. The close cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups cited above as taking place even in the first weeks of the Russian campaign makes me today give expression to my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH channels of communication about the extensive future mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists, and all other elements of resistance.

In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic counterintelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps, and some of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and the Chief of the Amt for Counterintelligence Abroad in the OKW (Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of the written agreement reached by Wagner and Heydrich.

This group of Ic counterintelligence officers and Ic officers remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact delineation of the Fuehrer's command "to smash utterly all resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as possible," including even planned mass executions of all elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic counterintelligence officers, immediately upon their return from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to march against Russia, about the full extent of the agreements.

[signed] WALTER SCHELLENBERG
26. XI. 45

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Paul A. Neuland, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Walter Schellenberg, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of five pages in the German language, and who swore that the same was true on the 26th day of November 1945.

I further certify that the two reports cited on pages 2 and 3 of the foregoing statement are documents contained in the official files of the Documentation Section of the Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany. I further certify that the document whose title is "Taetigkeitsund Lagebericht Nr. 6

der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR (Berichtszeit vom 1.-31.10.1941)" is document No. R-102, and that the document bearing the title "Gesamtbericht der Einsatzgruppe A bis zum 15. Oktober 1941" is document No. L-180.

[signed] Paul A. Neuland
PAUL A. NEULAND
Major, QMC
O-385720

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3711-PS

Nurnberg, 25 November 1945.

I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.

Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.

Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler who sent police forces to handle this matter.

In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as Jugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.

It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the

leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was further well-known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.

I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about cruelties of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side.

[signed] WILHELM SCHEIDT
Retired Captain of the Reserve

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of three pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 26th day of November 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3712-PS

STATEMENT

[This statement is substantially the same as the testimony given by Bach-Zelewski on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, 7 January 1946.]

1. I was born in 1899 in Lauenburg in Pomerania. In 1914 I joined the German army. I was twice wounded and received the Iron Cross Second and First Class. After 1918 I was taken on in the 100,000-man army. I had to give up active service in 1924 when two of my sisters married Jews. I remained active as a battalion commander in the Frontier Defense and also went on exercises every year as an officer of the reserve. In this war I have held various commands at the front in addition to my activities as Chief of Anti-Partisan units and on the recommendation of my superiors in the Armed Forces I have received clasps to the Iron Cross Second and First Class, the German Cross in Gold and the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross.

2. I joined the Party after the elections of September 1930, which showed that sooner or later the NSDAP would enter the government. My ideological reason was my nationalist viewpoint; my personal motive was fear of once more—as in 1924—seeing

my career and my living sacrificed because of Anti-Semitism. I hoped by joining the movement to avert the danger which was threatening my family and myself. The question of what I would do in the Party now arose. Pure politics did not appeal to me as a professional soldier. The SA leaders in my district were young men without military experience, to whom I did not wish to be subordinated. Moreover the SA refused to have anything to do with Frontier Defense. Since at this time the new semi-military body—the SS—was beginning to be set up, I joined it. Between then and 1934 I established Allgemeine SS and SS Frontier Defense units in the districts of Frankfurt/Oder and Schneidemuehl. From 1934 to the beginning of the Russian campaign I was Oberabschnittsfuehrer in East Prussia and Silesia. I was opposed to Himmler's exaggerated racial and Germanic ideas as early as 1934 when his pronouncements were becoming clearer and clearer. At the beginning of the Polish campaign and after Himmler's speech at the Wewelsburg I was filled with the profoundest misgivings because I saw that my national status would be questioned by reason of my half Slav descent and my Jewish relations.

3. At the beginning of the war I had the rank of SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Generalleutnant of the Police. I took part in the opening phase of the Russian campaign as Higher SS and Police Leader in Central Russia, i.e. in the Rearward Zone of Army Group Centre. The commander of this Rear Zone under the Army Group commander was General von Schenkendorff. I was mainly concerned with Anti-Partisan warfare. In 1941 I was promoted to the rank of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Police.

In 1943 I was appointed Chief of Anti-Partisan units, a post created for me and in which I was directly subordinated to Himmler. My functions involved close cooperation with the Wehrmacht and the use of Wehrmacht units, since SS and police units would not have sufficed by themselves. The conduct of an operation was always entrusted to that arm—whether Wehrmacht, Waffen SS, or Police—which provided most of the troops. The Wehrmacht had charge of most of the operations since it usually provided the greater part of the force. Both participants, however, had the same experiences with the result that Schenkendorff and I always agreed in our reports to Himmler and QMG of the Army.

4. The opening of Partisan warfare found the German soldier entirely unprepared. Quite apart from material losses, tens of thousands of German soldiers were without question killed by partisans, not to mention the wounded. The troops took to reprisals. These reprisals differed in scope and severity according

to the quality of the troops and the character of their commander. However, when whole peoples rise, as was the case in the east and southeast, leaders at the top who are conscious of their responsibilities cannot abandon the execution of reprisals to the caprice of individual commanders. This lack of direction in responsible quarters is a cowardly devolution of responsibility on to lower echelons. But if it is obvious to everyone that lack of direction leads to a chaos of reprisals and nevertheless no clear orders are given, then the only possible conclusion is that this chaos is intended by the leaders at the top. There is no question but that reprisals both by Wehrmacht and by SS and Police units overshot the mark by a long way. This fact was repeatedly established at conferences with Generals held by Schenkendorf. Moreover the fight against Partisans was gradually used as an excuse to carry out other measures, such as the extermination of Jews and gypsies, the systematic reduction of the Slavic peoples by some 30,000,000 souls (in order to ensure the supremacy of the German people), and the terrorization of civilians by shooting and looting. The Commanders-in-Chief with whom I came in contact and with whom I collaborated (for instance, Field Marshals von Weichs, von Kuechler, Bock and Kluge, Col. General Reinhardt and General Kitzinger) were as well aware as I of the purposes and methods of Anti-Partisan warfare. At a conference with the QMG of the Army at Headquarters I was able to establish, that he also was as well informed as I about Anti-Partisan warfare. Throughout the whole of 1943 I was flying from one C-in-C to another and organizing countless conferences and I constantly observed the close collaboration between Wehrmacht, SS, Police, and SD units. Examples of this are as follows:

(a) In the summer of 1943 the Higher SS and Police Leader in the Ukraine — Obergruppenfuehrer Pruetzmann — was given by Himmler the newly set up 1 SS Cavalry Division for the fighting against the Partisans in the Pripet marshes north of Zhitomir. I flew to Rovno in order to get information on the spot about the Partisan situation and to find out how it was proposed to use the Cavalry Division. The conference took place in the Wehrmacht casino. Not only was the Wehrmacht commander present in person, but also the two other generals and his whole staff. The Wehrmacht commander, as well as Pruetzmann, held forth at length on the situation. I got the impression that both of them were working together most closely on all details. This was further evidenced by the fact that the Wehrmacht commander kept a permanent liaison with Pruetzmann's staff in the person of the Wehrmacht Major von Bredow.

(b) The liaison between the chiefs of the SD Operations Groups and the Intelligence officers of the Army Groups was particularly close. In the case of Army Group Centre the HQ of the Chief of the Operations Group was always at the same place as the HQ of the Army Group.

(c) In Autumn 1943 almost the entire area on the junction of Army Groups North and Centre was occupied by a boldly-led Partisan group. On my map of Partisan dispositions I labelled this area "Partisan Republic." Both the competent army commander in Vitebsk—Col. General Reinhardt—and I drew attention to this danger in memoranda. These memoranda were exchanged between the RFSS HQ Staff and the OKW. It was suggested that there should be one chief of Anti-Partisan units and the supposition was that I myself should lead the undertaking, for the Partisan area overlapped the areas of two commanders. That the OKH recognized the operational significance of this undertaking is shown by the fact that it appointed a liaison officer of its own to my Battle HQ. This officer was of the greatest service to me for he kept both Army Groups currently informed on the battles my units were engaged in and also organized at Army Group the bringing up of artillery and the whole question of ammunition supply. For both these every Anti-Partisan undertaking was always referred to Wehrmacht depots anyway because the Police had no supply organization of its own. Even the fuel required for the movement of the troops could only be supplied by the Wehrmacht.

First I flew to Army Group Centre, where I and Gruppenfuehrer von Gottberg negotiated with the Chief of Staff, General Krebs, for the setting up of a Corps von Gottberg. Krebs assented to everything, the corps was set up and deployed without any sort of friction and Gottberg set up his Corps Battle HQ in Polock. Then I flew to Army Group North. First the Wehrmacht Commander (Cavalry General Bremer) Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln and I held a conference in Riga. Bremer stressed that his support went without saying as he was a bosom friend of Jeckeln. From Riga I drove with Jeckeln to Army Group at Pleskau. Here everything had been prepared for a conference. It was led by Field Marshal Kuechler in person. He had also invited the three or four army generals who were carrying on the fight against the Partisans in the North on behalf of the army. First there was a general discussion on the whole question of the Partisans and how to combat them. Kuechler himself made quite a long speech and indicated on a map which Partisan-held territories were to be pacified first. Then he turned to me and stressed

how close and good cooperation with Jeckeln was and how he could only continue to express to him his gratitude and his recognition for the services he rendered. Then we discussed the large scale undertaking planned and Kuechler promised the fullest support. While the battle was in progress Kuechler came to visit Jeckeln's Corps Battle HQ in a Fieseler-Storch aircraft.

[signed] von dem BACH 27.11.45.

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Polizei Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of seven pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 27th day of November 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3713-PS

STATEMENT

8 December 1945

As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.

At the beginning in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders Jews, political commissars, and agents were delivered up to the SD.

The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans.

[signed] ROETTIGER

STATEMENT

Supplementary to my above declaration of 8 December 1945, I declare: As I stated orally on 28 November 1945 my then Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.

Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object by peaceful means of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.

[signed] ROETTIGER

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General der Panzertruppen Hans Roettiger, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 8th day of December 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, Cav
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3714-PS

STATEMENT

During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counterintelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units

were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.

[signed] ROETTIGER

City of Nurnberg: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General Hans Roettiger, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 28th day of November 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
 WALTER H. RAPP
 Captain, CAV
 O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3715-PS

STATEMENT

I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Commando Staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for anti-partisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg, and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the

Reichscommissariate, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH SS and police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichscommissariate to support the army groups were likewise under the latter's command. Such transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichscommissariate. According to a specific agreement between Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944 mostly through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned, for compliance.

The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Drakonian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Hitler's desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents, and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above-named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.

[signed] ERNST RODE

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Ernst Rode, Major General of Police and Waffen-SS, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 30th day of November 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3716-PS

STATEMENT

As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army groups were *completely subordinate* to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because apparently they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents, and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent the same cruel death, as victims of so-called "purifications," is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. These methods were frequently mentioned, of course, in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.

[signed] ERNST RODE

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Ernst Rode, Major General of Police and Waffen-SS, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consist-

ing of one page in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 30th day of November 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3717-PS

STATEMENT

1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.

When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.

This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance all troops (security units, SS units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariate.

All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariate were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.

During anti-partisan operations *within* operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.

2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW [Keitel] to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance orders like those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the

population as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.

3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcome opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.

[signed] HEUSINGER,
Generalleutnant.

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, Walter H. Rapp, Captain, Cavalry, ASN O-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared General Heusinger to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of two pages in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 1st day of December 1945.

[signed] Walter H. Rapp
WALTER H. RAPP
Captain, CAV
O-454231

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3718-PS

STATEMENT

At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the First General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies the Commanding General of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Lemel-

sen) forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view.

[signed] BOGISLAV v. BONIN

Colonel

1 December 1945

OBERURSEL: SS

Before me, Paul A. Neuland, Major, QMC, ASN O-385720, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Colonel v. Bonin to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing "Erklaerung" (statement) consisting of one page in the German language, and swore that the same was true on the 1st day of December 1945.

[signed] Paul A. Neuland

PAUL A. NEULAND

Major, QMC

O-385720

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3719-PS

EXCERPTS

Testimony of: Alfred Rosenberg taken at: Nurnberg, Germany. 1500-1700, 6 October 1945 by: Lt. Col. Thomas S. Hinkel, IGD, OUSCC. Also Present: Interpreter: 1st Lt. Joachim Stenzel; Reporter: Pvt. Clair A. VanVleck.

[Page 3]

Q. Isn't it a fact, that Sauckel would allocate to the various areas under your jurisdiction, the number of persons to be obtained for labor purposes?

A. Yes.

Q. And that thereafter, your agents would obtain that labor, in order to meet the quota which had been given; isn't that right?

A. Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one couldn't fulfill unless one looked very closely into the matter.

Q. Never mind about Sauckel's desires being far-reaching or not being far-reaching That has nothing to do with it. You were given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and it was up to you to meet that quota?

A. Yes; it was the responsibility of the administrative officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments over the districts in such a way, according to number and according to the age groups, so they would be most reasonably met.

Q. These administrative officials were part of your organization; isn't that right?

A. They were functionaries or officials of the Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, but, as such, they were placed in their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories.

Q. You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by Sauckel could not be filled by voluntary labor, and you didn't disapprove of the impressment of forced labor; isn't that right?

A. I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary recruitments and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.

Q. Did you ever argue with Sauckel, that perhaps, in view of the fact that the quotas could not be met by voluntary labor, the labor recruiting program be abandoned except for what recruits could be voluntarily enrolled?

A. I couldn't do that, because the numbers or allotments that Sauckel had received from the Fuehrer to meet, were absolutely binding for him, and I couldn't do anything about that.

[Page 5]

Q. The letters that we have already seen between you and Sauckel, do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part with the principle of recruiting labor against their will; they indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the treatment that was later accorded these workers; that you did not oppose their initial impressment.

A. That is right. In those letters I mostly discussed the possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the matter; whereas, in no way, I placed myself in opposition to the orders that he was carrying out for the Fuehrer.

[Page 7]

Q. Do you recall receiving a letter from Sauckel in March, 1943, wherein he stated that approximately 1,000,000 foreign workers would be needed from the East, and that this 1,000,000 had to be transported within the space of four months from the date of the letter?

A. That is perfectly possible. Sauckel, in the course of his activities, as being specifically charged by the Fuehrer, has at several times transmitted to the ministry quotas of the men that had to be furnished.

Q. When these quotas were transmitted by Sauckel, did your organization then parcel the quotas out in the various places over which you had jurisdiction?

A. Normally, when such a request for a quota came in, there would be meetings between representatives of Sauckel's staff and of my staff and, occasionally, of the staff of the commissars,

in which these matters were hashed over, and, normally, I would say that, in view of the particular situation, it would be absolutely impossible to meet that particular number, but that we would try to see what could be done and never would we meet the entire quota that was given to us.

Q. But you did your best to meet it, didn't you?

A. It was their duty to do whatever they could.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3720-PS

Testimony of Albert Speer, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 18 October 1945, 1430-1700, by Lt. Col. M. I. Gurfein, AUS, OUSCC, Also present: Pfc. Sonnenfeld, Interpreter and Miss Evelyn Low, Reporter.

Q. You have already been sworn I take it?

A. Yes.

Lt. Col. Gurfein to Interpreter:

Q. Do you solemnly swear that you will truthfully, completely and accurately translate from English to German the questions and from German to English the responses of the witness given here today to the best of your ability, so help you God?

A. I do.

Q. I wanted to ask you today about the Central Planning Board?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you the chairman of that office?

A. The Central Planning Board was no office as such, it was a place where decisions were made. The Central Planning Board was not led by me but the decisions were made by three men in common—by Milch, Koerner and myself. After we took over the production department from the Ministry of Economics the fourth man, Funk, was added.

Q. And did you attend all the meetings of this Central Planning Board yourself?

A. I took part in all sessions except from February until May, when I was sick.

Q. In what year?

A. 1944.

Q. And while you were away, during February to May 1944, did you receive reports of the proceedings so as to be in touch with the situation?

A. I was kept informed of all current events by the chief of my ministry. The exact minutes of the sessions of the Central Planning Board I only read later.

Q. So that when you returned to work in May 1944 you went over all the minutes of the decisions and discussions of the Central Planning Board, I take it?

A. I don't remember this exactly but you must remember that when I returned after my sickness I came into the middle of much work and the plane attacks were going on at that time. I more or less tried to catch up with the information that I had missed with the use of certain key words in order to denote what had happened in my absence. But I will say now, frankly, that if a decision has been made, no matter what its nature, that I will tell you about it if I know about it now, even if I did not know about it at the time it was made.

Q. Who was your representative in the Central Planning Board at the time of your illness?

A. In the case of absence of one of the members of the Central Planning Board no deputy was chosen but one of the other members took over the functions of the absentee.

Q. Who was it?

A. I believe that it was Milch in this case.

Q. You mean that you were acting as the Chairman of the Central Planning Board before you became ill and that Milch took your place as Chairman?

A. There was no Chairman in the Central Planning Board as such, the three members had equal jurisdiction and powers, thus Milch was not Chairman when I was absent. In practice, however, it happened that Milch and I would usually agree upon what to do and Koerner played a subordinate part more or less.

Q. But to represent the production office of yours you must have had a man to represent your interests during the time of your illness?

A. May I say the following here. We agreed that in the Central Planning Board Milch and I would not represent special interests. If that had been so there would have had to be other representatives besides us. For instance, there should have been one for the Navy and also somebody to represent other main factors. We agreed that we would be impartial in representatives on the Board and that we would not be there as representatives of our representative Ministries.

Q. To put it clearly to you, did Kehrl work for you?

A. Kehrl was in charge of the Planning Board in 1944 and this Planning Board made a draft for the sessions of the Central Planning Board.

Q. Was Kehrl your deputy?

A. No. Well Kehrl as such had a very difficult position. He had a double position. He was in charge of the Planning Board of the Production Ministry and as such was responsible for the plans of this Ministry.

Q. To whom, to you?

A. Yes, he was my subordinate.

Q. So that you were his Minister?

A. Yes. His second function was in connection with the Planning Board of the Plenipotentiary General for Armaments. In this capacity he was responsible for the total planning which was outside the proper competence of my Ministry.

Q. And who, at that time, was the Plenipotentiary?

A. I was that and I also was the Chief of Kehrl.

Q. So that in both capacities in which Kehrl worked you were his chief, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you take over your position as chief of the Armaments Office?

A. You must differentiate here between different phases. On 8 February 1942 I took over the Army Office for Armaments, that is, I was the successor of Dr. Todt. In July 1943 I took over the Armament Office of the Navy. In September 1943 I took over the Production Office of the Ministry of Economics. And in August 1944 I took over the Armament Office of the Air Force. That was after an interim stage had been created after March of 1944 by the Jaegerstab.

Q. The Jaegerstab was a branch dealing with fighter planes, was it not, in connection with aeroplane production?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had a co-ordinate jurisdiction with Goering or Milch at that time, in the spring of 1944?

A. Yes, the Jaegerstab tried to get out of the way of any jurisdictional disputes because it could not prevent it that Goering would not give over to me completely the manufacture of air planes, even of fighter planes alone.

Q. That means that during your career in charge of armaments you went from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from responsibility to responsibility, always taking on more responsibilities?

A. Yes.

Q. So that each time that you took on a new jurisdiction you were cognizant already of the many and different problems that you were multiplying by taking on the new jurisdictions?

A. Partly this made things more difficult and partly this facilitated things. When I took over the Production Department of the Ministry of Economics this had the purpose of giving a total and more comprehensive jurisdiction over all these matters of production. Looked at as a whole, the overall control that was vested in me over production facilitated things rather than making them more difficult because it eliminated the brakes that were naturally put on it before, through control by the three separate branches of the Armed Services with their own separate Supreme Commander.

Q. That means that you were able in the first place, as you increased your jurisdiction, to get a better overall view of what resources you had at your disposal. Is that correct?

A. Yes, of course I had better possibilities of co-ordination by that and they could better meet the problems created by attacks.

Q. Your basic problems were, first, the obtaining of raw materials needed for your armaments production, is that correct?

A. This is a very complicated subject and it depends really at which phase you are looking. However, if you take a rough cross section of the whole problem then it is right to say that the raw materials created the greatest difficulties and among them certain products of the steel industry.

Q. Secondly, you also had the problem as a result of the bombing of where to locate factories and indeed the whole question of having adequate factory facilities?

A. This is a question that is extremely difficult to answer. It was my position that we should repair existing factories by committing everything we had at our disposal for this purpose. Others took the position that those factories should be relocated. I could not afford the change over to new localities from old localities because such a move always entails the loss of at least a half year's production. For instance, the aircraft industry after the intensive attacks on the fighter plane industry of February 1944 received the order from the Air Force to shift these factories and to cease all production in the present location.

Q. But in general the question of factory facilities, together with the question of raw materials were two of the larger problems that you had to meet?

A. Yes.

Q. There was always a third, was there not, and that was the question of obtaining a sufficient supply of labour?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with the obtaining of a sufficient labour supply, what were the alternatives that you had before you? I am now talking of the sources of labour supply?

A. To the first degree the manpower which I should receive from the employment offices, that is through Sauckel's department. Do you want me to mention all the details?

Q. Yes.

A. So far as Sauckel is concerned, the manpower we received from him was that which was made available by the shifting of German industry and we knew these under the heading of "Fluctuation". Then German manpower that could be naturally mobilized. Then the foreign manpower that was made available by Sauckel from abroad. Then a great source was also the prisoners of war, that is for total production. However, most of these were already distributed before my time. That is so because there were almost no prisoners of war coming in after 1942. The next were the workers that came from concentration camps.

Q. And this now represented all the sources of labour that you had at your disposal?

A. In the great outline, yes.

Q. Without pausing to discuss the various types of German labour that were available because that is fairly obvious, what types of foreign labour did you have available?

A. When you talk of foreign workers you cannot look at it in that way that they were directly available to me. It was handled in such a manner that the employment offices would assign German and foreign workers and then I would be informed about the total numbers of workers that were available.

Q. Obviously, the number of workers that were available or were to be supplied fluctuated, did it not?

A. Yes, they fluctuated.

Q. So that when you say that before you took office the foreign workers had already been distributed or allocated, naturally after you took office there had to be constant additions to the numbers?

A. There is a mistake. Only the prisoners of war were distributed before I entered my office, not the foreign workers. That is so because the bulk of the prisoners of war were taken in 1940 and 1941 and were then distributed.

Q. Do you mean by that that up to the time when you took office foreign workers were not being used in Germany?

A. Yes, I believe they were already there but I cannot say exactly in what numbers.

Q. When you took over your office for the first time you must have made a survey of the available manpower for the armaments industry generally, did you not?

A. When I took over my office for the first time you must remember that I was an architect and not an expert in these matters. In other words I had to get familiar with the job first and I did not find any exact information about it. To this must be added that I received intensive programs for armaments from the Army Armament office. These had already been given to Todt who was my predecessor but for the realization of these plans, this department (the Armament Office of the Army) calculated the necessary supply of materials and manpower.

Q. When for the first time did you make a survey of what the available manpower was in Germany to meet your tasks?

A. I never made any such investigation because it was not my task to ascertain what the total manpower was in Germany that would be available.

Q. I didn't mean for you to make the survey directly but you could have asked somebody for it, as for example, Sauckel?

A. I made a survey at that time how much manpower I could obtain from the building program, that is, if building was to be interrupted for an extended period of time. This survey showed that approximately one and a half million labourers or workers could be drawn from the building program if drastic reductions were effected. If I remember correctly this calculation was not precise but merely estimated. It did not only include the workers who worked directly in the building industries but those who gave material assistance to the building industry.

Q. Did there come a time when you had to estimate the needs for foreign workers in Germany?

A. I never estimated it in this manner.

Q. In what manner did you estimate the needs for foreign workers for the German armaments industries?

A. It was not my task to estimate how many or how much manpower I needed from abroad but rather I had to rely upon the amount of foreign and German workers that Sauckel could make available to me. I want to say the following here. I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny the fact that I demanded manpower and foreign manpower from Sauckel very energetically.

Q. With respect to this foreign manpower that you were requesting from Sauckel, what means did you discuss as to how these foreign workers could be brought into Germany?

A. I believe that regarding the first phase and I think that we are talking about that right now, Sauckel emphasized the fact that the foreign manpower was coming voluntarily into Germany. As far as I remember the voluntary manpower at that time was the manpower originating in the Ukraine.

Q. What period are you talking about now when you discuss this voluntary coming of workers, especially from the Ukraine?

A. I don't know how long the manpower from the Ukraine actually came voluntarily.

Q. When did you first find out then that some of the manpower from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily?

A. It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that at some particular point of time that the manpower from the Ukraine did not come voluntarily.

Q. And does that apply also to the manpower from other occupied countries, that is, did there come a time when you knew that they were not coming voluntarily?

A. Yes.

Q. When, in general, would you say that time was, without placing a particular month of the year?

A. As far as the Ukraine situation goes I believe that they did not come voluntarily any more after a few months because immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I should say offhand that this time was either in July, August or September of 1942.

Q. And as to the other occupied countries, for example Poland, when did you find out that foreign workers were being brought in against their will?

A. I believe that I received almost no manpower from Poland. That was because Polish manpower usually was allocated into agriculture, that was an old tradition or old practice with us.

Q. Just by the way, you used Polish workers in the mines didn't you?

A. Yes, but they lived there. That was in the Polish part of the Upper Silesia. In the Ruhr coal mines Russian prisoners of war were used in the main. And by the way I only took over this aspect of production in September 1943.

Q. With respect to the Czechs, when did you first find out that Czech workers were being sent into Germany against their will?

A. As far as Czech workers are concerned, I believe that only on one occasion was a recruitment program carried out there and that was done by the Air Force. If I remember correctly 80,000 Czech workers were recruited to be taught certain techniques in Germany and then returned to their homes. The Governor Frank of the Protectorate had a hard fight against this taking away of manpower from his area and in exchange he always offered an increase of production in his area.

Q. With respect to Dutch workers for example, when did you first find out that Dutch workers that were not volunteers were being brought into the Reich for work?

A. With the best intentions I cannot make a differentiation here between the different nations because, as such, I was not interested in the distribution of manpower that came from the west.

Q. But many workers actually did come from the west did they not, to Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. That means then that the great majority of the workers that came from the western countries, the western occupied countries, came against their will to Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. Who made the decision to take these foreign workers against their will into Germany?

A. It was the task of Sauckel to make decisions like that.

Q. But surely Sauckel by himself could not make a decision of as far-reaching international importance as that?

A. Sauckel as Gauleiter stood in immediate connection with Bormann and Bormann, if asked by Sauckel, would report on this to Hitler. It was necessary to give the competent military commanders the decisions that had been reached in this matter and I believe that nobody outside of Goering or Hitler would have been able to so instruct the military commanders and as far as I remember the Foreign Minister of the Reich had to be consulted several times in order to come to some agreement with the French Government.

Q. That is Herr von Ribbentrop you mean?

A. Yes.

Q. Personally?

A. I cannot say this exactly because I was not present but I do believe that Bormann instructed Ribbentrop personally about the wishes of the Fuehrer.

Q. At any rate, it is clear is it not, that you understood at the time that you were requesting labour through Sauckel that a good

part of this labour was coming from foreign workers who were being involuntarily brought to the Reich?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you personally present at any discussions concerning the advisability or the necessity of obtaining foreign workers by coercive means?

A. Sauckel usually effected his discussions with the Fuehrer alone. I was present at one discussion which took place in January 1944 and I mentioned it to you the other day. That is one where I was present.

Q. Would you mind repeating the substance of that very briefly?

A. This already belongs to a period where I had differences with Sauckel about the exploitation of the occupied areas of the west and I think it would be going too far if I was to go into all the details all over—it appears in a previous interrogation. At that time I tried to increase the productive output of the western countries and thus exploit their industrial potential and I was very much against the coercive measures used by Sauckel. Thus it was difficult for me not only to find manpower there but they also fled the factories where they had worked.

Q. That relates to 1944. Let us go back to as early as 1942. Did you ever have any conferences with the Fuehrer concerning the necessity or the desirability of using means of coercion?

A. I have handed over all the minutes of the conferences which I had with the Fuehrer. In itself the commitment of labour may be a very important thing. However, it was only a small part of my total activity. If there is any reference made in those minutes then I might be able to tell you more about it when I read it again.

Q. Without looking at the minutes to start with, were you in general in agreement with the policy of forcing civilian labour from the occupied territories to come to the Reich against their will?

A. Yes, I concurred in that because it was my opinion that this was done in an orderly and legal manner. I believe that I didn't have to go into all the details but I think that you may be well familiar with all the reasons why one could concur in such a policy. The last analysis of this ends in the legality of the French Government.

Q. How about the workers from the Ukraine, will you please state what reasons you had for concurring with that policy?

A. No, there are no reasons.

Q. How about with the Dutch?

A. There are no reasons there either. In the last analysis the individual responsibility for the manpower being deported out of the country was the competent deputy of Adolf Hitler in that country. I believe that I could not have refused to use the manpower that came from abroad any more than a factory manager can have done that.

Q. Leaving out the question of your own responsibility for the moment, is it your view then that the deputy of the Fuehrer in Holland, for example, was guilty of a crime in forcing these Dutch people to come into the Reich against their will?

A. I cannot answer that question.

Q. Before, you started to say that there was no legal reason, as I understood it, why it was possible to bring in foreign workers against their will and you stated that in the case of France it depended upon the recognition of an independent French Government but that in the case of Dutch workers for example there was no reason that you could give?

A. Yes.

Q. I ask you, then, when you state that there were no grounds to offer, I understood you to mean that there were no grounds legally which could be offered to support or defend the bringing in of Dutch workers against their will into Germany?

A. No, I cannot defend that and it was not my task either to investigate these things or to defend them.

Q. But I ask you now as you sit here whether there is any argument or ground that you can advance to justify legally the deportation into Germany of these Dutch workers against their will?

A. You mean on legal grounds?

Q. Or a moral one?

A. I had a correspondence with Sauckel in the Spring of 1944 and in a letter he accused me that I was calling the foreign workers in Germany deported workers. He stated that those foreign workers had been legally taken to Germany and there could be no talk of deportation.

Q. But when you wrote to Sauckel in the spring of 1944 you believed, did you as you state, that these workers had in fact been deported from Holland?

A. Yes, it was my opinion that they had been forced to come to Germany.

Q. And that opinion you held for a considerable period of time before you wrote the letter to Sauckel?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever object to anybody about this policy of bringing labour from the occupied countries into Germany against their will?

A. Yes, I did that at the moment when the transport of foreign workers did great damage to me as far as the production in the occupied areas is concerned.

Q. But I mean on moral or legal grounds, did you ever object?

A. I cannot remember that but I will think about it.

Q. So that during the period when you were asking for labour it seems clear, does it not, that you knew that you were obtaining foreign labour as well as domestic labour in response to your requests and that a large part of the foreign labour was forced labour?

A. Yes.

Q. So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on January 1, 1944, you required 50,000 workers for a given purpose would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, knowing that in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers?

A. Yes.

Q. One of the other categories that you mentioned at the beginning was labour from the concentration camps. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. This labour that was in the concentration camps, did you requisition that as you did other labour?

A. As far as I know, the allocation of manpower from concentration camps was directly negotiated between the Commandants of the concentration camps and the factory managers without consultation of my department for the commitment of labour but not of Sauckels. Sauckel knows exactly what I thought about it but I cannot say with certainty just how this was.

Q. So that I take it that in the case of the concentration camp labour your office was in even more direct relation to it than in the case of the foreign workers because Sauckel did not have to intervene in the matter?

A. I believe yes but I cannot say exactly but this can be ascertained. At any rate Sauckel was excluded from this matter. I cannot say whether this would be applicable in every case, Sauckel could tell you, I don't know whether the employment office

was excluded in every such case because they had to ascertain the needs.

Q. But, in general, the use of concentration camp labour was known to you and approved by you as a source of labour?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates of the concentration camps there were both Germans and foreigners?

A. I didn't think about it at that time.

Q. As a matter of fact you visited the Austrian concentration camp personally did you not?

A. I didn't—well I was in Mauthausen once but at that time I was not told just to what categories the inmates of the concentration camps belonged.

Q. But in general everybody knew, did they not, that foreigners who were taken away by the Gestapo, or arrested by the Gestapo, as well as Germans, found their way into the concentration camps?

A. Of course, yes. I didn't mean to imply anything like that.

Q. Were there any other special categories of foreign workers that were separately treated as, for example, Jews?

A. In 1942 for instance we used Jews in German factories.

Q. Foreign Jews or German Jews?

A. I believe German Jews.

Q. Put your mind on foreign Jews. Did you use those for forced labour in Germany?

A. As far as foreign Jews are concerned, Hungarian Jews were used in the building program.

Q. And when was that—in 1944?

A. Yes that was in 1944.

Q. Who made the decision to use the Hungarian Jews for this building work?

A. There is a history to that. Do you want me to tell you about it?

Q. Yes please, briefly?

A. Hitler had the intention to build great underground aeroplane factories in the fall of 1943. He gave an order to that effect. However, I did not concur in that and therefore I did not execute the order in all its strictness. In March of 1944 the director of the Central Organization Todt office submitted plans for those to Hitler. This was during the period of my illness. In this connection he stated that the building should be finished within six months. Hitler gave Dosch a direct order build these

six factories outside the normal competence of my Ministry. There were several big differences in this question between Goering and myself and also between Hitler and myself. As a result of these differences I received a written order from Hitler that Dosch was to build the six factories. The order should still be there. As far as I know the Hungarian Jews were made available for the building of these six factories by direct negotiations that Dosch carried out.

Q. Carried out with whom?

A. I don't know exactly and I cannot say this because all this took place during the period of my illness but I believe there is a note about that with the official papers that are in your possession.

Q. When did you recover from your illness?

A. In the middle of May 1944.

Q. Did you transact any business during April 1944 before you were completely recovered?

A. Of course I always had to do a few things in spite of my illness.

Q. Where were you actually while you were ill?

A. At first I was in Hohenlychen, that was because I had an infection of the knee, from there I went to Klessheim, near Salzburg and from there to Merano.

Q. And where were you in April 1944?

A. In Merano.

Q. Did you transact business from Merano?

A. Yes, I did this in a restricted measure. I was there to recover but every three or four days something came up.

Q. And did your people bring you papers to sign also?

A. Yes, I believe, yes.

Q. I want to ask you again, did you not personally order the arrangements to be made for the deportation of 100,000 Hungarian Jews for the project you have described?

A. No, I did not order that personally.

Q. I want to show you a letter of 17 April 1944, a photostat, and ask you to read it through and tell me whether you wrote that letter or dictated it?

A. As is apparent from the two letters TAE and the No. 474-44 it is evident that this originated in the Technical Department. The minutes of the discussions with the Fuehrer were always published under my name in order to give them the greatest possible authority. This is the result of such a discussion which took place during my illness. I did not write this. Sauer was the author of this document.

Q. And before this document was written you already knew and participated in the discussions as you have previously told us, about the obtaining of 100,000 Hungarian Jews for this Dosch project?

A. I believe that this is the same but it is out of the question that I participated in it because I was sick at the time.

Q. But you did tell us the history of the thing a little while ago concerning the requirements for the Dosch project and as I understood it you said that you knew that the Hungarian Jews were to be brought into Germany for purposes of this project. Is this correct?

A. I only didn't know the date any more. I didn't know whether this was before or after. At any rate it was not before the discussion that took place with Hitler at that time.

Q. What was not before, the letter or the knowledge?

A. What I mean to say is that I didn't know about the coming of those 100,000 Hungarian Jews to Germany before this letter was written or before the discussion took place with Hitler.

Q. But when you recovered and before the Hungarian Jews actually came you knew about it, is that what you mean?

A. When I recovered, of course I knew that those Hungarian Jews were coming to Germany. I didn't know at this time they actually were in Germany and had been obtained for this program.

Q. Did you object in any way to the use or to the transport of these Hungarian Jews by force?

A. No.

Q. I just wanted to ask you with respect to the coal miners, did you ever issue instructions to the effect that foreign workers to be used as coal miners should not be given the same medical examination as German miners?

A. No. As far as I know the right society for coal and coal products determined the foreign workers in the camps and determined whether they were to be used as miners.

Q. Do you remember being at a meeting of the Central Planning Board on the 22 July 1942?

A. I cannot say it just like that but it must be so.

Q. I want to show you a copy of the minutes of the meeting and ask you whether you recognize that you were present at the meeting?

A. Do you want me to read all of it?

Q. Yes?

A. I believe that the verbatim report of this should still be in existence and from that it could be determined who made the suggestion that the "Knappschaft doctors should be informed that prisoners of war should be judged differently from German miners". I could not give directives of any kind to the Knappschaft doctors, not even in my capacity as being a member of the Central Planning Board.

Q. Well Germany was an authoritarian state at the time. Somebody could give orders to the coal miners doctors as to the physical standard they should apply, could they not?

A. Yes, but I didn't know who that was and in my opinion it was the Ministry of Labour who was competent in any social questions. Or the trade supervisors which were in the Labour Ministry.

Q. At any rate you do not deny that you were present at the meeting at which the suggestion was made and you did not take exception to it?

A. I cannot remember it any more but I certainly did not object to it.

Q. I asked you towards the beginning whether you ever had any conversations with Hitler concerning the policy decision of employing compulsion with respect to the obtaining of foreign labour. Do you remember that?

A. Yes I remember it and I repeat my answer that I could find out from the minutes whether such discussions took place.

Q. I will show you a protocol of the conferences with the Fuehrer on the 10th, 11th and 12th August 1942, written up by you and call your attention particularly to what is recorded as Page 16 and ask you to read it and see if it refreshes your recollection?

A. It is certain that the conference took place, otherwise it would not have been contained here.

Q. Does that, after looking at it and after thinking about it, refresh your recollection a little as to the circumstances of the meeting and the discussion?

A. May I have the night to think about it and I am sure that I will remember something about it then. You must take into account that during a conversation with the Fuehrer thirty or forty different points were brought up and that such discussions took place almost every three weeks. You must furthermore take into account the fact that all these documents that you show me now, you received from me, so then you can believe me that I am not trying to hide anything.

Q. The question I want to ask you is not so much whether you remember this particular conference as whether it does not remind you that you did discuss at some time or other with Hitler the question of compulsion of foreign labour?

A. That was certainly the case and it is apparent from this note. To this I must add that Hitler would rather see foreign workers in Germany than in production in the foreign countries. I further wish to add that if you go through the minutes of the conferences with Hitler you will find that the commitment of labour was frequently discussed in the beginning, that is in August and September 1942 and that from there on there are no further points on this subject contained therein. This is due to the fact that at that time the differences between me and Sauckel already existed in that Sauckel discussed his problems either directly with Hitler or Bormann.

Q. But is it clear to you, Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the decisions were being taken concerning the use of forced foreign labour that you participated in the discussions yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. So that I take it that the execution of the program of bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been taken with your agreement?

A. Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of the manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made available to me, a far larger part of it was allocated to other departments that demanded them.

Q. A certain number of these foreign workers were used specifically for the armament industries under your control, were they not?

A. I don't quite understand the question that you are putting to me. It goes without saying that a certain amount of the workers were employed by me it was no specific part of the workers.

Q. So that some of the workers at least who were brought into Germany against their will from the occupied countries were used for the manufacture of munitions of war and weapons?

A. Not just some of them, a great part of them.

Q. Did you ever, in connection with the obtaining of foreign civilian labour from the occupied countries, participate in any discussions about making them prisoners of war and then taking them into Germany?

A. I remember that something similar to that was discussed. I remember that this question came up in connection with Russia and when we retired from there. The soldiers said that the male

population was used to fill the Russian ranks and they were being armed and it was discussed whether it would not be better to make them prisoners of war and take them to Germany instead of having them fight against us.

Q. In other words, you say that you were present at a discussion where it was proposed that ordinary civilians who were not bearing arms or in uniform were to be arrested and made prisoners of war as if they had been combatants?

A. I cannot say it in just this manner but I suppose you have a document which makes this apparent.

Q. No, but I would like you to rely on your own recollection too, if you were present as you said you were. But please tell us from your own memory?

A. Look here, you really must not expect too much from my memory. I had a great number of worries but rest assured I would say so if I remembered that such a discussion had taken place. As far as I know it was not only a question of committing manpower but also a military question. With the best intentions I could not swear to it.

Q. I want to show you then a minute of a conference with the Fuehrer which you signed, dated 8 July 1943 with a No. 17 on it and ask you please to read it through?

A. This is quite so as Hitler said that in these cases very determined action had to be taken.

Q. And you did not object to it, I take it?

A. No, I did not object.

Q. I would like to call your attention, if I may, to the fact that the reason given is that Russian prisoners of war are needed in the amount of approximately 150,000 to 200,000 for the mines and that if these prisoners could not be released by the Army then action would be taken against the civilian population.

A. That is what the document says, yes.

Q. So that the basis of the decision, as explained in the document, was not protect the military interests but for the purpose of obtaining needed labour. Is not that correct?

A. I don't know this exactly but it is a fact that in July 1943 I was not responsible for coal; as the document sets forth Sauckel and Pleiger were responsible to execute these orders and that they were to report to Hitler. As the document furthermore states, I merely requested a copy of this report for myself.

Q. So that, as I understand it, these Russian civilians that were to be brought in were not to be used only for the coal mines but also for the armament industry as well?

A. No, I believe that coal in the first degree. It should also be investigated whether this was ever carried out. You cannot say that every order that was given by Hitler was always carried out. And I believe that at this time the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups had different worries than just to carry out such measures.

Q. What interests me was that you said that you wanted a copy to be sent to you and you also state that you did not have coal mines in your jurisdiction but in fact you did have the armament industry in your jurisdiction and I ask you whether those workers that were not suitable for coal mines were not to be put under your supervision for armament work?

A. There are two reasons why I was interested in a copy of this. The reason you gave is undoubtedly correct. It is evident that only a part, say about half those workers, were suitable to work in coal mines. The other half was available for other purposes. In the Central Planning Board Pleiger was responsible for the handling of the coal production and then as a member of the Central Planning Board I was interested whether the manpower that was promised by Sauckel would be actually available. This was because coal production was the base of the total production.

Q. Let me ask you another thing with respect to this memorandum of the 8 July meeting 1943, it is stated in that—and I will read it in German and then translate it:

“The Fuehrer ordered at the same time that these prisoners of war who are not fit for the mines should immediately be placed in the Iron industry in the manufacturing and supply industry and in the armament industry”.

Was that the general policy with respect to the use of prisoners of war?

A. No. The fact was that the remainder of the workers that could not be used in coal mining were free for other uses. It was my purpose in this conference to secure at the same time those workers for other purposes that could not be used in the coal mines. It was the general line that Sauckel was responsible for the distribution and allocation of manpower. I want to add here that it is not certain that Sauckel actually carried out such a plan.

Q. What I meant to ask you generally is, was it the policy to employ prisoners of war in the armaments factories?

A. Not only the armament industry came under my jurisdiction but also the subsidiary industry of the Iron Products Industries. And my total competence was not defined as that of a

Minister for Production, as is done in other countries, but as a Minister for Armaments.

Q. But regardless of your competence or jurisdiction, was it a general practice to employ prisoners of war in the making of munitions?

A. I believe that prisoners of war were employed in armament factories but I did not pay any attention to this fact.

Q. Did they include only Russian prisoners of war or did that also include British, American, French, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian prisoners of war?

A. That includes all prisoners of war. It was not my opinion that I had any obligation to pay attention to this, and I don't know whether the conditions which I found in 1942 as far as it concerns prisoners of war were ever changed during my time.

Q. Let me understand; when you wanted labour from prisoners of war did you requisition prisoners of war separately or did you ask for a total number of workers?

A. Only Schmelter can answer that exactly. As far as the commitment of prisoner of war labour goes it was effected through employment officers of the Stalags. I tried several times to increase the total number of prisoners of war that were occupied in the production at the expense of other demand factors.

Q. Will you explain that a little more?

A. In the last phase of production, that is in the year 1944 when everything collapsed, I had 40% of all prisoners of war employed in the production. I wanted to have this percentage increased.

Q. And when you say employed in the production you mean in these subsidiary industries that you have discussed and also in the production of weapons and munitions, is that right?

A. Yes. That is the total extent of my task.

Q. Did you ever discuss any means of raising the productive capacity of prisoners of war?

A. Yes. As a matter of fact we sent circulars to the factory managers in order to tell them how the prisoners of war should be treated so that their productive capacity could be raised. One circular was sent out in either April or May 1944. I know that because I just read it. I believe that it is exemplary so far as the recommendations go for the prisoners of war.

Q. And did that include also the treatment of prisoners of war who were working in weapons and munitions factories?

A. This was a general circular that was sent to all the managers of the factories. You must remember the fact here that

some of the armament industry also produces other goods, take Krupp for instance, in addition to producing armaments they produce locomotives and other products.

Q. Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of Krupp for foreign labor?

A. It is certain that it was reported to me what lack Krupp had in foreign workers.

Q. Did you ever discuss it with any of the members of the Krupp firm?

A. I cannot say that exactly but during the time of my activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and it is certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of manpower.

Q. Did you ever discuss the labour problem with Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach?

A. I think that this is out of the question because Krupp was very old and I only saw him once during the years of my activity. If any such question came up it was discussed with the responsible directors of the factory.

Q. Did these directors ask you for foreign labour?

A. It is probable that they reported to me the total needs in manpower. It is not probable that they informed me about their requirements for foreign labour unless they had the opinion that at that time German manpower was not available.

Q. Coming back to the full use of the capacities of prisoners of war, was it ever suggested in any conference that you know about that the productive powers of prisoners of war could be increased by giving jurisdiction over them to the SS?

A. No, I cannot remember that.

Q. Did you ever see the minutes of such a meeting? I will show you a memorandum of a conference of Sauer with the Fuehrer and others, dated 6 March 1944 in Berlin?

A. I cannot say whether this was the case. This conference took place in March of 1944, that is, during the period of my illness. If there is a notation on the document—Gesehen Speer, then I saw the document after my illness.

Q. In connection with your trip to Austria, was it the purpose of your trip to establish concentration camps close to the side of factories so that the concentration camp inmates could be readily used as labour in the new factories?

A. When was that trip to Austria?

Q. Was that in 1941?

A. In 1941? I was not a Minister then.

Q. What were you then?

A. I was an architect in 1941. That was not 1941 it must be later.

Q. You had discussions with—

A. I cannot remember the name at the moment.

Q. Do you know Eigruber?

A. Yes, it must have been about 1943 or 1944 but I don't know exactly. I will think about it. The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps near the factories in order to use the manpower that was available there was a general fact. But it did not only come up in connection with this trip.

(Whereupon at 1700, 18 October 1945, the hearing was adjourned.)

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3721-PS

EXCERPTS

Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 10:30 to 12:10, 22 September 1945, by John J. Monigan, Jr., Major, CAC, USCC. Also present: Jesse F. Landrum, Capt., AGD, Court Reporter, and T/5 Gunter Kosse, Interpreter.

[Page 10]

Q. Would the Central Planning Commission, in their outline of workers to be provided for agriculture and for Speer and for Milch's industries, etc., just give you the numbers of workers which they required, or would you get the allocation of the workers, too, say panzers and machine guns, and so on, from the Central Planning Commission?

A. In general, I always got the numbers for the sections in large but except for Speer who always demanded individual numbers of workers for all agricultural works or mining industries; in other words, Speer always demanded a certain amount of workers for each work.

Q. Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in general for the broad field, but in Speer's work you would get them allocated by industry, and so on, is that right?

A. The others I only got whatever was left, because Speer told me once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for Speer and that mainly I am his man; * * *

EXCERPTS

Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 October 1945, 1030-1200, by Major John J. Monigan, Jr., CAC, OUSCC. Also present: Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter and S/Sgt William A. Weigel, Court Reporter.

[Page 10]

Q. For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

[Page 11]

Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives, was it not?

A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do, and the same applied to other countries.

[Page 12]

Q. Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating quotas in the General Government Poland?

A. Yes. I have to basically state again that the only possibility I had in carrying through these matters was to get in touch with the highest German military authority in the respective country and to transfer to them the orders of the Fuehrer and ask them very urgently, as I have always done, to fulfill these orders.

Q. Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the General Governor Frank?

A. Yes. I spent a morning and afternoon in Cracov twice or three times, and I personally spoke to General Governor Frank. Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebbel.

[Page 14]

Q. Was the procedure the same regarding discussions and allocations of quotas for the territory of the East with Rosenberg?

A. As far as it concerns the Eastern territory, that was ordered through Reichsminister Rosenberg; yes. My representative was Staatsrat Peukert. Staatsrat Peukert had a very close connection with Rosenberg in his Department of Labor, and at the same time he was working for the Reichskommissar in the Ukraine, and he was also working in the Labor Staff East for General Stapf. This was an economic institution of the Four Year Plan, for the operational functions in the East which have

been subordinate to the Army chiefs. In those three instances Staatsrat Peukert was my representative, as leader for the Department of Labor.

[Page 15]

Q. Was it necessary in order to accomplish the completion of the quotas given to have liaison with the OKW?

A. I remember that the Fuehrer had given directives to Marshal Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one, and I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions with the Fuehrer, when I asked him for his support.

Q. It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying out their assigned mission, was it not?

A. Yes. The Fuehrer had told me that he would inform the chief of the OKW, and the Chief of the Reichschancellery, as to these matters. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.

Q. The methods by which the quotas were filled in the occupied countries was the task of the civilian or military commander concerned, as we have just discussed before, was it not?

A. Yes, naturally. Yes, the executive rights naturally rested with him. However, he received advice and technical expert advice from the representative of the labor administration.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3723-PS

Testimony of GOTTLIEB BERGER, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, on 20 September 1945, 1030-1207, by Col. Howard A. Brundage, JAGD, OUSCC. Also present: Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter and Pvt. Clair Van Vleck, Court Reporter.

COLONEL BRUNDAGE TO THE INTERPRETER:

Q. Will you state your name?

A. Siegfried Ramler.

Q. By whom are you employed?

A. Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel.

Q. What are your present duties?

A. Interpreter.

Q. Will you stand, please. Do you solemnly swear that you will truly and accurately translate from German into English and English into German, all of the testimony to be given at this hearing?

A. I do, so help me God.

COLONEL BRUNDAGE TO THE WITNESS
THROUGH THE INTERPRETER:

Q. You are the same Gottlieb Berger, who appeared before me yesterday?

A. Yes, I was here yesterday.

Q. During 1944, will you tell me what your duties and functions were in connection with prisoners of war?

A. Yes. May I first present to you for the record a chart of my chief office, as I mentioned yesterday.

Q. Yes.

A. I testified under oath yesterday and I do not want to give the impression that I want to keep quiet about anything regarding my office.

Q. Let the record show that the witness has presented a hand-written chart, showing the organization of the SS office.

A. SS Chief Office.

Q. And on the reverse side is the whole organizational frame of the Reichsfuehrer SS Heydrich Himmler. Was Kaltenbrunner the superior of Pohl?

A. No. All these twelve chiefs that I mentioned here were always directly responsible to Himmler.

Q. Do you know what the duties and functions of Kaltenbrunner were?

A. He was the Chief of the whole Security Police.

Q. What did he have to do with concentration camps?

A. He was the man who executed orders. He was the last man because Mueller was subordinate to him.

Q. Then Pohl didn't fit into that chain of command?

A. Yes; Pohl did not fit into that chain because the whole organization is not organic. It was a specialty of Himmler to give one task to two different people.

Q. Just what did Kaltenbrunner do?

A. This is very difficult to answer. He had his service post in Berlin there. The different group chiefs that I have mentioned here, such as Mueller, Nebe, I have written it all down, Dr. Schellenberg, they conferred with him daily; and there, in this conference, all the difficulties, shall I say, the more important problems that occurred in the different groups, were discussed and decided upon. Starting early summer 1944, Kaltenbrunner personally conferred with Hitler without having Himmler there. While otherwise, Himmler was always careful to see that none of his men had conferences with the Fuehrer, without his being present too.

Q. As Security Police, what were, normally, his duties?

A. He was the guarantor of the interior security and order inside Germany.

Q. That put him at the head of the Gestapo; is that right?

A. Yes. He had all the interior police under him, not only the Gestapo, but also the criminal police and the SD under him.

Q. When people were arrested and put into concentration camps, that was done with Kaltenbrunner's men?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he also have the authority to name the camp in which these men were going to be placed?

A. Certainly.

Q. Did he also have the authority to issue orders to the commandant of the camp?

A. Certainly.

Q. He also was superior to the Death-head Guards and, likewise, the civilian employees of the camps?

A. No; that was Glucks. May I add something to this?

Q. Yes.

A. When I say that he certainly had the right to give orders to camp commandant, I mean to say that whenever I tried to get somebody out of a concentration camp, I have never been able to do so without the consent of Mueller, and that also means Kaltenbrunner.

Q. Mueller was his direct assistant?

A. Yes; directly under him.

Q. Assuming, only for the purposes of this discussion, that these atrocities that we hear about are true, who do you think is primarily responsible?

A. The first one, the commandant; the second one, Glucks, because he was practically responsible for all the interior direction of the camps. If one wants to be exact, one would have to find out how the information service between the camp commandant and Glucks actually operated. I want to give you the following example; during the night of the 22nd and 23rd of April, I was sent to Munich. As I entered the city, I met a group of perhaps 120 men dressed in the suit of the concentration camps. These people made a very starved impression on me. I asked the guard who was with them: "What about those men." He told me that these men were marching, by foot, to the Alps. Firstly, I sent him back to Dachau. Then I wrote a letter to the commandant, to send no more people by foot to any place, but whenever the Allies advanced any further, to give over the camp completely. I

did that on my own responsibility and I told him that I came straight from Berlin and that I can be found in my service post in Munich. The commandant, or his deputy, telephoned at about twelve o'clock and told me that he had received this order from Kaltenbrunner, after he had been asked by the Gauleiter of Munich, the Reichskommissar. It could be that even Gauleiters, in their nature as Reich Defense Commissars, have directly mixed up in concentration camps and have also given direct orders to the concentration camps.

Q. What was the result of this letter that you wrote to the commandant of Dachau?

A. Everything went in order for two days, and about on the 28th of April, when I returned from Kesselring, I saw, perhaps, 500 men in terrible condition near Wolfratshausen, 60 kilometers south of Munich. I held them up. At that time they were at an explosive works and I gave the order to the group leader to house the men immediately in the empty barracks that were near the street and to hold up further troops. I got in touch with the Kreisleiter in Wolfratshausen myself, as I could not get in touch with the Landrat, and he promised me to care for them. He actually kept his promise, as I found out in the following days. In spite of my order to keep the men there, and in spite of the same order that came from Kaltenbrunner, the Reich defense Commissar said that he supposedly got an order from the Fuehrer, in which it was stated that these camps have to be cleared immediately. There was quite a clear mix-up where the Gauleiter dealt with the things directly.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3724-PS

EXCERPTS

Testimony of Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht taken at "Dustbin", July 11, 1945, 1050 by C. J. Hynning.

[Pages 6 and 7]

Q. What were differences between you and Hitler in 1937 when you left the Ministry of Economics?

A. He had put Goering in command of the Economy—everything. He also wanted to command over the affairs of the Ministry of Economics. I was opposed to that. I objected to that and asked my dismissal.

Q. Did you ask for a dismissal?

A. I asked for a resignation for dismissal. He had to dismiss me. I had asked for that. I told him that I did not want to conduct that ministry under the order of Goering.

Q. What month was that?

A. August 1937. I think beginning of August '37. It took me two and a half months to get my resignation.

Q. Goering was appointed chief of Four Year Plan in October 1936. Your disagreement arose approximately one year later.

A. Nine months later—July 1937.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3725-PS

EXCERPTS FROM INTERROGATION OF
DR. HJALMAR SCHACHT on 20 July, 1945 at 2.45 p.m.
at "Dustbin". Interrogator: C. J. Hynning

[Pages 23 and 24]

Q. When did you next see Goering?

A. He invited me to a party in his house for the first of January 1931, where I met Hitler.

Q. Did you meet anybody else?

A. At that party Fritz Thyssen was also present, and that evening Hitler made a long speech, for almost two hours, although the company was a small one.

Q. Was that a monologue?

A. An entire monologue and everything that he said was reasonable and moderate that night.

Q. What did he say?

A. Oh, ideas he expressed before, but it was full of will and spirit.

Q. What did he say?

A. He elaborated his program as it was outlined more extensively in his book.

Q. And in the party platform?

A. Yes, also the party platform. But the platform is very short and brief, it is not so full of general phrases.

Q. Were there any prominent officers present?

A. No.

Q. Any industrialists like Fritz Thyssen?

A. No.

Q. What was your impression at the end of that evening?

A. I thought that Hitler was a man with whom one could cooperate.

Q. Did you think he was a man of the future and that you had to deal with him as a man of the future?

A. Well, I could not know that at the time.

Q. Did you think it desirable to join the Nazi Party at that time?

A. I can't tell you as to that time, but if his ideas, which he developed that night, were backed by a big party, as it seemed to be, I think that one could join that group for public purposes.
[Pages 27 and 28]

Q. Let us then direct our attention to February and March 1933. I have been told by Goering and by Funk and Baron von Schnizler and also by Thyssen, that there was a meeting held in the house of Goering of certain prominent German industrialists at which you were also present in 1933. This was after Hitler became chancellor but before the elections of that spring. Hitler came into the meeting and made a short speech and left. Then, according to the testimony of Funk, you passed the hat. You asked the industrialists to support the Nazi Party financially to the tune of approximately 7, 8, 9 or 10 million marks. Do you recall that?

A. I recall that meeting very well. And I have answered the same question to Major Tilley. It must be in one of my former memorandums or in the hearings done by Major Tilley. As far as I remember, the meeting was not in Goering's house, but in some hotel room I think, or some other more public room. After Hitler had made his speech the old Krupp von Bohlen answered Hitler and expressed the unanimous feeling of the industrialists to support Hitler. After that I spoke for the financial part only, not on political principles or intentions. And the amount which I collected was 3 million marks. The apportionment amongst the industrialists was made not by me but by they themselves and the payments afterwards were made to the bank of Delbruck Schickler. The books will certainly show the amounts which were paid in and which went to the party. I had nothing to do with that account. I just played the role of cashier or financial treasurer at the meeting itself.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3726-PS

EXCERPTS FROM INTERROGATION OF DR. HJALMAR
SCHACHT on 24 August 1945, at 10:45 a. m. at "Dustbin"

Interrogator: C. J. Hynning

[Pages 83 and 84]

Q. This was at the Paris Conference, 16 April 1929—you are quoted as having made this statement: (Read from page 3, in German.)

A. It may be that I have made such a statement.

Q. It reads: "Germany can generally only pay if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession and if besides somewhere on the earth colonial territory will be made available to Germany". As I remember our last interrogation, those sentiments are still yours.

A. I think the sentiment has been made useless by the following events. That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to pay after this war will be proved in the future.

[Pages 89 to 103]

Q. How, under this law, was foreign exchange allocated?

A. All of this is in the law, and I don't know why you ask me. We can talk for years, and I cannot tell any details of these things. The provisions of the laws are there, and they had to be executed, and they were executed orderly and correctly by everybody who had to work under the law.

Q. You were in complete sympathy with the law?

A. Whether I was in sympathy or not did not matter at all. I had to carry out the laws.

Q. Did you ever take any measures to change the law or to recommend any change in the law which would be taken as evidence of your not being in sympathy with it.

A. As long as I was in the Ministry of Economics, I had no vote in the Government at all, and did not interfere with Government.

Q. You may have had no vote, but you had a voice.

A. When I saw that things were intended which I did not like, I must have raised my voice, and certainly did it.

Q. Did you raise your voice against this particular law at any time?

A. I don't remember.

Q. I take it that if you had raised your voice against a law of this importance, you would remember.

A. Maybe.

Q. Did you have any previous knowledge of this statute?

A. Not the least. I don't remember the details of this statute.

Q. You were not consulted in any way prior to its enactment?

A. Certainly not.

Q. Since for some time you had to administer the Reichsbank's responsibilities under this law, did your experience result in your

concluding that it had any defects and, if so, what were the nature of these defects?

A. It had certainly no defects big enough to alter.

(Recessed for lunch)

Q. I am going to ask you this afternoon regarding some statutes and regulations, and my primary interest in them is economic rather than raising the technical points of law. You were head of the Reichsbank on June 9, 1933?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At that time the Reich Government decreed a law entitled "Law Governing Obligations to Pay Foreign Creditors".

A. Yes.

Q. That was a law in whose formulation you had participated?

A. Yes.

Q. Briefly, what circumstances resulted in the proposal and adoption of this statute?

A. The lack of foreign exchange. We had no foreign means to pay.

Q. A quick reading of the statute would indicate that the statute was drawn in such a way as to give you, as head of the Reichsbank, very complete, almost dictatorial powers in the situation.

A. Only as far as the execution of the law was concerned.

Q. In respect to the execution of the law, it gave you very sweeping power.

A. I don't think it is sweeping power. What do you mean, sharp?

Q. I will read several phrases to illustrate: "Rates of exchange fixed by the Reichsbank shall be deemed rates computed as defined under this law.—The Conversion Bank—is under the supervision of the Reich Directorate.—The Reichsbank Directorate appoints the responsible officials.—The time for payments of such credits shall be determined by the Reichsbank.—The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs may with the approval of the Reich Directorate permit exceptions to this law". In other words, that power was vested in you?

A. Yes.

Q. The bank which was created—

A. It was not a bank. It was simply bookkeeping and cash office.

Q. It was a corporation?

A. It was an institution of the Government.

Q. It was placed under the supervision of the Reichsbank?

A. I don't remember. I think it was a Government office, but that I don't remember.

Q. And the Reichsbank Directorate appointed the responsible officials?

A. Yes.

Q. As head of the Reichsbank, you would have exercised that appointing power?

A. Certainly, if it says in the law.

Q. It also was in your power to determine when the claim of the creditors should be paid?

A. What does it say in the law?

Q. "The time for payments of such credits shall be determined by the Reichsbank".

A. Maybe, yes.

Q. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, together with the Reichsbank Directorate, could grant exceptions to the law?

A. Yes.

Q. In view of that language, you would agree that you had very full powers under that law in respect to the foreign creditors?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall whether you signed that statute?

A. I don't think so. It was a law, wasn't it?

Q. Yes.

A. Then it must have been signed by the Chancellor and the Minister of Economics. Whether I signed it or not, I agreed with it.

Q. Under this law, exceptions were granted?

A. I do not think any exceptions have been made. I think that was just a facility which was in the statute in case events required such exception.

Q. There is a phrase here which I will ask you about. "The remaining legal affairs of the Conversion Bank are regulated by the by-laws issued by the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs with the approval of the Reichsbank Directorate". What remaining legal affairs of the Conversion Bank would there be that this covers?

A. I don't know, sir, I don't remember. Maybe the pensions of the officials, and gratuities—the payment of the officials or something. I don't know what it is. Certainly minor affairs.

Q. In connection with this legislation, by-laws were adopted which raised some question in my mind which I would like you to answer. I would like to have your answers provide a brief

explanation of the operation of the institution. The by-laws provided for: "The Bank may issue notes ('Schuldscheine') for deposited sums, payable in Reichsmarks and not bearing interest. Provision for the redemption of these notes shall be laid down by the Reichsbank Directorate."

A. That term does not mean notes. It means bonds.

Q. Then this further provides: "the Conversion Bank may issue interest-bearing scrap in the nominal amount of the obligation or its equivalent—."

A. It is all provided. How far it was executed, I don't recall.

Q. I will ask you for a brief description of the operations of this bank.

A. We could not pay any more the foreign creditors, but we did not want the German debtor to become released of his debt because it was only the problem of transfer involved, so the debtor had to pay to the conversion office and thereby was released of his debt, but the conversion office held that money on account of the creditor, and the intention was to pay the creditor as far and as soon as transfer would be made possible.

Q. It provides here: "It can accept payments from foreigners which emanate from blocked or registered accounts, and credit them to account". Can you explain that operation? This conversion bank served at times to transfer funds from Reichsmarks accounts of the foreigner to the foreigner in his own currency?

A. Yes. You see it provides for all possibilities. If you make a statute, you have to include everything.

Q. This statute appears to put the foreign creditor completely at the mercy of the Reichsbank.

A. Entirely. (pause) Entirely, as far as transfer was concerned. With their money inside Germany they could do what they liked. As to their German money there were several possibilities opened up to them to place that money.

Q. Do you wish to expand on that?

A. I think that is sufficient. Everybody will understand.

Q. How long did this conversion bank function?

A. Up to now.

Q. "Starting with July 1, 1934, the Conversion Bank offered to the foreign creditors for the amount of investment proceeds paid into the accounts in the Conversion Bank long-term interest-bearing bonds, payable in Reichsmarks which were guaranteed by the German Reich is a series of laws. These bonds could be exchanged with the Golddiskontbank for a limited amount of free exchange at a very substantial discount from the par value

of the bonds". Wasn't the effect of that a substantial reduction in the payment of principal and interest to the foreign creditors?

A. I think so.

Q. You stated a little earlier in connection with this legislation that its sole purpose was to provide more foreign exchange.

A. That was not the purpose—to provide foreign exchange—but to state that we had no foreign exchange. How can I get foreign exchange by not paying? If I don't pay I can't get foreign exchange.

Q. The purpose of this legislation was to make available for other purposes such foreign exchange as was in the control of the Reich?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you care to elaborate on the other purposes?

A. Yes, it would be interesting. The other purposes were to get foreign exchange for the import of foodstuffs and raw materials in order to carry on German economic life and to feed the population.

Q. At this time, the Nazi Regime having been in power for some months, foreign exchange was needed in connection with their requirements for the beginning of the rearmament program?

A. The rearmament was started a good time later only.

Q. Measuring time in days?

A. In months.

Q. Possibly the final production, but the initial stages?

A. I don't think so.

Q. This legislation provided a basis for conserving foreign exchange for a number of purposes which included such requirements for rearmament as there might be?

A. I don't know whether that was the intention.

Q. As I recall, you have already stated in earlier testimony that the rearmament program of the Nazis started in 1933?

A. I cannot give the exact date.

Q. It clearly was the purpose of this legislation together with the purposes which you have already stated, to free foreign exchange for the economic and political purposes of the Nazi regime.

A. I did not say for political purposes.

Q. I am not quoting you. I am stating that it was for that purpose.

A. For an economic life, industrial life, and for feeding the people.

Q. And for political purposes of the Regime?

A. I don't know. And I certainly don't know how many foreign exchanges were needed or wanted for political purposes unknown to me.

Q. You wouldn't say that you were entirely ignorant of the political purposes of the Nazi Regime from the time they came into power until you left office? That would be an astounding statement.

A. Yes. I want to make the astounding statement that Hitler hid his political intentions from his collaborators, including the Ministers and other high officials.

Q. You designate yourself as a collaborationist?

A. Certainly. I was in office under his Regime.

Q. You are acquainted with the decree of September 4, 1934, entitled "Commodity Exchange Decree"?

A. Yes. That is the first of these laws here, or decrees. I initiated it.

Q. And I believe you signed it?

A. Certainly.

Q. Would you tell us the reason for its initiation?

A. Yes. We had not sufficient foreign exchange to let everybody buy in foreign countries what he liked, because the little foreign exchange which we earned had to be used for those things which were most necessary for the economic life of Germany, so we had to take control of these purchases. We could not any more allow people to buy where they wanted and use the foreign exchange therefore, but we had to buy in countries where at the same time in exchange we could sell our products in order to be able to pay for the goods we bought.

Q. This constituted a very broad extension of your powers?

A. Yes. This is what they have always called the barter agreements with foreign countries.

Q. In effect, in respect to most commodities, it made you a virtual czar.

A. Not quite, sir. The industries were organized in self-governing bodies which were called Ueberwachungsstellen, and the czarism was used only in close cooperation with the self-governing bodies.

Q. To use a hypothetical example—to explain in part the mechanism and to have you interpret the statement which you just made, if for rearmament or other purposes the steel industry in Germany needed more raw material, they would state that need to you and you would, on the basis of your discretion, approve their requirements or tell them what they could have?

A. I cannot say here without having been in touch with my assistant officials in what way the decree functioned in any special case.

Q. And the officials you would want to consult were, by name?

A. I have already stated in my written statement that I do not remember who they were, but you can easily find out by asking in the Economic Ministry in Berlin.

Q. The men that you had to consult on these major problems you do not recall?

A. The man at the head of the total organization of Ueberwachungsstellen was Mr. Brinkmann.

Q. He could answer a question of the character I just asked you?

A. Entirely.

Q. I will read you the first section of this decree: "Section 1. Authorization. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs is authorized to supervise and regulate transactions in commodities, particularly to determine and adopt measures with respect to their content, distribution, storage, sale, use, and process". That language is very broad. It would appear to have given you power to channelize all raw materials and semi-finished goods so that the course of German economy was in your control under this statute. Do you agree?

A. Yes.

Q. How broadly was this term "storage" interpreted in the operations under this statute? In other words, under the terms of this statute, if you were to stockpile certain strategic commodities, this authorized that type of operations?

A. Certainly.

Q. And I take it that under this authorization you were responsible for the stockpiling of the strategic commodities?

A. In what way responsible? What do you mean by that?

Q. I mean by that that the statute authorized that type of action.

A. Yes.

Q. And that in carrying out your responsibilities, for which you had wide discretionary powers under this statute, these strategic commodities were in a number of instances stockpiled in substantial amounts?

A. I don't know whether they have been, but the possibility was given in the law.

Q. It wouldn't surprise you if proof were offered that it had been done?

A. I wouldn't care. Things I don't know, don't interest me. Couldn't we perhaps shorten the whole interrogation by asking me really what you want to know? You mean that I was responsible for the armament and so on? What is it you would like me to tell you?

Q. It may be by asking you specific questions—

A. Will you allow me to make a statement on armament?

Q. Go ahead.

A. It seems to me that the answers and statements which I have given at former interrogations do not circulate among the various interrogators. It would help greatly if this could be done, because there are so many interrogators, and always new and changing, that it takes very much time to answer always the same questions. I have in former statements very frankly admitted that I was entirely in favor of rearmament. I have given the reason for my opinion and I have stated how far with these rearmaments I wanted to go. I have stated further that when rearmaments exceeded the amount which I had intended and when I felt that this rearmament might lead to war, I have refused all further cooperation. I have even endeavored very hard to stop further armaments, because I was decidedly against war. And when I felt that Hitler wanted to go to war or might aim at war I turned 100 percent against him. Already in 1938 I participated in the first attempt to do way with Hitler. I take the full responsibility for my cooperation in the rearmament up to 1938, but not the least for the following time.

Q. The Munich incident was in September 1938, at which time, if historians are to be believed, on the basis of Germany's rearmament up to that time Adolf Hitler threatened the western powers with war. You did not resign prior or immediately after Munich—you continued in the Hitler Government.

A. An official under the Hitler Regime could not resign without his approval. I had to manage it so as to be released by him, which I did and succeeded in my dismissal 21 January 1939.

Q. Let us continue. Prior to your self-serving statement in respect to rearmament, you indicated that you did not know, and inferred that you did not have the means of knowing, anything about any stockpiling of strategic materials under the provisions of the commodity exchange decree of September 1934. That decree gave you explicit power to get practically any information that you might want from anybody and everybody operating in the economy of the Reich, so that you had the basis for complete information about the most trivial transactions as well as those

of a major character, which are the kind that you are being asked about. In drawing this statute you gave yourself such wide powers, such comprehensive powers that I think we can agree that with those powers you must accept responsibility for everything that was done under the terms of that statute.

A. Certainly not. It gave me the power, for instance, to look after commodities stored secretly by industrialists in order to make profits out of it. If it gave me the power to control that, I do not want to be made responsible if I had not discovered such stored commodities.

Q. To indicate this far-reaching power that you provided for yourself in this statute, I will read just a few portions of it: "The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs—may make determinations and adopt measures for the recording of business transactions, particularly accounting procedures. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs shall appoint a Reich Commissioner for the Reich Control Office and may designate one or more deputies for the Reich Commissioner. The Reich Commissioner shall direct the Reich Control Office, subject to instructions by the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs. The Reich Commissioner shall issue the rules of procedure for the Reich Control Office—the rules of procedure require approval of the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs. The members of the Advisory Board shall be appointed by the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs shall determine the manner of collection (of funds) and the group of persons and enterprises required to make contributions. Imprisonment and fines to an unlimited amount may be imposed". Are you in agreement that those are very broad powers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. To revert a moment to our brief mention of Munich, and your situation with respect to Munich, you testified at another time that you accepted full responsibility for all of your acts, and that your decisions were your own and that you were not bound by others.

A. Except by Hitler where the general political situation of the Reich was concerned.

Q. So that your failure to leave your post prior to Munich, at which time Hitler threatened war on the basis of the armaments he then had available, your failure to do that was something for which you accept full responsibility?

A. It was not a failure. I could only not do it immediately without great personal risk, and I told you that I had to manage

it so as to induce Hitler to dismiss me, in which I succeeded between Munich and the following 21st of January.

Q. In connection with the creation of the Devisenstellen, a high official of the Reichsbank has testified that by creating the Devisenstellen a development was started which became "more and more an instrument of economic policy and became later on a means of controlling the whole economic life and activity of Germany". He further testified that from the time of the "New Plan" of which you were the author "the devisen control system became more and more an instrument of economic politics".

A. I fully agree with those two statements.

Q. I take it that you would also agree with this statement which came from another source: That the purpose of this has been described as "to regulate demand and consumption and steer the scanty supply of raw materials into fields and in directions where it could do the most good, both from the political as well as the economic point of view".

A. I do not agree with the word "political". I don't know what that source includes.

Q. I think that might be paraphrased "would do the most good both from the standpoint of the political objectives of the Hitler Regime and its economic point of view".

A. From that statement I take it that the economic point of view and intentions of Hitler Regime coincide, wherewith I agree.

Q. Still another source, after a thorough-going study of the "New Plan" characterized the primary objective of it to be "devoting a maximum proportion of Germany's productive resources to rearmament and preparation for war."

A. I disagree entirely with that statement as far as war is included. It has certainly helped rearmament.

Q. You must agree that rearmament is preparation for war.

A. I disagree entirely with that statement. It means defense in case of attack.

Q. You would agree with the statement then if it were changed to read: "Devoting a maximum proportion of Germany's resources to rearmament and preparation for a defensive war".

A. That might go.

Q. In connection with this "New Plan" of which you were the author, in addition to the law controlling commodities which we discussed briefly, another important part of the "New Plan"

as it was enacted into legislation would be this law establishing this German clearing bank. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. This again is legislation which you initiated?

A. Entirely. Because it was the necessary consequence of the decree of the 4th of September, because we had to establish an international banking account where the balances, because cash payment would not take place, had to be debited and credited.

Q. The question that I am about to ask you may require a technical answer. The type of transaction in which this bank subsequently engaged had been carried on briefly to some extent by the Reichsbank, had it not?

A. That sort of business did not exist before that decree came out.

Q. My question arises from this section, which I will read to you: "Any rights belonging to the Reichsbank and obligations devolving upon it under clearing agreements which have been contracted by the German Government with foreign governments or by the Reichsbank with foreign central banks of issue, revert to the clearing bank. The clearing bank shall take over the management of accounts which is incumbent upon the Reichsbank".

A. It may be that some transactions have been made before, I don't know. The difference of time between the two decrees is only five weeks.

Q. Like the commodity control statute, this statute gave you as Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, complete control over the operations under the statute?

A. It was a bookkeeping and accounting office, nothing else. I don't know what power would be connected therewith.

Q. The powers, of course, are set forth in the statute which was given you by the interrogator at the previous session, and under the terms of that statute a board of directors was provided to control it, and you in turn as Reich Minister of Economic Affairs appointed that board of directors.

A. Yes. Which means that I appointed the accountants.

Q. There was no staff? There were only the directors?

A. I assume that they had a staff.

Q. The statute provides that the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs can allow exceptions. Were there any instances where these exceptions are allowed?

A. I do not remember any one, and I do not think that there were any.

Q. Perhaps you could tell us the extent to which you participated in the formulation of the clearing agreements which were subsequently administered under this statute?

A. The Minister of Economics took part in all the clearing agreements as long as I was in power. After that time, I do not know.

Q. Who were the others who generally participated during the time you were in power?

A. My assistant officials. You want names?

Q. No, not at this time. Were you and your assistant officials the only ones participating?

A. Oh, no. The foreign office also participated. And sometimes the Minister of Agriculture.

Q. Would it be correct to state that there were no clearing agreements effected during the time that you were in power which did not have your approval?

A. That is correct.

Q. In the self-serving statement which you made this afternoon, and in earlier statements, in respect to rearmament, you were careful to make the point that at a given time in the long process of rearmament you shifted your position and ceased to support further rearmament, and in January 1939 ceased to hold any official Government position except that of Minister without portfolio. The legislation which we have been discussing which provided the legal foundation for the "New Plan" provided a sufficiently well-rounded and comprehensive basis of control of the economic life of Germany for political purposes so that in carrying rearmament forward after you left the Government it was not necessary to make any radical changes for some time. Is that not true?

A. I first would like to reject the word "careful statement" which you used. I make true statements, and I am not aiming to be more careful than is necessary. As to your question, I think that every institution which exists in the world, and so every law, is open to abuse.

Q. If there is any difference between the operation of these laws during your period of office, and that of your successor, it would appear from the record to have been a difference of degree rather than kind.

A. I do not know what my successor has done, and whether he abused the law or not, and whether he abused it in degree or in kind.

Q. You are familiar, are you not, with the general trend of economic legislation subsequent to your departure from public office?

A. Not more than an ordinary newspaper reader.

Q. It has been testified that even as late as the period during which you were in custody of the Reich you requested economic information from the Reichsbank or its directors, and that an effort was made to send you such information. If this is true it would indicate a continuing interest far beyond that which one might infer from your last statement.

A. The statement is correct, but incomplete. I have asked once with the permission of my custodian to send the printed annual Reichsbank, because I filled my time in the prison with studies about the time of my former activity. The annual reports have reached me.

Q. You raise, in your testimony, the question as to how far advanced German rearmament was at the time you left the Reichsbank in the latter part of January 1939. Rearmament is a relatively slow process because of the time required to assemble raw material and to transform it into the complex modern instruments of warfare, and yet it was only a few months after you ceased official participation in the rearmament program that the Reich felt itself sufficiently prepared to engage in the second World War. What comment do you wish to make in respect to that relationship?

A. Here is a misunderstanding as to the dates. All payments from the Reichsbank ceased in March 1938, a thing which I have stated in former interrogations several times already. As to the length of time for manufacturing war goods, I have no technical knowledge whatever.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3727-PS

EXCERPT from testimony of HJALMAR SCHACHT,
taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 13 October 1945, 1530-
1630, by Lt. Colonel M. I. Gurfein, OUSCC. Also
Present: Miss Evelyn Low, Reporter

[Pages 1 to 3]

Q. I was looking over one of the statements that you made to Major Tilly and there was a sentence there that I wondered if you could explain. I copied it down, as follows: "In order to divert Hitler's attention from German expansion to the East which

could not have been achieved without war, I started very early to win Hitler to a colonial policy." Do you remember saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I want to ask you first how early was that when you say "very early"?

A. I think in 1932 already. It has always been in my mind.

Q. And you had discussions as early as 1932 about it with Hitler?

A. Oh certainly, from 1931. About everything—many questions.

Q. Such as what?

A. Economic and political and whatever it was—social, unemployment.

Q. But this particular point of foreign policy, you were the proponent, as you explained it, of the view that Germany, should get colonies rather than that there should be expansion to the east?

A. I don't know what it means—"proponent." The question of colonies has always been discussed by me since 1920. Even before that.

Q. And you wrote an article, as a matter of fact, on foreign affairs particularly?

A. Yes.

Q. In which you urged that Germany should obtain colonies?

A. Yes.

Q. In these early discussions that you had with Hitler concerning the desirability of trying to get colonies for the Reich, what position did Hitler take with respect to that?

A. He was not so much interested in colonial matters and did not lay much stress upon the colonial question at that time—only later.

Q. In other words, at the time of your talks with Hitler in 1931 and 1932 concerning colonial policy, you did not find him, shall we say, enthusiastic about the possibility?

A. Not enthusiastic and not very much interested.

Q. But he expressed to you what his views were alternatively to the possibility of obtaining colonies?

A. No. We didn't go to other alternatives.

Q. You told Major Tilly—that is why I read this, because I would like to get the details of it a little more clearly from an historical point of view—you told Major Tilly in substance that you started very early to talk him into a colonial policy in order to

divert his attention from the east. What was there in what he said that led you to believe that he was intending to move towards the east?

A. That is in Mein Kampf. He never spoke to me about that but it was in Mein Kampf.

Q. In other words, as a man who had read it, you understood that Hitler's expansion policy was directed to the east?

A. To the east.

Q. And you thought that it would be better to try to divert Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial policy instead?

A. Quite.

[Pages 7 and 8]

Q. Do you remember being interrogated by Major Ziegler. Do you recall having stated that the amounts expended for the rebuilding of the German Army and for armaments from the period 1934 to 1938 were substantial—about 45 billions of Reichsmarks?

A. Dr. Ziegler from his side gave some figures of taxes and loans and so on and we came to the conclusion that they might have reached that sum. I did not do it by my own knowledge but when he read his figures before me I have said "Well, that may be."

Q. To go back—that figure of 45 billions was also broken down as I recall it. I don't have it right before me but you had about 15 billions raised through taxes through the Reich budget during that period for armament. You had about 12 billion mefo bills—that is 27 billion. You had 8 million from loans—that is 35?

A. That comes to 35 billions.

Q. If all of the 8 billions has been spent on armaments, then this must be right. You would not say that figure of 35 billions was fantastic like the figure of 90 billions that Hitler said?

A. No, it would certainly not be so fantastic. I don't know whether these 15 billions have been spent on armaments and whether all the 8 billions loans went into armament. That I cannot control. The 12 billions mefo bills were exclusively appropriated for armament so I knew that money was not spent for dinners and suppers.

Q. Let us go back for a minute and reconstruct the position. You had these conversations with General von Blomberg and Count von Krosigk each year with respect to the total requirements of the Armed Forces, is that agreed?

A. No. Only from 1936 on. I should say middle of '36.

Q. From '36 on. And those were the total budget figures which included, as everybody has testified, not only the operating expenses of the existing Armed Forces, but also the accretions including the rearmament program itself.

A. It must have been.

Q. So that at that time, as President of the Reichsbank being called upon to supply funds you undoubtedly considered what proportion of the total that was being asked for by the Wehrmacht you personally as President of the Reichsbank were being asked to furnish, that is only natural?

A. It is quite natural.

Q. These figures that we have quoted of approximately 35 billion Reichsmarks for the period, as against 12 billion from mefo bills, would represent approximately one-third of the total amount expended for armaments?

A. Yes, maybe.

[Pages 16 to 19]

Q. Did you feel, Dr. Schacht, at the time you went to Vienna to make the speech within the week after the Anschluss that by your financing the rearmament you had enabled Hitler to use the Wehrmacht to accomplish his purpose by these methods that you did not favour?

A. In fact the Anschluss was made by the propaganda which Hitler did in Austria and by political pressure which he brought upon Schuschnigg and others—I don't know who were the leading men at that time. He did not use the military force in order to shoot or to make war, it was just the pressure which was behind it.

Q. Did the Wehrmacht or the fact that there was a Wehrmacht have anything to do with the result in your opinion?

A. I don't know how far the propaganda and the pressure which came from the Austrian Nazis would have succeeded if there had been no Wehrmacht.

Q. What I mean is did you at that time credit the Wehrmacht as an instrument for the achievement of Hitler's march into Austria?

A. I have never thought of that.

Q. I want you to think about that now. Logically, of course, anybody would have thought of it as the whole world did at the time?

A. Yes but I have never thought that it was primarily the Wehrmacht which forced the Anschluss so that for the Austrians there was the alternative. I think, whether to make the Anschluss or we will be at war with Germany.

Q. Did not Schuschnigg call for a plebiscite which he had to call off by a show of arms by Hitler?

A. I don't know what the arrangements between Schuschnigg and Hitler have been at that time.

Q. But that was a matter of common knowledge—in the press of the world at the time? You remember the ultimatum of Hitler—the ultimatum to Schuschnigg?

A. I know that.

Q. Which was based on the fact that Hitler was prepared to march?

A. That I didn't know.

Q. What they stated.

A. I believe so. I just don't remember. But you say it is public knowledge—I would like to see that.

Q. That the Wehrmacht was strong enough at that time and in a position to impose Hitler's will on Austria in the event that Schuschnigg did not comply with the ultimatum?

A. There can be no doubt because there is the people of 60 million on one side and on the other side a people of 6 million but I do not remember that such a menace was ever made.

Q. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection about your views on the 21st March 1938?

A. 21 March 1938.

Q. At the time at which you made a speech before the employees of the former Austrian National bank?

A. Yes.

Q. The Anschluss, you remember, was on the 13 March 1938 and this is eight days later. I will read it to you in German first and then we can translate it for the record and I want to see if you remember first making this statement in the speech. Do you remember saying it?

A. Certainly.

(The English translation was then given, as follows):

“Thank God these things have finally come to pass that they could not further hinder the great German people, for Adolf Hitler created a society of German will and thought. He supported it through a newly strengthened Wehrmacht and through them he finally brought the inner union between Austria and Germany also into this outward form.”

A. Quite, you are correct, yes.

Q. I ask you whether that passage in the speech refreshes your recollection as to the thoughts that you had as you stood there before the employees of the Austrian National Bank in

Vienna on the 21st March 1938 with respect to the role that the Wehrmacht had played in Hitler's achievement.

A. Yes, you remember that in 1932 I think it was, the Austrians and the German Government agreed about customs union. That customs union was prevented by the Allied Powers and not only Anschluss, which was not in question at that time, but even a mere customs union was not allowed to be contracted or closed. The fact that Hitler had put Germany on an equal international foot again with the neighboring powers made the Anschluss possible and so one of the aims which I had always had in mind, by force of rearmament was achieved because at that moment the Foreign Powers did not any more hinder the Anschluss.

Q. You characterized in last week's interrogation, Dr. Schacht, the method used by Hitler as "Reckless." What did you mean by that?

A. I meant that if Hitler forced these things upon the Austrians it was not good. He should have allowed the plebiscite. The fact that he hindered the plebiscite was certainly not favored by me.

Q. You still say you did not favor the methods that Hitler used?

A. Yes. I only favored the fact that the Foreign Powers did not any more hinder the coming together of Austria and Germany and that was due to the rearmament.

Q. In other words, the Army stood there let us say as a weapon in the hands of the politics of Hitler, vis-a-vis the Austrians.

A. Not vis-a-vis the Austrians but vis-a-vis the Allies—that is important.

Q. In other words you felt that the Wehrmacht had up till March 1938 been so strengthened that it was a sufficient threat to prevent the Allies from doing anything preventive in respect of Austria?

A. I don't know I am sure. To go to war at that time we would have been beaten the same way as we have been beaten now, but the fact that we had rearmed had the real effect that they didn't intervene.

Q. I am a bit naive about these things I must say. You say that the main use of the Wehrmacht in 1938 as an instrument for Hitler was not vis-a-vis Austria but against the Powers?

A. No against the Powers but vis-a-vis the Powers.

Q. That means that the Wehrmacht must have been strong enough to have an effect on any potential conflict. In other words no longer a negligible force?

A. I don't say that—even in 1934 the Allies respected the re-arming of Germany already so it was not comparison of force which I had in mind but simply the fact that we had armed or we were arming. We had armed.

Q. But basically you consider, as I understand it, that by 1938 Germany had resumed what you consider its rightful position as one of the armed Powers of Europe.

A. I was sure of that.

[Page 22]

Q. You may remember that I asked you last time, in the interrogation of 26 September 1945,

“Q. Did you ever state to them that only those who had loyalty to Hitler could remain?

A. I never did. My speech which I made to the employees must certainly be in the files of the bank.

Q. And the speech that you made represented your views at that time naturally?

A. Certainly. I never said anything which I didn't mean.”

Q. Do you recall making those answers? Would you like to withdraw that—I just want to know where you stand?

A. No. I would like to make clear that I have praised Hitler and appreciated what he had done in bringing Austria into the Reich, in re-establishing the international position of the Reich. I have not been in concurrence with his moral principles. And I don't think that from this speech you can take it that I approved his moral principles.

Q. That is your explanation?

A. Yes.

[Pages 28 and 29]

Q. In connection with that position, was it your duty to be prepared in the event of war for the control of the German economy?

A. I think that is true—that is correct.

Q. And is it correct to say that you then occupied a position of equal rank with the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht?

A. Not of the General Staff, I think the War Ministry.

Q. In other words you agree with Marshal Blomberg when he says that in your capacity as Plenipotentiary for the War Economy you were not under him but you were on a comparable footing with him?

A. Quite.

Q. So that the people who were charged with the responsibility in the event of war—No. 1. Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht and No. 2. on a similar footing, Dr. Schacht as Plenipotentiary for the Economics.

A. Yes.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3728-PS

Excerpts from Testimony of Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 16 October 1945, 1430-1630, by Lt. Col. Murray Gurfein, AUS, OUSCC

Questions by Colonel Gurfein to the Witness in English:

[Pages 2-9]

Q. Yes. So that, I take it, in March 1937, you were not in any way opposed to the further extension of the armament program except insofar as it was limited by technical reasons?

A. No. There is another reason in addition to that. I think that any overdoing of armaments contains the danger of war in itself.

Q. That is what you said last time that we talked, and I was interested in that. When did it first come to your mind that the extent of the German armament was in such a position as to cause the danger of war in itself?

A. That I can't tell you, because all restrictions and thoughts in my mind, accumulated in my mind, accumulated by and by. New points always came in, and the first time that I really thought Hitler might not be willing to avert a war by all means was in the Fritsch Affair. That changed my mind entirely.

Q. That was in February 1938?

A. May I just add a few remarks to my last interrogation?

Q. Yes.

A. When I made that statement, I didn't say what I meant. I had, of course, thought of ordinary life and none of the exceptional pressure under which I came through Hitler. When I made that statement in Vienna, I was still hopeful that I would be able to check Hitler some way or another, because the Fritsch Affair was not yet cleared. It was under trial, and the acquitting of Fritsch came only, I think somewhat later. I don't remember the date exactly, but I still hoped that Fritsch would become restituted to his post, and when that was not the case, then I said something must be wrong, because at the same time the Blomberg affair also became known to me. Some people hinted to me that that also was an intrigue, played by Himmler or somebody.

Q. Tell us a little more clearly, if you will, Dr. Schacht, what was there about the Fritsch affair that disturbed you?

A. Fritsch was the finest character in the whole army, in my opinion. Fritsch was certainly not willing to overdo armaments and certainly he would never have agreed to an aggressive war, so I relied entirely on him, and I was on good terms with him, and I knew that he was against any extension politics of Hitler's.

Q. But I thought we agreed last time that the attack on Austria was an aggressive one. Was that not your opinion?

A. No, we did not agree, sir. It was an aggressive one by propaganda, but not by military aggression.

Q. Just to revert to that for a moment scientifically, you recall that in your speech in Vienna you yourself said that "through the means of the German will and consciousness, and through the strength of the Wehrmacht of ours, we achieved our objectives" or something to that effect?

A. I stated at the same time in our last interrogation that this was towards the allies and not towards Austria. I have never heard of any military enemies to Austria. I have heard a good deal about propaganda, and such things.

Q. Let us review that for a moment. I don't want to get too deeply into the Austrian affair, but let us stick to matters that were of common knowledge. You know that the French asked the Italians, Mussolini, whether he would stand firm at the intervention in the independence of Austria? You remember that?

A. I don't remember the details.

Q. There was a time when Italy threatened to march sometime before, a good time before that.

A. A good time before that.

Q. There was this development with Schuschnigg being brought to Berchtesgaden, which was common knowledge.

A. Yes.

Q. And there was this whole question among the European powers as to whether this Anschluss, which was directly prohibited by treaty arrangement, would be performed. You remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. And you remember that the tension was extremely strong at the time on the question of whether France and Italy would move to maintain the integrity of Austria, the guarantee. You remember that?

A. That was long before.

Q. They guaranteed it long before, but the diplomatic statements were published at the time, were they not?

A. I think that Mussolini had this for his opposition long ago.

Q. What I am trying to say is, and I ask you, was it not the threat of armed force on the borders of Austria which preceded this Anschluss?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Was there a mobilization? Do you remember?

A. I don't know. Was there?

Q. I am just wondering what you remembered about it.

A. Yes, but that had nothing to do with Fritsch, because Fritsch was not in office.

Q. I am not talking about Fritsch now. We went off the subject as we said we would, Dr. Schacht when I said that it was parenthetical. I asked you in the first place whether after the withdrawal of Fritsch it was not an aggressive action against Austria, and I had thought that we had agreed last time that, although you said that you had no knowledge of it beforehand that, nevertheless, you still condemned Hitler's principles and so forth, and implied that the matter was an aggressive one.

A. I would even deplore propaganda, an aggressive propaganda, inside of Austria; not only military threat.

Q. But what I mean is, do you withdraw completely what you said at Vienna, where you seemed to be pleased at the success of Hitler's method of obtaining the Anschluss?

A. Would I what?

Q. Will you read the question?

(The question referred to was read by the reporter as set forth above.)

A. I stand by that statement.

Q. Now, coming back to this question of aggression and whether or not there was a threat of armed force, do you recall that on March 11th, Austrian reservists were called up to meet the crisis? Does that come back to your memory? I am just trying to get the framework on the situation.

A. I have not been in those details at the time.

Q. Well, but you were a living man at the time. We all were, and we were very influential, as a matter of fact.

A. No. I was not influential at all, not in that.

Q. What I am trying to do is to ask you whether you remember—and if you don't, say so—whether you remember the tension that existed in Europe prior to the Anschluss.

A. Certainly. There must have been.

Q. And that tension was caused, was it not, by the poisoning of the armed forces of Germany on the borders of Austria?

A. Well, I don't know that.

Q. Do you remember Hitler's speech of the 20th of February of 1938, for example?

A. No.

Q. Where he told the Reichstag that the Germans in Austria and the Sudetenland had to have self-determination?

A. No.

Q. Did you attend those sessions of the Reichstag, by the way?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Weren't you, as a member of the government, entitled to sit on the government benches at these Reichstag meetings?

A. Yes, but I have missed very, very many meetings.

Q. Do you recall whether or not you were present?

A. That is easily verifiable.

Q. That is why I asked you.

A. No, I don't know. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember?

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. You remember being on the Reichstag government bench at the time war was declared on Poland?

A. I certainly was not.

Q. You were not?

A. No.

Q. I just want to ask you this, a little off the beaten track: There is testimony, Dr. Schacht, to the effect that after you left the Reichsbank and retained your position as Minister without Portfolio that you still sat on the government bench in the Reichstag.

A. Once, sir.

Q. And when was that?

A. After Hitler came back from France.

Q. After the great victory?

A. After the great victory over France. The reason was this: The ministers were all ordered to meet Hitler at the station. I was in Berlin at that time. I couldn't escape joining them, and because I also greeted him from the station, I couldn't escape going to the Reichstag, and I did it; but I think that is the only time I attended the Reichstag after the opening of war.

Q. There weren't many sessions of course?

A. Oh, there were some, for Poland, for America, for instance, for—oh, yes there were some. After Poland, yes, but I don't think I have ever attended any, except this one.

Q. That is the only one you went to, at the moment of the great victory over France?

A. It is the only one I remember.

Q. Coming back to what we were discussing, Dr. Schacht, you recall this tension in Europe, as you say, at the time of the Austrian Anschluss and you recall even at that time the Czechs were making statements, saying that they would defend themselves if attacked?

A. (Pause)

Q. You must.

A. I have never been in these foreign politics and I don't remember what declarations and speeches were made.

Q. These were things that were in the public press.

A. I have read that as a common reader, but I wasn't very much interested in the matter.

Q. Let me ask you, then: Would you deny that there was tension in Europe and the threat of a war prior to the Austrian Anschluss?

A. I don't think that there was threat of war, not from our side.

Q. Your intentions were to take Austria, were they not? Not your personal intentions, but the intentions of the Reich?

A. I think Hitler intended to force the Anschluss.

Q. If Hitler intended to force the Anschluss, it might have tended toward a general war. That was one of the risks, was it not?

A. I don't think so.

Q. You don't think there ever was a risk?

A. No.

Q. You didn't think there was a possibility that France might have protected the integrity of Austria?

A. If France would have done that, then I think the right moment for any military intervention was when Germany began to rearm.

Q. But again you are dealing with risks and gambles, are you not, Dr. Schacht? You are dealing with the other fellow's point of view as to what he might or might not do.

A. You asked me if I think he could have done something. Of course he could.

[Pages 17-20]

Q. But would you say that the existence of that Wehrmacht as it was then constituted, gave the means to Hitler to pursue this foreign policy of his?

A. One of the means, yes.

Q. Now I just want to ask you, because I think you said it at the time and I am just going to see if you are still of the same opinion, because if you want to change the opinion, I'd like to get it—you made a speech I believe, to the German Academy for the Wehrwirtschaft. You had a reception on November 29, 1938, where you spoke on the theme of Finance Wonder and the New Plan. So you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. In that speech do you remember saying this: "With the help of its daring credit policy, Germany created for itself a strong armament and this in turn had made possible the success of our politics"?

A. Yes, I stand by that still today.

Q. Then you went on to say: "Despite this, there was no German financial wonder. The wonder was the reawakening of the German national conscience and German discipline, and for this wonder we must thank our Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler"?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, then, what interests me about this is that this was after the Munich agreement.

A. Yes, after the Sudeten question.

Q. And this was after the cessation of the Sudetenland?

A. Yes.

Q. And again you are in terms opposing the appeasement of Hitler?

A. Yes.

Q. So I take it the position you take would be what?

A. (Pause)

Q. The position you take is that at the time you said this publicly, you did not actually mean it, I suppose?

A. I have been satisfied with the results of the Anschluss. I have disproved the methods. I have certainly not objected in my mind nor openly to the Anschluss or the Sudeten Deustche, but I have always disapproved of the methods I have realized and stated publicly and privately that all this would not have been fulfilled unless the rearmament of Germany had taken place and changed the position of Germany towards the Allies.

Q. You realize, of course, that the Czechs had an army, and the Czechs had munition works, as well, did they not?

A. Sir, the method toward the Czechs or against the Czechs I had always disapproved of.

Q. But I am asking you, Dr. Schacht, this: You constantly speak of the Wehrmacht or the rearmament vis-a-vis the allies.

A. Yes.

Q. Now I ask you whether the fact of this strong standing army on the German side should not be measured against the Czechs?

A. No. I would have been absolutely against that, because that was the wrong method.

Q. You mean that the army would be built up to a strength so large that the allied powers would not seek to intervene?

A. No, certainly not, but that it could be of some nuisance, if not justified internationally. Claims could be dealt with on peaceful basis of negotiations, as for instance, in '32, the customs union.

Q. Now coming back to this Sudeten problem, you had an army here that was raised to the point where you say the allies would recognize the right of Germany to negotiate with the Czechs diplomatically?

A. Yes.

Q. If Germany did not have this army, the allies would not have recognized that right?

A. I think that the fact that Germany at that time had an army—had great consequences with the allies.

Q. In what sense?

A. Why, for instance, forbid to Germany the customs union with Austria in '32 by threatening Germany with armed force and why didn't they do it in '38 when the Anschluss was committed?

Q. You mean by 1938 Germany had created an army which was sufficiently large to take care of itself in any general conflict?

A. Sir, don't ask me these military questions. I can't answer to that. I only say that the fact that Germany was strong again and armed has altered the politics of the allies.

Q. Altered them in respect to what?

A. Their attitude toward Germany.

Q. Well, now, the Anschluss with Austria was not certainly by virtue of any international agreement, was it?

A. No, but they tolerated it.

Q. They tolerated it because Germany was strong, is that right?

A. They had not tolerated the customs union, which would have been much wiser, because then probably Hitler would probably never have appeared on the surface.

Q. We keep coming back to the customs union. Let's put our mind to the period of 1938, this crucial period in the world history. At that time this Wehrmacht which was created was strong enough to prevent the nations from interfering with any aggressive plans that Hitler wanted to plan?

A. I don't know. I can't say whether it was militarily strong enough. I can only say that it influenced, certainly must have influenced, the politics and the policies of the allies.

[Page 21]

Q. Let's come back to the turning. Obviously you must have had certain conflicts of conscience for quite a long time with respect to this problem.

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. And those conflicts of conscience must have been revolving themselves in your mind, I should have thought, for some years.

A. Sir, my first moral doubts about Hitler originated in '34. I have tried to make sure whether I was right in judging him that way. That can't be done from one day to another. It takes a long time, because I have seen him every few months or so, I mean. My doubts about the overdoing of the German economic and financial strength originated in the year about '36. Here, again, it took me some time to talk things over with Blomberg and Krosigk, and so on. Then I had to hope that on this field, which was my field, I was able to check him. That was why I held my position as managing man of the Ministry of Economics until the fall of '37. Then I went out, because I say I couldn't hold it against Goering.

[Pages 24-29]

Q. In November '38 in that same speech that I referred to: "At the beginning of the year, the spring of 1938 showed a change in our financing policy because German economy had finally reached the point of full employment."

A. Yes.

Q. "On the first of April 1938, the credit creations through the bank of issue were stopped and the financing of the State requirements were now put on to the way of taxes and loans."

A. Exactly what I said.

Q. Yes. So that it was clear that at that time at least it was felt that the difference in methods which you had predicted a long time before would ultimately come through the recreation of employment and so forth, and would enable a change of policy, isn't that correct?

A. But within the limits.

Q. But within the limits.

A. Within the given limits, certainly.

Q. Now the limits, however, you have always maintained, that is, the limits of armaments, you never knew.

A. No.

Q. That is what I don't know. What limits are you talking about, Dr. Schacht?

A. I doubt very much that any further armaments could have been financed unless he abused the Reichsbank. New loans could not any more be found. All that could be levied from the financial market and from the Germany economy, so that a further continuation of armaments would not have been possible.

Q. You mean that there would have been no income from loans and no income from taxes sufficient to have any armament program?

A. Not beyond the stage reached.

Q. In your speech of November 29th, '38, you certainly did not imply that, did you?

A. I don't?

Q. I don't think so.

A. What did I say?

Q. You say here, following that? "Therefore, the only correct way was for the bank of issue at the beginning to place at the disposal the necessary credits for work and rearmament and only up to the point where the economy again developed itself into a position where a considerable condition of savings and consolidation was possible. Only from that point on should, and in fact must the financing be changed over to the financing through taxes and loans."

A. Yes, certainly. That was one of the best speeches I ever made.

Q. What I am trying to get at is that that was a position that you held back as far as 1935, was it not, that you would give credit for a limited time in order to prime the pump, as we say in America?

A. Yes.

Q. And when the time came, when the economy itself, through the creation of savings, and throughout the act of business and the workers to absorb higher taxes, that at that time it would be unnecessary to either have notes printed or to have an expansion of credit through the Reichsbank, but that instead you would rely on normal budgetary and loan revenues? That was always your position?

A. Yes. Always.

Q. So nothing changed in the interim?

A. No.

Q. That is what I am trying to get at. So that there was nothing startling in 1937 about your refusal to give Hitler any more monies from the bank, because that had always been your position?

A. Because in '37 I say already that the—

Q. That the time had come?

A. That everybody was employed.

Q. That did not mean, I ask you again, that you were then opposed to further armaments if by some magic the money could be obtained from another source?

A. Sir, the money could not be obtained from some other source, because they had to repay the mefo bills. There were lots of other things to do. We had to assume a foreign debt payment on all this.

Q. There was nothing that said that that was inevitable?

A. What is that?

Q. Why did you have to resume the foreign debt payment? You had defaulted before.

A. I wanted to change the default. I wanted to become an honest debtor again.

Q. Actually, as a matter of fact, let me ask you this: At the time when you started the mefo bills, for example, there were no ready means available for financing the armament.

A. Quite.

Q. That is to say, through normal budget finance methods?

A. Not enough.

Q. Also you were limited at that time by the statute of the Reichsbank which did not permit you to give anything near the sufficient credit which was required for the armament program?

A. Quite.

Q. And yet you found a way?

A. Yes.

Q. And the way you found was by creating a device in effect which enabled the Reichsbank to lend by a subterfuge to the government what it normally or legally could not do?

A. Right.

Q. So I think for a resourceful man like yourself, it is difficult for me to understand how at a given moment of time in 1938, a situation had so altered itself that some way could not be found for some continuation of armaments.

A. Colonel, my impression was now it was enough.

Q. What was enough?

A. Money. Enough armaments. Enough money.

Q. I ask you again: You have always maintained that you did not know the size of the armaments. How did you know it was enough?

A. I didn't know. It simply was my feeling.

Q. Just a feeling?

A. Yes. But I knew, for instance, that with General Thomas I was always in agreement, and he was the man of the Ruestungsamt.

Q. Coming back to this business of your conflict of conscience that you were talking about, it finally resolved itself with respect to the Ministry of Economics in your departure from Goering in November of 1937. Now, for how long before that would you say had you begun to have substantial doubts whether you could carry on this post as Minister of Economics?

A. After the Four Years Plan.

Q. And the Four Years Plan came in when?

A. It was announced in September '36 on the Party day.

Q. Do you say that from the time that the Four Years Plan came in in September 1936, you were already to rid yourself of your economic duty?

A. No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Goering.

Q. Yes. In what sense?

A. That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my ministry.

Q. As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you?

A. I would not have appointed a man like Goering who didn't understand a bit about all these things.

Q. But you had originally, I take it, suggested to Hitler that he be appointed the Commissar for raw materials and foreign exchange.

A. Not for raw materials, but for foreign exchange. That was because I had not the least authority with the Party, and the Party always deceived me in foreign exchange.

Q. But, nevertheless, you say that at the time when Goering became delegate for the Four Year Plan you were not in sympathy with the appointment?

A. No, not at all.

Q. How long did it take for you to crystallize in your mind the feeling that you could not go along with Goering and maintain your position as Minister of Economics?

A. The first moment that it happened that Goering interfered with my business I drew the consequences, and that was in July '37, when he gave out a law about mining. I don't know the details any more, but it was about the State interfering with mining, something like that. That was the end of July. This law he brought out without even informing me beforehand of any intention to do so, or without discussing the law or the method of executing the law, and immediately after that beginning of August, I wrote a long letter to him, stating my differences of opinion. This letter is somewhere; perhaps you have it. I sent a copy of that letter to the Fuehrer and asked for my resignation as Commissar for the Ministry.

Q. That was towards the end of August?

A. No. The 11th of August. I remember the date.

Q. 11th of August. But before this July incident with respect to the mining that you speak about, had there been a series of developments with Goering since 1936?

A. I have stated at some former interrogation—I don't know whether it was with you—that in the middle of December '36, Goering for the first time in his new position assembled an assembly of industrialists and outlined his ideas about German economy before them, saying several foolish things, and that on the 22nd of January the following year, five weeks later at the occasion of my birthday—that is why I remember the date—my 60th birthday, in a public speech I refuted these ideas of Goering's, so that the difference of opinion between Goering and myself became already public at that time.

[Pages 34-39]

Q. Let me ask you: Did you in July 1937 have a discussion with Goering or indeed an argument with Goering about your retaining your position as Plenipotentiary for the War Economy?

A. It was never mentioned.

Q. I want you to think carefully about that, Doctor.

A. It was never mentioned, because I remember that very well. When I retired as Minister of Economics, at the same time I was withdrawn as Reichsverteidungskommissar. That is what you mean.

Q. No. It was Generalbevollmaechtigter der Kriegswirtschaft.

A. General?

Q. General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy.

A. It had been information gotten in the document which relieved me from my post as Minister of Economics, and a few days later Lammers came and said, "Now here is the other document about the Plenipotentiary." As to Goering, I have not discussed it with him. Nobody had thought about it.

Q. Now, let's go back very carefully. Set your mind on this, because it may turn out to be important. I am not talking now of the time when you resigned or was dismissed as Minister of Economics in November of 1937. I am now talking of the time when you were functioning as Minister of Economics in July 1937.

A. Yes.

Q. I ask you whether at that time before you had given up the position as Minister of Economics you did not have a dispute with Goering with respect to your maintaining or retaining the position of General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy?

A. I don't remember that I had it.

Q. Do you remember any discussion with Goering and with Hitler concerning your desire to continue in the post as Minister of the War Economy?

A. It is absolutely untrue, absolutely untrue.

Q. Did you have any discussion on that subject of any kind with Hitler or with Goering?

A. None whatever.

Q. Did you to anybody assert or maintain that you were entitled to retain the position of General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in July or thereabout of 1937?

A. Not that I remember. None whatever, because I didn't lay any stress upon such a position.

Q. Now, let me refresh your recollection as to this point, and see if it does. Did you have a discussion with Hitler and Goering in which you pointed out that in case of war Goering would be busy with the Luftwaffe and hence probably be in the field and that, therefore, he could not run the War Economy in the event of war, and that, therefore, you had better be left in that position?

A. Not after my dismissal.

Q. This is before your dismissal.

A. No. Such a conversation is possible, because I had always objected to Goering's abilities of managing the Economics, and that can only have been at the time when my dismissal was not yet discussed.

Q. Your dismissal was not yet discussed?

A. Yes.

Q. But I asked you, did you urge upon the Fuehrer that you be permitted to retain the position of Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in the event of war?

A. Certainly not.

Q. That is your best recollection?

A. My best recollection and conviction.

Q. See if this refreshes your recollection, Dr. Schacht: I just want to see if it does. This is a document that is marked Exhibit A of 15 October 1945, Edlow, and bears the date, "Berlin" 7 of July 1937. It is a copy signed "Herman Goering" and "Dr. Hjalmar Schacht," and I ask you if you will refresh your recollection from this document.

A. (Examining document) What does it mean?

Q. I am asking you. Does it refresh your recollection about the incident?

A. No. That has nothing to do with the question you have asked me.

Q. Why not?

A. What does it state?

Q. Would you mind reading it? Translate it into English for the record.

A. "At the request of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, and examination"—

Q. Let me read it. It may be easier for you, "At the request of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, and examination by both undersigned of the previously presented fundamental question which is hereby resolved had resulted that the tasks of the delegates of the Four Years Plan and the tasks of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy be resolved in closest cooperation. Additional the fact is agreed to that the Plenipotentiary for War Economy has without doubt the position of the highest Reich authority." Signed "Goering" and "Schacht."

A. Yes. Now can you give me an explanation of it?

Q. You remember first signing the document?

A. Certainly. I don't remember it, but there is no question about it.

Q. All right. You remember, then, having a further discussion with Goering about the situation?

A. No. But I can absolutely now explain how it has come about.

Q. Please do.

A. After Goering had taken over the Four Years Plan, and I must say after he had taken over the control of foreign exchange already since April '36, but still more after the Four Years Plan, September '36, he has always tried to get control of the whole economic policy. One of the objects, of course, was that as Plenipotentiary for War Economy in the case of war, and he being only too anxious to get everything into his hands, he tried to get that away from me. Certainly as long as I had the position of Minister of Economics I have certainly objected to that, because after he had got the foreign exchange and after he had got the Four Years Plan, I didn't want to give away one thing after the other and then remain as nothing. Therefore, the last sentence about the Plenipotentiary, I didn't want to dwindle down, and that is all.

Q. Now, Goering's explanation of the last sentence might amuse you. He says that made it definite that you would be under his jurisdiction, because all the Obersten Behorde were under him.

A. It may amuse you if I tell you that the last conversation that I had with Goering on these topics was in November '37, when Luther for two months had endeavored to unite Goering and myself and to induce me to further cooperate with Goering and maintain my position as Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Goering, and at the end of this talk Goering said, "But I must have the right to give orders to you." Then I said, "Not to me, but to my successor." I have never taken orders from Goering, and would never have done it, because he was a fool in economics, and I knew something about it, at least.

Q. Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive, personal business between you and Goering. That seems perfectly obvious.

A. Certainly.

Q. That was the fundamental reason why you could not keep your position any more, because you would have been in a position to take orders from a man whom you did not respect in economic matters?

A. Absolutely, and this is one of the stages where he tried to take something away from me, and immediately after my dismissal, after my resignation, this was also taken.

Q. What I am trying to analyze now, if I may for a moment, is what was it that he was trying to take away from here?

A. He wanted to become Plenipotentiary for the War Economy.

Q. Let's go into the duties of that job for a moment and see what he was trying to take away from you. There are only two possibilities as it has been explained to me. If I am wrong, correct me. One would be the preparation for a mobilization, and the other would be the actual taking charge of this in the event of war. Otherwise the post had no meaning. So the things you resisted his taking away from you, as I see it was the right to be in charge of the preparation for mobilization, and, secondly, the right to control in the event of war?

A. Correct.

[Pages 52-54]

Q. Do you recall why you were discussing as early as 1936 this mobilization business?

A. But sir, I was, as you have stated, Plenipotentiary for War Economics, and I have considered this as a routine method for the General Staff of the War Ministry, and certainly we had discussed these methods.

Q. In other words, you didn't consider it a negative or negligible task, as I think you first said the first time I asked you about it?

A. I have never thought of any possibility of mobilization, but, nevertheless, as a routine work, you have to deal with it.

Q. That is the only explanation you have of that?

A. Certainly.

Q. Goering at those meetings from time to time would speak about the possibilities of war. Do you think that was in the same vein?

A. I don't know whether it was in the same day—

Q. Same vein, the same vein, the same ideas as yours, those remarks?

A. I doubt it very much, because all those things were just those that made me suspicious.

Q. For instance, Goering says, "All means must be considered from the standpoint of assurance of the direction of war."

A. Yes.

Q. And you were present, of course, and you then replied to him, in which you suggested that there should be price fixing. Do you remember that?

A. I don't remember that, but certainly, it's true, if it is in there.

Q. So that, I take it, you actually did occupy this position that you were named to, as Plenipotentiary for the War Economy?

A. Certainly.

Q. And just as the Chief of the General Staff worries in advance about preparations in the event of mobilization from the military point of view, so you were concerned with it from the economic point of view?

A. Certainly.

Q. I think that is all for today, Dr. Schacht. I will probably see you tomorrow or the next day.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3729-PS

Excerpts from Testimony of Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht
taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 17 October 1945, 1145-1630
hours by Lt. Col. Murray Gurfein, AUS, OUSCC
Also present: S/Sgt. Horace M. Levy, Court Reporter.

[Pages 1 to 19]

Q. Now, I want to go back to something that interested me a little, Doctor Schacht, and I never quite got it clear in my mind. You made a statement some time ago, when you repeated, that after Munich, Hitler said that he was annoyed at Chamberlain for having deprived him of a military march into Prague; do you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. I wonder if you can tell me what the context of that was? It just stands in the record, as a statement in the air.

A. I think he was not satisfied with the Munich agreement at all; and I heard it simply standing in a crowd of his entourage; I don't remember who they were, perhaps, all these people, Bormann, Himmler, and others; and by some chance I was near, and I heard him saying that. My feeling at that time was that he wanted some glory.

Q. Well, how soon after Munich was it? Was it a sort of celebration after Munich?

A. I don't think so, no.

Q. Well, what was the occasion? That is what I don't have clear in the record. I just don't like to leave it that way.

A. I—

Q. Was it at the Chancellery, or where was it?

A. Most probably—no, not in the Chancellery, not in the new building. I can't tell you, but somewhere in Berlin.

Q. It was in Berlin. Now, was it a reception; can you refresh your recollection?

A. No, it was no reception, no; it was just—I had to do something, I don't know, and he was in his entourage then.

Q. Well now, I wasn't there, but it would seem that a remark would have been made very shortly after the event.

A. Yes, certainly, shortly after Munich, a few days after Munich, it must have been.

Q. In other words, you place it there as the beginning of October, 1938. Munich was about the 1st of October, 31st of September.

A. It must have been in those days.

Q. In those days!

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you draw any implication from the remark at the time, as you remember?

A. I—Did I?

Q. Draw any implication or any inference from it?

A. Just to see his mood, I mean, to see what he thought of the whole thing, which, of course, displeased me very much.

Q. Yes, but now, as you tell it, and I want to see if you get it clearly in your memory, the thing he was objecting to, was the preventing by Chamberlain of his marching into Prague, as you have told us several times. I take it that sticks in your mind.

A. Yes, I think he was not satisfied with the peaceful settlement, as it had the appearance in Munich.

Q. Yes?

A. And that he wanted something by which he could show the world that he was a great man and a victor, and so on.

Q. Yes. Now, as I see it, there were two implications from that; one was the one that you just mentioned, obviously, that he wanted some military glory; and the other might have been that he was not satisfied with the territorial settlement, but would have preferred to go into Prague.

A. No, I had not that impression at that time. That wasn't anything which came into my mind at that time.

Q. Well now, obviously, if he said he would have marched into Prague, didn't that bring to your mind that that was the goal at the time which had been stopped by a compromise, to wit, the Munich Agreement?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. So that, by that time then, in October, 1938, right after Munich, there was at least the implication that Hitler was not

wholly satisfied with the territorial achievement that he had obtained through Munich, and that he wished to go further.

A. That was not my impression.

Q. Now, I think you told us, though, the other day, did you not, that about that time, you already had begun to have misgivings with respect to his goals, and so forth?

A. Oh, I would even go further than that.

Q. In point of time, we are now talking about October of 1938.

A. Yes.

Q. And you expressed yourself, I think, quite strongly, did you not, that by that time it was obvious to you that Hitler's intentions were certainly not peaceful?

A. I was very afraid that whatever he had in his mind, he was not trying his best to avoid a military complication, and that he might abuse his Army for things which might become dreadful.

Q. And that feeling you had had not only as late as October, 1938, I think you said, but also from the time of the dismissal of Fritsch.

A. Yes, it grew within these months.

Q. Yes. Now, going back to another subject for a moment, in March 1937, you made an agreement with Hitler for the furnishing to him of three billions of Reichsmarks, by way of indirect credit from the Reichsbank.

A. Yes.

Q. Which, in substance, was to expire in about March of 1938.

A. Yes.

Q. In other words, at that time, in 1937, contrary to your usual practice, you fixed a time limit as well as an amount limit; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So that it was determined in advance, that by April 1, 1938, there would be some change in the method of financing armaments.

A. Yes, if he intended to continue.

Q. Yes, if he intended to continue, certainly.

A. Which I hoped at that time he wouldn't.

Q. Now, would you tell us what gave you that hope at that time, Doctor Schacht? I am interested in that.

A. Oh, certainly, from my standpoint, the financial question in the forerank; and then the general development of Germany's position, I mean, our economic position was much better than years before, and there was no need for any further arming.

Q. Well now, you knew in 1937, did you not, that one of the goals of Hitler was Austria?

A. Yes.

Q. And I believe you stated in November to Ambassador Bullitt, that Hitler intended to have Austria; do you remember that?

A. Maybe to Bullitt.

Q. You wouldn't deny that fact?

A. Yes, maybe. I don't know when it has been, but I remember that I met Bullitt at the American Embassy once in Berlin.

Q. That is correct; and you had a fairly extended conversation with him about the situation; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And to refresh your recollection, I will tell you that that was in November of 1937. You don't doubt that, do you?

A. No, I don't doubt it at all.

Q. Nor do you doubt the conversation. And in that conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, you further said that Hitler was interested in receiving the problem of the Sudeten Germans as well.

A. That may be.

Q. So that in 1937, you knew that Hitler's plans for expansion to the East had not yet been fulfilled; isn't that correct?

A. I would not call that "expansion to the East", because Austria was certainly not a profit to Germany from an economic standpoint, only partly, because of the tourist traffic, and so on; and the Sudetenland was certainly nothing which could help Germany in any way out of her economic pressure.

Q. No, but let's leave out for a moment, if you will, Doctor Schacht, my phrase about "expansion to the East."

A. Yes.

Q. In 1937, was it not brought home to your knowledge that Hitler still had at least limited goals, to wit, Austria and the Sudetenland?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did that feeling or that knowledge come to you during the year 1937, or were you also of that opinion in March of 1937, when you had the conversation with Hitler about advancing another three billions of Reichsmarks?

A. I have never considered the Sudeten problem as a real serious problem because I have never thought that this could be done otherwise than by some understanding with Czechoslovakia, on an economic basis, and as I told you before, I wanted Czechoslovakia, one day, by voluntary and peaceful and friendly under-

standing, to come into the customs union of what you may call "Middle Europe," or whatever it might be.

Q. Well, what I want to make clear to you, Doctor Schacht, is that I am not now probing for your views, which you have stated; I am now asking you for the views that you entertained with respect to what Hitler intended. You see, there is quite a difference, possibly, I don't know.

A. I had no notice that Hitler had other methods in his mind.

Q. No, when you made the statement to Ambassador Bullitt, for example, what was the intention of that statement? What did you seek to convey to the United States?

A. That they might help in some arrangement with Czechoslovakia.

Q. Well, was it not a statement—whether or not you agree with it, we won't discuss at the moment—to the effect that the United States had better be forewarned that Hitler had a specific objective in mind, and that it would be well to go along with him? Was that not the implication?

A. I don't quite understand what you mean by that. The United States could only help in, say, fostering the general feeling, nothing else, I mean, no political influence whatever.

Q. By letting Hitler have a free hand, as it were.

A. No, not by letting him have a free hand, but to help in some understanding with Czechoslovakia.

Q. Well, let's put it in that form then.

A. That is not a free hand.

Q. That the United States might act as a mediator, or as one—

A. As helpful.

Q. Or one of a concert of powers, or as helpful, with a clear understanding conveyed by you that Hitler was intent on his goal.

A. Yes, you may put it that way.

Q. So that, if Hitler did not have his way by diplomatic means, there was always the implication that he would stay fixed to that goal which he had set.

A. I had not the impression at that time that he would do anything forceful or illegal or unfriendly in reaching this goal.

Q. In other words, you, in effect, deny the fair implication of the statement to Bullitt, and Hitler had, by that time, established himself as a man who more or less got what he wanted; and I think you have so said frequently; have you not?

A. I didn't hope he would get everything that he wanted.

Q. No, but I am talking now of a description of the personality.

A. He was a very energetic—

Q. Very energetic?

A. Energetic fellow; yes, certainly.

Q. And when you stated the goal of a man like that, knowing the sequence of German history from the time he took power, there must have been at least an implication in your mind that he would set out to get what he wanted; isn't that correct?

A. If he could reach it by normal means.

Q. Now, that is what I want to ask you: Have you anything to suggest as to why you thought Hitler would be limited to achieve his goals only by normal means?

A. I had hoped so.

Q. No, but have you anything concrete to offer in support of that statement then? That was, what he was after, in any event.

A. Only his permanent assurance that he would maintain peace, which he stated at every public occasion, and privately in our conversations, too.

Q. Well now, this was all during the time when these preparations were being made with respect to armaments.

A. Yes.

Q. Preparations were being made, with respect to the event of mobilization.

A. Yes.

Q. Secret papers were being passed.

A. Secret?

Q. Secret papers were being passed about from one minister to another, with respect to the event of war.

A. Quite.

Q. There was at that time already a tension in Europe, I think, as we had discussed yesterday; was there not?

A. Yes.

Q. There were statements and declarations by the powers, with respect to guaranteeing integrities, and all the implications that we knew from the last war, that were a prelude to setting the stage.

A. Yes.

Q. I just want to refresh your recollection on that. At that time that you spoke to Mr. Bullitt in the Fall of 1937, all those things must have been very much in your mind and consciousness.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, this meeting that you had after Munich—just to come back to it for a moment—this attendance that you had, was that a voluntary attendance on Hitler, do you recall? Were you still doing business with him?

A. It was an occasion. I don't know what you mean by "voluntary." I happened to be there for some other matters, I don't know what it was, an ordinary routine matter.

Q. Routine matter?

A. Yes.

Q. In other words, as late as October, '38—I just want to get this thing clear—you were still seeing Hitler on business matters, that is, affecting your position?

A. Yes.

Q. And that also went into January, 1939, the month of your dismissal from the Reichsbank.

A. To the 2nd of January, 1939; that was the last time.

Q. Now, you don't mean to imply, Doctor Schacht, that was the last time you saw Hitler, on the 2nd of January, 1939?

A. I have seen Hitler during the war once, I think, when I intended to marry again; and I came to him in order to facilitate the formalities of my marriage. That must have been—I know, because I have married—in February '41. Since that time, I have never seen Hitler again.

Q. Now, what discussion did you have with him then? That was at Munich, was it not?

A. Pardon me?

Q. You went to see him at Munich or Berchtesgaden?

A. Before Berchtesgaden?

Q. No, I say, where did you go to see him in '41.

A. That was in '41, in the Chancellery.

Q. At the time you went to discuss your marriage.

A. Yes.

Q. Well now, you also went to see the Fuehrer in Munich, in February of 1941.

A. No.

Q. According to records of the Fuehrer.

A. No, no, no. I have seen him in '41 in Berlin. What do you allude to?

Q. To a trip you made to Munich to see Hitler in 1941.

A. I don't remember. Will you please help me?

Q. Well, I can help you, but the point is, you will have to refresh your recollection; but there is a record made of it in writing. That is all I can tell you, that you went to see the Fuehrer in Munich in February '41.

A. At what occasion? In '41.

Q. Yes.

A. I don't remember. I don't remember.

Q. Well now, you say you went to him solely for the purpose of getting your marriage fixed up?

A. In Berlin, yes.

Q. You had to go to Hitler for that, personally?

A. He had to give an order to the Minister of the Interior to do away with the formalities. You see, if one wants to marry, then the names have to be published for some weeks, and so on; and I wanted to do away with these formalities; and he granted that.

Q. How long did you see him on that occasion?

A. Quarter of an hour.

Q. Well, obviously, you must have discussed something with him?

A. No, nothing.

Q. Nothing?

A. No.

Q. You came in the midst of a war?

A. What?

Q. I say, you came in the midst of a war?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. You were still the Minister without Portfolio?

A. Yes.

Q. And you discussed nothing?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Did he ask your views about the economic situation?

A. No, he didn't.

Q. Did you offer any views of any kind?

A. No.

Q. Now, was that the only time you saw Hitler, from the 5th of January, 1939?

A. From the 2nd of January, '39, I have seen him once in '40; that must have been in February or March or January, one of the months in '40, and also in Berlin.

Q. And in what connection was that?

A. I had received from America two invitations to state to the American public the views of Germany about the whole situation. One came, I think, from "Foreign Affairs Magazine," and one came from the "Atlantic Monthly," which I think is a magazine of the "Christian Science Monitor," connected with it, the same group. When I got the first from the "Foreign Affairs Magazine," I did not want to do anything, of course, being a Minister without Portfolio; and in wartime, I did not want to write anything of which my Government had no knowledge; so I asked by

telephone, or I don't know how it was, but anyhow, I addressed the Foreign Minister, telling him that I had this invitation, and that I wanted to write that article, that I wanted to inform him about that; and after some days I got an answer, a written answer, I think, from him—no, I told him that I wanted a conversation with him about this matter, and then he said he didn't—he didn't mention that conversation which I had asked for, but he simply wrote me that he was agreed to my writing that article, on the condition that I showed the manuscript to him before I sent it. And that, of course, I didn't want; I didn't want any censorship. Either they had the confidence in me that I would write the good thing, nothing which would hurt Germany, or I wouldn't write the article; and so I dropped this thing. I didn't refer to that; and I think that I wrote to the magazine that I wasn't able to do that, to write the article; but then came the second demand from the "Atlantic Monthly," and again I personally had a wish to write the article; and so I wrote to the Fuehrer, and told him the story of the first demand and of the second demand, and said I wanted the conversation—I would like to have a conversation with Hitler; and so he asked me to come, and that, as I say, must have been sometime in February, or so, about that time; and when I saw him, I explained things to him, and said that my view was that it would not be sufficient just to write one article, but that somebody should go over to the United States, and try to inform the United States about the ideas prevailing in Germany; and he agreed to that. I didn't say that I would go, but that somebody should go; and that he agreed to that, and said, "I want to talk that over." He wanted to talk that over with Ribbentrop; and that was all I have heard until months later. I had then the occasion, once, to talk about this matter with Funk; and I said that also from an economic standpoint it would be essential to do something like that; and Funk said to me that he would take up the matter again with Ribbentrop; and some weeks or months later—it took some time—he told me that he had asked Ribbentrop, and that Ribbentrop had written to him that he did not agree: that "It was too early," as Ribbentrop said, "to do that"; and so I dropped the matter.

Q. Well now, "too early to do that." Was there some political—

A. I don't know.

Q. Political deal that you had in mind?

A. Not I, he.

Q. Well, we have had this version before, Doctor Schacht, but in a somewhat different way, that you volunteered to go to the United States, to try and convince the President or the powers that be in America, to stop giving as much aid to Britain, and to see the German point of view a little more clearly; isn't that the implication?

A. What do you mean by "implication"? I mean, that was the real implication, I mean.

Q. That is what you wanted to do.

A. To try to get the United States out of the war.

Q. Yes, so that at that time despite your conflicts with Hitler, which you have described here at length, you were still sufficiently with him to try to see a successful termination of the war for Germany.

A. I was not—I don't know his ideas, but I was of the idea that everything which would be done to shorten the war, and to avoid further conflicts, would be helpful.

Q. And a shortening of the war, with respect to your mission, if it had been successful, would have caused a German victory.

A. No, but it should mean an international understanding.

Q. Well, with the fruits of Czechoslovakia.

A. No, no.

Q. Of Austria and of Poland.

A. No, Austria was recognized and accepted, so that was no goal, any more, and as to Czechoslovakia, I had not the slightest goal to include this country into German authority.

Q. No, but by the time that you were still willing to undertake the trip, according to the chronology you gave, it was after the Fall of France, and after the invasion of the Low Countries.

A. No, I suggested that trip, as you will take from my statement, in the beginning of '40.

Q. Right, but the final discussion with Funk—

A. And wait a minute; just correct that. The Fall of France was only in the summer.

Q. Right.

A. So it was before France fell.

Q. No, but you said that months went by, the first time, and the second time, and the third time.

A. But the second time—he asked me the second time—I remember it well now—whether I could still go in '41. I said, "Now, it is too late." I wouldn't go.

Q. Well, let's place, if you will, now, the approximate date of the conversation you had with Funk, when you sent him to Rib-

bentrop with the suggestion that you would go to the United States; when would you say that was?

A. Perhaps in May, or something; perhaps the letter is there from Ribbentrop.

Q. I just want to get your recollection. You say definitely that that was before the invasion of France, or the attack on France?

A. At least before the fall of France.

Q. Yes.

A. That I had the conversation with Funk.

Q. Now, did you again renew that situation in 1941?

A. No, he asked me at that occasion, when I spoke about my marriage, whether I would still think it possible or feasible or wise to send somebody to America.

Q. That is, Hitler did.

A. Hitler did; Hitler did. He asked me whether I thought it wise, and I said, "It is too late now," because then the Lend and Lease agreement was already made a law.

Q. At least there was one subject in the conversation that you had with Hitler at the time, besides your marriage?

A. Yes, quite. I remember well, that is the one.

Q. Now, when you started to discuss Lend Lease with him, that discussion must have led to something else.

A. I didn't start any discussion about Lend and Lease. I just said, when he asked me, and he did it while I was going out of the room. Already, he said, "By the way, what about your thought of going or sending somebody to America?" And I said, "That is too late now," and then I dropped out, and there was no discussion whatever, neither about Lend or Lease, or about anything which had to do with politics, or economics, or whatever.

Q. Well now, did you, in Switzerland, in about '41 or '42—

A. '41, I was in Switzerland. I made my marriage trip to Switzerland. I asked him about that trip, too. I needed his permission to go to Switzerland.

Q. Yes. Now, when you were in Switzerland, did you tell anybody that you were still seeing Hitler from time to time, advising him generally; that at times your advice was taken, and at times it was not?

A. I don't remember, but if I did it was certainly wrong, because since February '41, I have not seen him; I have not seen him later.

Q. Let's go into that for a minute. You say it was certainly wrong. Why would you intentionally mislead anybody at that time?

A. I don't think I did. It may be that I advised some Swiss people, that I intended to see Hitler.

Q. No, I just want to get your recollection on the record, so that if we ever conflict, we know what we are doing. I ask you now, did you say to anybody in Switzerland, in 1941, that you were still seeing Hitler, not regularly, but from time to time, and that you were giving him advice from time to time, some of which was accepted, and some of which was rejected?

A. Not at that time anymore. It might have been formerly, but not at that time.

Q. No, speaking as of that time.

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Well now, do you remember seeing Hitler? It is just a question of "Yes" or "No."

A. I remember having seen Hitler for the last time in my life in '41, February, or March, or January, I don't know, but in the beginning of '41, just a few weeks before my marriage.

Q. Now, going back then to the year of 1940, did you see Hitler at all during that period?

A. I think I have seen Hitler only at that one occasion, about those articles for American magazines, not in Munich or elsewhere.

Q. Then, of course, you saw him when you attended the reception at the railroad station when he came back from Compiegne.

A. Oh, yes, I told you.

Q. Did you have any conversation with him on that occasion?

A. No—yes, just he, said to me, "What do you say now, Doctor Schacht?" before all the crowd; and I said the only thing I could say, "May God protect you." That was my answer.

[Pages 31 to 34]

Q. Well now, we discussed yesterday, too, the business of the raw materials that you were able to bring in under your "new plan," so called.

A. Yes.

Q. And the relationship of the materials thus selected to the needs of the armament program; you remember that?

A. I didn't select any commodities coming in.

Q. Well, didn't you have these offices that you created under the Ministry of Economics?

A. Yes.

Q. With respect to the control of foreign exchange, for example?

A. Yes.

Q. Wasn't that your own idea and your own creation?

A. Yes.

Q. And wasn't it the function of those offices to determine for what purposes foreign exchange would be made available for imports?

A. No, no. I mean, for what? I have explained that so often already. They couldn't know for what purposes these commodities came in.

Q. No, but they knew very well whether the license was for the import of iron, for example, or rubber, or foodstuffs.

A. Yes.

Q. And do you say you did not have a coordinated policy, with respect to what imports should be pressed, with respect to the granting of licenses for foreign exchange?

A. Just those that you mentioned.

Q. In other words, you were, by a coordinated system of control, controlling the flow of foreign exchange for the purchase of imports, which were required for certain purposes.

A. Until April '36.

Q. When Goering took it over.

A. Yes.

Q. What I am talking about is the creation of this new plan for which you take full credit, I take it.

A. Yes.

Q. The system, in effect, was a centralized system which would enable the Reich, actually yourself, as Minister of Economics, to control the flow of foreign exchange, and thus determine the quality and quantity of the products that would be imported.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I ask you, generally, then, whether the main purpose of the importation of these raw materials was not the armament program, taking into view also the fact that you had to feed the population in order to continue the economy, and indeed to continue the rearmament itself.

A. I can only refer to my yesterday's statement about these statements.

Q. It is preliminary again, but what is your answer again?

A. The answer is that I had to feed the people, and I had to maintain the economic life, and especially the exporting industries

in Germany, and certainly the raw materials for armaments were among these raw materials which I got.

Q. Right, but you do not take back the statement, which you made in the memorandum to Hitler on the 3rd of May 1935, as I understand it, that the primary goal of your economic set-up was rearmament.

A. Not of the economic; I said the political aim, the political goal is armament.

Q. The main purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Now, just to look at some situations and some figures: In 1934 to 1937, is it correct to say that the imports by Germany of manufactured goods decreased?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it correct to say that they decreased by 63%?

A. I don't know the figure, but yes, that might be right.

Q. And is it also true to say that the imports of iron ores increased?

A. I guess.

Q. Don't you remember?

A. No, but I should say so.

Q. And would it be correct to say that the imports of ores increased by 132%?

A. I hope you took it from the statistics. I haven't the figures in my mind.

Q. Well, it doesn't shock you especially?

A. No, not at all.

Q. And that grain increased by 102%?

A. Maybe.

Q. Oil by 116%?

A. Maybe.

Q. Copper by 71%?

A. Maybe, I hope that all these figures are correct.

Q. I will show you the figures in a moment.

A. I don't doubt it.

Q. You are the author of the figures; that is why I want to show them to you.

A. In my own speech, perhaps.

Q. In your own speech.

A. That's right.

[Pages 40 to 62]

Q. Let's get back for a moment to the first thing. You have raised the question of the Jews. We hadn't discussed that. What

did you think, at the time you subscribed to National Socialism, was the program with respect to the Jews?

A. When did I what?

Q. When you subscribed.

A. To what?

Q. When you became an adherent to National Socialism.

A. I was never an adherent to National Socialism as a Party.

Q. At the time you came into relationship with Hitler; that was as early as the beginning of 1931.

A. What I thought, about the Jewish problem?

Q. Not what you thought, what you thought the National Socialists thought.

A. The National Socialists, as I took it from the program, intended to not having such a great percentage of Jews in the governmental and cultural positions of Germany, with which I agreed.

Q. What else?

A. That is all; and under the second paragraph, I think, it is paragraph 5, or Article 5 of the program, it said that also there would be some restrictions by Article 4. The Jews should get legal protection and a law for them, under which they would be able to live.

Q. That is the law as subjects, but not as citizens; is that what you mean?

A. Not a full citizen.

Q. Not as citizens.

A. Not as citizens, but not with all the rights of the Christian citizen.

Q. But you know that Article 4 certainly did specifically prescribe that they were not to have the rights as citizens of the Reich.

A. Yes, but the rights of citizens; there are lots of rights.

Q. Well now, let's go after that. Did you agree with that part of the policy?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Now, you stayed in office as a member of the Cabinet during the years 1939, 1934, 1935, 6, 7, 8, did anything happen during these years, by way of legislation or decrees, concerning the Jews with which you did not agree?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you nevertheless—

A. Not—wait a minute—not as regards laws, but as regards behavior of the Party.

Q. Now, let's get that clear. May we then take it that you subscribed fully with all the laws that were passed during the period I have mentioned, with respect to the Jewish question?

A. Well, I would say, to the so-called "Nurnberg Laws," I would not have subscribed.

Q. Well now, were not the Nurnberg Laws, in effect, always a basic tenet of National Socialist Doctrine?

A. I had not assumed that before.

Q. Well now, you had read "Mein Kampf," had you not?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew the views of Hitler on the Jewish question; did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you not understand that he would, as he promised, liquidate this question, in effect?

A. Yes, but not the way he did afterwards.

Q. Well, let me ask you your expectations; how did you expect him to do it?

A. I just told you, not allowing such an enormous percentage of Jews to enter into either of the Government's or cultural decisions; owning a great percentage of the theatres; of films; music; and literature, and all these things. I thought that in a Christian state, the Jewish people should not maintain so many of these positions.

Q. Well now, during your time as Reichminister, statutes were passed, were they not, prohibiting all Jewish lawyers, for example, from practicing in the court.

A. Yes, that is just what I said.

Q. Did you agree with that?

A. Yes.

Q. That is all; that wasn't a limitation; that was a complete exclusion.

A. I didn't agree with the complete exclusion. I would have accorded the Jews in a percentage, a percentage of population, the right to keep some posts.

Q. Now, with respect to civil servants, there was this Aryan clause, business that was put in; did you agree with that legislation?

A. With the same restriction, with the same limitation.

Q. Now, did you ever express yourself, in the cabinet or elsewhere, to the point that you wanted these restrictions put in?

A. I don't think so; useless to do it.

Q. You say, "useless to do it?"

A. Yes.

Q. I thought you said at one time or another that the reason you stayed in is because you thought you might have some influence on policy?

A. Yes.

Q. You didn't consider this as important a matter to take a position on it?

A. Not important enough matter to break.

Q. You signed some of these things yourself, didn't you, Doctor Schacht, these laws about Jews?

A. I don't remember what law I have signed.

Q. Well, for example, about lawyers.

A. Yes, maybe.

Q. You certainly signed a law with respect to the prohibition against Jews receiving licenses to deal in foreign currencies; do you remember that?

A. Yes, maybe.

Q. Were you in favor of that?

A. I don't remember what the details were of that question.

Q. Well, it is not a matter of details; the question is a matter of discrimination.

A. Yes.

Q. You were in favor of it?

A. I wasn't in favor, but I had to sign it.

Q. Well, you were the only one who signed it; you were the Reichsminister of Economics.

A. Yes.

Q. And obviously, it was a bill which was put in by your Ministry; was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. So you take full responsibility, do you not?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Now, with respect to the public economic advisors for co-operatives, for example.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also sign a law prohibiting Jews from being admitted—

A. Yes.

Q. To the examination for that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you also go so far as to approve a law, imposing the death penalty on German subjects who transferred German property abroad, or to proffer or leave property abroad?

A. What property?

Q. Who transferred property abroad, or left property abroad?

A. Yes, maybe. I don't remember that; but certainly, too, if it is there.

Q. Were you in favor of it?

A. I had to do all this whether I was in favor or not, I didn't discuss it at that time.

Q. Well, who forced you to do it?

A. Hitler.

Q. You mean that Hitler personally sat up at night thinking out these laws? It is impossible.

A. If I would have declined to sign these laws, that would have meant a break with Hitler.

Q. Well now, was there a matter of conscience involved, or was there not?

A. To some extent, yes, but not important enough to risk a break, to run the break.

Q. Yes. In other words, you had quite another objective which was more important.

A. Quite.

Q. And what was that objective, Doctor Schacht?

A. Well, the objective was to stay in power, and to help carry this thing through in an ordinary and reasonable way.

Q. That is to say, the restoration of the German economy.

A. Quite.

Q. And the completion of the armament program.

A. The completion of the international equality, political equality of Germany.

Q. By means of armament, as you yourself have said.

A. Also by means of armament.

Q. Now then, there is one about the dismissal of Jewish officials and public notaries.

A. Yes.

Q. Which you also approved of.

A. It is all in the same thing.

Q. It is all in the same framework?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, was there anything about this Jewish legislation that particularly shocked you; do you recall?

A. Well, I thought the Nurnberg Laws were shocking to some extent.

Q. Well, those laws you knew about before they were promulgated, did you not?

A. I got them from the papers.

Q. You made a speech just a month before the Nurnberg Laws, Doctor Schacht, in which you predicted their passage; do you remember that speech?

A. No, I don't. Will you please show it to me?

Q. I will try to. I haven't got it with me, unfortunately, but you did make a speech just a month before the Nurnberg Laws were promulgated, in which you said, "Laws are in preparation now."

A. Oh, I made the speech, I remember that very well, in Koenigsberg.

Q. Koenigsberg, that's right.

A. Yes, the Koenigsberg speech. In that speech, the intention was just to the contrary. I said,—I blamed the Party people in that speech for attacking the Jews, and what would you call it, and torturing them, and so on; and I said that they should stop that because the laws were in preparation.

Q. Yes, so that you did know that laws were in preparation.

A. Oh, all the time, I was expecting something on that line.

Q. And specifically, the Nurnberg Laws, I take it.

A. No, I have not seen any contents of these laws before Nurnberg, nor of any law regarding the Jews, except these ordinances.

Q. Now, of course, the Nurnberg Laws, were promulgated in legal form, in a Reichstag session; were they not?

A. Yes.

Q. You were a participant, as a member of the government, were you not?

A. I wasn't present.

Q. You would have voted for them, had you been, I suppose.

A. No.

Q. You would have voted for them.

A. That I can't answer today.

Q. Did you sign anything in connection with that, as a Minister?

A. I have never signed any laws.

Q. Did the Cabinet ever do that, do you know?

A. The Cabinet, that I don't know. The Cabinet, as far as I remember, was summoned to Nurnberg, and I have not been there. I did not participate.

Q. But in the light of your other answers to the questions, you do not take the position, as I understand it, that you would not have gone along, as you did with all the other legislation?

A. I say, I doubt it, whether I would have stood that or not. I don't want to now, afterward, to formulate any opinion about that.

Q. Yes, well now, let's take that up for a moment, Doctor Schacht, as your signature on a piece of paper would not have meant anything, because there would have been others to sign it, would there not?

A. Quite so.

Q. So that when you say that you doubt that you would have signed it—

A. That would have meant the break.

Q. That would have been as a protest.

A. Yes.

Q. Well, the laws themselves actually were promulgated by the Cabinet and by the Reich.

A. Yes, I did not draw any consequence from that.

Q. And you remained?

A. But I have uttered my opinion afterwards at a meeting which was held by Minister Frick, when the question came up about how to treat the so-called mixed half-Jewish, half-Christian or half-Aryan; and in that meeting which was held in the Ministry of Frick, I was asked—I was invited to attend—and I was asked about this whole problem; and there I have stated my views about this. Do you want to hear them?

Q. No.

A. But I can tell you that they were against the whole idea of the racial policy of Hitler.

Q. That policy, however, was promulgated in the law which you made mention of, not in the Nurnberg Laws; and yet you felt, in conscience, that you could remain in that Cabinet and give further aid to Mr. Hitler?

A. I did.

Q. Well now, your objections are very interesting, in connection with the Jewish question and how it was to be treated. Your objections, as I read them in substance, were primarily based upon the bad effect that these acts were having outside of Germany, and the consequent disturbance of your foreign trade. Is that correct?

A. I don't catch what you mean.

COL. GURFEIN TO REPORTER: Would you mind reading that question.

A. Would you please explain it? I catch your words, but not the meaning.

Q. All right, for every suggestion that you made, you generally have a reason, being a logical and a normal man.

A. Thank you.

Q. The objection that you raised, with respect to the treatment of the Jews by the Party, was based upon some reason.

A. Yes.

Q. I suggest to you, on the basis of what you have written, that the reason why you were opposed to certain excesses of the Party, if you will, was because you felt that the repercussions abroad, particularly in the United States, were such as to interfere with your trade policy.

A. No, that was not my reason. My reason was the—that I objected to the racial point of attacking the Jewish problem.

Q. Well, I will go even further with you, Doctor Schacht, and say that you objected to it because it interfered with your rearmament task.

A. No.

Q. You say, "No"?

A. No.

Q. Well now, do you remember writing to General von Blomberg, on the 24th of December, 1933?

A. '35?

Q. '35.

A. 24th of December '35?

Q. 1935.

A. I think it was '36.

Q. Well, I have got it down as '35.

A. Is that a long letter?

Q. It is a long letter.

A. Yes, but I think I only wrote one letter to Blomberg about the whole question.

Q. Well we can find the letter later. It doesn't matter, but I have got it down as 1935; but in any event, you do remember writing a letter to him on that subject.

A. I don't know what subject.

Q. On the subject of rearmament. We have discussed that before.

A. I think it was '36. I didn't know it was as early as '35.

Q. To refresh your recollection to start with, the burden of your letter was the difficulties you were experiencing in obtaining the foreign exchange required for the rearmament program.

A. Not only for the armament program, but amongst others; also for the armament program; and certainly, to the Minister of War I have emphasized the armament program.

Q. And do you remember stating in that letter as follows—this is the translation of course—“The picture of the burdening of my trade and foreign exchange policy would not be complete, however, if I did not, again, note the cultural, political obstruction which in the whole world militates against commercial relations with us”?

A. Yes.

Q. You remember that?

A. Well, it is certainly in, because you quote from the letter.

Q. I go further: “The economic and illegal treatment of the Jews, the anti-church movement of certain Party organizations, and the lawlessness, which centers in the Gestapo, create an injury to our rearmament task.”

A. Yes.

Q. You remember saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. “Which could be considerably lessened through the application of more respectable methods,” do you remember saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. “Without abandonment of the goals in the least,” do you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you mean that when you said it?

A. I have not only stated that in this letter, but I have said that in the second memorandum, the 3rd of May, '35, which I gave Hitler, of which you showed me one of the two memoranda yesterday.

Q. Now, I ask you whether you meant what you said—

A. Certainly. certainly.

Q. When you wrote that you favored certain changes in method “Without abandonment of the goals in the least”?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in other words, the goals which you were subscribing, were apparently the persecution or the mistreatment of the Jews—

A. Also, yes.

Q. And the church policy?

A. Yes, and the Gestapo.

Q. No, perhaps you misunderstood me, I say the goals to which you were still subscribing were discriminatory legislation against the Jews—you were still in favor of that by other methods.

A. Quite.

Q. The church policy, but by other methods.

A. There was no legal attack on the church, as far as I understand; never has been; but that was simply the attack of the Party.

Q. Well, regardless of what it was, it was one of the goals, to which you still subscribed?

A. Yes.

Q. So that I take it, there was not much, as far as I have been able to discover, of the policies and practices of the Hitler Government, during the time that you were a Minister, that you objected to in principle; your objections were solely as to method?

A. As far as I understood the principles.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And your objections as to method were based largely on the interference with the heavy task that you had of trade, and particularly, export trade?

A. And others. You see, amongst others. In the Jewish problem, I have always been against the racial, or the anti, or the racial conception of Hitler; and I have always maintained the Christian conception.

Q. But what I am trying to get to, so that we can get it definitely, and get your views, if we can. Let's say, your views were that you were opposed to the treatment of the Jews as an inferior class, if you will—

A. Yes.

Q. Because it interfered with your foreign trade policy.

A. No, not because it interfered, but because I was against, in principle, I was against racial discrimination.

Q. But you stated, did you not, in a letter to Blomberg, which I have just quoted, that the goals could still be achieved, do you remember that?

A. Yes, amongst—aside of that principle, of that racial principle, which I did not accept, I said it was also hindering the policy.

Q. Let me understand the limitations of that, so that we can get your mind cleared up. Your only objection, then, I take it,

was that racial Jews, who were Christian by religion, should be excluded.

A. Quite.

Q. Now, after the Sudetenland was taken over by the Munich agreement, did you as the President of the Reichsbank, do anything about the Sudeten territory?

A. I think we took over the affiliations of the Czech Bank of Issues.

Q. And you also arranged for the currency conversion, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, going back to a memorandum that you told us about, that the Reichsbank Directors had written to Hitler at the end of 1938—

A. No.

Q. Beginning of 1939.

A. No, it was the 7th or 8th of January, 1939.

Q. Who was the author of that memorandum? Would you tell us?

A. The author, it was the concept, or what you call—it was Vocke.

Q. Vocke, and how long had he been working on that; do you remember?

A. Only after I came back from Berchtesgaden: that means, between the 2nd and the 7th of January.

Q. That is your conception?

A. Yes, except that, of course, we had a lot of discussions within the Directorium before that time, that we had to stop things.

Q. Well now, who was in favor of stopping, and who was not in favor of stopping?

A. We were all in favor of stopping.

Q. Well now, there is testimony, Doctor Schacht—I want to see what you say about it—by several Directors of the Reichsbank, to the effect that they pressed you for months to tell Hitler that the Reichsbank couldn't go any further, and that you kept putting them off from time to time.

A. Yes, I said, "Wait for the suitable moment."

Q. So that you agree that that testimony is correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, certain other Directors, for example, Hulse, says that as far as 1938, he opposed the Mefo financing, on the ground that it was reckless.

A. Yes.

Q. And would only lead to trouble; was that correct?

A. Maybe.

Q. I am trying to get the responsibility for the Mefo financing.

A. Yes.

Q. And you take that solely on yourself, do you?

A. No, the whole Directorium was responsible for that.

Q. That is what I am asking you; was there opposition within the Directorium to that financing?

A. We have never reached, as long as I have been President of the Reichsbank, to my recollection, any measure which was not approved by all the Directors.

Q. After discussion?

A. After discussion.

Q. And you, of course, as President, were the foremost in position at the bank.

A. Quite.

Q. So that your views went a long way with the Board.

A. (Witness shrugs shoulders.)

Q. I mean, aside from your own personality, as President it would.

A. Perhaps.

Q. What I am trying to get at is, did you receive personally any suggestions or warnings as early as 1936, by any of the Directors of the Reichsbank, against this policy of financing the Reich for armament?

A. Oh, we have discussed that many times.

Q. So that you knew that there were people who doubted the wisdom or the desirability, as early as 1938, of going along with Hitler.

A. No, of financing the Mefo bills.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. There was such opposition.

A. Oh, there were always doubts and considerations.

Q. Now, you know Wohltat very well, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. I was a bit surprised the other day, I must say when I showed you a paper signed with Wohltat's name; and I got the impression that you didn't seem to remember much about him; is that what you tried to convey?

A. I hadn't recalled that he was the man whom I put into the position of representing me as Plenipotentiary for War, for Economics in case of war.

Q. Do you remember that now?

A. Yes.

Q. You have refreshed your recollection about it?

A. Yes.

Q. So I take it that we may have it established then, that you did have a sort of office which dealt with the execution of your functions, as Plenipotentiary for the War Economy.

A. Yes, I thought it was Doctor Bade, but I remember now it was Wohltat that was on top of that office.

Q. And Wohltat, in effect, was your deputy?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, do you remember the other name of the other man, Worbs, who appeared on the letter?

A. Worbs, I didn't remember, but I think that Doctor Bade was also. I don't know how it comes to my mind that Bade was in, but I didn't remember the other ones.

Q. Well now, it is obvious that since there was no war at that time, the functions that these men performed for you were preparations for the event of war; is that correct?

A. Yes, in the ordinary routine of the General Staff, and the Minister of War.

Q. So that, in effect, your outfit, with Wohltat as your deputy and yourself as Chief, were working together with the General Staff for the contingency of (a) mobilization, and (b) The event of war from the economic side.

A. Yes, mobilization also in the case of war or threat of war.

Q. Now, I want to ask you briefly about a subject upon which I don't think I ever have touched with you, perhaps others have, and that goes back to the early days before the taking over of power by Hitler. When did you first become associated with the Nazis, or Nazi Leaders?

A. My first personal touch with them—and I had none whatever, no touch whatever before—my first meeting was with Goering, in December 1930. My first meeting with Hitler was on the 5th of January, 1931. I remember that date because it is written down in the little Book of the sister-in-law of Goering, and therefore I remember it.

Q. Yes, and at that time you became a supporter, I take it—

A. In the course—

Q. Of Hitler's coming to power.

A. Especially in the course of the years 1931 and 1932.

Q. Yes, did you go to America in 1931, do you remember?

A. No, in 1930.

Q. In 1930, rather?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you at that time give the impression wherever you went that Hitler was the coming man for Germany?

A. No, I don't think so. The statement, which I made at some occasion, was that if the Allies didn't find some means to treat Germany in another way, and then to see to the German situation, then there would be still more Hitlerites, which means, partisans of Hitler.

Q. Well, that included yourself; did it not?

A. I didn't state that.

Q. No, but obviously it did, because you were for Hitler at that time, were you not?

A. No, I wasn't.

Q. When did you become interested in becoming a co-worker of Hitler?

A. I'd say in the years of '31, '32.

Q. And that was when you saw that he had a mass movement that was likely to take power.

A. Quite, that was increasing every time.

Q. And did you publicly record your support for Hitler in those years?

A. I think I made a statement in December, '30, once coming back from America, at the Bavarian People's Party, where I said that there was a choice for any future German Government, either to hold against 25% socialists, or against 20% National Socialists.

Q. But what I mean—to make it very brief indeed—did you lend the prestige of your name to help Hitler come to power?

A. I have publicly stated that I expected Hitler to come into power, for the first time that I remember, in November '32.

Q. And you know, or perhaps you don't that Goebbels in his diary records with great affection—

A. Yes.

Q. The help that you gave him at the time.

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. November, 1932.

A. "From the Kaiserhof to the Chancellery and back."

Q. That's right; you have read that?

A. Yes.

Q. And you don't deny that Goebbeis was right?

A. I think his impression was, that was correct at that time.

Q. It was. Now, you knew at the time, that you stood as a conservative financier in the eyes of the world.

A. Yes, I hope so.

Q. A man who had formerly been President of the Reichsbank.

A. Yes.

Q. And a man who had been active in connection with international agreements.

A. Yes.

Q. And a man who had been a German representative, I believe on the Bank of International Settlements; certainly in your capacity as President of the Reichsbank.

A. As long as I was President, yes.

Q. As long as you were President.

A. Yes.

Q. And that the words that you uttered would logically be expected to have a soothing effect on the financiers, bankers, business men of the world.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you knew at the time, that if you made a public declaration in favor of Hitler then, that the conservative circles abroad, who might fear the excesses of such a Party as the Nazi Party, would in all likelihood be reassured by Doctor Schacht, as a personality, standing up for Hitler.

A. That may be.

Q. Well, I mean, it is a fact, isn't it?

A. I don't know.

Q. I am talking about your intention now.

A. My intention.

Q. Yes.

A. I had nothing of that kind in mind.

Q. Well, certainly, you know the effect of what you were saying.

A. I didn't consider that at the time, but I say it might be.

Q. It may be?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I just want to ask you to look at this record so that we can finish up. This is an article that was written in the 16th of January, 1937, or thereabout, which appeared in the "Mili-

taerische Wochenblatt," and I would like you to run through it and see if, in all modesty, you can admit that that article is a correct description of your activities and you [handing to witness]?

A. As I see it for the first time in my life.

Q. Do you accept it as correct?

A. I wouldn't say so—yes—but it was circulated as all research articles are.

Q. On the whole, you accept it as true?

A. I would say the underlying conception is certainly true.

Q. In other words, in effect, you are not taking the position that you were not largely responsible for the rearming of the German Army.

A. Oh, no, I never did.

Q. You have always been proud of the fact, I take it.

A. I wouldn't say proud, but satisfied.

Q. Now, I just wonder—I didn't identify several of these documents which I showed you the other day, and I am just wondering if your recollection is refreshed as to the point where you remember them any more, these letters, signed by Worbs and also signed by Wohltat?

A. I don't but it must certainly be correct, because it is from my office.

Q. Let me ask you a general question then: Do you take the responsibility, as the Plenipotentiary for the War Economy, for the writings that were made, and the actions that were done by Wohltat and his assistants?

A. I have to.

[Pages 71 to 72]

Q. Well now, let's go back for a moment to something else you said the other day which interests me. That is, with respect to the position of the Wehrmacht, in relation to the Anschluss, and in relation to the taking over of the Sudetenland. The position you took, as I understand it, was that the Wehrmacht was important not so much as an aggressive weapon against strong countries, Austria and Czechoslovakia, as against or vis-a-vis, if you will, the larger powers, the concert of nations in Europe; that is what you state.

A. My statement was that the armament of Germany has changed the attitude of the Allied powers.

Q. So that they would not be likely to intervene as they did in the case of the attempted Customs Union Anschluss of 1931.

A. For instance,—

Q. That means, that a stalemate would be created by virtue of the Armed might of Germany, which would tend to prevent the foreign powers, that is, Britain, France, Russia, from interfering in the plans of the new Reich, substantially.

A. Not the plans of the new Reich, but it would give Germany the equal position in international negotiations.

Q. The equal position being something as follows: That if Hitler decided to negotiate with Schuschnigg—see if I am right—that he would be able to negotiate with Schuschnigg with free hand, because he had a Wehrmacht, whereas if he didn't, England and France could intervene, as they did in 1931?

A. Yes, I may state it that way.

COLONEL GURFEIN: That is all.

(Whereupon, at 1630, 17 October 1945, the hearing was adjourned.)

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3730-PS

EXCERPTS

Testimony of Hermann Goering, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, 17 October 1945, 1030-1215, by Lt. Col. M. I. Gurfein, OUSCC. Also present: Captain Frank, Interpreter and Miss Evelyn Low, Reporter

[Page 1]

Q. I wanted to ask you to-day about some of the economic history of the period. When was the armament program first discussed, that is, the rearmament program—what year?

A. Immediately in 1933.

Q. In other words, Schacht had assumed the obligation at that time already to raise funds for the rearmament program?

A. Yes, but of course in co-operation with the Minister of Finance.

Q. During the years 1933 to 1935, before general conscription came in naturally, the rearmament was a secret rearmament was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. So that any monies that were used outside of the budget would have to be raised by some secret means, not to be known to foreign nations?

A. Yes, unless they could be raised from normal army funds.

Q. That is to say, you had a small budget for the standing 100,000 man Army which was open and the rest of the rearmament had to be from secret sources?

A. Yes.

[Pages 9-13]

Q. You had some jurisdictional differences with him in connection with that position I believe and I want to show you an agreement of the 7th July 1937 and ask you first to read it. Do you recognize that copy?

A. I can give you exact explanations. It was naturally my opinion that the Plenipotentiary for War Economy would be abolished through the nomination of myself for the Four Year Plan. Schacht opposed this conception very forcibly. It was his argument that I, as Supreme Commander of the Air Force, would be tied down for military reasons to much too large a degree in the case of war. This conception I logically had to agree to. And subsequently this contract was made. But I want to draw your attention to one thing—the last sentence. Apart from this, the fact that the Plenipotentiary for War Economy has a position of supreme Reichs authority can in no way be doubted. This sentence was inserted on my request. This means that I could give him instructions at all times since the authority of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan stated that I could give orders at any time.

Q. But it also was a face-saving device?

A. It gave me a possibility to give orders to the Plenipotentiary in spite of this agreement. Schacht, however, in the event of war desired to cancel the Four Year Plan by means of this agreement so as to take the situation in hand himself. Thus this safety sentence, this last sentence, was added.

Q. But on the face of it it looks as if it established a high position for Dr. Schacht and certainly prevented the abolition of his office.

A. No. The position of Plenipotentiary for War Economy meant an improvement of his position as Reichs Minister of Economy.

Q. So that it is clear, is it not, that as late as 7 July 1937 against your attempt to abolish Schacht's position as Plenipotentiary for the War Economy he was opposing any such step and in fact was urging that he be given broader powers in the event of war?

A. Yes, that is correct. I wanted this position abolished—in the event of war and yet he succeeded in retaining his position.

Q. Shortly after—

A. This I must underline. Schacht always tried to slide out and up and achieve yet a new position whilst all other Ministers co-operated absolutely.

Q. Shortly after this, before we leave this agreement which you have just identified, Mister Goering, I wanted to ask you, there is a reference in it I believe to a position of Hitler, with respect to this jurisdictional controversy?

A. The Fuehrer sent for us both and explained how he visualized this matter should be handled. He then put a proposal to us—Schacht was anxious to take something back in writing—regarding how such an agreement should be drafted.

Q. In this conversation that you had together with Dr. Schacht in the presence of Hitler, did Dr. Schacht make the proposal that he was anxious to continue his powers as economic dictator in the event of war?

A. Yes, he even suggested that he should carry out his activities independently from me. He gave as reasons that he could not otherwise carry out his task and said that in the event of war I would obviously be continuously absent, i.e. at my headquarters in the field, etc. Practically speaking, to say it in one sentence, I should like to say that what Schacht wanted was that in the event of war the Four Year Plan should be abolished.

Q. Shortly after this agreement that was decided upon by Hitler with respect to your jurisdiction in case of war, you began to have further disputes with Dr. Schacht concerning economic matters, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Let me show you a copy in English?

A. Just a moment—the Fuehrer did not lay down details in this connection. This agreement is on extremely vague lines.

Q. Coming to this period shortly thereafter when you say you had difficulties with Schacht, I should like to show you an English copy of a letter dated 26 August 1937 by Schacht to you and will ask the captain to be good enough to translate it into German—perhaps you can read it in English?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you understand this?

A. Yes.

Q. This is dated about a month later—roughly seven weeks. What was the background for this letter of Dr. Schacht's?

A. Some row between the departments.

Q. And you had apparently written a letter previously to Schacht, to which he took exception, is that correct?

A. Yes, certainly, either myself or my immediate subordinate—I have avoided whenever possible to write myself—but it is quite possible that I myself wrote in this case.

Q. Do you know what was meant by the phrase "fundamental differences exist in our economic policies"?

A. He was absolutely--how shall I say it--the basic principle was that I was interfering too authoritatively with economic matters and I had frequent conferences with the leaders of the economic system which were against the feelings of Schacht's personality. Furthermore, Schacht sent me situation reports in such cases which were not strictly in keeping with the facts. For instance, I received situation reports according to which no further import possibilities would exist after, say, six weeks or two months, and I must say some such nonsense. He would paint the situation in such extreme and black colors so as to scare me off personally.

Q. Did you feel there was always an implication that if Schacht were permitted to do it himself that he felt he could do it better?

A. Yes, that he has always told me, though indirectly.

Q. You recall that Schacht left the Reichsbank in January 1939. Do you remember the circumstances of that?

A. Yes. The circumstances in this connection were, I must say, ridiculous. The Minister of Finance, as it is often the case, demanded an advance at the end of the month as had been the case, and quite suddenly and without notice this advance was refused. He told the Minister of Finance to declare the Reich bankrupt. The Minister of Finance put the matter right on his own negotiation but thus proved to the Fuehrer that Schacht was being obstructive.

Q. But the discussions about Reichsbank financing with respect to the question of inflation, do you know anything about those?

A. Yes, the question of inflation arose during all conferences, and suggestions were always made regarding measures to prevent the actual arrival of an inflation. Opinions differed on these occasions. Someone, I cannot remember who it was, would say that we were practically in the middle of an inflation now and someone else would say that this was not so and could be avoided.

Q. I want to ask you this specifically. Was Schacht dismissed from the Reichsbank by Hitler for refusing to participate any further in the rearmament program?

A. No, because of his utterly impossible attitude in this matter, regarding this advance which had no connection with the rearmament program.

Q. Keppler says that as early as 1936 you were trying to get rid of Schacht by talking to the Fuehrer about him, is that correct?

A. No, it was much later.

Q. And when it was later, it was about these personality difficulties that you have discussed here this morning?

A. Yes. I always saw that he made considerable difficulties for my staff when they were working on economic subjects outside. I don't recall.

Q. I want to ask you whether this statement is true. Schacht in effect has said that he resigned as Minister of Economics because he could not agree with Goering or Goering's war policy and that he wanted to prevent the over-loading of industry for the preparation for war?

A. Oh! But that is absolute nonsense—he would never have said it then. If he had said this as a reason for his renunciation he would not have remained a member of the Reichs Cabinet nor the Chief of the Reichsbank.

Q. I don't say that he said it at the time, I said that he says it now. Is it true?

A. Of course what he says now, that I don't know. But I do not want to deny in this connection that I myself have pursued a very strong economic policy for the purpose of rearmament. That is the actual reason for the Four Year Plan. But if he does say this now he has certainly hidden it very successfully then.

Q. In general terms, Schacht was never opposed, as far as you were concerned, with the rearmament program or the extent of it?

A. No, he certainly did not oppose it generally but he had different opinions regarding the methods to be employed. Obviously it would have been quite out of the question that Hitler advanced and honoured Schacht the way he did—making him Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, etc.—if Schacht had been opposed to the rearmament program. But he was of the opinion—as I said before—that sums such as the Fuehrer visualized were impossible. That is correct.

EXCERPTS

STATEMENT OF SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK,
at OBERURSEL, 24 SEPTEMBER 1945
Interrogated by Lt. Col. M. I. GURFEIN, Office
of US Chief of Counsel, Report by Miss Evelyn
Low, Office of US Chief of Counsel.

[Pages 2-6]

Q. Well, we will leave that for the moment. In any event, you began to have meetings with Blomberg and Schacht concerning the financing of the armaments program, beginning, I believe, you said, in 1935?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, please tell us the discussions that took place the first time that you had this meeting.

A. These discussions during the years always took place in about the same way. The Field Marshal von Blomberg and later on the Field Marshal Keitel, told us the sums which for the following budget year the Minister of War thought to be necessary and then we discussed how these sums eventually could be financed. I made a statement on the probable income of taxes, Schacht said that he thought that probably we would be able to get a certain sum of treasury bills taken by the banks and that he could be able to finance a certain sum with the aid of the Reichsbank and if these two sums, the one sum which the Army wanted to have and the sums which we thought we could get, didn't suit, then, of course, there was a long discussion with the aim to come together and the result was in most cases that the Minister of War said "Well, I put down the amount I wanted to have and I will try to get through with the lower amount" and we said "Well, we will try to finance this sum, if it should prove not to be possible during the year, then we will meet again during the year and discuss what is going to happen." I think it was in 1936 that according to Motion made by Mr. Schacht we found the way of the Mefo bills and also according to Motion of Mr. Schacht we thought that we could go to the amount of 12 billion Mefo bills.

Q. Now, that sum of 12 billion marks of Mefo bills, how was that limit fixed? Was it based on the technical estimate of the capacity of the Reichsbank to finance or was it based on some other ground?

A. No, it was merely based on the technical capacity of the Reichsbank and Schacht said that he merely could estimate or could feel the possible height of this figure.

Q. And was there any discussion as to what alternative methods of financing should be employed when the ceiling of 12 billion marks through Mefo bill financing had been reached?

A. Not in the beginning because we then didn't know how long this amount of 12 billions would reach. In the moment as we saw that it would come to an end in a certain time we discussed the new methods of financing and we came to the result that in the first place we would have to increase the revenue of taxes and so we came to a resolution of increasing the corporation taxes.

Q. Was Dr. Schacht a party to this discussion about increasing the corporation taxes as a means of financing re-armament?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you say that a time came when it was clear that you were going to reach shortly the 12 billion figure? Can you recall how much had already been financed through Mefo bills at that point?

A. As far as I remember, it was at the time when the expenditures had reached the sum of 9 billions.

Q. Now, that coincided with the ending of the 4 year term of Dr. Schacht as President of the Reichsbank—he was appointed in 1933 for 4 years, ending in 1937. Now, did Schacht discuss with you at that time whether or not he should assume again the presidency of the Reichsbank?

A. I don't think that he discussed it with me but as far as I remember I have heard from Dr. Berger who always was on good terms with Dr. Schacht and with the other gentlemen of the Reichsbank that he was doubtful whether he should again take the duty for four years or whether he should take it only for one year to see what would happen in this year.

Q. What reasons were given to you by Dr. Berger and others as to why Schacht said that he was debating whether or not to take a 4 year term or a one year term as President of the Reichsbank?

A. As far as I remember the reason was the conflicts which had arisen between Schacht and Goering and between Schacht and Darre. This conflict was due to various technical differences. But these differences led also to a personal difference, especially between Schacht and Goering.

Q. And I believe you told me that there was resentment on the part of Schacht over the economic powers that Goering had been given by Hitler?

A. By Hitler because Schacht thought that these economic powers of Goering led to conflicts with powers as Minister of Economy or as President of the Reichsbank.

Q. In your discussions with Berger, was anything said about Schacht's attempt to regain the power over the Economy that he had lost to Goering?

A. I am not quite sure whether it was in conversations with Dr. Berger but I remember that in conversations with him or with other persons this reason then was discussed.

Q. Let me ask you, did you ever discuss it with Keppler?

A. I don't think I did. It's possible but I don't think I did.

Q. Who were these other persons, as you can remember?

A. Well, it is possible that I spoke about it with other Ministers, with Neurath, or Seldte, or Gertner, but I don't know.

Q. Well, in any event, is it clear that prior to the time when the last three billion financing by the Reichsbank of the Mefo bills were started, that everybody concerned knew that this was to be the last financing of Mefo bills. Did you understand that?

A. Yes. Well, I will put it in that way. I think that certainly Mr. Schacht said that it was his intention not to go beyond the sum of 12 billion Mefo bills.

Q. What I mean is, there was no new crisis so far as you recall in the 1937/1938 period because as you explained it, it was already understood before that, that the sum of 12 billion would be the limit?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, do you know anything of the circumstances under which Schacht finally resigned or was put out as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939?

A. Yes. Of course I am not quite sure whether the incident which I am going to tell was the real reason that Schacht resigned, but it certainly was a ground that gave the start. I asked Mr. Schacht to finance for the Reich for the ultimo of the month the sum of 100 or 200 millions. It was this quite usual procedure which we had used for years and years and we used to give back this money after a couple of days. Schacht this time refused and said that he was not willing to finance a penny because he wanted that, as he said, it should be made clear to Hitler that the Reich was bankrupt. I tried to explain that this was not the proper ground to discuss the whole question of financing because the question of financing very small sums for a few days during ultimo never would bring Hitler to the conviction that the whole financing was impossible. As far as I remember now it was Funk

who told Hitler something about this conversation, then Hitler asked Schacht to call upon him. I don't know what they said but the result certainly was the dismissal of Schacht.

Q. Now, did Schacht ever say anything to you to the effect that he wanted to resign because he was in opposition to the continuance of the rearmament program?

A. No, he never said it in this specific form but in some conversations he certainly said several times in his own way when he had conflict with Goering and anger with Darre, so that I didn't take these things very seriously.

Q. Well, let me put it this way and please think carefully about this. Did Schacht ever say that he wanted to resign because he realized that the extent of the rearmament program was such as to lead him to the conclusion that it was in preparation for war rather than for defense?

A. No, he never did.

Q. Was Schacht ever quoted to you to this effect by any of your colleagues or by anybody else?

A. No.

Q. Now after Keitel took over the position of Chief of the Wehrmacht, there were still meetings between Schacht and yourself, with Keitel in place of Blomberg?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Schacht ever say anything at these meetings to indicate that except for the technical question of the financing through the Reichsbank directly he was opposed to a further program of rearmament or opposed to the budget of the Wehrmacht?

A. No, I don't think he ever did.

Q. Is that your best recollection?

A. It may have been that he explained to Keitel that in his opinion the amount of rearmament could lead to economic difficulties especially as regards the level of prices.

Q. You mean that the pressure of armaments purchasing and the shortage of goods created thereby might cause a rise in prices?

A. Yes but I only stress this, that all the reasons I heard from Schacht as regards rearmament always were technical or economic reasons.

Q. Let me ask you one other thing. At the first meetings in 1935 between Blomberg, Schacht and yourself, Schacht has stated that at those meetings no fixed amounts were discussed in any form and that he was asked whether the Reichsbank would participate in the financing of rearmaments without discussion as to the amount involved. Is that also your recollection?

A. Yes, because that leads to the certain difference of opinion I had in the beginning.

Q. Please explain that.

A. I had the opinion that we should try to come to fix a certain sum for rearmament, if possible for some years. Schacht as well as Blomberg had the opinion that that was not possible and Schacht always thought that the natural limit for rearmament was the capacity of labor and the capacity of industry to produce. I always thought that the limit by fixing a certain sum would be more effective as it would lead the Minister of War to more careful thrift. So we then came to the arrangement to fix a sum not for several years but always for one year. Now, I am not quite sure for which year we fixed the sum in this way.

Q. The net result of that was, however, that it enabled you to make larger expenditures in the event that the capacity of industry and labor and resources increased. In other words, that you did not have a definite limit set in advance from the financing point of view, which would have restricted the possibilities.

A. Well, for one year, yes.

s/Graf Schwerin von Krosigk

29.9.45.

Sworn to me before this twenty-ninth day of September, 1945.

Murray I. Gurfein, Lt. Col. AUS.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3732-PS

Excerpts from Transcripts of Interrogation of
ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART, 9 October 1945, 1430-1510
by Mr. Thomas J. Dodd, OUSCC, Pages 18-25.

Q. I am not talking about this particular Holland situation; I am talking about your whole record in the course of events and your present position.

A. I am conscious of the fact that I was a representative bearer of the Great German Reich and that there happened an unbelievable and unthinkable catastrophe, and then one has to wonder to what extent one has contributed himself to it.

Q. What are you worried most about? Your activities in Austria, or your activities in Holland?

A. In Austria I am conscious that I have contributed to the Anschluss, which had not been achieved as I thought it; but the Anschluss is on the way of my national will or aspiration. In Holland, I had an unusually difficult administrative task. I do

believe that I did do certain things with which I am satisfied, as far as I was concerned.

Q. How do you feel about your deportation of the Jews of Holland?

A. I was against it. We wanted to concentrate the Dutch Jews into their quarters in order to keep them within the country.

Q. How do you feel about your transportation of workers out of Holland into Germany, by force?

A. The compulsory deportation started towards the end of '44. I then received a letter from Minister Lammers to the effect that we were to send to Germany 250,000 workmen. It was a matter of importance from the viewpoint of war. I wrote Lammers that this was impossible and if this was a matter decided for war, then the war should be fought over. That is written in black and white.

Q. You are a trained lawyer. You knew that that was a violation of every principle of international law.

A. One moment. Toward the end of '44 and the beginning of '45, the high command of the Army gave an order that all males, ages from 17 to 42, were to be removed from the province of Holland, deported from the province of Holland to the Reich, where they were to work. This order was issued to General Student, who transmitted it to the Commander of the Wehrmacht, and the action was carried out by the Wehrmacht.

Q. Under your direction?

A. Well, I can't intervene against the Wehrmacht.

Q. You were the personal representative of Hitler in Holland, weren't you?

A. In my province, but not in the province of the Wehrmacht, and the action was carried out by the Wehrmacht.

Q. Under your direction?

A. Well, I can't intervene against the Wehrmacht.

Q. You were the personal representative of Hitler in Holland, weren't you?

A. In my province, but not in the province of the Wehrmacht, and the action was carried out by a general with his own staff, which had been sent to Holland by the OKW.

Q. What did you do about it?

A. We consulted on the matter. According to the explanations of the generals, it was a matter indispensable from the military point of view.

Q. That satisfied you, I suppose?

A. I took note of it.

Q. What do you mean by "I took note of it"?

A. I didn't oppose it. I helped to carry it out within my province.

Q. What did you do about the shooting of the hostages in Holland?

A. In Holland, no hostages were shot.

Q. Oh, I beg your pardon. Are you telling us that no hostages were shot in Holland, while you were there as the Reichskommissar?

A. By the shooting of hostages, I understand people who had no connection whatever with an illegal action, were just taken out and shot.

Q. That is just what I understand.

A. I wish to say the following: according to my recollection, five hostages were shot in Holland in the spring of 1941. There had been an assault on a military train. Thereupon the Wehrmacht asked of the police that fifty hostages be shot. The Supreme Commander of the SS applied to me and I negotiated with the military commander and he reduced the number to five. Then the police carried it out.

Q. How did you feel about going to Poland as the assistant to Frank, the Governor General for that country which had been taken over by the Germans?

A. Well, I would like to state that, first of all, in a war, one has to follow all orders and receive any commands that are assigned to a person.

Q. You mean you had to go to Poland?

A. Well, I didn't go there against my wishes, but I had an order; I was appointed.

Q. The point is that you weren't forced to go. You were merely willing to go when you received the appointment. You didn't refuse it or resist it.

A. Why, I was assigned a task, and I accepted this task, and I accepted it because I felt that possibly I could do something good for the Reich.

Q. How did you feel when you were sent to Holland to do the same job there?

A. Well, the same as for the first—that is, I wasn't questioned, I was appointed; but I accepted that position because I felt that here, in war time, I was assigned a job to do in the Reich, and I felt that I was going to do as good a job as I could.

Q. All right. It must occur to you that it is an interesting feature of your history, that you were a principle figure in bringing the Germans into Austria; and that thereafter, you served the Germans in Austria; and later you served them in Poland; and still later you served them in Holland.

A. Yes.

Q. Have you any regrets about any of that?

A. Well, in Poland, naturally, I was not very active.

Q. Well, I don't care to hear any rationalization of how active you were in Poland, or how active you were in Holland, but for whatever part you played, you had something to do with the administration of affairs of Poland, and you were the Commissar, at least, in Holland. Now, my question is, knowing what happened in Poland; and knowing what happened in Holland; and knowing what happened in Austria; do you now have any regrets about your conduct, or would you do it all over again?

A. Well, there I would like to state the following, for naturally every man does commit mistakes, and I don't have any doubt that I made plenty of mistakes, but I would like to state in regard to Austria the following: For Austria, the course of events was such, that if there was any solution at all, then mine was the best one, but sometimes, I even doubt that there was even a solution, of this problem.

Q. So you are satisfied in playing the part that you played in turning Austria over to Germany; you have no regrets for whatever you did?

A. I most deeply regret the course that the events took, but I must reserve for myself, the right that I did take the responsibility for the course of events, in the best way that was open to me.

Q. And how do you feel about what you had to do with the conduct of affairs in Poland? Do you have any regret about that now?

A. Well, for Poland, I can't take any particular position because for me the fact that the war with Poland broke out, and that afterwards I was placed in that function—those are things that I view objectively.

Q. Well, to put it another way: knowing what happened in Poland while you were there under Frank, aren't you at least regretful that you had even any small part to play in what went on there?

A. I don't think that up to May of 1940, within the responsibility of myself and of Frank, were any such things, because then

we were just kind of getting ourselves settled and established. Primarily, I helped to establish a German body of administration, that is, in the German section.

Q. And would you do that all over again if you had the opportunity?

A. Well, that naturally brings up the basic problem of war, but considering the premises, and assuming that in the war one has to do the job that is assigned to him, I do not feel that I have to be ashamed of anything that I did.

Q. All right, let's turn to Holland. You were the Reich Commissar in Holland. Do you have any regret about what happened in Holland during your tenure of office?

A. I am conscious of the fact that I have made mistakes in Holland, possibly grave mistakes. I realize that fully, but with regards to the so-called exaggerations or excesses, for those I cannot consider myself responsible.

Q. They went on while you were there, however, as the Governor General.

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew about them.

A. Partly, yes, but for the greater part, I did not know about these events.

Q. And you never resigned or refused to serve?

A. No, I hold the viewpoint that in time of war one cannot do that.

Q. You weren't in the Army.

A. In the First World War.

Q. Oh, no, I am talking about this last one.

A. Well, I tried to volunteer in May 1940, that is, when I was still in Poland, but the answer was that I would not be accepted in the Army, but would be sent as Reich Commissar to Holland instead.

Q. Well, the point is that you weren't under the usual requirements of obedience by which a soldier must abide.

A. But I felt myself bound at least to the same degree as a soldier.

Q. That was your personal viewpoint of it.

A. Yes.

Q. You could have resigned.

A. I have once pondered on the significance that might have had. The most likely solution of that would have been that one would not have acknowledged it, but would have insisted that I remain at my post.

Q. In any event, you never tried.

A. No, I have not.

Q. You issued some orders in Holland, requiring the male population between the ages of 17 and 45, I think, to report for labor in Germany (Arbeits-Einsatz).

A. That must have been in January 1945.

Q. No, earlier than that. 17 to 40 were the ages, by the way, those born between 1905 and 1928. The orders were issued in 1941, were they not? Do you remember Order Number 42, for the Occupied Netherlands Territory?

A. Well, yes, it was the so-called "Call For Duty." I mean, the order for "Call for Duty."

Q. That was issued in 1941.

A. Well, but '41, it applied merely for work in the Netherlands, and only perhaps '43, I think it was extended to apply for work in the Reich.

Q. Do you remember Decree Number 48, issued in the year 1942?

A. Well, not from memory.

Q. With respect to the obligation to perform labor, and with respect to the restriction on changes of employment?

A. Yes, such a decree I did order.

Q. Now, in 1945, by virtue of these decrees of 1941 and 1942, all men within this age group were ordered to appear on the streets with a certain amount of equipment, and be prepared to leave their homes and take up work somewhere else.

A. In 1945, that was different already.

Q. Well, when was this order issued if it wasn't in '45?

A. Well, there was a decree in 1945, but the whole thing was somewhat different.

Q. Well, I am talking about the orders, based on your decrees, which ordered all these men in this age group, out on the streets as of a certain hour; ordered the inhabitants, women and children, to stay in their houses; and further, that all the doors to the houses were to remain open; and that if any man were to be found in their houses, failing to report on the street, they would be punished. Do you recall that order?

A. Well, I believe that those were the orders of the Armed Forces.

Q. Yes, based on your decrees of 1941 and '42, and put in operation while you were the Governor there.

A. Yes, well, yes, it was based on Decree 41; but the entire execution or administration of the law was strictly a function of

the military forces, and these great actions made no reference to my orders.

Q. They made specific reference to your orders. Do you remember what they looked like? Do you remember the posters that were put up on the streets in Holland?

A. Yes, I think that was about the middle of January, and may I say this right now: The big actions of the military forces, to draw the people subject to military service out of Holland, had already passed, that is, it was already settled.

Q. They weren't being drawn out for military security reasons, they were being taken out for work in Germany.

A. The order was that all men of military age were supposed to be removed from Holland and brought into the Reich, so that they would do work there.

Q. And do you remember the last line of that order? It said, "Anybody who tried to escape or who refused to obey, would be shot."

A. Well, in a state of emergency, and in a state of Martial Law, if somebody resists the order of the occupying forces, then that would be penalized by the death penalty.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3733-PS

Minutes of an Interview Held on 19 August 1941 between Vice-Minister Amau and Ambassador Ott

On the 19th August the German Ambassador Ott called upon the Vice-Minister and, after an exchange of courtesies and after a presentation of the war situation in Europe, advanced the idea (1) that it would be to the advantage of Japan also if at this time she attacked Russia from the east, and (2) stating that intelligence had been received to the effect that America was going to provide oil to Vladivostok by means of transport vessels, that the first of these ships had already sailed, and that after that they would sail in rapid succession, he remarked that this oil would doubtless be used for an attack upon Japan too, and this would have a very important bearing upon Japan. Thus, he tried to find out what Japan's attitude was regarding these matters. (3) He also tried to sound out Japan's attitude on the problem of American vessels stopping at Japanese ports (the problem of the President Coolidge). And (4) referring to Japan's attitude toward Thailand, he asked whether Japan was planning merely for the economic development of that country or whether she was think-

ing of a political or military penetration. He asked various questions in order to obtain intelligence of this kind.

To this the Vice-Minister replied: "For Japan to do a thing like attacking Russia would be a very serious question and would require profound reflection. As for the problem of American oil we are giving the matter very careful attention. And while we do not consider such a matter as American vessels stopping at our ports to be of such importance as to cause the world to get excited, we have not yet had time to investigate the facts in the case. (At this point Ambassador Ott interjected the remark that at the interview with the news reporters held today at the Information Bureau there were many questions and answers relating to the matter.) Then with regard to Thailand, Great Britain, in view of the fact that Thailand [?bears such a close relation?] to the defense of the British Empire, attaches very great importance to that country and Japan's attitude will therefore have to be decided by giving consideration also to the attitude of England and America."

In the course of the above interchange of questions and answers Ambassador Ott stated that the Russo-German war was at present making progress in the southern sectors, that southern Russia would soon fall into the hands of Germany, that Moscow would fall perhaps during the first part of September, but in that case whether or not the Stalin regime would fall or not could not be affirmed.

Gist of a Consultation held between the German Ambassador Ott and Vice-Minister Amau on 29th August, 1941

At 6 p.m. on 29th August Ambassador Ott called and had the following interview with Vice-Minister Amau:

The Ambassador:

According to a communique issued by the Japanese government this afternoon, Ambassador Nomura handed a message from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt. Is that correct? In fact, I had requested an interview with the Foreign Minister about this problem, but I have now come to you because I consider it my duty to get a detailed explanation on the question as to whether there would be any objection for us to understand that today's message does not depart from the policy which was determined at a conference held in the Imperial presence on 2nd July, at which time confidential information relating to the policy of the Japanese government in regard to the Axis was given to us, as well as on the question as to whether the present Cabinet is contemplating any change with regard to this point.

The Vice-Minister:

I regret that the Foreign Minister could not see you because of a previous engagement, but I will reply to your questions to the limit of my knowledge. It is true that Ambassador Nomura conveyed a message from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt. But that does not mean that there has been a change in Japan's policy, nor, that we are contemplating any change in our relations with the Axis. As you know, when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister, negotiations were carried on between Japan and America with regard to various problems, and at that time we sent confidential reports regarding the negotiations to your country. However, because of the Japanese Army's advance into French Indo-China a temporary rupture in these negotiations took place. And meanwhile in China, as well as in Japan and America, various questions arose between Japan and America, causing Japanese-American relations, contrary to our wishes, to become strained, so that in fact communications between Japan and America have at present come to a standstill, and the situation is such that even economic relations have been broken off. It is natural that no country would desire such a situation to persist for any length of time. It seems that America too desires a break in the deadlock, and the same thing is true of Japan. I understand that the reason for sending the message was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific.

The Ambassador:

Although I am aware that negotiations had previously been carried on between Japan and America, that these negotiations had been discontinued, and that since then various incidents have come up, do the proposed negotiations between Japan and America involve only matters that have fallen into abeyance, or do they concern entirely new problems?

The Vice-Minister:

As I have just said, the idea back of the message which was sent from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt was merely an attempt to start conversations between the two parties. It was not concerned with any concrete problem such as to what questions would be talked about. Furthermore we have not yet received any reply to the message from the President.

The Ambassador:

Have you received any notification from the American authorities that they are prepared to consent to negotiations?

The Vice-Minister:

We have not received any such particular notification from the American authorities, but as I have just said, we have received the impression that the American authorities are prepared to enter into negotiations in order to break the deadlock.

The Ambassador:

As usual, America will try to gain time by beginning negotiations with Japan, and meanwhile will put forth still greater efforts to carry out her objectives. Therefore, I think that precautions must be taken against America's scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her advantage.

The Vice-Minister :

We have given those points full consideration. And we have also given the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon Germany and Italy. As you are aware from the Imperial edict and other proclamations issued by government authorities at the time, the original purpose of the Tripartite Alliance was the quelling of disturbances and the restoration of peace. So even if we begin negotiations between Japan and America, the objective will always be to maintain peace, and therefore this will not conflict with the spirit of Axis diplomacy.

Moreover, if next I may express my own personal opinions, our aim at the time when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister was to keep America from participating in the war, and for this reason we took a firm attitude toward America. In order to prevent her from joining in the war, we considered it necessary to get her to reflect upon her attitude, and, judging from the situation at the time, it was no mistake at all for us to think that it was quite proper for us to take a firm attitude toward her. Nevertheless the results proved to be just the opposite, and we can not deny that American public opinion has grown stronger and stronger, speeding up American preparations for war. Meanwhile Germany took a very mild attitude toward America. That is, America in all kinds of ways gave aid to England, instituted a system of convoy, and invaded Iceland, on the other hand freezing German funds in America and even closing German Consulates, while Germany took a very gentle attitude. Even at present Japan's policy of preventing America from participating in the war remains unchanged, and our aim is to keep her from joining in the war. Even now there is no change whatever in that objective. However it will be necessary for us to consider a policy that is adequate for the attainment of said objective, depending upon the time and occasion. In the present situation, America being a country of wide expanse and plentiful raw materials, we might possibly think it preferable, just at this time when the hostile feeling of the people toward the situation is on the point of becoming violent, to appease them and bring about a domestic disintegration, rather than to excite and unify them.

The Ambassador :

Negotiations between Japan and America may prove to be quite troublesome. For instance, when we think of the China problem, since the sending of aid to Chiang Kai-shek is one of the fundamental policies of America, she will not readily give this up. And I think that it may be very difficult to come to an agreement with regard to various other problems. At any rate, since the contents of this message is considered to be of tremendously great importance to Germany also, even though I have not received any instructions from my government, would it not be possible for me to receive a secret report of its contents since I will have to send a report about it to the government?

The Vice-Minister:

As I have just said, the message conveys a statement from Premier Konoye to the American President, and we have not received a reply from the President as yet, but I will convey the substance of your desire to the Foreign Minister.

The Ambassador:

If that is the case, then will it be all right for the present for me to send a report to my government to the effect that the content of the message signifies that for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific negotiations are to be carried on between Japan and America on the basis of the Tripartite Alliance?

The Vice-Minister:

As I have just said, the object of beginning parleys between Japan and America is to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific. And while there is no objection to the use of the words "for the maintenance of peace," we think that it would be permissible to suppose that nothing like a concrete problem, such as, for instance, the concluding of a non-aggression pact, is mentioned in the message.

The Ambassador:

If so, do you have any idea of sending a special mission to America to carry on these negotiations?

The Vice-Minister:

As I have just said, it has not yet been settled as to whether or not negotiations will be begun, and preliminary arrangements regarding concrete problems have not yet been completed. So I understand that no decision has yet been reached as to such a problem as sending a mission.

The Ambassador:

Is this problem to be worked out through Ambassador Grew?

The Vice-Minister:

(Hesitated to say anything for a moment.)

The Ambassador:

Is Ambassador Nomura to do it?

The Vice-Minister:

(Nodded assent.)

The Ambassador:

Again may I ask you to tell the Foreign Minister that I would like to have a confidential report of the contents of the message. In fact, it has also some bearings upon instructions which I recently received from my home government regarding the Russo-German war. Will you please make arrangements so that I might by all means have an interview with the Foreign Minister tomorrow.

The Vice-Minister:

I will tell the Minister.

The Gist of an Interview held between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Ott on 30th August 1941, at 3:00 p.m. in the official residence (administrative official Yoshiuchi acting as interpreter)

After Ambassador Ott made a statement relating to the situation in the Russo-German War, the conversation proceeded as follows: (Ambassador Ott is to be designated by "O" and the Minister by "Toyo" in the following account.)

O:

In the notice sent to the German government on the 2nd July, the statement is made that Japan is making preparations for every possible eventuality in her relations with Russia and America, but are the intentions of the Japanese government still the same today? Is there any possibility that Japan may participate in the Russo-German war?

Toyo:

Japan's preparations are now making headway, and it will take more time for their completion.

O:

Are the intentions of Japan as given in the notice of 2nd July still the same?

Toyo:

There is no change in our intentions, which are, to make preparations in order to avail ourselves of any new development that may take place in the situation henceforth.

O:

I learned of the message which Premier Konoye sent to President Roosevelt for the first time through the newspapers, and later according to the Domei (in response to a question from the Minister Ott replied that this Domei dispatch was one that was "carried" by DNB on the evening of the 29th as a Domei report). I learned that this message mentions the disposal of the China problem and the establishment of a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere as the ultimate aims of Japan's national policy, and refers to the fact that as a result of the Russo-German War Japanese-American relations have become delicate. So far as the problems referred to in the message are concerned, from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact Germany has very grave apprehensions, and since a detailed report will have to be sent to my government, in disregard of propriety I must once more make inquiry about this matter. Yesterday Vice-Minister Amau gave me an explanation as to the contents of this message, but if you have anything beyond that to add, will you please state it.

Toyo:

The situation being what it is, all kinds of reports are bound to arise, but what I would like to tell you explicitly is that the report about problems concerning which I have just now heard for the first time, is absolutely false. Vice-Minister Amau gave you the right explanation of the message.

O:

If so, then the message does not concern any concrete matters?

Toyo:

It is just as Vice-Minister Amau explained.

O:

I would like to inquire what your impression is as to how the message was received by them [the Americans]. Even if it does not deal with any concrete matters, I would like to ask whether it was received in a friendly spirit, or whether their attitude was one of disapproval.

Toyo:

I can't tell you, because I have as yet received no report whatsoever about the matter.

O:

In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that "line." I would like to ask what Your Excellency's views are concerning this point.

Toyo:

In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as in the past; nor will it change in the future.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3734-PS

8 October 1945

SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION THE LAST DAYS IN HITLER'S AIR RAID SHELTER

1. *Source:*

Name: Fraulein Hanna Reitsch.

Rank: Flugkapiten [Captain of the Air-Honorary title given for outstanding aeronautical achievement].

Date of birth: 29 March 1912.

Marital Status: Single.

Occupation: Test-pilot and aeronautical research expert.

Citizenship: German.

Address: Leopolds Krone Castle, Salzburg, Austria.

Political Status: Non-party member.

Decorations: Iron Cross first class.

2. *Introduction:* This report is the story of the last days of the War as they were experienced by Hanna Reitsch, the well known German test-pilot and aeronautical research expert. Her story does not pretend to add any sensational details to what is already known of those days; it is rather an eye-witness account of what actually happened in the highest places during the last

moments of the War. Her account of the flight into Berlin to report to Hitler and of her stay in the Fuehrer's bunker is probably as accurate a one as will be obtained of those last days, although the "is he dead or is he not dead" fate of Hitler is only answered to the extent of describing the mental state and the hopelessness of the last-minute situation, from which individual opinions must be drawn. Her own opinion is that the tactical situation and Hitler's own physical conditions made any thoughts of his escape inconceivable.

3. Her story is remarkable only in that she played a small part in the events of the War's end and that she had personal contact with the top-bracket Nazis as that end descended upon them. It is also of interest as it is likely that Reitsch is one of the last, if not the very last person who got out of the shelter alive. Her information is evaluated as reliable and it is possible that her story may throw some light or perhaps serve as an aid to a fuller knowledge of what happened during the last days of Berlin and of the War.

4. At times she is not certain as to names and specific times. Names escape her. In many cases the contacts herein related were quite limited inasmuch as they have to do only with the last few days. Her times may be inaccurate as the events of those days followed each other with such tumult that she is often unable to remember the proper sequence of events.

5. It will be noted that much of the report concerns itself with the Nazi and German interpretation of "honor." Reitsch herself, in answering queries, carefully weighs the "honor" aspects of every remark and then gives her answers carefully but truthfully. The use of the word amounts practically to a fetish complex with the source and is almost an incongruous embodiment of her entire philosophy. Her constant repetition of the word is in no manner as obvious to her as it is to the interrogator, nor is the meaning the same, nor does she recognize the incongruous use she makes of the word. Therefore, each time "honor" appears it is apologetically submitted in quotations.

6. She tells her story in conversational form, and although it is, in part, reproduced in that manner here, no pretense is made that the quotations are in all cases exact; they are simply given as she remembers them. If it is kept in mind then that this material is a statement of her own opinions and observations, the information may be considered as completely reliable.

7. *The Trip to Berlin:* Hitler had sent a telegram to Munich on the 24th of April to Lieutenant General Ritter von Greim,

instructing him to report to the Reichschancellery on a highly urgent matter. The problem of getting into Berlin was then already a very precarious one, as the Russians had practically encircled the city. Greim however, decided that by availing himself of Hanna Reitsch as pilot, the entrance might be accomplished by means of an autogiro, which could land on the streets or in the gardens of the Reichschancellery.

8. During the night of the 25th to the 26th of April Reitsch and Greim arrived at Rechlin, prepared immediately to fly into Berlin. As however, the only available autogiro had been damaged that day, it was decided that a Feldwebel pilot, who had taken Albert Speer to the Fuehrer two days before, should fly Greim in because of the experience the previous flight had given him. Some sense of responsibility to Greim, as his personal pilot and friend, made Reitsch beg to be taken along. A Focke-Wulf 190 was to be used, which had a pig-a-back space for one passenger arranged behind the pilot's seat. Reitsch was stuffed into the tail through a small emergency opening.

9. Forty fighters were taken to fly cover. Almost immediately upon take-off they were engaged by Russian aircraft. A running, hedgehopping flight got them to the Gatow airfield, the only Berlin field still in German hands. Their own craft got through with nothing more than a few wing shots but the cost was heavy to the supporting fighters.

10. The landing at Gatow was made through further heavy attacks by Russian fighters who were strafing the field when they arrived. What was left of the German planes engaged the Russians while the Greim craft made a successful landing. Immediately attempts were made to phone the Chancellery but as all the lines were out, it was decided to fly an available Fiesler-Storch for the remaining distance and land within walking distance of Hitler's shelter. With Greim at the controls and Reitsch as passenger, the plane took off under a whirling cover of German-Russian dog-fights. At a height of a few meters Greim managed to get away from the Field and continue at tree-top level toward the Brandenburger Tor.

11. Street fighting was going on below them and countless Russian aircraft were in the air. After a few minutes of flight, heavy fire tore out the bottom of the plane and severely injured Greim's right leg. By reaching over his shoulders, Reitsch took control of the craft and by dodging and squirming closely along the ground, brought the plane down on the East-West axis. Heavy Russian artillery and small-arm fire was sheeting the area

with shrapnel as they landed. A passing vehicle was commandeered to take them to Hitler's shelter, with Greim receiving first aid for his shattered foot on the way.

12. *Arrival at Hitler's Shelter:* Greim and Reitsch arrived in the bunker between 6 and 7 o'clock on the evening of the 26th of April. First to meet them was Frau Goebbels, who fell upon Reitsch with tears and kisses, expressing her astonishment that anyone still possessed the courage and loyalty to come to the Fuehrer, in stark contrast to all those who had deserted him. Greim was immediately taken to the operation room where Hitler's physician tended the injured foot.

13. Hitler came into the sick room, according to Reitsch, with his face showing deep gratitude over Greim's coming. He remarked something to the effect that even a soldier has the right to disobey an order when everything indicates that to carry it out would be futile and hopeless. Greim then reported his presence in the official manner.

14. *Hitler's Denunciation of Goering:*

Hitler: "Do you know why I have called you?"

Greim: "No, mein Fuehrer."

Hitler: "Because Hermann Goering has betrayed and deserted both me and his Fatherland. Behind my back he has established connections with the enemy. His action was a mark of cowardice. And against my orders he has gone to save himself at Berchtesgaden. From there he sent me a disrespectful telegram. He said that I had once named him as my successor and that now, as I was no longer able to rule from Berlin he was prepared to rule from Berchtesgaden in my place. He closes the wire by stating that if he had no answer from me by nine-thirty on the date of the wire he would assume my answer to be in the affirmative."

15. The scene Reitsch describes as "touchingly dramatic," that there were tears in the Fuehrer's eyes as he told them of Goering's treachery, that his head sagged, that his face was deathly pallid, and that the uncontrolled shaking of his hands made the message flutter wildly as he handed it to Greim.

16. The Fuehrer's face remained deathly earnest as Greim read. Then every muscle in it began to twitch and his breath came in explosive puffs; only with effort did he gain sufficient control to actually shout:

17. "An ultimatum!! A Crass ultimatum!! Now nothing remains. Nothing is spared me. No allegiances are kept, no 'honor' lived up to, no disappointments that I have not had, no betrayals

that I have not experienced, and now this above all else. Nothing remains. Every wrong has already been done me."

18. As Reitsch explains it, the scene was in the typical "et tu Brute" manner, full of remorse and self-pity. It was long before he could gather sufficient control to continue.

19. With eyes hard and half-closed and in a voice unusually low he went on: "I immediately had Goering arrested as a traitor to the Reich, took from him all his offices, and removed him from all organizations. That is why I have called you to me. I hereby declare you Goering's successor as Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe. In the name of the German people I give you my hand."

20. *"To Die For the 'Honor' of the Luftwaffe"*: Greim and Reitsch were deeply stunned with the news of Goering's betrayal. As with one mind they both grasped Hitler's hands and begged to be allowed to remain in the bunker, and with their own lives atone for the great wrong that Goering had perpetrated against the Fuehrer, against the German people, and against the Luftwaffe itself. To save the "honor" of the flyers who had died, to reestablish the "honor" of the Luftwaffe that Goering had destroyed, and to guarantee the "honor" of their land in the eyes of the world, they begged to remain. Hitler agreed to all of this and told them they might stay and told them too that their decision would long be remembered in the history of the Luftwaffe. It had been previously arranged with operations at Rechlin that an aircraft was to come in the next day to take Greim and Reitsch out of Berlin. Now that they decided to stay it was impossible to get the information out. Rechlin, in the meantime, was sending plane after plane, each shot down in turn by the Russians. Finally on the 27th a JU 52, loaded with SS guards and ammunition, managed to land on the East-West traffic axis, but because Reitsch and Greim had intended to stay, was sent back empty. (The order cashiering Goering was released from the underground headquarters sometime on the 23rd of April.)

21. *Hitler Sees the Cause As Lost*: Later that first evening Hitler called Reitsch to him in his room. She remembers that his face was deeply lined and that there was a constant film of moisture in his eyes. In a very small voice he said, "Hanna, you belong to those who will die with me. Each of us has a vial of poison such as this," with which he handed her one for herself and one for Greim. "I do not wish that one of us falls to the Russians alive, nor do I wish our bodies to be found by them. Each person is responsible for destroying his body so that nothing recognizable remains. Eva and I will have our bodies

burned. You will devise your own method. Will you please so inform von Greim?"

22. Reitsch sank to a chair in tears, not, she claims, over the certainty of her own end but because for the first time she knew that the Fuehrer saw the cause as lost. Through the sobs she said, "Mein Fuehrer, why do you stay? Why do you deprive Germany of your life? When the news was released that you would remain in Berlin to the last, the people were amazed with horror. 'The Fuehrer must live so that Germany can live,' the people said. Save yourself, Mein Fuehrer, that is the will of every German."

23. "No Hanna, if I die it is for the 'honor' of our country, it is because as a soldier, I must obey my own command that I would defend Berlin to the last. My dear girl, I did not intend it so, I believed firmly that Berlin would be saved at the banks of the Oder. Everything we had was moved to hold that position. You may believe that when our best efforts failed, I was the most horror-struck of all. Then when the encirclement of the city began the knowledge that there were three million of my countrymen still in Berlin made it necessary that I stay to defend them. By staying I believed that all the troops of the land would take example through my act and come to the rescue of the city. I hoped that they would rise to super-human efforts to save me and thereby save my three million countrymen. But, my Hanna, I still have hope. The army of General Wenck's is moving up from the South. He must and will drive the Russians back long enough to save our people. Then we will fall back to hold again."

24. It appeared almost as if he believed this himself and as the conversation closed he was walking about the room with quick, stumbling strides, his hand clasped behind him and his head bobbing up and down as he walked. Although his words spoke of hope, Hanna claims that his face showed that the War was over.

25. Hanna returned to Greim's bedside, handed him the poison, and then decided with him, should the end really come, that they would quickly drink the contents of the vial and then each pull the pin from a heavy grenade and hold it tightly to their bodies.

26. Late in the night of 26th to 27th of April the first heavy barrage bracketed the Chancellery. The splattering of heavy shells and the crashing of falling buildings directly above the air-raid shelter tightened the nervous strain of everyone so that here and there deep sobbing came through the doors. Hanna spent the night tending Greim, who was in great pain, and in getting

grenades ready in the event that the Russians should enter the Chancellery grounds before morning.

27. *Hitler's Guests in the Shelter:* The next morning she was introduced to the other occupants and learned for the first time the identity of all those who were facing the end with the Fuehrer. Present in the elaborate shelter on the 27th of April were Goebbels and his wife with their six children; State Secretary Neuman: Hitler's right hand, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann; Hevel from Ribbentrop's office; Admiral Vosz as representative from Doenitz; General Krebs of the infantry and his adjutant Bourgdorf; Hitler's personal pilot, Hansel Bauer; another pilot Baetz; Eva Braun; SS Obergruppenfuehrer Fegelein as Liaison between Himmler and Hitler and husband of Eva Braun's sister; Hitler's personal Physician, Dr. Stumpfecker; Oberst von Below, Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant; Dr. Lorenz representing Reichspresse chief Dr. Dietrich for the German press; two of Hitler's secretaries, a Frau Christian, wife of General der Flieger Christian and a Fraulein Kreuger; and various SS orderlies and messengers. Reitsch claims that these composed the entire assembly.

28. A regular visitor during the last days was Reichsjugendfuehrer Axman who was commanding a Hitlerjugend division committed to the defense of the city. From Axman came current information as to the ground situation against the Russians which was well mirrored by the increasingly despondent manner of each visit.

29. *Another Betrayal:* Late in the afternoon of the 27th Obergruppenfuehrer Fegelein disappeared. Shortly thereafter it was reported that he had been captured on the outskirts of Berlin disguised in civilian clothes, claiming to be a refugee. The news of his capture was immediately brought to Hitler who instantly ordered him shot. The rest of the evening Fegelein's betrayal weighed heavily on the Fuehrer and in conversation he indicated a half-way doubt as to Himmler's position, fearing that Fegelein's desertion might have been known and even condoned by the SS leader.

30. *Observations on Shelter Occupants:* Reitsch had little contact with most of the people in the shelter, being mostly occupied in nursing von Greim, but she did have the opportunity to speak to many of them and observe their reactions under the trying conditions of the last days in the bunker. It is believed that she attempts to relate her observations truthfully and that her reactions are honestly conceived. It must be remembered that prior to her arrival in the bunker Reitsch had but

small contact with most of these individuals and that her previous opinions regarding them were at a rather low level. Of the people she was able to observe closely the Goebbels family probably stands out.

31. *Doctor Goebbels*: She describes Goebbels as being insanely incensed over Goering's treachery. He strode about his small, luxurious quarters like an animal, muttering vile accusations concerning the Luftwaffe leader and what he had done. The precarious military situation of the moment was Goering's fault. Their present plight was Goering's fault. Should the war be lost, as it certainly now seemed it would be, that too would be Goering's fault.

32. "That swine," Goebbels said, "who has always set himself up as the Fuehrer's greatest support now does not have the courage to stand beside him. As if that were not enough, he wants to replace the Fuehrer as head of the State. He, an incessant incompetent, who has destroyed his Fatherland with his mishandling and stupidity, now wants to lead the entire nation. By this alone he proves that he was never truly one of us, that at heart he was always weak and a traitor."

33. All this, as Hanna saw it, was in the best theatrical manner, with much hand waving and fine gestures, made even more grotesque by the jerky up-and-down hobbling as he strode about the room. When he wasn't railing about Goering he spoke to the world about the example those in the bunker were setting for history. As on a platform and gripping a chair-back like a rostrum he said:

34. "We are teaching the world how men die for their 'honor.' Our deaths shall be an eternal example to all Germans, to all friends and enemies alike. One day the whole world will acknowledge that we did right, that we sought to protect the world against Bolshevism with our lives. One day it will be set down in the history of all time."

35. It appears that Goebbels exercised his greatest ability to the very last. The rooms of Goebbels and Reitsch adjoined each other and doors were usually open. Through them the Goebbels oratory would sound out at any hour of the day or night. And always the talk was of "honor" of "how to die," of "standing true to the Fuehrer to the last," of "setting an example that would long blaze as a holy thing from the pages of history."

36. One of the last things Reitsch remembers hearing from the lips of the propaganda master was: "We shall go down for the glory of the Reich so that the name of Germany will live

forever." Even Reitsch was moved to conclude that the Goebbels display, in spite of the tenseness of the situation, was a bit overdrawn and out and out theatrical. She claims that in her opinion Goebbels, then as he always had, performed as if he were speaking to a legion of historians who were avidly awaiting and recording every word. She adds that her own dubious opinions regarding Goebbels' mannerisms, his superficiality, and studied oratory, were well substantiated by these outbursts. She claims too, that after listening to these tirades she and von Greim often asked each other, with a sad, head-shaking attitude, "Are these the people who ruled our country?"

37. *Frau Goebbels*: Frau Goebbels she described as a very brave woman, whose control, which was at most times strong, did break down now and then to pitiful spasms of weeping. Her main concern was her children, and in their presence her manner was always delightful and cheery. Much of her day was occupied in keeping the children's clothes clean and tidy, and as they had only the clothes they wore this kept Frau Goebbels occupied. Often she would quickly retire to her room to hide the tears. It appears from Hanna's description that Frau Goebbels probably represented the epitome of Nazi indoctrination.

38. If the Third Reich could not live she preferred to die with it, nor would she allow her children to outlive it. In recognition of the example she embodied of true German womanhood, Hitler, in the presence of all the occupants of the bunker, presented her with his personal golden party insignia. "A staunch pillar of the 'honor' upon which National Socialism was built and the German Fatherland founded," was his approximate remark as he pinned it to her dress.

39. Frau Goebbels often thanked God that she was alive so that she could kill her children to save them from whatever "evil" would follow the collapse. To Reitsch she said, "My dear Hanna, when the end comes you must help me if I become weak about the children. You must help me to help them out of this life. They belong to the Third Reich and to the Fuehrer and if those two things cease to exist there can be no further place for them. But you must help me. My greatest fear is that at the last moment I will be too weak."

40. It is Hanna's belief that in the last moment she was not weak.

41. Conclusions that can be safely drawn from Hanna's remarks is that Frau Goebbels was simply one of the most convinced subjects of her own husband's rantings; the most pro-

nounced example of the Nazi influence over the women of Germany.

42. *The Goebbels Children:* The Goebbels children numbered six. Their names and approximate ages were: Hela, 12; Hilda, 11; Helmut, 9; Holde, 7; Hedda, 5; Heide, 3. They were the one bright spot of relief in the stark death shadowed life of the bunker. Reitsch taught them songs which they sang for the Fuehrer and for the injured von Greim. Their talk was full of being in "the cave" with their "Uncle Fuehrer" and in spite of the fact that there were bombs outside, nothing could really harm them as long as they were with him. And anyway "Uncle Fuehrer" had said that soon the soldiers would come and drive the Russians away and then tomorrow they could all go back to play in their garden. Everyone in the bunker entered into the game of making the time as pleasant as possible for them. Frau Goebbels repeatedly thanked Reitsch for making their last days enjoyable, as Reitsch often gathered them about her and told them long stories of her flying and of the places she had been and the countries she had seen.

43. *Eva Braun:* It seemed to Reitsch that Hitler's "girl friend" remained studiously true to her position as the "show-piece" in the Fuehrer's circle. Most of her time was occupied in finger nail polishing, changing of clothes for each hour of the day, and all the other little feminine tasks of grooming, combing, and polishing. She seemed to take the prospect of dying with the Fuehrer as quite matter of fact, with an attitude that seemed to say: " * * * had not the relationship been of 12 long years duration and had she not seriously threatened suicide when Hitler once wanted to be rid of her. This would be a much easier way to die and much more proper * * * ." Her constant remark was "Poor, poor Adolf, deserted by everyone, betrayed by all. Better that ten thousand others die than that he be lost to Germany."

44. In Hitler's presence she was always charming, and thoughtful of his every comfort. But only while she was with him was she completely in character, for the moment he was out of ear-shot she would rave about all the ungrateful swine who had deserted their Fuehrer and that each of them should be destroyed. All her remarks had an adolescent tinge and it appeared that the only "good" Germans at the moment were those who were caught in the bunker and that all the others were traitors because they were not there to die with him. The reasons for her willingness to die with the rest were similar to those of Frau Goebbels. She

was simply convinced that whatever followed the Third Reich would not be fit to live in for a true German. Often she expressed sorrow for those people who were unable to destroy themselves as they would forever be forced to live without "honor" and reduced instead to living as human beings without souls.

45. Reitsch emphasizes that Braun was very apparently of rather shallow mentality, but she also agrees that she was a very beautiful woman. Beyond fulfilling her purpose, Reitsch considers it highly unlikely that Braun had any control or influence over Hitler. The rumor of the last minute marriage ceremony Reitsch considers as highly unlikely, not only because she believes that Hitler had no such intention, but also because the circumstances in the bunker on the last days would have made such a ceremony ludicrous. Certainly, up to the time Reitsch left the bunker, hardly a day before Hitler's death was announced, there had not been the slightest mention of such a ceremony. The rumor that there had been children out of the union, Reitsch quickly dismisses as fantastic.

46. *Martin Bormann*: Bormann moved about very little, kept instead very close to his writing desk. He was "recording the momentous events in the bunker for posterity." Every word, every action went down on his paper. Often he would visit this person or that to scowlingly demand what the exact remark had been that passed between the Fuehrer and the person he had just had an audience with. Things that passed between other occupants of the bunker were also carefully recorded. This document was to be spirited out of the bunker at the very last moment so that, according to the modest Bormann, it could, "take its place among the greatest chapters of German history."

47. *Adolf Hitler*: Throughout Hanna's stay in the bunker Hitler's manner and physical condition sunk to lower and lower depths. At first he seemed to be playing the proper part of leading the defense of Germany and Berlin. And at first this was in some manner possible as communications were still quite reliable. Messages were telephoned to a flak tower and from there were radioed out by means of a portable, balloon-suspended aerial. But each day this was more and more difficult until late on the afternoon of the 28th and all day on the 29th communications were almost impossible. On about the 20th of April, at what was probably the last Hitler war-council in the Reichschancellery, the Fuehrer is said to have been so overcome by the persistently hopeless news that he completely broke down in the presence of all the gathering. The talk in the bunker, where

Hanna heard of the collapse, was that with this display even the most optimistic of Hitler's cohorts tended toward the conviction that the War was irretrievably lost. According to Reitsch, Hitler never physically nor mentally recovered from this conference room collapse.

48. Occasionally he still seemed to hold to the hope of General Wenck's success in breaking through from the South. He talked of little else, and all day on the 28th and 29th he was mentally planning the tactics that Wenck might use in freeing Berlin. He would stride about the shelter, waving a road map that was fast disintegrating from the sweat of his hands and planning Wenck's campaign with anyone who happened to be listening. When he became overly excited he would snatch the map from where it lay, pace with a quick, nervous stride about the room, and loudly "direct" the city's defense with armies that no longer existed (as even Wenck, unknown to the Fuehrer, had already been routed and destroyed).

49. Reitsch describes it as a pathetic thing, the picture of a man's complete disintegration. A comic-tragedy of frustration, futility and uselessness. The picture of a man running almost blindly from wall to wall in his last retreat waving papers that fluttered like leaves in his nervous, twitching hands, or sitting stooped and crumpled before his table moving buttons to represent his non-existent armies, back and forth on a sweat-stained map, like a young boy playing at war.

50. *The Possibility That Hitler Still Lives*: The possibility that Hitler might have gotten out of the bunker alive, Reitsch dismisses as completely absurd. She claims that she is convinced that the Hitler she left in the shelter was physically unable to have gotten away. "Had a path been cleared for him from the bunker to freedom he would not have had the strength to use it," she says. She believes too, that at the very end he had no intention to live, that only the Wenck hope stayed his hand from putting the mass suicide plan into operation. News that Wenck could not get through, she feels, would immediately have set off the well rehearsed plans of destruction.

51. When confronted with the rumor that Hitler might still be alive in Tyrol and that her own flight to that area, after she had left the bunker, might be more than coincidental, she appears deeply upset that such opinions are even entertained. She says only, "Hitler is dead! The man I saw in the shelter could not have lived. He had no reason to live and the tragedy was that he knew it well, knew it perhaps better than anyone else did."

52. *Hanna's Opinion of the Fuehrer:* It is apparent from Reitsch's conversation that she held the Fuehrer in high esteem. It is probably also true when she says that her "good" opinion suffered considerably during the closing stages of the War. She is emphatic when she describes the apparent mismanagement she observed and learned of in the bunker. For instance, Berlin had been depleted of arms to hold the Oder. When that line fell it appeared that no coherent defense plan of Berlin had been prepared, certainly adequate arrangements had not been made to direct the defense from the bunker. There was no other communication equipment available than the telephone that led only to the flak tower. It appears that only in the last moment had he decided to direct the battle from the shelter and then did not have the first tools with which to operate. No maps. No battle plans. No radio. Only a hastily prepared messenger service and the one telephone were available. The fact that unknown to Hitler, the Wenck army had been destroyed almost days before, was only one example of the inadequacies. All of which resulted in the Fuehrer of Germany sitting helplessly in his cellar impotently playing at his table-top war.

53. Reitsch claims that Hitler the idealist died, and his country with him, because of the incompetence of Hitler the soldier and Hitler the statesman. She concludes, still with a faint touch of allegiance, that no one who knew him would deny his idealistically motivated intentions nor could they deny that he was simply infinitely incompetent to rule his country, that one of his great faults was proper character analysis in the people about him which led to the selection of persons equally incompetent to fill important positions. (Most important example: Goering.)

54. She repeatedly remarked that never again must such a person be allowed to gain control of Germany or of any country. But strangely enough she does not appear to hold him personally responsible for many of the wrongs and evils that she recognizes completely and is quick to point out. She says rather, "A great part of the fault lies with those who led him, lured him, criminally misdirected him, and informed him falsely. But that he himself selected the men who led him can never be forgiven."

55. *A Criminal Against the World:* "Hitler ended his life as a criminal against the world," but she is quick to add, "he did not begin it that way. At first his thoughts were only of how to make Germany healthy again, how to give his people a life free from economic insufficiencies and social maladjustments. To do this he gambled much, with a stake that no man has the

right to jeopardize—the lives of his people. This was the first great wrong, his first great failure. But once the first few risks had been successful, he fell into the faults of every gambler; he risked more and more, and each time that he won he was more easily led to the next gamble.” According to Reitsch it all began with the occupation of the Ruhr. This was the first and most difficult gamble of all and when the world did not answer his Ruhr bluff with war every succeeding risk became progressively easier.

56. Each success made the enthusiasm of the people greater and this gave him the necessary support to take the next step. The end-result, Reitsch claims, was that Hitler himself underwent a character change that transformed him from an idealistically motivated benefactor to a grasping, scheming despot, a victim of his own delusions of grandeur. “Never again,” she concludes, “in the history of the world must such power be allowed to rest with one man.”

57. *Suicide Council*: On the night of the 27th to 28th the Russian bombardment of the Chancellery reached the highest pitch it had yet attained. The accuracy, to those in the shelter below, was astounding. It seemed as if each shell landed in exactly the same place as the one before, all dead-center on the Chancellery buildings. As this indicated that the Russian ground troops could over-run the area at any moment, another suicide council was called by the Fuehrer. All plans as to the destruction of the bodies of everyone in the shelter were gone over again. The decision was that as soon as the Russians reached the Chancellery grounds the mass suicide would begin. Last instructions were given as to the use of the poison vials.

58. The group was as hypnotized with the suicide rehearsal and a general discussion was entered into to determine in which manner the most thorough destruction of the human body could be performed. Then everyone made little speeches swearing allegiance again and again to the Fuehrer and to Germany. Yet, through it all, still ran the faint hope that Wenck might get in the hold long enough to effect an evacuation. But even on the 27th, Reitsch claims, the others paid lip-service to the Wenck hope only to follow the lead of the Fuehrer. Almost everyone had given up all thoughts of being saved, and said so to each other whenever Hitler was not present. Closing the discussions on the destruction of the bodies there was talk that SS men would be assigned to see that no trace remained. Throughout the day of the 28th the intensity of the Russian fire continued while the suicide talk kept pace with the shelling in the shelter below.

59. *The Himmler Betrayal:* Then on the 29th fell the greatest blow of all. A telegram arrived which indicated that the staunch and trusted Himmler had joined Goering on the traitor list. It was like a death blow to the entire assembly. Reitsch claims that men and women alike cried and screamed with rage, fear and desperation, all mixed into one emotional spasm. Himmler the protector of the Reich, now a traitor was impossible. The telegram message was that Himmler had contacted the British and American authorities through Sweden to propose a capitulation to the San Francisco conference. Hitler had raged as a mad man. His color rose to a heated red and his face was virtually unrecognizable. Additional evidence of Himmler's "treachery" was that he had asked not to be identified with the capitulation proposals; American authorities were said to have abided by this request, while the British did not.

60. After the lengthy out-burst Hitler sank into a stupor and for a time the entire bunker was silent.

61. Later came the anti-climatic news that the Russians would make a full force bid to over-run the Chancellery on the morning of the 30th. Even then small-arm fire was beginning to sprinkle the area above the shelter. Ground reports indicated that the Russians were nearing the Potsdamer Platz and were losing thousands of men as they fanatically prepared the positions from which the attack of the next morning was to be launched.

62. Reitsch claims that everyone again looked to their poison.

63. *Orders to Leave the Shelter:* At one-thirty on the morning of the 30th of April Hitler, with chalk-white face, came to Greim's room and slumped down on the edge of the bed. "Our only hope is Wenck," he said, "and to make his entry possible we must call up every available aircraft to cover his approach." Hitler then claimed that he had just been informed that Wenck's guns were already shelling the Russians in Potsdamer Platz.

64. "Every available plane," Hitler said, "must be called up by daylight, therefore it is my order to you to return to Rechlin and muster your planes from there. It is the task of your aircraft to destroy the positions from which the Russians will launch their attack on the Chancellery. With Luftwaffe help Wenck may get through. That is the first reason why you must leave the shelter. The second is that Himmler must be stopped," and immediately he mentioned the SS Fuehrer his voice became more unsteady and both his lips and hands trembled. The order to Greim was that if Himmler had actually made the reported contact, and could be found, he should immediately be arrested.

65. "A traitor must never succeed me as Fuehrer! You must get out to insure that he will not."

66. Greim and Reitsch protested vehemently that the attempt would be futile, that it would be impossible to reach Rechlin, that they preferred to die in the shelter, that the mission could not succeed, that it was insane.

67. "As soldiers of the Reich," Hitler answered, "it is our holy duty to exhaust every possibility. This is the only chance of success that remains. It is your duty and mine to take it."

68. Hanna was not convinced. "No, no," she screamed, "what can be accomplished now, even if we should get through. Everything is lost, to try to change it now is insane." But Greim thought differently. "Hanna," he said, "we are the only hope for those who remain here. If the chance is just the smallest, we owe it to them to take it. Not to go would rob them of the only light that remains. Maybe Wenck is there. Maybe we can help, but whether we can or cannot, we will go."

69. Hanna, still convinced as to the absurdity of attempting an escape went alone to the Fuehrer while Greim was making his preparations. Through her sobbing she begged, "Mein Fuehrer why, why don't you let us stay?" He looked at her for a moment and said only: "God protect you."

70. *The Leave Taking*: Preparations were quickly made and Reitsch is graphic in her description of the leave taking. Below, late Goering's Liaison officer with the Fuehrer and now a staunch Greim-man said, "You must get out. It depends upon you to tell the truth to our people, to save the 'honor' of the Luftwaffe: to save the meaning of Germany for the world." Everyone gave the departing duo some token, something to take back into the world. Everyone wrote quick, last minute letters for them to take along. Reitsch says that she and Greim destroyed all but two letters which were from Goebbels and his wife to their eldest son, by Frau Goebbels first marriage who was then in an Allied prisoner of war camp. These Reitsch still had. Frau Goebbels also gave her a diamond ring from her finger to wear in her memory.

71. Thirty minutes after Hitler had given the order they left the shelter.

72. *The Flight Out of Berlin*: Outside the whole city was aflame and heavy small-arm fire was already plainly audible a short distance away. SS troops, committed to guarding Hitler to the end, were moving about. These men brought up a small armored vehicle which was to take Reitsch and Greim to where an Arado 96 was hidden near Brandenburger Tor. The sky was filled with

the thunder of shells, some of which landed so close that their vehicle was knocked out several hundred yards short of the revetment where the Arado was stationed. (Reitsch claims that she is certain that this was the last craft available. The possibility of another plane having gotten in and possibly out again with Hitler as passenger, she dismisses as highly unlikely as Greim would certainly have been informed. She knows that such a message was never delivered. She knows too, that Greim had ordered other planes in but that each craft was shot down in the attempt and as Russian troops already solidly ringed the city, she is certain that Hitler never left Berlin.)

73. The broad street leading from Brandenburger Tor was to be used for take-off. About 400 meters of uncratered pavement was available as run-way. The take-off was made under hailing Russian fire and as the plane rose to rooftop level it was picked up by countless searchlights and at once bracketed in a barrage of shelling. Explosions tossed the craft like a feather, but only a few splinters hit the plane. Reitsch circled to about 20,000 feet from where Berlin was a sea of flames beneath her. From that altitude the magnitude of the destruction of Berlin she describes as stark and fantastic. Heading north, 50 minutes saw them in Rechlin, where the landing was again made through a screen of Russian fighter craft.

74. *The Last German Reports:* Greim at once issued the orders calling all available craft to the aid of Berlin. Having performed the first of Hitler's commands he immediately decided to fly to Ploen, near Kiel, to determine what information Doenitz might have regarding Himmler. A Bucker 181 was used and by the time they got into the air German aircraft were already arriving in compliance with Greim's order. The entire heavens were soon a seething mass of German and Russian planes. Reitsch kept her own plane at 1 and 2 meters altitude and even with such protection against visibility she was twice unsuccessfully attacked. Landing at Lubeck still necessitated an automobile trip to Ploen, during which time they were again under constant Russian attack. On arrival they found that Doenitz knew nothing of Himmler's actions. The next move was to see Keitel in the event that a change in air tactics should be employed in helping Wenck in his entry into Berlin.

75. *The News of Wenck's Non-Existence:* Keitel was found in the early morning of the first of May and gave them the news that Wenck's army had long been destroyed or captured. And

that he (Keitel) had sent word to Hitler to that effect the day before. (30th of April).

76. Greim and Reitsch now knew that Hitler must surely have given up all hope and both fully expected that the well rehearsed suicide plans had already been put into operation.

77. *The "New" Government:* The advance of the English necessitated a retreat into Schleswig late on the first day of May. Here, the same evening, Reitsch and Greim learned that the announcement of Hitler's death had been made and that he had been succeeded by Doenitz. On the 2nd of May the new government was called to Ploen. Greims and Reitsch, to receive orders from Doenitz as to immediate Luftwaffe activities, had the additional purpose of meeting Himmler and confronting him with the betrayal story.

78. *Himmler's Capitulation Explanation:* Himmler arrived late so that all the others were in the conference room, leaving Reitsch alone when he walked in.

"One moment Herr Reichsfuehrer, a matter of the highest importance, if you can spare the time?" Reitsch asked.

Himmler seemed almost jovial as he said, "Of course."

"Is it true, Herr Reichsfuehrer, that you contacted the Allies with proposals of peace without orders to do so from Hitler?"

"But, of course."

"You betrayed your Fuehrer and your people in the very darkest hour? Such a thing is high treason, Herr Reichsfuehrer. You did that when your place was actually in the bunker with Hitler?"

"High treason? No! You'll see, history will weigh it differently. Hitler wanted to continue the fight. He was mad with his pride and his 'honor.' He wanted to shed more German blood when there was none left to flow. Hitler was insane. It should have been stopped long ago."

"Insane? I came from him less than 36 hours ago. He died for the cause he believed in. He died bravely and filled with the 'honor' you speak of, while you and Goering and the rest must now live as branded traitors and cowards."

"I did as I did to save German blood, to rescue what was left of our country."

"You speak of German blood, Herr Reichsfuehrer? You speak of it now? You should have thought of it years ago, before you became identified with the useless shedding of so much of it."

A sudden strafing attack terminated the conversation.

79. *The Last Orders—To Hold the Russians:* Greim indicated that little had been decided at the first Doenitz war council. How-

ever everyone was in accord that at best, resistance would only be possible for a few days longer. In the meantime commanders against the Russians were to hold to the last to enable as many civilians as possible to flee from the advance. Reitsch claims that Greim, whose leg was becoming increasingly worse, insisted upon flying immediately to Feldmarschall Joerner, in command of troops in Silesia and Czechoslovakia, to instruct him that he should resist even after the capitulation order.

80. On the flight to Joerner, Greim's foot became so bad that he had momentary lapses of unconsciousness. Upon arrival Joerner indicated that he had already decided to hold as long as possible and had issued orders to that effect even before Greim's arrival.

81. It was then decided to fly on to Kesselring with the same instructions, but Greim's leg was by now so critical that further movement was impossible. From the 3rd of May to the 7th it was necessary to remain at Joerner's headquarters in Koenigratz where Reitsch nursed Greim until he could move about again.

82. On the night of the 7th of May they took off in a Dornier 217 to fly to Graz where Kesselring was reported to be. Directly over the field German flak severely damaged their craft which crash landed at the edge of the field. Reitsch and Greim were of the understanding that the capitulation would come on the night of the 9th of May and when it was learned that Kesselring had left Graz for Zell am See they flew on in an effort to instruct him.

83. *The End at Zell am See:* They arrived at Zell am See flying a Fieseler-Storch, and reported to General Koller, Chief of the GAF General Staff, who was to tell them of Kesselring's whereabouts. Here they learned that the capitulation was to be on the 8th instead of the 9th. They still wanted to locate Kesselring but Koller either chose not to tell them where Kesselring was, because it was already too late or else he did not know that Kesselring was in the village of Almdorf, a few miles north of Zell am See. At this news Reitsch and Greim decided that any further efforts on their part were quite useless. Just before the capitulation they left Zell am See for Kitzbuhl to place themselves under the care of a well known Doctor who had just opened his hospital there.

84. Reitsch claims that had it not been for the severe agony of Greim's foot she would not have been able to convince him to save his limb. To the last he wanted to encourage resistance against the Russians.

85. *Why the "Redoubt" Was Not Utilized:* In response to the question as to why the Austria-Southern Germany last stand of resistance was never put into operation, Reitsch has little to add to what is already known. She states that as late as the 15th of April it still seemed that there was every intention of moving the government and military headquarters to Berchtesgaden. All of the bureaus and headquarters in Berlin at that time were on a constant 2 hour alert. From what she heard from Oberst Below and others it appeared that the conference mentioned in paragraph 46 was to decide on the full particulars covering the move. She claims that the reports Hitler received at that time were so shocking that he was convinced that preparations to make "Redoubt" resistance a success would never be completed in time. It was believed that the realization that "Redoubt," of which so much was expected, would have to be crossed off as useless was the major cause of Hitler's breakdown. It was also said that Goering and Hitler had had a strained conversation regarding this, with Goering insisting on an early evacuation to the "Redoubt" area and Hitler declining in the hope that the Oder would hold. Goering was to have claimed that "Redoubt" was ready for occupancy while Hitler preferred to wait until he could have its readiness confirmed at the above mentioned conference. It was the talk later at the Doenitz war council and elsewhere that Goering's departure was governed solely by his realization that the Oder would be crossed and by his unfulfilled hope that the partially completed "Redoubt" area would hold.

Had Goering's coup succeeded, it is believed that "Redoubt" might have been more actively defended. The reasons that it was not: First—Goering's failure. Second—Hitler's belief that continued resistance in Berlin might be more eventful than the sure collapse he saw in an uncompleted "Redoubt."

86. *Reporting to the Americans:* They arrived in Kitzbuhl on the morning of the 9th and reported to American Military authorities shortly thereafter. Greim was under treatment until the 23rd of May when he was taken to Salzburg, prior to being taken on to Germany as a prisoner of War. He committed suicide with Hitler's poison capsule in Salzburg on the night of the 24th of May. Although he was much less known than his corpulent predecessor, both in Germany or the world, in Hanna's opinion he should have had Goering's position years ago. The fact that he disagreed with Goering on almost every count is, to her, evidence enough of his capabilities.

87. *Evaluation of Source:* It is the opinion of the interrogator that the above information is given with a sincere and conscientious effort to be truthful and exact. The suicide of her family, the death of her closest friend, von Greim, the physical pain of Germany, and the trying nature of her experiences during the closing days of the war combined themselves to seriously tempt her to commit suicide as well. She claims that the only reason she remained alive is for the sake of the truth; to tell the truth about Goering, "the shallow showman," to tell the truth about Hitler, "the criminal incompetent," and to tell the German people the truth about the dangers of the form of government that the Third Reich gave them. She believes that she is fulfilling much of this mission when she speaks to the interrogator. It is therefore felt that her remarks may be considered as her deepest efforts at sincerity and honesty. At the moment she is undergoing a severe mental struggle in an effort to reconcile her conception of "honor" with her denunciations of Goering, of Himmler, and of Hitler himself. This difficulty appears less great when she is speaking to the interrogator than it is when she speaks to civilians, but from civilians who have led her conversation and then unknown to her, reported the results to the interrogator it appears that she is striving to exert a progressively more democratic influence over her countrymen.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3735-PS

Berchtesgaden, 20th June, 1945

Testimony of Mr. Erich Kempka on the last days of Hitler

1. I, Erich Kempka, was born on 16.9.1910 at Oberhausen/Rhineland as the son of a miner. I have 9 brothers and sisters. Whereas my father died in January 1945, my mother is living at Oberhausen. I attended the elementary school up to my 14th year of age and served an apprenticeship as electrician. After my apprenticeship I worked for one year as a practical apprentice with the automobile-distributors of DKW at Essen. Then I got a position as a driver with the "Essener Nationalzeitung," which position I held until 1932. Being a member of the NSDAP since May 1930 I came as a chauffeur to Adolf Hitler by recommendation of Gauleiter Terboven for whom I had done very much driving. In the years of 1932 to 1936 I, besides Brigadefuehrer Schreck, was a chauffeur for about 95% of all the trips of the Fuehrer. Since 1936 I was the sole chauffeur of the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer himself never drove a car. When Hitler stayed in

Berlin with his headquarters I was supervisor of the Reichs-Chancellery garage, to which about 40 vehicles belonged. I was in charge of about 60 drivers. Already in the days before 20th April 1945 I also passed the nights in the garage situated in the basement of the Reichs-Chancellery. On 20th April 1945 I went for about one-quarter of an hour to the Fuehrer's bunker in order to congratulate the Fuehrer upon his birthday. There was no special ceremony in the Fuehrer's bunker.

2. In the evening of 20th April 1945 I got the order to get ready about 12 vehicles by means of which persons belonging to the Fuehrer's headquarters and partly their relatives were taken to the Berlin airfields Staaken, Tempelhof, Schoenwalde, Gatow. These were about 80 persons, among them rear-admiral v. Puttkamer (adjutant of the navy with the Fuehrer), SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Goehler (representative of SS-Guppenfuehrer Fegelein), Miss Schroeder and Miss Wolf (two personal secretaries of the Fuehrer). Also on 21st April 1945 a number of vehicles was readied with which were driven 40 to 50 persons to several airfields. Cars for a direct drive from Berlin to Munich were not dispatched by me before or after this date. During the night of 22 to 23 of April 1945 the personal physician of the Fuehrer, Prof. Dr. Morell, two stenographers of the Fuehrer, the consulate-secretary Doehler and several women were driven to the airfield of Gatow.

Though I did not get any definite statement from authorized sources, I supposed that the Fuehrer would remain in Berlin after the 22.4.1945. During the days before 20 April 1945 I often heard the utterance of the Fuehrer that he would remain in Berlin in any case. In the days after 20 April 1945 I repeatedly asked Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche (adjutant of the Fuehrer) whether I was to secure the vehicles because they were gradually destroyed by artillery-fire. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche told me that would not make any difference, we had to go on with the vehicles as long as possible; the Fuehrer at any rate would stay at the Reichs-Chancellery. I do not know very much about the military situation in the town-district because I did not leave the Reichs-Chancellery. The buildings of the Reichs-Chancellery in the days after 22 April 1945 were repeatedly set afire. The fires were extinguished only very primitively. Communications to the outside were cut since about 25 April 1945. In these days a story was distributed by the German press-bureau that Himmler had turned to the western powers and had stated the Fuehrer was suffering from a cerebral hemorrhage, was completely ill and would not be

able to live for much longer. I had not read myself this story which was said to have been printed in the newspapers. As far as I could see Himmler did not appear in the Reichs-Chancellery during the days around 20 April 1945 or later.

(Remark of reporter: Himmler wanted to see the Fuehrer on 22.4.1945. The Fuehrer who did not want to be swayed from his resolution to stay in Berlin by anybody, declared that Himmler should not come.)

Only on the 1 May 1945 I heard that the Russians had infiltrated into the Tiergarten on which the Reichs-Chancellery borders and had advanced to the Reichstag.

The minister of foreign affairs von Ribbentrop did not see the Fuehrer as far as I recollect at any rate not after the 20.4.1945.

After 22.4.1945 the following still stayed with the Fuehrer: General Krebs (chief of general-staff of the Army), General Burgdorf (chief adjutant of the Wehrmacht and chief of the army personnel department), vice-admiral Voss (representative of Grand-Admiral Doenitz), Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels with his wife, secretary of state in the ministry for propaganda Dr. Naumann, SS - Hauptsturmfuehrer Schwegermann as adjutant of Dr. Goebbels, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein (representative of Reichsfuehrer SS with the Fuehrer), SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche (adjutant of the Fuehrer), SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Linge (valet of the Fuehrer), SS-Gruppenfuehrer Rattenhuber (leader of the SD in the Fuehrer's headquarters), SS-Standartenfuehrer Dr. Stumpfegger (the Fuehrer's first physician after Prof. Dr. Morell had left). I personally saw Reichsleiter Martin Bormann several times up to the morning of 2 May 1945. It is impossible that he could have been at Berchtesgaden or vicinity between 22 April 1945 and 2 May 1945. The children of Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels who were brought to the bunker of the Reichs-Chancellery on 22.4.1945, were taken away with a nurse only on 1 May 1945 from the Reichs-Chancellery.

Fieldmarshall Keitel and Col. General Jodl according to what I have seen and heard must have left Berlin already on 22 April 1945.

SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein telephoned me, I believe, in the afternoon of 28.4.1945 and asked me to come to see him in the Fuehrer-bunker in the evening in order to receive there important papers concerning the Fuehrer, the Reichsfuehrer SS and himself personally in order to destroy all or to hide them so well that they could not be found in case the Russians should come through to the Reichs-Chancellery. I went to the Fuehrer-bunker towards

evening in order to meet SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein. I did not meet Fegelein. Reichsleiter Martin Bormann asked me where Fegelein was. I could tell Reichsleiter Bormann that SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein had ordered a car and had driven to his dwelling. They endeavored to find Fegelein. Later on I heard that SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein had reappeared at the Reichs-Chancellery in civilian clothes and had been interrogated there by a SS-Gruppenfuehrer Mueller whom I had never seen before and who was said to belong to the SS-Hauptamt or to the SD. Fegelein is said to have admitted before Mueller that he before several times had been at Nauen in order to meet the Reichsfuehrer SS there; he had endeavoured to get out of the Reichs-Chancellery and let the Russians pass him and try to get through to the Reichsfuehrer SS in civilian clothes. According to what I had been told Fegelein was declared guilty of high treason and shot by order of SS-Gruppenfuehrer Mueller.

In the days after the 20.4.1945 I have still seen Hitler several times in his bunker in the Reichs-Chancellery. He had not changed in his behaviour and gave a quiet impression. Eva Braun stayed with the Fuehrer. After 28.4.1945 there were rumours in the Reichs-Chancellery that the Fuehrer had been married during the night from 28 to 29.4.1945 to Eva Braun. A Regierungsrat or Oberregierungsrat of the ministry for propaganda had performed the official ceremony. At the same time two orderlies had been married. There was no publication of the marriage of the Fuehrer to Eva Braun. I also did not congratulate the Fuehrer. Only on 1 May 1945 secretary of state Dr. Naumann confirmed the fact of the marriage of the Fuehrer.

I spoke to the Fuehrer for the last time on 29 April 1945. I reported to him that I was engaged in bringing food into the inner part of Berlin in order not to let the food fall into the hands of the Russians and in order to provide the hospitals situated in the government-district. In the Reichs-Chancellery itself there was a Hauptverbandsplatz [Battalion aid-station]. The hotel "Adlon," the building of the Gauleitung of the NSDAP of Berlin, and other buildings had been converted into hospitals. The bunkers of the Reichs-Chancellery where several hundreds of wounded had been quartered had not suffered any damage by the artillery-fire. There was no enemy infantry attack against the Reichs-Chancellery until the morning of 2 May 1945.

3. On 30 April 1945 at 1430 hours SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche telephoned me and asked me to come to the Fuehrer-bunker. Besides that I was to take care that 5 cans of gasoline, that is to

say 200 ltr., were brought along. I at once took along two or three men carrying the cans. More men were following because it took some time to collect 200 ltr. of gasoline. By order of SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Guensche the cans were brought by these men to the entrance of the Fuehrer-bunker located in the garden of the Reichs-Chancellery, which was next to the so-called tower-home and about 20 m beside the so-called Haus Kempka, my quarters (see drawing annex number 1). The men at once returned after depositing the cans. There was a sentry of the SD at the entrance of the bunker. I then went into the ante-chambre of the briefing-room (see room III, annex 2) where I met Sturmbannfuhrer Guensche. Guensche told me that the Fuehrer was dead. He did not tell me any details about the death of the Fuehrer. He only explained he had got the order from the Fuehrer to burn him at once after his death, "so that he would not be exhibited at a Russian freak-show." A short time after that SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Linge (valet of the Fuehrer) and an orderly whom I do not remember came from the private room of the Fuehrer (see room I, annex 2) carrying a corpse wrapped in an ordinary field-gray blanket. Based on the previous information from SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Guensche I at once supposed that it was the corpse of the Fuehrer. One could only see the long black trousers and the black shoes which the Fuehrer usually wore with his field-gray uniform jacket. Under these circumstances there was no doubt that it was the corpse of the Fuehrer. I could not observe any spots of blood on the body wrapped in the blanket. Thereupon came Reichsleiter Martin Bormann from the living-room of the Fuehrer and carried in his arms the corpse of Mrs. Eva Hitler, nee Braun. He turned the corpse over to me. Mrs. Hitler wore a dark dress. I did not have the feeling that the corpse was still warm. I could not recognize any injuries on the body. The dress was slightly damp only in the region of the heart. Behind Reichsleiter Bormann there came also Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels. SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Linge and the orderly now went upstairs with the corpse of the Fuehrer to the bunker exit towards the garden of the Reichs-Chancellery (see annex 1, Turmhaeuschen). I followed with the corpse of Mrs. Hitler. Behind me came Reichsleiter Bormann, Dr. Goebbels and SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Guensche. Reichsleiter Martin Bormann wore uniform. According to my recollection Dr. Goebbels also wore uniform. It was shortly before 1500 hours, if I remember that I received the first notice from Guensche at 1430 hours and needed 5 to 10 minutes to reach the Fuehrer-bunker. SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Linge and the orderly

carried the corpse of the Fuehrer from the westwardly directed bunker exit in the tower-house and put the wrapped corpse on the flat ground in a small depression which was about 4 to 5 m distant from the bunker exit (see the spot marked by two crosses on annex 1). There was no lawn, rather bare sand; in the last period construction work was being done in the Reichs-Chancellery. I put the corpse of Mrs. Hitler next to the Fuehrer's. Immediately SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche poured the complete contents of the five cans over the two corpses and ignited the fuel. Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels, SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche, SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Linge, the orderly and I stood in the bunker entrance, looked towards the fire and all saluted with raised hands. The stay in the bunker exit lasted only a short time because the garden of the Reichs-Chancellery was under heavy artillery-fire. The short-lasting leaving of the bunker exit already meant a danger to our lives. The ground of the garden of the Reichs-Chancellery was ploughed by shell holes. Besides us the event could only have been observed by the tower post of the SD. This one however was not notified of what had happened.

Upon returning into the Fuehrer-bunker no words were exchanged. Guensche, Linge and another person went into the living-room of the Fuehrer. In order to return to the garage I had to pass through the Fuehrer-bunker and wanted to look once more at the rooms in which the Fuehrer had lived last. I followed the personnel mentioned into the living-room of the Fuehrer. Opposite the entrance of the room the dimensions of which are only 3 x 4 m stood a narrow sofa (see drawing annex 3). Before the right front leg of the sofa (compare a) lay a Walther-Pistol, 6.35 mm cal., which, as I knew, belonged to Miss Eva Braun. Also on the floor approximately before the middle of the sofa lay a Walther-Pistol, 7.65 mm cal. I supposed that this pistol belonged to the Fuehrer. I myself did not touch anything in the room, but silently stood there only for a few seconds. I did not put any questions and no one else spoke to me. According to the situation it was clear to me that the Fuehrer and Miss Eva Braun shot themselves. From the location of the two pistols I concluded that the Fuehrer sat about on the middle of the sofa before firing the shot and that Eva Braun had sat on the right part of the sofa.

After returning to the garage I notified my men that the Fuehrer was dead. A ceremonial was not held. I cannot say for which reason the date of death of the Fuehrer was given as 1 May 1945 over the radio. I cannot say with complete sureness

that the death of the Fuehrer, as previously described, took place on 30 April 1945. For on the same evening General Krebs had led negotiations for the return of the wounded with the Russian general Tschukow. It may be expected, that General Krebs regarded the continuation of the fight after the death of the Fuehrer as futile. So far as I know nothing was done later on to remove any traces of the corpses at the place of their burning. This also was not necessary, because the traces had been wiped out by the uninterrupted artillery-fire on the government district.

4. In the late afternoon of 1 May 1945 I received official notice from SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche, who was the commandant of the Reichs-Chancellery, that on the same evening at 2100 hours the break from the Chancellery was to take place. All men who were able to walk and wanted to go along as well as the women who had belonged to the Fuehrer's surroundings were to take part. SS-Brigadefuehrer Mohnke was destined as the leader of the group to break out: he had previously a combat group within the government district. The persons included in the break assembled at 2100 hours in the coal-bunker of the new Reichs-Chancellery, before the Hauptverbandsplatz. The number of persons assembled there may have amounted from 500 to 700, among them a number of women. All available weapons, rifles, submachine-guns, pistols, automatic carbines, light machine-guns and Panzerfaeuste were distributed to the combat-groups 1 to 6. Brigadefuehrer Mohnke took the lead and led combat-group 1. Ambassador Hewel (representative of the Foreign-minister in the Fuehrer's headquarters), SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche as well as the Mrs. Christian (wife of Brig. Gen. Christian of the Luftwaffe), Mrs. Junge, Miss Krueger, the secretaries of the Fuehrer, belonged to combat-group 1, about 50 to 60 persons. The men and women singly left the Chancellery through a narrow hole in the wall along Wilhelm-Strasse near the corner of Wilhelm-Strasse and Voss-Strasse. Because of the heavy artillery-fire everyone ran as quickly as possible to the next entrance of the subway in reach. The next entrance of the Kaiserhof-stop about 50 m from the building of the Reichs-Chancellery had collapsed after a direct artillery-hit. Therefore we went to the entrance approximately 200 m distant from the Reichs-Chancellery which was located opposite the Hotel Kaiserhof. This entrance was open. At the subway-station the single groups gathered again and went to the subway-station Friedrichstrasse along the tracks of the subway. There were many civilians on the platforms of the subway-station Friedrichstrasse, soldiers sat around on the stairs of the station.

As leader of my group which consisted of approximately 60 drivers I left the subway-station through one of the exits which are located north of the city railway-station Friedrichstrasse in the Friedrichstrasse. Outside everything was quiet. Without danger I went about 200 m up to the road-lock on the Weidendammer bridge (about 300 m north of the railway-station Friedrichstrasse). A few meters behind the road-lock I came upon a group of soldiers who told me that shortly before a group of 50 to 60 persons had passed this spot towards north. This was the leading-group Mohnke. The soldiers declared that they had already tried to break through, but that they had been beaten back. Russian troops had occupied the houses and basements to both sides of the Friedrichstrasse north of the Weidendammer bridge. I now returned and fetched my men from the subway-station in order to let them take cover in the Admiralspalast which was located in front of the subway-exit. After several groups had arrived in the meantime another break-through was decided upon. I made one break-through attempt with my group. Without being fired upon we came through the second road-block on the Weidendammer bridge. But 10 or 20 m behind the second road-block we received strong machine-gun fire from all sides and had to retreat again. Further break-out attempts which failed were undertaken. The break-through of the first group probably succeeded only because of the surprise of our opponents. Later on I met Mrs. Junge on a march. She told me that the leading-group under Brigadefuehrer Mohnke had had to start after a few hundred meters. About 0530 hours a negotiator appeared and had made known that General Tschukow wished a temporary armistice until 0615 hours. During these negotiations Mrs. Junge together with the other women had left the basement. Ambassador Hewel had taken poison. SS-Gruppenfuehrer Rattenhuber who also belonged to Group I had received a serious injury.

During our stay in the Admiralspalast Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, Brigadefuehrer and State's secretary Dr. Naumann, the adjutant of Dr. Goebbels, Schwegermann, and other higher personalities appeared about 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning. I declared to Reichsleiter Bormann that it was impossible to push through without heavy weapons. Later on 5 to 6 tanks and armoured recogn. cars arrived which were manned by soldiers. It was decided that the tanks were to attempt the break-through and that the men who had broken out of the Reichs-Chancellery were to advance under the protection of the tanks. Behind one tank State's secretary Dr. Naumann went as the first in the top of the

tank-turret, behind him Reichsleiter Martin Bormann followed by SS-Standartenfuehrer Dr. Stumpfegger. I went behind Dr. Stumpfegger. More men joined us. After the tank had gone about 30 to 40 m he received a direct hit with a Panzerfaust. The tank flew apart. I saw a short flash of lightning and flew to the ground where I remained lying unconsciously. My last impression was that Dr. Naumann, Bormann and Dr. Stumpfegger fell together and remained lying. I could no longer recognize any injuries. Because Dr. Stumpfegger who preceded me was 30 cm taller than I he protected me from the full blast and I escaped with splinter injuries at my thigh and my upperarm. After an undetermined period I regained consciousness, saw only fire around me and crept back on the ground. I got up behind the road block and sat down on the street because just then I could not see correctly. SS-Standartenfuehrer Beetz (after SS Gruppenfuehrer Baur the second command pilot of the Fuehrer) was the first whom I saw. He had a serious head injury. Just then I saw a new attack started from our side, but I decided not to go along any more because of its futility. I returned to the Admiralspalast, assembled my men and declared them that they were dismissed. Each one could go on on his own, join a combat group or go home. I also advised them to procure for themselves civilian clothes. I myself returned to the Friedrichstrasse railway station with 7 men, among them the lieutenant of the armoured troop Joerke who had been assigned to us with 3 armoured half tracks. We crossed the Spree river on the foot path directly under the city railroad, were able to reach a house on the northern bank of the Spree river without being fired upon and from there across several elevations up to a spot in the region of Albrechtstrasse, Karlstrasse or Ziegelstrasse. The city railroad runs along there. We reached a band of the city railroad in which a dump of medical equipment was located. There we met two Jugoslavs and 2 Russian civilians who had chosen the city railway band as their quarters. These at once sympathized with us and promised to procure civilian clothes for us. When a part of us had already civilian clothes the first Russian soldiers arrived at the yard. Lieutenant Joerke who still had no civilian clothes was hidden by us. We others quickly changed clothes. The Russians demanded that we come into the yard. A Yugoslav woman introduced me as her husband, while the others were designated as camp labourers. We decided to form small groups and thus to go into the street. At this attempt I was recognized by a Russian soldier and had to return again. The Russian soldiers procured food and drinks. I

have participated at this ceremony which lasted until 2 o'clock of the following night. After the ceremony the Yugoslav woman left, but returned in the morning and brought me a coat. In this disguise I was able to leave the house and walked via Tegel to Henningsdorf.

In Henningsdorf I was stopped by Russian soldiers and brought into a yard. There were German soldiers who all wore civilian clothes. We spent a few hours there. We were asked for papers. Nine-tenths of the men had no papers. Nevertheless all of us were dismissed. I joined three men who walked towards Kremmen. In the afternoon we were again arrested in a village before Kremmen and locked up in a chicken stable. We were not given any food. On the next morning about 5 o'clock we were brought before the commanding officer of the troops. The commander was told that we had been arrested at night as partisans with weapons in a forest. We were then brought to Velten to the regional commandant there, a colonel. He was told the same thing. One of my German escorts understood Russian and notified the commandant that we had not been in the forest that night, but had been arrested without weapons in the afternoon at 6 o'clock in the middle of a village. The commandant had sent for an interpreter. The negotiation lasted about half an hour. Probably inquiries were made. Then we were searched. All articles of ordinary use, knives, razors, fountain pens, pencils, etc. were taken away from us. We were then dismissed with a pass in the direction of Bernau. However, we four men again marched off in the direction of Kremmen. 2 men went ahead. With my escort I passed north of Fehrbellin via Neustadt a.d. Dosse towards Havelberg. About 10 km before Havelberg, in the village of Kuemmeritz, we were again stopped by a sentry beside whom a closed car was standing. He asked us whether we were "Wehrwolf". We denied it. After he had asked several times he went to the car and brought a carbine. He took it off safety, aimed at us and once more repeated his question. Then we were loaded upon a car. We were driven through the vicinity for a long time. About six times we were taken out of the car and interrogated like before with rifles aimed at us. Again we were searched. Things that could be used were kept. Other things were thrown away. My wallet which at first was taken from me was returned. We were told that we could go. Before leaving a Russian soldier gave me a cigarette. With the uncertain feeling that one would fire at us we left.

In the evening of 8th May 1945 we arrived in Havelberg. We looked for the next best barn in order to sleep. On the next morn-

ing we were again thrown out very early; this was a camp for various foreigners. These were led to work in the morning. We were able to leave with the water carriers. We went through Havelberg to a farm. There we received milk and went to sleep. We awoke at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 2 other Germans who wanted to cross the Elbe river, but could no longer cross it, had been living with this farmer for one or two days. We conferred to make an attempt to cross the Elbe River together on the following day. We remained with the farmer for one or two days.

In the morning of 11th May 1945 we crossed the Havel River near Havelberg in the direction of Sandau and reconnoitered the situation there. Boys declared us that the Elbe was situated behind the woods. We would only have to go through a swamp. When we came there on the next morning about 11 o'clock the woods were heavily occupied. However, we crept through the woods and landed in the swamp. All the day long until about 2 o'clock at night we stayed in the swamp. Then we crossed the dam, went into the water at once and swam to the other side. After we had dressed we were stopped by the Russians about 300 m farther. This had really been only one arm of the Elbe river. We were returned to Havelberg to a camp. In Havelberg we were held for 16 days together with 30 to 40 men and transported to Kyritz via Golewen. On the next day I left Kyritz again with a Marine. We walked to the next railway station and from there rode with a workers' train to Wittenberge. In Wittenberge we tried to receive permission to stay for three days. However, we were denied it with the reason that Wittenberge could not feed itself and that for the time being no food would be provided for transients. We continued in the direction of the Elbe River. On our way we were stopped by a Cossack. There we worked for a whole day, carted dung, swept the yard and cleaned dishes. On the same day we left the Cossack and went to the edge of the city of Wittenberge where we spent the night with Germans.

On the next day we looked at the situation on the Elbe River and agreed to swim across the Elbe River at the point of this house. We procured the upper part of a baby car in order to store our things in it while swimming across the Elbe River. Thus we swam across the Elbe River at 0130 hours. We reported to the Buergermeister in Gottberg. The locality was occupied by Americans. The Buergermeister told us that a change of command between Americans and English was just taking place and advised us to move on until a new command had been established. We

then went to Vorsfelde. There I received a march order to Salzburg from an English command post.

I still remember the following details. On the morning of 2 May 1945 SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Schwegermann notified me that Dr. Goebbels and his wife were dead. They had both died in the Fuehrer's bunker. Thereupon the Fuehrer's bunker had been ignited. I did not ask any further question, but I suppose that Dr. Goebbels and his wife had committed suicide.

General Burgdorf and SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Schaedle of the Fuehrer Escort Command still remained in the Reichs-Chancellery. Schaedle told me that he would shoot himself if the Russians were to push through to the Reichs-Chancellery. So far as I know further members of the Fuehrer Escort Command did not remain there. It is possible that some returned after futile breakthrough attempts.

After 20 April 1945 Reichsminister Speer came to the Reichs-Chancellery with a Stork (compare to US L-5) which was flown by Thea Rasche. I expect that the plane had landed on the Hofjaegerallee (across road to the East-West axis). However, the Fuehrer at once sent Speer away. I do not believe that aircraft have landed and started on the East West axis. Soon after 22nd April 1945 heavy artillery fire was laid on the East West axis.

As reporter

/s./ Herrgesell
Amtsgerichtsrat

/s./ Erich Kempka

BERCHTESGADEN,

4 July 1945

Supplementary statement of Mr. ERICH KEMPKA

After Herman Karnau's story was read to me, which was written by Staff Writer Daniel DeLuce on 6/30/45 at Montgomery's headquarters, I state:

1. I am sure that the story of the death of Adolf Hitler and Eva Braun, as I have given it, as well as the burning of both of them on 4/30/45, happened. I can give a few reasons for my positive statement. The escape of the troops of the Reichs-Chancellery happened on 5/1/45 at 2100. More than a day's time elapsed between Hitler's death and escape of the troops. After Hitler and Eva Braun were cremated, there was a meeting in the bunker of the Reichs-Chancellery between Gen. Krebs, Gen. Burg-

dorf and Reichs Minister Dr. Goebbels. As a result of this meeting, Gen. Krebs, as Chief of Staff of the German Army, received an order from Dr. Goebbels to make contact with the Russians in order to confer about the fate of the German wounded in the district of Greater Berlin. At the same time, it also became known that the rest of the troops were to leave the Reichs-Chancellery on the evening of 4/3/45. Gen. Krebs wasn't able to leave the Reichs-Chancellery until 1800. The conference between Gen. Krebs and the Russians dragged away into the evening. For this reason, the departure from the Reichs-Chancellery was delayed. The cooks and kitchen personnel who were ready to leave with the rest already had their belongings packed and had to unpack again. I didn't see Gen. Krebs after 4/30/45. But we did not have to worry about the fate of the wounded, since the Russians assured us they would abide by International Law. I can remember the happenings of 5/1/45 in the Reichs-Chancellery. Since there was heavy artillery fire on the whole Government settlement, not much could be done. In the afternoon of 5/1/45, the Commander of the Government settlement, SS-Brigadefuehrer Mohnke gave the order that in the evening of 5/1/45 at 2100 the departure from the Reichs-Chancellery was to take place.

2. To the statement of Karnau that at 1600 on 5/1/45 he saw Hitler still alive, and that 1830 he witnessed the cremation of the two bodies, I can't agree. I remember surely that I was called by SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche on 4/30/45 by telephone to come over and have some gasoline brought there. From that I conclude that the cremation happened around 1500. It is possible that Karnau witnessed other cremations. During these days, many times two, three, four or five cans of gasoline were asked for, the contents with which important papers were burned in the vicinity of the bunker exit.

3. To a great part of the story Karnau, Herman, gave about the cremation, I agree, but to a small part, I do not agree. I don't know Herman Karnau personally, nor did I ever hear his name before. But this is no reason for me to doubt the existence of his person or of his name. I only knew part of the members of the SD Police at the Fuehrer Headquarters. Karnau could have been the guard who was at the exit of the Fuehrer's bunker leading into the garden of the Reichs-Chancellery. This guard had to be present there at the cremation, also. Because of the heavy artillery fire, he could not have been in the garden of the Reichs-Chancellery, but he had to be by the entrance of the bunker. He

must have been standing close to the rest of them during the cremation.

I think it is impossible that Karnau recognized the Fuehrer by his moustache shortly before the cremation. The upper part of Hitler's body was fully covered by a blanket. I don't think it possible that, by laying the body on the ground, the blanket was blown back sufficiently to uncover the head of the body. All that could be seen were the feet, which stuck out fifteen to twenty centimeters. The black low-cut shoes, black socks, black pants, which the Fuehrer usually wore, could be seen.

Eva Braun, as I said before, was easy to recognize. She was not covered by a blanket. She wore shoes with a high heel, and it is possible that the shoes had a cork sole.

Hitler's body was laid on its back, as Karnau said. It is the truth that Hitler's knees were pulled up a bit. Contrary to Karnau's statement, I remember that Eva Braun was also laid on her back so that her face was upwards. I still remember that, because of the wind, her skirt was blown up so that her garters could be seen. The place where both were lain out was about three or four meters away from the exit of the bunker. Hitler and Eva Braun were not laying parallel to each other, but Eva Braun's body was at an angle to Hitler's (see sketch). Hitler's body was on the left, and Eva Braun's body was on the right, as seen from the exit of the bunker.

Karnau's statement that next to the bodies there were four empty gasoline cans could be true. There were at least five cans brought there. One can holds twenty liters. Two hundred liters were not available in the garage any more. That amount was brought there. It could be that eight cans of approximately 160 liters, at the most, were brought to the place of the cremation. Karnau gave the distance from the place of cremation to the bunker as two meters, whereas, I think it was three to four meters. Karnau's statement that Dr. Stumpfegger was present at the cremation of Hitler's and Eva Braun's bodies could be true. I said in my statement of 6/20/45 that SS-Sturmfuehrer Linge and an "orderly" carried Hitler's body. Now I believe that it is possible that the person named as "orderly" by me could have been Dr. Stumpfegger, since it was Dr. Stumpfegger who pronounced Hitler and Eva Braun dead.

The belief of Karnau that Dr. Stumpfegger, who was the assistant and follower of Dr. Morell, last with the rank of SS-Standartenfuehrer, poisoned Hitler and Miss Eva Braun, is untrue from my observations. I saw a wound on the body of Eva Braun, and

I also saw in Hitler's private room, the two pistols described by me. Besides that, SS-Sturmfuehrer Guensche told me after the cremation of both bodies (I believe on 5/1/45) that the rug which was in Hitler's private room was burned because it was full of blood spots. This I did not observe during my stay in Hitler's private room in the afternoon of 4/30/45 shortly after the cremation, because it was a multi-colored rug—that Hitler's shepherd bitch was poisoned three days before 4/30/45, I saw during my stay at the Reichs-Chancellery. Who did the poisoning, I cannot say.

That in a newspaper statement reported to have been made by the Russian Marshall Chukov that Hitler and Eva Braun could have escaped from the Berlin area by air, I can't agree. On 4/30/45 and two or three days previous, no one could possibly have left the inner parts of Berlin by air. There was a heavy artillery fire on all the inner parts of Berlin during those days. Neither did I hear about a plane arriving or leaving after the 25th or 26th of April 1945. After the 22nd of April 1945, the usual briefing didn't take place. On the 25th or 26th of April 1945 Dr. Speer, the Reichsminister, arrived with the Storch. On orders of the Fuehrer, he had to leave immediately. It was told that the Storch landed in the vicinity of the Siegessaule. I believe that he was standing at the Hofjaegerallee (Cross-road to the East-West Axis).

I am changing my statement on page 6 of 6/20/45 on grounds of later recollection, to the effect that I carried Eva Braun's body through different rooms of the bunker to the beginning of the steps. There SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche took Eva Braun's body away from me. Guensche then placed Eva Braun's body next to Hitler's, on the outside.

4. SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Guensche told me shortly after the cremation on 4/30/45 was publicized, that Hitler had ordered that the bunker in the Reichs-Chancellery was to remain the way he left it. He meant that the Russians were to see that he was down there till the last moment. But, in fact, the bunker was set afire. On the night of 1-2 May, 1945, Dr. Goebbel's chauffeur, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Alfred Rach, who, together with State Secretary Dr. Naumann, arrived at the railroad station, Friedrichstrasse, said that the bunker was set afire on orders of Dr. Goebbels. From the talking of Rach, I came to the conclusion that Dr. Goebbels and his wife either shot or poisoned themselves at the Reichs-Chancellery, and gave orders previously to have the Reichs-Chancellery set afire. Dr. Goebbels and his wife didn't

make any attempt to leave the Reichs-Chancellery. It is possible that Dr. Goebbels did not know about the Fuehrer's will to keep the Fuehrer's bunker intact. Hitler's valet, SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Linge I saw a few times during the night 1-2 May, 1945, on the place of escape and at the railroad station, Friedrichstrasse. Where he went to, I don't know. The SS-Sturmbannfuehrer, Schedule, named in the newspaper report of Daniel de Luce, is the SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Schadle, the leader of the Fuehrer's guard command named by me, who, together with Gen. Burgdorf, remained at the Reichs-Chancellery.

Although it was said in the press report that Hitler and Eva Braun had two children, I must say is impossible. I knew Eva Braun since 1932, and I know of no indications that she brought a child into the world.

Recorder

/s/ GERHARD HERGESELL

Judge

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3737-PS

HAGUE CONVENTION NO. IV OF 18 OCTOBER 1907
(36 Stat. 2277; Treaty Series No. 539; Malloy Treaties, Vol. 11.
p. 2269)
[Translation]

CONVENTION
RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON
LAND

[Here follows the list of Sovereigns and Heads of States who sent Plenipotentiaries to the Conference.]

Seeing that, while seeking means to preserve peace and prevent armed conflicts between nations, it is likewise necessary to bear in mind the case where the appeal to arms has been brought about by events which their care was unable to avert;

Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interest of humanity and the even progressive needs of civilization;

Thinking it important, with this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war, either with a view to defining them with greater precision or to confining them within such limits as would mitigate their severity as far as possible;

Have deemed it necessary to complete and explain in certain particulars the work of the First Peace Conference, which, fol-

lowing on the Brussels Conference of 1874, and inspired by the ideas dictated by a wise and generous forethought, adopted provisions intended to define and govern the usages of war on land.

According to the views of the High Contracting Parties, these provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit, are intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with the inhabitants.

It has not, however, been found possible at present to concert Regulations covering all the circumstances which arise in practice;

On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.

Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.

They declare that it is in this sense especially that Articles I and II of the Regulations adopted must be understood.

The High Contracting Parties, wishing to conclude a fresh Convention to this effect, have appointed the following as their Plenipotentiaries:

[Here follow the names of the Plenipotentiaries.]

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the present Convention.

ARTICLE 2

The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article I, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.

ARTICLE 3

A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention, duly ratified, shall as between the Contracting Powers, be substituted for the Convention of the 29th July, 1899, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

The Convention of 1899 remains in force as between the Powers which signed it, and which do not also ratify the present Convention.

ARTICLE 5

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague.

The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a *proces-verbal* signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein and by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means of a written notification, addressed to the Netherland Government and accompanied by the instrument of ratification.

A duly certified copy of the *proces-verbal* relative to the first deposit of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding paragraph, as well as of the instruments of ratification, shall be immediately sent by the Netherland Government, through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as well as to the other Powers which have adhered to the Convention. In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph the said Government shall at the same time inform them of the date on which it received the notification.

ARTICLE 6

Non-Signatory Powers may adhere to the present Convention.

The Power which desires to adhere notifies in writing its intention to the Netherland Government, forwarding to it the act of adhesion, which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government.

This Government shall at once transmit to all the other Powers a duly certified copy of the notification as well as of the act of adhesion, mentioning the date on which it received the notification.

ARTICLE 7

The present Convention shall come into force, in the case of the Powers which were a party to the first deposit of ratifications.

sixty days after the date of the *proces-verbal* of this deposit, and, in the case of the Powers which ratify subsequently or which adhere, sixty days after the notification of their ratification or of their adhesion has been received by the Netherland Government.

ARTICLE 8

In the event of one of the Contracting Powers wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Netherland Government, which shall at once communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which it was received.

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying power, and one year after the notification has reached the Netherland Government.

ARTICLE 9

A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for Foreign Affairs shall give the date of the deposit of ratifications made in virtue of Article V, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the date on which the notifications of adhesion (Article VI, paragraph 2) or of denunciation (Article VIII, paragraph 1) were received.

Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this register and to be supplied with duly certified extracts.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their signatures to the present Convention.

Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland Government, and duly certified copies of which shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers which have been invited to the Second Peace Conference.

[Here follow signatures.]

ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND

SECTION I.—ON BELLIGERENTS

CHAPTER I.—The Qualifications of Belligerents

ARTICLE 1

The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

3. To carry arms openly; and

4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination "army."

ARTICLE 2

The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war.

ARTICLE 3

The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and noncombatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.

CHAPTER II.—Prisoners of War

ARTICLE 4

Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them.

They must be humanely treated.

All their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property.

ARTICLE 5

Prisoners of war may be interned in a town, fortress, camp, or other place, and bound not to go beyond certain fixed limits; but they cannot be confined except as an indispensable measure of safety and only while the circumstances which necessitate the measure continue to exist.

ARTICLE 6

The State may utilize the labour of prisoners of war according to their rank and aptitude, officers excepted. The tasks shall not be excessive and shall have no connection with the operations of the war.

Prisoners may be authorized to work for the public service, for private persons, or on their own account.

Work done for the State is paid at the rates in force for work of a similar kind done by soldiers of the national army, or, if there are none in force, at a rate according to the work executed.

When the work is for other branches of the public service or for private persons the conditions are settled in agreement with the military authorities.

The wages of the prisoners shall go towards improving their position, and the balance shall be paid them on their release, after deducting the cost of their maintenance.

ARTICLE 7

The Government into whose hands prisoners of war have fallen is charged with their maintenance.

In the absence of a special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated as regards board, lodging, and clothing on the same footing as the troops of the Government who captured them.

ARTICLE 8

Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of the State in whose power they are. Any act of insubordination justifies the adoption towards them of such measures of severity as may be considered necessary.

Escaped prisoners who are retaken before being able to rejoin their own army or before leaving the territory occupied by the army which captured them are liable to disciplinary punishment.

Prisoners who, after succeeding in escaping, are again taken prisoners, are not liable to any punishment on account of the previous flight.

ARTICLE 9

Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, and if he infringes this rule, he is liable to have the advantages given to prisoners of his class curtailed.

ARTICLE 10

Prisoners of war may be set at liberty on parole if the laws of their country allow, and, in such cases, they are bound, on their personal honour, scrupulously to fulfill, both towards their own Government and the Government by whom they were made prisoners, the engagements they have contracted.

In such cases their own Government is bound neither to require of nor accept from them any service incompatible with the parole given.

ARTICLE 11

A prisoner of war can not be compelled to accept his liberty on parole; similarly the hostile Government is not obliged to accede to the request of the prisoner to be set at liberty on parole.

ARTICLE 12

Prisoners of war liberated on parole and recaptured bearing arms against the Government to whom they had pledged their honour, or against the allies of that Government, forfeit their right to be treated as prisoners of war, and can be brought before the Courts.

ARTICLE 13

Individuals who follow an army without directly belonging to it, such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers and contractors, who fall into the enemy's hands and whom the latter thinks expedient to detain, are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from the military authorities of the army which they were accompanying.

ARTICLE 14

An inquiry office for prisoners of war is instituted on the commencement of hostilities in each of the belligerent States, and, when necessary, in neutral countries which have received belligerents in their territory. It is the function of this office to reply to all inquiries about the prisoners. It receives from the various services concerned full information respecting internments and transfers, releases on parole, exchanges, escapes, admissions into hospital, deaths, as well as other information necessary to enable it to make out and keep up to date an individual return for each prisoner of war. The office must state in this return the regimental number, name and surname, age, place of origin, rank, unit, wounds, date and place of capture, internment, wounding, and death, as well as any observations of a special character. The individual return shall be sent to the Government of the other belligerent after the conclusion of peace.

It is likewise the function of the inquiry office to receive and collect all objects of personal use, valuables, letters, &c., found on the field of battle or left by prisoners who have been released on parole, or exchanged, or who have escaped, or died in hospitals or ambulances, and to forward them to those concerned.

ARTICLE 15

Relief societies for prisoners of war, which are properly constituted in accordance with the laws of their country and with the object of serving as the channel for charitable effort shall receive from the belligerents, for themselves and their duly accredited agents every facility for the efficient performance of their humane task within the bounds imposed by military necessities and administrative regulations. Agents of these societies may be ad-

mitted to the places of internment for the purpose of distributing relief, as also to the halting places of repatriated prisoners, if furnished with a personal permit by the military authorities, and on giving an undertaking in writing to comply with all measures of order and police which the latter may issue.

ARTICLE 16

Inquiry offices enjoy the privilege of free postage. Letters, money orders, and valuables, as well as parcels by post, intended for prisoners of war, or dispatched by them, shall be exempt from all postal duties in the countries of origin and destination, as well as in the countries they pass through.

Presents and relief in kind for prisoners of war shall be admitted free of all import or other duties, as well as of payments for carriage by the State railways.

ARTICLE 17

Officers taken prisoners shall receive the same rate of pay as officers of corresponding rank in the country where they are detained, the amount to be ultimately refunded by their own Government.

ARTICLE 18

Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete liberty in the exercise of their religion, including attendance at the services of whatever Church they may belong to, on the sole condition that they comply with the measures of order and police issued by the military authorities.

ARTICLE 19

The wills of prisoners of war are received or drawn up in the same way as for soldiers of the national army.

The same rules shall be observed regarding death certificates as well as for the burial of prisoners of war, due regard being paid to their grade and rank.

ARTICLE 20

After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall be carried out as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER III.—The Sick and Wounded

ARTICLE 21

The obligations of belligerents with regard to the sick and wounded are governed by the Geneva Convention.

SECTION II.—HOSTILITIES

CHAPTER I.—Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments

ARTICLE 22

The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.

ARTICLE 23

In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden—

- a.* To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
 - b.* To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.
 - c.* To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;
 - d.* To declare that no quarter will be given;
 - e.* To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
 - f.* To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention;
 - g.* To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
 - h.* To declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a Court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.
- A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war.

ARTICLE 24

Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered permissible.

ARTICLE 25

The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.

ARTICLE 26

The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities.

ARTICLE 27

In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.

It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.

ARTICLE 28

The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.

CHAPTER II.—Spies

ARTICLE 29

A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.

Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies. Similarly, the following are not considered spies: Soldiers and civilians, carrying out their mission openly, intrusted with the delivery of despatches intended either for their own army or for the enemy's army. To this class belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose of carrying despatches and, generally, of maintaining communications between the different parts of an army or a territory.

ARTICLE 30

A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous trial.

ARTICLE 31

A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.

CHAPTER III.—Flags of Truce

ARTICLE 32

A person is regarded as bearing a flag of trust who has been authorized by one of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag. He has a right to inviolability, as well as the trumpeter, bugler or

drummer, the flag-bearer and interpreter who may accompany him.

ARTICLE 33

The commander to whom a flag of truce is sent is not in all cases obliged to receive it.

He may take all the necessary steps to prevent the envoy taking advantage of his mission to obtain information.

In case of abuse, he has the right to detain the envoy temporarily.

ARTICLE 34

The envoy loses his rights of inviolability if it is proved in a clear and incontestable manner that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an act of treachery.

CHAPTER IV.—Capitulation

ARTICLE 35

Capitulations agreed upon between the contracting parties must take into account the rules of military honour.

Once settled, they must be scrupulously observed by both parties.

CHAPTER V.—Armistices

ARTICLE 36

An armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties. If its duration is not defined, the belligerent parties may resume operations at any time, provided always that the enemy is warned within the time agreed upon, in accordance with the terms of the armistice.

ARTICLE 37

An armistice may be general or local. The first suspends the military operations of the belligerent States everywhere; the second only between certain fractions of the belligerent armies and within a fixed radius.

ARTICLE 38

An armistice must be notified officially and in good time to the competent authorities and to the troops. Hostilities are suspended immediately after the notification, or on the date fixed.

ARTICLE 39

It rests with the contracting parties to settle, in the terms of the armistice, what communications may be held in the theatre of war with the inhabitants and between the inhabitants of one belligerent State and those of the other.

ARTICLE 40

Any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities, immediately.

ARTICLE 41

A violation of the terms of the armistice by private persons acting on their own initiative only entitles the injured party to demand the punishment of the offenders or, if necessary, compensation for the losses sustained.

SECTION III.—MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE HOSTILE STATE

ARTICLE 42

Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

ARTICLE 43

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

ARTICLE 44

A belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of defense.

ARTICLE 45

It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.

ARTICLE 46

Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.

Private property cannot be confiscated.

ARTICLE 47

Pillage is formally forbidden.

ARTICLE 48

If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so.

as far as is possible in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate Government was so bound.

ARTICLE 49

If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the above Article, the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, this shall only be for the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.

ARTICLE 50

No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.

ARTICLE 51

No contribution shall be collected except under a written order, and on the responsibility of a Commander-in-chief.

The collection of the said contribution shall only be effected as far as possible in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence of the taxes in force.

For every contribution a receipt shall be given to the contributors.

ARTICLE 52

Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country.

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.

Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.

ARTICLE 53

An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.

All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or

things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of ammunition of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

ARTICLE 54

Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in the case of absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

ARTICLE 55

The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.

ARTICLE 56

The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property.

All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3738-PS

GENEVA (PRISONERS OF WAR) CONVENTION OF 27 JULY 1929
(47 Stat. 2021; Treaty Series No. 846; Malloy, Treaties, Vol. IV,
p. 5224)

[Translation]

CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

[Here follows the list of Sovereigns and Heads of States who sent Plenipotentiaries to the Conference.]

recognizing that, in the extreme case of a war, it will be the duty of every Power to diminish, so far as possible, the unavoidable rigors thereof and to mitigate the fate of prisoners of war;

desirous of developing the principles which inspired the international conventions of The Hague, in particular the Convention relative to the laws and customs of war and the Regulations annexed thereto;

have decided to conclude a Convention to that end, and have appointed the following as their Plenipotentiaries, namely:

[Here follow the names of Plenipotentiaries.]

Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1

The present Convention shall apply, without prejudice to the stipulations of Title VII:

(1) To all persons mentioned in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, of October 18, 1907, and captured by the enemy.

(2) To all persons belonging to the armed forces of belligerent parties, captured by the enemy in the course of military operations at sea or in the air, except for such derogations as might be rendered inevitable by the conditions of capture. However, such derogations shall not infringe upon the fundamental principles of the present Convention; they shall cease from the moment when the persons captured have rejoined a prisoners-of-war camp.

ARTICLE 2

Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Power, but not of the individuals or corps who have captured them.

They must at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity.

Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited.

ARTICLE 3

Prisoners of war have the right to have their person and their honor respected. Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex.

Prisoners retain their full civil status.

ARTICLE 4

The Power detaining prisoners of war is bound to provide for their maintenance.

Difference in treatment among prisoners is lawful only when it is based on the military rank, state of physical or mental health, professional qualifications or sex of those who profit thereby.

TITLE II. CAPTURE

ARTICLE 5

Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, or else his regimental number.

If he infringes this rule, he is liable to have the advantages given to prisoners of his class curtailed.

No coercion may be used on prisoners to secure information relative to the condition of their army or country. Prisoners who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind whatever.

If, because of his physical or mental condition, a prisoner is unable to identify himself, he shall be turned over to the medical corps.

ARTICLE 6

All effects and objects of personal use—except arms, horses, military equipment and military papers—shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, as well as metal helmets and gas masks.

Money in the possession of prisoners may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer and after the amount is determined. A receipt shall be given. Money thus taken away shall be entered to the account of each prisoner.

Identification documents, insignia of rank, decorations and objects of value may not be taken from prisoners.

TITLE III. CAPTIVITY

SECTION I.—EVACUATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

ARTICLE 7

Prisoners of war shall be evacuated within the shortest possible period after their capture, to depots located in a region far enough from the zone of combat for them to be out of danger.

Only prisoners who, because of wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are may be temporarily kept in a dangerous zone.

Prisoners shall not be needlessly exposed to danger while awaiting their evacuation from the combat zone.

Evacuation of prisoners on foot may normally be effected only by stages of 20 kilometers a day, unless the necessity of reaching water and food depots requires longer stages.

ARTICLE 8

Belligerents are bound mutually to notify each other of their capture of prisoners within the shortest period possible, through the intermediary of the information bureaus, such as are organized according to Article 77. They are likewise bound to inform each other of the official addresses to which the correspondence of the families may be sent to prisoners of war.

As soon as possible, every prisoner must be enabled to correspond with his family himself, under the conditions provided in Articles 36 *et seq.*

As regards prisoners captured at sea, the provisions of the present article shall be observed as soon as possible after arrival at port.

SECTION II.—PRISONERS-OF-WAR CAMPS

ARTICLE 9

Prisoners of war may be interned in a town, fortress, or other place, and bound not to go beyond certain fixed limits. They may also be interned in enclosed camps; they may not be confined or imprisoned except as an indispensable measure of safety or sanitation, and only while the circumstances which necessitate the measure continue to exist.

Prisoners captured in unhealthful regions or where the climate is injurious for persons coming from temperate regions, shall be transported, as soon as possible, to a more favorable climate.

Belligerents shall, so far as possible, avoid assembling in a single camp prisoners of different races or nationalities.

No prisoner may, at any time, be sent into a region where he might be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor used to give protection from bombardment to certain points or certain regions by his presence.

CHAPTER 1.—Installation of Camps

ARTICLE 10

Prisoners of war shall be lodged in buildings or in barracks affording all possible guarantees of hygiene and healthfulness.

The quarters must be fully protected from dampness, sufficiently heated and lighted. All precautions must be taken against danger of fire.

With regard to dormitories—the total surface, minimum cubic amount of air, arrangement and material of bedding—the conditions shall be the same as for the troops at base camps of the detaining Power.

CHAPTER 2.—Food and Clothing of Prisoners of War

ARTICLE 11

The food ration of prisoners of war shall be equal in quantity and quality to that of troops at base camps.

Furthermore, prisoners shall receive facilities for preparing themselves, additional food which they might have.

A sufficiency of potable water shall be furnished them. The use of tobacco shall be permitted. Prisoners may be employed in the kitchens.

All collective disciplinary measures affecting the food are prohibited.

ARTICLE 12

Clothing, linen and footwear shall be furnished prisoners of war by the detaining Power. Replacement and repairing of these effects must be assured regularly. In addition, laborers must receive work clothes wherever the nature of the work requires it.

Canteens shall be installed in all camps where prisoners may obtain, at the local market price, food products and ordinary objects.

Profits made by the canteens for camp administrations shall be used for the benefit of prisoners.

CHAPTER 3.—Sanitary Service in Camps

ARTICLE 13

Belligerents shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to assure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.

Prisoners of war shall have at their disposal, day and night, installations conforming to sanitary rules and constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness.

Furthermore, and without prejudice to baths and showers with which the camp shall be as well provided as possible, prisoners shall be furnished a sufficient quantity of water for the care of their own bodily cleanliness.

It shall be possible for them to take physical exercise and enjoy the open air.

ARTICLE 14

Every camp shall have an infirmary, where prisoners of war shall receive every kind of attention they need. If necessary, isolated quarters shall be reserved for the sick affected with contagious diseases.

Expenses of treatment, including therein those of temporary prosthetic equipment, shall be borne by the detaining Power.

Upon request, belligerents shall be bound to deliver to every prisoner treated an official statement showing the nature and duration of his illness as well as the attention received.

It shall be lawful for belligerents reciprocally to authorize, by means of private arrangements, the retention in the camps of physicians and attendants to care for prisoners of their own country.

Prisoners affected with a serious illness or whose condition necessitates an important surgical operation, must be admitted, at the expense of the detaining Power, to any military or civil medical unit qualified to treat them.

ARTICLE 15

Medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be arranged at least once a month. Their purpose shall be the supervision of the general state of health and cleanliness, and the detection of contagious diseases, particularly tuberculosis and venereal diseases.

CHAPTER 4.—Intellectual and Moral Needs of Prisoners of War

ARTICLE 16

Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete liberty in the exercise of their religion, including attendance at the services of their faith, on the sole condition that they comply with the measures of order and police issued by the military authorities.

Ministers of a religion, prisoners of war, whatever their religious denomination, shall be allowed to minister fully to members of the same religion.

ARTICLE 17

So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organized by prisoners of war.

CHAPTER 5.—Internal Discipline of Camps

ARTICLE 18

Every camp of prisoners of war shall be placed under the command of a responsible officer.

Besides the external marks of respect provided by the regulations in force in their armies with regard to their nationals, prisoners of war must salute all officers of the detaining Power.

Officers who are prisoners of war are bound to salute only officers of a higher or equal rank of that Power.

ARTICLE 19

The wearing of insignia of rank and of decorations shall be permitted.

ARTICLE 20

Regulations, orders, notices and proclamations of every kind must be communicated to prisoners of war in a language which they understand. The same principle shall be applied in examinations.

CHAPTER 6.—Special Provisions Regarding Officers and Persons of Equivalent Status

ARTICLE 21

Upon the beginning of hostilities, belligerents shall be bound to communicate to one another the titles and ranks in use in their respective armies, with a view to assuring equality of treatment between corresponding ranks of officers and persons of equivalent status.

Officers and persons of equivalent status who are prisoners of war shall be treated with the regard due their rank and age.

ARTICLE 22

In order to assure service in officers' camps, soldiers of the same army who are prisoners of war and, wherever possible, who speak the same language, shall be assigned thereto, in sufficient numbers, considering the rank of the officers and persons of equivalent status.

The latter shall secure their food and clothing from the pay which shall be granted them by the detaining Power. Administration of the mess-fund by the officers themselves must be facilitated in every way.

CHAPTER 7.—Financial Resources of Prisoners of War

ARTICLE 23

Subject to private arrangements between belligerent Powers, and particularly those provided in Article 24, officers and persons of equivalent status who are prisoners of war shall receive from the detaining Power the same pay as officers of corresponding rank in the armies of that Power, on the condition, however, that this pay does not exceed that to which they are entitled in the armies of the country which they have served. This pay shall be granted them in full, once a month if possible, and without being liable to any deduction for expenses incumbent on the detaining Power, even when they are in favor of the prisoners.

An agreement between the belligerents shall fix the rate of exchange applicable to this payment; in the absence of such an agreement, the rate adopted shall be that in force at the opening of hostilities.

All payments made to prisoners of war as pay must be reimbursed, at the end of hostilities, by the Power which they have served.

ARTICLE 24

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the belligerents shall, by common agreement, fix the maximum amount of ready money which prisoners of war of various ranks and classes shall be allowed to keep in their possession. Any surplus taken or withheld from a prisoner shall be entered to his account, the same as any deposit of money effected by him, and may not be converted into another currency without his consent.

Pay to the credit of their accounts shall be given to prisoners of war at the end of their captivity.

During their imprisonment, facilities shall be granted them for the transfer of these amounts, in whole or in part, to banks or private persons in their country of origin.

CHAPTER 8.—Transfer of Prisoners of War

ARTICLE 25

Unless the conduct of military operations so requires, sick and wounded prisoners of war shall not be transferred as long as their recovery might be endangered by the trip.

ARTICLE 26

In case of transfer, prisoners of war shall be officially notified of their new destination in advance; they shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, their correspondence and packages which have arrived for them.

All due measures shall be taken that correspondence and packages addressed to their former camp may be forwarded to them without delay.

Money deposited to the account of transferred prisoners shall be transmitted to the competent authority of their new place of residence.

The expenses occasioned by the transfer shall be charged to the detaining Power.

SECTION III.—LABOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR

CHAPTER 1.—Generalities

ARTICLE 27

Belligerents may utilize the labor of able prisoners of war, according to their rank and aptitude, officers and persons of equivalent status excepted.

However, if officers or persons of equivalent status request suitable work, it shall be secured for them so far as is possible.

Noncommissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do supervisory work, unless they expressly request a remunerative occupation.

Belligerents shall be bound, during the whole period of captivity, to allow to prisoners of war who are victims of accidents in connection with their work the enjoyment of the benefit of the provisions applicable to laborers of the same class according to the legislation of the detaining Power. With regard to prisoners of war to whom these legal provisions might not be applied by reason of the legislation of that Power, the latter undertakes to recommend to its legislative body all proper measures equitably to indemnify the victims.

CHAPTER 2.—Organization of the Labor

ARTICLE 28

The detaining Power shall assume entire responsibility for the maintenance, care, treatment and payment of wages of prisoners of war working for the account of private persons.

ARTICLE 29

No prisoner of war may be employed at labors for which he is physically unfit.

ARTICLE 30

The length of the day's work of prisoners of war, including therein the trip going and returning, shall not be excessive and must not, in any case, exceed that allowed for the civil workers in the region employed at the same work. Every prisoner shall be allowed a rest of twenty-four consecutive hours every week, preferably on Sunday.

CHAPTER 3.—Prohibited Labor

ARTICLE 31

Labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct relation with war operations. It is especially prohibited to use pris-

oners for manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind, or for transporting material intended for combatant units.

In case of violation of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, prisoners, after executing or beginning to execute the order, shall be free to have their protests presented through the mediation of the agents whose functions are set forth in Articles 43 and 44, or, in the absence of an agent, through the mediation of representatives of the protecting Power.

ARTICLE 32

It is forbidden to use prisoners of war at unhealthful or dangerous work.

Any aggravation of the conditions of labor by disciplinary measures is forbidden.

CHAPTER 4.—Labor Detachments

ARTICLE 33

The system of labor detachments must be similar to that of prisoners-of-war camps, particularly with regard to sanitary conditions, food, attention in case of accident or sickness, correspondence and the receipt of packages.

Every labor detachment shall be dependent on a prisoners' camp. The commander of this camp shall be responsible for the observation, in the labor detachment, of the provisions of the present Convention.

CHAPTER 5.—Wages

ARTICLE 34

Prisoners of war shall not receive wages for work connected with the administration, management and maintenance of the camps.

Prisoners utilized for other work shall be entitled to wages to be fixed by agreements between the belligerents.

These agreements shall also specify the part which the camp administration may retain, the amount which shall belong to the prisoner of war and the manner in which that amount shall be put at his disposal during the period of his captivity.

While awaiting the conclusion of the said agreements, payment for labor of prisoners shall be settled according to the rules given below:

a. Work done for the State shall be paid for in accordance with the rates in force for soldiers of the national army doing the same

work, or, if none exists, according to a rate in harmony with the work performed.

b. When the work is done for the account of other public administrations or for private persons, conditions shall be regulated by agreement with the military authority.

The pay remaining to the credit of the prisoner shall be delivered to him at the end of his captivity. In case of death, it shall be forwarded through the diplomatic channel to the heirs of the deceased.

SECTION IV.—EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF PRISONERS OF WAR

ARTICLE 35

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, belligerents shall publish the measures provided for the execution of the provisions of this section.

ARTICLE 36

Each of the belligerents shall periodically determine the number of letters and postal cards per month which prisoners of war of the various classes shall be allowed to send, and shall inform the other belligerent of this number. These letters and cards shall be transmitted by post by the shortest route. They may not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reasons.

Within a period of not more than one week after his arrival at the camp, and likewise in case of sickness, every prisoner shall be enabled to write his family a postal card informing it of his capture and of the state of his health. The said postal cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner.

As a general rule, correspondence of prisoners shall be written in their native language. Belligerents may allow correspondence in other languages.

ARTICLE 37

Prisoners of war shall be allowed individually to receive parcels by mail, containing foods and other articles intended to supply them with food or clothing. Packages shall be delivered to the addresses and a receipt given.

ARTICLE 38

Letters and consignments of money or valuables, as well as parcels by post intended for prisoners of war or dispatched by them, either directly, or by the mediation of the information bureaus provided for in Article 77, shall be exempt from all postal duties in the countries of origin and destination, as well as in the countries they pass through.

Presents and relief in kind for prisoners shall be likewise exempt from all import and other duties, as well as of payments for carriage by the State railways.

Prisoners may, in cases of acknowledged urgency, be allowed to send telegrams, paying the usual charges.

ARTICLE 39

Prisoners of war shall be allowed to receive shipments of books individually, which may be subject to censorship.

Representatives of the protecting Powers and duly recognized and authorized aid societies may send books and collections of books to the libraries of prisoners' camps. The transmission of these shipments to libraries may not be delayed under the pretext of censorship difficulties.

ARTICLE 40

Censorship of correspondence must be effected within the shortest possible time. Furthermore, inspection of parcels post must be effected under proper conditions to guarantee the preservation of the products which they may contain and, if possible, in the presence of the addressee or an agent duly recognized by him.

Prohibitions of correspondence promulgated by the belligerents for military or political reasons, must be transient in character and as short as possible.

ARTICLE 41

Belligerents shall assure all facilities for the transmission of instruments, papers or documents intended for prisoners of war or signed by them, particularly of powers of attorney and wills.

They shall take the necessary measures to assure, in case of necessity, the authentication of signatures made by prisoners.

SECTION V.—PRISONERS' RELATIONS WITH THE AUTHORITIES

CHAPTER 1.—Complaints of Prisoners of War Because of the Conditions of Captivity

ARTICLE 42

Prisoners of war shall have the right to inform the military authorities in whose power they are of their requests with regard to the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.

They shall also have the right to address themselves to representatives of the protecting Powers to indicate to them the points on which they have complaints to formulate with regard to the conditions of captivity.

These requests and complaints must be transmitted immediately.

Even if they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not occasion any punishment.

CHAPTER 2.—Representatives of Prisoners of War

ARTICLE 43

In every place where there are prisoners of war, they shall be allowed to appoint agents entrusted with representing them directly with military authorities and protecting Powers.

This appointment shall be subject to the approval of the military authority.

The agents shall be entrusted with the reception and distribution of collective shipments. Likewise, in case the prisoners should decide to organize a mutual assistance system among themselves, this organization would be in the sphere of the agents. Further, they may lend their offices to prisoners to facilitate their relations with the aid societies mentioned in Article 78.

In camps of officers and persons of equivalent status, the senior officer prisoner of the highest rank shall be recognized as intermediary between the camp authorities and the officers and persons of equivalent status who are prisoners. For this purpose, he shall have the power to appoint a prisoner officer to assist him as an interpreter during the conferences with the camp authorities.

ARTICLE 44

When the agents are employed as laborers, their activity as representatives of prisoners of war must be counted in the compulsory period of labor.

All facilities shall be accorded the agents for their intercourse with the military authorities and with the protecting Power. This intercourse shall not be limited.

No representative of the prisoners may be transferred without the necessary time being allowed him to inform his successors about affairs under consideration.

CHAPTER 3.—Penalties Applicable to Prisoners of War

1. General Provisions

ARTICLE 45

Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armies of the detaining Power.

An act of insubordination shall justify the adoption towards them of the measures provided by such laws, regulations and orders.

The provisions of the present chapter, however, are reserved.

ARTICLE 46

Punishments other than those provided for the same acts for soldiers of the national armies may not be imposed upon prisoners of war by the military authorities and courts of the detaining Power.

Rank being identical, officers, non-commissioned officers or soldiers who are prisoners of war undergoing a disciplinary punishment, shall not be subject to less favorable treatment than that provided in the armies of the detaining Power with regard to the same punishment.

Any corporal punishment, any imprisonment in quarters without daylight and, in general, any form of cruelty, is forbidden.

Collective punishment for individual acts is also forbidden.

ARTICLE 47

Acts constituting an offense against discipline, and particularly attempted escape, shall be verified immediately; for all prisoners of war, commissioned or not, preventive arrest shall be reduced to the absolute minimum.

Judicial proceedings against prisoners of war shall be conducted as rapidly as the circumstances permit; preventive imprisonment shall be limited as much as possible.

In all cases, the duration of preventive imprisonment shall be deducted from the disciplinary or judicial punishment inflicted, provided that this deduction is allowed for national soldiers.

ARTICLE 48

Prisoners of war may not be treated differently from other prisoners after having suffered the judicial or disciplinary punishment which has been imposed on them.

However, prisoners punished as a result of attempted escape may be subjected to special surveillance, which, however, may not entail the suppression of the guarantees granted prisoners by the present Convention.

ARTICLE 49

No prisoner of war may be deprived of his rank by the detaining Power.

Prisoners given disciplinary punishment may not be deprived of the prerogatives attached to their rank. In particular, officers and persons of equivalent status who suffer punishment involving

deprivation of liberty shall not be placed in the same quarters as noncommissioned officers or privates being punished.

ARTICLE 50

Escaped prisoners of war who are retaken before being able to rejoin their own army or to leave the territory occupied by the army which captured them shall be liable only to disciplinary punishment.

Prisoners who, after having succeeded in rejoining their army or in leaving the territory occupied by the army which captured them, may again be taken prisoners, shall not be liable to any punishment on account of their previous flight.

ARTICLE 51

Attempted escape, even if it is a repetition of the offense, shall not be considered as an aggravating circumstance in case the prisoner of war should be given over to the courts on account of crimes or offenses against persons or property committed in the course of that attempt.

After an attempted or accomplished escape, the comrades of the person escaping who assisted in the escape may incur only disciplinary punishment on this account.

ARTICLE 52

Belligerents shall see that the competent authorities exercise the greatest leniency in deciding the question of whether an infraction committed by a prisoner of war should be punished by disciplinary or judicial measures.

This shall be the case especially when it is a question of deciding on acts in connection with escape or attempted escape.

A prisoner may not be punished more than once because of the same act or the same count.

ARTICLE 53

No prisoner of war on whom a disciplinary punishment has been imposed, who might be eligible for repatriation, may be kept back because he has not undergone the punishment.

Prisoners to be repatriated who might be threatened with a penal prosecution may be excluded from repatriation until the end of the proceedings and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment; those who might already be imprisoned by reason of a sentence may be detained until the end of their imprisonment.

Belligerents shall communicate to each other the lists of those who may not be repatriated for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph.

2. Disciplinary Punishments

ARTICLE 54

Arrest is the most severe disciplinary punishment which may be imposed on a prisoner of war.

The duration of a single punishment may not exceed thirty days.

This maximum of thirty days may not, further, be exceeded in the case of several acts for which the prisoner has to undergo discipline at the time when it is ordered for him, whether or not these acts are connected.

When, during or after the end of a period of arrest, a prisoner shall have a new disciplinary punishment imposed upon him, a space of at least three days shall separate each of the periods of arrest, if one of them is ten days or more.

ARTICLE 55

Subject to the provisions given in the last paragraph of Article 11, food restrictions allowed in the armies of the detaining Power are applicable, as an increase in punishment, to prisoners of war given disciplinary punishment.

However, these restrictions may be ordered only if the state of health of the prisoners punished permits it.

ARTICLE 56

In no case may prisoners of war be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prison, penitentiaries, convict prisons, etc.) there to undergo disciplinary punishment.

The quarters in which they undergo disciplinary punishment shall conform to sanitary requirements.

Prisoners punished shall be enabled to keep themselves in a state of cleanliness.

These prisoners shall every day be allowed to exercise or to stay in the open air at least two hours.

ARTICLE 57

Prisoners of war given disciplinary punishment shall be allowed to read and write, as well as to send and receive letters.

On the other hand, packages and money sent may not be delivered to the addressees until the expiration of the punishment. If the packages not distributed contain perishable products, these shall be turned over to the camp infirmary or kitchen.

ARTICLE 58

Prisoners of war given disciplinary punishment shall be allowed, on their request, to be present at the daily medical inspec-

tion. They shall receive the care considered necessary by the doctors and, if necessary, shall be removed to the camp infirmary or to hospitals.

ARTICLE 59

Excepting the competence of courts and higher military authorities, disciplinary punishment may be ordered only by an officer provided with disciplinary powers in his capacity as commander of a camp or detachment, or by the responsible officer replacing him.

3. Judicial Suits

ARTICLE 60

At the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, the detaining Power shall advise the representative of the protecting Power thereof as soon as possible, and always before the date set for the opening of the trial.

This advice shall contain the following information :

- a. Civil state and rank of prisoner ;
- b. Place of sojourn or imprisonment ;
- c. Specification of the [count] or counts of the indictment, giving the legal provisions applicable.

If it is not possible to mention in that advice the court which will pass upon the matter, the date of opening the trial and the place where it will take place, this information must be furnished to the representative of the protecting Power later, as soon as possible, and at all events, at least three weeks before the opening of the trial.

ARTICLE 61

No prisoner of war may be sentenced without having had an opportunity to defend himself.

No prisoner may be obliged to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.

ARTICLE 62

The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by a qualified counsel of his choice, and, if necessary, to have recourse to the services of a competent interpreter. He shall be advised of his right by the detaining Power, in due time before the trial.

In default of a choice by the prisoner, the protecting Power may obtain a counsel for him. The detaining Power shall deliver to the protecting Power, on its request, a list of persons qualified to present the defense.

Representatives of the protecting Power shall be entitled to attend the trial of the case.

The only exception to this rule is the case where the trial of the case must be secret in the interest of the safety of the State. The detaining Power should so advise the protecting Power.

ARTICLE 63

Sentence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power.

ARTICLE 64

Every prisoner of war shall have the right of appeal against any sentence rendered with regard to him, in the same way as individuals to the protecting Power immediately.

ARTICLE 65

Sentences pronounced against prisoners of war shall be communicated to the protecting Power immediately.

ARTICLE 66

If the death penalty is pronounced against a prisoner of war, a communication setting forth in detail the nature and circumstances of the offense shall be sent as soon as possible to the representative of the protecting Power, for transmission to the Power in whose armies the prisoner served.

The sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of at least three months after this communication.

ARTICLE 67

No prisoner of war may be deprived of the benefit of the provisions of Article 42 of the present Convention as a result of a sentence or otherwise.

TITLE IV. TERMINATION OF CAPTIVITY

SECTION I.—DIRECT REPATRIATION AND HOSPITALIZATION IN A NEUTRAL COUNTRY

ARTICLE 68

Belligerents are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of rank or number, seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners of war, after having brought them to a condition where they can be transported.

Agreements between belligerents shall accordingly settle as soon as possible the cases of invalidity or of sickness, entailing direct repatriation, as well as the cases entailing possible hospitalization in a neutral country. While awaiting the conclusion

of these agreements, belligerents may have reference to the model agreement annexed, for documentary purposes, to the present Convention.

ARTICLE 69

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, belligerents shall come to an agreement to name mixed medical commissions. These commissions shall be composed of three members, two of them belonging to a neutral country and one appointed by the detaining Power; one of the physicians of the neutral country shall preside. These mixed medical commissions shall proceed to the examination of sick or wounded prisoners and shall make all due decisions regarding them.

Decisions of these commissions shall be by majority and carried out with the least possible delay.

ARTICLE 70

Besides those who are designated by the camp physician, the following prisoners of war shall be inspected by the mixed medical commission mentioned in Article 69, with a view to their direct repatriation or their hospitalization in a neutral country:

- a. Prisoners who make such a request directly of the camp physician;
- b. Prisoners who are presented by the agents provided for in Article 43, acting on their own initiative or at the request of the prisoners themselves;
- c. Prisoners who have been proposed by the Power in whose armies they have served or by an aid society duly recognized and authorized by that Power.

ARTICLE 71

Prisoners of war who are victims of accidents in connection with work, except those voluntarily injured, shall enjoy the benefit of the same provisions, as far as repatriation or possible hospitalization in a neutral country are concerned.

ARTICLE 72

Throughout the duration of hostilities and for humane considerations, belligerents may conclude agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity.

ARTICLE 73

The expenses of repatriation or of transportation to a neutral country of prisoners of war shall be borne, from the frontiers of the detaining Power, by the Power in whose armies the prisoners have served.

ARTICLE 74

No repatriated person may be utilized in active military service.

SECTION II.—RELEASE AND REPATRIATION UPON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

ARTICLE 75

When belligerents conclude a convention of armistice, they must, in principle, have appear therein stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war. If it has not been possible to insert stipulations in this regard in such convention, belligerents shall nevertheless come to an agreement in this regard as soon as possible. In any case, repatriation of prisoners shall be effected with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace.

Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution might be pending for a crime or an offense of municipal law may, however, be detained until the end of the proceedings and, if necessary, until the expiration of the punishment. The same shall be true of those sentenced for a crime or offense of municipal law.

On agreement between the belligerents, commissions may be established for the purpose of searching for dispersed prisoners and assuring their repatriation.

TITLE V. DEATH OF PRISONERS OF WAR

ARTICLE 76

Wills of prisoners of war shall be received and drawn up in the same way as for soldiers of the national army.

The same rules shall be observed regarding death certificates.

Belligerents shall see that prisoners of war dying in captivity are honorably buried and that the graves bear all due information, are respected and properly maintained.

TITLE VI. BUREAUS OF RELIEF AND INFORMATION CONCERNING PRISONERS OF WAR

ARTICLE 77

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each of the belligerent Powers, as well as the neutral Powers which have received belligerents, shall institute an official information bureau for prisoners of war who are within their territory.

Within the shortest possible period, each of the belligerent Powers shall inform its information bureau of every capture of prisoners effected by its armies, giving it all the information regarding identity which it has, allowing it quickly to advise the

families concerned, and informing it of the official addresses to which families may write to prisoners.

The information bureau shall immediately forward all this information to the interested Powers, through the intervention, on one hand, of the protecting Powers and, on the other, of the central agency provided for in Article 79.

The information bureau, being charged with replying to all inquiries about prisoners of war, shall receive from the various services concerned full information respecting internments and transfers, releases on parole, repatriations, escapes, stays in hospitals, deaths, as well as other information necessary to enable it to make out and keep up to date an individual return for each prisoner of war.

The bureau shall state in this return, in so far as is possible and subject to the provisions of Article 5: the regimental number, given names and surname, date and place of birth, rank and unit of the interested party, the given name of the father and the name of the mother, the address of the person to be advised in case of accident, wounds, date and place of capture, internment, wounding and death, as well as any other important information.

Weekly lists containing all new information likely to facilitate the identification of each prisoner shall be transmitted to the interested Powers.

At the conclusion of peace the individual return of the prisoner of war shall be delivered to the Power which he served.

The information bureau shall further be bound to receive all objects of personal use, valuables, letters, pay vouchers, identification marks, etc., which are left by prisoners of war who have been repatriated, released on parole, escaped or died, and to transmit them to the countries interested.

ARTICLE 78

Relief societies for prisoners of war, which are properly constituted in accordance with the laws of their country and with the object of serving as the channel for charitable effort, shall receive from the belligerents, for themselves and their duly accredited agents, every facility for the efficient performance of their humane task within the bounds imposed by military necessities. Agents of these societies may be admitted to the camps for the purpose of distributing relief, as also to the halting places of repatriated prisoners, if furnished with a personal permit by the military authorities, and on giving an undertaking in writing to comply with all measures of order and police which the latter may issue.

ARTICLE 79

A central information agency for prisoners of war shall be created in a neutral country. The International Committee of the Red Cross shall propose the organization of such an agency to the interested Powers, if it considers it necessary.

The function of that agency shall be to centralize all information respecting prisoners, which it may obtain through official or private channels; it shall transmit it as quickly as possible to the country of origin of the prisoners or to the Power which they have served.

These provisions must not be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activity of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

ARTICLE 80

Information bureaus shall enjoy the privilege of free postage on postal matter, as well as all exemptions provided in Article 38.

TITLE VII. APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION TO
CERTAIN CLASSES OF CIVILIANS

ARTICLE 81

Individuals who follow armed forces without directly belonging thereto, such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers, contractors, who fall into the enemy's hands and whom the latter thinks expedient to detain, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from the military authorities of the armed forces which they were accompanying.

TITLE VIII. EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION

SECTION I.—GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 82

The provisions of the present Convention must be respected by the High Contracting Parties under all circumstances.

In case, in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall nevertheless remain in force as between the belligerents who are parties thereto.

ARTICLE 83

The High Contracting Parties reserve the right to conclude special conventions on all questions relative to prisoners of war, on which it seems to them expedient to have particular regulations.

Prisoners of war shall receive the benefit of these agreements until the completion of repatriation, except in the case of express stipulations to the contrary contained in the above-mentioned agreements or in later agreements, or also except in the case of more favorable measures taken by one or the other of the belligerent Powers respecting the prisoners which they hold.

In order to assure the reciprocal application of the stipulations of the present Convention, and to facilitate the conclusion of the special conventions provided for above, belligerents may, upon the commencement of hostilities, authorize meetings of representatives of the respective authorities charged with the administration of prisoners of war.

ARTICLE 84

The text of the present Convention and of the special conventions provided for in the foregoing article, shall be posted, wherever possible in the native language of the prisoners of war, in places where it may be consulted by all the prisoners.

The text of these conventions shall be communicated to prisoners who find it impossible to get the information from the posted text, upon their request.

ARTICLE 85

The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal Council, the official translations of the present convention, as well as of the laws and regulations which they may come to adopt to assure the application of the present Convention.

SECTION II.—ORGANIZATION OF CONTROL

ARTICLE 86

The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular application of the present Convention will find a guaranty in the possibility of collaboration of the protecting Powers charged with safeguarding the interests of belligerents; in this respect, the protecting Powers may, besides their diplomatic personnel, appoint delegates from among their own nationals or from among the nationals of other neutral Powers. These delegates must be subject to the approval of the belligerent near which they exercise their mission.

Representatives of the protecting Power or its accepted delegates shall be permitted to go to any place, without exception, where prisoners of war are interned. They shall have access to all places occupied by prisoners and may interview them, as a general rule without witnesses, personally or through interpreters.

Belligerents shall so far as possible facilitate the task of representatives or accepted delegates of the protecting Power. The military authorities shall be informed of their visit.

Belligerents may come to an agreement to allow persons of the same nationality as the prisoners to be permitted to take part in inspection trips.

ARTICLE 87

In case of disagreement between the belligerents as to the application of provisions of the present Convention, the protecting Powers must, in so far as possible, lend their good offices for the purpose of settling the difference.

For this purpose, each of the protecting Powers may, in particular, suggest to the interested belligerents a meeting of representatives thereof, possibly upon a neutral territory suitably chosen. Belligerents shall be bound to accede to proposals in this sense which are made to them. The protecting Power may, if occasion arises, submit for the approval of the Powers concerned a person belonging to a neutral Power or a person delegated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, who shall be summoned to take part in this meeting.

ARTICLE 88

The foregoing provisions are not an obstacle to the humanitarian activity which the International Committee of the Red Cross may use for the protection of prisoners of war, with the consent of the interested belligerents.

SECTION III.—FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 89

In the relations between Powers bound by the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether it is a question of that of July 29, 1899, or that of October 18, 1907, and who participate in the present Convention, this latter shall complete Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to the said Hague Conventions.

ARTICLE 90

The present Convention, which will bear this day's date, may be signed up to February 1, 1930, on behalf of all the countries represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva July 1, 1929.

ARTICLE 91

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible. The ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.

A record of the deposit of each instrument of ratification shall be prepared, a duly certified copy of which shall be forwarded by the Swiss Federal Council to the Governments of all the countries on whose behalf the Convention has been signed or notification of adherence made.

ARTICLE 92

The present Convention shall become effective six months after the deposit of at least two instruments of ratification.

Subsequently, it shall become effective for each High Contracting Party six months after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 93

From the date on which it becomes effective, the present Convention shall be open for adherences given on behalf of any country in whose name this Convention was not signed.

ARTICLE 94

Adherence shall be given by written notification addressed to the Swiss Federal Council and shall take effect six months after the date of their receipt.

The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate adherences to the Governments of all the countries on whose behalf the Convention was signed or notification of adherence made.

ARTICLE 95

A state of war shall give immediate effect to ratifications deposited and to adherences notified by belligerent Powers prior to or after the outbreak of hostilities. The communication of ratifications or adherences received from Powers at war shall be made by the Swiss Federal Council by the most rapid method.

ARTICLE 96

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to denounce the present Convention. The denunciation shall not take effect until one year after notification has been made in writing to the Swiss Federal Council. The latter shall communicate such notification to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.

The denunciation shall have effect only with respect to the High Contracting Party which gave notification thereof.

Moreover, such denunciation shall not take effect during a war in which the denouncing Power is involved. In this case, the present Convention shall continue in effect, beyond the period of one year, until the conclusion of peace, and, in any event, until the processes of repatriation are completed.

ARTICLE 97

A duly certified copy of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations by the Swiss Federal Council. Likewise, ratifications, adherences, and denunciations of which the Swiss Federal Council shall be notified, shall be communicated by it to the League of Nations.

In faith whereof, the Plenipotentiaries named above have signed the present Convention.

Done at Geneva, the twenty-seventh of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, in a single copy, which shall remain in the archives of the Swiss Confederation and duly certified copies of which shall be forwarded to the Governments of all the countries invited to the Conference.

[Here follow signatures.]

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3739-PS

AFFIDAVIT TO ACCOMPANY MEMORANDUM
ON THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF AND
HIGH COMMAND.

We, Peter John Ambrose Calvocoressi, of Guise House, Aspley Guise, Bletchley, in the County of Buckingham, barrister-at-law, Acting Wing Commander in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, and Oliver Charles Berthoud, of 79 Streathbourne Road, London, S.W.17, schoolmaster, Major in the Intelligence Corps, jointly and severally make oath and say as follows:

1. In September 1945 we were detailed by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go to Nurnberg, Germany, to advise and assist the prosecutors of major Axis war criminals before the International Military Tribunal.

2. Acting in such capacity we were required to draw up a list of the persons comprised in the "General Staff and High Command Group" of the German Armed Forces, as defined in the Indictment presented to the said Tribunal. The document now produced and shown to us, marked A, is a copy of the list compiled by us in pursuance of this request.

3. In compiling this list we consulted the relevant Intelligence departments of the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry, and we used lists produced for us by those departments as the basis for our own final list. In cases which seemed to us to be doubtful and to require further elucidation or confirmation we caused inquiries to be made of senior German officers, now prisoners of war in England and Germany.

4. We do not claim that the said final list is wholly exhaustive or necessarily correct in every detail. In particular some of the dates there given are now known to us to be slightly inaccurate. It will be seen, moreover, that certain names were overlooked in the first place and appended as corrigenda. It may be that there are a few further omissions which we have not spotted. We are, however, confident that the said list is a substantially accurate and substantially complete list of the members of the said "General Staff and High Command Group".

5. Officers who qualified for inclusion in the said group by reason of no more than a few weeks' service in a post or command comprised in the said definition in the Indictment were omitted from the list.

[signed] Peter Calvocoressi,
Wing Commander.
[signed] Oliver Berthoud,
Major.

Sworn to at 9 Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, in the County of London before me on this 14th day of February 1946.

[signed] W. A. Rhodes,
Commissioner for Oaths.

THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND

Herewith are the names of all officers who held any of the positions designated in Appendix B of the Indictment. Officers who have since died are included with an "x" against their names. The total number of officers involved is 131 of whom 114 are believed to be living. By services the figures are:

| | | Total | Living |
|---------------------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Staff Officers | OKW | 4 | 4 |
| | OKH | 6 | 5 |
| | OKM | 5 | 5 |
| | OKL | 6 | 3 |
| Commanders in Chief | Army | 89 | 76 |
| | Navy | 15 | 15 |
| | Air Force | 11 | 10 |

Army Commanders in Chief include one or two officers drawn from the Air Force or SS. Hitler, C-in-C of the Army from December 1941 is excluded.

Ranks given are the highest achieved during the war.

High Command of the Armed Forces
Chief Field Marshal Keitel,
Wilhelm. 5.2.38-May 45

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------|
| Chief of the Operations Staff. | Col. General Jodl, Alfred. | Aug. 39-May 45 |
| Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff | Lt. Gen. v. Warlimont, Walter. | April 41-Sept. 44 |
| | Lt. General Winter. | Sept. 44-May 45 |
| High Command of the Army | | |
| C-in-C | Field Marshal v. Brauchitsch, Walter. | Feb. 38-Dec. 41 |
| Chief of the General Staff..... | x Col. General Beck. (?) | 34-Sept. 38 |
| | Col. General Halder, Franz. | Sept. 38-Sept. 42 |
| | Col. General Zeitzler, Kurt. | Sept. 42-July 44 |
| | Col. General Guderian, Heinz. | July 44-Feb. 45 |
| | General Krebs, Hans. | Feb. 45-May 45 |
| High Command of the Navy | | |
| C-in-C | Admiral of the Fleet Raeder, Erich. | May 35-31.1.43 |
| | Admiral of the Fleet Doenitz, Karl. | 1.2.43-May 45 |
| Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff | Admiral Schniewind, Otto. | (?) 38-12.6.41 |
| | Admiral Fricke, Kurt. | 12.6.41-Jan. 43 |
| | Admiral Meisel, Wilhelm. | Feb. 43-May 45 |
| High Command of the Air Force | | |
| C-in-C | Reichsmarschall Goering, Hermann. | March 35-April 45 |
| | x Field Marshal Ritter v. Greim, Robert. | April 45-May 45 |
| Chief of the General Staff..... | Col. General Stumpff. | June 35-Feb. 39 |
| | x Col. General Jeschonnek. | Feb. 39-Nov. 43 |
| | x Col. General Korten. | Nov. 43-20.7.44 |

General Kreipe,
Werner. Aug. 44-Oct. 44
General Koller,
Karl. Oct. 44-May 45

Commanders in Chief of Army Groups and Armies

| Name | Appointments | | Dates |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Army Group | Army Theatre | |
| Gen. Allmendinger, Karl. | | 17 East | May 44-Jul. 44 |
| Gen. Angelis, Maximilian. | | 2 Pz. Balkans | Oct. 44-Apr. 45 |
| Col. Gen. v. Arnim, Juergen. | | 5 Pz. Africa | Dec. 42-May 43 |
| Gen. Balck, Hermann. | | 4 Pz. East West | Jul. 44-Aug. 44 Oct. 44-Dec. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Blaskowitz, Johannes. | G | 2 Poland | Oct. 39 |
| | | 9 West | May 40-June 40 |
| | | 1 West | Oct. 40-May 44 |
| | | West | May 44-Sept. 44 |
| | | West | Dec. 44-Jan. 45 |
| Gen. Blumentritt, Guenther. | H | West | Jan. 45-Apr. 45 |
| | | 25 West | Jan. 45-Mar. 45 |
| x F. M. v. Bock, Fedor. | B South | Poland France | Sept. 39-Dec. 41 |
| | | East | Jan. 42-Jul. 42 |
| Gen. Boege, Ehrenfried. | 18 | East | Sept. 44-May 45 |
| Gen. Boehme. | 20 Mtn. | 2 Pz. Balkans | June 44-Jul. 44 |
| | | Norway | Jan. 45-May 45 |
| Gen. Brandenberger, Erich. | | 7 West | Aug. 44 |
| | | 19 West | Mar. 45-May 45 |
| x F. M. Busch, Ernst. | | 16 East | Oct. 39-Oct. 43 |
| Gen. Busse, Theodor. | | 9 East | Jan. 45-May 45 |
| Gen. v. der Chevallerie, Kurt. | | 1 Pz. East | Apr. 44-May 44 |

3739-PS

| | | | |
|--|----------|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| Gen. Christiansen, Friedrich (GAF). | 25 | West | Apr. 45-May 45 |
| x Col. Gen. Dietl, Edward. | 20 Mtn. | Finland | Jan. 42-June 44 |
| Oberstgruf. Dietrich, Josef. | 6 SS Pz. | West/East | Oct. 44-Apr. 45 |
| x Col. Gen. Dollmann, Friedrich. | 7 | West | Sept. 39-June 44 |
| Col. Gen. v. Falkenhorst, Nikolaus. | 21 | Norway | Apr. 41-May 45 |
| Gen. Foertsch, Hermann. | 1 | West | Mar. 45-May 45 |
| Gen. Fretter-Pico, Maximilian. | 6 | East | Jul. 44-Dec. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Friessner, Johannes. S.Ukraine (renamed South) | | East | Jul. 44-Dec. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Guderian, Heinz. | 2 Pz. | East | Oct. 41-Jan. 42 |
| Gen. Graser, Fritz. | 4 Pz. | East | Sept. 44-May 45 |
| x Col. Gen. Haase, Kurt. | 15 | West | Jan. 41-Jan. 43 |
| Gen. Hansen, Christian. | 16 | East | Oct. 43-Jul. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Harpe, Josef. | 9 | East | Nov. 43 |
| | 4 Pz. | East | May 44-June 44 |
| | | East | June 44-Jan. 45 |
| | | | |
| | 5 Pz. | West | Mar. 45-Apr. 45 |
| Gen. Hasse, Wilhelm. | 17 | East | Apr. 45-May 45 |
| Oberstgruf. Hausser, Paul. | 7 | West | Jul. 44-Aug. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Heinrici, Gotthard. | 4 | East | Jan. 42-Jul. 44 |
| | 1 Pz. | East | Aug. 44-Mar. 45 |
| | | East | Mar. 45-Apr. 45 |
| | | | |
| Gen. Hilpert, Karl. | 16 | East | Sept. 44-Jan. 45 Jan. 45-Apr. 45 |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| x RFSS Himmler, Heinrich. | Upper Rhine Vistula | | | Late 44 Early 45 |
| x Col. Gen. Hoepner, Erich. | | 4 Pz. | East | Oct. 41-Jan. 42 |
| Col. Gen. Hollidt, Karl. | | 6 | East | Mar. 43-Apr. 44 |
| Gen. Hossbach, Friedrich. | | 4 | East | Jul. 44-Jan. 45 |
| Col. Gen. Hoth, Hermann. | | 17 4 Pz. | East East | Oct. 41-Jan. 42 Feb. 42-Dec. 43 |
| x Col. Gen. Hube, Hans. | | 1 Pz. | East | Oct. 43-Feb. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Jaenecke, Erwin. | | 17 | East | Jun. 43-May 44 |
| F. M. Kesselring, Albert. | South (renamed C) | | Italy | June 43-Oct. 44 Jan. 45-Mar. 45 |
| Gen. Kleffel, Philipp. | | 25 | West | Mar. 45-Apr. 45 |
| F. M. v. Kleist, Ewald. | | 1 Pz. | Balkans & East East | Nov. 40-Nov. 42 Nov. 42-Mar. 44 |
| x F. M. v. Kluge, Guenther. | A | 4 | Poland, West & East | Sept. 39-Dec. 41 |
| Gen. v. Knobelsdorff, Otto. | | 1 | West | Sept. 44-Dec. 44 |
| Gen. Kreysing, Hans. | | 8 | East | Dec. 44-May 45 |
| Gen. Kuebler, Ludwig. | | 4 | East | 41-42 |
| F. M. v. Kuechler, Georg. | | 18 | West/East East | Nov. 39-Sept. 41 Jan. 42-Jan. 44 |
| F. M. Ritter v. Leeb, Wilhelm. | North North | | West East | Sept. 39- (?) Jul. 41-Jan. 42 |
| Gen. Lemelsen, Joachim. | | 1 14 10 14 | West Italy Italy Italy | May 44 June 44 Oct. 44 Feb. 45-May 45 |

3739-PS

| | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| Col. Gen. Lindemann, Georg. | 18 | East East | Jan. 42-Mar. 44 Mar. 44-Jul. 44 |
| | | North | |
| F. M. List, Wilhelm. | 12 | West East | Sept. 39-June 42 June 42-Dec. 42 |
| | | A | |
| Gen. Loch, Herbert. | 18 | East | Mar. 44-Sept. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Loehr, Alexander. | 12 | Balkans Balkans | Jul. 42-Dec. 42 Dec. 42-(?) 44 |
| | | E | |
| Gen. Lucht, Walter. | 11 | East | Mar. 45-May 45 |
| Col. Gen. v. Mackensen, Eberhard. | 1 Pz. 14 | East Italy | Nov. 42-Mar. 43 Nov. 43-June 44 |
| F. M. v. Lewinski, genannt v. Mannstein, Fritz. Don | 11 | East East East | Sept. 41-Nov. 42 Nov. 42-Jan. 43 Jan. 43-Mar. 44 |
| | | South | |
| Gen. v. Manteuffel, Hasso. | 5 Pz. 3 Pz. | West East | Sept. 44-Jan. 45 Mar. 45-May 45 |
| F. M. Model, Walter. | 9 | East East East East West | Jan. 42-Nov. 43 Jan. 44-May 44 May 44-June 44 June 44-Sept. 44 Sept. 44-Apr. 45 |
| | | North North Ukraine Centre B | |
| Gen. Mueller, Friedrich. | 4 | East | Jan. 45-May 45 |
| Gen. Nehring, Walter. | 1 Pz. | East | Mar. 45-Apr. 45 |
| Gen. v. Obstfelder, Hans. | 1 19 7 | West West West | Dec. 44 March 45 Mar. 45-May 45 |
| F. M. Paulus, Friedrich. | 6 | East | Feb. 42-Feb. 43 |
| Gen. Rasp, Siegfried. | 19 | West | Dec. 44-Mar. 45 |
| Col. Gen. Raus, Erhard. | 4 Pz. 1 3 Pz. | East West East | Dec. 43 May 44 Aug. 44-Mar. 45 |

| | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| x F. M. v. Reichenau, Walter. | 10 6 | Poland West/East | Sept. 39 May 40-Jan. 42 |
| Col. Gen. Reinhardt, Hans. | 3 Pz. | East East | Oct. 41-Aug. 44 Aug. 44-Jan. 45 |
| Centre | | | |
| Col. Gen. Rendulic, Dr. Lothar. | 2 Pz. 20 Mtn. | Balkans Finland | Aug. 43-June 44 June 44-Jan. 45 |
| Kurland | | East | Jan. 45 |
| North | | East | Jan. 45-Mar. 45 |
| Kurland | | East | Mar. 45-Apr. 45 |
| South | | East | Apr. 45-May 45 |
| x F. M. Rommel, Erwin. | Pz. Army B | Africa West | Dec. 41-May 43 Nov. 43-July 44 |
| F. M. v. Rundstedt, Gerd. | South A South D | Poland West East West | Sept. 39- Apr. 40-June 41 June 41-Dec. 41 Mar. 42-Jul. 44 Sept. 44-May 45 |
| Col. Gen. Ruoff, Richard. | 4 Pz. 17 | East East | Jan. 42 May 42-June 43 |
| Col. Gen. v. Salmuth, Hans. | 2 15 | East West | July 42-Feb. 43 Aug. 43-Aug. 44 |
| Col. Gen. Strauss, Adolf. | 9 | West/East | May 40-Jan. 42 |
| Gen. v. Saucken, Dietrich. | 2 | East | Mar. 45-May 45 |
| Col. Gen. Schmidt, Rudolf. | 2 Pz. | East | Jan. 42-July 43 |
| Gen. Schlemm, Alfred. | 1 Para. | West | Nov. 44-May 45 |
| x Col. Gen. Ritter v. Scho- bert, Eugen. | 11 | East | June 41-Sept. 41 |
| F. M. Schoerner, Ferdinand. | A S. Ukraine Kurland Centre | East East East East | Mar. 44-May 44 May 44-Jul. 44 Jul. 44-Jan. 45 Jan. 45-May 45 |

3739-PS

| | | | |
|---|---------|---------|-----------------|
| Gen. Schulz, Friedrich. | 17 | East | Jul. 44-Apr. 45 |
| Gen. v. Sodenstern, Georg. | 19 | West | Aug. 43-June 44 |
| Ogruf. Steiner, Felix. | 11 | East | (?) 45 |
| Col. Gen. Student, Kurt. | 1 Para. | West | Feb. 44-Nov. 44 |
| | H | West | Dec. 44-Jan. 45 |
| x Gen. v. Stuelpnagel, Heinrich. | 17 | East | Feb. 41-Oct. 41 |
| Gen. v. Tippelskirch, Kurt. | 1 | West | Oct. 44-May 45 |
| Gen. v. Vietinghoff, genannt Scheel, Heinrich. | 15 | West | Feb. 42-Aug. 43 |
| | 10 | Italy | Aug. 43-Oct. 44 |
| | C | Italy | Oct. 44-Jan. 45 |
| | Kurland | East | Jan. 45-Mar. 45 |
| | C | Italy | Mar. 45-May 45 |
| F. M. Frhr. v. Weichs, Maximilian. | 2 | Poland | Oct. 39-July 42 |
| | | France | |
| | | Balkans | |
| | | East | |
| | B | East | Jul. 42-Jul. 43 |
| | F | Balkans | Aug. 43-May 45 |
| Col. Gen. Weiss, Walter. | 2 | East | Feb. 43-Mar. 45 |
| | North | East | Mar. 45-Apr. 45 |
| Gen. Wenck, Walter. | 12 | East | Apr. 45-May 45 |
| Gen. Wiese, Friedrich. | 19 | West | June 44-Dec. 44 |
| x F. M. v. Witzleben, Erwin. | 1 | West | Apr. 40-Oct. 40 |
| Gen. Woehler, Otto. | 8 | East | Nov. 43-Dec. 44 |
| Gen. v Zangen, Gustav. | 15 | West | Aug. 44-May 45 |

Commanders in Chief in the Navy

| | | |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Admiral of the Fleet Boehm, Herman. | Naval Chief Com- mand Norway | Feb. 43-Mar. 43 |
| Admiral of the Fleet Carls, Rolf. | Naval Group Com- mand North | July 40-Feb. 43 |

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| Admiral Ciliax, Otto | Naval Chief Com- mand Norway | Mar. 43-May 45 |
| Admiral Densch, Hermann | C-in-C N. Sea Station | Feb. 43- |
| Admiral Foerste, Erich | C-in-C N. Sea Sta- tion | Mar. 43-May 45 |
| Admiral Fricke, Kurt | Naval Group Com- mand South | Mar. 43-Dec. 44 |
| Admiral Guse, Guenther | C-in-C Baltic Sta- tion | Feb. 43-Mar. 43 |
| Admiral Krancke, Theodor | Naval Group Com- mand West | Apr. 43-Oct. 44 |
| | Naval Chief Com- mand West | Oct. 44-May 45 |
| Admiral of the Fleet Kum- metz, Oskar. | C-in-C Baltic Sta- tion | Mar. 44-Dec. 44 |
| Vice-Admiral Loewisch, Werner. | Naval Chief Com- mand South | Jan. 45-May 45 |
| Admiral of the Fleet Mar- schall, Wilhelm. | Naval Group Com- mand West | Sept. 42-Apr. 43 |
| Admiral of the Fleet Saal- wachter, Alfred. | Naval Group Com- mand West | Aug. 39-Sept. 42 |
| Admiral Schmundt, Hubert | C-in-C Baltic Sta- tion | Mar. 43-Mar. 44 |
| Admiral Schniewind, Otto | Naval Group Com- mand North/Fleet | Feb. 43-Apr. 44 |
| Admiral Schuster, Karl Georg | Naval Group Com- mand South | Jul. 41-Mar. 43 |

Commanders in Chief in the Air Force

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Col. Gen. Dessloch, Otto | Luftflotte 4 | Mar. 43-Sept. 44 |
| | Luftflotte 3 | Sept. 44-Oct. 44 |
| | Luftflotte 4 | Oct. 44-May 45 |
| F. M. Ritter v. Greim, Robert | Luftflotte 6 | Mar. 43-May 45 |
| Col. Gen. Keller, Alfred | Luftflotte 1 | Apr. 40-(?) 43 |
| F. M. Kesselring, Albert | Luftflotte 1 | Sept. 39-Apr. 40 |
| | Luftflotte 2 | Apr. 40-Mar. 43 |
| Col. Gen. Loehr, Alexander | Luftflotte 4 | Sept. 39-Jul. 42 |
| Gen. Pflugbeil, Kurt | Luftflotte 1 | (?) 43-May 45 |
| F. M. v. Richthoffen | Luftflotte 4 | Jul. 43-Mar. 43 |
| | Luftflotte 2 | Mar. 43-Aug. 44 |
| Gen. Seidel | Luftflotte 10 | Oct. 44-May 45 |
| F. M. Sperrle, Hugo | Luftflotte 3 | Sept. 39-Aug. 44 |

Col. Gen. Stumpff, Hans Juergen...Luftflotte 5 Apr. 40-Feb. 44
 Luftflotte Reich Feb. 44-May 45

Note

In 1933 von Blomberg as Reich Defense Minister [Reichswehrminister] had under him a Chief of Army Staff and a Chief of Naval Staff [Chef Heeresleitung, Chef Marineleitung] — von Fritsch and Raeder respectively.

In May 1935 von Blomberg became Reich Minister for War and C-in-C Armed Forces [Reichskriegsminister und Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht]. The army and navy staffs became high commands [Oberkommando des Heeres—OKH, and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine—OKM], their chiefs being upgraded to commanders-in-chief [Oberbefehlshaber]. Von Fritsch and Raeder remained in their positions.

The Air Ministry [Reichsministerium der Luftfahrt] was a separate institution. Goering was at once Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Air Force [Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe—R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L]. It was not until 1944 that the air set-up was nominally brought into line with the other services and renamed High Command of the Air Force [Oberkommando der Luftwaffe—OKL].

In both the Reichswehrministerium and Reichskriegsministerium there was an interservice department called the Wehrmachtamt. From this developed in February 1938 the High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht—OKW], which superseded the War Ministry. Keitel became Chief of the OKW [Chef OKW] and von Blomberg retired. The OKW contained an Operations Department [Wehrmachtfuehrungsamt] —later Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab] whose Chief [Chef OKW WFSt] was Jodl. Warlimont got the title of Deputy Chief in 1941.

Von Brauchitsch replaced von Fritsch in Feb. 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and was in turn replaced by Hitler in Dec. 1941. Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in Jan. 1943. For the last month of the war von Greim was Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in the place of Goering.

The commonest terms with their normal German abbreviations and English equivalents are:

| | |
|---|---------------------------|
| Chef | Chief |
| Fuehrungstab (Fuest) | Operations Staff |
| Generalstab (Genstab) | General Staff |
| Heeresleitung | Army Staff |
| Marineleitung | Naval Staff |
| Marineoberkommando (MOK) | Naval Chief Command |
| Militaerbefehlshaber | Military Commander |
| Oberbefehlshaber (OB) | Commander-in-Chief |
| Oberkommando | High Command |
| Oberster Befehlshaber | Supreme Commander |
| Seekriegsleitung (SKL) | Naval War Staff |
| Stellvertretender Chef (Stv.Chef) | Deputy Chief |
| Wehrmacht | Armed Forces |
| Wehrmachtbefehlshaber (WB) | Armed Forces Commander |

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3740-PS

AFFIDAVIT BY FRANZ HALDER

Nurnberg, 6 March 1946.

I, Franz Halder, being first duly sworn, declare:
My last position in the German armed forces was Chief of Staff of the German Army.

On the occasion of a common meal on the birthday of the Fuehrer in 1942 the people around the Fuehrer turned the conversation to the Reichstag building and its artistic value. I heard with my own ears when Goering shouted into the conversation: "The only one that really knows the Reichstag, is I; because I put the fire to it." With that he took his flat hand and hit his thighs. As far as I can remember today Keitel was sitting to the left of Goering.

This luncheon took place in the so-called Kasino (officer's mess) of the Headquarters of the Fuehrer (East Prussia).

[signed] Franz Halder
Franz Halder

Subscribed and sworn to before me today, this 6th day of March, 1946, Nurnberg, Germany.

[signed] Richard W. Sonnenfeldt
Richard W. Sonnenfeldt
Investigating Officer

27th May 1935

DIARY OF THE GERMAN MINISTER OF JUSTICE, 1935

[Page 174]

1. Prosecuting Authorities in Waldeshut, Baden (15.5.)

Criminal proceedings against the Catholic vicar Paul Wasmer. Is submitted with the request that it be discussed, whether a penal sentence should be proposed by Rosenberg because of libel.

In a sermon the accused cited the last verse of a song which is being sung by young people and against which Bishop Bares has taken exception in his official paper dated 10/2/35. The text is as follows:

“Pope and rabbi shall yield,
We want to be pagans again
No longer creep into the churches.
The orb of the sun alone is leading us.
Out with the Jews, and with the pope from the
German home.”

In addition the accused quoted from page 8 of “Blut und Ehre”, the little book of songs published by Baldur von Schirach, a verse with the following text:

“We want to complain to the Lord in heaven, Kyrieleis!
That we want to kill the priest, Kyrieleis!
Out with your spear, forward,
Set the red cock on the cloister roof!”
(Set the cloister roof on fire)

Furthermore the accused quoted a saying of Baldur v. Schirach's: “The path of German youth is Rosenberg.”

* * * * *

[Page 192]

4. The Archbishop of Paderborn reported on 6th June regarding incidents on 12th May with the request that steps be taken to see that similar things did not occur again in the future.

On the 12th May the Archbishop of Paderborn was to hold a confirmation. On the 10th May a Hitler Youth Fuehrer conference took place, at which a secret order was issued, according to which the Hitler Youth were to attend at specified places in Hamm in uniform clothing (not Service dress). On Sunday, the 12th May, the Hitler Youth appeared in uniform clothing at the big parade ground. There the song about the foreign exchange racketeer [Devisenschieberlied] was practiced:

"When we were foreign exchange racketeers, there were the three of us, a Father and two monks, they were foreign exchange racketeers, there was a nun with them

"And when they continued racketeering, then there were only two, one was in jail, they nabbed him, then the fun was over.

"Then she whispered softly, now it is your turn my friend, now you come with your close-cropped hair, looking like an A . . . with ears, to answer the heavenly roll-call."

Bannfuehrer Grothet then made a speech.

Scattered over the railway station and the square in front according to plan.

On the appearance of the Archbishop a civilian gave three cheers for the beloved Lord Bishop.

When the Archbishop wanted to get into his car, the Hitler Youth try to prevent him, calls of "down with the foreign exchange racketeer" and so on. Hitler Youths rush after the car and try to overturn it. A few youths jump on to the running board of the car and when they are prevented from so doing, push their way forward brandishing their daggers of honour. A Hitler Youth tries to spit into the car. Passers-by who urge them to stop, are abused and beaten. A woman civilian has to be carried away from the square. When the Archbishop arrives at the church the Hitler Youth roar "Throw the black fellow down the stairs". During the sermon, the Hitler Youth continue the uproar, often banging against the church door so that the service is greatly disturbed. Finally the emergency squad restored order. On that day alone there were 7 Hitler Youth leaders from outside present in Hamm. They were in civilian clothes.

* * * * *

[Page 215]

The General Public Prosecutor in Stuttgart submits a report by the prosecuting authorities in Stuttgart concerning the case in Schorndorf against Paul Roos and accomplices charged with intimidation. The victim had refused to have "Der Stuermer" displayed in a display case at his house, and at the same time described the "Stuermer" as a vulgar newspaper which the Fuehrer had already repeatedly banned. Thereupon a demonstration was staged against him in which the defendant, Sturm-fuehrer Roos, as well as SA-reserves in civilian clothing and Hitler Youth with a band of musicians in uniform, took part. The

injured party was forced to march through the city behind the band, and recitation in unison of anti-Jewish sentiments were staged. The incident is said to have created quite a stir in Schorn-dorf.

* * * * *

[Page 228]

9. The Prosecuting Authority, Bamberg reports regarding criminal proceedings against Chaplain Heinrich Mueller and the town clergyman Franz Ruemmer concerning an offense against the Law of 20.12.34. The accused have stated, in a circle of Catholic clergy, that the following song was sung by the Hitler Youth at the Party Rally 1934:

“We are the happy Hitler Youth
 We need no Christian virtues,
 For our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler
 Is always our mediator.
 “No parson, no evil man can prevent us
 From feeling ourselves to be Hitler children,
 We do not follow Christ but Horst Wessel,
 Away with incense and holy water vessels.
 “We follow our flags singing
 As worthy sons of our ancestors,
 I am no Christian, no Catholic,
 I go with the SA through thick and thin.
 “I can do without the Church,
 The Swastika is redemption on earth,
 I will dog its steps,
 Baldur von Schirach, take me with you!”

The prosecuting authority would like to bring [crossed out in ink at least] the one accused to trial, but considers it possible that the Court may consider the statement by the Pol. Dir. Nurn-berg, that the song was unknown to all Hitler Jugend Units in Upper and Central Franconia as insufficient evidence and would therefore result in an acquittal.

The General Prosecuting Authority notes that there is no doubt that the song in question was sung or circulated in the Hitler Youth circles, but he thinks that the statement that the song was sung at the Party Rally, i.e. to a certain extent under the eyes and with the consent of the highest Party officials, can be disproved.

* * * * *

[Page 241]

Chief Public Prosecutor (OSTA) Magdeburg reports in a report to the Central Public Prosecutor's Office (subsequently forwarded

to me) concerning a demonstration in front of the house of a member of the "Stahlhelm" by the name of Sonntag in Warsleben, District (Kr.) Neuhaldenslebe on Saturday, 6 July, about 2100. The cause for this statement which Sonntag is said to have made a few days earlier at a Landwehr Social Gathering, to wit: "I was and still am faithful to the Kaiser. Not Hitler but quite other forces rule in Germany. . . ." Sonntag denies having made this statement. He claims to have declared that he had been true to the Kaiser and that he had then wanted to continue that his allegiance now belonged to the Fuehrer. Thereupon, on 6 July, the accused Schuett, is the leader of the party organization squads [Bereitschaftsleiter der PO] in 16 communities, at a squad evening of the party organization in Warsleben, together with the accused, District Training Leader [Kreisausbildungsleiter] Stueber, induced the 58 local officers [Amtswalter] to take part in the demonstration. In addition 17 members of the Hitler Youth organization who were working in the vicinity as farm helpers were drawn in. Schuett declared to those present that it was the task of party members to take part in remedying the existing abuses, and promised the farm helpers in particular that those who took part in the demonstration would not make themselves liable to any punishment, and in the case of official intervention the party organization [PO] would use its influence to quash the proceedings. Then they assembled in front of the house in which Sonntag lives, searched it resulting in the usual damage, threatened Sonntag's wife, who was then taken into protective custody by the police sergeant who came upon the scene. Schuett was arrested. The public prosecutor (StA) calls attention to the fact that, according to statements of the Kreisleiter, the population of Neuhaldensleben is in an alarming state of excitement because the Party and the Fuehrer were constantly being referred to contemptuously, particularly by members of the Stahlhelm.

The matter has been referred to State Secretary Schlegelberger.

* * * * *

[Page 392]

General Public Prosecutor [GenStA] Marienwerder (1.10.) Attack upon a member of the German Girls' League [BDM-Maedel] named Dux. On 22 August a report appeared in the Voelkischer Beobachter according to which a member of the German Girls' League [BDM-Maedel] named Dux in Schneidemuehl was openly assaulted in the street by members of a Catholic

youth group and struck down with a bicycle pump. The girl is said to have been seriously injured and to have required medical attention. The same incident led to a large protest demonstration by the Hitler Youth [HJ] in Schneidemuehl and to a propaganda march by Hitler Youth in the same place.

[Marginal note to foregoing paragraph: "V. (letter to Goebels concerning recent lying reports in the press)"]

At this point the Chief Public Prosecutor [OStA] in Schneidemuehl made a report concerning results of the inquiry. According to this it was so dark where the incident took place that the recognition of insignia of any organization was impossible. The physician who was stated by Dux to have treated her denied this. The Dux girl finally admitted that she had not been under medical care. Inspection by the police doctor revealed that no head wound existed under the dressing covering the Dux girl's forehead (minute reddened area).

3. Chief Public Prosecutor [OStA] Elbing (27. Sept.)
Legal proceedings due to an assault upon Hitler Youth Scharfuehrer Schubring.

A report appeared in the Voelkischer Beobachter of 16 August, under the heading "Hitler Youth member struck down by members of Catholic youth groups," according to which Sch. was assaulted and struck down in the most brutal manner. The Chief Public Prosecutor's report [OStA] indicates that the statements of Sch. are to be seriously doubted. Sch. did not see or hear anything of the assaulter. According to medical testimony the blow did not create an outwardly visible wound or induce any change at all other than a slight redness round the eyes, so that it is inexplicable how Sch. could have become unconscious, considering that he can box.

* * * * *

[Page 341]

Chief Public Prosecutor [OStA] in Duisburg (26 August 1935) compare 2825. On 9 July the attempt was made to set free the SA-man and another intruder, who had been arrested.

On the same evening—9 July—a further clash took place, during which a police official who intervened was wildly insulted and shoved around by the crowd. He drew his side-arm and injured a Hitler Youth member. There was no improper conduct on the part of the police official.

On the same evening several window panes were broken in prelate Cupper's house, by stones being thrown.

An SA-man who had attended the meeting at which Muckermann spoke was attacked on his way home.

On the evening of 10 July encounters with the police took place by reason of the posters which were put up and again removed. 5 police officials were slightly injured.

About 2100 the Catholic Institute was stormed and its fixtures and furniture destroyed. Police who hurried to the scene were received with ugly oaths. "You bloodhounds, for shame, get out of here or we will trample you to death."

When the Institute was stormed for a second time the police officials were actually attacked, two of them injured, one by a knife stab in the face.

About 2300 the Catholic workers' home was visited by large numbers of people then suddenly deserted as pre-arranged, without payment being made for the beer, the flags of the Catholic Workers' Association were taken away, also three sashes, carrying belts, a flag streamer and 10 ashtrays; a chocolate-machine and a bust of St. Joseph were destroyed.

On 10 July another attack on the Catholic Youth Hostel.

The participants for the most part belong to the Hitler Youth. The evening at home which had been planned was not carried out, as the Hitler Youth participants are said to have gone out of curiosity to the scenes of activity. From the fact that the places where the deeds took place were suddenly filled with a crowd of over 2000 persons, the impression is created that numerous members of the Hitler Youth were instructed to assemble at a given time by some office with authority over the youths who appeared. A 15-year-old Hitler Youth member who appeared in uniform was sent back to put on civilian clothing.

The ringleaders [Raedelsfuehrer] Schoer, Bettelhaeuser, Schulte, Schmidt, Hommrich, Schofs, are to be accused of disturbance of the peace, also Sonneborn, Mehl, Herwig and Suhr. Other cases suspended.

At first considerable disturbance among the citizens of Duisburg, now considerably more peaceful atmosphere.

[Pages 409-414]

The Reichminister of Justice
Z.F.g.10 1717.34

Berlin, 14 May 1935

Personal

To: The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, Berlin

Subject: Ill-treatment of Communist Internees by Police Officials

Enclosure: One loose document

My dear Reichminister,

Enclosed you will find copy of a report of the Inspector of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.

This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental attitude toward the question of the beating of internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have come to the knowledge of the administration of justice can be divided into three different causes for such ill-treatment of prisoners:

1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment [Hausstrafe] in concentration camps.
2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to make them talk.
3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer fun, or for sadistic motives.

I should like to make the following detailed comments on those three categories:

About No. 1. In the remand prisons and penal establishments under the Ministry of Justice, there was no need to introduce corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure. The experience of the administration of justice has taught that a well-trained, reliable and conscientious personnel of wardens is in a position to set up and to maintain model order under a strict discipline, even without corporal punishment. The more training and discipline the prison guards have, the less need exists to introduce corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure.

But if, contrary to this view, one is to suppose that there might be a need to introduce corporal punishment in concentration camps, it appears indispensable that this disciplinary measure and the manner of its application should be determined, uniformly and unambiguously, for the whole territory of the Reich. It has happened recently that camp orders of individual concentration camps concerning this matter and the use of weapons, contained unusually severe instructions which were brought to the knowledge of the internees as a stern warning, while the warden personnel was administratively informed that these regulations, which dated mostly from 1933, were no longer applicable.

Such a situation is equally dangerous for the warden personnel and for the internees. It would therefore appear, after the question of imposing protective custody was generally settled by the competent minister, that in the interests of all concerned, one should urgently and clearly define responsibility and legal aspect, furthermore that the same responsible authority would have to settle, by means of camp regulations generally applicable, the question of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure, which is still unclarified, as well as the question of the use of arms by the warden personnel.

About No. 2. I cannot concur with the opinions expressed in the enclosed letter. The present penal law, which I have to enforce, renders liable to particularly severe penalties those officials guilty of inflicting ill-treatment in the performance of their duties, especially when such ill-treatment is used to extort admissions or statements. That these legal provisions also reflect the will of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor is shown by the fact that, during the suppression of the Roehm revolt, the Fuehrer ordered the shooting of three members of the SS who had ill-treated prisoners in Stettin. That being the legal situation, it is out of order to grant silently one part of the police forces permission to extort statements by means of ill-treating prisoners. Such a measure would destroy the respect for the existing laws and would thereby lead necessarily to the confusion and demoralization of the officials concerned.

Furthermore, such statements extorted by force are practically without value if they are supposed to serve as evidence in trials for high treason. The courts which have jurisdiction in cases of high treason consider to an ever-increasing degree statements of the defendants made before the police as worthless and without any evidenciary value for court decisions. This was the result of their getting convinced in the course of numerous proceedings that confessions and statements made before the police were extorted by ill-treatment.

Moreover, I cannot follow the statements contained in the attached report inasmuch as the beating of Communists held in custody is regarded as an indispensable police measure for a more effective suppression of Communist activities. These explanations of the Gestapo office show precisely that the methods used up to now have not been successful in combatting the illegal Communist machine or to hinder its development.

Experience shows that such police measures may perhaps partially be successful but that they never can attain a total suppression and destruction of an illegal revolutionary organization

which alone is of importance in the long run. Behind such revolutionary organizations there are professional revolutionaries of great experience and frequently exceptional intelligence. These succeed very soon, by means of cleverly camouflaging all more important functionaries, in excluding for all practical purposes the possibility of betrayal as a result of mistreatment.

About No. 3. The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally lose pretty soon the feeling for the purpose and meaning of their actions and permit themselves to be governed by personal feelings of revenge or by sadistic tendencies. As an example, members of the guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow near Stettin completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that the woman two months later still showed two open and infected wounds on the right side of her buttocks, one 17.7 by 21.5 centimeters and the other 12.5 by 16.5 centimeters, as well as a similar wound on the left side of the buttocks 7.5 by 17 centimeters. In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, etc. In some cases the prisoners were given first salt herring to eat, so as to produce an especially strong and torturing thirst. In the Hohenstein concentration camp in Saxony, prisoners had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this purpose until the drops of water which fell down in even intervals caused seriously infected wounds in their scalps. In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed for days—once without interruption for three days and nights, once five days and nights—to a grating in the form of a cross, being fed so meagerly with dried bread that they almost died of hunger.

These few examples show such a degree of cruelty which is an insult to every German sensibility, that it is impossible to consider any extenuating circumstances.

In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these three points to you, my dear Herr Reichsminister, in your capacity as cabinet member in charge of the establishment of protective custody and the camps for protective custody.

1. It seems now absolutely necessary that the competent minister should decree unified camp regulations for all camps for protective custody, which shall regulate completely and unmistakably the question of corporal punishment as disciplinary measure, and the question of use of weapons by the guards.

2. It appears necessary that the competent cabinet minister order, valid for all police authorities, an absolute prohibition against mistreatment of prisoners for the purpose of forcing statements.

3. All mistreatments which are entirely or partly due to personal reasons must be prosecuted vigorously and punished under close cooperation of all governmental offices concerned.

Heil Hitler!

(signed) Dr. Guertner

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3762-PS

I, Kurt Becher, formerly a colonel in the SS, born 12 September 1909, at Hamburg, declare the following under oath:

Between the middle of September and October 1944 I caused the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler to issue the following order, which I received in two originals, one each for SS Generals [Obergruppenfuehrer] Kaltenbrunner and Pohl, and a carbon copy for myself:

“Effective immediately I forbid any liquidation of Jews and order that, on the contrary, hospital care [pflege] should be given to weak and sick persons. I hold you (and here Kaltenbrunner and Pohl were meant) personally responsible even if this order should not be strictly adhered to by lower echelons.”

I personally took Pohl's copy to him at his office in Berlin and left the copy for Kaltenbrunner at his office in Berlin.

In my opinion Kaltenbrunner and Pohl bear the full responsibility after this date for any further killings of Jewish prisoners.

When visiting the Concentration Camp Mauthausen on 27 April 1945 at 9:00 a.m. I was told under the seal of strictest secrecy by the Commandant in the Camp, SS Colonel Ziereis, that “Kaltenbrunner gave me the order that at least a thousand persons have still to die at Mauthausen each day.”

The facts mentioned above are true. This declaration is made by me voluntarily and without coercion. I read through them, signed them, and confirmed the statement with my oath.

Oberursel, the 8th of March 1946.

[signed] Kurt Becher

Kurt Becher, SS Colonel in Reserve

Subscribed to and sworn before us at Oberursel, Germany this 8th day of March 1946.

[signed] Richard A. Gutman

Richard A. Gutman, 1st Lt. AUS

[signed] Kurt L. Ponger

T/e Kurt L. Ponger 32968282

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3766-PS

[Report prepared by the German army in France, 1942; concerning removal of French art objects through the German Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France.]

[Pages 28-48]

"In the Jeu de Paume seven exhibits in all were arranged in order to give Reich Marshal Goering and Reichsleiter Rosenberg a general survey of the especially valuable objects."

On the occasion of one of these visits (report on the situation by the deputy of the Reich Marshal, Dr. Bunjes of 20 November 1940, "protection of art treasures" files) Goering issued an order on the future fate of the art treasures. As far as the author of this report recalls he (Goering) dictated this report to Dr. Bunjes to the typewriter. It is dated 5 November 1940 and reads as follows:

"In continuance of the measures adopted heretofore for the safekeeping of Jewish art property by the Chief of the Paris Military Administration and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg (Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command 2 f 28. 14 W.Z. No. 3812/40 g) the art objects brought to the Louvre will be dealt with in the following manner:

1. those art objects concerning the further disposition of which the Fuehrer will reserve for himself the right of decision;
2. those art objects which will be used to complete the collections of the Reich Marshal;
3. those objects of art and library contents, the use of which seems appropriate in the building of the High School [Hohe Schule] and in the sphere of activity of Reichsleiter Rosenberg;
4. those objects of art which are suitable for transfer to German Museums, will without delay be subjected to an orderly inventory by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg packed, and brought to Germany with the assistance of the Luftwaffe;
5. those objects of art which are suitable to be passed on to French museums and the German and French art market will be sold at auction at a time to be determined, and the proceeds will be turned over to the French state for the benefit of dependents of French soldiers killed in the war.
6. The further seizing of Jewish art property in France continues, in the manner which has proved satisfactory up to now, by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in coordination with the Chief of the Military Administration Paris.

Paris, 5 November 1940.”

To the order the following handwritten supplement was added:
 “I shall submit this proposition to the Fuehrer. Until his decision this regulation is valid. signed: Goering”

The supreme decision was made in favor of Goering's proposal, as was to be expected. In his report on the situation [Lagebericht] of 20 November 1940 (files protection of art) Dr. Bunjes, deputy of the Reich Marshal, reported:

“This regulation was submitted to the Fuehrer by Reich Marshal Goering on 14 November 1940. The Fuehrer approved these suggestions and commissioned Reich Marshal Goering to have the objects mentioned under points 1-4 brought to the cellars of the Reich Chancellery in a special train as soon as possible.”

A report by the Chief of the Military Administrative District Paris (Dr. Medicus) of 9 February 1941 (files protection of art) shows that the transport to Germany was now beginning:

“Re: Secured Jewish art property in the Jeu de Paume.

On 5 February 1941 Reich Marshal Goering gave orders that a number of art objects which the Fuehrer wishes to acquire and those objects of art which are to become the property of the Reich Marshal are to be brought to Germany immediately in the special train of the Reich Marshal.

Payment for those works of art removed will be made according to the estimates of a French expert.¹

¹ No payments were made for Jewish property—it was regarded as “ownerless”—whether payment was made for other property is an open question.

* * * * *

The fate of these and in part of other Rothschild assets¹ can be seen from the following report of the head of the foreign currency protection command [Devisenschutzkommando] of 8 December 1941 (Files Justice, Vju 864 b. 2282.41 secret):

Strictly confidential!

The Reich Marshal of the greater German Reich on 3 December 1941, on the occasion of his presence in Paris, made decisions on the assets of the Rothschild family. These decisions the Reich Marshal has entered in my files.

¹ There is a further list, no less extensive, on table silver, knives, forks and spoons, dishes. It is in the archives of the economic division of the military administration.

1. 52 packages with objects of art and jewelry from the property of the various members of the Rothschild family.

a. 21 packages are to be turned over to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.

b. 31 packages are to remain until sent for by the Reich Marshal under lock and key of the foreign currency protection command. The Reich Marshal will send for the packages after having conferred with the Reich Minister of Finance about the evaluation of the pieces.

2. 22 large boxes and three baskets with table silver and knives, forks and spoons from the property of the various members of the Rothschild family:

as 1.b).

3. Pictures and objects of art which were found in a cupboard in the house of the Jewess Alexandrine Rothschild, Paris, 2 rue Leonardo da Vinci: These paintings and objects of art are to be turned over to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. The delivery took place on 5 December 1941.

4. Jewelry found by the office of the general of the Luftwaffe Paris in the house of Bernhard Rothschild and turned over to the foreign currency protection command France. The foreign currency protection command France has to report to the Reich Minister of Finance, so that he may be able to decide on the disposal of this jewelry. This jewelry, or rather its counter-value shall, in the opinion of the Reich Marshal, be put at the disposal of the German Reichskasse."

Mr. von Behr in this connection showed me a part of the files concerning the securing of the art values of the House of Rothschild with the personal notation of Reich Marshal Goering that the securing is to take place without delay.

Mr. von Behr gave me the opportunity to view the exhibition of art values from Jewish possession in the pavillion "Jeu de Paume" which was prepared for the visit of Reich Marshal Goering.

b. Toward evening of the 14th of this month, two trucks appeared with French workers who declared that they were to fetch sixteen boxes of Jewish art values.

c. About half past seven, a Dr. Schilde appeared, who without delay caused the loading of the sixteen boxes and immediately departed for Paris.

d. The curator pointed out at that time that in his opinion it was doubtful whether all the boxes contained Jewish art values; they were art goods of a Jewish art dealer's and according to ex-

perience it is possible that they might be purely Aryan art possessions which were offered for sale at the art dealer's in question.

e. I told the curator that the confiscation had been carried out without the consent of my general.

When the cellars were inspected on the following day Mrs. Gould's statements were found to be true. No trace of weapons! A valuable tryptich and two precious single pieces were, however, found; everything very old, carved in ivory. An agent of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg had already taken possession of these three pieces.

Mrs. Gould declared on the spot that she wanted to contribute the entire stock of wine for the soldiers on the eastern front; all the copper and brass, which filled an enormous cellar room, was to go to German war industry. As far as the three objects of art were concerned, which had apparently been stored in the cellar without her knowledge by an overzealous employee at the beginning of the occupation, she reserved decision.

A few days later conference with Mr. von Behr, as the head of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. Although Mrs. Gould was not obligated in any way and although the Einsatzstab on the other hand had no right to seize this private property of an American citizen, the following was agreed upon:

a. Mrs. Gould will dedicate the tryptich to the Reich Marshal. The Reich Marshal will present the tryptich to the Cluny Museum in Paris, to which the Gould family had intended to will it.

b. As a sign of Mrs. Gould's gratitude for the Reich Marshal's presentation of the objects to the Cluny Museum, the two single pieces were then to be given to the Reich Marshal as his *private property*.

Many weeks passed. I contacted von Behr many times in regard to the Reich Marshal's decisions. After a few months I received the following reply:

"It had finally been possible to show the three pieces to the Reich Marshal; he was informed of the above offer by Mr. von Behr. The Reich Marshal, however, liked *all three* pieces and ordered that *all three* were to be brought to Germany.

I had the impression that Mr. von Behr did not use his influence to bring about this decision. Von Behr also asserted that he had pointed out to the Reich Marshal the obvious legal argument—Private Property!—but had found no understanding for this.

After that I frequently talked with Mrs. Gould and her lawyer. They beseeched me to refrain from any further undertaking in the matter in order to avoid any difficulties for Mrs. Gould, (American citizens were for the most part interested!) such as the possibility of her being sent to a concentration camp.

Nevertheless, whenever I could I brought this case up for discussion and asked that the Reich Marshal be informed, since I had to assume that the entire action was due only to the fact that the Reich Marshal was wrongly informed. Everywhere I met with a regretful shrug of the shoulders.

8. *Wildenstein collection.* The collection of the Jewish art dealer Wildenstein, consisting in part of goods on commission of non-Jewish owners, was looted by an unknown party during the night from 2 to 3 August 1941, at Castle * * * where it had been sent for safe-keeping. Thirty-eight of the 129 pictures stored there were taken, including "The Washerwomen" by Fragonard. Thus a notation of the group for protection of art [Gruppe Kunstschutz] (KVR Dr. Pfitzner) of 29 May 1941 (Files Kunstschutz, supplement) reads as follows: "In part of this castle was quartered a unit commanded by a first lieutenant, who was unable to prevent the gentlemen so instructed from forcing their way into the sealed room, since they claimed to be acting on higher orders. The mayor of the nearby town of Coulombieres, who was called to the scene, was given a kind of receipt . . ." The receipt bore the signature 'Bruno Berger 2 S.D. / 2 Group: GFP for special use'." Dr. Pfitzner's notation continues: "My office, which wanted to act immediately to recover the pictures, was cautioned by a higher authority against doing anything further in the matter."¹ At the instance of the Gruppe Kunstschutz, the rest of the collection was thereupon taken to Castle Surches.

On 12 May 1941 the Reich Chancellery (Art dealer Haberstock) informed the Gruppe Kunstschutz by telephone that the Wildenstein collection was soon going to be removed from Surches. At that time the Einsatzstab Rosenberg had also stated that it wished to remove the collection.

On 13 May 1941 Captain von Poellnitz (Luftgau III), an agent of Haberstock, pointed out by means of a French letter, dated 24 April 1941 and written by or to a certain Hugo Engel, that the collection had meanwhile been transferred to Aryan hands

¹ It is possible that the action was undertaken by the German Embassy, which felt at that time that it was acting under orders of the Fuehrer to seize Jewish art property (See above II 4).

and that the new owner desired its removal to Germany. Thereupon the shipment had to be approved. Commission goods belonging to others were sorted out previously.

The occurrences are revealed by a note of Dr. Pfitzner (Gruppe Kunstschutz) of 15 May 1941 (Kunstschutz files, Supplement). Obviously Dr. Pfitzner¹ was advised to observe the strictest secrecy. Nevertheless there is no doubt that the pictures were intended for the highest places. A copy of the note went with a communication of 17 May 1941 to SA Major General [Gruppenfuehrer] Albert Bormann, Reich Chancellery, Berlin, another, with a communication of 15 May 1941, to General Hanesse, Paris, for "forwarding to the office of Reich Marshal Goering, Berlin, W 8" (Kunstschutz files, Supplement).

* * * * *

The military commander, however, considered it necessary to repeat his verbal request impressively in written form. Special significance attaches to his letter to this effect addressed to the commander in chief of the Army dated 31 January 1941 (von Stuelpnagel files 1941), as testimony to the legality and national responsibility. It reads:

"Dear General Fieldmarshal:

In response to the communication of the Quartermaster General [Gen. Qu.] section K.V., No. 2/597/4 of 17 January, in which the Gen. Qu. on your behalf asks my position on the question of the use of the confiscated Jewish art property, I have presented my legal standpoint in a communication of 26 January. I was in agreement with the Gen. Qu. that neither you as the commander in chief of the Army nor I as the military commander have anything more to do with this question.

I may remark, however, that I do not, as I have already verbally declared, deem as very fortunate the Reich Marshal's order of 5 November, which, as I probably not unrightly suspect, was instigated by another source, and that I am afraid that it may later be of considerable disadvantage for the esteem of the state and the responsible directing figures in the judgment of the world and also of the public at home, as the confiscation of the entire Jewish art property itself may be. I do not in fact know how these transactions can be justified on the basis of international or domestic law at all. From many personalities and also from the mass of the people I have heard very bitter condemnation.

¹ later died in battle, therefore no longer available for purposes of information.

I myself, on taking over my office, sharply refused to concern myself in any way with this question, much less to make myself co-responsible through any action. My entire inner feeling, my juristic thinking and my conception of the necessary bearing of the conqueror in the occupied territory are against it.

As regards the order of the Reich Marshal dated 5 November, I do not regard the character of the collections referred to in No. 2. The wording, at any rate, certainly seems to me unfortunate.

At any rate, the text in No. 6 of the order: 'in cooperation with the Chief of the Military Administration Paris' (it probably ought to read 'Chief of the Military Administrative District Paris') ought not to mean, in my opinion, that this 'cooperation' with an office subordinate to me and to you should lead again to a certain co-responsibility.

The whole question of the confiscation has already stirred up plenty of dust. I myself am of the opinion that it ought to stop now, and that any further seizure ought to be refrained from.

I direct this communication privately to you, General Field-marshal, in supplement to my official opinion, in the hope that you will rightly grasp and understand my representations, which stem from the purest patriotic sentiments.

With obedient greetings,

Yours very respectfully,

Signed: von Stuelpnagel."

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3775-PS

REICHSJAEGERHOF ROMINTEN, KREIS GOLDAP

(East Prussia.)

21 November 1940.

Dear Eric,

I thank you for your letters and the attached items. I am sorry to learn from it that insidious and untrue reporting of the great Swedish newspapers gave you the impression too that the air warfare and the destruction caused by it are about the same in England as in Germany. I should like to point out that England has suffered terrible blows from my air force and that a city such as *the important armament town of Coventry, was actually completely levelled, while London shows immense destruction and earthquakelike annihilation of entire districts.* On the other hand, Mary will be able to tell you that with the exception of a few burnt attics and a few destroyed houses, nothing at all has been destroyed in Berlin. The exaggeration of the British are simply grotesque.

A comparison will be able to show how different the achieved results are. Until 1 November 1940 the British have dropped 31 tons on Berlin, while we have dropped during the same period 15,872 tons of bombs on London. Up to that date (1 November 1940) the British have dropped a total of 130 tons of bombs over Germany while we have dropped 21,500 tons of bombs over England.

It is also to be considered that the heaviest type of bombs dropped by the British was a bomb of 250 kg which until now has been dropped in a very few instances only, while the majority of the high explosive bombs weighed 100 kg. The greater part of bombs used were incendiary bombs of the 25 kg type. On the other hand, the heaviest German bomb weighs 1800 kg, while the bulk of the bombs which we have dropped, consisted of bombs weighing 250 to 500 kg.

While the British fly with 60 to 90 aircraft per night over Germany, and do not dare to come at all during daytime with a single plane with the exception of three instances when they attacked with one plane, the German Air Force sends on the average four to five hundred planes to England per night and attacks without interruption during the day.

A further comparison may be derived from the fact that until now London had almost 350 air raid alarms while Berlin had not even one tenth this number. During many nights when the British did not send any planes at all because of the weather, such as just tonight, the German planes were over England in all sorts of weather.

Since the attack on London on 7 September, London was not bombed for one night only and was spared during daytime on six days. Otherwise bombs are thundering day and night in London without interruption, while during the war Berlin was never attacked in daytime and had one to two nightly air raid alarms per week, on the average.

Alone from the amount of bombs dropped by either side you can see the tremendous difference between the German and British Air Forces. Until now in no part of the entire German Reich were damages caused which could not have been repaired within a few hours, while in England photographs prove that important armament factories, etc. were completely levelled.

Besides, I have not even mentioned the innumerable ships which have been sunk by the Air Force.

It is especially easy for Sweden to investigate the ridiculously small damage which the British Air Force has caused in Ger-

many. Time and again opportunity was offered to Swedish reporters for this purpose, the more so as we here in Germany are outraged at the impossible attitude of especially the large Swedish bourgeois newspapers. I do not make any single exception; even though the Stockholm Tidningen may be slightly better, even this paper is far away from an attitude *which could be called friendly or even strict neutrality*.

I have done everything to point to this fact time and again and to warn. I did not leave any ways unexplored. *If Sweden believes that its freedom of press, i.e., its lack of discipline is more important than its future, then we have to accept such an attitude. But Sweden should not be surprised later on if Germany's attitude will take the consequences from these facts one day.*

*However, I would like to tell something more pleasant, namely, the fact that your Finnish friends can be completely reassured as to their future, even after the visit of Molotov. In this matter I have sent my confidential agent to Mannerheim months ago and am doing it right now again. The Finns were clever enough to realize their completely wrong policy towards Germany, which nearly cost them their existence and to change their attitude radically in the sense of a pro-German attitude. A friendly Finland can and will never be deserted by Germany.

Furthermore, I am quite prepared to give to a small Swedish group to which you could belong too, an opportunity to personally inspect the so-called damage caused by the British and, on the other hand to show to this commission how the German Air Force dealt with Holland, Belgium and France, as we are not in the position right now to prove the damages caused in England by our side. But I am completely convinced that this will become possible one day. Unfortunately, the British government has a completely different attitude, because it exercises a rigorous censorship in order to prevent that anything should become known about German destructions in England. Nevertheless, we have received sufficient reports from neutral side, particularly from Americans, partly with photographic evidence, and we ourselves have made enough air photos in order to prove how terribly severe the destructions are in England.

With kindest regards I remain

Your faithful brother-in-law

(signed) Hermann Goering

* This confidentially only for you and for Mannerheim.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3780-PS

[Stamp] Secret Reich Letter.

Record

of the Fuehrer's conference with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister (RAM) and Minister [Gesandter] von Sonnleithner at the Berghof the 27 May 1944 from 16.35 to 17.45 hrs.

* * * * *

The Fuehrer advised Oshima that the Japanese should hang—not shoot—every American terror pilot [Terrorflieger]; then the Americans would think it over before making such attacks.

Berghof, 27 May 1944

Signed: von Sonnleithner.

Distribution:

Reich Foreign Minister (RAM)
State Secretary (S.St.)
Office of Reich Foreign Minister (Buero RAM)
Ambassador RITTER
[Further distribution illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3786-PS

Stenographic transcription in the
Headquarters of the Fuehrer.

Discussion on the Situation of January 27, 1945

First copy of second transcription

No 24/25

Situation at noon of January 27, 1945 in Berlin

Present:

| | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| The Fuehrer | Rear Admiral v. Puttkamer |
| Reich Marshal Goering | Colonel v. Below |
| Field Marshal Keitel | Colonel v. Brauchitsch |
| Col. General Jodl | Captain (naval) Assmann |
| Col. General Guderian | Hauptbereichsleiter Zander |
| General Burgdorf | Direktor Dr. Schuster |
| General Buhle | Lt. Colonel Waizenegger |
| Ambassador Hewel | Major Buechs |
| Lt. General Winter | Major v. Freytagh-Loringhoven |
| General Koller | Major John v. Freyend |
| Vice Admiral Voss | SS Major Goehler |
| SS Maj. General Fegelein | SS Major Guensche |
| Maj. General Scherff | |

Beginning 16.20 hrs.

Dr. Schuster: As far as the weather conditions are concerned, my Fuehrer, I have to report, the weather conditions are characterized by incoming depressions over the Atlantic all the way to France. They continue over Germany with snow and remain in the east, caused by a strata of cold air, which lies over Russia and which penetrates in the area of the province of East Prussia caused by strong winds from the east and south. An offshoot of this depression spreads all over Italy and this causes a considerable increase in difficulties in parachuting for the enemy.

A major change in the weather conditions cannot yet be expected. These depressions with some areas of precipitations will as before continue from the west; it is going to spread from west to east and stay longer here in this area, because a further advance to the east is barred.

For England that means, that the conditions for parachuting are deteriorating with these east winds, which blow here towards England. In the last 3 days the whole of the eastern counties and the Midlands, there were low-lying clouds with continuous falls of snow, accompanied by poor visibility and heavy icing in these clouds. But the weather in England is not so bad as to prevent all flying, because conditions over the west of England are better, when the wind is blowing off the land. There the clouds are sparse and visibility is good, i.e. better weather. Hence the complete lull in flying over England is not caused solely by the weather.

The Fuehrer: By what else?

Goering: Here there are no airfields; the latter lie in this direction.

Dr. Schuster (*to the Reichsmarschall*): We have further ascertained, that in December similar conditions existed over England and during 4 weeks the British flew under similar circumstances. They were compelled, within one month, to move 2800 aircraft to airfields in the North and the West of England.

- Goering: They have also lost a lot in recent weeks through these changes.
- Schuster: The fact remains, that the major part of the British airfields, approx. 90%, are located in a territory of bad weather. England is reporting considerable snow fall and low temperatures. New precipitations are coming over France and the western front. The whole territory from the Eifel to the south is covered today by snow with heavy clouds and very bad visibility. The weather conditions over the Reich are very much different. Snow covered territories alternate with belts of fog, especially in the northern part of the Reich. Conditions improved somewhat in the territory south of Stettin as far as Breslau including the large territory of Posen. The clouds are dense, but at a height of 800-1200 m and below these clouds visibility is about 5-10 km, with the result that flying is possible today. This is the first day for some time past, which shows somewhat more favorable conditions. Therefore the area of Pomerania and the Vistula, as far south as Cracow has very poor visibility the whole day owing to the snowfall. Here the units are grounded. In East Prussia the clouds are dense, at a height of 300-500m with temperatures of -15 degrees. Yesterday there was a strong easterly wind with a velocity of about 40 km p.h. This strong east wind makes icing in the whole of this area worse. As far as Hungary conditions make for good flying over the whole Hungarian area with its heavy clouds at a height of about a 1000m. Budapest lies within the region of snowfalls. At nighttime: clouds at 400 m very heavy icing was recorded.
- As regards to ice, I have to report that the Oder, throughout the whole area, is completely covered with ice except in a few places. The ice is so thick, that people can walk over it and vehicles even drive across it. The ice is about 50cm thick. From 60 cm upwards armored vehicles can cross it. With regard to the Danube, there is ice in the neighborhood of Budapest.

Regarding Baltic ports I have further to report, that Pillau, even with these strong easterly winds and low temperatures, remains open the whole winter whereas Koenigsberg, at such low temperatures, has great difficulty to contend with as regards ice. The channel from Koenigsberg to the sea has to be kept open by ice-breakers. The Stettiner Haff (lagune) all freezes very hard, but Swinemuende is comparatively free from ice. The remaining Baltic ports, to the west of Swinemuende as far as the Mecklenburger Bight already have heavy ice, particularly in the region of Ruegen and southeastwards.

As regards to Neisse I have to report, that it is frozen to the south of Ottmachau. The Neisse is only open in the town of Neisse itself. The situation is this: if we want to open the Oder by changing the water level, then very large quantities of water must be at our disposal.

- The Fuehrer: Small quantities are not sufficient?
 Schuster: The waves subside very strongly on this long course down to the Oder and exceedingly strong thrust of water is required; the ice breaks up, the blocks of ice push over the cover of ice, but freeze very fast again. The temperature has to be close to zero, so that the structure of ice can change and that the ice can break up easier.
- Guderian: My Fuehrer, the situation changed somewhat at the army groups.
- The Fuehrer: This has to be stopped at once! There is no sense in it anymore, they have to fight their way back; a defense line has to be built here and they have to repel that.
- Guderian: The enemy has attacked here. Up till now he was repelled everywhere. However, it can be easily seen, that the XVIIIth panzer division is reinforced by the VIIth and there is a possibility Plijew will be placed here or down there.
- The Fuehrer: It is obvious that position cannot be held with the forces at our disposal at this place.
- Guderian: This is clear by now—The enemy achieved a dent up till here, and was repulsed in the center. He is further being repelled now. 10 tanks have been

destroyed. The bridgehead is annihilated. Very strong attacks here. Strong attacks being made here from four directions, a total of 15 tanks were destroyed here.

A counter attack is made against the attack of the 23rd tank division.

The 356th division is arriving, the first transports are here already.

The Fuehrer: We cannot count upon it yet.

Guderian: The 23rd tank division is being taken out in order to build up replacements here.

The advance of the 6th tank division came up till the red circle. An enemy attack was repulsed here.

The Fuehrer: This has to be discontinued. We have to change here to the defense, we have to retake that, the Werfercorps and the people's army artillery have to go on defense. The units have to be put in the line here in order to retake that.

Guderian: The situation in Budapest became more acute, because the enemy transferred his main effort in the center of the west section and penetrated up to the so-called "Blutwiese" (bloody field), on which up till now most of the parachuting took place. A counter-attack is in the making. Whether we will succeed with the available forces in improving the situation is questionable because our heavy losses increased considerably. He is attempting to build a bridge across the Margaretenwiese. The situation becomes more acute day by day.

On the rest of the front there are up here individual attacks: they were repulsed here, a small dent here, without any importance. An attack was repulsed here. Regrouping, replacement of Russian troops with Rumanian troops in this corner here. The Plijew corps is being withdrawn in this direction.

The Fuehrer: Here.

Guderian: Either he replaces the 6th guard tank army

The Fuehrer: No, he will succeed.

Guderian: Either he will succeed, or he goes over here.

- The Fuehrer: No, he will succeed, in order to break through here. He knows, that the 20th is gone. Where is the 6th tank army now?
- Guderian: It departed in the direction of Vienna. I don't know exactly, where the transports stand at this time.
- Keitel: 6 trains have departed.
- Winter: The forward elements of the 12th SS tank division are already in the train. The conditions are somewhat better and eased, because there is enough fuel on hand; the road conditions became better, because it did not snow; even the activities of the planes decreased in the afternoon. In spite of that the progress for which we hoped generally and which was ordered, could not be achieved. It can be assumed, that the rate of speed is slightly improving now.
- The Fuehrer: I at once said: there is no sense in hypnotizing yourself and then saying: I need it here, consequently it must happen. After all, I must face facts as they are. The deployment of sufficient forces from the West is not feasible for another 6 to 8 weeks, because it just could not be done. Anyone who says the contrary is dreaming and lives in a state of wishful thinking, but not in reality. This is exactly the same, as when units were recalled from Greece. But that takes time; we can't help that. I shall be glad, if the 1st and 2nd corps get here, say in fourteen days, if they are able to come at all from so far away. If that can be done, it will be extraordinary. However, I believe, that at the most, combat units [Kampfstaffeln] will be here. But, there again, one cannot merely say, I entrain the Kampfstaffeln, whatever happens. And I cannot wait long, but I must see, that I get it done, otherwise everything that stays will also be destroyed.
- Winter: There is a strict order that no consideration can be given to that, but they have to leave.
- The Fuehrer: It is quite clear, there is no other possibility; they must leave, otherwise everything will come to a standstill. All will be destroyed and afterwards nothing will get away. As far as can be foretold,

the units which at least can be used here, will get away; those that have been farthest in the rear will arrive first.

Goering: How can he get out in such strength?

The Fuehrer: He assembled everything.

Guderian: He scraped everything together.

The Fuehrer: I believe he will start his next attack here. Now, I am not sure, whether the 44th division can stand up under it.

Guderian: There is still the 46th division which through its withdrawal moves the front farther back and shortens the lines.

The Fuehrer: Then they must be brought close to this position here, and not any farther back. We can't waste anymore time. Whatever breaks in front, cannot be repaired in the rear. Things must be tightened up. The attacks will most likely be in the direction of Kormon. That is quite clear. Then he also blocks the railroad.

Guderian: This is occupied by the 357th, which is going into position. The 271st is not so far advanced. Eventually it would be at our disposal for that. Now we have to consider, whether we should bring the 356th here. In any case, the 46th Division must then come here.

The Fuehrer: What does the 46th division look like?

Guderian: It is a good division.

The Fuehrer: We must do it that way for the reason, that we come to a standstill here, so that I don't have to use the corps or the army here, but I have to use it in the south. But one sees how dangerous this is. Things must be cleared up. It is not quite clear to me, whether we can do it from here, because we have to expect frontal assaults, or whether we should come around from below. Because, once we are involved in long frontal assaults, this would not work. But with the strength of this army it can't be done. For that reason he must go into defensive positions as quickly as possible, before it is too late. He must build up a front between the Valances Lake and the Danube, and must cut his way through to the south.

- Guderian: In the opinion of General Woehler and Balck, some bungling has occurred here. Turning to the west has been done too slowly. Certain complications in the passing of commands and communications have caused the delays.
- The Fuehrer: I also think, it is too narrow again. The other one stood firm. Things are like this: if one pushes into an enemy, who is massed, then the meaning of a panzer division is of no value. A panzer division is then practically nothing else but an inferior infantry division with assault artillery support and panzer support. It is armored support artillery, nothing else. Here we have to learn from the British and the Americans. Now we must pay more attention to that. The panzers also, will then become more artillery support. For a break-through they are no longer useful, because of minefields, etc.
- Guderian: Everywhere very close teamwork has been established between armored infantry, pioneers, and the armored forces.
- The Fuehrer: I believe the training in firing of the armored forces at the present time is still limited to very short distances. Thus the panzers will be destroyed.
- Guderian: No, my Fuehrer, I as Inspector General personally increased it to the highest possible range of our optical instruments.
- The Fuehrer: The optical instruments must still be improved: for it is quite clear, if I advance them so far, they will then destroy the tanks and that through artillery fire. Thus the tanks will be destroyed. Our tanks, especially the old ones, with armored sideplates of 30- to 40-mm are hardly safe against heavy shrapnel. This must be decided upon today.
- Guderian: This will be decided.
- The Fuehrer: The pushing through has no sense any more. That doesn't help. How he stops it, doesn't make any difference. The right thing is for him to settle down here, go on the defensive, and try, through bringing up a unit, if necessary with the most combatable parts of both SS divisions and the 1st

- armored division, to take a good grip of the whole thing, and then sweep upwards, so that no space is lost any more.
- Guderian: The XXIIIrd armored corps, which up to now has been in reserve, has also turned up here.
- The Fuehrer: So, that makes no more sense.
- Guderian: Of course, he now has no tank-reserves.
- The Fuehrer: I would no longer withdraw the 23rd from here.
- Guderian: This is most likely taking place now. He will spread out the cavalry.
- The Fuehrer: This is very serious. Once, Guderian, this is taken back, he will again push in here. He will make a strong attack in the direction of Stuhlweissenburg, because he is cutting up the whole business [Klumpatsch]. This must therefore be secured. That is the most important thing to do. The second one is here.
- Guderian: Yes, that will be stressed later.
- The Fuehrer: He will push in here with all his might. This is the first move.
- Guderian: If that is withdrawn, certainly. The question is, whether this should be held here.
- The Fuehrer: Then they will be destroyed here. It can't be done with the present forces. Here one line for the defense must be taken, and one here.
- In this area he has to make the assault first against the weaker enemy; he can do that somehow. Otherwise he will get a defensive front here of such a length, that it can't be done with these forces. Then he must retreat. We must make decisions now with lightning speed. We have no time to try out anything like up there, but it must be done like lightning. Therefore I order that he immediately assumes the defensive and that he strengthens it with all possible means. Here he has the people's artillery corps. Here he must have other units, otherwise he can't do anything. Unfortunately one can not count on this division; this is an illusion.
- Guderian: It will take a very long time.
- The Fuehrer: Probably the rear echelon troops will arrive first. There is one train here?

- Guderian: One train has arrived, six are due to arrive. There are combat units among them, but not many, some artillery and one battalion.
- The Fuehrer: With cavalry I can't stop a tank assault, that will certainly happen here, and should he suddenly break-through here, then the whole thing is totally lost. Then I have to see, that I manage it somehow; there is nothing one can do about it. The whole assault came at a moment when he had the forces free here. That is too late already. It had to be carried out for a start, three weeks ago; perhaps at that time it would have been possible, that we would have come through with one push and establish a connection. It is also a question, whether one would have been able to hold that. I do not know. For, on the other hand, I do not overlook that one point, that the enemy would not have stood here, but here. This is also a questionable thing; if he pushes on farther here, then. . . . This must be put in hand right away.
- Guderian: This will be done right away, my Fuehrer. At the Central Army Group movements are carried out smoothly. The other final position which is to be taken, is this line. The enemy has only pushed very slightly there. The withdrawal of the 208th division proceeds rather smoothly. The transport stopped due to various interruptions on the railroad. One part is being loaded in Briesen.
- The Fuehrer: Is this the final position?
- Guderian: Yes. It should be reached by 30 January.
- The Fuehrer: Naturally, this would be good, because behind it we would still have the large Rochade Line.
- Guderian: It should then connect with the 8th army at that point below. Over here the 100th Jaeger division is withdrawing; this is now almost accomplished. Behind it is the Ski Jaeger division, of which the first two battalions already are in position up here. It isn't quite deployed as yet. Here is a part of the Ski Jaeger division, which had to be sent in, because the enemy had pressed heavily here. In the area of the 17th army very heavy battles have developed. The attacks have become

static in one connecting line in the area from Richau to Auschwitz. However Auschwitz has been lost. Farther north the 371st division has been split into three fighting groups, between which only very loose connections exist. Five tanks have been shot up. The situation in the industrial area itself is serious. The enemy has encircled Mieslowitz from both sides in a break-through from the south and a break-through in the north, and has pushed through towards Kattowitz. There is fighting in Kattowitz. From the south enemy tanks have pushed into Kattowitz. Fighting groups, consisting of groups scraped together from other units, units of the 20th panzer division, have been committed to counter attacks in order to regain the loss. In various places farther north very heavy attacks and break-throughs have taken place, nevertheless General Schoerner decided to withdraw a further number of battalions here, in order to cut off the enemy break-through in the direction of Hindenburg and to the south of it which has taken place beyond Gleiwitz. In these battles, yesterday 30, and today again 10 tanks of the 20th panzer division have been shot up, altogether 40. However the 20th panzer division itself is engaged on a wide front in a very furious and unequal defense battle.

The enemy once more has encircled us farther south. Three battalions of the 1st Ski Jaeger division are being sent up in order to counteract this move.

The 8th armored division, now arrived in greater part (31 of 39 transports) is being assembled near Ratibor to be used in a counter-attack in the direction of Rauden.

The Fuehrer: Where is the principal coal district?
 Goering: Rybnick and Maehrisch-Ostrau.
 Buhlè: That is a very important district.
 Goering: High-grade steel and everything.
 Guderian: As from this evening, regimental units from Gneisenau, now in the Protectorate will be put in

marching order, to join the army group [Heeres-Gruppe] in Maehrisch-Ostrau overnight.

Here the 3rd Russian guards-tank-army with its subordinate corps, a total of 5 tank corps is deployed, who are strongly pushing south, to surround this industrial district from the west. Here, the fighting is heavy and at present unequal.

To the north, within the region of the army group, fighting for the Oder-crossings developed. We succeeded at Kruppitz in throwing back the enemy yesterday. This morning, they advanced and recrossed the Oder. Counter-attacks are in progress to throw them back again. Here the 100th Jaeger division and the Stegmann group, which is an armored group of the 103rd panzer brigade are in the line.

The bridgehead which had formed a connecting link here, was broken into and split at this one place. Whether this situation will remain so permanent, is not quite certain.

To the north of Oppeln there is also an enlarging of the bridgehead, which will have to be diminished through counter-attacks of assembled combat groups under command of General Hoffmann. Here there was an advance as far as the river, likewise here in the middle.

The broad bridgehead south of Schurgast presents difficulties and anxieties.

The enemy also managed to cross the river between Brieg and Ohlau. Counter-attacks were started but did not succeed. Now, here in Zedlitz, where the enemy attack yesterday has progressed far beyond the street and the railroad, the enemy was thrown back into the street by combat elements under direction of the commanding officer Ohlau. We shall try today, by putting in the Pantherrabteilung I/39, to clear up the situation completely. So far 4 enemy tanks have been knocked out.

No change in the situation in the bend of the Oder southeast of Breslau. In spite of heavy attacks and a slight indentation of the lines, the

269th division has managed to maintain its position. The situation is difficult south of Steinau and at Koeben, where during the forenoon the enemy managed to accomplish deeper breakthroughs in the direction of Herzogswalde and Rauthen. Here combat elements of the LOS have been thrown in under the command of General Kirchner's LVIIth tank corps and here under the command of the staff of the 16th tank division which had already been withdrawn from the pocket, a counter-attack was made together with a number of SPW from the Glogau district about the result of which we have no reports. All we know is, that the attack has been ordered.

The Fuehrer: What does this mean?

Guderian: This is the objective of the Saucken and Juer-corps. They have reached the district of Koppelstedt and are now to advance to Schmueckert; there they should turn south and beat the enemy forces in line, especially the 4th guards tank army and the two tank corps, which have advanced already as far as the river, thereby endangering the bridgehead, and thus relieving the sector north of Breslau.

The Saucken-corps was attacked today at Horle from the south. 16 tanks were destroyed in this sector. The northern flank of this corps is covered by the 19th armored div. which is deployed in the sector of Gosten and Storchnest and remains in fair fighting condition with a number of light artillery pieces and their own artillery, so that it is to be hoped that this screening is sufficient to cover the attack to the south.

The 9th army today moves into the Reichsfuehrer's sector of the Weichsel army group. The command in Glogau has already been taken over by the XXIVth tank corps under General Nehrung, who withdraws his forces, so far as they are still within his command, to form a new point of resistance on the Oder and if possible to extend this point eastwards from the Oder.

The enemy up here is at present advancing with tank corps. What has filtered through the line

Glogau-Graetz, so far consists chiefly of reconnaissance elements, who are, up to Wollstein quite numerous but of negligible strength from there on. The Tirschtiegel position was held, and only a few patrols infiltrated there.

Fegelein: The Reichsfuehrer just ordered that the Tirschtiegel position be held by Volkssturm only, and all other elements were to advance.

The Fuehrer: That is the objective.

Fegelein: That is correct.

The Fuehrer: The objective is, that the Volkssturm is to be put in the line here, and all other available troops are to advance and press on down here.

Guderian: An order to all units had been issued. Above all, they were to advance to the line Lissa-Kosten-Posen. That was interrupted here. Without the Reichsfuehrer and myself knowing about it, these units were stopped at the Tirschtiegel positions by Wehrkreis III. I have made inquiries twice a day, whether these units are moving forward. The order has evidently not been carried out with the necessary emphasis.

The Fuehrer: It will be carried out with the necessary emphasis now.

Fegelein: He now has 2 companies of light artillery. His objective is to advance into the Posen sector.

Guderian: That is the Saucken group. The Reichsmarschall's division and the Brandenburg division are here. They will lead the attack, and annihilate enemy forces in the Steinauer-Oder bend.

The Fuehrer: That is good.

Jodl: There is only one thing I cannot understand. Didn't you say, that the 19th was to be withdrawn?

Guderian: No, the 19th is in Gostyn.

Jodl: Then it must be other forces, since they must cover the rear.

Guderian: No, so far only rear echelon units, workshop units etc., have been withdrawn. They are beyond the Oder. All else will be held there. I request authorization, for putting in line the war academy, which at any rate would close within the next few days, in order to form in this sector, directly west of the Oder together with 2 com-

- panies of the Berlin guard regiment a dense line of resistance, strongly interspersed with officers, to avoid dispersal of other forces.
- The Fuehrer: Yes.—And here cavalry is to be employed.
- Fegelein: The reserve training cavalry regiment, about 1,500 strong, which General Schoerner supplies from rear echelons.
- Guderian: The men are to be distributed.
- Goering: What returns here, is of course very weak in officer material; now, when these good selected officers are added. . . .
- The Fuehrer: I admit that. Here tens of thousand men retreat. They must be collected. They must also have officers, and the best, or else you cannot get hold of them.
- Guderian: You want to start here, collect things, put them in order and initiate a forward movement.
- Goering: But not in formations.
- The Fuehrer: No, I want to establish a collecting line here, to assemble men and put things in order. But you can do that only with the best.
- Goering: I am of the same opinion.
- The Fuehrer: And here we must have the cavalry.
- Fegelein: They will arrive the day after tomorrow.
- The Fuehrer: What is the name of the unit?
- Fegelein: That is the cavalry reserve and training regiment. They are about 1,500 strong.
- The Fuehrer: Schoerner will be entrusted with this task, to cover the roads in the rear.
- Guderian: The war academy is to cover the roads from Breslau to Glogau.
- The Fuehrer: Eastwards of Breslau this can be done by the cavalry regiment. They are 1500 strong.
- Fegelein: There may be more, I am not certain. The commanding officer is on the way. They are at the disposal of the 8th and 22nd divisions. But that is not of importance.
- The Fuehrer: It is of no importance. The most important thing is, that they solve this problem.
- Guderian: It is true that formations which retreat in marching order are in good condition and carry no surplus men, but that a good many shirkers have infiltrated into treckers and railroads returning from the front and that on these vehicles

many soldiers are returning as drivers and helpers who have, in part, changed their uniform for civilian clothing. Control of these matters should not so much cover military formations, which under guidance of officers, maintenance men, and inspectors retreat in orderly fashion, but rather these treckers.

The Fuehrer: They are caught in a rear zone anyway. They cannot get beyond it, but whatever leaks through must be caught in rear echelons. Schoerner reports that so far he was able to reinstate 13,000 men.

Guderian: As from today, with the taking over of the command by the XXIVth tank corps and the 9th army in the Weichsel army group, a new demarkation line will be in force, which will run north to Glogau, south of Lissa, north of Krotoschin into the general direction of Kalisch. Here the XL corps is in the line which covers exclusively the terrain from Lissa to Posen; then there is the Posen command and to the north the Vth SS-alpine-corps, with whom communication at present is very bad, due to harassing tactics of enemy patrols, which continuously interrupt the communication system. Up here, on the Tischtiegel front a continuous line, and ahead of it a locked door. It is not quite clear, whether Graetz is in our possession. Then, we have the Posen fortress, which was subjected to several attacks from the northwest and the south. Here, apparently a fort was taken, it is not entirely clear, whether here or there.

At any rate, something unpleasant happened there.

Through decoding of enemy radio messages it has been possible to ascertain beyond doubt, that opposing forces were elements of the 1st guards tank army. They are to be deployed in this line. The flanks extend exactly, as is pencilled in here, in this general direction.

The Fuehrer: I want within the next days, a clear picture of the troop concentrations, the position of the enemy, their probable objectives, and the areas

of concentration, since counter-measures depend upon this knowledge.

Guderian: Yes. At any event the 1st guard armored army is reported as deploying in the Posen area.

Fuehrer: With how many corps?

Guderian: With their armored corps; four altogether.

Fuehrer: They have normally 1600 tanks. How many will they have left now?

Guderian: Half that amount at the most.

The fortress Posen, which has held out, lies in between. The enemy infantry, according to radio messages, depends mainly on the railroad which runs from Nakel to the south toward Jarotschin via Gnesen.

Fuehrer: The further they penetrate here the more difficult their supply.

Goering: The railroads are all intact, indeed; they will get through smoothly along the railroads.

Fuehrer: I hope that not all trains and all locomotives were left behind by us.

Guderian: There has been a considerable bottle neck not everything could be gotten out. Then there the second guard armored army with their corps. The situation there has also become somewhat more complicated. Strong reconnaissance elements of the enemy have crossed the river Netze near Scharnikau and are advancing toward Schoenlanke, Schloppe and Filehne. Schneidemuehl was attacked today. This bridgehead near Usch was still in our hands this morning. The enemy, however, has by-passed it and crossed the river Netze.

Fuehrer: This river is no obstacle.

Guderian: It is frozen over now.

Fuehrer: Completely frozen over.

Guderian: He is threatening the position of Schneidemuehl and is also probing his way from the east and the northeast; there he was repulsed. The headquarters of the army group is being moved to Groessinsee.

The situation around Nakel is uncertain, Nakel itself is lost. The Latvian division has displaced toward the north. The General High Command

has withdrawn toward Preussisch Friedland; the enemy has broken through in between.

The situation around Krone is questionable. Bromberg is in the hands of the enemy. The holding force is in this railroad triangle and the enemy is advancing from there with the second guard cavalry corps along the roads of the valley of the Vistula and along the railroad in the direction of Schwetz. The XXXXVIth panzer corps with the 4th panzer division, the 337th division and the 542nd division has launched a counter-attack.

The bridgehead around Kulm which has become smaller is held on the eastern fringe only by the 252nd division.

- Fuehrer : If necessary it must be given up.
- Guderian : It must be given up. The Reich Fuehrer intends as he has already discussed with you, to give it up.
- Fuehrer : The big one; he wants to have a small one.
- Guderian : He wants to hold Graudenz and the small bridgehead of Marienwerder and take across his forces there.
- Fuehrer : No he prefers to hold Graudenz. Marienwerder is so far away.
- Guderian : Graudenz is preferable, it is a fortress. The lines run along here. The enemy attacked there and succeeded in breaking through. He also attacked near Graudenz but was repulsed. The enemy is also pushing against the bridgehead of Mewe and succeeded in crossing the river to the south with minor elements but was repulsed to the north.
- At Marienburg are battles for the castle and the railroad which are in our hands. A navy battalion is marching in there.
- Fuehrer : They have thus far given a good account of themselves.
- Guderian : Yes, indeed. The position along the Nogat is held by the navy.
- The 7th panzer division is being deployed toward Neutisch, in order to defeat the enemy who has crossed the Nogat, and is fighting in collaboration with the navy regiment which up to now has

occupied the bridgehead, in order to clear up this matter on the left bank of the Nogat.

The bridgehead south of Elbing is still in our hands. The enemy has penetrated into the town with several tanks, 15 altogether. A battle is in progress.

The Reichsfuehrer wanted to deploy the 32nd division in the Nakel area.

Fegelein: One regiment just arrived, he reports just now.

Fuehrer: Where?

Fegelein: I do not know.

Guderian: The 227th division which likewise has come down from Kurland stands here. It is already here with essential elements, with the bulk of its forces, while the 32nd division is on its way.

Fuehrer: That's our problem child now (East Prussia).

Guderian: The army group North launched their attack, this morning, and achieved pretty good results. Advanced elements of these tank destroyers and the Arko 302 have advanced half way to Frauenburg-Elbing. There they were already this morning. Armored groups that advanced here got up to this point, the 28th Jaeger division got as far as Karwinden and Liebemuehl and engaged the enemy north of that town. Group Einem was to give support in this direction in order to force a decision. The 170th division and 131st division also obtained good results in their attack, as is shown here by these blue arrows.

Further to the south is the territory of the 18th armored division and the remnants of the 229th division. Their own attack aimed mainly at keeping the enemy engaged did not succeed, the decision remains that we defend ourselves in this position. It is intended to attack again at this place in order to tie down the enemy.

Down here an enemy attack was repulsed.

"Grossdeutschland" was pulled out here together with another division, at present however, still without gasoline.

Fuehrer: "Grossdeutschland" to be sent there?

Guderian: "Grossdeutschland" is to be sent up here, also the 562nd division. It is intended to move the 562nd division up there on foot in order to be able to deploy them up there or here, as necessary. The disengagement occurred without pressure of the enemy. The enemy did not pursue. O.P.'s and rear guard elements are still far behind in touch with the enemy.

There is a pressure against Friedland without result.

Furthermore, the enemy attacked south of Koenigsberg in considerable force. The 547th division, remnants of the 61st division and elements of the 2nd division "Hermann Goering" which were movable have been put into action. The main pressure of the enemy lies at the north-eastern front and north of Koenigsberg where the remnants of the 551st division and the 286th division apparently have lost the last remainder of their fighting power and where, therefore, this morning a critical situation has arisen. It is not quite certain whether the front still runs as is shown here or whether it was taken back into.

Fuehrer: If they are in this line, they can no longer withdraw.

Guderian: Then nothing will come back from the Nehrung. I spoke with Colonel General Reinhardt and pointed this fact out to him.

Lasch, the commander of the fortress Koenigsberg, was given the command as far as the Samland coast. I ask for your subsequent approval.

Fuehrer: Yes, or course.

Guderian: He is the most remarkable personality we have up there. Koch himself has called up, also General Lasch, reporting that a serious crisis has arisen there. General Lasch went there personally in order to halt the disordered troops here. It is hoped that they get there in time in order to halt them. There are now 3 battalions of the 95th division, 3 battalions of the 58th division, 3 battalions fortress troops, a chemical brigade, and the 278th s.p. artillery brigade.

Fuehrer: I cannot understand one thing. One should have left the fortress troops here to the end and bring in the infantry first.

Guderian: Yes, indeed, do it the other way round.

Fuehrer: One can experience the most primitive affairs if one does not indicate exactly in advance what has to be done.

Guderian: It was indicated that at first one division should be restaged. That was done. There is still another battalion with trucks on its way. I hope they get there in time to halt it.

Fuehrer: Where are the S.P. guns?

Guderian: The S.P. guns are mostly here already. That's already on the way. The 278th and the Tiger detachment are still in here.

Fuehrer: I hope they have not been sent down here.

Guderian: They had such order.

Fuehrer: Find out, these are 60 pieces.

Guderian: This up here is the weakest point. Army Group Kurland was again successful holding back the enemy. It has now become necessary due to strong enemy pressure to withdraw the front toward a formerly designated line. Enemy attacks have failed there, his preparations were broken up. Here is a break-through which is being successfully fought off by the 14th panzer division supported by elements of the 218th division.

All enemy attacks have been repulsed there under considerable losses to the enemy. He lost 10 tanks. Unimportant local break-throughs will be cleared up by the 12th armored division which is approaching the scene.

The enemy is regrouping from here also, toward the west and it seems more and more as if his main effort is directed toward the southern front in the direction of Libau.

Fuehrer: That's obvious because there is a port there, and they hope to get it. Libau, therefore, must be heavily protected.

Guderian: Rather heavy enemy air activities during the night.

- Goering: There are 10,000 captured air corps officers at Sagan, their custody is the responsibility of the Director General of Training [BDE]. Personnel for guarding or transporting them is said to be lacking. The thought has been expressed to leave the prisoners to their Soviet Allies. It would give them 10,000 flyers.
- Fuehrer: Why did you not remove them earlier. This is unequalled bungling.
- Goering: That's the BDE. We have nothing to do with it. I can only report it.
- The Fuehrer: They must go, even if they have to march afoot through the mud. The Volkssturm will be called out. Anyone who escapes, will be shot. This has to be done with all means available.
- Goering: That is from Sagen, there are 10,000 men.
- Guderian: Of those to be transported back, the 4th panzer division has been moved out completely, also the 227th division. The rest of the 32nd division is moving back now. Then the general command of the IIIrd SS panzer corps will move tonight, and tomorrow night the "Nederland" division, which has come out already. Sections of "Nordland" have also already been withdrawn from the front.
- The Fuehrer: Are they to get replacements? Are these underway already?
- Guderian: Fegelein has seen to that. He has already ordered that they should be replenished immediately.
- The Fuehrer: It is absolutely clear, the army group Vistula has nothing beside the corps Nehring, one group and what stands on the Weichsel. This has to be organized. That comes only now from here, partly from Germany. This must be done. Nevertheless!
- Goering: How many cattle-cars are required for 10,000 men?
- The Fuehrer: If we transport them according to German standards we will need at least 20 transport trains for 10,000 men. If we transport them according to Russian standards, we will need 5 or 3.
- Goering: Take off pants and boots so they can't walk in the snow.

Guderian: Then Wlassow wanted to make certain statements.
 The Fuehrer: Wlassow is nothing at all.
 Goering: Then they should not walk around in German uniforms. Everywhere one sees young people. That only irritates the people. If one tries to get hold of them, then they are Wlassow people.
 The Fuehrer: Well, I was against it, to have them dressed in our uniforms. But who was for it? That was our dear army, who had their own ideas.
 Goering: At present they are walking around like that.
 The Fuehrer: I can't give them a change of clothes, we have no uniforms. Altogether at that time I wanted the foreigners. . . . But our Herr v. Seeckt sold German steel helmets to the Chinese. One has no sense of honor around here. Every wretch is put in German uniform. I was always against it. I was against putting Cossacks in German uniforms. We had to give them Cossack uniforms and insignia as proof that they were fighting for us. That is much more romantic too. The British would not think of putting English clothes on an Indian. Such shamelessness exists only with us because there's no character in it. Otherwise one would not put German steel helmets on the heads of others. The British let the Indians run around as natives.
 Goering: The Wlassow-men surely are so hated over there, that they'll be punished if they are caught.
 The Fuehrer: Don't say that, they are deserting just the same.
 Goering: That is the only thing they can do: desert, they are not capable of more.
 Guderian: Shall the division garrisoned in Muensingen be gotten ready speedily?
 The Fuehrer: Yes, indeed, have them made ready.
 Fegelein: The Reichsfuehrer wanted to be put in command of the two divisions.
 The Fuehrer: Wlassow will not desert.
 Goering: They can't do more than desert. Then they'll no longer eat here.
 Fegelein: The men will not desert, either: I have seen them.
 The Fuehrer: They look mad. We have experienced it in France, they did desert.

- Fegelein: The Russians will kill them all, because the Russians also kill all the laborers who have worked for us. We already have the proofs. They will beat them all to death.
- The Fuehrer: We do exactly the same with those who have worked in the West. The Allies find it already difficult, to find a mayor.
- Goering: I would use the Wlassow-men just the same.
- Fegelein: And the officers from Sagan.
- Goering: Obergruppenfuehrer Tuettner shall move the 10,000 prisoners away from Sagan.
- The Fuehrer: They must be moved away by all the means available, Volkssturm will have to be called out with the most energetic men. Attempted flight will be punished with shooting.
- Fegelein: We have a man for it, who guarded the KZs. That is Gruppenfuehrer Gluecks, he will have to do it.
- Guderian: Schoerner is complaining that Group Rudd has been called away. He asks for a written report on it and is beside himself. This is really inexcusable, after all one has to give something to the Reichsfuehrer.
- The Fuehrer: Because he has nothing at all. Rudel can move much better out in the open than in the industrial section.
- Guderian: Then may I tell Schoerner, that this is your order. I have talked it over with Zoller once more. He is of the same opinion.
Then there are 1,800 men of the SS antitank replacement and training unit at Kastenburg. They shall be moved out immediately. I believe, they will have to be left in Koenigsberg, so that that man has something.
- The Fuehrer: But there is no SS-unit here. I would put them also at Himmler's disposal, he needs them. There they have nothing at all. They must be given to Himmler, so he can gradually get a skeleton force.
- Guderian: At present they are with the combat group Hauser, which has been at Loetzen.
- The Fuehrer: If they were defending Loetzen, I would not say anything. But after that is gone anyhow!

Guderian: The question is, whether they are to be left in Koenigsberg, so as not to create a complete vacuum there.

The Fuehrer: I am afraid they will not get to Koenigsberg, but go to the West.

Guderian: An order can be given to that effect.

The Fuehrer: You can give orders alright. But whether they'll be carried out! Nobody carries out the orders.

Guderian: Yes, they do.

Burgdorf: Rendulic has just arrived up there.

Guderian: Rendulic and Natzmer have taken over the command.

Goering: The decisive question is arms. We screen out men. The men are here and get no arms.

Guderian: Here are the strength reports. I don't know if you have asked Wenck for them.

(Report) The 203rd has 3400 men, the 541st has 3100 still. Of the "Hannibal"—that is to say the police unit—there are 900 men; combat unit Hauser and 21st could not be obtained, however, "Grossdeutschland", still halfway OK: 2 medium, 1 average, 3 weak battalions, 4 light batteries, 39 pieces of heavy artillery. This means the corps artillery and army artillery. Armor strength considerably diminished. Yet altogether still some 25.

Then, my Fuehrer I wanted to request the authorization, to remove the recruits of 1928 from the Eastern military districts, so that they will be trained only in somewhat safer military districts.

Keitel: Otherwise the Russians will take them. Every month about 50- to 60,000 men, we need them under all circumstances.

Guderian: Military districts I, XX and XXI; VI and XII have dropped out, VIII has dropped out also. Already II and III have to be exempted too.

Keitel: For the next 3 or 4 months. I have had everything discussed once more with Juettner today.

Goering: Arms! Arms!

The Fuehrer: That is quite clear. We are losing industrial areas all the time and do not have as many arms.

Goering: But we mobilize men and thereby everywhere harm our reserves.

- The Fuehrer: What are you talking about reserves. At present we cannot work to capacity in the industry anyhow.
- Goering: No I mean military reserves. Without any consideration everything is crowded together to the utmost, to get men free, and we have no arms. I want to call attention to one thing only. I was obliged to turn in all the small arms of the anti-aircraft. And I have done it. Now the anti-aircraft stands there with their heavy guns and has no small arms. So and so many heavy batteries were overpowered in combat because they had no small arms and could not shoot with the heavy guns.
- The Fuehrer: A large program is coming up. I hope that it can be carried through with the forces at our disposal; I can not say. 900,000 assault pistols are to be manufactured monthly.
- Buhle: That will require some time yet.
- The Fuehrer: And the People's Rifle [Volkswehr]?
- Buhle: The People's Rifle is being delivered now. This month we will get the first 8,000, next month 25,000, and the month after that 50,000. That's the prognosis.
- Goering: The arms, which Field Marshal Keitel has taken away from us.
- The Fuehrer: Where are our rifles manufactured? Mainly in Upper Silesia?
- Buhle: No, the rifle factories are located more in Central Germany, in Suhl and Oberndorf. But there are also a lot of them in Wuerttemberg, and there is the terrible shortage of coal and electricity.
- The Fuehrer: As far as I know, the rifle and machine-gun factories are not affected by it.
- Buhle: This is going to be shortened now. It will be completely adapted to the emergency program for coal and electricity, to that everything else will stop with one stroke and something will come along there. Hence this month will be a very bad one.
- Guderian: Then regarding the situation of south I want to state: The army group believes, that in that sector they cannot get along with only one division.

- They propose, to have the entire Corps Gille with 2 divisions remain there, to get out the first and 23rd and to take together the entire group under Breith.
- The Fuehrer : Here we have to protect ourselves also; because here will be the next very large attack. The moment we leave there the big push will start. This is even more dangerous.
- v. Freytag-Loringhoven : The 346th has arrived with 6 troop trains.
- The Fuehrer : But this has no fighting power yet. These trains cannot be considered. All that comes from Italy are at first the service forces.
- Guderian : There were, however, already a few combat troops among them. I shall find out, how much it is.
- The Fuehrer : When he withdraws the 23rd, he has here only the cavalry. When this goes over to the defensive he will come over with his armor. This is a great danger.
- Guderian : He will have to leave his armored group long enough until the danger is entirely removed.
- The Fuehrer : He has to leave his armored group by all means here.
- Jodl : The combat echelon went at first, and is departed. It has now completely left down there.
- Winter : It travels about with speed?
- The Fuehrer : But this is the decisive point. If he succeeds in breaking through here, everything is lost, we have to be clear about that. I have no objection to the Korps Gille going also over to the defensive.
- Guderian : The 1st panzer division out and assigned to the 3rd. and whatever can be relieved of the 23rd, in addition the Generalkommando Breith.
- The Fuehrer : He believes that he can not do it with the 1st alone.
- Guderian : I do not know it, I have to discuss that myself.
- The Fuehrer : How does the 1st look on the whole?
- Guderian : It is not too strong any more. It was replenished once more in numbers. The 23rd is in fact the stronger one, it is better.
- The Fuehrer : When I speak of danger, I would say: Danger-point one is here, danger-point 2 is here, danger-point 3 is here. If he breaks through at this

- place everything is lost. If he advances here, this part will collapse too.
- Guderian: This is the 1st, the 3rd, the 23rd.
- The Fuehrer: The 23rd is the best.
- Guderian: Yes, passable, also the 6th, and then the two SS-divisions. This is the position of the 24th. It has somewhat suffered naturally in the fighting. But in spite of that, it is always the best with regards to replacements.—I shall discuss that.
- The Fuehrer: Say it again: This is the most critical point. The next one is here. When he breaks through at this place the thing is lost. This is also a dangerous point.
- Guderian: Here are artillery and mine throwers.
- The Fuehrer: When one is forced into a hose, it will slow up the retreat. But here you have the wide plain. When he penetrates in here the whole thing collapses, this is the most dangerous.
- Jodl: No important change has been noticed with the enemy apart from the 6th English airborne division which went into the lines in the sector of Venlo which caused a slight consolidation of these very wide division sectors. In the attack on the Roer bridgehead also no additional divisions have been deployed, apart from a few panzer brigades, so that the English guard panzer division and the 50th English division, also the 11th English panzer division are here still in the reserve. The American group around Luettich is very likely still there.
- The Fuehrer: What about the English air attacks in the south in connection with the weather situation.
- Keitel: No attacks on a large scale.
- Jodl: It was bad, it was snow storm and fog.
- Goering: No action on both sides. I therefore do not believe solely in the weather condition.
- Keitel: There was no large scale attack.
- Jodl: Only five trainloads have been dispatched of the 1st SS panzer division. The division is now moving into the sector. Gasoline is there. If now further delays should occur it will be the fault of the march technique or of the strongly snow-covered roads. Here too the conditions did not deteriorate.

The Fuehrer: One day without flying is of course better than five days with flying, if they move fast on such a day.

Goering: There is no flying today, Buechs?

Buechs: No.

v. Below: Very little, so far.

Jodl: The 12th SS pz. division is moving now with the advance units into the zone of embarkation. The 9th SS pz. division has also started moving. It is unknown in what direction the 2nd must come.

The Fuehrer: If the weather stays like that for one or two days, do you believe that he will attack? When can we count on the arrival in Vienna of at least the combat troops of this panzer army, not before two or three weeks?

Jodl: The one corps will be there in a fortnight.

The Fuehrer: And the 2nd corps?

Jodl: That one will mix.

Winter: That will take 12 days. The 2nd Corps can be there in another 4 or 5 days, if it keeps going like it did so far.

The Fuehrer: They are arriving just in time, because down there will be the next crisis.

Jodl: The railroad will probably run then very smoothly. If they are assembled now we should think that in 16 days the complete 4 divisions will be there and the speed with 40 trains will then be rather fluid.

The Fuehrer: This is the first real fighting power.

Keitel: Across Germany it goes very fast.

Goering: In a fortnight he can be deployed up there.

Jodl: 23 trains arrived with the second mountain division. The 25th did not start moving yet.

The Fuehrer: How did the 2nd stand up?—I understand it had a slight failure.

Jodl: Yes, I have such a report. I shall ask the division commander for another report.

The Fuehrer: But it proved itself very well up there. The best division can once sustain a reverse somewhere.

Jodl: There are entirely new conditions here. It is always like that. When a division comes into a new theatre of operation, there is always a little crisis at first.

- The Fuehrer: Even the best division can get a shock.
- Jodl: Besides every new division will be regarded suspiciously.
- The Fuehrer: Especially if it arrives in good condition; well-looking men with good boots, in good shape, and the rifle not rusted. At once they say: Where do they come from, are there still such things?
- Jodl: The 3rd panzer grenadier division has been started moving. It comes to Erkelenz.
- The Fuehrer: What dirty tricks are done there, I know from my own experience. Once there arrived a brand new division from home. One regiment came to the place where we were. They passed through but rested then and stacked rifles. Our men then really did a nasty trick. Before they could blink an eye the nice rifles were gone and the old completely dirty and rusted ones were there. They had to go on. It was a mess but nothing could be done. Immediately they say: Where do they come from, do such things still run around?
- Jodl: The Fuehrergrenadier and Fuehrereskort brigade did not yet start moving, but are now assembled. The Fuehrergrenadier brigade reports the following strength: 4,229 men basic strength, 2 panzer IV, 3 in repair, 8 panzer V, 10 in repair: 5 assault guns, 11 in repair, 27 in transit. That amounts to a total of 60 panzers.
- The Fuehrer: And the Fuehrereskort brigade is slightly stronger.
- Jodl: I do not have its report.
- The Fuehrer: I believe it has 7,000 men.
- Goering: Can not small groups of panzers—6 or 10—be assigned which speed around in the foreground and put the panzer advance guards out of action?
- The Fuehrer: This is being done. They work in very small groups of 10 to 14 assault guns with SPW.
- Goering: They look for the panzers.
- Keitel: Antitank reconnaissance patrols [Panzerjaeger-spaehtrups].
- The Fuehrer: And antitank reconnaissance cars with PAK which drive very fast. They will now be deployed there for hunting.

Goering: Reconnaissance units can be very helpful.

Jodl: At the thrust against the 6th parachute division on the 26th, the enemy lost 25 killed, who have been counted and 2 Flamepanzers (flamethrowing tanks) which have been destroyed. Stronger range finding fire by batteries southeast of Nymwegen.

The Fuehrer: Until when, may we assume, can the 7th parachute division be brought back from down there, to its original unit?

Jodl: That will take long, at least 14 to 20 days.

The Fuehrer: Alright, but we have to bring it up here; because here will be a critical point of the first degree. And the 5th parachute division?

Jodl: There are no stronger forces yet but at least the 5th and 3rd are here.

Goering: We have to combine them. The fighting strength of 4 combined parachute divisions equals that of five divisions.

Jodl: Assembled reserves have been destroyed here through artillery fire. The assault continues here with the present forces. He penetrated in Ottilienburg and was thrown out.

The Fuehrer: They moan terribly about the whole situation on the Western front and cry.

Jodl: The front has been pushed back there. There are now two flat bridgeheads beyond the Roer. It was quiet on the rest of the front, there was movement. The attacks did not take place with the same concentration as during the last days, but were continued more weakly and sporadically. The enemy penetrated south of Hevenbach. A counter-attack is being made there. Farther south he was repelled again. Northwest of St. Vith he was also repelled.

The Fuehrer: Here is the Schnee-Eifel.

Jodl: No, the Schnee-Eifel is farther back. Here runs the Westwall. This is the wooded ridge of hills, which has to be held then. Well the line will be running a little bit backwards. They are still standing somewhat in front of it. This was the part, which was in the hands of the enemy. Here is the Westwall.

Farther south the attacks were sporadic and weaker. Three strong attacks in the direction of the castle Reyland were repulsed.

This arc will be retaken on this chord. The Roehr has been already reached in one place. From there the line bulges again. Only skirmishes took place today. The following up of the enemy was prevented again and again through counter-attacks. The enemy is suffering here considerable losses anyway.

The Fuehrer: You reported, that the Americans lost 85,000 men this month; that would mean 50% of their total losses during the whole world war.

Jodl: Farther south all was quiet. The enemy advanced again yesterday in the corner at Remich up to Schlossburg and beyond. He was again repulsed there by counter-attacks north of Tettigen. Additional attacks were repulsed. The tanks withdrew after the leading tank was destroyed.

Considerable movement was observed southeast of Saarburg. Some replacements or reinforcements seem to take place near Saargemine. There was a strong concentration of rolling stock in the area around Metz and a strong concentration of vehicles in the area around Saverne and Saarbourg.

There was no fighting yesterday at the newly gained Moder front, where the section of Moder-Rotbach was reached everywhere. The bridge in the rear near Merzviller has been completed in this section in spite of the shelling by enemy artillery; it is a 40 ft bridge, which facilitates the supply.

Heavier fighting was raging down here, where the enemy continued his attack from the area south of Erstein and south of Colmar. We succeeded here, however, to repel all attacks. One tank was destroyed. These attacks were also repulsed at Markolsheim and 8 tanks were destroyed here.

The Fuehrer: This matter here has to be straightened out under any circumstances. The situation is such, that

we have to attempt to retake this segment. Does this mean the recapture?

Jodl: This is the recapture, which he ordered, on the 27th this line, on the 28th this position.

The Fuehrer: But the most important thing is, that this segment will be taken by us. He should carefully consider, whether we should not pull out here the 6th mountain division, relieve it by some other unit, move this unit around and unite it with the 2nd mountain division, so that we can manage. Only mountain divisions can do the trick; the decisive point is, that Breisach remains safely in our hands. If that remains in a large bridgehead, the danger in itself will be small. Maybe you can talk it over with the Western High Command. An attempt has to be made, to remove by any method the 6th SS mountain division and transfer it to the 2nd mountain division, so that both mountain divisions can jointly execute the attack. This can be done in partial movements. The enemy cannot achieve here very much with his tanks. The attack has to be carried out here. That always was also Himmler's idea, because he cannot achieve very much with his tanks. On that sort of ground that may result in a success. The distance is 30 to 50 km. A mountain division can do that. Otherwise it cannot be done. If his affair could be settled, it would fit very well with that linking up here. Schlettstadt could be outflanked; that is not so necessary, that can be smaller too, this does not make any difference, the only thing is, we would have better protection, because Colmar is very close.

Jodl: And the whole artillery is here.

The Fuehrer: The bridges have to be out of artillery range. Planes are reported, when they approach, but not artillery fire.

Jodl: Up here the whole thing has been stopped. It has been stopped.

The Fuehrer: Discuss it with Western High Command, whether the 6th SS mountain division cannot be pulled out there. This line can also be held easier defensively later on than the other one.

- Jodl: Much easier.
- The Fuehrer: If 2 mountain divisions are placed in the front-line, the whole position could be held.
- Jodl: This order was issued yesterday.
(Presentation)
- The Fuehrer: Especially an elaborate defense line has still to be built here.
- Jodl: That's the old one, the new one is a little bit farther in front.
- The Fuehrer: This one has to be developed.
- Jodl: The question of command in the West is still to be discussed today.
- The Fuehrer: Yes, Goering, I wanted to talk that over with you. Well, the people, who are speaking here today, assume, that Student has become very tired.
- Goering: He need not stay, you don't know him, you don't know his terrible slow way of talking. You don't understand that. But he is still—if I don't consider Model—of all of them, as he was before, the one of those with the greater standing power if the going is tough, I am convinced of that. He is terribly slow; you think he is nuts, because you don't know him. But I take him gladly.
- The Fuehrer: He had the same thing previously at the operations in Italy.
- Goering: He talked just as slowly. Everybody thought, he was dumb. I take him gladly, because I know—and you, gentlemen, are witnesses—that he will be called again in a critical hour. I am taking him with the greatest pleasure; for I need him, because he inspires again his parachute army. He says: "Yes, the Fuehrer told me also. . . ." I know him, the others don't. I don't blame them, because they don't have any other means to judge him. The other day somebody asked me, whether I had a dumbbell up there. Then I replied: No, he is not dumb, he talked so slowly before. As he was wounded on the head, they think that this is an effect of it. But he had it previously. Nevertheless before every operation he says: We better jump on the enemy.
- The Fuehrer: He performed the most audacious operations.

- Goering: Well, I gladly take him, so that he won't be judged wrongly. I know, he will be called in the critical hour. He stands up well. He is not a great genius in any other respect but he is sticking it out in a good and straight fashion, who knows that he has to hold his troops in line. But I take him gladly away, that you can judge later on how the front is held, after he is gone.
- The Fuehrer: I would regret that very much, I really don't know. Does Blaskowitz stick it out so well?
- Goering: No, he is a smoothy. Student's little toe is worth more than all of Blaskowitz.
- The Fuehrer: That's just the question.
- Goering: But I shall be delighted to take him because I know at the critical moment you will get angry and ask for Student again. I shall be looking forward to that day.
- Fuehrer: I won't.
- Goering: No, but you will give him back to me then. Why should I expose an outstanding man to such gossip. You know him he has always talked so slowly.
- The Fuehrer: At the time I developed our plans for the West he was just as slow. But at the end he delivered the goods. The same goes for the operation for the liberation of the Duce.
- Goering: He did his other jobs in Italy well, too.
- Fuehrer: He absolutely cleared up everything in Italy.
- Goering: If he had stayed there, no bridgehead would have been established there either. But I need him urgently. He must reorganize the army of parachutists and move the divisions there. You got a man then whom you can transfer somewhere else where the going is rough, in case the need arises. He won't yield an inch. He probably will speak then still more slowly, that is possible, but he will be slower in retreating, too.
- The Fuehrer: He reminds me of Fehrs my new valet from Holstein. When I tell him something it takes him minutes to grasp it. He makes a very stupid impression, but he does his job very well, only he is terribly slow.

- Goering: Student is a man with very clever ideas. There is no doubt about it. He figures things out for himself.
- The Fuehrer: It was suggested however, to move Blaskowitz up there and give his job to Hausser or should we do it the other way around?
- Jodl: To move up Hausser.
- Goering: Hausser has now become familiar with things here now.
- Jodl: Here are essentially SS-formations.
- The Fuehrer: I just want to say that's mere improvising. In case I want to carry out that thing I should like to have Hausser here too.
- Fegelein: Especially since pressure always comes from the Reichsfuehrer although he can no longer interfere; he, nevertheless always presses him.
- The Fuehrer: To carry out this operation. The Reichsfuehrer is all wrapped up in it. He says: "My Fuehrer, if we have that piece here, then he has one important supply line less, we have a beautiful new position, and I can guarantee that nothing is going to happen at Breisach." After all, the whole bridgehead depends on it. Ferries this and ferries that, a bridge is much better after all.
- Jodl: In any case, the difficulties caused by the severing [of the line] becomes already apparent. Hausser has now pulled out all he could out of the line and deployed them down below there, so that it is impossible to figure out at the moment, how to get out the fast moving formations.
For this reason also it will be necessary to concentrate the control in one hand; too many high headquarters only cause difficulties, there. Apart from that he has no quartermaster staff.
I would suggest that Hausser is left here and that we give him also the 1st army. That I believe would be the right thing.
- The Fuehrer: Hausser is a shrewd fellow. He gives the impression of a shrew-mouse.
- Jodl: A terribly sarcastic, witty man. At least that's what he was.
- The Fuehrer: He has the features of a fox.
- Guderian: He has a good wit.

Keitel: He is very quick-witted.

The Fuehrer: With his sly little eyes. Only I am not quite sure whether he has suffered through the last serious injury.

Fegelein: No he has not suffered, this was tested. The Reichsfuehrer said he does not quite trust the story. He says if he comes with a succession down there, and he does something which does not fit who's mind is not quite in order this would be most embarrassing for him [sic]. The Reichsfuehrer is so smart he would not have suggested it if he did not know exactly that it would be possible, because he makes a fool of himself and the Reichsfuehrer is very sensitive in such matters.

The Fuehrer: We all are.

Fegelein: But, of course the Reichsfuehrer is always being subjected to criticism.

The Fuehrer: When something goes wrong.

Goering: I should like to ask that the relief of Student takes place in such a manner that it does not look as if he was a failure; because he has not failed in a single point, nowhere, this I wish to emphasize, but he accomplished all his tasks very well, even though there was not much going on. He carried out the flooding etc. I should like to arrange it so that I require him urgently for the parachute army and make the request.

Fegelein: Hausser has also the following philosophy: He says as a soldier I am almost 65 years, the highest achievement I can accomplish is that I shall die in battle.

The Fuehrer: I do not want that at all.

Fegelein: But he is pushing.

The Fuehrer: This is no philosophy at all.

Guderian: I know him very well. This will not necessarily have to come to pass. He is a happy man.

Fegelein: Above all he gives his last regardless of anything. He walks through artillery fire and when his aides flung themselves to the ground, he says: why are you so sensitive?

The Fuehrer: I would lie down, too. I had only one general who did not lie down. But he did not hear it.

Jodl: Nevertheless I would suggest it. This a little weak, Christiansen too is not exactly a born army leader.

Goering: That I admit.

Jodl: Up there it is rather thin as far as command is concerned.

The Fuehrer: Allright. . .

Jodl: I believe that this is the most practical way. Thus the Reichsfuehrer will get his staff in the East.

Guderian: This is especially important: at present the staff of the Reichsfuehrer is a miserable improvisation with which he cannot achieve anything. The communication service does not function, it is bad. They cannot go on like that. Something must be sent there immediately.

Keitel: Entirely adapted to his personality.

The Fuehrer: Well, it shall be done thus: Hausser remains here, Blaskowitz there.

Fegelein: My Fuehrer, I have here something which requires immediate decision. I have just checked. Out there in the barracks of the Leibstandarte there are 6,000 men for the 1st panzer corps. It will yet take some time for the moment. I request that 4,000 to 5,000 of these men with the best officers are placed behind Schoerner. It does not matter during the next fortnight whether they are in the barracks or on the streets.

The Fuehrer: We are not going to do that: because they have to be trained. When the Leibstandarte is pulled out, they must move in immediately.

Fegelein: They are trained.

The Fuehrer: I will not be able to assemble them any more at that time. This corps has not much time. Take the cavalrymen, they are 1,500 men. You can add a few "Volkssturm" men.

Fegelein: Shall I bring the commander here?

The Fuehrer: Just as you like, I, for my part, see no need talking to him.

Fegelein: Well, they are not to be taken away then.

The Fuehrer: No.

v. Below: Then the ammunition allotment.

The Fuehrer: Yes, the business about the ammunition allotment. He says: with eight or five rounds for heavy field howitzers he cannot fight a defensive.

Jodl: This is the calculation by the Quartermaster General and he added: this will become still worse.

The Fuehrer: But he cannot fight a defensive in such critical places.

Jodl: I assume that it was figured out that way.

The Fuehrer: If one has a large front line sector with quiet sections, it might be possible. But if one has the bad luck—

Jodl: This is prorated for the entire western front for every artillery piece.

The Fuehrer: Quite. But if one has the bad luck to be in a sector which gets a constant boxing and he receives his 5 rounds of ammunition, he cannot possibly manage, because on a single day of defense he needs 500 to 600 rounds. In the first World War during large defensive battles we used up to 500 to 600 rounds with a small battery.

Guderian: This calculation goes for the entire front.

The Fuehrer: For that very reason. If one has a large sector, it is better.

Jodl: This is ordered for the entire western front.

The Fuehrer: Now he is doubly unlucky. All others have divisions while he on the Rhine has only a medley of troops which have no artillery at all. Consequently his allotment is very small because he has the artillery only where there is shooting and where emergency exists. He has no other artillery, only Russian cannons etc. There is no shooting elsewhere. For instance he has 100 field howitzers, they are in the midst of constant heavy fighting. If he can fire 500 rounds per day with 100 field howitzers it will not be of much use in a heavy battle. This has to be taken in consideration when he gets a larger sector, that this will be balanced.

Jodl: No, this is for the entire front.

The Fuehrer: In the world war in normal times in 1915/16 we had an ammunition supply which was atrocious.

Guderian: 1 to 2 rounds per gun per day.

- The Fuehrer: Frequently the regiment begged all day long for retaliation fire. Then, regularly towards the evening, six rounds were approved, 4 with time fuse and two with percussion fuse. This was the entire artillery support of an infantry regiment. They came usually after the others had ceased firing and upon that they started again. We became raving mad and said: if only we had not started with those 6 rounds. But I must say: when there were attacks during heavy fighting there was unlimited ammunition. Then they fired all the barrels could shoot.
- Guderian: This is not the case at present.
- The Fuehrer: Normally there was an enormous restriction. But when an attack was imminent or actually started, they really blasted away. I know, on 9 May the battery of Major Parzival fired 5,000 rounds. They fired away, the whole day long, full blast, that is to say more than 1,000 shells per barrel.
- Jodl: In Italy all quiet, snow and fog. The last remainders of the 29th armored infantry division are now withdrawn and the last parts of the 4th parachute division have gone into the line. The 1st and 4th parachute divisions are now combined under the 1st parachute corps.
- The Fuehrer: I don't know, do you think that the English still regard the whole Russian development with honest enthusiasm?
- Jodl: No, definitely not. The plans were indeed entirely different. This will perhaps be realized in its full extent only later.
- Goering: That we stop them there and in the meantime let the Russians conquer all of Germany, that is definitely not according to their plans. If things continue like that we shall receive a telegram in a few days. It is not so that we do not let them advance one step and, according to the opinion of the enemy, hold like mad in the West and the Russian penetrates more and more into Germany and practically has all of Germany.
- The Fuehrer: In that way the National Committee, the organization of the traitors, could have a certain impor-

- tance. If the Russians really proclaim a national government, then the English will naturally get frightened.
- Jodl: Those have always regarded them with suspicion.
- The Fuehrer: I have ordered that something is to be played into their hands now, namely the report that those set up an army of 200,000 of our men, under the leadership of German officers, completely infected by communism, which they intend to send into battle. I ordered that this report be played into the hands of the British. I gave it to the Foreign Minister. That is something which will have an effect on them, just like you prick a shoemaker's awl into something.
- Goering: Those entered the war so that we should not get to the East but not that the East come to the Atlantic.
- The Fuehrer: That is quite clear. That is something abnormal. English papers are already writing bitterly: What is the sense of that war?
- Goering: On the other hand I read in the "Braunen Blaettern" a report, they could support the Russians with their air force. Because they could reach with their heavy bombers those territories to which the Russians would have come, even though it would have been a long flight. But the report comes from an absurd source.
- The Fuehrer: They cannot give them tactical support. If we ourselves do not know where the Russians are and where we are, how could they know?
- Jodl: 31 trains of the 356th division departed with speed 8.
- The Fuehrer: I have a disagreeable duty yet to perform today. I have to "hypnotize" Quisling today, or I let him come tomorrow at three o'clock. Below, try to find out whether this is possible.
- I want to have a short talk with the Foreign Minister, as to whether Quisling can be received at 3 o'clock; whether that is at all possible; whether he will wait till the end of our state of war. It is an awful affair. He is completely out of his head, the people have driven him crazy.

Jodl: The cleaning up near Travik is finished. The 104th is being brought up here. It is impossible to get through here. He further asks that the bridgehead near Visegrad be eliminated. I have no objections to this. Since we no longer intend to attack in that direction, it is no longer important. He requests to withdraw behind the river Drina because they can thus save forces and can spread out more.

The Fuehrer: Yes.

Jodl: The 22nd is fighting in this direction and has now reached the Drina. The bridge there is out. They are moving north on the western bank.

Here in this district there is a considerable lessening of tension through the moving away of Partisans in connection with the fights of the Jetnicks. Communication with Plevlja is re-established. The situation here has thus improved.

First elements of the 297th division have reached Brod. Supply situation has again improved because the 8-ton bridge was completed yesterday the 25th. Communication is thus re-established. A hospital convoy has been attacked on the road by fighter planes here, 10 dead and 7 more wounded. The Syrmish Front was quiet. Commando activity of our own. About two divisions can be assembled here by the 1st February, 3 or 4 divisions by 6th February.

The Fuehrer: In other words, it can't be done before then.

Guderian: If there is no crisis, mein Fuehrer, it is better to wait.

The Fuehrer: Absolutely. I will not give myself away in advance, but preparations will be made quite secretly and then suddenly the matter will be tackled from both sides concentrically.

Jodl: Whether the 233rd Schuetzen division is completely lost is not certain, but it must be assumed. Again, several attacks against the Fischer group which have been repulsed.

The territory round Virovitica was quiet. A new movement is intended toward the south to be done

- by the Cossacks who as a matter of fact are doing very well.
- The Fuehrer: The Cossacks are good. But why must they wear German uniforms? Why not have the beautiful Cossack uniforms?
- Jodl: Most of them have Cossack uniforms.
- Guderian: Red fur caps.
- The Fuehrer: They still have them?
- Jodl: Yes, they have red trousers with silver stripes.
- The Fuehrer: Really it is wonderful that Cossacks are marching with us!
- Burgdorf: General von Pannwitz, the commander of the Cossack division, always visits his troops in a Cossack uniform. I have seen a photograph of him; he looks quite savage with his crooked sword dangling in the scabbard hanging down in front.
- Jodl: They have been recruited as national troops. They now also have their reinforcements because their families were with them. I don't know where *they* are now. They were in East Prussia before.
- Guderian: They left there long ago. They reached some place or other.
- Goering: They were in Belgrad.
- Jodl: They have their children there.
- Goering: Their campaigns always resemble a tribal movement, they take everything with them.
- Jodl: Nothing else has happened here excepting attacks that were repulsed. This territory was also quiet on account of the tremendous amount of snow. The same is true of the Brenner pass. In the north the 163rd division is now with 57 trains in Oslo, the 2nd mountain division left Aarhus with 39 trains.
- I now want to present the report of General von Uthmann from Stockholm.
- That is a case where even the ambassador could show a stiff upper lip.
- The Fuehrer: Can the ambassador show a stiff upper lip? Thomsen always makes some very clever remarks; his views on world policy are inspired by the Stockholm atmosphere.

Goering: Mein Fuehrer, may I read you the following about the panzer division which is fighting with the Saucken Corps? The report is dated 27th. After successful defensive battles near Litzmannstadt the division fought its way toward the west according to orders.

(Reads:) 5 Panthers achieved 25 hits.

The Fuehrer: An American or English newspaper man got his temper up, he said he would not be stopped from telling the truth. The truth was that the Germans were far superior with their tanks.

Hewel: He cites a lot of examples.

The Fuehrer: He cites examples, how he was forced to lie.

Hewel: For instance, they had lost as many tanks as the enemy; he was forced to write they had only lost a few.

The Fuehrer: He says the German tanks are superior, that is undeniable.

Guderian: The main problem with us at the present time is gasoline supply.

The Fuehrer: That's why I am worried, Guderian, that something is going to happen down there. That would be the end. That is the most dangerous point. You can still improvise everywhere but not down there. You cannot improvise gasoline. I cannot make a tank into a wood burner; in garrison that's possible. I have seen tanks with wood generators for training purposes.

Guderian: Yes indeed, we had them months ago.

The Fuehrer: There was something else: Buhle, news has come that they have a giant tank, the Boxer . . . gun L48. . . .

Buhle: The note which I gave you, yes.

The Fuehrer: They fight the tank from a distance from 200 to 300 meters. Should we not make a new type of shell perhaps with a bigger charge, I don't know whether the Hohlladung principle is applicable. Or, perhaps, under certain circumstances, one could fire a grenade with a handle attached to it; a grenade with a handle. Of course one would have to load the piece from the front, but all one has to do is to approach the target sufficiently. It is certain that such a grenade can be fired.

Buhle: I believe a HL 70 is necessary at first.
 Guderian: 38 T might also be possible.
 The Fuehrer: But it is not quite certain whether it will penetrate the new tank.
 Goering: Does the heavy Panzerfaust penetrate?
 The Fuehrer: That has not been tried out.
 Buhle: It is to be assumed. A charge of a 150-mm penetrates also.
 The Fuehrer: If one fires a shell or bomb with a handle it is sure to destroy the tank. Of course, one can only fire once.
 Buhle: One must move with the piece charged, in order to be ready.
 The Fuehrer: If its approach is observed.
 Guderian: Then he must hit with the first shot.
 The Fuehrer: They have approached up to 150 to 200 meters.
 Goering: Does the 88-mm penetrate also?
 The Fuehrer: It has not been proven. One has been unable to find out. The Koenigstiger with his long-barrelled gun could penetrate, perhaps.
 Buhle: On the side it seems to have a flat roof.
 The Fuehrer: Anyway it seems to be a new thing.
 Buhle: I spoke about it with Sauer yesterday.
 Goering: Has a Jagdtiger ever been hit?
 Keitel: Thus far none of the Jagdtigers have ever been hit effectively. He was hit from behind, not yet from the front. It is different with the Jagdpanther. The Jagdtiger is the toughest nut to crack.
 The Fuehrer: Thus far it has blown up every pill box with one shot.
 Buhle: We will bring out the new 250-mm on the 5th.
 The Fuehrer: It is very slow, only 12- to 15-km per hour.
 v. Below: Reich Minister Lammers says that Quisling could come tomorrow. One day more or less did not matter.
 The Fuehrer: He will be glad to be able to stay here. But I would like the Foreign Minister to hold himself in readiness so that he can report on the situation.
 v. Below: Yes indeed.
 The Fuehrer: Is there anything else?
 Hewel: Only one thing. In connection with this story the Swedish newspapers publish also sensational articles according to which the inventor and con-

structor of the V-weapons has arrived there. They are publishing interviews with a certain Professor Hartmann. I have already spoken with the Luftwaffe and General Buhle; they don't even know him.

The Fuehrer: They have not found a V-man but an S-man, a swindler.

Hewel: They do that regularly. They suddenly discover something tremendously sensational.

Goering: They are used to tremendous sensations.

The Fuehrer: They must know everything if they believe they have got the inventor.

Hewel: They even got the man now who worked on the V-4. He was ready to give detailed reports.

Assmann: In the Polar Sea there are movements of British and Russian naval forces. U-292 has carried out supply missions for meteorological troops on Bear Island.

Three of our destroyers from the 4th destroyer flotilla are now being transferred from Narvik to home base because they will be urgently needed in the Baltic during spring.

We unfortunately lost an ore boat of 2900, too, during an aerial attack on a southbound convoy. She was hit thrice by bombs, was still afloat, but when being towed into port she sank anyway.

In the waters round Haugesund several mines have been cleared. We are laying a mine field near Stavanger for coastal protection.

Traffic between Oslo and Aarhus suffered yesterday again from the weather. We have extraordinary bad weather. The convoys can make their runs, but are 7 to 10 hours late. One troop transport ship with 776 men of the 163rd infantry division, 328 horses and 191 vehicles arrived at Aarhus. Another 5,500 men of the 163rd division are waiting for shipment in Oslo. Reports come in from the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, saying that transports are still running according to schedule. 3 ships arrived, 4 ships will arrive today. These 4 ships will probably leave today again loaded. In Libau are no more boats at present, because traffic from Gotenhafen and

Danzig had to be stopped yesterday on account of the stormy weather.

Yesterday's transport record: 3,294 men from Courland, further 1,122 horses, 713 vehicles, 115 tons of ammunition and some prisoners of war.

The traffic from Memel also ran according to schedule. 211 men, 40 vehicles and 2,000 tons have left for Pillau. The ferry "Deutschland" is enroute to Swinemuende with 1,500 wounded men. The evacuation of East Prussia has further progressed with 34 vessels. 25,000 refugees have been sent to the western part of the Baltic Sea. Including them, 45,360 refugees have started from East Prussia to the Reich. A small steamer with 150 vehicles has run aground near the peninsula of Hela. Salvage attempts are being made. Yesterday, in loading mines at Pillau a deplorable explosion. 207 mines did explode. They were aerial mines with time fuses. Probably, the accident happened by a mine that was dropped, whereby the fuse was set off. The result was heavy damage, 19 men were lost.

The cruiser "Prinz Eugen" has been scheduled for action north of Elbing. It could not be done today, however, on account of the very bad weather situation. There was a blizzard with very poor visibility. The necessary preparations have been made. The cruiser can go into action at any time, as soon as the weather situation improves.

The Fuehrer: Is it not possible to use here the old canoes "Schleswig Holstein" and "Schlesien"?

Assmann: They are no longer very seaworthy. They are being used only for training purposes and are lying stationary at Gotenhafen.

v. Puttkamer: One has been sunk.

Assmann: Yes, "Schleswig Holstein" is no longer seaworthy.

The Fuehrer: If she has been sunk, she cannot fire.

v. Puttkamer: The 15 centimeter are no longer on board, only the worn out 28.

The Fuehrer: Why can't you rebore them?

v. Puttkamer: I don't know about that.

The Fuehrer: So that you don't run the danger of putting them into action suddenly.

- v. Puttkamer: Probably there is other work which has priority now.
- The Fuehrer: Since the days of the Westernplatte, the reboring of the 8 barrels could have been done.
- Assmann: In the Pomeranian Bight a minesweeper hit a mine. The boat is being towed in.
In the North Sea blizzard, wind velocity up to 7. In front of the peninsula some of our mines blocking the beach have been exploded by ice stoppage.
It was not possible to commit our speed boats and small U-boats on account of bad weather.
No special reports from the Mediterranean.
- Buechs: Only local fighting in Hungary yesterday southwest of Ipolysag.
Provisioning with 19 airplanes has been attempted. Only 7 succeeded, have dropped 6 tons of ammunition, 16 tons of food.
The fighting in Silesia was concentrated between Oppeln and Steinau, 103 airplanes, also partly around Bentschen, Gleiwitz and for the first time somewhat more at Marienburg with 114 airplanes. 391 fighters mostly for low level attacks, destroyed 5 tanks, about 178 vehicles, many of them horse drawn.
Besides, 2 bridges, which were put up between Oppeln and Breslau, were hit.
In the west only fighter bombers [JABO] concentrating upon the Ruhr district and a weak two-engine unit.
Last night London brought a radio report which answered the question, why they did not fly. It said, that they have had bad weather over England for 4 days, that they would use this time to bring their machines into top fighting trim. Apparently, they have recruited and used once more 70,000 men and women. Apparently, due to our offensive, they have used many men and the technical ground staff have decreased very much, or it is an excuse upon questions. It was announced publicly over the radio.
During the night only 20 mosquitoes flew in and dropped bombs upon Recklinghausen. Bad weather

- in Italy. From the west and south no flights of fighting units today.
- The Fuehrer: The meeting seems to take place again in Teheran.
- Hewel: If it will take place at all now. I am sure it will be postponed.
- Burgdorf: Here is an excerpt of measures taken by Frederic the Great and Frederic William I. I can give it to you to read.
- The Fuehrer: If people think that I am so brutal—I would recommend all dignified gentlemen to read this.—It has always been that way. These things ought to be read by our officers. They have absorbed only the spirit of Schlieffen, not the spirit of Moltke, Frederic the Great, Frederic William I, Bluecher, etc. That was also a good spirit. That can be seen by the 73 year old Courbiere.
- Goering: That shows, age does not mean anything.
- The Fuehrer: No, on the contrary, if they get old, they become “bucks”. I have seen that too.
- Burgdorf: Schoerner has heavily interfered with your authority which only belonged to you, my Fuehrer, dismissals, etc. But I am in favor of not disavowing it afterwards. Otherwise, we don't get anywhere. He also writes here, that he almost feels like hanging the commander if he does not bring order into it. Then the matter of the officers, which I presented, has been brought up again by the Reichsmarshal. The Reichsmarshal holds the view that it is better to leave the men in their ranks and that they should be used in subordinate positions according to their aptitude.
- (Presents text)
- Goering: For instance, I have a commanding general leading a company in a parachute regiment. Up to now degradation was part of the punishment, if somebody had committed a crime. If now somebody has been dismissed honorably, and he is called back, only you give him a smaller position because he cannot lead anything else, we cannot draft him as a sergeant. That is a degradation. I do not know who would still want to become an officer. Even if the work is done honorably there would be no protection any longer.

- The Fuehrer: It is very difficult, if today a general should lead a company under a battalion commander who is perhaps only a first lieutenant.
- Goering: In this case it will work all right. But he must not be degraded.
- Burgdorf: If I may point out the development as it is in the army very often. We have now several thousand officers who have never served with a fighting unit, or the last time, at the end of the world war. Since that time they were either used in office positions, administrative positions or as railroad commanders, patrolling trains, while the front was far away and these spaces had to be protected. Now they are at our disposal. Reichsminister Goebbels has now justifiably demanded that these men shall not be dismissed because we could not use them as officers, while all men back to the class of 86 have been drafted. Because, if we would discharge them from the active Wehrmacht, even younger men might be dismissed who could still be IA, while old men are still being drafted. That they remain on active service has not been disputed by the Reichsmarshal. That they have to be used, is evident. The only question is how can they be used.
- Goering: In the World War the men have done their duty as officers and have been retired.
- Burgdorf: But they have not been trained with arms at all. We have an officer's training regiment at Wildflecken. There, the men have been divided into three parts: those who have to be dismissed because they can't do their job any more, and would be of better use in business—that will be thoroughly examined—those who could be used advantageously in any capacity within the units, and those who have systematically shirked their duty during the whole war. We have found people who have been with 15 different units during one year from which it can be seen that they have been sent away everywhere.
- Goering: If you have a shirker, you courtmartial and de-commission him. I am only of the opinion that it is impossible in a profession—this can't be found

in the whole world—that somebody, with a clean record, who has served honorably, shall be degraded because he is being used in a subordinate position.

The Fuehrer: It is so with us, not in England.

Goering: He always remains an officer.

Burgdorf: A retired officer can only start again. Hewel told me of a colonel, who entered the service again and was killed as an airgunner.

Goering: Ask, why he has been dismissed.

Burgdorf: He thinks, he has been quite a decent fellow.

The Fuehrer: In England rank goes with the position.

Goering: I have examined it thoroughly. If a man is a captain and is in line to become major in 10 years, and tomorrow he fills a post which carries the rank of major, he will be made major out of his turn, and if he returns to a position which carries the rank of captain, he becomes a captain again. But, if due to his length of service, he is up for major after 10 years, he will become major, no matter which position he holds. That applies only for those who advanced outside of their turn.

The Fuehrer: Now I want to have an exact report how it is in England. Who can give it?

Fegelein: General Christian knows it well, I have talked to him, he was in America.

Burgdorf: It will then have to be decided, whether we should form officer units, whereby should be added that in the officer units a first lieutenant may lead perhaps a squad and a captain a platoon, where ranks are nonsense. But I warn you, since I have seen the men. The last prestige of the officer corps will be lost by the run of an entire battalion of officers. Because the men I have seen, will run away.

Goering: That is correct. But how do you intend to make an officer of a man who knows that he may be degraded any time without him doing anything wrong?

Burgdorf: As soon as the Fuehrer started to promote men without regard in what rank he happened to be only according to their qualification, at that moment, it was logical that we said to the people

- who could not fulfill it: I am sorry but you are not capable to fill that post.
- Keitel: But these men are completely different men. They would not have come if they had been told that, they would have taken up another profession.
- Burgdorf: In this war there is no officer, who has not been promoted three grades during this war.
- Goering: Naturally he has been promoted; if an officer has gotten his discharge because of age or temporary illness, illness does not enter into the question—
- The Fuehrer: I believe, the point is briefly as follows, Goering. This whole bureaucratic apparatus is going to be cleaned out now. It has indeed become so inflated that in comparison the civilian bureaucracy, appears like a rabbit against a saurian, and that comes from the fact that the military at the beginning of the war automatically calls back into the ranks every man who has ever seen military service and appears on some file. They have been called up on the basis of their former ranks. They have been promoted again now. The men have grown old and can lead only in a limited way. For those are world-war-officers, they have the rank of a general today, and are not capable of commanding a battalion. Thus the situation would arise that I would call out all the men in the whole nation who are only fit for limited war service, and have them serve in the army, regardless of the positions they occupy in civilian life, while at the same time I am dismissing and sending home others, who occupy superfluous posts, because I cannot use them. To the general I cannot give a division or a regiment, because he can't handle it. To a colonel I cannot give a battalion, because he cannot handle that at all. He has been currently promoted and cannot even command a company. This is the problem. It has nothing to do with his claims for a pension. But the moment I am calling up the Volkssturm and drafting, God only knows what kind of people by lowering the age limit, I up and send people home who are absolutely fit for front line duty, because they oc-

copy a post, which apparently needs not to be occupied at all,—and they do not fill this post, because the post is superfluous, because they sit in a bureaucracy, which we want to air out. Thus I am sending home people, who are fit for front line duty, are really soldiers, and others, who are only fit for limited service, and are not soldiers, I am drafting.

- Goering: Exactly—that must not happen. He shall go to a post where he can work but in his rank.
- The Fuehrer: Yes, I can not use him in his rank.
- Goering: Not in his official position. He has done his duty during the world war, has become a regular army officer.
- The Fuehrer: I admit all of that. But take it, the man is now a colonel, and to give him command over a regiment would mean assassinating 3,000 men.
- Goering: He is not to get a regiment, either.
- The Fuehrer: Under certain circumstances he may not even be able to command a squad, then it will be difficult.
- Goering: Then he can stand guard. I have made that proposition to generals of mine. I have said, I cannot give them anything else.
- The Fuehrer: Have the generals accepted that?
- Goering: Some yes; some no.
- The Fuehrer: And these?
- Goering: These I will call in now under the more stringent regulations. Up until now, I have given them their choice, and have not drafted them.
- The Fuehrer: What is he going to do then?
- Goering: If there is nothing else, he will stand guard.
- The Fuehrer: As a general?
- Goering: As a general.
- The Fuehrer: Do you think that the cause will be served better in this way?
- Goering: During World War I this general proved himself as a valiant battalion commander, was discharged as a colonel, and has now been called in again because he is needed.
- The Fuehrer: In the world war no battalion commander was discharged as a colonel.
- Goering: As lieutenant colonel.

- The Fuehrer: My regimental commander was a major, then later he was given an acting rank, and only I made him a colonel. In the world war people were not promoted at all. That was the poorest promotion possible.
- Goering: Some were promoted. But this one was given the rank of an acting lieutenant colonel, and was drafted as a lieutenant colonel, because he was needed in some bureaucratic affair, and received further promotions. Hitherto demotion has been considered the greatest disgrace imaginable among officers—there is no doubt about it—and this is not being understood among us.
- The Fuehrer: I too, am of the opinion; on principle that must be done differently. It will have to be done so that rank and appointment will be basically identical.
- Goering: That is right. Here I am entirely of your opinion. For three years I have tried to go after this.
- The Fuehrer: With the British this is basically so. If one commands a division, he is division general, if he commands a regiment, he is colonel, and if he commands a battalion, he is a major. If he has for a time, been commander of a regiment, he afterwards goes back again.
- Goering: Only a "Schweinehund" would take a demotion. If he was not that, he would have shot and killed himself.
- The Fuehrer: That is no demotion.
- Goering: If one has been a colonel, and is called up to serve as sergeant, that is a demotion. If he is put into that rank, he can—
- The Fuehrer: This is not to affect his emoluments.
- Goering: I would simply throw the emoluments at his feet and say: You are taking away my honor, and you well know, that so far this has been considered the greatest disgrace among officers.
- The Fuehrer: In reality it is not so. That is your conception. It was also considered a disgrace when I promoted a man like lightning. It was considered a disgrace among the officers when I promoted one Major Remer immediately to colonel.

Goering: Certainly not for him.

Burgdorf: If I, a general, should have to serve as a major, I would prefer to do it in a major's uniform, otherwise it would be a constant public defamation, and everybody would know it.

Goering: You say that, because it does not apply to you. Then do it. It would be a shining example.

Burgdorf: I am confident that I can still be used in the capacity of my rank.

Goering: Then complete reconstruction will be necessary. In this case it would be demotion without judicial sentence.

The Fuehrer: It is no demotion. The man is not demoted, he is only given a position which he really can fill, which he had outgrown, without being able to measure up to the new rank. Then it would be a demotion also, if I draft the president of some concern today, and he has to serve as a private.

Goering: No, he is not a professional officer, he did not choose the profession of a soldier.

The Fuehrer: But the other one has chosen his profession, and must be able to meet its requirements. If he cannot do that, that is no demotion.

Goering: If he does not meet the requirements of a president, he will be discharged.

The Fuehrer: Then he can no longer be president, but perhaps be only plant manager.

Goering: Or somewhere else a travelling salesman.

Fegelein: It has always been like that with the political leaders.

The Fuehrer: Fundamentally I am of the opinion, that the British system is healthier. It says: Anyone who commands a division is a division general, and if he does not, he is not, and if a division general should some day again command a regiment, then he is regimental commander.

Keitel: In the "Reichswehr" we were, at the time, of the opinion, the generals there were never to command regiments and battalions, and therefore we took off the old army insignia as unsuited. We simply said, we will not wear uniforms, just stars, so that a general at that time could also command a battalion. We could not have done it any other way.

Goering: With me a general had command of a group.

The Fuehrer: Then what kind of insignia did these wear?

Keitel: In the Reichswehr only stars.

Fegelein: Hausser was discharged as a major general and then was a colonel with us.

The Fuehrer: Here is an example. I want to tell you something right now. How many were discharged from the army as generals, entered the Waffen-SS and occupied subordinate positions.

Goering: They were not forced to do it.

The Fuehrer: What do you mean "not forced"? We stand in a time of emergency today. The question is this: I must think myself in the place of a company commander. Such an officer is a lieutenant and able to lead a company, but he has a colonel, who himself is absolutely incapable to lead a company, because it has been 25 years since he knew how. But he is now in that company as a platoon leader, maybe not even that, he is in it in his uniform. What sort of a mottled affair are we going to have then? Does the officer in charge of the company then salute his colonel?

Goering: It is a fundamental matter, which upsets and overturns everything that has been existing hitherto, an idea, which was inconceivable until now. To this alone I call attention.

The Fuehrer: Anyhow, it is this way in the rest of the world.

Goering: Not in the rest of the world. It's never so in England. Therefore I made the suggestion, to differentiate between rank and position.

Keitel: In the Volkssturm there have been no difficulties so far.

Goering: No, not there. You said, in the Reichswehr. Then you mean to say, that it had been introduced by the Reichswehr, that some general, who commanded a battalion, was only a major.

Keitel: Exactly. He did not wear a General's uniform and the man was called battalion commander, and no longer major, lieutenant colonel or general.

Goering: How long was that?

Keitel: It had been carried through in the Reichswehr. Then it disappeared again, because it was said, how can you do such a thing, this is madness. I was the one who said we have no rank, no lieu-

tenant, no captain, major, lieutenant colonel, but we have platoon leaders, company leaders, battalion leaders, regimental leaders.

Goering: When for instance was a general, a platoon leader?

Keitel: I must know that. I have been organizational chief of the Army General Staff.

Goering: What years are you speaking of?

Keitel: The years 1925-30. The mobilization orders which were applicable to the entire Armed Forces, had been officially introduced and recognized. There was no longer any rank, only the rating connected with the appointment.

Goering: That is just what I have been requesting for 2 years. But it has not been the case, that a general, who was a general, suddenly becomes sergeant.

Jodl: I would do it this way: Lt. Colonel X would be ordered to report for active duty as a platoon leader.

The Fuehrer: He will not be demoted. That is a definition which suddenly was dropped in here. But his rank in itself is dormant.

Goering: If one has been a general, and is ordered to report for active duty as a sergeant, then according to the prevailing conception, he is demoted.

The Fuehrer: I cannot call him in as a general.

Goering: If he is ordered to report as platoon leader or squad leader, that is something different.

Keitel: At that time an emergency existed and with the giant officers corps of the world war we could not have done otherwise.

Jodl: Such extreme cases surely would never occur.

Burgdorf: To be squad leader, one does not need to have any leadership-personality at all.

Goering: How do you intend to change the rank? You said yourself, as technical sergeant or sergeant.

Burgdorf: It is the numerous captains and majors, with whom I am stuck.

Goering: You spoke of generals. But even with a colonel it is not easy either.

Burgdorf: Even a colonel I could always use as an officer. But the majority of them have never been soldiers.

- Goering: Right, I agree with your definition, if the rank is taken into account.
- The Fuehrer: But even then he can't run around in a general's uniform. What kind of a company would you have, if each company commander wears the uniform of a lieutenant and the platoon leader the uniform of a general, to speak in extremes. I don't know which one is the greater degradation. On the other hand, I can't give a unit to the general that corresponds to his rank, when he is not capable of it. How can I give a young volunteer division to the general, when it is going to be destroyed through it? Maybe he was a poor company commander in World War I, where it was generally known, that in normal peace times he would not have been in the position to lead a company. Then he would have had to attend courses, just like nowadays. We promote many and know, that under normal peace time conditions, they couldn't make it.
- Jodl: Can't one say: Colonel X will be given the command as a chief of a Volkssturm company [Volkssturmkompaniechef], even though he is transferred elsewhere?
- Burgdorf: There he is subject to a different classification.
- The Fuehrer: I had people in the SA and the SS who advanced by hard work. In the army this is impossible. Just visualize this company in reality, led by a capable lieutenant, who became a lieutenant; who is able to lead it and must lead it, and under his command he has a couple of lieutenant colonels or generals in their respective uniforms. During that time the service rank must not count, the way I see it. There is no other way.
- Goering: Off duty he will keep his rank, on duty he will not.
- The Fuehrer: One thing must be avoided: that those men who are fit for active service now don't fight at all, because they can't hold their jobs, but the one who is fit for limited combat duty must fight. Nowadays I must keep in mind the psychological moments not only in the case of officer but also of the German people. After all this is no disgrace.

Goering: But that must be made clear.

Jodl: There must not be the feeling of a degradation without guilt.

Burgdorf: Six weeks of training will be given to them, in order to show whether they are capable or not. I have seen the men and you yourself would say instantly, Reichsmarshal, that fellow shouldn't be in uniform at all. If I had to carry out thousands of judicially interwoven degradations, I wouldn't have even enough men, to do the work.

Goering: Then I would say immediately, out of the armed forces and into the Home Guard [Volkssturm].

Burgdorf: There are old people in the Volkssturm. Then a 46 year old man comes up who is fit for combat, and who has been shirking successfully and who has been in the West before.

Goering: You could degrade a man like that.

The Fuehrer: He also cannot command a unit. He has never held such positions. I can't trust him with the smallest unit.

Goering: Then in the unit itself, a number of men has also to be taken out.

Burgdorf: In a fighting unit one can see that pretty quickly.

Fegelein: The Reichsfuehrer did it the same way. He only said to the 19th army, I am of that opinion, and that did it.

The Fuehrer: After all, the profession of a soldier is a fighting profession. That must be the aim.

Goering: That must be made clear basically. Because this is an entirely different point of view.

The Fuehrer: It is no degradation, but the rank drops during the time of operations. If the man is capable, then he will be reinstated into his rank within a short time. He has a much easier time than anyone else. But some solution must be found. One thing must be avoided: that a military purge takes place, with the result of a change from the military bureaucracy into civilian idleness. I can't even use them in the labor-pool, because in a way we have a surplus of workers. Apart from that, people are justified in saying: This one is fit for combat and not the other one who is sent to the front.

- Burgdorf: The sending of a mortar platoon to the Reichsfuehrer in the Black Forest worked miracles in the O.C.S. regiment. However, it didn't look so good to the lower ranks, when a lieutenant colonel and three lieutenants carried mortars around.
- The Fuehrer: This to me is much more degrading than the other method. The other method consists in giving a position to a man which corresponds to his ability and with which I can trust him fully. Otherwise I let him run around in his uniform and perform work, that can be done by a common private or N.C.O.
- Goering: Then one must act consequently and quick by freezing promotions, etc.
- Burgdorf: To promote unit commanders only.
- Goering: Then none will stay on the staff.
- Burgdorf: Privileged positions are to be had.
- Keitel: We have duties, which have to be performed by men who are really close to the front. We can't do anything with idiots.
- Burgdorf: It is much worse to take away the men who are fit for combat.
- Keitel: Would you read my order concerning the withdrawal of men, who are fit for combat. This is gradually becoming unbearable.
- Goering: I also can't let anyone remain with the staff, when he says: I can't be promoted while on the staff, I must prove myself as commanding officer of troops, I won't stay here, that you can't ask of me. Today I can lead a company, you suspended me for one year, now I am not able anymore to lead a unit, this is not my fault. That is what he will say.
- Burgdorf: We promote them. We take paymasters as C.O.'s of companies and battalions, as soon as they can do that.
- The Fuehrer: I deem it worse, to assemble so called officer's battalions these days. Because if they fail, they leave a very bad impression. That will be talked about in another unit. Then they are looked upon as disciplinary battalions. In my opinion it would be better to place them into other units. For this would be a definite defamation.

- Guderian: In the mortar battalion mentioned, there is as lieutenant colonel one who was my supply leader in Poland, France, and Russia, he was decorated, I myself decorated him with the Iron Cross, first class. This man was reported by one of his countrymen from Oberdonau because of alleged remarks which he never made, but which were said to be made before the Anschluss; therefore he was dismissed from his position, was placed into this mortar battalion at Wildflecken, and as a decent, splendid lieutenant colonel who in his case has been an outspokenly capable and especially splendid man, he is carrying mortars around, and he wrote me the most awful letters that were just heartbreaking. He says: I have been defamed without being guilty, without a logical investigation and verification, only because of a dirty fellow who reported me, and I don't know how to help myself. I believe, he has not been rehabilitated yet.
- The Fuehrer: Those are cases in which at the present we have to discharge 5/6 of our administration. It is not a question of defamations. The administration must be discharged, and one cannot decide that those 5/6 don't have to be soldiers anymore for the reason, that they can't get a military command corresponding their rank.
- Guderian: Then we must use them some place else. If a colonel can only be used as a leader of a battalion or company, he is going to get that rank and for the duration of this duty he takes off his shoulder-pieces.
- The Fuehrer: That is it.
- Goering: But he does not become a N.C.O.
- Guderian: No, he remains a colonel or general with full pay and all privileges.
- Goering: Never mind the pay.
- Fegelein: With the escort detachment there are a great many captains [Hauptsturmfuehrer] who served with the Leibstandarte in the rank of sergeants. There were never any difficulties.
- Goering: The Waffen-SS is an active formation. The other ones are inactive. When they are serving there, they are on reserve duty. One can be Oberpraes-

- ident and also can be corporal. This is something else. Not a single one will remain now in a command, because he says, I am running this risk.
- The Fuehrer: Under no circumstances would I release these men to go home in the first place. At a time, when I draft men up to almost 56 years, who are fit for limited combat service, I discharge 45-year-old ones, although they have been soldiers all the time. That doesn't work. In the second place, it is not plausible that I give a man, who is not able to lead a unit, a command of a unit in spite of it.
- Goering: And in the third place, I cannot say to the man, after I have taken them on the staff and who were able to lead a unit: Because you have been on the staff, you won't get a unit.
- The Fuehrer: If they are able to lead a unit, then they will get it.
- Goering: No, they were capable.
- The Fuehrer: Then they will be there again within the shortest time. That they must learn. This is no disgrace. I myself had to learn it too, to be Reichschancellor. I used to be party leader, my own boss, and as Reichschancellor I was a subordinate of the Reichspresident. For a period of time I was Regierungsrat in Braunschweig.
- Goering: But not an acting one.
- The Fuehrer: Don't say that. I have been very useful to the country.
- Burgdorf: We will put them all into training courses, to continue their training. In addition to that we constantly have a request to higher army authorities to release the ones concerned to us for two months, so that the man in question returns again. This way he won't become a stranger.
- The Fuehrer: Nowadays I can bring the born commanding officer on any staff,—when I return him, I cannot say, that he will skip all that. That is an impossibility. Because they must learn an awful lot. Anyone who is leading out there now, will confirm that. In a few months, however, he will naturally again prove his qualities as a leader. He will then again have the position corresponding to his rank, if he is the born commanding officer at

all. That is quite clear; it shouldn't be difficult. Now, take the born commanding officer, he'll be that corresponding to his rank, in no time at all.

Fegelein: The 10,000 officers and non-coms, the British and Americans in Sagan, will march in two hours and in formation. Besides that, there are also 1,500 men marching toward Sagan who were somewhere near the Government General. They were offered to remain with the Russians, because they couldn't be transported; they declined that and offered to fight on our side. . . .

Hewel: They want guns.

Jodl: Should we succeed in persuading the British and Americans to fight against the Russians, this will be a sensation.

Hewel: But this is not confirmed yet.

The Fuehrer: Perhaps somebody said something like that, and then it is immediately generalized. I am suspicious to the utmost.

Fegelein: If it works, O.K., we may do so.

The Fuehrer: But not, because someone said so.

Fegelein: The 1,500 marched on foot, they did not want to ride trucks, because they were afraid, they would be driven to the Russians. Therefore they marched, because they saw, that the Russians drove into a German civilian formation. This impressed them in such a way, that they left on foot.

Hewel: One should really let a few English officers go over.

Jodl: They may be airplane specialists.

End: 18:50 o'clock.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3787-PS

Vol. 67-3 [pencil note] 140/39. W/Le 29
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
AFA/L No. 1436/39 g Kdos IV

Berlin, 10th July 1939

Subject: 2nd Meeting of the Reich Defense Council

100 Copies.
84th copy.
(224) pencil

MOST SECRET

I enclose herewith the report of the 2nd meeting of the Reich Defense Council on 25th June 1939.

--1 appendix

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By order of and acting for

[signed] v. [illegible]

[stamp] Economic Staff Le

14th July 1939

No. 140/39

Distribution:

I. *Party:*

Fuehrer's Deputy

for the attention of SS-Brigadefuehrer

Knoblauch

1st Copy.

II. *Reich Departments and Prussian State Ministry:*

Chief of the Reich Chancellery

2nd Copy.

for the attention of Min. Dir. Kritzingner

for the Chief of the Reich Chancellery

3rd Copy.

President of the Secret Cabinet Council

Ministerpraesident General Field Marshal Goering

Commissioner for the Four Years Plan

and the Prussian State Ministry

for the attention of Min. Councillor

Bergbohm

4th & 5th Copies.

Reich Air Ministry and

C. in C. Air Force

Chief of the Ministry Office

for the attention of Generalmajor

Bodenschatz

6th & 7th Copies.

Foreign Office

for the attention of Legation Councillor

Dr. Baron v.d. Heyden-Rynsch.

8th Copy.

- General Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration
for the attention of Min. Section Head
Dr. Danckwerts. 9th-18th Copies.
For Direction Staff of the General
Plenipotentiary for Administration.
For Reich Ministry of the Interior.
For Reich Ministry of Justice.
For Reich Ministry of Education.
For Reich Ministry for Church Affairs.
For Reich Office for Planning.
- General Plenipotentiary for Economy
for the attention of Min. Director
Sarnow: 19th-29th Copies.
For Direction Staff of the General
Plenipotentiary for Economy.
For Reich Ministry of Economy.
For Reich Ministry of Food & Agriculture.
For Reich Ministry of Labour.
For Reich Chief Forrester.
For Reich Commissioner for Price Control.
- Reich Ministry of Finance
for the attention of Min. Section Head:
Geh. Rat. Dr. Bender. 30th Copy.
- Reich Ministry of Finance
for the attention of Finance President
von Dietz. 31st Copy.
- Reich Ministry of Transport—Motor Transport
and roads—
for the attention of Min. Section Head
Baur. 32nd Copy.
- Reich Ministry of Transport—railways—
for the attention of Min. Councillor
Dr. Ebeling. 33rd Copy.
- Reich Post Ministry
for the attention of Min. Councillor
Honold. 34th Copy.
- Reich Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda
for the attention of Oberstleutnant
Wentscher. 35th Copy.
- Reichsbank Directorate
for the attention of Reichsbank Director
Dr. Mueller. 36th Copy.

General Inspector of German roads
for the attention of Chief Government Councillor
for Construction (Oberreg. Baurat) Henne. 37th Copy.

III. *Armed Forces:*

OKH (Section 2 of Army General Staff).
38th-47th Copies.
OKM (A II). 48th-53rd Copies.
Reich Minister for Air and C. in C. Air Force.
(Section 2 of the Air Force General Staff).
54th-61st Copies.
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:
WZ. 62nd Copy.
WH. 63rd Copy.
Armed Forces Reserve [?] (WR). 64th Copy.
L (I, II, IV). 65th-70th Copies
Armed Forces Communications Service
(also to the Liaison Officer at the
Postal Ministry). 71st-73rd Copies
A/Ausl.Abw. 74th-77th Copies.
General Armed Forces Department
78th-79th Copies.
Armed Forces Staff. 80th-84th Copies
Reserve held by L IV. 85th-100th Copies.

REPORT
ON THE 2ND MEETING OF THE REICH
DEFENSE COUNCIL

Date: 23.6.1939. Commencement: 1110

Place: Large Conference Room of the Reich Air Ministry.

Termination: 1355

President: Ministerpraesident General Field Marshal Goering.

Persons present:

Supreme Reich Authorities

| | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| The Fuehrer's Deputy. | SS-Brigadefuehrer Knoblauch. |
| Chief of the Reich Chancellery. | Reichminister Dr. Lammers. |
| Ministerpraesident General | Secretary of State Koerner. |
| Field Marshal Goering. | Secretary of State Neumann. |
| Commissioner for the Four | Min. Councillor Bergbohm. |
| Years Plan. | |
| Prussian State Ministry. | Oberst.v.Schell. |
| | Oberstleutnant Schricker. |

| | |
|---|---|
| General Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration. | Reichsminister Dr. Frick. Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler. Secretary of State Pfundtner. Secretary of State Dr. Stuckart. General of the Regular Uniformed Police Daluege. Ministerial Section Head Danckwerts. |
| General Plenipotentiary for Economy. | Reichsminister Funk. Secretary of State Dr. Posse. Secretary of State Dr. Syrup. Secretary of State Dr. Landfried. Secretary of State Backe. Ministerial Councillor Dr. Burandt. |
| Reich Ministry of Finance. | Reichsminister Count Schwerin v.Krosigk. |
| Reich Ministry of Transport. | Reichsminister Dr. Dorpmueller. Secretary of State Kleinmann. |
| General Inspector of German Roads. | Professor Dr. Ing. Todt. |
| ARMED FORCES [Wehrmacht] | |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. | Generaloberst Keitel. |
| WFA (Secretariat Reich Defense Council). | Oberst d.G. Warlimont. Oberst d.G. Gause. Oberstleutnant v.Mauch. Generalmajor Thomas. |
| Armed Forces Staff. | |
| Supreme Command of the Army. | |
| Army General Staff. | General of Artillery Halder. Oberst i.G. Gercke. |
| General Army Department. | Oberst d.G. Burdach. |
| Supreme Command of the Navy. | Grossadmiral Dr.h.c.Raeder. |
| Reich Minister for Air and C. in C. Air Force. | Generaloberst Milch. General der Flieger Stumpff. Generalmajor Bodenschatz. |

CONTENTS

| <i>DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR:</i> | <i>Page</i> |
|--|-------------|
| Directives of the President of Reich Defense Council. | |
| Principles governing the distribution and employment of the population in wartime. | |

Employment of labour in the case of mobilization; Schedule of manpower for the war.

Effect of the schedule of manpower on the continued direction of economy.

Economy in personnel in public administration.

Increase in the efficiency of the *Transport Service*.

Suspension of the Secret Protection of the *Reich Defense Laws*

A. INTRODUCTION

Ministerpraesident *General Field Marshal Goering* emphasized, in a preamble that, according to the Fuehrer's wishes, the *Reich Defense Council* was the *determining body* in the Reich for all questions of preparation for war. It is to discuss only the most important questions of Reich Defense. They will be worked out by the Reich Defense Committee.

Meetings of the Reich Defense Council are to be convened only for those decisions which are unavoidable. It is urged that the Departmental Chiefs themselves be present.

B. DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR

I. The *President* announced the following directives to govern the *distribution* and employment of the *population* in wartime.

1. The *total strength of the Armed Forces* is determined by the Fuehrer. It includes only half the number of those fit and liable for military service. Nevertheless, their disposition will involve difficulties for economy, the administration, and the whole of the civil sphere.

2. *When a schedule of manpower* is made out, the basis on which the question is to be judged is how the remaining number, after those required for the Armed Forces have been withdrawn, can be most suitably employed.

3. Of equal importance to the requirements of the Armed Forces are those of the *Armament Industry*. It, above all, must be organized in peace-time, materially and as regards personnel, in such a way that its *production* does not decrease but *increases* immediately with the outbreak of war.

4. The *direction of labour* to the vital war armament industry and to other civilian requirements is the main task of the *General Plenipotentiary for Economy*.

a. War armament covers not only the works producing war materials, but also those producing synthetic rubber (Buna),

armament production tools [Waffenbetriebsmittel], hydrogenation works, coal mining etc.

b. (1) As a rule, no essential and irreplaceable workers may be taken away from "*war decisive*" factories, on whose production depends the course of the war, unless they can be replaced. *Coal mining* is the most urgent work. Every worker who is essential to coal mining is "indispensable".

Note. *Coal mining* has even now become the key point of the whole of the armament industry, of communications and of export. If the necessary labour is not made available for it now, the most important part of the export trade, the export of coal, will cease. The purchase of coal in Poland will stop. The correct distribution of labour is determinative. In order to be able to man these key points with the right people, severe demands will shortly be submitted to the Fuehrer which, even in the current mobilization year, will under certain circumstances, lead to an exceptional direction of the war, e.g. to the immobilization of lorries and to the closing down of unessential factories owing to lack of coal.

In addition, there is the supplying of Italy and other countries such as Scandinavia with coal (to maintain the German supplies of iron).

(2) The remaining "*war essential*" industries can and must suffer losses, as must the "*vital*" industries which are of *importance to the life of the people*,—cf. No. 23—.

Note by the Reich Defense Committee. The industries will be combined under the term "*war economy industries*,"—cf. the "General principles for cooperation between the OKW and the General Plenipotentiary for Economy in the preparation of war economy industries for war" dated 3.5.1939, which was approved by the President of the Reich Defense Council, and the "*Principles for the distribution and direction of the Population in wartime*," dated 10.6.1939.

c. (1) An important and valuable *specialist worker* will be of more use in his place of work than at the fighting front. The greater number of specialist workers must be drawn from those who are no longer liable for military service, that is from the *older age groups*.

(2) A second category of workers liable for military service will be called up during the war after their replacements have been trained. A decisive role is played by the extensive *preliminary training* and *retraining* of workers.

(3) Preparations must be made for replacing the mass of other workers liable for military service, even by drawing on an increased number of women. There are also disabled servicemen.

(4) *Compulsory work for women* in wartime is of decisive importance. It is important to proceed to a great extent with the training of women in war-essential work, as replacements and to augment the number of male workers.

d. In order to avoid confusion when mobilization takes place, persons *working in war-essential branches* e.g. administration, communication, police, food, will not at first be removed. It is essential to establish the degrees of urgency and the standard of value.

e. In the interests of the auxiliary civilian service, provided by every European people to gain and maintain the lead in the decisive initial weeks of a war, efforts must, in this way, be made to ensure by a trustworthy organization, easily understood, that every German in wartime not only possesses his mobilization orders but has also been thoroughly *prepared* for his wartime activity. The works must be adapted to receive the replacements and additional workers.

II. The *President of the Reich Defense Committee*, Generaloberst Keitel, Chief of the OKW, made a report explaining the "Principles for the distribution and employment of the population in wartime," issued by the Reich Defense Council on 10th June 1939.

III. The *President* allotted the following tasks:

5. In 4 weeks time, Secretary of State Dr. Syrup will be requested to make a conclusive report to the President of the Reich Defense Council on the problem of personnel in connection with the *employment of women*.

6. The General Plenipotentiary for Economy is given the task of settling what work is to be given to *prisoners* of war, to those in prison, concentration camp and penitentiary. According to a statement by the Reichsfuehrer-SS, greater use will be made of the concentration camps in wartime. The 20,000 inmates will be employed mainly in workshops inside the concentration camps.

IV. *Secretary of State Reich Minister of Labor Dr. Syrup* made a report on the *employment of labor* in the event of mobilization and the schedule of manpower for the war.

7. The figures for the *schedule of manpower* drawn up experimentally, could be only of a preparatory character and merely give certain guiding principles. The basis of a population of 79 million was taken. Of these, 56.5 million are between the ages of 14 and 65. It is also possible to draw upon men over the age of 65 and upon minors of between 13 and 14. Defectives and the infirm must be deducted from the 56.5 million. Most prisoners are already employed in industry. The greatest deduction is that of 11 million mothers with children under 14. After these deduc-

tions have been made, there remains an employable population of 43.5 million:

26.2 million men, after deducting 7 million members of the Armed Forces: 19.2.

17.3 million men, after deducting 250,000 nurses etc.: 17.1 for the whole of Germany's *employable* economic civil life.

The President does not consider women over the age of 60 as employable.

8. The number of workers at present *employed* and of employees (2/3 of those gainfully employed) distributed over 20 large branches of industry, amounts roughly to the following: 24 million men (excluding 2 million service men), 14 million women.

9. No information was then available regarding the number which the *Armed Forces* will take from the individual branches of industry. Therefore an estimate was made of the numbers remaining in the individual branches of industry after 5 million servicemen had been called up.

The *President's* demand, that the exact number liable to be drawn upon be established, is being complied with. These enquiries are not secret apart from figures given and formations.

10. About 13 economic groups can support the *deduction* of approx. 2 million men apart from service men called up, especially the building trade, whose peace-time strength of 2.6 million can be cut to 1 million, to the advantage mainly of mining and agriculture. Builders will be required only for roads, expansion of the war industry and the like.

11. Apart from the 13.8 million *women* at present employed a further 3.5 million unemployed women, who are included on the card index of the population, can be employed.

2 million women would have to be *redirected*: e.g. a transfer can be made to agriculture and to the metal and chemical industry, from the textile, clothing and ceramic industries, from small, trading, insurance, and banking businesses and from the number of women in domestic service.

12. The lack of workers in *agriculture*, from which about 25% of the physically fit male workers will be withdrawn, must be made up by women (2 in the place of 1 man) and prisoners of war. No foreign workers can be counted on. The Armed Forces are requested to release to a great extent works managers and specialist workers such as milkers, tractor drivers (35% are still liable for call up).

13. The *President* emphasized that factory managers, police, and the Armed Forces must make preparations for the employment of *prisoners-of-war*.

14. In the *agricultural* sphere, preparations must also be made to *relieve* individual employment through help from neighboring farms, systematic use of all machines and making a store of spare parts available.

15. The *President* announced that, in the war, hundreds of thousands of workers from non-war economy concerns in the *Protectorate* are to be employed under supervision in Germany, particularly in agriculture, and housed together in hutments. General Field Marshal Goering will obtain a decision from the Fuehrer on this matter.

16. The speaker recommended the increased expansion of *Women's Labor Service* in peacetime, in contrast to the men's, which is to be decreased. The girls are to be employed by the peasants, not in groups but singly.

17. *a.* The result of the *procedure* of establishing *indispensable* and guaranteed workers is at present as follows: of 1,172,000 applications for indispensability, 727,000 have been approved and 233,000 rejected; 8.1 million peacetime personnel and 1.9 supplementary workers have been guaranteed. These are mainly distributed as follows: war economy industries 8.13 million, administration 890,000, security and auxiliary service, air defense 320,000, additional police defense 185,000, civilians attached to the Armed Forces 740,000.

Note. Reserves for the additional Police Defense will be reduced to 100,000 persons.

b. The great *fluctuation* in labor has been considerably decreased by the restriction on periods of notice and recruiting contained in the latest decrees and, in the case of mobilization, is stopped altogether.

c. The *orders* to supplementary personnel to report for duty are ready and tied up in bundles at the Labor Offices.

18. *a.* There can be production premium in connection with the *wage* schedule to be fixed for the war.

b. *Family accommodation* will be made to depend on the employment of members of the family.

19. *Service men, no longer fit for service in the field*, are to be placed in employment in Germany as soon as possible.

20. *New occupational recruits* will, in wartime, be directed only into war economy factories.

21. When labor is being regrouped, it is important and, with specialist workers, essential that the workers are *re-trained* for their work in the new factory, in order to avoid setbacks in the initial months of the war. After a few months have passed, it must be possible to replace most of the specialist workers.

22. The speakers asked that the table of figures for the schedule of personnel be *checked* by all authorities, in order to gain a complete and detailed picture.

23. The *President* remarked that factory managers, even if they can in wartime count only on their older and most valuable workers, must not neglect the *training of new young workers* and must make preparations for the training of older age groups as specialist workers.

V. *The General Plenipotentiary for Economy*, Reich Minister of Economy Funk, stated his *opinion* of the consequences of the schedule of manpower, from the point of view of *the carrying on of industry*.

24. *a.* In accordance with the verbal agreements made with the OKW, the regulations regarding *indispensable personnel* have been laid down, and the certificates of indispensability issued.

b. The *regrouping* of labor must lead to decreases in production. The *re-training* will be carried out at high pressure after determining those to be called up for war service.

25. In reply to the request by the speaker that when withdrawing workers for the Naval *Dockyards*, more consideration should be shown for the important sections of industry particularly Export and Newspaper concerns, the *President* pointed out the necessity of carrying out the Naval Building Program as ordered by the Fuehrer, in its entirety.

26. Secretary of State Backe, *Reich Ministry of Food*, stated the percentage of *workers in agriculture* liable for military service to be 30-34%, and not only 25%—see para. 12. He repeated the request that factory managers, milkers and tractor drivers be released; of 3.3% “indispensable” applications, only one-half had been approved.

VI. *The General Plenipotentiary for Administration*, Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, dealt with *the saving of labor* in the public *administration*.

27. The task is primarily a problem of *organization*. As can be seen from the surveys showing how the authorities, economic and social services are organized, which were submitted to those attending the Conference, there are approximately 50 different

kinds of officials in the District Administration (Kreisinstanz), each quite independent of the other—an impossible state of affairs. Formerly there were in the State two main divisions, the state Civil Service and the Wehrmacht. After the seizure of power the Party and the permanent Organizations (Reich Food Estate etc.) were added to these, with all their machinery from top to bottom. In this way the number of public posts and officials was increased many times over. This makes Public Service more difficult.

28. Since the war tasks have increased enormously, the organizing of total war naturally requires much more labor, even in the Public Administration, than in 1914. But it is an impossibility that this system should have increased its numbers 20- to 40-fold, in the lowest grade alone. For this reason the Reich Ministry of the Interior is striving for the *co-ordination of administration*. The officials of the general and domestic administration are the backbone of the administration, also in time of war. Difficulties arise through the numerous authorities who, from the highest to the lowest, all make a particular effort to increase their numbers. That is a heritage from the Liberal system, where every Specialist Department endeavored to build up its own official organization. At the very least there must be extensive co-ordination of all the authorities in the middle grade, such as has been introduced in the Ostmark and Sudeten Gau Law. In the Kreis administration the authorities must be co-ordinated as much as possible. For then in this way difficulties can already be smoothed out at this stage or by middle grade authorities, without calling upon the central authorities or even the chief state administration.

29. Instead of further discussions before the whole assembly, the forming of a small *commission* was recommended, which will make definite proposals. Extensive preparatory work has been undertaken.

Note by the Reich Defense Committee. The commission came into operation under letter OKW WFA No. 1465/39 Top Secret L IVa dated 27.6.1939.

President: Secretary of State Dr. Stuckart,

Plenipotentiary for Administration.

Members: Fuehrer's Deputy.

Commissioner for the Four Years' Plan.

Plenipotentiary for Economy.

Reich Minister for Finance.

Reich Minister of the Interior.

OKW.

30. The *President* requested that the commission's proposals be submitted. It was an important section of the preparation for war.

VII. *The speech by the GBW [Plenipotentiary for Economy]* provided for in the agenda regarding the importance of the officials of the GBW, the factories and organizations, the directing of new occupational recruits (shortage of labor, migration from the country, Women's Labor Service), training of youth, stepping-up of production, procedure for obtaining maximum efficiency, supply position, was not given.

C. INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

Report by the Chief of the Transport Service in wartime, Oberst Gercke, Chief of Department 5 (Transport Department) of the Army General Staff.

31. The result of the examination of the work necessary for strategic concentration a year and a half ago showed that the transport service could not meet all the *demands* made on it by the *Armed Forces*. The Minister of Transport agreed. The 1938 section of the Four Year Program will presumably be completed in August 1939.

32. Shortly after this program was drawn up, *demands were made on the Wehrmacht*, which changed completely the usual employment of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of a war. Troops had to be brought to the frontier, in the shortest possible time, in numbers which had until then been completely unforeseen. The Wehrmacht was able to fulfill these demands by means of organizational measures, but transport could not.

33. *In the Transportation sphere Germany is at the moment not ready for war.*

a. In the case of the three operations in 1938/1939 there was no question of an actual strategic concentration. The troops were transported a long time beforehand near to the area of strategic concentration by means of *camouflaged measures*.

b. This stop gap is of *no use whatsoever*, when the time limit cannot be laid down and known a long time beforehand, but an *unexpected* and *almost immediate* military decision is required instead. According to the present situation transport is not in a position despite all preparations, to bring up the troops.

34. a. There was now a considerably *extended program* to be drawn up for 5 years, as against that of the year before. This means the utmost which can be achieved, both as regards manufacture, and in the way of train personnel and rolling stock by the Reichsbahn.

b. Nevertheless this program is not expected to be *sufficient* for the demands made by the Wehrmacht and Industry. The speed of the mobilization of the Wehrmacht has made this mobilization more complicated. And in addition there is the speeding up of the strategic concentration.

c. In addition to this, shipping and lorries must be utilized more than ever before. And at the same time to ensure the transportation of the speedily mobilized Wehrmacht and Industry, better use must be made of rolling stock by means of a more extensive employment of *lorries* in the supply and distribution traffic of the Reichsbahn.

35. The renewal of *installations* and tracks, only 50% of which is at the moment possible, is, from 1940 onwards, to be included in the rearmament work.

36. Mainly Industry but also the Army and Air Force, are interested in the *water-ways*, in connection with the distribution of fuel reserves and the replenishing of stocks. The demands of the Sections of the Wehrmacht for the allocation of shipping space can be met in the main during the current year.

37. a. In *order of importance* in the development of the waterways, the connection from the *Weser to the Danube* is, from the military point of view, as important, if not more important, than the connection from the *Rhine to the Danube*. The usefulness of the Rhine is questionable, for the time being there is no water communication from the North to the South East.

b. The Armed Forces have a further particular interest in the *Central Canal* (Mittellandkanal). It cannot be put to sufficient use for the war industry situated thereby means of the ships' lifting gear on the Elbe alone.

c. The *Hansa Canal* must be connected above Hamburg if the transportation of war industry is to be carried out without a hitch.

If the Elbe—Trave Canal is separated from the Hansa Canal by the port of Hamburg, the efficiency of the installations will decrease.

38. In order that troops may be moved in *lorries* speedily and without hindrance, the *highways* which secured the connections from East to West and from North to South must be determined in the same way as are the transport routes in connection with the railways; they, together with the Reichsautobahnen, must be developed to a greater degree.

Cross roads and level crossings are to be abolished, especially at the exit areas [Auslaufgebieten]. This matter will be taken up further by the Reich Defense Committee.

39. The *President* remarked that, even in peacetime, certain vital *supply stores* of Industry and the Armed Forces are to be transferred to the war industrial centers to economize in transport later on.

The VJP will provide for the further development of the shipping pool so that it can be used principally for reinforcements. The Central Canal is of special importance. Numerous other canals could also be used. AA guns could be employed, on inland ships, to good effect. Unfortunately, many bridges are too low; this must be remedied. At any rate, it is urged that the waterways be included in the forefront of the subjects to be considered by the departments.

40. a. *The Reich Minister for Transport*, Dr. Dorpmueller, explained that the reason for the shortage of rolling stock was that the railway network had been considerably increased. Furthermore, the additional Reich territories required a new communications system and new railway lines. The materials there needed to be considerably supplemented. The delay was caused by the fact that the Reich Ministry of Transport received neither steel, nor material, nor personnel. For work on the railways and the waterways was *not* described as *essential to the State*.

b. The *President* gave the assurance that, under certain circumstances, vital *sections* of the work of the Reich Ministry of Transport would be declared essential to the State.

41. To sum up, the President affirmed that all essential points had been cleared up at this meeting. The directive of the Reich Defense Council for preparing *means of transportation* for war was issued on June 23rd, 1939: RVR OKW/WFA No. 1371/39 Secret L IV dated 24.6.1939.

D. THE LAST ITEM ON THE AGENDA

The results of the suspension of the *secret protection (Geheim-schutz)* of the *Reich Defense Law* and measures for facilitating commercial intercourse are dealt with by the letter from the Reich Defense Committee OKW WFA/L No. 1114/39 Most Secret IVA dated 26.6.1939.

Vice Admiral Canaris
Chief of the Office for Foreign Intelligence and Counter Intelligence in OKW.
Berlin, 13th Dec 1939
No. 5389/12.39. Secret Abw. III.

Dear State Secretary:

On the occasion of an official visit to Bucharest the following came to my knowledge:

1. The Landesgruppenleiter of the NSDAP there has appointed the Stuetzpunktleiter in Konstanz—Mr Cropp—to take up intelligence activities in Roumanian and foreign industrial undertakings as well as in the harbor area of Konstantza.

This activity is also to extend to the collecting of information regarding the enemy Espionage Organization, for instance the Intelligence Service identified in Roumania.

The duties of the Landesgruppenleiter are laid down in a strictly confidential letter, which sealed with the official Stamp of the Legation, was handed by the Landesgruppe to the Roumanian Postal Authorities for despatch. The letter was opened by the Roumanian Censor and thus came to the knowledge of the Sigurantz. A copy of the Landesgruppenleiter's letter is enclosed herewith—Enclosure 1.

I should like to take this opportunity of pointing out in general that the gaining of military intelligence abroad and in particular also the intelligence reconnaissance against the foreign military intelligence services are a matter for the Counter Intelligence Departments under my command.

2. Two cases were mentioned to me, of racial Germans, who as a result of their longstanding connections with Roumanian authorities, render valuable service in the interests of German War Economy or of counter-sabotage work in the oil districts, voluntarily giving up their positions or being more or less forced to do this by the Auslandsorganisation.

Details given in enclosures 2 and 3.

I should be very much obliged to you if you would let me know the result of your decisions.

Heil Hitler!

(signed) CANARIS

3 enclosures.

After dispatch V.A.A.

Enclosure 1.

Contents: strictly confidential directives for you.

Bucharest, 25th October 1939.

The Landesgruppenleiter.

To the Precinct Leader (Zellenleiter) in Konstantza, Party Member Joachim Cropp:

On the 9-12th October conferences took place with the Senior Party Functionaries, or their deputies of the South Eastern and Southern European Groups, at the offices of the Direction of the Auslandsorganisation. I subsequently received direct instructions from the competent office of the Direction of the Auslandsorganisation.

During the war every National Socialist abroad must directly serve the Fatherland, either through propaganda for the German cause or by counteracting enemy measures.

Propaganda is to extend to the spreading of news within the colony and through it to the Roumanians with the possible eventual intervention of racial Germans. Together with the latest news the German interpretation of the principal discussions with the enemy powers are first of all to be circulated as extensively as possible. Insofar as the possibility exists of playing German music in your district either in inns or elsewhere, portable gramophones and records can be provided, with the obligation to use only the records provided free of charge by the Germans.

In exceptional cases teleprinters can be delivered to larger Groups of racial Germans. Naturally German films are to be supported to the utmost. Foreign newspapers and statements by enemy politicians must be followed up by you and your assistants and the essential points refuted in a suitable manner, which can often be effected without any further trouble by the emphasizing of points from the recent speeches of our leading men, Goebbels and Ribbentrop.

As everywhere else it is extremely important to know where the enemy is and what he is doing. It has been ascertained that the I.S. [Intelligence Service] has attempted, sometimes successfully, to obtain admittance into the activities of the Party Groups and associate organizations for seemingly trustworthy persons. It is therefore necessary that you thoroughly investigate not only all those persons coming into contact with you who are not very well known to you, but more than anything else you must put any new person appearing in your circle, visitors etc. under a magnifying glass, even possibly let him be taken in hand by a comrade, whose absolute Nazi convictions are not generally known to the

man in the street, i.e. to lay a trap for the visitor by a seemingly hostile attitude towards the Third Reich on the part of the comrade.

You are to report everything that comes to your notice, even though it may at first sight appear very insignificant. Rumors suddenly arising also come within this category, however false they may be.

An important section of both you and your comrades work must be industrial concerns and business enterprises etc. Not only because you can transmit your propaganda very well in this way. Particularly in such concerns can you easily pick up information concerning strange visitors. It is known that the enemy Espionage Organizations especially, are active in industrial circles, both as regards collecting information and carrying out acts of sabotage. Comrades, with close connections with the Shipping and Forwarding Companies, are particularly suitable for this work. It goes without saying that you must be meticulous and cautious when selecting your assistants.

In this connection a reference to Inter-state Organizations and Exchange Organizations is relevant. It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the foreign Intelligence Service. A connection between members of the colony and such Organizations and Unions must definitely be prevented, without this measure in any way becoming public.

During the months of October and November a declaration in the following words is to be read at the meeting of the Ortsgruppen and Stuetzpunkte of the Party, in the Party Offices, its organizations and associate organizations.

“The foreign Intelligence Service (Espionage centers) have been attempting for some time to obtain information in every sphere from members of the NSDAP, its organizations and associate organizations, on things which are to be kept secret. When associating with foreigners the greatest caution and reserve should be employed. It should be borne in mind that the heads of Espionage posts with the object of camouflaging themselves have wormed their way into senior positions in such foreign organizations as appear from their attitude and activities to be friendly inclined towards present-day Germany. Every Party Member and Member of an organization is bound to report immediately to his Ortsgruppenleiter or Sturmfuehrer should a foreigner or a person otherwise unknown to him and of suspicious appearance approach him with the object of obtaining informa-

tion regarding the domestic matters of the Party. Refraining from reporting a case of espionage which has become known will result in criminal proceedings being taken. In the same way personal enquiries by Party Members into cases of espionage are not allowed and under certain circumstances punishable. The particular duty as regards reporting such cases laid upon the various Professional Groups (e.g. Armaments Industry) is not affected by this.

Statements regarding domestic, foreign, military, and economic policies and other matters are not to be made to racial comrades who have no official connection with the things mentioned. Seemingly harmless information on things which are not common knowledge to everyone can be of value to the enemy intelligence service. Everyone who irresponsibly gives the enemy Intelligence Service an opportunity to obtain information about things which are to be kept secret, is guilty of at least high treason through negligence. Quite apart from the fact that for high treason the most severe punishments are laid down, every National Socialist carries the heavy responsibility towards himself and his people of preventing anything which could be harmful to the interests of the Reich.

Any National Socialist punished for high treason, even if only guilty of negligence, will be thrown out of the Party for all time in disgrace."

Even though it is very much the duty of all nationals to serve their country by means of daily propaganda, it should be most emphatically impressed upon them that they should refrain from making any statements which might be of value to the foreign Intelligence Service.

I request that any attacks on the honor or the self-conceit of the French Army be avoided. The main emphasis lies on the following train of thought:

1. The French Army has an impossible task before it—with or without the Eastern front;
2. The Englishman is fighting for his political aims with foreign forces on foreign soil.

Furthermore it should be continually emphasized by us, that now as before, Italy is to be regarded as a full military ally and is to be esteemed in consideration of her attitude up to now. Furthermore every German must have the iron conviction that the decision between victory or defeat is decided right from the

very beginning, i. e. that Germany will *definitely* win this fight, and that furthermore every racial German wherever he may be, must contribute his utmost towards the bringing of the war to a successful conclusion.

As regards relations with Russia sarcastic remarks from a third party should be answered thus: that we were successful in doing in a few days that which our enemies attempted without success for months, in other words in bringing Russia to our side. We have thus at one fell swoop broken the encirclement which England worked on for years, and assured ourselves of a rich country for the supply of raw materials. But over and above that—and this should be particularly emphasized—we have created the basis for an understanding with the Russian World Power, which will always be historically valuable for Germany. There is every sign, as the Reich Foreign Minister stressed, that this alliance will take effect in its present hardly perceptible form.

There has been a lot of talk in Roumania about the resettling of racial Germans, in view of the Fuehrer's measures in other countries. These measures have nothing at all to do with Roumania or at least not in the immediate future. Nevertheless, I give you and your immediate colleagues the task of investigating which groups and families among the racial Germans in your district are desirous of resettling, in which connection the worthiness of the individual women and men in question is of interest.

I stated at the beginning that this report is strictly confidential. This is to be understood thus; not one word of this report must under any circumstances come to the ears of anyone whose German loyalty is not assured. On the other hand I give you and your comrades official instructions to act with all the means and power at your disposal.

Further I would draw your attention to the fact that in future the drafting of any sort of certificate of reliability requires my permission.

I await your further reports, which however must only be sent to me through absolutely reliable personal channels or through our Consulates.

[service stamp]

Heil Hitler!

(signed) KONRADI
Landesgruppenleiter

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3803-PS

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA
Office of the Judge Advocate
APO 777, U. S. Army

15 March 1946

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: Office of United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg APO
163, U. S. Army.

1. Transmitted herewith original letter of Kaltenbrunner, and
letter of transmittal from Mayor of Vienna.

2. For your information, Bleschke is presently confined at
Camp Marcus W. Orr, Salzburg, Austria.

FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE:

ARTHUR T. RATCLIFFE

Major JAGD
Asst Judge Advocate

Telephone VIENNA A-20472

Copy to Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Branch,
Wiesbaden

Vienna, on the 11 March 1946

Mayor of the City of Vienna:

To the Legal Division USFA:

Vienna IX, Otto Wagnerplatz

I permit myself to refer to you a letter of the former Chef of
the Sicherheitspolice and of the SD, Dr. Kaltenbrunner to
Blaschke, the former mayor of the city of Vienna, with the request
to transmit same to the court at Nurnberg. This letter was found
in the files of the Viennese City Hall and is in my opinion an im-
portant document of proof for the war criminal case at Nurnberg.
I transmit this letter to you since Nurnberg lies in the American
occupied zone.

A copy of this letter goes at the same time to the minister of
Justice, Dr. Geroe.

The mayor of the city of Vienna:

s/ KOERNER

3803-PS

Chief of the Security Police and of the SD
IV A 4b—3433/42g (1446)

(In reply refer to above and date)

Berlin SW 68, 30 June 1944

Prinz-Albrecht Strasse 8

Telephone: 12 00 40

SECRET

[Stamp]

Immediate action

TO: Buergermeister of the City of Vienna, SS Brigadefuehrer
Blaschke, Vienna.

SUBJECT: Assignment of Labor Force to War essential work
in the city of Vienna.

RE: Your letter of 7 June 1944

Dear Blaschke!

For the special reasons cited by you I have in the meantime given orders to ship several evacuation transports to Vienna-Strasshof. SS Brigadier Dr. Dellbruegge had, as a matter of fact, already written to me concerning the same matter.

At the present 4 shipments with approx. 12,000 Jews are pending. They should reach Vienna within the next few days.

According to previous experience it is estimated that 30% of the transport will consist of Jews able to work (approx. 3,600 in this case) who can be utilized for the work in question, whereby it shall be understood that they are subject *to be removed at any time*. It is obvious that only a well guarded, enclosed place of work and a secured camplike billeting arrangement can be utilized and this is an absolute prerequisite for making these Jews available. Women unable to work and children of these Jews who all are kept in readiness for special action [Sonderaktion], and therefore one day will be removed again, have to stay in the guarded camp also during the day.

Please discuss further details with the State police Headquarters in Vienna, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Ebner and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Krumey from the Special Action Command Hungary [Sondereinsatzkommando Ungarn] who at the present happens to be in Vienna.

I hope that these transports will be of help to you in carrying out these urgent work details of yours.

Heil Hitler!

(signed) Your Kaltenbrunner

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3814-PS

At present at Neuhaus, 17.2.45

I/1

To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Dr. Lammers,
Berlin
Reich Chancellery

Dear Dr. Lammers,

Now that the tremendous difficulties have been overcome to some extent, the last small remainder of my Cracow Staff has arrived at its evacuation point in Neuhaus near Schliersee. I desire to inform you that I await definite instructions from the Fuehrer.

I will prepare a report for you of all happenings in connection with the evacuation of Cracow and will forward it as soon as possible.

My main duty appears to me to be to see that all officials and employees in any way superfluous, who served in Cracow right up to the end, are now immediately further utilized in suitable employment in the service of the Fuehrer and the Reich. For the total administration of the Generalgouvernement, the evacuation point is at Dresden in the building of the office of the "Landes" Agricultural Workers' Association [Landesbauernschaft] for Saxony, Ammonstrasse 8.

I am pleased to be able to inform you that efforts to save all the important documents, both from Cracow and the evacuation point Seichau in Silesia, from falling into enemy hands were successful.

With kindest regards,

Heil Hitler!

yours

[signed] Frank.

Berlin, W.8. 15th February 45.
Voss-Str. 6.

The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Rk. 202 D g.

SECRET

To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank.
Dear Party Member Frank,

The High Command of the 4th Panzer Army has sent the documents, copies of which are enclosed, to the Director of the Party Chancellery. Reich Director Bormann has passed them on to

me. I would ask you to let me have your opinion as soon as ever possible with regard to the accusations made in the enclosures.

Furthermore, I should have been glad had you advised me and kept me informed of the transfer of your Department and the other steps which you took in connection with the development of the military situation. I would ask you also to let me have further information as soon as possible in this connection.

Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully
Dr. Lammers.

Copy to RK. 202 D g

SECRET

COPY

High Command of the 4th Panzer Army, NS-Fuehrungsoffizier
Army H. Q. 6. February 1945

Personal

Major Hess

On my trips to the rear positions at Jauer and Liegnitz, numerous complaints were made to me by the Party and the civilian population regarding the unbelievable conduct of the Frank Government of the Generalgouvernement in its evacuation quarters, ["Ausgleichsquartier" in the German text has been translated as though it were "Ausweichquartier"]—Seichau Castle, 10 km. North West of Jauer, as well as regarding its cowardly flight on 23.1.45., so that, in order to curb the rumours, I had the matter investigated by an NS-Fuehrungsoffizier and the witnesses were interrogated. I am sending you enclosed the most important papers.

The interrogations revealed that the rumours circulating in the districts regarding the extravagant excesses and the over-hasty flight were actually, for the most part, founded on fact.

But, unfortunately, no one had yet found the courage to report these occurrences officially. It was also evident that all the witnesses were most cautious and timid in their statements, as high ranking persons were concerned in this matter.

Together with many art treasures, large quantities of drink and foodstuffs, an eight cylinder car (Special Mercedes motor, luxury model) was left around and even secret documents and press information. What was particularly disgraceful in connection with this over-hasty departure was the fact that this

place was not endangered and an evacuation of the civilian population from Liegnitz had not even been thought of, quite apart from the fact that in these difficult days, such behaviour by leading persons must have resulted justifiably in considerable bitterness among the population. I need, therefore, hardly say anything about the words accompanying these rumours.

[signature illegible]

COPY

Seichau, 3.2.1945

At noon on 23.1.45, I was telephoned by the Office of the Generalgouvernement to come to the Castle immediately so as to take some things over. When I arrived at the Castle with the Director of the office of the National Socialist People's Welfare (MSV-Amtsleiter Thomas), the Governor General and his staff had already departed without the many things that were left behind having been handed over to anyone.

It was very much discussed in the village that, at the Castle, large quantities of all kinds of foodstuffs had been hoarded by the Staff. I saw myself how the rooms of the Castle looked after the departure of the guests, and everything that was left. At the request of Count v.Richthofen, we saw to it that knowledge of these circumstances did not become still more public.

The Burgomaster
signed. CONRAD

When the Governor General's staff was here, the inhabitants of Seichau were already extremely annoyed as the former were mostly drunk, and in this state they, among other things, collided with the gateway of the Dominion at Seichau in cars causing large cases of rationed foodstuffs to fall into the mud, together with hundreds of cigars—the aforementioned gentlemen simply drove on and just left the said articles lying there. Witnesses of this incident are available.

signed. THOMAS.

Local district leader of the National Socialist People's
Welfare

(Ortsgruppenleiter NSV)

Checked:
Signed: Signature
Hauptmann

COPY

Report of Count Manfred v. Richthofen, Seichau Castle.

My house was requisitioned by the Foreign Office in August of last year as evacuation point for the Governor General Dr. Frank and his office. Thereupon large transports were sent here and the goods stored in the rooms of my house. These were mostly art treasures which came here for storage, later, however, also a large quantity of stocks of foodstuffs and alcohol. It made the worst impression imaginable that, with the war situation as it then was and its privations to which we in the homeland here have been subjected, such large stocks were hoarded here, which could have had nothing to do with the service obligations of the Governor.

At first, there were only a few people of the Cracow office here at various intervals, until the time when, on the surrender of Cracow during the general retreat on the East front, a considerable number of persons arrived here in January from Cracow and even the Governor General himself and his attendants went to his evacuation point here. It had been unpleasantly striking here that various employees of the Cracow Office lived lavishly with stocks of foodstuffs and alcohol they had brought with them and this, in view of the current war situation, caused very bad blood among the local inhabitants.

The occupation of the house by Reich Minister Frank and his immediate staff lasted only a few days, up to the time when, on about 23.1.45., the sudden flight took place and the house was left in complete chaos. In most of the rooms there were lying around openly foodstuffs, household articles, opened bottles of schnaps and articles of personal use, which could no longer be packed and removed. In one of the corridors several cases of schnaps were left behind.

Owing to the fact that, immediately after the departure of the Reich Minister, the house began to be crowded by a stream of refugees and soldiers, it was not possible for me, in that short space of time, to put the house in order.

Soldiers, among whom there was a group of volunteers from the East who were not under supervision, plundered the stocks of alcohol lying around and also broke into the Governor's locked store room.

The foodstuffs, objects d'art, typewriters, writing materials, and documents which were left behind here by the Staff of the Governor General were not handed over to me for custody in the proper manner.

When they left, the Adjutant of the Governor General called out to me that the motor vehicles left behind were at the disposal of the Armed Forces.

signed. v. Richthofen.

COPY

2.2.1945

Report of Economy Inspector Heinrich Gross, Seichau Castle.

In August 1944 an evacuation point for the General Gouvernement was set up at Seichau Castle.

In the months which followed, lorry loads and railway consignments arrived continually, which brought objects d'art, but mainly all kinds of foodstuffs and large quantities of alcohol.

Between August and the beginning of January, the only visitors here were one or two men from the Generalgouvernement.

In the middle of January, the Governor General himself came to Seichau with his immediate staff (about 20 to 25 persons) and remained here about 6 to 7 days.

When these visitors suddenly disappeared on 23.1.45., they left the rooms in complete chaos. Everywhere in the corridor and in the rooms lay empty and opened schnaps bottles, scraps of food, material and household articles.

In addition to several motor vehicles, typewriters, office equipment, document files, and material, a large quantity of foodstuffs (ham, tinned fruit, butter, fats, and alcohol) was also left behind. A large part of these foodstuffs was shortly afterwards stolen by a group of volunteers from the East.

The remaining foodstuffs were placed at the disposal of the National Socialist People's Welfare to feed the refugees who were passing through. After the departure of the visitors, I should have had the rooms put in order, but was ashamed to have this carried out by Germans so as to prevent this matter becoming a new topic for discussion and causing fresh unrest.

signed Gross.

COPY
SECRET

2.2.1945

Report from Frl. Liselotte Freund, Seichau Castle.

I have been a domestic help at Seichau Castle for three years. Since August 1944 large consignments of objects d'art, foodstuffs.

and alcohol continuously came here from the Generalgouvernement, and were stored in the house.

In January 1945, the Governor General moved into the Castle with his office. It was there about one good week. I personally was not in the rooms during this time and can only report in what condition I found the rooms after the sudden departure of the visitors on 23.1.45. The rooms were in the greatest disorder. Wine and schnaps bottles, cigarette ends, bread and sausage lay around everywhere. In the large kitchen we found opened cans of meat, the contents of which had already gone bad, opened cases of butter and eggs, the contents of which we later gave to refugees passing through. Bottles and cigarette ends lay around everywhere in the entrance-hall too.

As far as I could see, the whole staff had just celebrated here. At 9 o'clock the man-servant was still asleep; the other members of the staff were to be seen much later in the day. Living and dining rooms were not cleared up at all. On the speedy departure of the staff on 23.1.45, its members left even personal things such as washing things and even a savings book here.

In the village these matters were much discussed.

(signed) Lieselotte Freund

COPY

2.2.1945

Report of the housekeeper, Elisabeth Matschewsky, Seichau Castle.

I have been housekeeper to Count Manfred von Richthofen since 1.1.1945.

In the middle of January, the Governor General Dr. Frank came and set up quarters in the Castle with his staff.

The staff occupied the North wing and the lower floor of the Castle. A separate kitchen for them was also placed at their disposal.

It particularly struck me that the lavish stocks of foodstuffs and spirits were being squandered. Foodstuffs lay around everywhere—the cook did not prepare breakfast till 11 o'clock. The man-servant was still asleep at 9 o'clock. The consumption of alcohol must have been particularly great, as empty and half-empty schnaps bottles lay around everywhere in all the rooms and corners. The departure on 23.1.45 was in the nature of a flight. I should have prepared the lunch as the cook had already left, but no one had time to eat.

Even household articles such as washing things were left behind. Large quantities of china, silver articles, and linen which were also left behind, were taken by the refugees who were billeted here immediately afterwards.

signed. Elisabeth Matschewsky

COPY

2.2.1945

*Statement of articles left behind by the Staff of the
Generalgouvernement, at Seichau Castle and found on 2.2.1945*

- 3 cases of cutlery
- 14 typewriters
- 3 packets of art folders
- 4 cases of books
- 1 cabinet: general matters of personnel
- 1 cabinet: telegrams
- 1 cabinet: supplies, installations
- 1 cabinet: real estate management
- 1 cabinet: personnel documents
- Innumerable empty Leitz-Cabinets
- 1 card index case, new
- 1 cash book SS-District [Oberabschnitt] Generalgouvernement
- 1 room full of objects d'art
- 1 armoured car Mercedes-Motor (8 cylinder) about 20 car rugs of various sizes
- 1 deck chair

The stocks of foodstuffs still found were placed at the disposal of the National Socialist People's Welfare in Seichau to feed refugees passing through. The remaining articles have been placed in safety with the Army Engineer Battalion 742 (He. Pi. Batl. 742).

signed: Signature

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3815-PS

The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in the General Gouvernement.

Commander of Security Police—Journal No. 89/42. Secret.

Cracow, 25th. April 1942

SECRET

1. Note

Re: The former Governor, Dr. Lasch.

On 26.4.1942 I personally interviewed Dr. Lasch at his own request. On this occasion Dr. Lasch learnt—for the first time,

according to him — that the Reichsfuehrer-SS had duly given him the opportunity of proving himself in the front line. He was furious that Secretary of State Buehler had not only said nothing of this offer of the RFSS but, in reply to his question as to whether he could not make up his lapses by employment at the front, had said that it was now too late. After his memory had been further assisted Dr. Lasch declared he would drop his reserve with regard to his former friends, and speak the truth about them frankly. He asked for my support in approaching the RFSS, as he proposed to send a plea to the Reichsfuehrer SS, requesting him to give him once more the opportunity of proving himself at the front. He said he had recognized the true feelings of Secretary of State Buehler and the clique at the Castle and no longer had any intention of sparing them. He recognized that they had dropped him and tried to put all the blame on him. He could only state in his defense that his lapses were not the only ones, but that nearly all leaders in the administration of the Generalgouvernement had enriched themselves in this way and even more extensively.

I requested Dr. Lasch to write down everything he knew himself. Up to now Dr. Lasch has written as follows:

“Dr. Frank’s attitude to the Party, the SS and the State is, to a very great extent, influenced by his Secretary of State Buehler who is, again, agreeable to Dr. Frank simply because he is entirely lacking in any creative power. Dr. Buehler owes his position to the fact that he can do nothing, has no initiative and in emergencies is presented with a *fait accompli*. The assertion is continually being made that there is a struggle between Bormann and Dr. Frank. It can be assumed that Reichsleiter Bormann knows nothing about it. Dr. Frank is a pronounced adversary of Bormann.

Between the Reichsfuehrer and Dr. Frank and also between SS-Lieutenant General Heydrich and Dr. Frank lies, in the opinion of Frank/Buehler, a whole world of injustice, police authority, oppression of the people, concentration camps, cruelty! Dr. Frank preaches a State controlled by a legal code, and by that he means a Legal State. RFSS Himmler desires a police state! By means of speeches and writings, propaganda is said to be made for a Ministry of Justice which excludes police influence which has become so strong. According to Dr. Frank’s interpretation, its “justice” is opposed to the RFSS Himmler’s “injustice.” *The dangerous influence of the SS in the judicial sphere* was considered proven by the example of the Prague Trials. An

SS Fuehrer is said to have acted as Public Prosecutor at these. (Trial of the former Prime Minister of the Protectorate). *The dangerous influence of the SS in the State* is considered proven by the fact that SS rank was conferred on all leading men in the Reich — Ribbentrop, Lammers, Bormann, Seyss-Inquart, etc. Herein lies the danger of the leading position of the SS in the State. Dr. Frank wishes, after the war, when the Fuehrer is no longer in such great need of the RFSS, to inaugurate the greatest fight for justice, with the assistance of the Armed Forces and the SA! A fight against the SS in the Generalgouvernement will take this course! Krueger and Schoengarth must be dismissed. Perhaps they know too much. Dr. Buehler's ambition plays a great part here. Moreover these efforts will be vigorously furthered by Dr. Keith, the "Golen" Gutbred (SS-Sergeant) [SS-Unterscharfuehrer] and Waechter. Since Waechter has been in Galicia he may have changed his attitude. He always wanted SS-Lieutenant-General [Obergruppenfuehrer] Krueger's post and tried to get it. Waechter is SS-Brigadier-General [SS-Brigadefuehrer] but was always less friendly disposed towards the SS than all other Governors. In token of his power, Dr. Frank, in October charged Buehler and Boepple with the duty of assembling the *Special Service* and of settling the quarrel between Zoerner and Globocnik in Lublin by banning the "Globus." Later on exactly similar things were to be done in Cracow. Buehler and Boepple were to be in command and were charged with making strategic plans. After much discussion, it was possible to impress upon Buehler the craziness of such action. I suggested telephoning Dr. Wendler, inviting him to this conference. Buehler saw the advantage of this. Wendler came to Cracow after my arrest. He is said to be completely under Buehler's thumb now! At first against Krueger-Schoengarth and then against others. In the meantime Buehler quickly dismissed his SS Adjutant, he suddenly became a private—such things take place at the Castle."

In this connection a statement by Minister Ruemelin (retired) regarding SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, made on the occasion of a visit on 22.4.42, is interesting. Ruemelin happened to say that people had been struck by the fact that, on the occasion of the establishment of the SA in the Generalgouvernement on 20.4.42 and the taking over of the leadership of the SA by the General Governor as SA-Obergruppenfuehrer, no leader of the SS was represented. Ruemelin declared that there was already talk of a Roehm situation. Since 3 Police Officers had replaced the 3 Wehrmacht officers who retired from the Special Service.

he had now learnt that the Wehrmacht (General von Gienanth) had offered the Special Service 12 Wehrmacht officers who were no longer fit for active service. Ruemelin enquired of Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger if Lasch was still alive.

It is evident from the letter of the General Governor to SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, copy of which is attached, that Dr. Keith's efforts to liquidate the SS-Escort Command have succeeded. The Castle is being cleared of all SS-troops whom they suspect of spying on them.

Dr. Lasch continues:

The Amnesty Commission [Gnadenausschuss] of which Keith is executive is a proof of "justice" in the Generalgouvernement, for the SS can no longer remove anyone they wish! The Amnesty Commission is to act as a brake on so-called arbitrary acts by the SS against Poles and Jews. Dr. Frank is ruler in Poland, head of an independent State, he will brook no interference. This is, of course, all fancy, but it clearly shows the tendency all through the Government. From this point of view the unity of the administration is merely a slogan, intended to prove the necessity of gathering up all the reins into one hand. The Reich must not be allowed to interfere.

There is no question of a just distribution of food. The heads can have everything, need deny themselves nothing, even live better than in peace-time, the others must buy with coupons and exist with those.

Frank, Buehler, and Waechter have probably the best furnished kitchens of the whole German Reich, including all subsidiary territories.

The big dinners with many, many courses were only discontinued after my case, when I reported to him the arrests in my circle of acquaintances. But in January, dinner at the Castle with meat, magnificent salads, fruit, and dessert was always a feast. The shorthand-typists, as well as Keith's staff, led a life such as one reads about in the Arabian Nights. It is an oasis where no one notices the war. When the war with Russia broke out, everybody at the Castle was terrified. It was looked upon as an act of heroism that Dr. Frank's son (13 years old) wished to be in Munich on 9 November to hear an air raid warning, as Frau Frank had maintained that the English would come on that day. She therefore remained in Schliersee with her whole family. The children are not allowed to be in Berlin but are taught at home or attend the school at Miesbach * * *.

In this family the principle of enrichment at all costs is the ruling factor. Everything that can be grabbed is got hold of.

The only person who is welcome is the man who brings something. Woe to him who possesses something more beautiful or who owns more. When Dr. Ley furnished his estate, there was tremendous gossip, also regarding Dr. Goebbels, Funk, etc.

He was no example to us, for his day consists of running round from castle to castle in a magnificent carriage with guards of honour, books, music, plays, and banquets. The best value is to be got out of every reception. There is nothing natural, no simplicity, all is pose, playacting and serves to satisfy his intoxication, brought about by ambition and lust for power and, at the same time, his likeness to Mussolini, of which he is convinced by his flatterers, is interpreted as fate and destiny.

Astrology, palmistry, telling fortunes by cards, lead melting, all methods of looking into the future are employed. Frau Frank has often gone to two women in one day, in order to see if what has been said tallies. Fortune smiles on him. Jupiter is his lucky star. That being so, nothing can happen to him. Others will fall, he will always remain on top. Frau Frank has often said in large circles that she intends to die a Minister's wife. It is a Prince's Court in which we, his closest colleagues, live as strangers. It is cold magnificence in which, as at the Castle, one is smothered in the Gothic style * * *.

His attitude to the other Reich Ministers is determined by his exaggerated ambition, by his overweening opinion of himself and his autocracy. He waves everybody aside, some more than others. Thus he often says that Dr. Lammers owes his position to him. He would like to have been Foreign Minister in succession to Baron von Neurath, after having realized for some time that there was no prospect of becoming Minister of Justice during Dr. Guertner's life-time and so he tried hard to obtain a post as Ambassador. He wished to be Ambassador in Rome.

His spiritual opposition to Himmler and Heydrich is deep-rooted. Before he became General Governor and as only Reichsminister, he was always criticizing the fact that the Fuehrer did not summon the Reich Cabinet. He even did this publicly in the sessions of the Council of the Academy for German Law and referred to it as being the kind of Cabinet in which everyone could speak openly. He also did this as General Governor. His Cabinet meetings do not consist of deliberations but of lectures, with much affectation, about fictitious conditions, and conclude with a long monologue by Frank, praising the achievements of the General Governor in all strains * * *.

Particularly interesting are his efforts to create, after the war, a Reich Law Ministry [Reichsrechtsministerium] which is to

house the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Church and Education, and Public Worship, as well as a number of subsidiary authorities. This is to become the principal Command Post for all transactions of domestic policy in the Reich, which are all to be based on "justice." For justice is the most valuable possession of the nation. True, everything is a conglomeration of legislation, jurisdiction and administration, but it must all be given a fine name. It is his desire to amalgamate everything—over and above judicial law—under the title of justice, everything which can be understood by the moral conception of justice. The saying: "Everything is right which is of use to the nation" is cleverly utilized here. Accordingly, everything was to be under the control of the Reich Law Leader [Reichsrechtsfuehrer]. In his modesty he does not call himself Leader of the Legal Profession [Rechtswahrerfuehrer] but Reich Law Leader. Legislation, that will of the Fuehrer or the people which is made standard, would have to go through him. In this sphere too, he hopes to be given special assignments by the Fuehrer after the war. Frau Frank often says: "You see, if my husband had the opportunity of having long talks with the Fuehrer, it would be a good thing for the Fuehrer, for there is no one with whom he could speak so well as with my husband."

Every little token given him by the Fuehrer is immediately magnified a thousand fold and utilized for his ambitious plans. If he ever has the opportunity to talk for example to Schaub or Prof. Hoffmann or anyone else in the Fuehrer's entourage, he repeats what he has been told as if it originated from the Fuehrer himself.

His conversations with foreign statesmen are also on this plane, and have often made our blood boil. If, in his capacity as resident of the Academy for German Law, he travels abroad and is received by the Duce, Count Ciano, King Boris of Bulgaria, or the Bulgarian Prime Minister, he always acted as if, in his capacity as Reichsminister, he had received instructions from the Fuehrer; he discussed foreign policy but was always able to turn the conversation when it became dangerous. He did this also in Hungary and in France before the war, where he met the former Premier, Chautemps, in Paris.

After the shooting of Roehm he violently criticized Dr. Guertner's statement in the Reich Cabinet, according to which, the execution of the sentences passed was legal * * *."

Lasch gives the following details regarding the personal relations between Dr. Frank and his wife:

Through Dr. Heuber, Frau Frank received regular monthly donations during 1935/36. For several years she received RM. 750.— monthly from the Academy for German Law, but the Treasurers of the Academy for German Law put an end to that. Furthermore Frau Frank had, for over a year, a free ticket from Berlin to Munich which had to be paid for by the Academy for German Law * * *.

When travelling abroad she bought principally in Ghettos and from Jews. First of all clothes-baskets and then their contents. The foreign exchange was taken from the combined quota of her co-travellers. The articles were brought duty free across the frontier under diplomatic pass.

Otto Herbst (brother of Frau Frank) was called up at the beginning of the Polish campaign. Applications for his release were immediately made, although he was only a clerk in a Veterinary Company which collected horses far behind the front line. He was reserved for the Generalgouvernement, but so far has not done a day's service in the Generalgouvernement. He keeps his post. In the meantime he has become the director of the Academy for German Law. He had only been reserved for this post. Richard Schneider-Edenkoben, cousin of Frau Frank, was called up as N.C.O. and immediately requested a reserved job. He was given that of film expert for the Generalgouvernement. He once drew up a short memorandum (four pages), then disappeared and was never seen again.

Above all, Frau Frank's relations, as well as her women friends, are given posts everywhere.

Pictures, as well as great quantities of food of all kinds, were despatched regularly to the Reich in the General Governor's Pullman car. The whole family often travelled in the coach without tickets. The guard often had trouble in this way. At the frontier it is known as the smuggling coach!

Frau Frank received a large diamond ring of 5 carats from the Governor, Dr. Fischer. It is said to have cost RM. 5000— (Note: it is rumoured in Warsaw that Dr. Fischer has so far tried in vain to get back from Frau Frank the money said to have been spent on this ring).

Dr. Fischer also gave the General Governor a Rembrandt which was brought by County-Court Judge [Landgerichtsrat] Dorn to Schliersee where it was hung. It is, however, no longer there. Dorn is said to have objected and the picture was then returned.

As soon as Dr. Lasch had written down, without prejudice, everything he knows, I intend to examine him exhaustively on

his depositions in order to complete and gain more basic information on his statements regarding some points. I have had to allow a few days' grace as, at present, Dr. Lasch is not feeling well. I wish to avoid any objection by Dr. Lasch that when in ill health he revealed facts, the effects of which he could not perceive in his condition. After Lasch has been interrogated on these lines I will submit a final copy of Lasch's statements.

2. Submitted to SS-Lieutenant General [SS-Obergruppenfuehrer] Krueger requesting him to note contents.

[Signed] [Illegible]

SS-Brigadier General [SS-Oberfuehrer]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3817-PS

Dear Mr. von Ribbentrop!

I am using the opportunity of the October couriers to send you a report again. During the last weeks I had the opportunity to become acquainted with almost all leading personalities in Japan and to speak extensively to some of them. I was offered the possibility of becoming personally acquainted with the North Chinese theater of operations: therefore, I am in a position to supplement the general report with a special one on North China.

I was able to convey your regards to Prince Kanin on 14 September—he commissioned me to thank you most kindly and to express his absolute accord with your ideas and sentiments.

I hope that my next report—supplemented by many things which would congest a written report too much—will be made by me personally in the second half of November, be it in Berlin or London. I hope to bring along a very clear (although not always delightful) picture of the East Asiatic situation.

15 April 1937

To the Office of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich, Attention: Oberregierungsrat Boettger.

For the purpose of carrying out my official trip to Japan planned for the period from July to November 1937, I am requesting the office to grant the following allowances:

Date 15 June RM 500.00 in free foreign exchange (pounds or dollars).

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Date 15 June | RM 500.00 in Reichsmark for transfer to the Steamship Company (the amount will be paid out in Japanese currency). |
| Date 1 August | RM 1500.00 } to be drawn in Japanese currency from bank account in |
| Date 1 October | RM 500.00 } Tokyo. |

Tokyo, 1 September 1937

To the Deputy of the Fuehrer Reichsminister Rudolf Hess
 Harthäuserstrasse 48
 Harlaching

Munich

Dear Mr. Hess:

I am using the courier to send you also personally a short report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It contains as briefly as possible a summary of what I could observe and hear over here in four weeks.

I am thinking a great deal about my homeland the problems of which, in comparison with the East Asiatic intricacies, are completed, in the background of the news picture, and I hope that you will have found time, indeed, to enjoy a few weeks of rest in your beautiful Isar valley.

With kind regards, also to your wife, I am

Yours faithfully,
 [signed: illegible initials]

Tokyo
 1 September 1937

To Mr. Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop
 German Embassy
 London

Dear Mr. von Ribbentrop:

I am using the courier to send you in a brief report the impressions of the first four weeks.

I have not as yet spoken to Prince K., he is in the midst of mobilization. Ambassador von Dirksen has asked me to send you his cordial regards in return.

England and Spain are completely stepping into the background as far as news is concerned, however, I see from reports that

Woermann is active in the cause of noninterference, I hope that you had the possibility to find a few weeks of relaxation and care for your health.

With cordial regards, also to your wife,

Faithfully yours,
[no signature]

Handwritten notes:

4 copies, report went to:

1. Ribbentrop
 2. Hess
 3. Dierksen
- This is No. 4

Japan—end of August 1937

I. Situation before the China Conflict

The failure of Hayashi's cabinet (unsuccessful dissolution of the legislative body) meant a strong set-back for the achievement of the political aim of the army. The defense economic program, envisaged by Konoye, which was supposed to balance at least partially the bad situation of Japan's raw materials, was a meager substitute for the out-of-hand external and internal political actions. (Hainan incident; lost internal reforms.) The financial and economic situation was tense. The imperial circles as well as the capitalists had gained territory compared to 1936. Attempts to bring about a settlement with England were underway (started by Sato, to endanger also the good relations with Berlin as a price for the English settlement).

II. Development of the China Conflict

1. Cause and Motive.

The tension in the buffer zone between Mandschukuo and China (East Hopei-Chahar) has existed for years. "Incidents" could happen any time. The July incident was presumably not caused by Japan. After it had nevertheless occurred as a local discharge of a general tension, it was used by the army as a welcome cause to clean up in northern China. It was hoped this way to be able to bring the continental policy an important step forward and at the same time to insure the rule of the army in Japan proper.

2. Presuppositions and goals of the Japanese action.

Foreign politically one started from the point that—

a. The Western Powers were fully occupied by the Mediterranean tension.

b. America would restrict herself to theoretical demonstrations.

c. The Red Army would be too weak and the internal situation of the Soviets generally was too uncertain to interfere.

In military respect, one was convinced of the total inferiority of *China's* troops.

Therefore, one believed to be able to get through with an action in North-China which was limited in time and in territory, the result of which was to be the establishment of a North-Chinese Buffer State under Japanese leadership and cutting off China's connections to the Soviet territory. At the same time one hoped to destroy by short blows the presupposition for a further strengthening of China under Chiang-Kai-Shek.

3. Occurrences up to now.

It turned out that this calculation contained a few errors. One had judged correctly the foreign political situation but the military power of resistance of a part of the Chinese troops as well as the effect of the far advance into China, above all, was underestimated. The expansion of the conflict to the international nerve center, Shanghai, and on the South-China-coast (with all dangers of international incidents) was absolutely contrary to the original program.

4. Results and effects in China.

a. Military. North-Hepei and the greatest part of Chahar were cleared and the participation of Inner Mongolia was at least partially secured. A narrow strip of land in and around Shanghai was occupied. Ever increasing forces had to be employed for this, but at the same time it proved distinctly the superiority of the military performance, especially through the rapid and high rating military success in the Kalgan zone and through the commitment of the Air Forces using Kiushu as a base.

b. Political. The establishment of an autonomus government in North-China is still in the beginning stage. No prominent Chinese are partaking. The rebellion of the autonomous Police Corps in East Hopei proved furthermore that the hired and the bought Chinese people are not reliable in case of an emergency.

c. Economical. The total Japanese trade in Middle- and South-China is dead; a great part of Japanese property has been destroyed.

5. Effects within Japan.

The Army has seized the leadership entirely; Government, parliament and economy have to obey. The Navy has lost face, too, because it could only succeed at Shanghai after an Army

beach unit arrived for its support. War propaganda is good and effective. On the other hand one must not draw conclusions from the seemingly uniform picture as to the lack of high tensions. Imperial circles are obviously worried about the further development. The economy and a part of the intelligentsia raise concealed opposition. The economic consequences show up clearly; difficulties with raw materials, stopping of foreign trade, sharply increasing prices with the living standard of the broad masses being very low as it is. For all these reasons a rapid success is necessary.

6. *Foreign propaganda.*

With the possibility of complications with third powers (stiffening of England after the Ambassador in Nanking had been injured) the efforts toward foreign political safeguarding are increasing. Into this category belongs the attempt to lure Germany out of her neutrality by proving to her that the Japanese action would serve the aims of the anticomintern pact. In contrast to this it must be stated that the unquestionable increase of Russian and communistic influences in the whole of China is an immediate consequence of the Japanese action.

III. Prospects

If the internal Chinese structure does not produce any surprises (which cannot be judged in Tokyo), if the Chinese are intelligent enough to apply the Russian defense measures of 1812, then we must count on a long duration of the conflict and with a sharp overexertion of the Japanese forces and a simultaneously resulting Chinese chaos—a result, which must be unwelcome in every respect to German policy.

December 17, 1937

Lt. Col. Bodenschatz, Office of the Personal Adjutant of the Col.
General and Minister President,

Berlin W. 8
Reich Air Ministry.

Dear Lt. Colonel:

I permit myself to place the enclosed report at the personal disposal of the Col. General and Minister President. Only a few copies of this report are in existence (for the Fuehrer, Hess, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Himmler, the War Ministry and the

Foreign Office). It is based on personal impressions during the period of July to November and on exhaustive discussions with nearly all leading Japanese statesmen and generals.

Best regards,
Heil Hitler,
Yours very truly,

December 13, 1937

Professor Dr. Langsdorff, Staff Ribbentrop
Berlin W. 8,
Wilhelmstr. 63.

Dear Langsdorff,

Enclosed is a copy of the announced report for your office. Ribbentrop has his already. I should like to suggest that you give only the inner circle of chief consultants access to this memorandum which deals with some ticklish matters.

Sincere regards,
Heil Hitler.
Always yours,

Berlin SW 11, 30 March 1938
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8

The Reichsfuehrer—SS,
Chief of the Personal Staff
File No. AR/438
When replying state File No.
E/F

Dear fellow party member Dr. Haushofer,

I am sorry that because of the many events of the last months and weeks and because of a recreational leave I have had in the meantime I did not find the time until today to express to you my gratitude for the interesting report on your East Asiatic impressions, which you sent me in your letter of 13 December 1937. I have submitted it to the Reichsfuehrer-SS for his information.

With best regards and

Heil Hitler.
Your [sgd] (Wolff)
SS—Gruppenfuehrer

14 December 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

Gruppenfuehrer Wolff,
Office of the Reichsfuehrer SS,
Berlin SW

Dear Gruppenfuehrer,

May I place at the personal disposal of the Reichsfuehrer the enclosed report summarizing my East-Asiatic impressions.

Of course, I am perfectly willing to supplement this report, especially with regard to personnel in East Asia politics. That would best be done orally, I believe.

With best regards,

Heil Hitler!

As ever, Yours sincerely,

Berlin W 35, 17 December 1937
Tirpitzufer 72-76.

Section III.

Chief General Staff of the Army.

Dear Mr. Haushofer,

I thank you sincerely for sending me your summarizing report. It is more than a matter of speech, when I assure you that it is excellent in my opinion. It furnishes the General Staff with a very valuable basis for an estimate of the situation and—what seems more important yet—of possible developments there.

I should like to discuss some of the points with you some day. There will not be much time before Christmas. Permit me to get in touch with you after New Year.

Again many sincere thanks and the Season's Greetings.

Heil Hitler

Yours very truly,
sgd. v. Tippelskirch.

13 December 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

Colonel von Tippelskirch,
General Staff of the Army, Section III,
Berlin W. 35.

Dear Colonel,

Supplementary to our discussion permit me to send you enclosed

an attempt on my part to summarize my East Asia impressions in a report.

With best regards,

Heil Hitler!
Yours very truly,

Berlin W 35, February 2, 1939
Tirpitzufer 66

Oberquartiermeister VI
General Staff of the Army

REGISTERED

Dear Dr. Haushofer:

Enclosed I am returning to you with my sincerest thanks the letter from Chungking. It is really very interesting and shows possibilities of development, which one would wish to materialize for the sake of Japanese interests.

I am also attaching for you the promised report. The report on aviation contains many particulars, which may not be of interest to you I would be especially grateful to you for their early return by messenger after perusal and most confidential handling, as the reports are urgently needed here.

With best regards and

4 enclosures

Heil Hitler,
Yours respectfully

13 December 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To the General-Admiral Dr. E. H. Raeder
Naval Command
Berlin W 35

Dear General-Admiral:

After my return from East Asia I have taken it upon myself to write a summary of my impressions, based on my tour in North China and on numerous conversations I had with the majority of the responsible personalities in Japanese politics. May I take the liberty to send you a copy thereof for your personal use.

With friendly greetings,

Heil Hitler
Yours respectfully,
[signed: illegible initial]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3819-PS

Paris, 17 March 1944

The Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary-General for Labor Commitment

SECRET!

My Fuehrer,

In my report of 2 December 1943 on the situation of labor commitment and in the subsequent conference at your headquarters I pointed out, as was my duty, that the total employment of war economy reached in 1943 can be maintained in 1944 only if it is possible to mobilize workers from the occupied territories on a large scale this year as well.

The labor commitment program for 1944 which I thereupon set up and which was approved by you provided among other things for the supplying of one million French workers. Only if the Frenchmen are supplied can your figure of 4,050,000 workers to be recruited be reached.

The organizational measures required for the mobilization of these forces were already taken, as far as my jurisdiction is concerned, in the last quarter of 1943. Now, however, the realization of my plan is encountering serious difficulties, which lie outside my competency and which I must submit to you with a respectful request for a decision.

1.

The appointment of protection concerns [Schutzbetriebe—S-concerns] for the purpose of safeguarding armament assignments and transferring civilian quotas occurred in the occupied western territories to such an extent and in such a form that it made a fluent and systematic commitment of labor impossible. I may note the following details in this connection.

Since taking over my assignment I have constantly endeavored, on my own initiative, to promote the execution of the German tasks in the occupied territories with all means available. It is true that I have always demanded, in the interest of making the best possible use of the whole European labor potential for the German war effort, that the foreign concerns are to conduct themselves in exactly the same way as the German concerns in regard to systematizing labor commitment, that is, that they can employ altogether only as many workers as they need to fulfill their urgent tasks and that they do not keep workers—especially members of age classes of military interest—from being taken by the Germans for employment in the Reich.

Moreover, I saw to it that the proportion of skilled workers (who are so urgently needed for the further expansion of German armament) is limited to the indispensable. The concerns were

also urged to train assistants as skilled workers as far as possible —just as is done in German concerns. They were urged to employ women as much as possible, in order to free men. The introduction of these principles in no way endangered the German tasks in the occupied territories. This is shown by the constantly increasing turnover and production figures and the increasing number of persons employed in concerns working for German purposes.

Now, however, approximately 5,900 armament concerns in France with 890,000 employees and approximately 8,500 civilian concerns with approximately 550,000 employees have been removed from my influence through appointment as S-concerns. In these concerns the need for workers can no longer be examined by my agencies. I am not in a position to investigate whether workers are being hoarded, whether there are surplus skilled workers, to what extent members of the younger age classes are hiding in these concerns. Nor can my agencies any longer carry out a sensible exchange of labor commitment so that women and workers who cannot be exchanged are assigned to these concerns, in order to free fully capable workers for Germany. This exchange is essential, however, if one million workers are to be mobilized. I may remark that aside from the above-mentioned groups of S-concerns the following are also protected:

| | | |
|--|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| Railroads and transportation | | |
| with approximately | 450,000 | workers |
| Agriculture with approximately | 2,750,000 | workers |
| Organization Todt with approximately | 150,000 | workers |
| Luftwaffe construction | } with } approxi- } mately | 200,000 workers |
| Navy construction | | |
| Armament sector | | |
| Wehrmacht agencies | | |
| with approximately | 140,000 | workers |
| Forestry with approximately | 250,000 | workers |
| Gendarmerie with approximately | 130,000 | workers |

Similar conditions exist in Belgium.

| |
|-------------------------|
| [handwritten: 4,070,000 |
| 890,000 |
| 550,000 |
| <hr/> |

5,510,000]

In view of this situation, it is essential that I again be given a free hand, in order to carry out a general systematic commitment of labor, which is in the most urgent interest of the war economy, for which I will of course assume the full responsibility that the

war-important German tasks in the occupied territories are promoted in every way as far as labor commitment is concerned.

I may report to you, my Fuehrer, in this connection that in the last few months the workers needed by the Organization Todt for its urgent construction programs in the West were supplied. The RM concerns have likewise been constantly kept supplied with manpower.

2.

Another difficulty for the execution of my plan lies in the completely inadequate executive means available in the occupied territories. An energetic executive is of decisive importance for success in view of the attitude of the French population which, as a result of the enemy propaganda and the terror acts, is becoming more antagonistic toward voluntarily going to Germany or fulfilling a duty assignment. Although I acknowledge the work done by the new police chief Darnand meanwhile to put in order and improve the French police, the fact remains that the French police does not carry out with enough success its tasks in connection with the "France" operation. The police is numerically too weak, not reliable enough as regards personnel, and inadequately armed. It hesitates to proceed against shirkers in order not to expose itself to retaliation measures of the terrorists. In the majority of the districts the disturbances caused by the terrorists continue to increase. This terror is directed against those who want to go to Germany and against their families, against the government and its organs. It also threatens transportation, with the result that in entire Departments there are no passable roads to this very day.

The German police force is not strong enough numerically to be able to carry out a thorough search for service evaders besides its regular police duties. In recognition of the special significance of the France drive the military commander issued an order commanding the use of military police and if necessary even of troops, as far as other tasks permit. I myself am trying in collaboration with the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, to organize a protective corps which, as a supplement to the other police organs, is to seize service evaders by force and send them off. The assertion of state authority in the field of labor commitment is merely a part of the question of total authority. We must succeed in putting a stop to terrorist activity and thus guaranteeing that a given state order will be obeyed. It is necessary that, besides supporting the constructive work on the part of Police Chief Darnand, an increased number of troops will be employed especially in those cases in which troops or agencies are directly attacked.

I may report in summary that the strengthening of executive means is an essential prerequisite for the execution of the screening measures at present in progress. It is being investigated in the course of those screening measures how many surplus workers there are in these enterprises, how many are working at tasks less vital for the war effort, and in how many instances skills are not fully utilized. By removing dispensable workers to the Reich and by keeping order in labor commitment within concerns in France, an attempt is being made to achieve the best possible increase in the total potential.

Should the screening measures not suffice to procure one million workers, we shall consider drafting workers by calling up certain age classes without exception or by mustering all males by communities in the form of a military requisition. For this also it is essential that the executive means be previously extended and intensified.

Respectfully and loyally yours,

signed: Fritz Sauckel

5 April 1944

To the Fuehrer
Fuehrer's Headquarters

My Fuehrer:

On 17 March 1944 Gauleiter Sauckel as the Plenipotentiary-General for Labor Commitment sent you a memorandum in which he requests that the blocked concerns of armament and war production situated in the occupied territories be released for recruitment of labor according to his judgment.

On this matter I take the following viewpoint:

The expansion of armament and war production which has already taken place and is still expected demands that the occupied territories and friendly countries (Italy, Hungary) be incorporated to a constantly greater degree.

As long as the most vital armament factories of the Reich are not protected against air raids, I am also interested in having an extensive distribution to as many factories as possible. For this I need above all unhampered production in the occupied territories.

In the course of my conversations with Minister Bichelonne which took place in September 1943, the shifting to France was determined, and after that the concept of blocked enterprises was created for all the occupied territories in cooperation with

Party Comrade Sauckel, after the continuous removal of workers to Germany from these enterprises vital for armament and war production had caused great alarm.

At that time blocked enterprises were created in the occupied areas with his consent and proclaimed by me, in accordance with the principle clearly laid down by me and previously always recognized by Party Comrade Sauckel, the principle that workers in armament and war production were not to be removed by him unless I gave my consent for a withdrawal or transfer.

At that time I renewed the promise given to the blocked enterprises after you my Fuehrer, had stated expressly and without contradiction by Party Comrade Sauckel in the conference at Fuehrer's Headquarters on 4 January 1944 that the blocked enterprises in the occupied territories should not have to part with any of their workers.

I am unable to deviate from the promise given to the blocked enterprises at the time they were created, since in each of these blocked enterprises a public notice issued by my office is posted expressly announcing the fact of protection from possible transfer to Germany.

Moreover, if it be granted that his offices may be permitted to interfere with armament and war production, according to Party Comrade Sauckel's request, it would mean a first and serious invasion of the total leadership of my sphere of work which I built up laboriously, and thus it would seriously endanger its further responsible leadership.

So far Gauleiter Sauckel has merely assigned workers to me for enterprises of armament and war production, while I alone made the decisions as to their use in my enterprises or their transfer.

At present the total number of protected workers in the blocked enterprises of armament and war production in the occupied western territories amounts only to about 2,700,000 employed; very soon, however, this number must be increased to about 3 million in order to meet the demands which I will have to make on the occupied western territories. Since the total population of the occupied western areas is 57 million, this is by no means a percentage which cannot be met. On the contrary, it is far below the percentage of workers employed in armament and war production in Germany.

(Occupied areas 1:21, Germany 1:8)

It must be possible to dispense with these workers, in view of the total number available in France, without hampering the procurement of additional workers for Germany.

I regret that Party Comrade Sauckel did not, before writing to you, my Fuehrer, endeavor to reach an agreement with me regarding the treatment of the blocked concerns [Sperrbetriebe]. Many of the disputed points could doubtless be solved in mutual agreement, especially in view of the principle, hitherto consistently recognized by him, that the manpower in the industries of armament and war production, also in the occupied territories, is chiefly my responsibility.

Please order that (1), the blocked concerns in the occupied territories and in Italy continue to be protected in accordance with the agreements; (2) exceptions to this are to be allowed only by me or with my concurrence; and (3) the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment is to contact me for the purpose of clarifying matters further.

I very much regret that I now have to bring this affair to your attention, my Fuehrer, after having settled by myself other much more important and more significant matters, which distressed me much more, in order to give you, with your tremendous burdens, no unnecessary worries.

Heil my Fuehrer!
yours, Signed: Speer

List of those present
for the Conference in the Reich Chancellery
on 11 July 1944 1600 hours

| Name | Official Capacity | Station |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Dr. Kuehne | Mi.V.Chief | Mil.Rg. * * * [illegible] |
| Warlimont | General of Artillery | OKW |
| Dr. Kohlhaase | Director of Labor Section of the Supreme Commissioner | Adriatic Coast Trieste |
| Dr. Landfried | Staff Fuehrer * * * | of the Military Administrator for Italy |
| Walter Funk and Albert Speer | | |
| Milch | | illegible |
| Krosigk | | |
| Steengracht | St.s. | Foreign Office (A.A.) |
| Abetz | Ambassador | German Embassy in Paris |
| Hanel | Lieutenant General | Armaments Commissioner Staff France |
| von Linstow | Colonel of Gen. Staff | Military Commander France |

| Name | Official Capacity | Station |
|------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Saas | Colonel of Gen. Staff | Plenipotentiary-General for Italy |
| Franssen | Lieutenant-General | Armaments Inspector Belgium |
| Waeger | Lieutenant-General | Armaments |
| Sarnow | Ministerial Director | Gen.Staff of Army Gen.Qu. |
| Koegel | Lieut. Col. of Gen. Staff | Gen.Staff of Army Gen.Qu. |
| Reeder | Chief of * * * | Brussels |
| Heider | Chief of General Staff | Brussels |
| Ley | | |
| Sauckel | Labor Plenipotentiary | Berlin |
| H. Backe | Minister | Reich Food Ministry |
| Marrenbach | Commander-in-Chief | German Labor Front |
| Leyers | Armament Plenipotentiary | Italy |

Also present:

Ministerial Director Klopfer (Party Chancellery)
 Ministerial Councillor Broehling
 Ambassador Rahn
 Dr. Huber * * * [illegible]
 Police Chief Dr. Kaltenbrunner
 General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann
 Colonel Meixner (OKW)

To Rk. 5815 C

Berlin 12 July 1944

Re: *Increased Procuring of Foreign Manpower Executive Conference, 11 July 1944*

1. *Note.*

Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs and representatives indicated in the attached lists of those present. No guarantee can be given for the absolute completeness of the lists, as all participants did not sign.

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers reported by way of introduction on the various proposals at hand by the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment that serve the purpose of bringing about the increase in labor commitment in Germany which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited the theme of the discussions by saying that actually all possibilities were to be examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be covered, for example the question of the reestablishment of an acceptable price and wage scale between the Reich and the extra-German territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion can be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must be examined how the executive

forces, regarding the inadequacy of which the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment raises lively objection, can be strengthened, on the one hand through an influence on the foreign governments and on the other through building up the indigenous administration (Executive), whether by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, of the police, or of other German agencies. Reichsminister Dr. Lammers then gave the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment, Gauleiter Sauckel.

Gauleiter Sauckel stated that the present deficit in the matter of the half-year program of 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be fulfilled by 30 June of the current year, amounted to 500,000 workers. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were apprentices and women, both of which categories cannot be regarded as workers of full value. Of the 560,000 foreigners who were put to work, three-quarters came from the East alone. This result is a scandal in contrast to the German people who are incorporated in the labor process to the greatest extent, and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German authority in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers were still idling. In executing the labor commitment we did not exert the necessary severity and in particular we were not able to achieve the necessary unity of the German authorities. It would not do for German authorities to interfere irresponsibly with the tasks of the GBA (Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment). The latter must have much greater freedom of action, as was the case in 1942. With the present methods of recruitment for voluntary commitment we will not make any progress, for one thing because the volunteers still at hand exposed themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly obligated and decently treated in their work, they did completely satisfactory work. The treatment of the wage and price questions connected with the subject was desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If it were not dealt with now, then our labor commitment program would fail with the consequence that the fighting forces no longer could receive the arms they need.

Staatssekretär von Steengracht, Foreign Office, stressed that the Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment. The Foreign Office could, however, do nothing besides urging the foreign governments more or less intensively to fulfill the German demands, which had been done consistently up to the present. The executive is in the hands of other offices which

therefore would now have to express themselves on the subject of the conference.

The Deputy of the Head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had to place themselves in the service of the work of acquiring manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was and was not employed exclusively in pressing military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be assigned for the purposes of the GBA. General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions:

a. The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over in addition the task of acquiring manpower in the partisan areas. Everyone, who cannot fully prove the purpose of his stay in these areas, is to be seized forcibly.

b. When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food, are wholly or partly evacuated the population suitable for labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.

c. The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the areas near the front should be handled especially intensively with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.

Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and expressed the expectation that certain successes could therewith already be achieved.

On behalf of the military commander of Belgium and Northern France. The Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder, put up for discussion the possibility of expansion of the Feldgendarmarie, at the time comprising only 70 men, and of the civilian searching service [Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 people). If the Feldgendarmer were strengthened to 200 men, appreciable searching results could be accomplished. At the inquiry of Reichsminister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont agreed for the OKW to this strengthening of the searching service.

On further inquiry by the Reichsminister Dr. Lammers, whether with the withdrawal of the troops the population suitable for recruiting could not be taken along, Colonel Saas (Pleni-potentiary General for Italy) stated that Fieldmarshal General Kesselring had already decreed, that the population in a depth of 30 kilometers behind the front area was to be "captured." This measure could however, not be extended to areas situated farther behind the lines as thereby the sharpest shocks would occur in the whole structure of these areas, especially in regard

to the industry not fully employed in production.

Gauleiter Sauckel was of the opinion that widest circles of the Wehrmacht saw in the labor recruiting program something disreputable. It had actually occurred that German soldiers had endeavored to protect the population from being taken by the German labor service. Therefore an instruction of the fighting forces on the extraordinary importance of labor recruiting seemed necessary. In opposition to the much too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevik conception of war when occupying territories, immediately to have the fighting troops commit the whole population to labor. The question of administration (Executive) thus was not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. One must finally proceed to establish examples, then the passive resistance would quickly change into active cooperation. One ought also not to shrink back from proceeding with drastic means against the administrative heads [Behördenleiter] themselves who sabotage the labor commitment. Not the small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other means too must be applied. Thus thought should be taken for the removal of a great part of the remaining exceptional Italian harvest in order to improve thereby the rations of the Germans and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the entirely insufficient alimentation of the Italian military internees who were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute for these military internees gradually altered. No inconsiderable working energies would be released thereby.

Reichsleiter Dr. Ley underscored these statements and suggested the establishment of a searching office made up of all German forces in the extra-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless enrollings in large areas.

Against these proposals, doubts were expressed:

Reichsminister Funk anticipates from ruthless raids considerable disturbances of the production in the extra-German territories. The same opinion is held by the Chief of the *Military Administration of Italy*, *Staatssekretär Dr. Landfried*, who considers the German forces comprised in the executive body as too small and fears that the Italian population will escape the seizure in great numbers and will flee into uncontrollable regions.

Reichsminister Speer stated that he had an interest both in spurring on an increased labor recruiting for the Reich and also in the maintaining of the production in the extra-German territories. Up to the present 25 to 30 percent of the German war

production had been furnished by the occupied Western territories and Italy, by Italy alone 12½ percent.

The Fuehrer recently decided that this production must be maintained as long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, especially in the field of transportation. The executive is well in a position, in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, to seize sufficient foreign workers with its present strength, as a relatively small number of executive men are sufficient for this purpose. All that is needed are stricter orders, but no violent measures nor large-scale raids may be carried out. One should, rather, proceed with clean methods step by step.

For the military commander in France, the military administration chief Dr. Michel referred to the statements of State Secretary Dr. Landfried and advanced the opinion that the situation in France was similar. The calling up of entire age classes is prepared in France, but has not yet begun, as the German military authorities have not yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French authorities cannot be doubted, but it is in part lacking among the lower and middle authorities. These and the persons willing to work expose themselves, with a loyal attitude toward the German authorities, to reprisals by the French population.

Ambassador Abetz confirms these statements. The application of severe measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, is of no use; it will only drive the population the more quickly into the Maquis. In these territories, in which the Wehrmacht is employed anyway, some 10,000 more workers would doubtless be seized. Then these same German forces could be employed for executive measures, which would also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In this connection, entire plant communities might be transplanted.

The chief of the security police Dr. Kaltenbrunner declared himself willing, when asked by the GBA, to place the security police at his disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable whether entire age classes could be seized with these weak forces. In his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign governments.

State Secretary von Steengracht (Foreign Office) commented on this. The agreements made with the foreign governments were entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, on the request of the Foreign Office, to issue the correspond-

ing orders. If these orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate executive of the foreign governments themselves. In France this had for political reasons been reduced to a minimum. In Italy there was no longer an executive in actuality. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy.

Ambassador Rahn believes that there is still a sufficient number of workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out, although $\frac{2}{3}$ of the Italian territory had been lost with respect to population also. He had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was, until before the fall of Rome, in general successful, as can be seen from the fact that 200,000 Italians could be seized for military purposes. Since that time the situation in Italy has become extremely difficult, however, since the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the Italian people. The German authorities had attempted to intercept the effects and united the entire executive in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of violent methods on a large scale is not possible, since that would cause complete disorder and interruption of production. The best example for this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the strikes in Turin through which 10% of the personnel were to be seized as unwilling to work. 4,000 German forces were collected for this purpose. The result was that the food supply to Turin was cut off by the resistance movement and the supply of energy was interrupted, so that 250,000 workers had to stop work. This could not be justified in view of the considerable contribution to the war of the Italian armament industry. General Field Marshal Kesselring declared that a continuation of forced obligations would cause not only the loss of the armament production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater of war. In the face of this statement, the hardest political will must keep silent. The only thing which could happen would be the execution of the forced obligations in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out:

- a. The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued.
- b. To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with machinery and workers.
- c. The transmittal of salary savings of the Italian workers in Germany to their homeland, which is not operating well, is to be safeguarded. For this purpose an automatic procedure is

to be introduced, which Ambassador Rahn had already proposed in another connection.

d. The system of the induction of age classes will be reintroduced when the German military authorities consider the time ripe.

In answer to the reported remark of General Field Marshal Kesselring, *General Warlimont* (OKW) commented that this remark was unknown to the OKW. The OKW's approval of this standpoint could therefore not yet be assumed.

Gauleiter Sauckel declared that all these proposals were inadequate, since they were not suited to set into motion the masses of manpower which he needed. The execution of all these proposals had already been tried in practice, since the labor commitments authority had at no time limited themselves to one method. He still had to call it seriously damaging to the execution of the labor commitment that his far reaching competencies and powers had been made the subject of discussion. What he needed, as already said, was "elbow room."

At the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, *Gauleiter Sauckel* declared himself willing to set up several programmatic demands on which he wants to vote with the participants and which then are to be submitted to the Fuehrer with a request for acknowledgment and legalization. A written formulation will follow. For the time being the GBA presents his demands as follows:

a. The proposals of General Warlimont will be discussed directly among the participants and will be executed together.

b. The GBA receives permission to establish national security and recruitment machinery for labor commitment, which will operate on the basis of orders and directives of the GBA without need of interference by other offices.

c. The regulations made by the French and Italian authorities in regard to German labor commitment are to be fortified by concrete execution regulations which guarantee the most active collaboration of foreign authorities in the acquisition of manpower.

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, having made these statements, closed the meeting by pointing out that he would inform the Fuehrer about its results and that he would leave the further treatment of the problem, as proposed, to those concerned.

[signed] L. [Lammers]

2. Respectfully submitted
to the Reich Minister
signed M.13/7 [?]

17.J.

Kr. [Kritzinger]
[illegible initials]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3838-PS

Statement
of

Standartenfuehrer Martin Sandberger

I, Martin Sandberger, make under oath and after being first duly sworn in, the following declarations:

In my capacity as group leader VIa at the RSHA, the following became known to me:

In February 1945, I was told by group leader VIb, SS Standartenfuehrer Steimle, that he had to represent Schellenberg at the daily section chief meetings. On that occasion, Mueller, section chief IV, presented to Kaltenbrunner a list of names, who were in confinement in or close to Berlin, and Kaltenbrunner should decide, if they were to be transported to Southern Germany or if they should be shot, because the Russian Armies were closing in on Berlin. Steimle did not know who was concerned. Kaltenbrunner made his decisions in an extremely hasty and superficial manner and Steimle indignantly turned to me regarding the frivolity of the procedure. I assumed that Kaltenbrunner had ordered a number of executions because if evacuation would have been ordered, there wouldn't have been talk about frivolity of the procedure.

Schellenberg suggested to Himmler in March or April 1945, that the V-weapon factories in concentration camps shouldn't be destroyed, but to surrender installations, located in Thuringia properly to the advancing American Army. Himmler agreed to it. As I was informed by Schellenberg in September 1945 at an internment camp in England on the occasion of a walk, Kaltenbrunner frustrated this, by obtaining a contradictory order directly from Hitler.

That the facts stated above are true; that the declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; that after reading over the statement, I have signed and executed the same.

[Signed] Martin Sandberger

Oberursel, 19th of November 1945

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Oberursel/Germany this 19th day of November 1945.

[signed] Rudolf Urbach

RUDOLF URBACH, Captain, AUS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3839-PS

Statement
of
SS-Oberfuehrer Josef Spacil

I, Josef Spacil, make under oath and after being first duly sworn the following additions to complete my declaration of 30 Sep 45.

In my and in the presence of the persons mentioned below, Obergruppenfuehrer (at that time Gruppenfuehrer) Pruetzmann in the first days of August 1941 at his office at Riga (Ritterhaus) mentioned in the course of a conversation that an order or a directive of the RFSS had arrived, according to which criminal elements were to be resettled. Upon counterquestions of the men, where the RFSS expects the resettlement, Pruetzmann answered approx. the following: "Not how you think, they are to be expedited to the next world." According to my memory, the following were present:

Stubaf Sievers
Staf Fromm
Mr Preuss (probably from Koenigsberg)
3-4 men from the ORPO, Berlin

The word was mentioned in my presence from Pruetzmann for a second time at ROWNO in May or June 1942. He said approx.: "The Higher SS and Police Leaders are ordered to RFSS, who is passing through. (Through ROWNO.) The resettlement has caused sensation abroad." Present according to my memory were:

General Oelhafen
Oberf Hoffmeier
Some men of the construction HQ of highway IV, names unknown
Lt. Col. Gericke
And myself

In regard to "special treatment," I have the following knowledge: On occasion of the meetings of the section heads, Gruppenfuehrer Mueller frequently remarked to Kaltenbrunner, if the one or the other case should receive "special treatment" or if "special treatment" was to be considered. The expressions were the following for example:

Mueller: Obergruppenfuehrer, please case B special treatment or not?

Kaltenbrunner: Yes, or to be presented to RFSS for decision.

or

Mueller: Obergruppenfuehrer, no answer has arrived from the RFSS in regard to special treatment of case A.

Kaltenbrunner: To be traced.

or

Mueller handed a paper to Kaltenbrunner and requested instructions as described before.

If such a conversation between Mueller and Kaltenbrunner took place, only the initials were mentioned, so that the persons present at the table never knew, who was involved.

I asked Mueller once, what the true meaning of "special treatment" was. He replied that these people came to a special camp. He spoke of:

Walzertraum at Walsertal

or

Winzerstube, Godesberg

Exact information besides Kaltenbrunner might also be furnished by the Adj. of the section head IV, Hstuf Tuchstein.

As far as I recall it, Mueller spoke to Kaltenbrunner mainly on questions of the 20 July 1944.

Mueller as well as Kaltenbrunner have proposed special treatment resp. presentation to RFSS for approval of special treatment in my presence for special cases, which I cannot identify. I estimate that in approx. 50% of the cases, special treatment was approved.

That the facts stated above are true; that this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; that after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at Oberursel/Germany this 8th day of November 1945.

[signed] Josef SPACIL
SS-Oberfuehrer

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Oberursel/Germany this 9th day of November 1945.

[signed] Rudolf Urbach

RUDOLF URBACH, Captain, AUS

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3840-PS

Before me, Major Luke P. Rogers, being authorized to administer oaths, personally appeared Karl Kaleske, who, being duly sworn, through the interpreter, made and subscribed the following statement:

My name is Karl Kaleske. I was Adjutant to Doctor von Sammern-Frankenegg from November 1942 until April 1943, while he was SS and Polizeifuehrer of Warsaw. I then was Adjutant to SS and Polizeifuehrer Stroop until August 1943. The action against the Warsaw ghetto was planned while von Sammern-Frankenegg

was SS and Polizeifuehrer. General Strop took over the command on the day of the commencement of the action. The function of the Security Police during the action against the Warsaw ghetto was to accompany the SS troops. A certain number of SS troops were assigned the task to clear a certain street. With every SS group there were from four to six Security policemen, because they knew the ghetto very well. These Security policemen were under Doctor Hahn, Commander of the Security Police for Warsaw. Hahn received his orders not from the SS and Polizeifuehrer of Warsaw, but directly from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. This pertains not only to the ghetto action but to all matters. Frequently Doctor Hahn came to our office and told the SS and Polizeifuehrer that he had received such and such an order from Kaltenbrunner about the contents of which he wanted to inform the SS and Polizeifuehrer. He would not do this with every order, but only with certain ones.

I remember the case of three hundred foreign Jews who had been collected in the Polski Hotel by the Security Police. At the end of the ghetto action, Kaltenbrunner ordered the Security Police to transport these people away.

During my time in Warsaw the Security Police had been in charge of matters concerning the underground. The Security Police handled these matters independently of the SS and Polizeifuehrer, and received its orders from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. When the leader of the underground in Warsaw was captured in June or July 1943, he was flown directly to Kaltenbrunner in Berlin.

I have read the statement over and I have understood it completely. I have made the statement freely and without compulsion. I swear before God that this statement is in accordance with the full truth.

[Signed] Karl Kaleske

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Wiesbaden, Germany, on this 24th day of February 1946.

[Signed] Luke P. Rogers
Major CMP
Investigating officer

COPY OF DOCUMENT 3841-PS

Before me, Major Luke P. Rogers, being authorized to administer oaths, personally appeared Juergen Strop who, being duly sworn, through the interpreter, made and subscribed the following statement:

My name is Juergen Stroop. I was SS and Polizeifuehrer of the District of Warsaw from the 17th or 18th of April 1943, until the end of August 1943. The action against the Warsaw ghetto was planned by my predecessor, SS Oberfuehrer Doctor von Sammern-Frankeneegg. On the day of the commencement of this action I took over the command and von Sammern-Frankeneegg explained to me what was to be done. He had the order from Himmler before him, and in addition I received a teletype from Himmler which ordered me to clear the Warsaw ghetto and raze it to the ground. To carry this out, I had two battalions of Waffen-SS, one hundred army men, units of Order Police, and seventy-five to a hundred Security Police people. The Security Police had been active in the Warsaw ghetto for some time, and during this program it was their function to accompany SS units in groups of six or eight, as guides and experts in ghetto matters. Obersturmbannfuehrer Doctor Hahn was commander of the Security Police of Warsaw at this time. Hahn gave the Security Police its orders concerning their tasks in this action. These orders were not given to Hahn by me, but came from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. As SS and Polizeifuehrer of Warsaw I gave no orders to the Security Police. All orders came to Hahn from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. For example, in June or July of the same year, I was together with Hahn in Kaltenbrunner's office and Kaltenbrunner told me that while Hahn and I must work together, all basic orders to the Security Police must come from him in Berlin.

After the people had been taken out of the Ghetto, numbering from fifty to sixty thousand, they were brought to the railroad station. The Security Police had absolute supervision of these people, and was in charge of the transport of these people to Lublin.

Immediately after the ghetto action had been completed, about three hundred foreign Jews had been collected at the Polski Hotel. These people had partly been here before the action, and partly brought here during the action. Kaltenbrunner ordered Hahn to transport these people away. Hahn himself told me that he had received this order from Kaltenbrunner.

All executions [literally, carrying out death sentences] were ordered by the Reich Main Security Office, Kaltenbrunner.

I have read this statement over and I have understood it completely. I have made the statement freely and without compulsion. I swear before God that this is the full truth.

{signed} Juergen Stroop

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Wiesbaden, Germany, on this 24th day of February 1946.

[signed] Luke P. Rogers
Major CMP
Investigating Officer

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3842-PS

Fritz Mundhenke PWE Bad Aibling, 7 March 1946

I, George August Friedrich Mundhenke, born 15 February 1898 at Celle-Hanover, Ex-SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer of the motor vehicle service of the Allgemeine SS and Ex-SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer of the Reserve in the Waffen SS, hereby state the following:

I recollect that with reference to the occupation of Czechoslovakia two different actions were taken, viz:

The first one: occupation of the Sudetenland and the Border Districts inhabited by German Nationals.

The second one: occupation of Czechoslovakia proper (called afterward the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and the Slovakian State).

Some time before the second action, officers of the "Hlinka-Garde" (the illegal or underground para-SS organization in the Slovakian part of the former Czechoslovakian Republic) used to come to the premises of SS-Oberabschnitt Donau (which at the time may still have had its original name of SS-Oberabschnitt oesterreich). In this connection I would point out for corroboration the character of the Hlinka-Garde in so far as later, after the invasion, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Nageler was attached to the diplomatic representation of Germany to the Slovakian State with a view of supervising the training of the Hlinka-Garde. I also noticed the leader of the Volksdeutschen in Slovakia, Karmasin, who later on was appointed secretary of state. The men (of the Hlinka-Garde) were transported by police trucks. This could be verified beyond doubt through the green police coloring of the trucks. I recollect that some of the gentlemen wore black uniforms (black pants and blouses in shirt cut). It was said at the time that they had passed the Danube in civilian clothes and had donned the uniforms on the German bank of the river. I do not remember the rank distinctions in particular; I only recollect that they could rather be called "Officer-Distinctions" than the "half" rank distinctions of the single "Gliederungen" (organizations) of the NSDAP. [Note of the translator: By "half" distinctions of the Gliederungen the writer apparently refers to the

fact that the Gliederungen wore their distinctions on only *one* side of the shirt collar and also only on *one* shoulder.] There were secret meetings in which I did not take part. I felt that I was not fully trusted. I saw the gentlemen in Kaltenbrunner's ante-room only and as far as I can remember in the dining room. The discussions the topics of which I was not aware referred without doubt to the action planned. I think so for the following reason:

Shortly afterwards, increased traffic of motor vehicles set in. Normally, I was in charge of the handling of the vehicles of the Oberabschnitt. In this instance, SS-Oberfuehrer Erich Cassel, at the time chief of staff and deputy of Kaltenbrunner (Cassel's last employment was to my knowledge leader of the "Amt fur Volksturmsfragen" in the Reichsleitung of the NSDAP at Munich and honorary SS-Brigadefuehrer of the General SS and according to hearsay he had been appointed to this post upon request of Himmler) put me aside and directed the action personally. At first, I did not even know where the vehicles were sent, only, after the return of the first trucks, I learned that their destination had been Engerau. The trucks were loaded in the inner overglazed court of the building and, so far could be judged from the outside, the cases contained victuals and spirits (liquor). Secretly, I was told that the trucks carried high explosives as well. The trucks went to the Engerau bridge leading into Slovakia.

Through the personnel department, photos of most of the staff were collected. SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Curth was chief of the department at the time, his assistant being SS-Oberscharfuehrer Mueller. Both are said to have been killed in action. These photos were used for the manufacturing of false documents. Members of the staff have even shown to me their falsified pass-cards for the near-border traffic between Czechoslovakia and the former Austria. I remember distinctly the dirty blue-grey shade and the near postcard size of the paper and the poor printing. I guess that these falsifications were made by the Gestapo. Using these passes which were showing false names and trades, both members of the General SS (of SS-Oberabschnitt Donau and SS-Abschnitt XXXI) and also of the Gestapo were either crossing the Danube bridge "legally" or, at night, crossing the river in small boats. I remember fairly well, just as if it had happened only today, that my assistant at the time, the later and now SS-Obersturmfuehrer Franz Kourik once rushed into my office and related excitedly the following tale: "Boy! Uncle Fritz! I'm just back from an embarrassing trip. By fast train from Berlin there arrived a certain Doctor X, a

member of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. In his small unobtrusive baggage he was carrying high explosives sufficient to blow a whole part of Vienna city to the high heavens. I was driving my 220 Steyr vehicle very warily having in mind the bad state of the roads down there. If we had had a crash! I was fairly sweating. * * * There is quite a lot going on the other side. Spatz will see to matters."

From other men I could ascertain that buildings had been blown up on the other side with a view of making believe that this had been done by Czech Nationalists and in order to get a pretense for the invasion of German troops to protect the Volksdeutschen and the suppressed Slovaks. Besides other objects, a water tower was mentioned. It was either definitely blown up or one of the malefactors was arrested by the Czechs when he tried to do so, and he was freed only shortly before being hung. This must have been a Stapo man, because otherwise I should remember his name. According to hearsay, both Czech guards and Volksdeutsche were killed.

The German press, at the time, reported attempted evil doings of the Czech Nationalists and asked that something be done for the protection of Germans and Slovaks.

Kaltenbrunner alone was responsible for these actions.

In charge of the actions from the side of the Allgemeine SS was SS-Standartenfuehrer Spacil (nicknamed shortly Spatz). He was chief of the administration of SS-Oberabschnitt Donau and was called later on by Kaltenbrunner to Berlin and made chief of staff at the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Spacil was one of the most intimate friends of Kaltenbrunner.

As furthermore taking part in these actions I remember—

1. SS-Obersturmfuehrer Franz Kourik.
2. SS-Untersturmfuehrer Karl Spitt, who according to a statement of Kourik is supposed to be in hiding with 2 women in the Alps. Kourik ought to know his whereabouts.
3. A member of the SS by name of Apfelbeck, his latest rank to my knowledge being SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, a most intimate friend of Spacil's.
4. The then SS-Oberscharfuehrer Stadler.
5. A SS-Oberscharfuehrer by the name of Petenka or similarly named.

I believe that, being given an opportunity to look up the roster of personnel of the SS-Oberabschnitt Donau, I should be able to give further information on the group of persons myself.

I, myself, had nothing to do with the whole action.

I would propose to hear 2 civilian employees of the former

SS-Oberabschnitt Donau called Weiss and Bieritz respectively. These men were making repairs on the trucks and also used to fill up the tanks with gasoline. Particulars on their persons I am not able to give. I only remember that Weiss was nicknamed the "Japanese" for his being the Japanese type.

Whenever I came forward in the circle of my comrades stating my scruples I was always told that the English were using similar methods in their secret service for a long time and that, in addition, they had given their consent to the whole action. Anyhow, I could do nothing under the circumstances. Things happened so fast that nothing I could have done would have brought any results.

In August 1939, I had an appendectomy done upon me and, due to complications arising, I was able to do light duty after 8 months had passed.

I have made this statement

1. Not from feeling of hate or just because I like to be a squealer but from understanding that in so doing I can serve in detecting crimes which I as a German am ashamed of.

2. Being fully convinced that on account of my statements I will be slandered by the other side. I know quite well the men who are trying to make trouble for me and that for a long time. But this shall not deter me from helping the spirit of justice to a victorious end.

I hereby certify and solemnly declare that I have made the above statements to the best of my knowledge and belief and to the best of which my memory serves me. I am also prepared to swear this statement before a public court (in open court).

PWE 26, Bad Aibling, this seventh March 1946

[signed] Fritz Mundhenke

Ex-SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer of
General SS and ex-Captain of
Reserve of the Waffen-SS

Fritz Mundhenke

PWE Bad Aibling, 8 March 1946

Appendix to my statements of 7 March 1946.

After having slept over my statement of yesterday and looked them over this morning:

THEY ARE CORRECT AS GIVEN!

In addition, I have to state the following:

1. *Question:* Who took part in the secret meetings?

Answer: a. Besides Karmacin I did not know any more

men from the Slovakian side. After so much time, it is rather difficult to give adequate descriptions of persons. There is no point in making general remarks. But I should be able to recognize one or the other person if I was put to pick them out from a big group.

- b. On the German side for certain
SS-Standartenfuehrer Spacil
SS-Oberfuehrer Cassel
at a guess I mention additional
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Kammerhofer (at the time leader of SS-Abschnitt XXXI) latest known employment: Superior SS- and Polizeifuehrer of Croatia,
SS-Brigadefuehrer Huber of the Vienna Gestapo,
SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Apfelbeck.

2. At the time (and as I mentioned above) I felt remorse and scruples and I have tried to see Cardinal Innitzer in order to confide in him the happenings. But before his residence I noticed the Secret Police examining the personal papers of the visitors. They accosted me with: "Oh, look here, have you too been coming snooping around?" Later on, everything was already past and done for.

[signed] Fritz Mundhenke
Ex-SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer of the
General SS and ex-Captain of
Reserve of the Waffen-SS.

Subscribed and sworn to
before me this 8th day
of March 1946.

[signed] R. S. Kotite,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
Asst. Operations Officer.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3844-PS

Before me, Paul C. Guth, 2nd Lt. AUS, being authorized to administer oaths, personally appeared Josef Niedermayer, who, being by me first duly sworn in German, made and subscribed the following statement in his own handwriting:

I, Josef Niedermayer born 11 April 1920 in Salzburg declare herewith the following:

1. From the fall of 1942 until May 1945 the so-called cell-

barracks of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp were under my supervision.

2. During the beginning of December 1944 the so-called "bullet" orders were shown to me in the political department of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Those were two orders each of which bore the signature of Kaltenbrunner. I saw both of these signatures myself. One of these orders stated that foreign civilian workers who had repeatedly escaped from work camps were to be sent to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp under the "bullet" action in case of recapture.

The second order stated that the same procedure was to be followed with officers and noncommissioned officers who were prisoners of war with the exception of British and Americans if they repeatedly escaped from prisoner of war camps. These prisoners of war were also to be brought to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp.

3. On the basis of this "bullet" order and the oral instructions of Kaltenbrunner which went with it 1,300 foreign civilian workers, officers, and noncommissioned officers were brought to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. There they were lodged in block number 20, and fed badly according to orders so that they had to starve. Eight hundred of them died from hunger and illness. The bad food and the lack of medical care resulted from the personal oral orders of Kaltenbrunner.

This statement was written by me on 7 March 1946 in Dachau, Germany in my own handwriting of my own free will and without compulsion. I swear before God that it is the truth.

[signed] Niedermayer Josef

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Dachau, Germany, this 7th day of March 1946.

[signed] Paul C. Guth, 2nd Lt. AUS
Investigating officer

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3846-PS

Interrogation of Johann Kanduth, 30 November 1945, at Salzburg, Austria, Hq WCIT 6836, by Lt. Col. David G. Paston. O-189428, concerning the murder of American and British prisoners of war on or about 24 January 1945.

Q. What is your name?

A. Kanduth, Johann.

Q. Where do you live?

A. Linz, Weissenwolfstrasse 7.

Q. Have you an address in Salzburg?

A. Salzburg, Solleystrasse 13.

Q. Were you at any time an inmate of the concentration camp at Mauthausen?

A. Yes.

Q. During what period?

A. From the 21st of March 1939 till the 5th of May 1945.

* * * * *

Q. Besides your work in the kitchen did you also work in the crematorium?

A. Yes.

Q. At what date did you begin your work in the crematorium?

A. From the 9th of May.

Q. What did you do there?

A. I worked the heating for the cremation of the bodies.

Q. Describe your work.

A. At first my occupation consisted of removing the bodies, then I served the heating and had to learn how to put in the corpses, then I had to stir up and to take out the ashes. This was my occupation during 4 years. Afterwards I had to fill the urns. In the first quarter of the year cremations of single persons took place, afterwards there were only mass cremations, the ashes were thrown away. When the Americans advanced, we filled 3,000 urns of Dutch Jews. We had to smash the urns afterwards and to throw the ashes away, so that every trace was wiped out.

* * * * *

Q. Do you know how many bodies you cremated?

A. Yes.

1940—1,242

1941—1,676

1942—6,523

1943—2,960

1944—5,479

1945—9,676

We had two categories, the non-Jewish and the Russian prisoners. These papers I saved. But there were many additional corpses which were not cremated in the ovens. They were transported to a private crematorium at Steyr.

Q. Do these figures really represent the cremations you yourself did?

A. Yes.

* * * * *

Q. Have you ever seen Kaltenbrunner at Mauthausen on a visit at any time?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember when it was?

A. In 1942 and 1943.

Q. Can you give it more exactly, maybe the month?

A. I do not know the date.

Q. Do you remember only this one visit in the year 1942 or 1943?

A. I remember Kaltenbrunner three times.

Q. What year?

A. Between 1942 and 1943.

Q. Tell us, in short, what did you think about these visits of Kaltenbrunner which you describe? That is: what did you see, what did you do, and when did you see that he was or was not present at such executions?

A. Kaltenbrunner was accompanied by Eigruher, Schulz, Zeireis, Bachmaier, Streitwieser, and some other people. Kaltenbrunner went laughing in the gas chamber. Then the people were brought from the bunker to be executed and then all three kinds of executions: hanging, shooting in the back of the neck, and gassing were demonstrated. After the dust had disappeared, we had to take away the bodies.

* * * * *

Q. When did you see the three different kinds of executions? Were these just demonstrations or regular executions?

A. I do not know if they were regular executions, or just demonstrations. During these executions, besides Kaltenbrunner, the bunker-leaders "Hauptscharfuehrer" Seidel and Duessen, were also present. The last named then led the people downstairs.

Q. Do you know whether these executions were announced for this day or if they were just demonstrations or if the executions were staged just for pleasure of the visitors?

A. Yes, these executions were announced for this day.

Q. How do you know they were set for this day? Did somebody tell you about these announced executions?

A. "Hauptscharfuehrer" Roth, the leader of the crematorium, always had me called to his room and said to me: "Kaltenbrunner will come today and we have to prepare everything for the executions in his presence." Then we were obliged to heat and to clean the stoves.

LAMMERS, OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT IN
THE THIRD REICH

[Staatsfuehrung in Dritten Reich.] Part II. The Leader State.
[Der Fuehrerstaat.] Verwaltungsblatt, 59, 1938,
2, pp. 563-565, 585-589.

Out of this total basic concentration of power of authority in the person of the Fuehrer, however, no excessively strong and unnecessary centralization of administration in the hand of the Fuehrer results in the governmental administration. In my general elaborations on the basic concept of the Fuehrer state I have already pointed out that the subordinate leader's [Unterfuehrer] authority, directed downward, forbids interference with every individual order he may issue. This principle is manipulated by the Fuehrer in his government leadership in such a manner that for example the position of the Reich ministers is actually much more independent today than formerly, even though today the Reich ministers are subordinated to the Fuehrer's unlimited power of command in their entire official sphere, even in every individual measure and decision in the most trivial matters. Willingness to bear responsibility, ability to make decisions, aggressive energy, and real authority—these are the qualities which the Fuehrer demands primarily of his subordinate leaders [Unterfuehrer]. Therefore he allows them the greatest freedom in the execution of their affairs and in the manner in which they fulfill their tasks. Nothing is more foreign to him than narrow or fault-finding criticism.

* * * * *

By Divine Providence and the genius of Adolf Hitler the collapse of this (Austrian) dictatorship became the deliverance and salvation of the German Ostmark and the hour of birth of our glorious, beloved Greater German Reich.

* * * * *

Today the whole world knows that the "German National Socialist Revolution," which was a real revolution even though no blood flowed, had its beginning on January 30, 1933. For this German National Socialist revolution did not signify merely a change in government. It was rather a complete upheaval of philosophy [Weltanschauung], and beyond that a radical change in state and political thinking in general.

* * * * *

According to National Socialist conception the most basic differences in men are not accidental but determined by their blood.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, being first duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

1. I am forty-six years old, and have been a member of the NSDAP since 1922; a member of the SS since 1934; a member of the Waffen-SS since 1939. I was a member from 1 December 1934 of the SS Guard Unit, the so-called Deathhead Formation [Totenkopf Verband].

2. I have been constantly associated with the administration of concentration camps since 1934, serving at Dachau until 1938; then as Adjutant in Sachsenhausen from 1938 to May 1, 1940, when I was appointed Commandant of Auschwitz. I commanded Auschwitz until 1 December 1943, and estimate that at least 2,500,000 victims were executed and exterminated there by gassing and burning, and at least another half million succumbed to starvation and disease making a total dead of about 3,000,000. This figure represents about 70% or 80% of all persons sent to Auschwitz as prisoners, the remainder having been selected and used for slave labor in the concentration camp industries. Included among the executed and burnt were approximately 20,000 Russian prisoners of war (previously screened out of Prisoner of War cages by the Gestapo) who were delivered at Auschwitz in Wehrmacht transports operated by regular Wehrmacht officers and men. The remainder of the total number of victims included about 100,000 German Jews, and great numbers of citizens, mostly Jewish from Holland, France, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, or other countries. We executed about 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at Auschwitz in the summer of 1944.

3. WVHA (SS Main Economic and Administration Office), headed by Obergruppenfuehrer Oswald Pohl, was responsible for all administrative matters such as billeting, feeding and medical care, in the concentration camps. Prior to establishment of the RSHA, Secret State Police Office (Gestapo) and the Reich Office of Criminal Police were responsible for arrests, commitments to concentration camps, punishments and executions therein. After organization of the RSHA, all of these functions were carried on as before, but, pursuant to orders signed by Heydrich as Chief of the RSHA. While Kaltenbrunner was Chief of RSHA, orders for protective custody, commitments, punishment, and individual executions were signed by Kaltenbrunner or by Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, as Kaltenbrunner's deputy.

4. Mass executions by gassing commenced during the summer 1941 and continued until fall 1944. I personally supervised execu-

tions at Auschwitz until the first of December 1943 and know by reason of my continued duties in the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps WVHA that these mass executions continued as stated above. All mass executions by gassing took place under the direct orders, supervisions, and responsibility of RSHA. I received all orders for carrying out these mass executions directly from RSHA.

5. On 1 December 1943 I became Chief of AMT I in AMT Group D of the WVHA and in that office was responsible for coordinating all matters arising between RSHA and concentration camps under the administration of WVHA. I held this position until the end of the war. Pohl, as Chief of WVHA, and Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of RSHA, often conferred personally and frequently communicated orally and in writing concerning concentration camps. On 5 October 1944 I brought a lengthy report regarding Mauthausen Concentration Camp to Kaltenbrunner at his office at RSHA, Berlin. Kaltenbrunner asked me to give him a short oral digest of this report and said he would reserve any decision until he had had an opportunity to study it in complete detail. This report dealt with the assignment to labor of several hundred prisoners who had been condemned to death—so-called "nameless prisoners."

6. The "final solution" of the Jewish question meant the complete extermination of all Jews in Europe. I was ordered to establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941. At that time, there were already in the general government three other extermination camps; Belzek, Treblinka, and Wolzek. These camps were under the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and SD. I visited Treblinka to find out how they carried out their extermination. The Camp Commandant at Treblinka told me that he had liquidated 80,000 in the course of one-half year. He was principally concerned with liquidating all the Jews from the Warsaw ghetto. He used monoxide gas and I did not think that his methods were very efficient. So when I set up the extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyclon B, which was a crystallized prussic acid which we dropped into the death chamber from a small opening. It took from 3 to 15 minutes to kill the people in the death chamber depending upon climatic conditions. We knew when the people were dead because their screaming stopped. We usually waited about one-half hour before we opened the doors and removed the bodies. After the bodies were removed our special commandos took off the rings and extracted the gold from the teeth of the corpses.

7. Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that we

built our gas chambers to accommodate 2,000 people at one time, whereas at Treblinka their 10 gas chambers only accommodated 200 people each. The way we selected our victims was as follows: we had two SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine the incoming transports of prisoners. The prisoners would be marched by one of the doctors who would make spot decisions as they walked by. Those who were fit for work were sent into the Camp. Others were sent immediately to the extermination plants. Children of tender years were invariably exterminated since by reason of their youth they were unable to work. Still another improvement we made over Treblinka was that at Treblinka the victims almost always knew that they were to be exterminated and at Auschwitz we endeavored to fool the victims into thinking that they were to go through a delousing process. Of course, frequently they realized our true intentions and we sometimes had riots and difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently women would hide their children under the clothes but of course when we found them we would send the children in to be exterminated. We were required to carry out these exterminations in secrecy but of course the foul and nauseating stench from the continuous burning of bodies permeated the entire area and all of the people living in the surrounding communities knew that exterminations were going on at Auschwitz.

8. We received from time to time special prisoners from the local Gestapo office. The SS doctors killed such prisoners by injections of benzine. Doctors had orders to write ordinary death certificates and could put down any reason at all for the cause of death.

9. From time to time we conducted medical experiments on women inmates, including sterilization and experiments relating to cancer. Most of the people who died under these experiments had been already condemned to death by the Gestapo.

10. Rudolf Mildner was the chief of the Gestapo at Kattowitz and as such was head of the Political Department at Auschwitz which conducted third degree methods of interrogation, from approximately March 1941 until September 1943. As such, he frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz for incarceration or execution. He visited Auschwitz on several occasions. The Gestapo Court, the SS Standgericht, which tried persons accused of various crimes, such as escaping Prisoners of War, etc., frequently met within Auschwitz, and Mildner often attended the trial of such persons, who usually were executed in Auschwitz following their sentence. I showed Mildner throughout the extermination plant at Auschwitz and he was directly interested

in it since he had to send the Jews from his territory for execution at Auschwitz.

I understand English as it is written above. The above statements are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement, I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg, Germany, on the fifth day of April 1946.

[signed] Rudolf Hoess

RUDOLF FRANZ FERDINAND HOESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

5th day of April 1946, at Nurnberg, Germany.

[signed] Smith W. Brookhart Jr.

SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,
LT. COLONEL, IGD.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3870-PS

AFFIDAVIT OF HANS MARSALEK

I, Hans Marsalek, after first being duly sworn, declare as follows:

1. I was born on 19 July 1914 in Vienna, and was in Concentration Camp Mauthausen from 29 September 1942 until my liberation. I had the function of second clerk in this camp. My present occupation is with the Directorate of Police in Vienna as the Director of Department IV. Counter-Intelligence Service of the State Police [Staatspolizeilicher Abwehrdienst], and my present address is: Vienna 19, Grinzingstrasse 12.

2. On 22 May 1945, the Commandant of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, Franz Zierys, was shot while escaping by American soldiers and was taken to the branch camp of Gusen. Franz Zierys was interrogated by me in the presence of the Commander of the 11th Armored Division (American Armored Division) Seibel; the former prisoner and physician Dr. Koszeinski; and in the presence of another Polish citizen, name unknown, for a period of six to eight hours. The interrogation was effected in the night from 22 May to 23 May 1945. Franz Zierys was seriously wounded—his body had been penetrated by three bullets—and knew that he would die shortly and told me the following:

"I joined the SS on 30 September 1936 as a training specialist with the rank of Obersturmfuehrer (Lieutenant). I was assigned to the 4th SS Regt at Oranienburg and was transferred to Mauthausen on 17 February 1939, with the rank of Hauptsturmfuehrer (Captain) and as successor to the former Commandant of the camp, SS Fuehrer Saurer. My

rapid and extraordinary career is due to the fact that I volunteered frequently for the Front. By orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler I was forced to remain in Mauthausen. The SS complement in Mauthausen had the following organization:

There was one SS man for ten prisoners. The highest number of prisoners was about 17,000 (seventeen thousand), with the exception of the branch camps. The highest number in Camp Mauthausen, the branch camps included, was about 90,000 (ninety thousand).

The total number of prisoners who died was 65,000 (sixty-five thousand). The complement was made up of Totenkopf units, strength of 5,000 (five thousand) men, which were made up of guards and the command staff.

Later, 6,000 (six thousand) men came from the Army and the Air Forces [Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe] for guard duty and they were put into SS uniforms. Moreover, there were many "Racial Germans" [Volks Deutsche] who had been conscripted into the Wehrmacht. The recruitment of former prisoners into the SS was done on orders of Himmler. These were to fight against the enemy, particularly the Bolsheviks. For the greater part they were to be recruited as volunteers.

I have personally killed about 4,000 (four thousand) prisoners by assigning them to the Penal Company. The formation of Penal Companies was done by order of Berlin to effect a more rapid extermination of prisoners through hard labor. I always took part personally in the executions.

By order of Dr. Lohnauer, incorrigible professional criminals were transferred to Hartheim near Linz as mentally deficient, where they were exterminated by a special system of SS Captain Krebsbach. The greatest number of murdered prisoners goes to the account of Bachmeyer. Chemielskwy and Seidler in Gusen had human skin specially tanned on which there were tattoos. From this leather they had books bound, and they had lampshades and leather cases made.

According to an order by Himmler, I was to liquidate all prisoners on behalf of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the prisoners were to be led into the tunnels of the factory Bergkristall and only one entrance was to be left open. Then this entrance was to be blown up by the use of explosives and the death of the prisoners was to be effected in this manner. I refused to carry out this order. This matter was the extermination of the prisoners of the so-called Mother

camp, Mauthausen, and of the camps Gusen I and Gusen II. Details of this are known to Herr Wolfram and SS Obersturmfuehrer Eckermann.

A gassing plant was built in Concentration Camp Mauthausen by order of the former garrison doctor, Dr. Krebsbach, camouflaged as a bathroom. Prisoners were gassed in this camouflaged bathroom. Apart from that a specially built automobile commuted between Mauthausen and Gusen, in which prisoners were gassed while travelling. The idea for the construction of this automobile was Dr. Wasicki's, SS Untersturmfuehrer and pharmacist. I, myself, never put any gas into this automobile, I only drove it, but I knew that prisoners were being gassed. The gassing of the prisoners was done on the urging of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Krebsbach.

Everything that we carried out was ordered by the Reich Security Main Office [Reichssicherheitshauptamt], furthermore, by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller or Dr. Kaltenbrunner, the latter being Chief of the Security Police.

SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl gave the order that prisoners were to be driven into the woods because they were weak and had had no food, in order to pick berries there and to eat buds. The above-mentioned shortened the daily ration from 750 grms per day to 350 grms per day through the administration. SS Gruppenfuehrer Gluecks gave the order to classify weak prisoners as mentally deranged and to kill them by a gas plant which existed in the Castle Hartheim near Linz. There, about a million or a million and a half human beings were killed. Those prisoners were reported as having died from natural causes [Normal Verstorbene]. The death reports of prisoners still alive, who were to be transported, were sent to the political department concerned previous to their transport.

The number of prisoners who were murdered in Hartheim is not known to me, but the number of victims at Hartheim is about one million or a million and a half, including the civilians who were sent to Hartheim. The gassing plant in Mauthausen was really built by order of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Gluecks, since he was of the opinion that it was more humane to gas the prisoners than to shoot them. One day Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl sent me about 3,000 women and children without prior notice, who were without food for ten days. In December 1944, they were transported in open coal cars without blankets. The children of these transports had

to be put on the march to Bergen Belsen by order from Berlin and I suppose that all of them died.

The Gauleiter Eigruber denied me food for new arrivals and all weak prisoners. He ordered that I was to turn over 50% of the potatoes which had been stored for the winter to the Gau (District).

SS Obergruppenfuehrer Gluecks was the one who gave the order to transfer those prisoners who were working in the Crematorium of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to Gusen and to have them killed by shooting them in the neck. There was a secret order whereby the Crematorium Kommando was to be killed every three weeks.

In the presence of Baldur von Schirach, Gauleiter Reiner, Dr. Ueberreiter, Dr. Juri, I received the following order from Reichsfuehrer Himmler: The Jews who were working on the South East Wall fortifications must be put on the march from all places of the South East Border of the Ostmark after finishing their work; their destination was to be Mauthausen. According to Himmler's order, 60,000 Jews were to come to Mauthausen. In point of fact only a fraction of this number arrived. As an example I mention a transport which left with 4,500 Jews but which arrived with 180. It is unknown to me from which place the transport originated. Women and children had no shoes—they were covered with rags and had lice. In this transport there were whole families and innumerable persons were shot on the way because of general bodily weakness. •

Under my administration, as Commandant, there were the following camps:

| | | | |
|---------------------|------------|--------|-----------|
| Mauthausen | with about | 12,000 | prisoners |
| Gusen I and II..... | with about | 24,000 | prisoners |
| Linz I | with about | 5,000 | prisoners |
| Gusen III | with about | 300 | prisoners |
| Linz II | with about | 500 | prisoners |
| Linz III | with about | 300 | prisoners |
| Ebensee | with about | 12,000 | prisoners |
| Passau I | with about | 600 | prisoners |
| Passau II | with about | 150 | prisoners |
| Passau III | with about | 60 | prisoners |
| Ternberg | with about | 500 | prisoners |
| Grossramming | with about | 3,000 | prisoners |
| Melk | with about | 10,000 | prisoners |
| Eisenerz | with about | 500 | prisoners |
| St. Lambrecht | with about | 350 | prisoners |

| | | |
|--------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Schloss Lindt | with about | 20 prisoners |
| Peggau | with about | 500 prisoners |
| Klagenfurt-Junkerschule | with about | 70 prisoners |
| Laibach | with about | 500 prisoners |
| Loiblpass | with about | 3,000 prisoners |
| Schechart-Henkelwerke.. | with about | 4,000 prisoners |
| Wiener-Neustadt | with about | 1,500 prisoners |
| Mistelbach | with about | 1,000 prisoners |
| Wiener-Neudorf | with about | 3,000 prisoners |
| Florisdorf | with about | 1,000 prisoners |
| Florisdorf Henkelwerke | with about | 800 prisoners |
| Sauerwerke Wien | with about | 2,000 prisoners |
| Steyer-Muenichholz | with about | 3,000 prisoners |
| St. Valentin | with about | 1,500 prisoners |
| Wels | with about | 2,000 prisoners |
| Amstetten | with about | 3,000 prisoners |
| Gunskirchen | with about | 450 prisoners |
| Schlier | with about | 1,000 prisoners |

There were still several other camps, the total being about 45 (forty-five). However, I cannot remember anymore exactly now.

During the last month, or month and a half before the end, there was a Kommando of Lithographs and Graphic experts in Camp Schlier. They were exclusively occupied in printing false Pound Sterling notes, as well as with the falsification of identification papers and stamps from all over the world. As far as I was informed, this Kommando made a total of 750,000,000. Pound notes and this Kommando was founded at the time by order of Dr. Kaltenbrunner, at Oranienburg, in the Concentration Camp Sachsenhausen.

In order to stop sexual intercourse between prisoners of the same sex, as far as possible, in the year 1942 a bordello for prisoners was opened. The visitors were asked two marks as payment—the prostitute received fifty Pfennings [Translator's note: ½ mark] and the remaining 1½ Mk went to the central Concentration Camp Office at Oranienburg.

The reason for the execution of the Austrians who had been in Mauthausen Concentration Camp for almost a year is the following:

On the suggestion of the Gauleiter Eigruber, Dr. Pipprater, and also the Director of the Linz Gestapo Office, Spann, the execution was carried out. A certain agent of the Gestapo, Prohaska, was put in charge of the execution.

The son of Regent [Reichsverweser] Horthy lived in ar-

rest at Mauthausen under the covername "Maus" (Mouse), Badoglio, under the name "Brausewetter." All prominent prisoners in the arrest building at Mauthausen received these covernames. On order of the Gauleiter Eigruber, the above-mentioned were to be killed, but after further discussion with Col. Kuppert I refused to carry out this order. I sent these people to Dachau with the exception of Horthy who hid himself among the cells."

3. I, Hans Marsalek, declare in addition, as follows:

With reference to the number of one million to one and a half million murdered human beings in Hartheim, which was the number given by Franz Ziereis, it is pointed out to him by me that this number was too high. He however insisted on this number and explained to me that actually a great number of mentally deranged from the entire Southern Area of Germany were shipped there and liquidated. This accounts for the high number of victims. In spite of his serious injury and his knowledge that he would probably die soon, Franz Ziereis tried to put the greater part of the guilt on his subordinates.

In early summer of 1943, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner visited the Concentration Camp Mauthausen. The Camp Commandant Ziereis, Gauleiter Eigruber, first leader of the Protective Custody camp Bachmeyer and several others accompanied Kaltenbrunner. I saw Dr. Kaltenbrunner and the people who accompanied him with my own eyes. According to the testimony of the "Corpse Carriers" of that time, the former prisoners Albert Tiefenbacher, present address Salzburg; and Johann Polster, present address Pottendorf near Wiener Neustadt, Austria; about fifteen prisoners of the arrest class were selected by Unterscharfuehrer Winkler, in order to show Dr. Kaltenbrunner three ways of extermination, by a shot in the neck, hanging, and gassing. Women whose hair had been cut were among the executed and they were killed by shots in the neck. Above-mentioned "Corpse Carriers" were present at the execution and had to carry the corpses to the Crematorium. Dr. Kaltenbrunner went to the Crematorium after the execution and later went into the quarry.

Baldur von Schirach visited the camp in fall of 1944. He, too, went to the arrest building and also to the Crematorium. Eight or nine "political" Austrians were shown to him at the time, and he promised to discharge them soon. As a matter of fact, actually one of these men, whose name I have forgotten, was discharged soon thereafter.

4. I declare that the above testimony was given by me voluntarily and that no compulsion was exerted on me.

It conforms to the truth, to the best of my knowledge and to the best of my conscience, and I swear to it.

Nurnberg, 8 April 1946.

/s/ Marsalek, Hans.

/t/ Hans Marsalek.

Subscribed and sworn to before me today
this 8th day of the month of April 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart Jr.

/t/ Smith W. Brookhart Jr. Lt. Col
Executive Officer, Interrogation Division
OUSCC APO 124A US Army.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3901-PS

November 1932

Your Excellency;

Much Esteemed Herr Reich President:

Filled, like your Excellency, with profound love for the German people and the fatherland, the undersigned welcome hopefully the fundamental change which your Excellency has initiated in the conduct of state affairs. We agree with your Excellency on the necessity of a government run independently from parliamentary party matters; the ideas which your Excellency formulated with regard to a Presidial Cabinet bring this thought into the open.

The outcome of the Reichstag elections of November 6 of this year had demonstrated that the former cabinet, whose sincere intentions no one among the German people doubted, did not find adequate support within the German people for the pursuit of its course; it also demonstrated that the goal at which your Excellency is aiming has the support of a full majority of the German people if we—as we should—exclude the Communist party whose attitude is negative to the State. Not only the Black-White-Red party and its related smaller groups, but the National Socialist German Workers Party as well are fundamentally opposed to the former parliamentary party regime; thereby they have agreed to the aim of your Excellency. We consider this result extremely gratifying and cannot imagine that the realization of the goal should now founder at the maintenance of ineffective methods.

It is evident that an oft-repeated dissolution of the Reichstag with increasingly frequent and sharpening elections would not only be detrimental to a political pacification and solidity but to an economic one as well. It is equally clear, however,

that any constitutional change which is not supported by the broad masses would elicit even worse economic, political, and psychical results. We therefore consider it a moral duty to ask your Excellency respectfully that, in order to attain the goals of your Excellency which all of us support, the reorganization of the Reich Cabinet be carried out in a manner which would line up the greatest possible popular force behind it.

We confess to be free of any narrow party-political attitude. We recognize in the national movement which penetrates our people the promising beginning of an era which, through overcoming of class contrasts only now creates the essential basis for a rebirth of German economy. We know that this rebirth will claim many sacrifices yet. We believe that these sacrifices can be made willingly only when the largest group of this national movement receives a leading share in government.

Entrusting the leader of the largest national group with the responsible leadership of a Presidial Cabinet which harbors the best technical and personal forces will eliminate the blemishes and mistakes with which any mass movement is perforce afflicted; it will incite millions of people who today are still standing apart, to a positive effort.

With full confidence in the wisdom of your Excellency and your Excellency's feeling of solidarity with the people, we greet your Excellency with the most profound respect.

| <i>Signed:</i> | <i>Signed:</i> | <i>Signed:</i> | <i>Signed:</i> | <i>- Signed:</i> |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| Helferich | Schacht | Hecker | Tischbein | Kalkreuth |
| Krogmann | Reinhart | Voegler | Jaenicke | von Oppen |
| R. Slomann | Schroeder | Rosterg | Rob. Bosch | Keudell |
| Witthoeft | Fink | Silverberg | Ullrich | Rabethge |
| Cuno | Kurt Eich- | Theyssen | Luebbert | Wenzel |
| Kiep | born | Reusch | Beidorff of. | Keyserling |
| Albert | | Haniel | Reindorff | |
| Much | | Krupp | Wentzky | |
| Kurt Woer- | | Siemens | | |
| mann | | Springorum | | |

| | | |
|---------------|------------------|-----------|
| Krogmann | Schmitt [?] B | Ullrich R |
| Helferich | Thyssen Sch | Rabethge |
| Schacht | Reusch [?] Sch | Wenzel |
| Reinhart | Veegler [?] | Krupp |
| Schroeder | Haniel [?] Sch | Brandes |
| Hecker | Rob. Bosch [?] K | |
| Rosterg | Fink [?] B | |
| R. Slomann H. | Kalkreuth B | |

3901-PS

| | |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Witthoeft H. | v. Lussinich x |
| Cuno—Kiep H. | v. Oppen B |
| Albert (Hecker) | Eichborn R |
| Silverberg | Merck H |
| Tischbein | Luebbert B |
| Jaenicke | v. Keudell B |

Copy from scratch paper

| | |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| Helferich | Hecker |
| Krogmann | Voegler |
| R. Slomann | Rosterg |
| Witthoeft | Silverberg |
| Cuno | Thyssen |
| Kiep | Reusch |
| Albert | Haniel |
| Much | Krupp |
| Kurt Woermann | Siemens |
| Schacht | Springorum |
| Reinhart | Tischbein |
| Schroeder | Jaenicke |
| Fink | Rob. Bosch |
| Kurt Eichborn | Ullrich |
| | Luebbert |
| | Beirdorff oder Reindorff |
| | Wentzky (name schlecht leserlich) |
| | Kalkreuth |
| | von Oppen |
| | Keudell |
| | Rabethge |
| | Wenzel |
| | Keyserling |

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-2

1.10.38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

No. 1103.38 Most Secret Ausl. VI.

7 Copies

To:

7th Copy

OKH (Section 6. Army General Staff)

OKM (Naval War Staff, 1st Division, for the attention of
Min. Rat. Dr. Eckhardt)

Reich Minister for Air and Civ C. Air Force (Air Force Gen-
eral Staff for the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Mueller)

Foreign Office via the Foreign Office Representative (VAA)

Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW of the vio-
lations of international law which may be expected on the part
of fighting troops.

Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, columns
C 1 and C 2 had to be filled directly here for the time being.

The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in
their opinion so that a final version may be drawn up.

The same is requested of the Foreign Office.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

By Order

sgd. Burkner

3 Enclosures :

MOST SECRET

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INCIDENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROPAGANDA HANDLING
I. OUR OWN MEASURES

3

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law [Gruppe Voelkenrecht] | (d) Explanation by propaganda minister |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) Judgment by International law | (2) Justification by the laws of warfare |
| <p>800</p> <p>(1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations.</p> <p>(a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas.</p> | <p>(1) (a) In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed.</p> | <p>(I) Art. 25 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare of 1907 forbids attacks and firing on undefended towns, villages, dwellings and buildings by whatever means. Bombing by aircraft is to be included in the special qualification "by whatever means".</p> <p>Giving the supposition that no orders for the bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas will be given by us under any circumstances, the action in the case in question would have been carried out by mistake.</p> | <p>An accident of this kind can best be explained publicly by the fact that the British Embassy is in the immediate vicinity of military installations, the bombing of which was an indispensable military necessity. If, therefore, the British Embassy was hit by mistake, it is to be described as a regrettable</p> |

(2) Injuring or killing of subject of neutral states outside the actual war zone.

Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.

Since it must be assumed that the deaths or injuries were caused unintentionally by our troops, there is no question of a violation of international law.

accident, such as are unfortunately unavoidable in war. The German Government will pay compensation for the damage.

The deaths and injuries caused unintentionally are to be excused as being unavoidable accidents which the events of war can cause even to non-belligerents. Compensation is to be guaranteed.

(3) Bombing and shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches, and cultural monuments.

(3) The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.

Art. 17 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare lays down that during sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as much as possible, any building dedicated to religious services, art, science, welfare; also historical monuments, hospitals and centers for sick and wounded, provided that they are not at the same time being used for military purposes. The elucidation of the last named reservation above is always very difficult and lengthy. Unless such a case is indisputably established, it cannot be judged by international law. Deliberate firing on protected buildings which are above suspicion is contrary to International Law in any case.

It seems appropriate, in this case, to make a public announcement with the corresponding justification after the attack.

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Explanation by propaganda minister |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| | | (1) Judgment by International law | (2) Justification by the laws of warfare | |
| <p>(4) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain conditions or of new types of war weapons such as gas, flame throwers, chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances.</p> | <p>(4) On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.</p> | <p>Under the supposition that the Prague Hradschin, as the seat of government, is used for military purposes, which include, among other things, the maintenance of the military power of the Czech people, air attacks upon it are justified.</p> <p>According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas warfare, that they consider themselves exempt from the prohibition should the opponent use gas.</p> | <p>If the assertion, that the opponent—in this case the Czechs—used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the firing of gas projectiles is justified and it must be given out in public that it can be proved that the <i>enemy was the first to violate the prohibition</i>. It is therefore particularly important to furnish the proof. If the</p> | |

(5) Retaliatory measures against enemy civilians who take part in combat or are guilty of espionage (Passing of intelligence).

(5) Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of food-stuffs and fodder) or are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.

Therefore, the burning question of who violated the prohibition first will always arise when the decision is made. Whether this can be established is doubtful.

If the inhabitants of an enemy territory under our occupation commit hostile acts against us or our allies, they are guilty of war treason, which must be judged by German law (Armed Forces Penal Gazette). The right to punish enemy civilians for committing hostile acts against the occupying power derives from Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare which allows the occupying power to carry out public administration and expressly assigns to it the responsibility for the maintenance of public order and public life.

assertion is unfounded or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the same way did the Italians in the Abyssinian War. In this case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must also be proved.

If Czech civilians, who are not recognizable as soldiers, are seized while committing the acts and crimes mentioned in the case 5b, and shot out of hand, this type of retaliatory measure is justifiable and permissible under International Law only if the lives of our own troops were endangered. If offenders of this kind are taken prisoner, they may not simply be put against a wall, but must be tried according to the decrees relating to the case. This procedure can take place briefly and summarily in the field. The experiences of the World War have taught us that this procedure offers the enemy no opportunity of attack, whereas executions without trial are the best foundations for the enemy's propaganda. En-

| | | | |
|--|--|---|---|
| <p>nected with the requisitioning of billets, supplies of foodstuffs, fodder and live-stock etc.</p> | <p>to requisition billets, foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.</p> | <p>ing powers to claim payment in kind and service from the communities and inhabitants of an occupied territory. These payments must be in relation to the resources of the country. Harsh oppression of the civil population is justified only if the occupying power is itself in need and must live. Oppression and the enforced delivery of goods unless they are a due military necessity are not only contrary to international law, they are also unworthy.</p> | <p>toilets and the deliveries of foodstuffs and fodder. Mention that the troops are suffering from the same shortage would be appropriate. Moreover it must be added that women, children, and invalids will be provided for as far as possible.</p> |
| <p>(8) Compulsory evacuation of the population from their homes.</p> | <p>(8) Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.</p> | <p>According to Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare and if military necessity urgently requires it. The removal of inhabitants to the rear of the operational zone is authorized by international law.</p> | <p>The most advisable justification is that the inhabitants must be protected against bombardment.</p> |
| <p>(9) Measures which affect religious and church life.</p> | <p>(9) Churches are used for military accommodation.</p> | <p>German soldiers will use churches as military accommodation for men and horses only in the most extreme cases of need.</p> | <p>If the urgent military necessity exists, justification under International Law is granted and must be given out in public with this as the reason. Experience has shown, however, that the use of religious buildings for such purposes offers effective propaganda material to the enemy.</p> |

| | | | |
|---------------|-------------|---|--|
| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | (d) Explanation by propaganda minister |
|---------------|-------------|---|--|

808

| | | (1) Judgment by International law | (2) Justification by the laws of warfare |
|--|---|--|--|
| (10) Violation of neutral territorial rights by aircraft flying over or by bombing. | (10) In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft. | According to Art. 1 of the 5th Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is <i>not to be violated</i> . A <i>deliberate</i> violation by flying over this territory is a breach of International Law, if the neutral powers have declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of International Law, provided that this action is not expressly permitted. | An attempt at denial should first be made. If it is unsuccessful, a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds of miscalculation of position) to the Polish Government, and compensation for damage guaranteed. |
| (11) Measures of naval warfare which are part of the mine-U-boat war, the blockade and the war of merchant shipping (on the basis of ma- | 11(a) Stationing of U-boats and war activity within the approaches to the Baltic or within neutral coastal water. (b) Prize laws meas- | No judgment by international law, of the questions listed here, can be made without consultation with OKM, as it is not known here, what measures are intended should the occasion arise. | |

terial available to the Naval War Staff).

ures as part of the war on merchant shipping, which are objected to by the enemy or by neutrals as contrary to international law.

(c) Use of armament by armed merchant ships.

(d) Announcement of declared areas.

(12) Measures aimed at stiffening the will to resist on the part of national minorities either foreign or of German origin in enemy countries (by the distribution of leaflets, by air proclamations, broadcasts, training and arming).

(12) P r o c l a m a - tions over the German radio to Hungarian, Slovak and Polish minorities who are opposed to the Czech Government.

The spreading of news by whatever means with a view to raising the moral forces of peoples in the enemy territories who are racially related or connected is included in the ruses of warfare, allowed under Art. 24 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare.

Justification of our own measures is not necessary; in any case the opponents will reply with their own, i.e., counter propaganda.

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

32

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister |
|--|--|---|---|---|
| | | (1) Judgment by International law | (2) Justification by the laws of warfare | |
| <p>808</p> <p>(1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations.</p> | | <p>Judgment by International Law as in Section I, No. 1, c 1.</p> | | |
| <p>(a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas.</p> | <p>(1a) In an air raid on Berlin, the French Embassy is destroyed.</p> | <p>In no case are extra-territorial buildings military objectives; therefore, according to Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, they must be spared as far as possible.</p> | <p>If it is at all possible, claim that the enemy carried out deliberate precision bombing and what is specially to be condemned is that the French Embassy contains valuable art treasures and that subjects of enemy states are staying there, having found asylum there. Moreover, that the French Embassy made efforts to avert the conflict.</p> | |
| <p>(2) Injuring or killing of subjects of</p> | <p>American subjects are injured and killed in</p> | <p>Subjects of neutral states outside the actual war zone are protected</p> | <p>It will be difficult to prove that the enemy did this with intent. The</p> | |

| | | | |
|--|---|--|--|
| neutral states outside the actual zone. | an air raid on Dresden. | by International Law. | only other possible assertion is that as the buildings and persons were clearly distinguishable by indications of American territory, or white flags, there was no excuse for attacking them. There were no military objectives near the scene of the onslaught. |
| (3) Bombing and shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches and cultural monuments. | (3) In an air raid on Vienna, hospitals are destroyed and Red Cross personnel and patients killed. | Judgment by International Law as in Section I, No. 3, c 1. | Accuse the enemy of having violated Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare by omitting to provide suitably for the protection of the hospitals in Vienna which by day and night were marked sufficiently distinctly by the Red Cross. In this case, also, the intention of precision bombing must be imputed as much as possible. |
| (4) Destruction of villages, settlements, agricultural areas, industrial and communications installations which serve no military purpose. | (4) Detonators are placed in the Aussig Dam in order to destroy the surrounding area and the inhabitants by flooding. | Prohibition of international law exists only with regard to the destruction and removal of <i>enemy</i> property, other than in those cases where this destruction or removal is made urgent by the necessities of war (Art. 23g of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare). | Such destruction as the blowing up of the Aussig Dam can only be branded as the most inhuman, senseless, and useless method of taking revenge on innocent people. Compare similar cases of barbaric action in the Hussite Wars and in the behavior of the Czech Legion in Siberia, 1918/1920. |
| (5) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain | When Czech troops withdrew from the Sudeten - German | Judgment by International Law as in Section II, par 5, C 1. | Making wells unfit for use by throwing in stable manure, for example, is an authorized means |

(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister

(a) Incidents

(b) Example

(c) Attitude of the International Law Group

(1) Judgment by International law

(2) Justification by the laws of warfare

conditions and of new types of war weapons such as gas, flame - throwers, chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances.

area, wells in many places are contaminated.

of war. International Law forbids only the poisoning of wells. Contamination by bacteria, on which this example is apparently based, is forbidden by International Law both in the Hague Ruling for Land Warfare and in the Convention of 1925. A propaganda attack is therefore justified.

(6) Underhand means of waging war: continuing the fight after the enemy has apparently surrendered — camouflage by abuse of German or neutral national markings.

In Postelberg, Czech trucks and locomotives have been camouflaged by German National markings and swastikas.

Underhand means of warfare as, for example, feigning death and shooting from the rear at advancing troops, showing white flags and firing with hidden machine guns on the approach of the unsuspecting enemy justify immediate reprisals without mercy. The misuse of the flag of truce, the national flag or of the military badges or uniforms of the oppo-

The enemy must be accused of employing unchivalrous means of warfare, and he will gain little advantage by means which are dishonorable and repugnant to an honest soldier.

| | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| (7) Maiming or killing of wounded, prisoners, defenseless persons, women and children. | When being taken into the Eger hospital, a seriously injured Sudeten-German motor cyclist is shot by Czech soldiers, who said: "The German swine will die any way." | <p>ment or of the Red Cross is forbidden (Art. 23e, Hague Rules for Land Warfare) but it becomes misuse only if enemy operations are undertaken under the camouflage; these enemy operations also justify immediate reprisal measures. The camouflaging of Czech trucks and locomotives by German national markings and swastikas is not contrary to international law. It becomes contrary thereto only if they are employed in enemy operations, under this camouflage.</p> | In this case, propaganda can only be directed once more against Czech brutality in general. In addition, it must be stressed that those injured and killed were subjects who belonged to Czech state only because they were forced to and whose return to the Reich had already been promised. |
| (8) Use of prisoners of war for war work (road construction, digging trenches, production of munitions, employment | German prisoners of war are employed under guard as truck drivers for transferring back raw materials of war. | Judgment by International Law as in Section I, para. 8, C 1. | Discretion must be used in reproaches of this kind, for it is possible that similar accusations could be made against us by the opponent if the fact is to be made use of for propaganda purposes. |

(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister

(a) Incidents

(b) Example

(c) Attitude of the International Law Group

(1) Judgment by International law

(2) Justification by the laws of warfare

in transport service, etc.).

(9) Terrorism measures against national minorities aimed at suppressing and breaking their consciousness of nationality, their religious life, and church and cultural activities.

(10) Compulsory evacuation of national minorities from their homes, and confiscating their food stuffs,

Officials of the Sudeten Party are arrested and abducted, their homes seized and looted.

Members of the Polish minority are compulsorily evacuated to the interior of the country in military

The oppression of one's own subjects in Czechoslovakia does not come under the judgment of *International Law*, but to the judgment of the Treaty of 1919 regarding the protection of minorities. In every case, this would have to be consulted in the judgment of the case. In addition see concluding sentence of para. 7C2

A judgment from the standpoint of International Law does not come into the question.

All that can be asserted is that our prisoners were employed by the opponent for transporting munitions behind their front lines.

The arrest and abduction of officials of the Sudeten Party and robbing and looting them can be branded only as outbreaks of Czech brutality (similar outbreaks have already been employed for propaganda purposes).

Also, all that can be referred to in propaganda are Czech acts of brutality.

fodder and live-stock, etc.

(11) Measures for inciting, arming, and taking control of the civilian population (Franc-tireur warfare).

(12) Violation of neutral territorial rights by flying over or bombing it.

transports.

In localities on the Czech-Silesian frontier summons to fight German troops are issued, and arms distributed to the civilian population.

Czech airmen drop bombs on the German-Polish frontier, destroying the town hall in Lissa and a church in Rawitsch.

Measures for inciting one's own subjects, for arming and conducting guerilla warfare, are allowed. The national warning itself, must not exceed the limits prescribed by International Law (Art. 1 and 2 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare), i.e., prescribed badges recognizable at a distance, bearing arms openly, etc.

It is contrary to International Law for combat aircraft to fly over the territories of neutral power.

In this case it would be appropriate to give warnings referring to the civilian warfare of August 1914 in Belgium, which caused the death of thousands of inhabitants. Cunning snipers without uniform and soldiers in civilian clothes, after pretending to be acquiescent, attacked soldiers on the march and in their billets and provoked the reprisals justified by such actions. For use in propaganda, it must be particularly stressed that the above-named conditions justifying a national uprising were not fulfilled and the outward identification marks of armed civilians were lacking.

The violation of the neutrality of Polish territory and the destruction of non-military buildings of which the church in Rawitsch is specially protected by International Law constitute a serious breach of International Law which must be correspondingly used to the full in propaganda. In addition, it is necessary to

| (a) Incidents | (b) Example | (c) Attitude of the International Law Group | | (d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister |
|--|---|---|--|---|
| | | (1) Judgment by International law | (2) Justification by the laws of warfare | |
| <p>(13) Slanderous propaganda by false reports on the measures of the German command and on the combat elements, by accounts of atrocities in press reports, news picture broadcasts, etc.</p> | <p>The Melnik Radio Station spreads reports that dum-dum projectiles have been used by German troops. Polish newspapers show false photographs of this.</p> | <p>Making the enemy contemptible is a stratagem of war allowed by international law, even if in so doing many lies and misrepresentations are made. The efforts made by different powers, Germany amongst them, to form an international agreement to restrict the propaganda of war atrocities failed in 1932.</p> | <p>point out that it was obviously a deliberate air raid.</p> <p>Remedy in this case is possible only by correcting the reports, and better still by counter-attack, in which, of course, we can also make use of the spreading of atrocity stories. Nothing more can be done than to attempt to beat the opponent at his own game or get equal with him in some way or other.</p> | |

Wilhelmshaven, 9.10.39

FLAG OFFICER SUBMARINES
 OPERATIONS DIVISION
 B. Nr. MOST SECRET. SO. ONLY

MOST SECRET

To: Supreme Command of the Navy-Naval War Staff/ 1st Div.
 No written reference.

Subject: Base in Norway

I. *Suppositions:*

- a. A position outside the Shetlands—Norway Straits.
- b. Freedom from ice.
- c. Rail communications.

These suppositions apply only to Trondheim and Narvik.

II. *Advantages and Disadvantages:*1. *Trondheim:*

Advantages:

- a. Position within the fiord which is unaffected by artillery action from the sea.
- b. Deep water in the entry channels—difficult for the enemy to mine in their mining operations.
- c. Existence of several entry and exit routes.
- d. Protected areas directly in front of the harbor for exercises and entry.
- e. Southern position: i.e. short lines of communications to Germany, better climatic conditions, shorter route to the Atlantic.
- f. Basins which, according to the North Sea Handbook and instructions of the Navy Office at Hamburg, are suitable for U-boats.
- g. Several industrial installations which facilitate the constructions of repair—and supply installations.

Disadvantages:

Short distance from the bases of the British Air force—
 danger of air attack.

2. *Narvik:*

Advantages:

- a, b, c, d. the same conditions as Trondheim
- e. Greater distance from the British bases—less danger of air attack.

Disadvantages:

- a. Northern position: Long lines of communication to Germany, unfavorable climatic conditions, longer route to the Atlantic.

- b. Communications only with the Baltic—The Gulf of Bothnia is not free from ice.
- c. No basins, quay-installations only in the bay.
- d. Very few industrial installations.

Trondheim is therefore the more favorable place.

III. The following is therefore proposed :

- 1. Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including :
 - a. Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions.
 - b. Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.
 - c. *Good* opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews.
 - d. Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.
- 2. Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative.

Sgd. Doenitz.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-6

Berlin, 30.12.1939.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

No. 222 48/39 Most Secret, S.O. only WFA/Section L.I.

10 Copies

5th Copy.

Subject: Intensified Measures for Sea and Air Warfare in connection with Fall "Gelb."

In addition to the instructions directly concerned with Fall "Gelb" which have already been issued for the Navy and Air Force, the following intensified measures for the conduct of sea and air warfare come into force *with the start of operations in the West*:

1. The Navy will approve the sinking without warning of *all* ships by U-boats, in sea areas off the enemy coasts *where it is possible to use mines*. In this case outward appearances should create the impression that mines have been used. U-boats should bear this in mind when taking action and using arms.

[Red pencil note referring to underlining.] This would be an undesirable limitation.

[Note in green pencil referring to red pencil note—] Not intended to be.

The C-in-C of the Navy decides on the exact limits of these areas, and give notification of them via the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

2. As long as army operations in the West are in progress the Air Force has the following tasks:

(a) To give direct support to these operations (Directive No. 6 section 4)

In doing so it is important to attack, outside the actual theater of operations, troop transports from England to France, Belgium or Holland, including ports of embarkation and disembarkation, as well as British air force ground installations in the home country itself, which are used as bases for operations against the continent.

(b) To tie up as strong forces as possible of fighter aircraft in the British homeland.

It is not in keeping with the whole conduct of the war, however, to unleash the full force of aerial warfare on our own initiative, before we have created for ourselves favorable conditions for it, and before there are strong forces available suitable for operations against Britain.

For this reason, attacks also, which imperil to any great extent the civilian population, are to be reserved for cases which demand reprisals.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel.

[The following note is added—"Superseded by OKM No. 22010/40 Most Secret, WFA/L I 6 dated 17.1.40, Skl I Op 64/40 Ia J18/c".]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-10

Berlin 28.11.1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 221/39 Most Secret SO only

[Stamp]: C in C Navy

Op 43./39

8 copies

Recd. 29 Nov. '39

2nd copy

Subject: Employment of the 7th Flieger Division

MOST SECRET

S.O. only access only through officer.

1. Should the quick breakthrough of the 6th Army, north of Liege, fail, owing to the demolition of the bridges over the Maas and the Albert canal, the intended employment of the 7th Flieger Division against the bridgehead at G will also be cancelled.

Special orders for this event will be issued.

2. The Fuehrer is of the opinion that the 7th Flieger Division must *on the first day of the attack* be employed on another task and requests that the following possibilities be examined:

a. The occupation of Watcheren Island and thereby Flushing

harbor, or of some other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air warfare.

b. Taking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur and Dinant with the object of keeping them open until the arrival of the mobile troops employed in the 4th Army sector.

c. Securing of the territory north of Carignan and north-east of Sedan, so that the mobile troops employed in the sector of Army Group A may be able to escape from the wooded heights south-west and south-east of Bouillon.

3. It is requested that the above-named possibilities be explored as quickly as possible and that the following state their opinion:

OKA to 2 *a* and *b*

Naval War Staff to 2 *a*

Reich Minister for Air and C in C Air Force to 2 *a*, *b* and *c*

Chief of the Supreme Command of the

Armed Forces.

Sgd. KEITEL

Distribution:

C in C Army—Copy 1

C in C Navy—Copy 2

Reich Minister for Air and C in C Air Force—Copy 3

OKW

WFA—Copy 4

Chef L—Copy 5

1a—Copy 6

1b—Copy 7

1c—Copy 8

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-12

Berlin, 20.12.39.

Supreme Command of Armed Forces.

WFA No. 22249/39 d.K. Chefs.Abt.L.I.

Ob.d.M.,C/Skl. and 1/Skl.

Re: Conduct of U-boat warfare on Merchant shipping against England.

11 Copies

1st. Copy.

S.O. Only. Access only through officer.

Ob.d.M.

I. op.i/40.

Completed 1.1.40.

Enclosures Nil.

On 30.12.39 according to a report of Ob.d.m., the Fuehrer and

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:—

(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked without warning—where the impression of a mining incident can be created.

[Pencil note] Too narrowly defined.

Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.

C.-in-C. High Command.

By Order.

[signed] JODL.

[Pencil Note] Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen, the denial of the sinking of these steam-ships in case the expected protests are made must be possible. (OKW 2201/40 0 Vol of 7(?) I, 40). Para. 10(?), Skl I. Op 64/40.

Distribution:

OKM—1A

OKW—

WFA—2A

HWK—3A

Abroad—4A

L—5-9A

Inform OKH—10A.

Rdl and Ob.d.L.—11A

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-17

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN NAVY 1919—1939

Part A (1919—THE YEAR OF TRANSITION), Chapter VII.

*First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty
and to limit its effects.*

[Page 70]

(a) *Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of Naval offices in Civil Ministries, etc.*

[Page 75]

(e.g. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems—Jade—Canal, etc., into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; Noskes' proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; formation of the "Naval Arsenal Kiel".)

(b) *The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.*

[Page 85]

1. North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts.

[Page 90]

2. Baltic. (Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemuende; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars there.)

[Page 95]

3. The beginnings of coastal air defence.

* * * * *

Part B (1920—1924.—The ORGANIZATIONAL NEW ORDER)

Chapter V.

[Page 140]

The Navy

Fulfilment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty

Foreign Countries

[Page 145]

(a) *The inter-allied Control Commissions*

[Page 150]

(b) *Defense measures against the fulfilment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies.*

[Page 155]

1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons.

[Page 160]

2. Limitation of demolition work in Heligoland.

[Page 165]

3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923.

[Page 170]

4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of “sports” unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment)

[Page 175]

5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920

(Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing)

[Page 180]

6. Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti air raid defence, training of pilots).

[Page 185]

7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.

* * * * *

Part C (1925—1932. REPLACEMENT OF TONNAGE)

Chapter IV.

The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries.

[Page 110]

(a) *The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission)*

[Page 120]

Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case.

[Page 125]

1. The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935.

[Page 130]

2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to Spain, Argentine, Turkey; the first post war U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927; 250 ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti U-boat school.

[Page 135]

3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later Luftdienst GMRH; Naval Flying School Warnemuende; Air Station List, training of sea cadet candidates, Military tactical questions "Air Defence Journeys", technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development DX etc., catapult aircraft, arming, engines ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926.

[Page 140]

4. Economic re-armament ("The Tebeg"—Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War economic questions.)

[Page 145]

5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret investigations.)

[Page 150]

(c) *Planned Armament Work with the tacit approval of the Reich Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power)*

[Page 155]

1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work.

[Page 160]

2. Finance question. ("Black Funds" and the Special Budget).

[Page 165]

3. The Labour Committee and its objectives

[Page 170]

(d) *The Question of Marine Attaches*
(The continuation under disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933).

(e) *The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in Germany* (The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931. The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).

* * * * *

Part D (1933—1939. THE GERMAN NAVY DURING THE MILITARY FREEDOM PERIOD) Chapter I.

[Page 5]

I. *National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of prestige at sea.*

[Page 10]

II. *Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State.*

[Page 15]

(a) National Socialism in the Navy before 1933

[Page 20]

(b) The taking over of power and the Navy

[Page 25]

(c) The oath of the Navy to the Fuehrer

[Page 30]

(d) *The taking over of the National Insignia of the Party by the Navy*

(Autumn 1933, November 1935)

[Page 35]

(e) *The first alteration of Flag (March 1933) and the New War Flag*

(7.11.35)

[Page 40]

(f) *The Supreme Commander of the Navy placed under the Fuehrer*

(February 1938)

[Page 45]

III. *The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the Reich Government in a disguised way.*

(1933 up to the achieving of military freedom in 1935)

[Page 50]

(a) *The new political bases for armament questions Reichrat Reichstag Party.*

[Page 55]

(b) *The Independence of the Supreme Commander of the Navy with regard to the Re-armament and Development of the Navy. (The only limitation disguise of the re-armament work with regard to the Versailles Treaty)*

[Page 60]

(c) *Public Budget and Maintaining of the previous Special Budget*

[Page 65]

(d) *Preparations for the construction of a strong fleet and the first results in the constructions of the Navy (1933-1935)*

[Page 70]

1. In the fleet. (Launchings, commissionings, construction of auxiliaries, etc.)

[Page 75]

2. With coastal fortifications, etc.

[Page 80]

IV. *The Period of Military Freedom*

[Page 85]

(a) 16th March, 1935

[Page 90]

(b) *The Fuehrer's speech dated 21.5.1935 (Point VIII concerning the future German Naval Policy). The Defence Act of 21.5.1935 and its implications for the Navy.*

(The legal framework of the Navy; change of names and new formations from 1935)

[Page 95]

(c) *German-English Fleet Relationship from 1933*

[Page 100]

1. The attitude of the Fuehrer to the question of competitive re-armament and a new fleet rivalry threatening peace

[Page 105]

2. The German-Anglo Naval Agreement dated 18.6.35. Contents: example of voluntary limitation of armament; chief points: the nullification of all naval conditions of the Versailles Treaty, for example the prohibition of U-boats, aircraft, coastal fortifications. (Concerning this, 15.11.1936, the declaration of the German Government over the suspension of the limiting conditions of the Versailles Treaty.) Reich Sovereignty of waterways, for example territorial rights in the North Sea-Baltic Canal. The extensive discussions of 22.6.35 over the future qualitative limitations of construction programme. The German renunciation of the unrestricted U-boat warfare of 25.6.1935. The fulfilment of the Naval Agreement in the year 1937 and the discussions of December 1938. The abrogation of the Treaty on 28.4.1939

[Page 115]

(d) *Naval Activity in new construction after the conclusion of the Anglo-German Agreement*

[Page 120]

1. New plans for expansion and measures for the construction programme; launchings and commissionings, coastal fortifications. (The effects of the preparations of the period 1919-1920 —with the U-boat arm.) Comparisons with foreign countries.

[Page 123]

1a. Co-operation with the Army

[Page 125]

2. The economic significance of re-armament of the Navy. (Scope of development of the active armament industry for the Navy)

[Page 130]

(e) The Personnel side of re-armament.

[Page 135]

1. The increase in numbers

[Page 140]

2. Recruitment

[Page 145]

3. Training question

[Page 150]

(f) *The re-incorporation of naval sections previously disbanded* (e. g. sections of the German Sea-mark Service)

[Page 155]

(g) *The Navy at Work*

[Page 160]

1. In representing German Interests and in warding off Bolshevik attacks against Europe in Spain (Activities, trials, experiences)

[Page 165]

2. The return home of Austria and the taking over of the Danube flotilla 1938. The cultivation of the "Gross-Deutschland" tradition in the Navy (Prinz Eugen)

[Page 170].

3. The participation of the Navy in the reunion of Memel with the Reich (28.3.39)

[Page 175]

4. Service abroad

[Page 180]

5. Research, Surveying, Charts

[Page 185]

6. Fishery Protection

[Page 190]

V. *The Preparation of the Merchant Navy for Future War Tasks.*

[Page 215]

VII. *The encouragement of Naval and Sea mindedness in the German people.*

[Page 220]

(a) The Navy at Party Congresses.

[Page 225]

(b) *The foundation of the Reich League for German prestige at sea—its tasks and the work of the Party*

[Page 230]

(c) The Navy at the 1936 Olympic Games

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-21

INTENSIFICATION OF U-BOAT WARFARE

[Extracts from a file]

[Page 1]

Conference with Head of Naval War Staff: 1.1.40.

Special Points.

1. Report by I a [Chief of Staff] on Directive of Armed Forces

High Command of 30.12. According to this, the Fuehrer, on report of C. in C. Navy, has decided:

(a) "Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.

(b) In the Bristol Channel, all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given out as hits by mines.

Both measures are to be taken with immediate effect"

[Pencil note:] "For the conduct of the air war too? See page 5 above"

* * * * *

[Page 5]

Conference with Head of Naval War Staff: 2.1.40.

Special Points.

1. Report by Ia on Directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30.12., referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with "Fall Gelb" [case yellow, the code word for the invasion of Holland and Belgium].

In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats, without any warning, of *all* ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which *mines can be employed*. In this case, for external consumption, pretense should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.

* * * * *

[Page 37]

U-boats Warfare against Merchantmen: 6.1.40.

The Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes of report of C. in C. Navy of 30.12) to authorize firing without warning whilst maintaining the pretense of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockaded zone. In accordance with this, the following order is herewith given to the Flag Officer Submarines, Group East and Group West:

"All U-boats in the North Sea, position between 61 degrees and 56 degrees North and 4 degrees West and 0 degrees, are authorized to make immediately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships. Attacks should be unobserved so that the pretense of mine hits can be maintained".

* * * * *

[Page 139]

18.1.40

Special Points:

1. The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the fol-

lowing Directive dated 17.1 cancelling the previous order concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen: The Navy will authorize, with immediate effect, the sinking without warning by U-Boats of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended. U-Boats must adapt their behaviour and employment of weapons to the pretense, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. Ships of the U.S.A., Italy, Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks.

[“Spain” has been added underneath in green pencil]

* * * * *

[Page 221]

Extract from minutes of report of C. in C. Navy to Fuehrer. 26.1.40 [After mentioning the Fuehrer's decisions on, and agreement with measures for intensifying U-Boat warfare against merchant shipping the minutes end with the words:]

Attacks should be unobserved in order to preserve as far as possible the pretense of hits by mines.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23

[Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered German Navy file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy.]

O.K.M.

A - 21 - 1

Questions of Type. Shipbuilding Plan.

COPY

Berlin, 18.2.1938

Copy No. 2.

M to Head of Office A

* * * * *

The displacement of the battleships “Scharnhorst-Gneisenau” and “F/G” is in both cases greater than has been notified to the British.

* * * * *

| | Length. | Beam | Displacement actual | by Type notified | Draught actual | noti- fied |
|-------------|---------|------|------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Scharnhorst | 226.0 | 30.0 | — 31.300 ts | 26.000 ts | 8.55 | 7.50 |
| “F” | 241.0 | 36.0 | — 41.700 ts | 35.000 ts | 8.69 | 7.90 |
| “HI” | 254.0 | 41.0 | — 56.200 ts | 46.850 ts | 9.60 | 8.40 |
| or “H II” | 254.0 | 41.0 | — 56.200 ts | 45.000 ts | 9.60 | 8.15 |
| or “H III” | 254.0 | 41.0 | — 56.200 ts | 43.000 ts | 9.60 | 7.85 |
| * * * * * | | | | | | |

In the opinion of A IV it would under no circumstances be right to notify a larger tonnage than that which for instance England, Russia or Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not be held responsible for a race in armaments.

O.K.M.

Shipbuilding Plans.

BZ 221 Vol. 5

S. 5

COPY

Copy No. 2

Berlin, 8.3.1938.

General Navy Office to M (Chief of Staff with request to bring to the attention of the C-in-C Navy).

BB 6207/38

Subject: Address by C in C Navy to Directors of Shipbuilding Yards.

* * * It is proposed to make a statement something after the following style:

“In a very roughly outlined programme of new ship construction the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of providing him by a given time with the means of power which he needs for the carrying out of his foreign policy * * *.”

R.W.M.

A 24 — 2

Planning Committee.

COPY

Copy No. 2.

Carls

Admiral and C-in-C Fleet

Tender “Hela” September 1938

Most Secret

Opinion on the “Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England”.

A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

1. If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.

2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo—French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.

3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well as

a large number of countries overseas, in fact against $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the whole world.

It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared *economically* as well as *politically* and *militarily* and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-27

MEETING BETWEEN C-IN-C NAVY AND THE FUEHRER. 30.XII.39

(See the report of the meeting in War diary, Part C, Vol. 7
KTB Teil C. Heft 7—for separate items of the meeting)

Special points:

1. Reference to the necessity of attacks by the G.A.F. on trade traffic in the Downs (as it is under the Command and protection of the British Navy) C-in-C, G.A.F. will obtain the Fuehrer's decision in his own time. The Fuehrer, in agreement with Chief of the Naval War Staff, considers it necessary to give previous warning to the neutrals.

2. The Fuehrer confirms the intention of making a proclamation at the time of a general intensification of the War. The Chief of the Naval War Staff requests that *full power* be given to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area and of neutral ships in *those* sections of the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine—danger can be upheld, e.g. the *Bristol Channel*.

The Fuehrer is reserving the publication of the law in reply to the order in council until the moment of the intensification of the war.

3. The considerate treatment of friendly neutrals is to be continued.

4. The Fuehrer agrees that no guarantee can be given to the Italians, that their trade traffic with Britain may be carried on with safety, owing to mining.

* * * * *

B.Nr. MI 376/33 Top secret. Berlin W, 31 January 1933
TOP SECRET

General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry.

The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing "self-sufficiency" would in any case make such participation superfluous.

However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:

a. The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later.

Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent.

b. The consequent estimation of the duties of the German Armament Industry lies mainly in the *Military-political* sphere.

It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements.

c. Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their output from the point of view of military policy.

d. It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the world.

e. If, however, the German Armament Industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the *confidence* of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be kept secret, under all circumstances, in the interest of the defense of the country is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that, at the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that time, or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

f. To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the Industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something special is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.

Sgn. Raeder.

Distribution:

A

B

VGM

Ing

[various illegible notations]

K

Abw (by message)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-30

MOST SECRET

C. O. Air/Sea Forces.

27.7.39.

"Transportubueng Stolpmuende"

SECRET

C. O. Air/Sea Forces—Order No. 3.

Occupation of the German Free State of Danzig on (Y-day)

I. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with

the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect the German population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.

II. *How the occupation is to be effected.*

a. *The Army* will enter the Danzig Free State with troop units from East Prussia, in order to occupy and defend the Polish frontiers.

Until the town of Danzig is reached—the advance, unhindered, is expected about—o'clock (Y+16 hours),—the Danzig police, supported by the population, will hold and defend the town.

b. *The Air Force*, will support the army by the employment of air-borne troops in Danzig and will defend Danzig territory against the Polish air-force.

c. *The Navy* will defend the bay of Danzig against Polish forces, at the same time protecting the mouth of the Weichsel at Schiewenhorst and Neufahr against the penetration of Polish Light forces and auxiliary vessels. It will afford protection and support to the German population, by entering the Neufahr waters and Danzig, and defend the westerplatte which belongs to the Polish armed forces installation. * * *

Sgd. Cooler.

SURVEY LIST COMPILED AFTER THE CONFERENCE WITH THE CHIEF OF "A" SECTION ON

9 SEPTEMBER 1933*

MOST SECRET

3 copies

1st copy

[Illegible notes]

I Material Measures

Neu A II v 4212/33 Most Secret

833

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|----------|--|---|---|
| 1 | Exceeding the permitted number of mines. | Number permitted: 1665 Actual number: 3675 (x) should occasion arise, this number could possibly be increased by the addition of newly delivered mines. | Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered. |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-32

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|----------|--|---|--|
| 2 | Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries. | <p>The following guns, which according to the Versailles Treaty may be removed temporarily from their positions for maintenance reasons only, are permanently stored up in the Baltic area:</p> <p>3 — 30.5 cm 3 — 28 cm 68 — 15 cm 14 — 10.5 cm 8 — 8.8 cm — 96 guns</p> | Justification: Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs. |
| 3 | Non-destruction of guns which could be used for new ships and other new guns by the preparations for new armament. | <p>Since 1919, the following guns have been newly constructed:</p> <p>6 — 28 cm (for Deutschland) 48 — 15 cm (for Deutschland, cruiser) 22 — 10.5 cm 4 — 8.8 cm — 80 guns</p> | <p>Since then, the following guns have been handed over to the Army for scrapping:</p> <p>10 — 28 cm (actually scrapped) 8 — 21 cm 7 — 21 cm 25 — 15 cm 8 — 10.5 cm 30 — 8.8 cm 2 — 7.02cm 9 — 3.7 cm</p> |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | A receipt was sent from the Army to the Naval Staff (BW) saying that the 99 guns had been scrapped. We know however that the guns were not scrapped. As this is so, the question is settled as far as the Navy is concerned. |
| 4 | Deviation from the places settled by the Entente for the disposition of coastal batteries. | <p>When the change in armament took place, the following batteries were not set up in exactly the places laid down by the Entente.</p> <p>Coronal, Borkum (4—28 cm) Grosser Kurfurst, Pillau (3—28 cm) Graf Dohna, Pillau (3—17 cm) v. Hermann, Pillau (2—8.8 cm)</p> | A transfer conditioned by modernization, to avoid firing damage and to gain a clear field of fire. Coronal has been set up within the battery area, the other 3 batteries outside it. A small point, Coastal fortifications are purely defense measures. When the equality of rights has been recognized, discussion of this question is unnecessary. |
| 5 | Laying gun-platforms for artillery batteries and storing Flak ammunition in Borkum, Sylt, Nordene, where no Flak batteries have been allowed. | <p>Gun-platforms for the following artillery Flak batteries have been laid or are being constructed in positions not allowed by the Entente:</p> <p>8 in Pillau 7 in Swinemuende 2 in Bug 2 in Nest 1 in Borkum</p> | Flak defense is purely a defense measure. |

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|----------|--|--|---|
| 6 | Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area. | The following gun-platforms have been laid or are being constructed in the Kiel area for artillery Flak batteries: 2 completed 4 in construction | The offense over and above that in Serial number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe: pure defense measures. |
| 7 | Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries. | v.d.Groeben 3 — 17 cm in place 6 — 15 cm of Graf Dohna 3 — 17 cm in place 6 — 15 cm of | Possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger, the number of guns is less. |
| 8 | Arming of Minesweepers. | The arming of the mine-sweepers of the 1st and 2nd mine-sweeping half flotillas. The armament consists of: 1 — 10.5 1 — MG C/30 | The reply to any remonstrance against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality of rights). |
| 9 | Arming of 6 E-boats and 8 Motor mine sweepers. | The boats have MG C/30 E-boats are also equipped with torpedoes. | Reply to the question: arming: Only temporary for training and experimental purposes. |

| 10 | Setting up practice Flak batteries. | Several practice Flak batteries have been set up for training purposes in positions where, according to the Versailles Treaty, they are not allowed. | The practice Flak batteries stand on provisional gun-platforms so that the character of the temporary measure may be retained. Training of personnel purely as a defense measure. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|--|---|---------------|------------------|-----------------|--------|--------|-----------------|--------|--------|-------------------|--------|---------|-----------------|---------|---------|----------------|-------|-------|------------------|--------|---------|--|---------|---------|--|
| 11 | Salute battery Friedrichsort. | The battery should be equipped only with 7.7 cm field guns rendered un-serviceable it has however, 4 8.8 cm A/A guns quite ready for use. | Purely a defense measure. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | Exceeding the amount of allowed ammunition. | <p>The permitted total amt. of ammunition has been exceeded to the following extent:</p> <table data-bbox="651 568 1052 820"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th style="text-align: right;">Actual amount</th> <th style="text-align: right;">Amount permitted</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>17 cm</td> <td style="text-align: right;">16 700</td> <td style="text-align: right;">14 600</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15 cm</td> <td style="text-align: right;">90 000</td> <td style="text-align: right;">85 600</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10.5 cm</td> <td style="text-align: right;">87 000</td> <td style="text-align: right;">134 000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>88 cm</td> <td style="text-align: right;">166 000</td> <td style="text-align: right;">164 000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6 cm</td> <td style="text-align: right;">3 600</td> <td style="text-align: right;">8 600</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3.7 cm</td> <td style="text-align: right;">63 500</td> <td style="text-align: right;">118 000</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right; border-top: 1px solid black;">426 800</td> <td style="text-align: right; border-top: 1px solid black;">524 800</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>The numbers are given in round figures. The ammunition for heavy artillery has not been included as in this case the actual amount is less than the amount permitted.</p> | | Actual amount | Amount permitted | 17 cm | 16 700 | 14 600 | 15 cm | 90 000 | 85 600 | 10.5 cm | 87 000 | 134 000 | 88 cm | 166 000 | 164 000 | 6 cm | 3 600 | 8 600 | 3.7 cm | 63 500 | 118 000 | | 426 800 | 524 800 | At the present moment; large quantities of ammunition are in part being produced, in part being delivered so that the total amount of ammunition permitted will also soon be exceeded. To the question: Ammunition for heavy artillery is not so much as allowed. The contingents of material stocks were not fixed in any of the agreements and suggestions for Naval disarmament already made. Equality of rights. |
| | Actual amount | Amount permitted | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17 cm | 16 700 | 14 600 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 cm | 90 000 | 85 600 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10.5 cm | 87 000 | 134 000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 88 cm | 166 000 | 164 000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 cm | 3 600 | 8 600 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3.7 cm | 63 500 | 118 000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 426 800 | 524 800 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|--|--|------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----|-----|------------------|--------|--------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------------------|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| 13 | Exceeding the number of machine guns etc. permitted. | <table border="0"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th style="text-align: right;">Amount permitted</th> <th style="text-align: right;">Actual amount</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(1) m/g's</td> <td style="text-align: right;">656</td> <td style="text-align: right;">954</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(2) rifles</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10 233</td> <td style="text-align: right;">18 133</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(3) pistols</td> <td style="text-align: right;">3 483</td> <td style="text-align: right;">5 553</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(4) gas-masks ...</td> <td style="text-align: right;">22 500</td> <td style="text-align: right;">43 000</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>The actual amount of ammunition, side-arms, hand-grenades, search-lights, smoke-apparti, etc. likewise exceed the amount permitted but not to any considerable extent.</p> | | Amount permitted | Actual amount | (1) m/g's | 656 | 954 | (2) rifles | 10 233 | 18 133 | (3) pistols | 3 483 | 5 553 | (4) gas-masks ... | 22 500 | 43 000 | Can be made light of. |
| | Amount permitted | Actual amount | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (1) m/g's | 656 | 954 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (2) rifles | 10 233 | 18 133 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (3) pistols | 3 483 | 5 553 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (4) gas-masks ... | 22 500 | 43 000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | Obtaining 337 m/g C/30 without scrapping equally serviceable weapons. | 112 m/g C/30 have already been delivered. They are counted as machine guns. The corresponding number of m/g's has not, however, been destroyed. The existence of 2 cm ammunition with detonators is in itself already a breach of the Hague Treaty. | It devolves into a question of detonators. Otherwise it is a small matter. Weapons for a purely defensive measure (air defense). | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 16 | Intended: Arming of U-boat depot-ships.) Arming of E-boat depot-ships.) | As the term "exempt ships" has not yet been applied to Germany, this arming is a breach of the Versailles Treaty. | For the present, the armament should not be mounted. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | |
|----|---|--|---|
| 17 | Intended construction of reserve destroyers of 1850 tons. | The question of reserve ships has not yet been settled in our favour. Under the Macdonald plan, the construction and tonnage would be justifiable. | Not to be settled until further notice. If necessary, it could be declared that, according to the Macdonald plan, it would be possible and that we had agreed to this plan. |
| 18 | Construction of U-boat parts. | | Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied. |
| 19 | Intended construction of a large armoured ship. | | Not to be settled until further notice. On the other hand, it must be established that the possibilities of the Versailles Treaty have not yet been fully exploited. |
| 20 | Arming of fishing vessels. | | For warning shots. Make little of it. |
| 21 | Arrangement for <i>Gebr, Thiel G.m.b. H.</i> —Ruhla to undertake the further manufacture of mechanized detonators. Holding ready separate parts, mechanism, tools for the work, so that the time required for starting work is shortened. | Together with the Army. | These firms are permissible. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|----------|--|---|---|
| 22 | Arranging for the <i>Westfaelisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoffabrik A.G.</i> (Wasag). Reinsdorf to undertake the further manufacture of explosives. | Together with the Army. | These firms are permissible. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |
| 23 | Arranging for <i>Julius Pintsch A.G.</i> , Fuerstenwalde (Spree) to undertake the production of mine-shells. | Together with the Army. | This firm is permitted only for torpedo tubes and air compressors. The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |
| 24 | Incorporation of the firm <i>Kuhlmann</i> , Wilhelmshaven in the work of manufacturing discharge opening cases. | According to the list of firms, <i>K.</i> is not permissible. | The list has been superseded in any case by the exclusion of firms etc. To be made light of. |
| 25 | Arranging for <i>Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A.G.</i> Magdeburg to undertake the manufacture of Flak shells, Flak gun barrels, 2 cm to 10.5 cm. Holding ready part-materials, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened. | Also not permissible. | |

| | | | |
|----|---|--|-------------------------|
| 26 | Arranging for the <i>Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke A.G., Lauchhammerwerk Groeditz</i> to undertake the manufacture of Flak shells. Holding ready part-material, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened. | Also not permissible. | |
| 27 | Arranging for <i>A.G. Lignose, Sprengstoffabrik Schoenebeck Elbe</i> to undertake the manufacture of explosives. | Also not permissible. | |
| 28 | Arranging for <i>Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A.G., Augsburg Works</i> to undertake the mass production of engine types, essential for war purposes. Holding ready part-material, mechanisms, tools for the work so that the time required for starting work may be shortened. | The measure can be opposed as a whole as a preparation for mobilization. | Together with the Army. |
| 29 | <i>Preparations in the sphere of motor experimental boats.</i> | | |

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|----------|---|---------|---------|
| 30 | <p><i>Probably in the near future (up to and including 1934) the following serious breaches will be necessary:</i></p> <p>(1) Continuation of the work in A I, 1-3.</p> <p>(2) Continuation of the work in No. 21,22.</p> <p>(3) Continuation of the work in 24,25,26,27, further work of 25 by Fried, Krupp Grusonwerk A.G. in the production of complete guns.</p> <p>(4) Expansion of the Work in 24-28 to include further armament spheres.</p> | | |

APPENDIX TO AII v 4212/33 MOST SECRET

MOST SECRET

II Measure of organization

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|----------|--|--|---|
| 1 | Methodical preparatory work in preparation for mobilization. | Relevant correspondence and appropriate allotting of personnel (G.A.F. employees). The same applies to the Army. | Can be regarded as a natural measure to take, with reference to the equality of rights. |
| 2 | Creating a camouflage system of economy. | The same with the Army. | |
| 3 | Negotiations with the civil authorities and the responsible part to be taken by them in the preparations for mobilization. | The same with the Army. The Army is taking the lead. | |
| 4 | Creating groups and departments of the military authorities, which are concerned solely with the preparations for reinforcement. | The same with the Army. | |

| Ser. No. | Measure | Details | Remarks |
|----------|---|--|--|
| 5 | Exceeding the permitted number of active personnel by the measures of reconstruction. | From 1 June 33 approx. 1500 persons. From 1 Jan. 34 approx. 2300 persons. The army accordingly. | In the navy, however, the number of officers is at the moment far <i>below</i> the officer quota given in the Versailles Treaty. |
| 6 | Inclusion of units of the Armed Forces in planned preparations for the defense of the Reich, by the appropriate measures of organization and training. | The same with the Army. | |
| 7 | Training outside the Armed Forces for the purpose of creating a reserve of leaders and sub-leaders, also the corresponding young replacements and a specialist reserve. | Training establishments in Pillau Wangerooge Swinemuende Schillig Neustadt Wilhelmshaven Kiel Borkum in the large towns of the Reich outside the demilitarized zone. | With arms. Without arms. |
| 8 | Creating a replacement organization. | Imminent (Army) (started on 1 Oct. 33). | |
| 9 | Creating an L-officers corps. | In camouflaged form the same with the Army. | |

| | | | |
|----|---|--|------------------------------|
| 10 | Nominal and statistical roll of reserve personnel. | | |
| 11 | Professorships of military science. | In connection with the Reich Ministry of Military Science. Same with the Army. | Lectures by active officers. |
| 12 | Determining the production capacity of the war-essential industries. | In cooperation with the Army. | |
| 13 | Preparations on paper for making full use of the war-essential industries in case of war. | In cooperation with the Army. | |
| 14 | Preparations for the supply organization of the Armed Forces in War. | In cooperation with the Army. | |

OPERATIONS BARBAROSSA AND MARITA

* * * * *

5.2.41

8. Proposals for command and organization of operation "Barbarossa".

a. The organization remains intact. Group North has the operational responsibility in the Naval Sphere during operation "Barbarossa".

b. Under the direction of Group North the Flag Officer Cruisers (Bd.K) will, as "Flag Officer Baltic", direct operations for "Barbarossa" from the Command Station Swinemuende.

c. "The Flag Officer Baltic" has under him:

The S. O. Minelayers. Augmenting of the Staff of Flag Officer Baltic by Chief of Staff, Staff of S.O. torpedo boats and the assigning of a staff officer for U boats. For missions of coastal aviation units in the Baltic, Fliegerfuehrer "EAST" is at his disposal.

Flag Officer in Charge Baltic Defenses is responsible for the security of passages into the Baltic, the Kottegot and Skayerrok.

The responsibilities for security of the Baltic Station are limited to the sea territory west of the narrows of Gjedse.

d. For the tasks of organization and defense of the conquered coastal areas the following are to be set up:

| | |
|------------------------|-----------------|
| Flag Officer (Coastal) | Baltic Coast |
| Flag Officer (Coastal) | Gulf of Finland |

with corresponding sea commandants.

Responsibility for the Arctic Sea Coast is given to the Admiral Polar Coasts.

e. The duties of the Flag Officer Cruisers are to be taken over by the Fleet Command where questions of the fleet forces are concerned and by 2nd Admiral of the fleet where questions of the training squadron are concerned.

The Chief of Naval War Staff agrees to the above.

* * * * *

[Page 17]

2.41

Until the regrouping for "Barbarossa" takes place, efforts must be made to obtain increased activity of air and naval warfare.

* * * * *

[Page 97]

8. From a memorandum passed to Ia for information, of an interview of the Commander in Chief of the German Army with the Fuehrer, it becomes clear that with regard to the imminent Marita/Barbarossa operations, the troops in reserve for operation "Felix" will have to be utilized for the new undertaking. For "Marita" 6 Panzer divisions are to be held in readiness as a precaution in the event of Turkey's entry into the war.

* * * * *

[Page 199]

SPECIAL OPERATIONS:

.2.41

Sunday

The Chief of Naval War Staff ordered an inspection of defenses in the French Naval Bases, in case of internal disturbances caused by sudden attacks from inland by the French. This question was also presented to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Lt. Commander Junge). Lt. Com. Junge's verbal reply was as follows:

The defense of naval bases in France remains the duty of the Army even after a reduction of forces there. It is intended to leave 31 divisions in France during operation "Barbarossa."

In German Naval War Staff 1st Division Ref. 2567/41 Top Secret dated 11.2 Admiral for France, was asked what arrangement could be made with Army authorities in France in such a case.

* * * * *

[Page 231]

b. In carrying out operation "Attila" the surprise occupation of Korsika should be considered.

c. For the taking of Malta the employment of the XI Flieger Korps is indispensable.

C-in-C Air Force is to be asked to give an opinion as to whether it is possible to employ the airborne corps against Malta before "Barbarossa" takes place.

* * * * *

[Page 231]

"BARBAROSSA"

Time for intended negotiations with Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia and Roumania which should be as late as possible, is to be set by German Supreme Command of Armed Forces. High Commands are asked to make their respective desires known to the German Supreme Command.

Report by Ia concerning an order from Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for instructions for Deception of the Enemy (German Naval War Staff I of 153/41 Top Secret S.O. only).

Aim of the deception is to conceal the preparations for operation "Barbarossa". The important point is that in the first period, i.e., up to about the middle of April the now prevailing uncertainty concerning our intentions should be maintained. Later, the preparations for Barbarossa that can no longer be camouflaged, must then be represented as a deception diversion from the invasion of England. The following directions for this deception are given:

a. for the first period. To increase the already existing impression of an impending invasion of England. Estimate of new weapons and transportation equipment. Exaggeration of the importance of minor operations and the troops employed therefor. ("Marita" "Sonnenblume" X. Flueger Corps).

* * * * *

[Page 232]

18.2.41.

Reasons for deployment for "Barbarossa" as exchange measures between West, Homeland, and East.

b. During the second period the deployment for "Barbarossa" is to be made the greatest deception in the history of warfare the purpose of which is to camouflage the last preparations for the invasion of England.

The Carrying out of this Deception.

Regulating of communications service through Chief of Counter Intelligence Abroad in agreement with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, /Armed Forces Ops Staff/Department L and the High Commands.

Measures to be taken by the High Commands.

In spite of the farreaching disintegration of the operation "Seelowe" everything possible should be done to maintain the impression amongst our own troops that the invasion against England is being further prepared.

In order to create further uncertainty about our plans, the Army High Command has to prepare the sudden "blocking" of certain territories on the English Channel and in Norway. (Code word for this action: "Albion").

Whether measures having to do with "Barbarossa" e.g., Maximum Capacity Schedule [Hochstleistungsfahrplanes], cancelling of leaves, etc. can be made to coincide with operation "Marita" for purposes of deception is to be investigated by Army High Command.

[Page 233]

.2.41.

12. Report by Ia on intended organization for Operation "Marita".

The following Commands to be established:

a. *Admiral Balkan* (for the Balkan area to work under Naval War Staff). Duties: To safeguard Naval interests in the Balkans, cooperation with other Armed Forces elements (Army group List).

Later on cooperation with the Italian Navy in question of Coastal defense and sea warfare.

Location: At first Bukarest, later Sofia or Athens, to be close to Army Group List.

b. *F.O.I.C. Roumania* (F.O. of the Naval Mission to Roumania).

(1) Duties: Commanding the entire defense by German and Roumanian units. Under him an Artillery Commander in the Constanza Sector.

(2) Direction of Roumanian Naval warfare.

(3) Liaison with the Head of the German Military Mission in Roumania and the two other Wehrmacht components, to be stationed at Bukarest.

c. *Naval Liaison Staff, Bulgaria*: Duties: To represent German Naval interests in Bulgaria. To influence measures taken by the Bulgarian Naval Command and Coastal Defense.

To be located at SOFIA.

d. *F.O.I.C. Greece*.

Duties: To support the army in its actions against Greece in question of enemy naval actions.

[Page 248]

9.2.41.

In regards to the impending operation "Barbarossa" for which all S-boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of same can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.

Chief of Naval War Staff decided after discussion that on SKL's suggestion an evasive reply should be given to the Camp. (Ref. I of 149/41 Top Secret /O only [Written in in longhand.] "Since the proposed operation—Barbarossa cannot yet be determined"

5. Instructions of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for operation "Marita".

Construction of bridge across the Danube to begin on 28.2. Invasion of Bulgaria on 2.3.

6. A request of Group North to lay a minefield "Swine" between Shetlands and Bergen approved by Chief of Naval War Staff.

* * * * *

[Pages 249-250]

7. Captain Bruening who was sent as a mine adviser for the Roumanian Navy to Bukarest demands for the Roumanian Navy 2000 explosive floats and the necessary personnel for assembling and laying these mines by a destroyer. Furthermore, it is necessary to draft at short notice a suitable and experienced junior officer (Sperr) and mine expert in an advisory capacity. It is desirable for sake of precautions, to transfer a unit suitable for disposal of Electrical Aircraft Mines in the Danube and Black Sea ports from the sector "S.C. Mine Sweepers Netherlands". There are at present no facilities for sweeping Electrical Aircraft Mines in Roumania.

The shipment of explosive floats is promised together with the necessary personnel and they are both on their way.

The transfer of a mine sweeping unit is refused for the time being and German sweeping apparatus for the Roumanian boats in question is promised. A radio minesweeping apparatus (Stell F R G) is being shipped with the explosive floats.

* * * * *

[Page 340.]

5. To give notice to the OKW Dept L. as to the time required for the intended liaison with the Finnish, Swedish and Roumanian Navies in Operation "Barbarossa".

- a. Finland: Time required, 4 weeks for:
 - aa. Delivery of mines to Finland for intended mining of Gulf of Finland.
 - bb. Use of Finnish Naval Units for joint naval operation in the Northern Baltic, especially in the Gulf of Finland.
 - cc. Preparation of Finnish Naval bases for acceptance of German naval units (Minelayers, U-boats, and, should occasion arise, S-boats) for operations on the Finnish area.
 - dd. Support of German Intelligence Service (B-Dienst) against Russia through the Finnish News Service units as was already the practice up to 1939.
- b. Sweden: Time required, 14 days for:
 - aa. Protection of Swedish territorial water for carrying on German shipping by the employment of Swedish naval units.

bb. To lay Swedish barrages in Swedish territorial waters, as a continuation of German prohibited areas and as a protection for the sea of Botten.

These measures may have to be carried out at a correspondingly later date should negotiations with Sweden start later.

c. Roumania: Time required, 8 days for:

aa. Preparation of Roumanian naval elements and the fitting out of auxiliary mine layers for offensive action in mine warfare.

bb. Increase of general security measures which were possibly limited after the "Marita" operation.

d. In the event that longer periods for the preparations of the Army be necessary and conceded to, great store would be set by the full use being made of the Navy, as the appointed periods are very limited.

(Ref. I op. 154/41 Top Secret S.O. only)

* * * * *

[Page 354]

26.2.41

2. It is the task of German Naval Units in the Balkans to safeguard the Balkan Sector towards the Sea against hostile landing attempts and against the shelling of important coastal installations. Utilization and protection of the shipping routes along the coasts of the Black Sea and the Aegean for our own shipping. The possibility of using the Turkish Straits must be brought about by political means.

3. A later extended task, especially in the Greek Sector, with the aid of Italian naval units, is the conquest of the Aegean Islands, support of the Dodecanese, and finally the capture of Crete. The final aim to be envisaged must be the gaining of a jumping off point from which to conduct warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean.

4. For gaining this objective we have at our disposal: German naval units negligible; Roumanian and Bulgarian forces very insignificant; at a later time commitment of Italian forces in the Greek sector can be reckoned with.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-35
GERMAN NAVAL WAR DIARY

30 January 1941 [Page 401]

7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces.

I. *Objectives of war against Britain.* a. Main purpose of the navy consists in continued actions against Britain. Possibility of intensifying U-boat war be necessary discontinuance of submarine training in the Baltic and thereby release of part of the training ships for combat duty.

b. Importance of securing of sea lanes on the West Coast of Norway by the temporarily suspended traffic in the Baltic. Since some battle-worthy security forces are not sufficient, additional combat-units from the Western theater of operation are indispensable.

II. *Objectives of war against Russia.* Solution of the problem in spite of Russian superiority possibly by the sacrifice of a temporary discontinuance of our sea traffic (ore transports) in the Baltic.

a. Protection of our coast secured by presently existing or about-to-be reorganized coast artillery. Defense against enemy submarine attack by using units of submarines, pursuit ships, and mine sweepers.

b. Prevention of escape of enemy combat vessels from the Baltic secured by the defense power of our coastal batteries, by creating new mined waters, with suitable barrage and the existing big air threat.

Additional safety measures:

To get ready loaded minelayers for immediate tactical blockade and the installation of the "Schlesien" and "Schleswig-Holstein" ships as floating batteries.

Since it is not possible for the Navy to prevent the escape of smaller Russian combat vessels through the Weissmeer canal, immediate commitment of air force is required to destroy locks of this canal.

c. To declare mines in waters and to effect blockades to fortify present defensive power and to discourage operations of Russian waterborne combat units against the Western Baltic at the start of war:

(1) Danger zone "Oland" between Memel and south end of "Oland."

(2) Danger zone "Bornholm" between Kolbergbornholm and Bornholmstadt.

(3) Danger zone at the south outlet of the Sund (renewed and enlarged).

(4) Danger zone "Gjedser Enge."

(5) Danger zone at the western outlet of the Finnish Bay (offensive blockade).

Demands to the Swedish navy to blockade Swedish waters including the Southkvarkenstreet (Aaland Sea).

d. To harrass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:

(1) Lightninglike commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.

(2) Actions with mines (for example with E-boats) against the Baltic strong points, attack of submarines against traffic center points, attack of camouflaged minelayers from the cliffs. If opportunity arises, premature laying of delayed action mines.

(3) To make use of the fighting power of the Finnish fleet is desirable. Important support of German objectives by a surprise laying of a blockade with Finnish ships inside the Gulf of Finland. (If the opportunity arises, material support is required).

e. Protection of the sea lanes in the Ice Sea is possible, however, not so the elimination of the Russian main stronghold of Polarnoje-Murmansk. Here, a lightninglike attack of the air force is necessary (bombers and air mines).

f. In the Black Sea, on account of Russian superiority, limitation to coastal defense and securing the Danube and its estuaries.

For early regulation of the Rumanian and Bulgarian objectives, timely appointment of liaison officers is asked. Besides support by furnishing mines and coastal guns, the transfer of river flotillas from the Netherlands to the lower Danube is intended.

Possibilities of preparing a minelayer for offensive purposes and air mine action are being examined.

g. In case Russia respects Swedish rights in her waters, German sea traffic in Swedish waters under convoy of Swedish war ships is aspired from North Sweden to the Kattegat.

h. Even after the elimination of the Russian Baltic Fleet, long lasting effects from the mine war, to be expected of Russia, are to be reckoned with. Since our minesweeper units are not at disposal, it is attempted to use also Finnish and Swedish combat vessels and to commit captured Russian booty ships, if the opportunity arises, with a Russian crew. The head of the naval war

staff agrees with these proposals. They are submitted to the Armed Forces High Command per naval war staff I op 94/41. Top Military Secret, matter for Chief.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-37

REFERENCES TO OPERATION "BARBAROSSA" IN
GERMAN NAVAL WAR DIARY

[Page 30]

4 June 1941 *Conference with Head of Naval War Staff**Plans for Operation "Barbarossa"*

(1) For B-day [Translator's note: the date laid down for the beginning of the Operation] see File "Barbarossa" No. 60.

(2) For assurance by means of surprise air attacks against enemy preventive measures see Armed Forces High Command Directive and Naval War Staff's Order to Group North, Admiral Norway, Station 0 in File "Barbarossa" No. 61.

[Page 145]

13 June 1941 *Area of Admiral South-East/Aegean*

* * * Admiral South-East requests Naval War Staff's opinion on proposal to exert pressure on Turkey to safeguard her own territorial waters against enemy submarines; at the same time (there should be) supervision of intelligence emanating from Turkey in violation of neutrality and thereby encouraging British submarine activity.

Naval War Staff concurs * * *

[Page 165]

15 June 1941 *Planning for "Barbarossa"*

* * * par. c. Naval War Staff's proposal for ruthless destruction of enemy U-boats in the Baltic has been approved by Armed Forces High Command. Subsequently following order to Group North and Flag Officer Cruisers.

(1) Use of weapons against Russian U-boats authorized with immediate effect south of the line formed by the Northern edge of the Aaland mined area.

(2) Ruthless annihilation to be the aim.

(3) Reports of success only by means of officers' code. It is important to state whether destruction is certain, whether enemy was able to send out any message and whether there are any survivors. * * *

[Pages 248-249]

21 June 1941 *Conference with Head of Naval War Staff*

* * * par. 2b. Head of Naval War Staff reports on a lecture given by Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg to whom the Fuehrer has entrusted the task of organizing a new civil administration in the occupied Russian Territories. Rosenberg spoke on the historical importance of the Eastern problem and the New Order envisaged for political relationships. Partition of White Russia is necessary. Besides the creation of a Greater Finland the following structure is planned:

Commissariat White Russia/Baltic States under a German High Commissioner.
Commissariat Ukraine with autonomous administration.
Commissariat Caucasus (autonomous administration).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-38

Seekriegsleitung

Berlin, 13 June 1941

B. Nr. I. SKL. I Op. 00969/41 Op. Chiefs

TOP SECRET!

Through officer only!

URGENT!

Vfg.

I. To

OKW/WFST/Z

Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in operation "Barbarossa."

Procedure: OKW/WFH/2 (I Kop) Nr. 44590/41 Chefs.

30/4/41

- I. On 12 June at 2000 hours one of the two outpost patrol boats which had been carefully stationed on either side of Bornholm reported an unknown, surfacing submarine on a west-course near Adlergrund (20 sm southwest of Bornholm). It answered recognition signal after some time with a meaningless letter signal.
- II. In the opinion of the "Seekriegsleitung" there is no doubt that the enemy is starting his deployment of forces in the Baltic Sea and is also moving his submarines forward into the central Baltic Sea.
- III. In the opinion of the "Seekriegsleitung" it is to be considered if orders for offensive action against these submarines could not be started immediately, or in

the very near future, in order to keep losses of tonnage or of men of war down as far as possible. In this connection it remains to be seen if the reported submarine or additional Russian boats are already at present carrying out mining operations or if the boats are to be used for torpedoing after the beginning of hostilities.

It is urgently requested and appears possible to release orders for this offensive action with the aim of destruction without any trace of the Soviet submarines including their crews. Radio silence which most certainly is ordered for the enemy submarines will make it more difficult if not impossible for the enemy to prematurely learn of the attack, even if the complete destruction should not be successful. If necessary it may be stated that the attack was made because it was asserted that British submarines had penetrated into the Baltic Sea.

IV. In consideration of the importance of this question an early decision is requested.

[illegible] 1 2 3 4
 II. Copy: 1 Nord, Ib, LIK (junge), Gr Nord
 [illegible]
 III. I Op.
 G/SKL.
 1. SKL.
 Ia I Op.

TOP SECRET

High Command of Armed Forces
 (OberKommando der Wehrmacht)
 No. 44 986/41 gK, Chefs. WFST/Abt.L(10p.)

Fuehrer Headquarters, 15 June 1941.

6 copies

1st copy

TOP SECRET

THROUGH OFFICER ONLY

Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the Baltic Sea.

Re: 1 SKL. I Op. No. 00969/41 Op.

Chefs. 13 June 1941

To

High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL)

Offensive action against submarines south of the line

Memel-southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces.

The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.

Chief of the German High Command
[signed] Keitel

Distribution:

| | |
|--------------------|----------|
| Ob.d.M. (SKL) | 1st copy |
| Ob.d.L (Lw.Fue.St) | 2d copy |
| WFST | 3d copy |
| Abt.L | |
| Chef/Ktb. | 4th copy |
| I K | 5th copy |
| I L | 6th copy |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-39

TOP MILITARY SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L(I op)

Fuehrer's Headquarters

TOP SECRET [CHEF SACHE]

ONLY THROUGH OFFICER

21 copies:

3d copy Ob. d. M.

I op.00845/41

Received 6 June

Enclosures: —

The Fuehrer has authorized the appended time table as a foundation for further preparations for "Barbarossa." If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: Keitel

Distribution:

C-i-C of Army (Gen. Staff of Army).....1st and 2d copy

C-i-C of Navy (Command of Ocean

Navy)3d and 4th copy

C-i-C of Air (Air Leader Staff).....5th and 6th copy

Defense Office Norway.7th copy

OKW

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab 8th copy

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| Abt. L..... | 9th to 15th copy |
| WNV | 16th copy |
| WPr | 17th copy |
| Wohrm.Trsp.Chef | 18th copy |
| Amt Ausl./Abw..... | 19th copy |
| Abt. Ausl | 20th copy |
| Wi Rue Amt..... | 21st copy |

[Pencil note]

Correct I op 00910/41
(old pages 6 and 10
destroyed and replaced
by new ones.)

F.M. 11 June 41

Enclosure with OKW/WFST/Abt.L (I op)
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret

TIME TABLE BARBAROSSA

State of preparations on 1 June 41

1. *General.* The time table for the maximum massing of troops in the East was put into operation on the 22 May.

2. *Negotiations with friendly states.* *a.* Bulgaria is requested not to weaken materially her units which are protecting her Turkish frontier.

b. According to the demand of the Supreme Commander of the German troops in Rumania the Rumanians have started a camouflaged part mobilization to defend their frontier against possible Russian attack.

c. Utilization of Hungarian territory for concentrating parts of Army Group South is only considered if it is necessary to push a German unit between Hungarian and Rumanian troops. This question will not be put to the Hungarian authorities till the middle of June.

d. Two German divisions are drawn up in the Eastern part of Slovakia. Reinforcements will be unloaded in the area around Prosov.

e. Negotiations for preparations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25 May.

f. Sweden has not been consulted. Negotiations will be started after commencement of operations.

3. *Army. a. West.* Total strength (after departure of 6 Infantry Divisions and introduction of 5 formations of the fifteenth wave from the Reich during the period 22 May—1 June:

40 Infantry Divisions, 1 Infantry Division (motorized), 1

Police Division, 1 Armored Brigade.

Attila or [underlining in pencil] Isabella can be executed at ten days' warning (this holds good also for the Air Force).

b. North. Total strength. 6 Infantry Divisions, 2 Mountain Divisions, 1 Lines of Communication Division, SS—Battle Group North and 140 GHQ Batteries (Heeresbatterien) for coastal defense.

In addition 1 Lines of Communication Division and 18 GHQ Batteries are scheduled for transport from the home area to Norway.

1 reinforced Infantry Division with Corps troops is scheduled for transport from the home area to Finland. Of these forces 1 Infantry Division, 2 Mountain Divisions and SS—Battle Group North are to be committed for *Silver Fox*.

It is planned after the beginning of the operations to bring up a further Infantry Division by rail across Sweden for the attack on Hango.

c. Balkans. In the Balkans are stationed, in addition to the formations scheduled for the final occupation, 8 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured Division which will be transported in part into the Concentration Area East as OKH Reserve but not before B-Day.

d. East. Total strength is raised to 76 Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, 3 Armored Divisions.

The Army Groups and Armies have taken over command in their sectors, partly by means of camouflaged battle Headquarters (Arbeitsstaebe).

4. *Navy.* Command of the Baltic has been established, for the present in Kiel, later in Swinemuende. Group North have been supplied with additional protective forces from the West.

5. *Air Force.* Air Fleet 3 has taken over sole command in the conduct of air warfare against Britain.

Air Fleet 2 has been withdrawn from action and transferred to the East.

VIII Air Corps which has been earmarked for Barbarossa will be transferred as soon as possible to the East. Several anti-aircraft Battalions which were given up by Twelfth Army to Air Fleet 4 are still tied down operationally in the South East.

6. *Camouflage.* Second phase of deception of the enemy (Code names: Haifisch and Harpune) in operation with the aim of giving the impression that landings are being prepared from Norway, the Channel Coast, and Brittany. Troop Concentration East (Aufmarsch Ost) will be represented as a deception exercise for the landing in England.

| Date | Serial No. | Army | Air Force | Navy | OKW | Remarks |
|----------------|------------|---|-----------|---|---|---|
| from 1 June | 1 | Move up of Echelon, to last till 22 June. <i>Additional Transfers to the East:</i> 4 Corps Staffs. 14 Armored Divisions. 12 Infantry Divisions. (Motorized). | | | | Main effort in first part by 4b-Echelon (Air Force Components) in second part (from about 10 June) mobile formations of the Army. <i>Offensive Activity of the Airforce.</i> With the transfer of flying formations to the East slackening off of offensive activity against Britain and in the Atlantic. With the transport away of antiaircraft units the antiaircraft protection of Air Defense Area Center will be diminished. |
| | 2 | | | "Schlesien" and "Schleswig-Holstein" are ready for action, scheduled as floating batteries. | <i>Armed Forces Area Norway</i> current till 22 June transport of the last 18 Army Coast Defense Batteries. | |
| | 3 | | | U-boat School, "Tirpitz" and School Squadron transferred to Drontheim. | | Transfer of the Navy Units camouflaged as concentration for "Harpoon." |
| | 4 | | | Minelayers from Area West assigned to Group North. Minelayers of Group North change their bases. Strong concentration of mine-carrying craft in the Baltic. | | Camouflage: exercises during the summer months which are unsuitable for mine-laying. |

| | | | | | | |
|--------|---|--|--|---|---|--|
| | 5 | | | Task Force (German help with construction Cruiser "L") will be recalled from Russia in groups by stages. [exclamation mark and line in red pencil at left side] | | |
| 5 June | 6 | See OKW | | See OKW | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> <i>Transports Stettin-Bottenhaefen:</i> 5-14 June reinforced 169th Infantry Division in 7 Echelons. 8 June, First landing in Finland. <i>Transports Oslo-Bottenhaefen:</i> 5-12 June XXXVI Corps with Corps troops in 4 Echelons. 9 June, First landing in Finland. | |
| 7 June | 7 | Intended start of transporting VIIIth Air Corps and Anti-Aircraft Artillery. | | | | Adherence to deadline not yet ascertained with certainty. [struck through in pencil] |
| | 8 | | | | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> Start of movement by road of SS Battle Group North from Kirkenes Southward. | |
| 8 June | 9 | | | Start of laying of the prepared harbor protective barrages of the East and Middle Baltic and of the Gjedser Submarine net obstruction. | | |

| Date | Serial No. | Army | Air Force | Navy | OKW | Remarks |
|---------------|------------|------|--|--|--|---|
| | 10 | | | | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> First landing in Finland of the transports from Germany. First landing in Finland of the transports from Norway. | Warning for Russia. The occupation of the Petsamo area must be given up immediately in the event of Russian offensive action against Finland. |
| from 10 June | 12 | | | | Battle HQs for 4 Armed Forces Commanders Staffs at action stations. | Scheduled for political administrative areas East. |
| 10 June | 13 | | | | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> Start of movement by road and rail from the Bottenhaefen northwards. | |
| 12 June | 14 | | | The scheduled minelayers and E-boat flottilles (S-flottilen) transferred to Finland. | | Camouflage as express transports for North Norway via Finland. |
| about 12 June | 15 | | | | Decision on Barbarossa Conference with the Roumanians. | |
| 14 June | 16 | | [original p. 6 marked "new" in pencil] | | <i>Hungary:</i> Hint to Hungarian Armed Forces to reinforce their safeguards on the border against Soviet Russia. | |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------|----|--|--|---|--|--|
| | 17 | | | Russian ships kept by disguised measures from entering the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Canal and (from 17 June) Gotenhafen. [two strokes in blue pencil at the side] | | |
| 15 June | 18 | | | | Warning order on adherence to arrange B-day. | |
| from 17 June | 19 | | Closing of schools in the Eastern area. | Inconspicuous withdrawal of German merchant shipping from Soviet Russian ports. | | |
| | 20 | | | Suspension of further outward sailings to Soviet Russian ports. Similar measures to be suggested to the Finns through Attaché. | | |
| | 21 | | | U-boats of Group North to take up positions in the Baltic unobserved. | | |
| | 22 | | Start of planned aerial reconnaissance of the Baltic. 1st enclosure to OKM I op 00910/41 pr 40 | | | Decision on this point depending on general situation. |
| till 18 June | 23 | | | | Still possible to continue forming the point of main effort [Schwerpunkt] of the Army without discarding camouflage. | |

| Date | Serial No. | Army | Air Force | Navy | OKW | Remarks |
|---------|------------|--|---|---|--|---|
| 18 June | 24 | | Concentration of Air Force to be concluded (less VIII Air Corps). | | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> Switch of XXXVI Corps Groups from the Arctic route to the East. | Intention to attack need no longer be camouflaged. [Underlined and marked in red pencil] |
| | 25 | | Order for protection of Fuehrer Headquarters. | | | |
| 19 June | 26 | | | Scheduled return into home ports of the shipping space earmarked for transports to Finland. | | <i>Shortly before start of operations Army:</i> To carry out the closure of traffic of waterways which cross the frontier. <i>Air Force:</i> Decree prohibiting take off of civilian air traffic. <i>Navy:</i> Decree prohibiting merchant shipping from putting to sea from Baltic ports. <i>OKW:</i> Order for a general clamp-down on foreign intelligence (Military Intelligence (Foreign Branch Security)). |
| 20 June | 27 | | Conclusion planned of Concentration of VIII Air Corps. | | | |
| 21 June | 28 | | | Minelayers and Mine-carrying Craft (E-boats) make ready for sea and put out at staggered times for their operational harbors. | | |
| 21 June | 29 | Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (spae- tester Anhaltetermin). | | | Cancelled by Codeword: "Altona" or further confirmation of start of attack by codeword: "Dortmund." | Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort [Schwerpunkt] (concentration of armor & artillery) must be reckoned with. |

| | | | | | | |
|------------|----|---|--|---|--|---|
| 21/22 June | 30 | | | Execution of the measures laid down for blocking the Gulfs of Finland and Riga. | | In the event of an encounter with enemy forces the use of arms is authorized [<u>underlined in red pencil</u>]. |
| 22 June | 31 | | <i>Invasion Day</i> H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Force. 0830 hours. | | | Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force. |
| | 32 | Execution of closure of the frontiers of the German Reich which are bounded by the Barbarossa area. | | Seizure of ships in German, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, and Belgium ports which originate from the Barbarossa area. | Frontiers of the Reich area and of the occupied areas to be closed to all nationals of the Barbarossa area. (Military Intelligence/Foreign Branch (Security)). | |
| | 33 | | | | Mountain Corps occupies Petsamo area. | Arctic, East Baltic, and Black Seas declared operational zones by wireless etc. Extension of danger zones for mines announced. (dates received by Foreign Office). |
| | 34 | | | | Report to the Supreme Reich Authorities and Party Offices on the successful closing of the German Reich frontier bordering on the Barbarossa area or the rear boundary of the operational zone (WFST/Liv). | |

| Date | Serial No. | Army | Air Force | Navy | OKW | Remarks |
|----------------------|------------|--|---|------|--|---------|
| | 35 | <p><i>Distribution of Forces for Barbarossa on Invasion Day:</i> <i>Total strength</i> (less the formations under command of Military Commander Norway): 80 Infantry Divisions. 1 Cavalry Division. 17 Armored Divisions 12 Infantry Divisions (Motorized), 9 Lines of Communications Divisions. 2 Formations of the Fifteenth Wave and 2 Infantry Divisions as Army Reserves (Already arrival with 4b Echelon).</p> | <p><i>Air-Fleet 4 with—</i> 3 Reconnaissance Squadrons. 12 Twin-engined Bomber Wings (Kampfgruppen) (1 temporarily). 6 Pursuit Wings. <i>Air-Fleet 2 with—</i> 3 Reconnaissance Squadrons. 10 Twin-engined Bomber Wings. 8 Dive Bomber Wings. 2 ME 110 Wings (Zerstoeergruppen). 1½ Army Cooperation Wings (Schlachtgruppen). 9 Pursuit Wings (2 temporarily). <i>Air-Fleet 1 with—</i> 2 Reconnaissance Squadrons. 9 Twin-engined Bomber Wings. 3 ¾ Pursuit Wings (¾ temporarily).</p> | | | |
| approx. from 25 June | 36 | <p>Start of transport forward of 5th Echelon (OKH Reserves). Duration till about 20 July Total available: 22 Infantry Divisions. 2 Armored Divisions. 1 Infantry Division (Motorized).</p> | | | <p><i>Sweden:</i> Negotiations for the use of Swedish railways for— (a) Bringing up of 163 Infantry Division from South Norway to Rovaniemi. (b) Supply transports.</p> | |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----|---|--|--|---|
| | | 1 Police Division (including 9 Infantry Divisions. 1 Police Division from the <i>West</i> , to which it is planned to bring up 2 formations of the Fifteenth wave.) | | | Employment of a German transport organization and a Signals Liaison Officer. |
| | 37 | | | | <i>Japan, Manchukuo, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan</i> to be prevailed upon to cut off the sending of any supplies to Russia, by diplomacy. |
| | 38 | | | | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> 23-27 (or 28) June, state of readiness for attack on Murmansk. 23-30 June, state of readiness for attack on Kandalakscha. |
| at earliest 28 June | 39 | | | | <i>Finland:</i> Attacking Group "Ladoga" ready to attack. Decision necessary five days before start of attack whether point of main effort is to be west or east of Lake Ladoga. |
| 28 June or 29 June | 40 | | | | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> Attack on Murmansk. |
| 1 July | 41 | | | | <i>Armed Forces Commander Norway:</i> Attack on Kandalakscha. |
| 2 July | 42 | | | | 4 Armed Forces Commanders Staffs ready on call. |

COPY

QUESTIONS OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND BASES

I. These problems are preeminently of a political character and comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it is not the Navy's province to answer, but they also materially affect the strategic possibilities open,—according to the way in which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and operation of the Navy.

It is too well known to need further mention that Germany's present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight, and in the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of states, and under their influence,—is an impossible one for the future of Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the war.

The solution could perhaps be found among the following possibilities:

1. The territories of Denmark, Norway, and Northern France acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied and organized that they can in future be considered as German possessions.

This solution will recommend itself for areas where the severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy, and where a gradual "Germanizing" of the territory appears practicable.

2. The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct connection with Germany's main body, and which, like the Russian solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the hostile state. Such areas might be considered possibly around Brest and Trondjem.

[Pencil note] But this isn't at all the case with Trondjem.

This type of solution can only be discouraged. It is fraught with every conceivable weakness to which a bridgehead in a hostile country and national body, difficult of access, far removed from the homeland and thrown back on its own resources is subject. On the face of it the thought of having made provision for the outbreak of a fresh war is a right one. As, however, it has in mind the possibility of a war breaking out in the near or distant future, it is basically wrong and ineffectual.

[Pencil note] What does this mean in Norway's case?

3. The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas ac-

quired in this war should result in the existing population of these areas feeling themselves politically, economically, and militarily, to be completely dependent on Germany. If the following results are achieved: that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military measures for occupation taken during the war—that French powers of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of the question—that the smaller states, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will enable us in any circumstances and at any time, easily to occupy these countries again—then in practice the same, but psychologically much more, will be achieved.

[Pencil note] No, I can't agree there as far as Trondjem is concerned. If we clear right out of Trondjem the British could make difficulties again one fine day. We must have Trondjem!

The solution given above therefore, appears to be the proper one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above. To straighten out relations with Switzerland.

The possession of Iceland would mean material strategic expansion for Germany.

[Pencil note] Yes.

II. I would advise against the creation of bases in the North and South America, Asia, or Australia. On the other hand contiguous possessions in Central Africa are considered extremely desirable—possessions which are made up of the area between Senegal and the Congo and stretch east as far as German East Africa—that is, they comprise: the French possession, say, South of the line of Latitude running through the mouth of the Senegal, the former German Colonies of Central Africa and the Belgian Congo. For the purpose of rounding off this area, German South West Africa could be considered as exchange territory for British or Portuguese possessions.

[Pencil note] Yes.

The acquisition of one or more bases on the groups of islands off Africa would be of the greatest importance, and besides this the possession of Madagascar and the French groups of islands in the Indian Ocean.

Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will make an extension of these demands possible.

1. Skl.

[signed] Fricke 3.6.40.

COPY

Teleprinter message to C.inC. Navy received 30.11.44

MOST SECRET

Most Secret.

Re: Sabotage in Norway and Denmark.

Sabotage to dockyards and ships in the Norwegian-Danish area has increased to such an extent that energetic countermeasures are necessary.

1. C.inC. Armed Forces Norway and C.inC. Armed Forces Denmark are commissioned to effect the proclamation of an Order and its carrying out to the Reich commissar for the occupied Norwegian territories and to the Reich plenipotentiary in Denmark through F.O. (Battleships); according to this order the personnel and if necessary those connected with them (relatives) are rendered responsible for the cases of sabotage occurring in their works. Every shipyard worker etc., must know that every case of sabotage occurring in his sphere of work entails most grave consequences for him personally, and if he disappears, for his relatives.

2. C.inC. Armed Forces Norway and C.inC. Armed Forces Denmark will reinforce the defense against sabotage, which up to the present has been carried out by special detachments of the Navy and the Reich commissar for shipping, by escort forces composed of personnel from all arms of the service in collaboration with F.O. (Battleships) with all means available. For this purpose, in South Norway, the homeward stowage of troops in the area around Oslo is to be held back. If the numerous troops of the homeward stowage available in Oslo and also in Denmark, and the rear units are energetically made use of, the escort can be tripled. I can, moreover, not allow acts of sabotage of this kind to be accepted as acts of God and inevitable, without the authorities responsible for escort being called to account. Troops of the armed forces destined for defense against sabotage are to be placed in readiness for action at the disposal of the F.O. (Battleships) responsible for them.

Chief of Staff, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

[signed] Keitel

General Field Marshall Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces—Ops, Staff of the Armed Forces.

(Sec 24-5/C-48)

Section (?) 2 (North) No. 00139/72/44

3/ Naval War Staff.

Most Secret

30.11.44.

Section 3 Book No.
 Defense 6161/44
 Most Secret

| Copies to: | Serial No. |
|--|------------|
| 1/Naval War Staff Ia | 1. |
| 1/Naval War Staff Ib | |
| For the attention of Korvettenkapitaen Mejer | 2. |
| Naval War Staff Admiralty Section (?) | 3. |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-50

Naval War Staff Berlin, 17 June 1941
 Reg. No. 1 SKL. Ia 00149/41 MOST SECRET S.O. Only
 [illegible markings]

MOST SECRET
 By hand of officer only

ORDER

1. Address to:

| | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|------------|
| Group North | Copy | 1- 2 |
| Admiral Norway | Copy | 3- 4 |
| Baltic Station | Copy | 5- 6 |
| F.O. Cruisers | Copy | 7- 8 |
| Liaison Staff Finland | } for informa- tion | Copy 9-10 |
| Naval Command "C" | | Copy 11-12 |
| Naval Command "D" | | Copy 13-14 |

1. Inclosed is an Order by the Fuehrer concerning the application of Martial law in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

2. Make copies of the Fuehrer Order of 13th May and attach 2 copies of each to the document mentioned in 1.

3. I Op.

ii
 after departure

Naval War Staff
 iA Ia
 initials
 [illegible notations]

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
 WFSt/Section L (IV qu) Fuehrer's Hq., 14 May 1941
 No. 44718/41 Most Secret S.O.

MOST SECRET
 Only by officer
 [illegible markings]

23 copies
 7th copy

Subject: Application of military jurisdiction and procedure in area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

Inclosed is an order by the Fuehrer concerning application of military jurisdiction and procedure in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures. If possible *further distribution will not be made until 1 June 1941.*

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
 By order:

[Signature illegible]
 [illegible notation]

Distribution:

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| C-in-C of the Army (Ops-Abt)..... | 1st copy |
| C-in-C of the Army (Gen Qu)..... | 2d-3d copies |
| Supreme Command of the Army (Chief H. Ruest.u.Bd.E) | 4th copy |
| C-in-C of the Air Force (Lw. Fuehrungsstab)..... | 5th copy |
| C-in-C of the Air Force (Gen Qu)..... | 6th copy |
| C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff)..... | 7th copy |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/WFSt..... | 8th copy |
| Dept L—Chief..... | 9th copy |
| Dept L—IH..... | 10th copy |
| IL | 11th copy |
| IK | 12th copy |
| IV/Qu | 13th copy |
| II | 14th copy |
| Ktb | 15th copy |
| WR | 16th copy |
| Armed Forces Propaganda..... | 17th copy |
| Foreign/Abw | 18th copy |
| Abw III | 19th copy |
| Reserve | 20th-23d copies |

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
 Fuehrer's Headquarters, 13 May 1941

[Pencil note]

One copy for Group South sent 15.12.1941. V.W.

ORDER CONCERNING THE EXERCISE OF MARTIAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN THE AREA "BARBAROSSA" AND SPECIAL MILITARY MEASURES

The application of martial law aims in the first place at *maintaining discipline*.

The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.

This is possible only if *the troops* take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area "Barbarossa" (area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration):

I. Treatment of offenses committed by enemy civilians:

1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for *crimes committed by enemy civilians*.

2. *Guerillas* should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.

3. Likewise *all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces*, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.

4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible; *persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.*

On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a Battalion Commander, *collective despotic measures* will be taken without delay against *localities* from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

5. It is *expressly forbidden* to keep suspects in *custody* in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.

6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders *reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians*, in areas which are sufficiently settled.

For the *area of the "Political Administration"* this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

II. Treatment of offenses committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.

1. With regard to *offenses committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht* and its employees *prosecution is not obligatory* even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offense.

2. When *judging such offenses*, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether *legal measures* are necessary. In the case of offenses against inhabitants it will order a *court martial* only if *maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces* call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offenses originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offenses which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores of other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.

The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

4. *Extreme caution* is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.

III. Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are *personally* responsible for seeing that—

1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I above.

2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of *verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs*.

3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

IV. *Security.*

Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as "Most Secret."

By order
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
[signed] Keitel

Checked
Dressel (?)
Major d.G.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-51

High Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Dep.L(IV/Qu) Fuehrer's HQ., 27 July 1941
Nr.001590/41 Top Secret. [illegible notations]

TOP SECRET

24 copies
20th copy

Reference: OKW/TsT/ Dep. L(IV Qu)
Nr. 44718/41 Top Secret S.O. 14 May 1941,
Re: Military Courts.

In accordance with the regulation concerning classified material, the following offices will destroy all copies of the Fuehrer's decree of 13 May 1941 issued in the communication mentioned above:

- a. All offices upwards to (the ranks of) General Commands inclusive.
- b. Group Commands of the armored troops.
- c. Army Commands and offices of equal rank, if there is an inevitable danger that they might fall into the hands of unauthorized persons (Rules concerning classified materials No. 58).

The validity of the decree is not affected by the destruction of the copies. In accordance with paragraph III it remains the personal responsibility of the Commanding Officers to see to it that the officers and legal advisers are instructed in time and that only those sentences are confirmed which correspond to the political intentions of the High Command.

C-51

This order will be destroyed together with the copies of the Fuehrer's decree.

The Chief of the High Command
[signed] Keitel

Distribution:

The same as referred to in
the communication above,
and Gen. on special mission
with High Command Army.

[rubber stamp with hand markings:]

Encl to /SKl 17245/init top secret.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-52

TOP SECRET

By officer only

Fuehrer HQ. 23 July 1941

Chief, High Command of the Armed Forces

No. 441254/41, Top Secret, by officer only

Armed Forces Operational Staff/Dept. L (1 Op)

14 copies
Copy No. 2.

Supplement to order no. 33

On 22 July, the Fuehrer after receiving the Commander of the Army issued the following order with a view to supplementing and enlarging Order No. 33:

[1 to 5: strategic measures]

* * * * *

6. In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East, the forces available for establishing security in these areas will be sufficient only if all resistance is punished not by legal prosecution of the guilty, but by the spreading of such terror by the occupying forces as is alone appropriate to eradicate every inclination to resist amongst the population.

The respective Commanders, with the troops available to them are to be held responsible for maintaining peace within their areas. The Commanders must find the means of keeping order within the regions where security is their responsibility [Sicherungsraume], not by demanding more security forces, but by applying suitable, draconian measures.

[Signed] Keitel

Distribution: * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-53

High Command of Armed Forces

"WFSt"/Dep. L. No. 33 298/40 Top Secret (I)

Fuehrer HQ, 20 Sept. 1940.

6 copies

Copy No. 3

TOP SECRET

By officer only

Since the Rumanian Government has applied for German instructors and instruction troops, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided as follows:

1. Army and Air Forces will send Military Missions to Rumania. To the world their tasks will be to guide friendly Rumania in organizing and instructing her forces.

2. The real tasks—which must not become apparent either to the Rumanians or to our own troops—will be:

a. To protect the oil district against seizure by third powers or destruction.

b. To enable the Rumanian forces to fulfill certain tasks according to a systematic plan, worked out with special regard to German interests.

c. To prepare for deployment from Rumanian bases of German and Rumanian forces in case a war with Soviet Russia is forced upon us.

* * * * *

The Chief of the High Command
[signed] Keitel

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-54

High Command of the Armed Forces

No. 44780/41 Top Secret "WFSt"/Dep. L (I Op)

Fuehrer HQ, 23 May 1941

15 copies

Copy No. 3

TOP SECRET

By officer only

Re: Rumania

The Fuehrer, having received Col. Gen. Ritter von Schobert, has ordered the following:

Upon his arrival in Rumania Col. Gen. Ritter v. Schobert will be appointed "Officer Commanding the German Forces in Rumania." His duties will be as follows:

a. He will prepare the defensive measures and the subsequent offensive operations planned for "Barbarossa."

b. He will be responsible for the protection of the entire Rumanian area with the proviso that he is entitled to transfer the protection of Rumania as an independent task to the Chief of the Military Mission as soon as the 11th Army leaves Rumania for the attack.

The Chief of the Military Mission and the Chiefs of the Armaments Missions are subordinated to him for this purpose. (For this see the instructions concerning the protection of the oil district and the coast.)

c. He will conduct the negotiations with the Rumanian Chief of State with regard to all questions touching directly upon his duties.

With regard to these negotiations the Fuehrer has ordered the following:

1. Upon his arrival, Col. Gen. Ritter v. Schobert will report to Gen. Antonescu and will introduce himself as successor to F.-M. List as "Officer Commanding the German Forces in Rumania." He will make it known to Gen. Antonescu that the Fuehrer intends shortly to invite Gen. Antonescu to Germany for a personal discussion.

2. The change in the office of "Officer Commanding the German Forces in Rumania" will be explained to Gen. Antonescu by pointing out to him that the present concentration of extremely strong Russian forces within the area of the western frontier requires precautionary measures for the protection of Rumanian territory. It was for this reason that simultaneously with the liquidation of our deployment on the Balkans, the German Forces in Rumania were being increased to about 6 divisions.

3. Since it was a common German-Rumanian duty to protect Rumanian territory against surprises, Rumania on her part would have to introduce corresponding measures. Gen. Antonescu will be asked to make appropriate suggestions and these will be harmonized with the German measures by Col. Gen. Ritter v. Schobert.

A large scale mobilization of the Rumanian Forces is, however, undesirable.

4. Any questions whether Germany expected war with Russia, or whether Germany would attack Russia under certain conditions will be evaded.

* * * * *

The Chief of the High Command
[signed] Keitel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-59

Fuehrer's HQ, 19 February 1941

TOP SECRET

10 copies
2d copy

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 44 187/41, Top Secret, WFST/Section L (I Op)
S.O. Only
By officer only.

On 18 February the Fuehrer made the following decision regarding the carrying out of operation "Marita."

1. The following dates are envisaged:
Commencement of building bridge.....28 February
Crossing of Danube..... 2 March

The final order for carrying out the operation will be given on 26 February at the latest.

It will be decided on 26 February at the latest whether the XIVth Army Corps will march into Bulgaria when bridge-building operations are begun or whether only AA Forces will be moved in.

2. It is for the Bulgarians alone to decide if and when to lay mines off Varna and Burgas.

3. If air attacks are carried out against Bulgaria and Rumania from Greek territory, the Xth Air Corps has freedom of action in operations against Greek territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By order

[signed]: Warlimont

Distribution:

| | |
|---|--------------|
| C-in-C Command of the Army (Operational section) | 1st Copy |
| C-in-C Command of the Navy (Naval situation report) | 2d Copy |
| C-in-C Command of the Air Force (Air Force Operational Staff) | 3d Copy |
| <i>Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:</i> | |
| Armed Forces Operational Staff..... | 4th Copy |
| Section L | 5th-9th Copy |
| Foreign/Military Intelligence | 10th Copy |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-62

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 172/39 Top Secret. WFA/L
TOP SECRET

Berlin, 9 October 1939

8 copies

Copy No. 2

[Stamp]

C in C Navy Op 283/39 Recd. 10.10.39

S.O. only

access only through office

DIRECTIVE NO. 6 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1. If it should become apparent in the near future that England, and, under England's leadership, also France, are not willing to make an end of the war, I am determined to act actively and aggressively without much delay.

2. If we wait much longer, not only will Belgian and perhaps also Dutch neutrality be lost in favor of the Western powers, but the military strength of our enemies will grow on an increasing scale, the neutrals' confidence in a final German victory will dwindle, and Italy will not be encouraged to join us as a military ally.

3. Therefore I give the following orders for the further military operations:

a. Preparations are to be made for an attacking operation on the northern wing of the Western front, through the areas of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out with as much strength and at as early a date as possible.

b. The purpose of this attacking operation will be—

To defeat as strong contingent of the French operational army, as possible as well as the allies fighting by its side, and at the same time.

To gain as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France as a base for conducting a promising air and sea war against England and as a glacis for the vital Ruhr area.

c. The timing of the attack depends on the readiness of tanks and motorized units for use,—this must be speeded up by every possible effort, also on the weather conditions then prevailing and the weather prospects ahead.

4. The Air Force is to prevent the Anglo-French air force from attacking our own army, and, if necessary, to give direct support to the army's advance. In this connection, it will also be essential to prevent the Anglo-French air force as well as

English landing troops from gaining any hold in Belgium and Holland.

[Marginal note in handwriting: "It will also be up to the Air Force to cut the supply lines of those English troops which have already landed. The employment of U-boats in the Channel will soon cease because of heavy losses."]

5. The Direction of Naval Warfare must concentrate everything on being able to give direct and indirect support to the operations of the army while this assault lasts.

6. Apart from these preparations for starting the attack in the West according to plan, Army and Air Force must be ready at any time and with increasing strength, in order to be able to meet an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium as far inside Belgian territory as possible, and to occupy as much of Holland as possible in the direction of the West Coast. [Marginal note in handwriting: "This kind of procedure would be more desirable in every respect"]

7. The camouflage used for these preparations must be that they are merely precautionary measures in view of the threatening concentration of French and English forces on the Franco-Luxembourg and Franco-Belgian borders.

8. I request the Supreme Commanders to give me, as soon as possible, detailed reports of their intentions in the basis of this directive and from now on, to keep me informed, via the OKW, of the state of the preparations.

[signed] Adolf Hitler

Distribution:

| | |
|---|------------|
| Supreme Command of the Army | Copy No. 1 |
| Supreme Command of the Navy | Copy No. 2 |
| Reich Minister for Air and C. in C. Air Force | Copy No. 3 |

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:

| | |
|--|------------|
| Chief Armed Forces, General Staff Dept. | Copy No. 4 |
| Chief L | Copy No. 5 |
| I a | Copy No. 6 |
| I b | Copy No. 7 |
| I c | Copy No. 8 |

MOST SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
W.F.A. No. 20/39 Most Secret S.O. only

Berlin, 15 October 1939

[should read 15 November 1939]

Subject: "Fall Gelb"

S.O. only, access only through officer

7 copies

Copy No. 2

The queries roused by the Supreme Command of the Army, on the subject of the execution of Directive OKW/WFA/L No. 213/39 Most Secret dated 14 November 1939, were discussed with the Fuehrer today.

The result was as follows:

It is of not inconsiderable significance for the over-all strategy of the war to protect the Ruhr areas by moving the plane-spotting organization and the air defense as far forward as possible in the area of Holland.

The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective can the defense of the Ruhr area be made. This viewpoint must determine the choice of objectives made by the Army, even if Army and Navy are not directly interested in such a territorial gain. Therefore, the purpose of the Army's preparations must be to occupy—when a special order is received—the area of Holland, at first as far as the Grebbe-Maas line. It will depend on the political and military attitude of the Dutch, as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether it will be necessary and possible to push the objective still farther.

Likewise, preparations must be made to take possession of the West Frisian islands, with the support of the Navy, at first with the exception of Texel, as soon as the Northern coast of Groningen is in our hands; these, too, are of great significance as bases for the A/C reporting service and England must be deprived of the possibility of seizing them for similar purposes.

[signed]: Keitel

Distribution:

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| Supreme Command of the Army (Gen. Staff of the Army) | Copy No. 1 |
| Supreme Command of the Navy | Copy No. 2 |
| Reich Minister for Air and C in C Air Force | Copy No. 3 |
| Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Sect. L | Copy No. 4, 5, and 6 |
| Draft | Copy No. 7 |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-63

Berlin, 27 January 1940

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
No. 22045/40 Top Secret WFA/Dept.L

TOP MILITARY SECRET

Chief Matter

Through officer only

5 copies

Copy No. 2

[illegible notations]

Re: Study "N"

Ref: 22039/40 Top Secret WFA/Dept L (I) 23 Jan. 1940

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces desires that work on the Study "N" be continued under his personal and immediate influence and in closest collaboration with the conduct of the war as a whole. For these reasons the Fuehrer has ordered me to take charge of the further preparations.

For this purpose a working staff will be formed within the High Command of the Armed Forces; this staff will at the same time represent the nucleus of the future operations staff.

I request the High Commands of the Service to appoint each one officer suitable as Ia and, if possible, trained in questions of organization and supply. The Office for Intelligence Abroad (Ausl./Abw.) will furnish the Ic, and Armed Forces General Staff Dept. (WFA) will furnish the transport expert, 1 officer for signal communications and 1 officer for general questions of territorial administration.

The date when the staff will convene will be communicated later.

All further preparations will be conducted under the code-word "Weseruebung."

[Signed] Keitel

[Marginal note in handwriting:] "M.K.A. is informed and takes over the appointment of the officer (probably Sea Captain Kamke Ia [initial illegible] 29/I)"

Distribution:

| | |
|---|------------|
| Supreme Commander of the Army..... | Copy No. 1 |
| Supreme Commander of the Navy..... | " No. 2 |
| Reich Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Air Force..... | " No. 3 |
| Armed Forces General Staff Department..... | " No. 4 |
| Department Air..... | " No. 5 |

MEETING OF NAVAL STAFF WITH FUEHRER ON 12.12.39
1200 (KEITEL, JODL, PUTTKAMMER)

Norwegian question.

1. C. in C. Navy has received Quisling and Hajelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable and states that:—

As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great—especially through Storthing—President Hambro (Jew, a friend of Hore-Belisha), all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway. In which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great—possibly very shortly. From 11/1/40 onwards the Norwegian Parliament and therefore the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament in defiance of the constitution, prolonged its term by a year. This would give an opportunity for a political reshuffle. Quisling has good connections with officers of the Norwegian Army and has supporters in important positions (for example, Railways). In such an event Quisling is ready to take over the Government and to call upon Germany for help. He is also ready to discuss preparations of a military character with the German Armed Forces.

C. in C. Navy points out that with such offers one never knows how far the people concerned are wishing to further the ends of their own party or how much they have German interests at heart. Therefore caution is indicated—Norway must be prevented at all costs from falling into England's hands. That might have a decisive effect on the war; for Sweden would be completely under England's influence and it would bring the war into the Baltic, thus preventing completely the activities of the German Navy in the ocean and the North Sea. The Fuehrer, too, said that a British occupation of Norway would be unbearable. C. in C. Navy pointed out that occupation by Germany of positions on the coast of Norway would naturally produce strong British counter-measures to stop the export of ore from Narvik, and that this would bring about surface warfare off the Norwegian coast, to which the German Navy was not equal for any length of time. This was one weak spot of the occupation.

The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C. in C. Navy suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a

favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation—

a. By peaceful means, that is, German forces summoned by Norway, or

b. To agree to do so by force (Fuehrer agrees) [ink note]

2. C. in C. Navy advocates that a very clear policy in the Russo-Finnish conflict be maintained. No help to Finland by the supply of arms (which would mean passing through unreliable Sweden).

The C. in C. Armed forces states that the Swedish Foreign Office has been informed that arms would only be sent to Sweden, on guarantee in writing by the government that they were only for the use of the Swedish Armed Forces.

The C. in C. Navy on the other hand is in favor of concessions to Russia, for example, the supply of oil to U-boats, as Russia would also offer us practical help [Vorteile], for example, the holding of foreign steamers in Murmansk until three days after the "Bremen" has sailed.

The Fuehrer has agreed to both points.

RAEDER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-65

MEMO

[Enclosure in a letter of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the
C.-in-C. of the Navy]

[illegible notations]

Re: Visit of Privy Councillor Quisling—Norway.

Rounding out previous information, I inform you that Quisling is considered as one of the best known Scandinavian officers of the General staff, that he was military attache in Finland, and that he represented British interests in Moscow from 1927 to 1930 before the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the Soviet-Union and Great Britain. He was Norwegian Minister of War from 1931-1933, being a representative of the Norwegian peasant party, then resigned and founded a National Radical Socialist party under the name of "National Party." This party held and still holds anti-Semitic views and stands for the closest collaboration with Germany, has 15,000 registered members, and Quisling estimates the number of his immediate supporters as between 2 and 300,000, that is, that 10 percent which, even

amidst the manifest anti-German feeling in Norway and Sweden today, are in favor of collaboration with Germany. His party has also not taken any part in the elections for the Great Assembly [Storthing].

The reasons for a coup, about which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing had, in defiance of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on 12 January. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that: if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished. He only hoped that there would still be sufficient of the nation left to be able to create a people out of the remains which could then build up Norway again well and truly. It was right that the race of today should be relegated to obscurity, and one had to admit it didn't deserve any better fate; for as he saw it, the Norwegians had committed an offense against the unalterable law of the universe. This law demanded work and idealism, and stupidity had never been regarded as a plausible excuse. "I shall not do anything for the old boozier Madsen (Minister of Trade), the enemy of Defense Monsen (Minister of War), and the blockhead Nygolswold (Prime Minister). It may on the contrary be a good idea and a useful one, to spend one's time in risking one's neck for the national revival." Signed Konrad Sunlo.

Amtsleiter Scheidt, who had been to Norway several times, and has a number of acquaintances there, says that the Commanding Officer of the largest drilling-ground, Hroslev, had expressed similar opinions, as had also the head of the Military Academy at Halden, Captain Fritzner.

The king knows Quisling very well from the time when he held office and he believes that the king also had a high opinion of him, even though he is, by and large, pro-British in his views. The Jew Hambro is cited as Germany's greatest enemy, and as possibly the most powerful personality in politics, who practically controls the policy of Scandinavia at the moment. He is President of the Storthing, who at the same time holds the office of President of the Foreign Committee. He is also leader of the League of Nations Delegation and Leader of the strongest political party, the so-called "Conservatives," with whom the fate of

the present minority Government rests. Hambro also controls the communication system in Norway, and so there is reason to fear—and indeed shortly to fear—that as far as the anti-Russian feeling is concerned, which has increased by reason of the Russo-Finnish conflict, this will gain in strength in favor of England and against Germany in an increasing degree.

A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practiced in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with all speed to Norway where details would then require to be further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German Fleet together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instantaneous success — would immediately bring him the approval of those sections of the army with which he at present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the king is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an accomplished fact.

Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations.

[Signed]

A. Rosenberg

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-66

[MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL ASSMANN FOR HIS OWN USE, SIGNED "RAEDER," 10 JANUARY 1944.]

I. *S. O. Only*

a. Barbarossa.

1. At this time the Fuehrer had made known his "unalterable decision" to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situations had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff I was never convinced of the "Compelling necessity" for Barbarossa.

2. During the campaign in France and also during the beginning of preparation for Seelowe [invasion of England]—while the Fuehrer still had hopes of gaining control of the air (which he too recognized as being an essential prerequisite of Seelowe), it was doubtless his intention after France's fall to concentrate on the Navy and Air Force. The Fuehrer described the moving of troops to the Eastern front in August to *me* as a large scale camouflage measure for Seelowe. (A statement from the Supreme Command of the Army would have to be obtained on this point.)

The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea.

The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained—a realization which the Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses)—surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back as August and September, to consider whether—even prior to victory in the West—an Eastern campaign would be feasible with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear, however, until well into September.

The Fuehrer's remark of 21 July 1940 is an indication of reflections of this kind (Section 68) ("It is of course our duty to give careful consideration to the question of America and Russia!"); furthermore, comments such as Section 76, dated 12.8, dealing with the fortification of the North Norwegian fjords, and occasional statements regarding the meeting of Russian demands for the delivery of ships and heavy artillery, which show the Fuehrer's mistrust of the Russian attitude and his hope of evading certain commitments altogether.

Doubtless during September 1940 the possibility of an Eastern campaign was mentioned rather often by the Fuehrer, for *I* was worried that the war should take a wrong turn (being diverted from the main danger "England"), and this caused me to have an interview with the Fuehrer, *tete a tete*, "even outside my own department" on 26 June 1940, concerning the significance of the Mediterranean and North Africa, after I had *first* made

a thorough report on these questions, on 6 September 1940. In this interview of 26 September 1940 my statement—"It is questionable whether an attack on Russia from the North is necessary," removed all doubt that there had been talk during the previous weeks of the Eastern operation. It is in keeping with the Fuehrer's usual mode of procedure for him to exercise personal reserve in the first instance in this matter vis-a-vis the *Chief of Naval War Staff*, whose concept would necessarily be a different one. In this connection the Supreme Command of the Army will be able to give fuller details, since it was primarily concerned in the preparations, and will have been addressed by the Fuehrer on the matter. I would particularly point out here—quite apart from the Eastern operation—how I have attempted to impress on the Fuehrer the decisive importance for the war of the question of the Mediterranean and North Africa (when I reported to the Fuehrer on 6.9 and 26.9.40). After the discussion on 26.9. the Fuehrer told Kapitan zur See von Puttkamer that this report had been especially valuable to him, and that he could, in the light of it, review his own opinions, and see whether he was "in the right perspective."

3. At that time (*al* above), the Fuehrer was *firmly resolved* on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany,—this, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to insure surprise. Concern lest a note to Matsuoka which stated his telling Matsuoka the whole truth. He told me so at the time at a party!

4. The expression "greatly abbreviated" describes the representations I have always made while at 1 SKL,—memorandums, which were not so much German essays, or very exhaustive, as notes, and thus easier to put into report form. By means of the notes I could the more briefly and forcefully present this report, which without doubt gave a particularly clear and significant picture of the situation. It formed a very good supplement to and continuation of my reports made on the 6.6. and 29.6.40. The Fuehrer, whose primary interest was in the setting in motion of Barbarossa (thus, for instance, he wanted to employ the German Air Forces principally on the Eastern Front)—naturally took a special interest in those points in connection with which fuller aid could be secured from the Italians. It would be a mistake to conclude, from the expression "greatly abbreviated," that there was "reserve" on my part on this subject, to which I have always given the greatest publicity.

5. In view of previous statements by the Fuehrer (see Section

2), and the contrasts in ideology, I personally have always doubted that the Fuehrer believed from the very beginning that the Russo-German pact would last. I think that the pact arose solely out of the need of the moment and that the Fuehrer (in spite of his speech in the Reichstag on 1.9.39) *in no way* intended it to be a *permanent solution* of the Russian problem. After the campaign against Poland he had contented himself in the first instance with a frontier line which would, with the help of an Eastern wall, afford an effective defense against Russia. In my opinion it was only later—when, on the one hand, the first successes in Russia had been gained, and on the other, when the prospects of turning North Africa to good account were fading—that it became his aim to make the feeding of Europe dependent on the Ukraine, this plan bringing with it *permanent* opposition to Russia. Though nothing was actually said, this would involve giving up all thought of targets for which a certain measure of sea power was required, that is, it would mean striving for a pure continental policy.

6. As under section 3. A statement such as this to the Duce should be considered merely as camouflage. The Fuehrer kept his plans most carefully secret from the Italians. I believe that Stalin is our *greatest* enemy—a statesman at home and abroad, a soldier and an organizer on a prodigious scale, a Titanic genius seeing far into the future. I consider it extremely probable that in 1937 and 38 Stalin came to recognize, through the efforts of the United States ambassador, as described by Davies in “Mission to Moscow,” that Russia could play an important part in a subsequent conflict between the Anglo-Saxon races and Germany, and that he thereupon began to speed up his armaments. The pact with Germany was of a kind which would help him toward the realization of the first part of his scheme—Eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and perhaps the Balkans and the Dardanelles. The gains of 1939–40 were indeed great. In 1940–41 Stalin had no reason to march against Germany. Germany’s surprisingly great successes against France and the Balkans impressively demonstrated her strength to him and perhaps even awakened fear of her. Stalin cannot therefore have intended to take the initiative in attacking this strong Germany in 1941, but while continuing to arm, he must have wanted to wait and see whether the subsequent course of the war between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers would offer him a favorable opportunity—he knew from Davies that the USA would join in sooner or later. Whether in this connection he favored a push towards the

Rhine, passing through the Scandanavian countries, or to the North Atlantic, or in the direction of the Mediterranean to the Dardanelles, or through Persia to the Indian Ocean, or finally towards India, must have depended entirely on the course of the struggle between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers. As I see it, it does not do justice to the importance of Stalin to assume that he intended "to start the war against Germany in the autumn of 1941." It is true that an essential part of his armament was made ready for this deadline. I have sometimes been in doubt whether, for Stalin, the ideological point of view had not taken second place long ago in favor of a tremendous effort to use to the full the opportunity he was offered of realizing the schemes of Peter the Great. Was the announcement of the dissolution of the Comintern perhaps a hint to Germany that an understanding between Germany and Russia would have been possible even then, and that, after the Russian territories had been regained, a peaceful relationship would have been possible between the two States, who, taking the long view, are both threatened by the USA?

7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between I SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasions (dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command, to justify a step he had planned) usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the "inner circle," than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.

Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical.

Gross Admiral Assmann, for your own personal information.
Not for distribution.

[signed] Raeder. 10.1.44.

1 Chefsache

* * * * *

b. Weser-Ubung. The memo is wholly insufficient and does not correspond to the contents of the report. During the weeks preceding the report on 10.10.39, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coasts by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SKL for their information and prepared some notes* based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer which I made on 10.10.39, since my opinion was identi-

cal to that of Admiral Carls, while, at that time, SKI was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I set out the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us—control of the approaches to the Baltic, flanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also mentioned the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast-outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of British minefields as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence, hoped that Narvik might be excluded. (At that time, we were able to use Murmansk and/or a special Russian Base). The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.

In the further developments, I was supported by Korv. Kapitän Schreiber Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-chief personally—in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me—with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.** On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of 14.12.39, the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and, even then, they were somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Kpt.z.S. Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff.

* With the help of K.Adm.v.Puttkamer, these may possibly still be obtainable; I had no duplicate as I did not think I should have to give the notes up.

** At the crucial moment, R. hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of 14.12.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-72

Berlin, 7 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/Dept. LI No. 207/39 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
2d copy

TOP SECRET
Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

On 7 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing reports on the meteorological and the railway transport situation, has ordered:

A-day is postponed for the time being by three days. The next decision will be made by 1800 hours on 9 November 39.

[signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

OKH
OKM
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L.
WFA
L

Berlin, 10 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/L I No. 208/39 Top Secret Important Matter

8 copies
2d copy

TOP SECRET
Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

On 9 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:

The earliest date designated for A-day is 19 November. The next decision hereon will be made by 1800 hours on 13 November.

[signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
Ob.d.M..... 2nd copy
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L...... 3d copy
OKW:
WFA..... 4th copy
L..... 5th-8th copy

Berlin, 13 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/L I No 212/39 Top Secret Important Matter

6 copies
2d copy

TOP SECRET
Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

On 13 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after receiving a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:

The next decision on A-day will be made on Thursday, 16 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Wednesday, 22 November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
[signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy
WFA..... 4th copy
OKW/L..... 5th and 6th copies
Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

Berlin, 16 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/ Dept L I No 214/39 Top Secret Important Matter

6 copies
2d copy

TOP SECRET
Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

On 16 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 20 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday, 26 November.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
[signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Ob.d.H..... | 1st copy |
| Ob.d.M..... | 2d copy |
| <hr/> | |
| R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... | 3d copy |
| WFA..... | 4th copy |
| OKW/L..... | 5th and 6th copies |

Berlin, 20 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/Dept L No 217/39 Top Secret Important Matter

8 copies
 2d copy

TOP SECRET
 Important Matter
 Only by hand of Officer

On 20 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, after hearing a report on the meteorological situation, has decided:

The next decision on A-day will be made on Monday, 27 November. A-day therefore definitely not before Sunday 3 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

| | |
|-----------------------|----------|
| OKH..... | 1st copy |
| OKM..... | 2d copy |
| <hr/> | |
| R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... | 3d copy |
| <i>OKW:</i> | |
| Chief WFA..... | 4th copy |
| Chief L..... | 5th copy |
| Ia..... | 6th copy |
| Ib..... | 7th copy |
| Ic..... | 8th copy |

Berlin, 27 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/Dept L No 219/39 Top Secret Important Matter

8 copies
 2d copy

TOP SECRET
 Important Matter
 Only by hand of Officer

On 27 November the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:

1. All mobile units are to be transported immediately to the transit quarters.
2. The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 4 December.
3. Earliest date of next A-day 9 December.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
 [signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| Ob.d.H..... | 1st copy |
| Ob.d.M..... | 2d copy |
| <hr/> | |
| R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... | 3d copy |
| <i>OKW:</i> | |
| WFA..... | 4th copy |
| Chief L..... | 5th copy |
| Ia-Ic..... | 6th-8th copy |

Berlin, 29 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
 Department for National Defense
No. 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
 2d copy

TOP SECRET
 Important
 Only by hand of Officer

Enclosed the time-table for the preparations of the attack in the West No. 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter, 2d copy.

The time table sent on 8 November 1939 under No. 196/39 Top Secret Important Matter to be destroyed. [Marginal handwritten note: destroyed.]

For the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
 [signed] JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
 Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy

OKW:

Chief OKW..... 4th copy
 Chief WFA..... 5th copy

Berlin, 29 November 1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
 Department for National Defense
 No 223/39 Top Secret Important Matter

10 copies
 2d copy

TOP SECRET
 Important Matter
 Only by hand of Officer

TIME-TABLE FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK
 IN THE WEST

A-day = Day of Attack

| No | Time | Army | Navy | Air Force | Remarks |
|----|---------------------------------|---|------|---|--|
| 1. | A-day minus 5 1800 hrs. | Decision by Fuehrer as to A-day. | | | 1. Next decision 4 Dec. at 1800 hours. 2. Attack can be stop- ped until A-day mi- nus 1 at 2300 hours if disadvantages will be accepted. |
| 2. | A-day minus 1 during the day | | | Air Force units move to for- ward air- fields. | |
| 3. | A-day minus 1 1200 hrs. | Last moment at which an order of the day by the Fuehrer has to reach the C-in-C of the Army, if it is to reach company commanders before the commencement of the attack (tele- phone transmission unavoidable). | | | |
| 4. | A-day minus 1 2300 hrs. | Latest moment for stopping the attack. | | | |

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy

OKW:

Chief OKW..... 4th copy
Chief WFA..... 5th copy
Chief L..... 6th copy
Ia-Ic..... 7th-9th copy
K..... 10th copy

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/Dept L No 226/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Berlin, 4 December 1939

8 copies

2d copy

TOP SECRET
Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

On 4 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:

1. The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 6 December.
2. Earliest date of next A-day 11 December.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy

OKW:

WFA..... 4th copy
Chief L..... 5th copy
Ia-Ic..... 6th-8th copies

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/Dept L N 22 230/39 Top Secret

Berlin, 6 December 1939

8 copies
 2d copy

TOP SECRET
 Important Matter
 Only by hand of Officer

On 6 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:

1. The next decision on A-day will be made at 1800 hours on 12 December.
2. Earliest date of next A-day 17 December.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
 Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy

OKW:

WFA..... 4th copy
 Chief L..... 5th copy
 Ia-Ic..... 6th-8th copies

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/No. 22/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Berlin, 12 December 1939

8 copies
 2d copy

TOP SECRET
 Important Matter
 Only by hand of Officer

On 12 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has ordered:

1. The next decision on A-day will be made by 1800 hours on 27 December.
2. Earliest date of next A-day therefore 1 January 1940.
3. Christmas leave to be arranged accordingly by the branches of the armed forces.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: JODL

Distribution:

OKH..... 1st copy
 OKM..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy
 WFA..... 4th copy
 L..... 5th-8th copy

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

WFA/Dept L No 22 244/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Berlin, 27 December 1939

8 copies

2d copy

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

On 27 December the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has made the following decision:

In view of general meteorological situation, the date of the attack is further postponed, as far as can be foreseen by at least a fortnight. The next decision will be made *at the latest* by 1800 hours on 9 January.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
 Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy
 OKW:
 WFA..... 4th copy
 Chief L..... 5th copy
 Dept L Ia-Ic..... 6th-8th copies

[handwritten note]: Group W advised by teleprinter 1800 on 27 Dec.

[handwritten] *Note:* According to information L I b (H), the above means that the *earliest A-day* is *the 9 Jan.* and the latest day for a decision is also the 9 Jan. Rectification accordingly by Top Secret message No 2821 on 28 Dec. to Group West.

[Initial]

[handwritten] :

| Date | Moon phase |
|--------|---------------|
| 2 Jan | last quarter |
| 9 Jan | new moon |
| 17 Jan | first quarter |
| 24 Jan | full moon |
| 31 Jan | last quarter |

TOP SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

WFA/Dept L (Ib) No 22247/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Berlin, 30 December 1939

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

To: The High Command of the Navy

Subject: Skl B No 1 Skl Io Op. 512/39 Top Secret Important Matter

Re: Clarification of date for A-day

Your interpretation that the earliest date for A-day is now the 9 January, but that the next decision will also be made at the latest by 1800 hours of the same day is confirmed as correct.

Should the attack take place in the period between the 9 January and 14 January 1940, Naval High Command will receive the necessary notification (warning-order) early, i. e. 9 days before the commencement of the attack.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: JODL

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

No 22007/40 Top Secret Important Matter OKW/WFA LI

Berlin, 9 January 1940

8 copies

2d copy

TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

A decision on the date of A-day will not be made before 10 January 1940.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
[signed]: JODL

Distribution:

OKH..... 1st copy
OKM..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy

OKW:

Chief WFA 4th copy
Chief L..... 5th copy
Ia..... 6th copy
Ib..... 7th copy
Ic..... 8th copy

[handwritten] *Note:* Has been passed by telephone by the
I/Skl Io on 9 Jan 40 to A I Group West.

[Initial]

Berlin, 11 January 1940

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No 22014/40 Top Secret Matter Dept L (I)

9 copies

2d copy

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

Re: Contingency "Yellow."

On 10 January 1940 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after receiving reports from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, has ordered the following:

1. *A-day and X-hour:*

A-day is Wednesday, 17 January 40. (Wednesday, 17 in ink)

X-hour 15 minutes before sunrise at Aix-la-Chapelle on
A-day = 0816 hours. (0816 in ink)

The code-name "Rhine" or "Elbe" (see instruction No 8 for the conduct of the war, dated 20 November 39, No 1) will be issued before 2300 hours on A-day minus 1, provided the weather forecast permits.

2. *Employment of the 7th Air Div.* The operation is to be carried through according to the instructions so far given, with the following modification:

For the 7th Air Div., besides the "North" and the "South" drives, a third drive (code-name: "Einsatz fortress") is to be

prepared for obtaining possession of the heart of the Dutch fortress. The Supreme Command of the Army makes preparations to enable it to break quickly into the Dutch fortress beyond the goal hitherto designated, that is the Maas-Grebbe line, should the "Einsatz fortress" be the order given to the 7th Air Div.

The decision on the "Einsatz fortress" will be made at the latest on the morning of A-day minus 1. The "North" and "South" drives can only be considered if by A-day, a sufficient depth of snow improves jumping and landing conditions near Ghent and along the Maas, which at the moment are fraught with difficulties.

3. *Air Force Attack on the Enemy Air Force.* If the weather is suitable, the air force will on 14 January 40 attack with all available forces the majority of the occupied enemy airfields in northeastern and eastern France by surprise, with the principal aim of destroying the fighter and reconnaissance aircraft stationed there. For this attack, the air force is at liberty to fly across Luxemburg and, as far as necessary, also across Belgian and Dutch territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

| | |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| OKH..... | 1st copy |
| OKM..... | 2d copy |
| <hr/> | |
| R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... | 3d copy |
| <i>OKW</i> | |
| Chief WFA..... | 4th copy |
| Dept L..... | 5th-9th copies |

TOP SECRET

Berlin, 13 January 39 [sic]

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

WFA No 3/40 Top Secret Important Matter

Re: Contingency "Yellow."

5 copies

Important Matter

2d copy

By hand of Officer Only

On account of the meteorological situation, the Fuehrer has decided to postpone A-day, probably to 20 January 40. Latest time for issue of orders re above is 1800 hours on A-day minus 5.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: JODL

6015

Distribution:

OKH..... 1st copy
OKM..... 2d copy

R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L..... 3d copy
OKW/WFA..... 4th copy
L..... 5th copy

Berlin, 7 May 1940

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/Dept L No 22 179/40 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies
2d copy

TOP SECRET
Important Matter
Only by hand of Officer

1. The orders:

OKW/L No 22 176/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated
6 May 40 and
OKW/L No 22 177/40 Top Secret Important Matter, dated
6 May 40 are cancelled.

2. The new A-day will be ordered, according to the weather
situation, at 1200 hours on A-day minus 1 only. A new X-hour
will be given accordingly.

Next decision at 1200 hours on 8 May.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: JODL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy
Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

Ob.d.L..... 3d copy
WFA..... 4th copy
Dept L..... 5th copy

Berlin, 9 May 1940

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

WFA/ Dept L No 22 180/40 Top Secret Important Matter

5 copies

2d copy

TOP SECRET

Important Matter

Only by hand of Officer

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:

A-day.....10 May

X-hour.....0535 hours

The code-words "Danzig" or "Augsburg" to reach the branches of the armed forces by 2130 hours on the 9 May at the latest.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

[signed]: KEITEL

Distribution:

Ob.d.H..... 1st copy

Ob.d.M..... 2d copy

Ob.d.L..... 3d copy

OKW:

Chief WFA..... 4th copy

Chief L..... 5th copy

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-74

COPY

MOST SECRET

[Stamp]

Naval War Staff

Naval War Staff / 1 Div. B No I sp 1289/41

Most Secret, S.O. only

Fuehrer's H.Q., 14 July 1941

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

S.O. only

access only through Officer

13 copies

5th copy

OKW/WFSt/Dep.L(II)Org.

No. 441219/41 Most Secret

Distribution of the copies:

*Copy 1—Naval War Staff**Copy 2—Chief of M Wa Wi*

Copy 3—Chief of K
 Copy 4—Chief of A Wa

By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies:

1. *In general*; The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the *Army* to be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased.

Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America.

The main effort in armament will be shifted to the *Air Force*, which must be greatly increased in strength.

* * * * *

[signed] Adolf Hitler

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-75

TOP SECRET
 Only by Officer

Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
 Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
 No. 44 282/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer's Headquarters, 5 March 1941
 [Various handwritten notations and stamps]

14 copies
 2d copy

Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan

The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

1. It must be the *aim* of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible *to take active measures in the Far East*. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.

The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation

will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note—"slightly exaggerated"]

2. To *prepare the way* for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the *Japanese military potential* with all means available.

For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.

3. The *harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties* is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.

This will be subject to the following guiding principles:

a. The *common aim* of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.

b. The great successes achieved by Germany in *mercantile warfare* make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

c. The *raw material situation* of the *pact powers* demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.

d. The *seizure of Singapore* as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

4. In the *military commissions* to be formed in accordance with the *Three Power Pact*, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the *three* participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of *economic warfare*.

The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
[Signed in draft]: Keitel
Correctness certified by
JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander

Distribution:

Commander in Chief of the Army (Army General Staff): 1st copy
Commander in Chief of the Navy (1st Sect., Naval War Staff): 2d copy
Commander in Chief of the Air Force (Air Force Gen. St.): 3d copy
Armed Forces High Command: Joint Operations Staff: 4th copy
Office of Foreign Counterespionage, 5th copy
Chief of Foreign Affairs (simultaneously for Foreign Office): 6-7 copies
Economic Armament Office, 8th copy
Mercantile and Economic War, 9th copy
Dept. L, 10-14 copies

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-77

TOP SECRET

Fuehrer HQ, 18 May 1941

High Command of the Armed Forces
"WFSt" Dep.L (I Op) No. 44747/41 CC.Ch.M.

Top Secret

By officer only

To: Navy High Command, Naval Warfare Direction
Air Force High Command, General Staff IA.

The Foreign Office has prepared for the use in "Barbarossa"

the attached draft of a Declaration of Operational Zones.

The Foreign Office, however, reserves its decision as to the date (when the Declaration will be issued) as well as discussion of particulars.

The Chief of the High Command By Order

[signed]: von Falkenstein

[Note: The inclosure is a draft for a declaration concerning operational zones in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic, and the Black Sea.]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-78

TOP SECRET

Only by Officer

OFFICE OF WEHRMACHT ADJUTANT

at Berchtesgaden, 9th June 1941

To the Fuehrer

Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret

TOP SECRET

Re: Conference "Barbarossa"

1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on "Barbarossa" by the Commanders of Army Groups, Armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.

2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

3. Time table:

- a. 11.00 hrs "Silver Fox"
- b. 12.00 hrs—14.00 hrs Army Group South
- c. 14.00 hrs—15.30 hrs Lunch party for all participants
in conference
- d. From 15.30 hrs Baltic, Army Group North,
Army Group "Center" in this
order

Participants see inclosed list of participants.

[List of names, etc. follows]

* * * * *

[signed] Schmundt

Colonel of the general staff and Chief
Wehrmacht adjutant to the Fuehrer

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

I. *Morning and afternoon:*

1. Army:
 - General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch
 - General Halder
 - Maj. General Paulus
 - Colonel Heusinger
 - Lt. Colonel von Gyldenfeldt
2. Navy:
 - Captain Wagner
3. Air Force:
 - Reich Marshal Goering
 - General Field Marshal Milch
 - Lt. General Jeschonnek
 - Maj. General Bodenschatz
 - Brig. General von Waldau
4. High Command of the Armed Forces:
 - General Field Marshal Keitel.
 - Lt. General of the Artillery Jodl.
 - Brig. General Warlimont
 - Major Christian of the General Staff.
5. Office of adjutant of the Armed Forces:
 - Colonel Schmundt of the General Staff.
 - Captain von Puttkamer (Navy).
 - Major Engel.
 - Major von Below.

II. *Morning:*

1. "*Silver Fox*":
 - Army:* General v. Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway.
 - Air Force:* General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5.
2. *Group "South"*
 - Army:* General Field Marshal v. Rundstedt, Army Group South.
 - General Field Marshal v. Reichenau, High Command 6th Army
 - Infantry Lt. General v. Stuelpnagel, High Command 17th Army.
 - General v. Schobert, High Command 11th Army.
 - General v. Kleist, Armored Group 1.
 - Air Force:*
 - General Loehr, Air Fleet 4.

III. *Joint dinner of all participants.* In addition: General Fromm, General Udet (arrival: 13.40 o'clock, 78 Wilhelmstrasse).

IV. *Afternoon:*

1. *High Command of the Navy:*

Grand Admiral Raeder.
Vice Admiral Fricke.
Captain Schulte-Moenting.

2. *Baltic:*

General Admiral Carls, Navy Group North.
Vice Admiral Schmudt, Commander Baltic.

3. *Group "North"*

Army: General Field Marshal Ritter v. Leeb, Army Group North.

General Busch, High Command 16th Army.
General v. Kuechler, High Command 18th Army.
General Hoopner, Armored Group 4.

Air Force: Col. General Keller, Air Fleet 1.

4. *Group "Center":*

Army: General Field Marshal v. Bock, Army Group "Center."

General Field Marshal v. Kluge, High Command 4th Army.

General Strauss, High Command 9th Army.
General Guderian, Armored Group 2.
General Hoth, Armored Group 3.

Air Force: General Field Marshal Kesselring, Air Fleet 2.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-102

Berlin, 11.3.38

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
OKW L I a Nr. 420/38 g.Kdos.

30 Copies
11th copy

Referring to: Operation OTTO

TOP SECRET

1. If other measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

2. The whole operation will be directed by myself.

According to my instructions:

The Ob.d.H. will direct the land operations with the 8th Army in the formation and strength suggested to me, and with the attachments of the Air Force, the SS and police. (See appendix.)

The Ob.d.L. will direct the air operations with the forces suggested to me.

3. Operational duties, *a.* Army. The invasion of Austria must be carried out in the manner explained to me. The Army's first target is the occupation of upper Austria, Salzburg, Lower Austria, the Tyrol, the speedy occupation of Vienna and the securing of the Austro-Czech frontier.

b. Air Force. The Air Force must demonstrate and drop propaganda material, occupy Austrian aerodromes for the use of further possible reinforcements, assist the Army upon demand as necessary, apart from that, hold bomber units in readiness for special tasks.

4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms.

Austrian units who come over to us, immediately come under German Command.

6. On the remaining German frontiers no security measures are to be taken for the time being.

[Signed] A. HITLER

[Translator's note: This document bears the initials of Jodl, Keitel, and one other which is illegible.]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-103

A T 16/38 "Oel"
Berlin, 11 March 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 428/38 Top Secret L. IA.

40 copies
6th copy

[Pencil note]: C-in-C Navy
is informed.

TOP SECRET

Special instructions No. 1 to "The Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces No. 427/38
Top Secret L IA of 11.3.38."

Directive for policy towards Czechoslovakian and Italian troops
or militia units on Austrian soil

1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered
in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.
2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends es-
pecially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the
solution of the Austrian Question.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By order

JODL

Distribution:

As directive No. 1

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-105

GERMAN NAVAL WAR DIARY, 21 December 1940, Page 252.

U 37 reports: a torpedo fired at a tanker of the "Kopbard"
type (7329) had a giro failure, and probably hit an Amphitrite
submarine in the tanker's convoy. The tanker is burnt out.
Spanish steamer "St. Carlos" (300) without distinguishing mark
by gunfire. 9 torpedos left.

According to this, U 37 has torpedoed the French tanker
"Rhone" and the submarine "Sfax," as well as sunk the *Spanish*
fishing-vessel.

We shall continue to maintain to the outside world that there
is *no* question of a German or Italian submarine being in the sea-
area in question for the sinkings.

*NAVAL DECEPTION AND CAMOUFLAGE IN THE
INVASION OF NORWAY*

[The following extracts are taken from a file of naval operation orders for Operation "Weseruebung"—the invasion of Norway] [Page 6] 4.4.40

V. *General orders.* (a) The Sperrbreachers [Translator's note: barrage breaking vessels] will penetrate inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fiord distinguished as merchant steamers.

(b) Challenges from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero-hour.

Orders for reconnaissance Forces.

[Page 84] 24.3.40.

XI. *Behavior during entrance into the harbor.* All ships darkened, lights to be put on only by order of the Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces by V.H.F.

No personnel on deck except gun crews and other upper deck action stations. All Army troops below deck.

The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as possible. All challenges in morse by Norwegian ships will be answered in English. In answer to questions a text with something like the following content will be chosen:

"Calling at Bergen for a short visit, no hostile intent."

* * * * *

Challenges to be answered with names of British Warships:

| | |
|---------------|------------------------------|
| "Koeln" | =H.M.S. "Cairo" |
| "Koenigsberg" | =H.M.S. "Calcutta" |
| "Bremse" | =H.M.S. "Faulknor" |
| "Karl Peters" | =H.M.S. "Halcyon" |
| "Leopard" | =British Destroyer |
| "Wolf" | =British Destroyer |
| E-boats | =British motor torpedo boats |

Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke.

. Annex 3 to Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces

[Page 106] *Most Secret 110/40 SO only.* 24.3.40. Copy number 20.

Prepared Signals, Group III, for possible traffic with passing ships and with land during entry into Bergen harbor.

Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft.

To challenge: (in case of the "Koeln") H.M.S. "Cairo."
 To order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2) Impossible to understand your signal.
 In case of a warning shot: "Stop firing. British ship. Good friend."
 In case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose:
 "Going Bergen. Chasing German steamers."

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-116

[Extract from a German Naval file]
 [Pages 143-144] 9.8.41.
 Conference with Head of Naval War Staff

* * * * *

Attempts at escape by Norwegian ships out of Goeteborg.

2. As, owing to the known attitude of the Swedes, we cannot count on their meeting our demand to prevent the departure of further ships for England, the Head of Naval War Staff has taken the decision to give Group North the task of preventing the escape of these ships through the Skagerrak. On the instructions of Naval War Staff, infringement of Swedish territorial waters, as long as it is necessary in the carrying out of the required measures, cannot be helped. The decisive factor is that the intended result should be obtained. However, the Group is instructed to avoid a battle with Swedish naval forces at all costs. Steps within Swedish territorial waters are therefore only to be taken, if Swedish naval forces are not present, or if, through a corresponding show of strength on our part, there it is guaranteed that Swedish naval forces will not oppose our own measures by the use of their weapons.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-117

PREPARATIONS FOR THE LAYING OF A MINEFIELD
NEAR THE BOSPHORUS.

[Extract from a German Naval File] Page 196.
 13.7.41.

The development of the situation characterized by the ostensible English command of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, as well as the occupation of Syria by the English, compels us to an increasing extent to make preparations for the short-term surprise laying of a minefield in the immediate vicinity of the Bosphorus, without considering territorial waters, in order to prevent any break out from the Black Sea.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-118

AUTHORIZATION OF ATTACKS ON
U. S. MERCHANTMEN.

[Extract from a German Naval file] Page 276.

18.7.41.

Special Points

I. Supplementary to the order forbidding for the time being attacks on U. S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered the following:

1. Attacks on U. S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U. S. convoys, or independently is authorized in the *original* operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U. S.—blockade zone and, which does *not* include the sea-route U. S. A.—Iceland.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-120

[A]

Top Secret
Officer Only

Berlin, 3 April 1939

The High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW]
WFA Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only L Ia
SUBJECT: Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40

5 copies
2nd Copy

The Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Defence") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

Part II "Fall Weiss" is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will be appended later.

The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to "Fall Weiss":

1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1.9.39 onwards.
2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the 3 branches of the Armed Forces.
3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by 1.5.39.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

[signed] KEITEL

Distribution:

| | | | |
|--------------|---|-------|---------------|
| OKH | = | 1 | (Copy No. 1.) |
| OKM | = | 1 | (" " 2.) |
| RdL u Ob.d L | = | 1 | (" " 3.) |
| OKW (L) | = | 2 | (" " 4 u. 5) |
| | | <hr/> | |
| Total | | 5 | |

[B]

Top Secret.
Officer Only

Berlin, 11 April 1939

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only. WFA/LI

5 Copies
2nd Copy

Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40.

I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of war.

Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:

I. Safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks. (see Annex I)

II. "Fall Weiss" (see Annex II)

III. The Annexation of Danzig (see Annex III)

Annexe IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution:

| | | | |
|--------------|---|-------|---------------|
| OKH | = | 1 | (Copy No. 1.) |
| OKM | = | 1 | (" " 2.) |
| RdL u Ob.d.L | = | 1 | (" " 3.) |
| OKW (WFA/L) | = | 2 | (" " 4 u. 5) |
| | | <hr/> | |

[C]

TOP SECRET

5 Copies
2nd Copy
Top Secret
By Officer Only

ANNEX I to OKW L Ia No. 37/39

I.

*Safeguarding the Frontiers of the
German Reich and Protection
Against Surprise Air Raids.*

[Translation Omitted]

* * * * *

Enclosure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I,
dated 11 April 43; Annex I

Top Secret
By Officer Only

*Special Order for "Frontier Defence"
(Grenzsicherung)*

[Translation Omitted]

* * * * *

[D]

ANNEX II to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret L I

Top Secret

5 copies
2nd copy

II

"Fall Weiss"

The present attitude of Poland requires, beyond the plan "Frontier-defense East", the effecting of military preparations to exclude, if necessary any threat from this direction forever.

1. Political Requirements and Aims.

German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.

The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a

part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.

The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this, cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.

The attitude of the *Baltic States* will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.

On the German side, Hungary can not be considered a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.

2. *Military Conclusions.*

The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the "Western Democracies". "Fall Weiss" constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents.

The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them.

Against the Baltic States—Lithuania in particular,—security measures are to be carried out for the event of a Polish march through this country.

3. *Tasks of the Armed Forces.*

The task of the Armed Forces is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. For this reason a surprise attack is to be striven for and prepared. The camouflaged or open general mobilization will not be ordered earlier than the day before the attack at the latest possible moment.

The forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" (annex I "Frontier defense") must not be employed for any other purpose for the moment.

All other frontiers are to be kept under observation—the Lithuanian is to be covered.

4. *Tasks of the Branches of the Armed Forces.*

a. *Army*

The operational objective in the East is to destroy the Polish army.

For this purpose the German Armed Forces, on the southern flank, may enter Slovak territory. In the North, communication between Pomerania and East Prussia must be established quickly.

The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way, that even without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilized units, positions can be taken up immediately by the first available troops. A camouflaged assembly for these units just before the day of attack may be provided. I reserve for myself the decision in this matter.

Whether the forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" will be deployed there completely, or will be partly available for some other employment,—will depend upon the political situation.

b. *Navy*

The tasks of the Navy in the Baltic sea are as follows:

1. Destruction or elimination of the Polish Navy.
2. Blockade of all sea-ways to the Polish Naval bases, especially Gdynia. The neutral shipping in Polish harbours and in Danzig is to be given at the beginning of the invasion of Poland, a time limit for sailing. After its expiration, the Navy will be free to set up blockade measures. The disadvantages for the naval warfare produced by this time limit must be accepted.
3. Suppression of the Polish maritime trade.
4. Securing of the sea-route Reich—East Prussia.
5. Protection of German sea-communications to Sweden and Baltic States.
6. Reconnaissance and protection, as far as possible in an inconspicuous manner, against an intervention by the Soviet Navy from the Gulf of Finland.

Suitable naval forces are to be provided for defense of the coast and coastal zone of the North Sea.

In the southern part of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak measures are to be taken for precautionary protection against a surprise intervention of the Western powers. These measures are to be restricted to the absolute minimum. Their inconspicuousness must be assured. It is of decisive importance to avoid here any sort of action which might make the political attitude of the Western Powers more unfriendly.

c. Air Force

The whole Air Force except, for necessary forces left in the West, is to be used for a surprise attack against Poland. Besides destruction of the Polish Air Force in the shortest time possible, —the tasks of the German Air Force are principally as follows:

1. Interference with the Polish mobilization and prevention of planned Polish strategic concentrations.

2. Tactical support of the Army, especially support of the spear-heads starting immediately after the crossing of the frontier.

A possible transfer of flying-units to East Prussia, before beginning of operations, must not endanger surprise.

The moment of the first flight over the frontier is to be timed in coordination with the Army's operations.

Attacks against the harbour of Gdynia may be undertaken only after expiration of the time limit for sailing for the neutral ships. (See number 4 b)

Strong points of air-defense are to be set up above Stettin, Berlin and the Upper-Silesian industrial district including Maeh-risch Ostrau [Moravska Ostrava] and Bruenn [Brno].

[E]

Typed by Officer

Top Secret. Officer Only

High Command of the Armed Forces.

WFA. Nr 67/39 Top Secret Officer Only. L (I)

Berlin, 24th June 1939

5 Copies

2nd Copy

Subject: - "Fall Weiss"

The Army High Command is herewith directed to prepare all measures necessary for capturing intact the bridges over the lower Vistula. On the completion of preparations, the Army High Command will briefly report to the Armed Forces High Command.

Besides, the Army and Navy High Commands will again examine whether the element of surprise in sudden attacks against the bridge at Dirschau will be impaired by preceding actions of the Navy in the Danzig Bay. In view of the importance of the bridge, it should be stated if the consent of the Army High Com-

mand to the intended measures of the Navy (mining before Y-time) is upheld.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
(signed) KEITEL

24.6

Distribution:

| | |
|-------------------|----------|
| OKH | 1st Copy |
| OKM | 2nd Copy |
| R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L. | 3rd Copy |
| Ausl/Abw | 4th Copy |
| WFA/L | 5th Copy |

[F]

Enclosure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I of 11 April
1939 (Annex II)

Top Secret

Senior Officer
only
Officer only

*Special Orders for
"Fall Weiss"*

1. Legal Basis

We must start with the fact that the "State of Defense" or the "State of War" in the meaning of the R. V. Gesetz (Reich Defense Law) of 4 September 1938, *will not be declared.*

All actions and requests are to be based on peace-time legislation. The Provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, apply appropriately. The right to issue of supplements is reserved.

2. Mobilization

Directives concerning the extent of preliminary measures for execution of "Fall Weiss", especially where they entail the induction of supplementary personnel or the procuring of supplementary materiel, will be issued later by the OKW.

If, for the Armed Forces, or parts of them, a *mobilisation without public proclamation (X-case)* is ordered, it will not apply automatically to the civilian sphere including the armaments industry. However, the OKW will order such measures, with locally limited application, as are required for the mobilization of the Armed Forces or parts of them and for the maintenance of the ability of government agencies and of enterprises to function.

If for the armed forces as a whole the *general mobilisation by public promulgation* is ordered, then this mobilisation will quite automatically and indissolubly apply to the civil sphere, including the armaments industry. However, the mobilisation by public promulgation is not to be counted upon, if the military operations are restricted to "Fall Weiss".

3. Zone of operations and executive power.

For "Fall Weiss" the Eastern Zone of Operations [Op. Gebiet Ost] will be put into effect by the OKW. If the "Frontier Defense West" is involved, too, the Western Zone of Operations [Op. Gebiet West], provided for this contingency, will also be put into effect.

After the crossing of the frontier the operation zone will be extended forward, corresponding to the areas occupied by the troops.

In the "Army Operation Zone" the Commander-in-Chief of the Army will by special order receive the authorization to exercise executive power, with the right to delegate this authorization, completely or partly, to army commanders.

4. V.G.A.D. or V.G.A.D. (K) and Frontier Guards.

Orders for the formation "Reinforced frontier control service" —V.G.A.D., or V.G.A.D. (K) and the "Frontier Guard" will be issued by the O.K.W. if necessary.

5. Powers for the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in questions of aerial defense.

Authorizations given for the mobilization (X-) case to the Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce according to the order OKW. Nr. 2230/38 g.K. WFA/L II of the 27 Sept. 38, Part. III, may be conferred upon him by an order of the Supreme Commander, already in the period of tension.

6. Clearing the frontier zones.

Clearing and evacuation measures will not be executed in the East. O.K.H. will make preparations for a receiving organization for refugees of German descent from Poland.

7. Evacuation and Rehousing of Population for Protection against Air-Attacks.

Insofar as the evacuation and rehousing of the population, as well as other measures for protection against air-attacks (clearing of school-buildings, public buildings, hospitals etc), come under consideration for the Mobilization (X) Case, these measures are to be prepared and the dates fixed by the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce in cooperation with the military and civil authorities concerned. Execution of such

plans in the period of *tension* depends upon the approval of O.K.W.

8. *Organization of command.*

According to situation, the following will be put under complete or partial command of:

a. *The Commander-in-Chief of the Army:* The Air-force units provided for "Fall Weiss"; The SS Military Units [SS-Verfuegungstruppe] according to the order O.K.W. No. 1730/38 g.K. WFA/L II of 28 August 1938. From the police at first those units provided for by the mobilization plan. The elements of the German Labor Service (RAD) provided according to Special Annex 7 to the mobilization plan for the Army.

b. *The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy:* The Naval Air Force units; The RAD-units provided for by the mobilization plan.

c. *The Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce:* The RAD.-units enumerated in Special Annex 3 of the Air Force Mobilization plan. The army units provided for airborne operations according to request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce.

.9. *Supervision and prevention of communications on the land- and sea-frontiers and prevention of railroad-, air- and sea traffic.*

The necessary measures will be prepared by the O.K.W. in cooperation with the Services in such a way that they can be put into operation completely or partly for "Fall Weiss" as well as on other frontiers (including the sea coast), according to the situation. Detailed provisions will follow.

10. *Signal Communications.*

* * * * *

11. *Supply.*

According to order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the troops may be supplied from occupied territory. In this regard the critical situation of the German minority should be given due consideration. Requisitioning in occupied territory may be carried out in accordance with the Hague Land War Convention; insofar as contributions must be demanded from people of German descent, they must be paid for in German currency. The rate of exchange for every kind of contribution will be announced in due time by the O.K.W.

12. *Allowances (pay, rations, billeting, clothing, medical care)*

* * * * *

13. *Accounting of additional expenses which may arise.*

Additional expenses resulting from "Fall Weiss" are to be

charged finally under expenditure, to the (Special Budget) Account VIII E 230 (Budget of OKW) set up especially for this purpose.

initialled
[illegible]

[G]

Annex III to OKW. Nr. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I
Top Secret 5 Copies
By Officer only 2nd Copy

III

Annexation of Danzig

A surprise annexation of the Free State of Danzig may come into consideration, independently of "Fall Weiss," in order to exploit a favorable political situation.

The preparations are to be carried out on the following basis: The "Organization of command in East-Prussia in case of war-like complications" (see Annex IV) will be put into effect, in regard to fig. 3.

The occupation will be carried out by the Army from East-Prussia.

The Navy will support the action of the Army by intervention from the sea, according to the detailed order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The naval forces involved are to be instructed to cooperate with the Army.

The extent to which the units of the Air Force can take part in the action of occupation is to be decided by the Reichminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Details on cooperation are to be settled among the Services directly.

* * * * *

Enclosure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret
WFA/L I, dated 11 April 39, Annex III
Top Secret By Officer Only

Special Orders for
"Annexation of Danzig"

* * * * *

[H]

Annex IV to OKW/L Ia No. 37/39 Top Secret

5 copies
2nd copy

TOP SECRET

By officer only

IV

*Provisions for the Exercise of Command
in East Prussia in Case of Warlike Complications*

* * * * *

[I]

Annex V to OKW L Ia No. 37/39 Top Secret

5 copies
2nd copy

V

*Boundaries of the Zone of Operations
of the Army*

* * * * *

[J]

Berlin, 10 May 1939

High Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1050/39 Top Secret WFA/L II c.

TOP SECRET
200 copies
Copy No. 45

Subject: Exercise of Military Powers in Area of Operations of
the Army.

* * * * *

[K]

Top Secret
Officer Only

Berlin, 10th May 1939

The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

7 copies
2nd copy

Nr. 48/39 Top Secret WFA/L (I)

Subject: Directive for the uniform preparation
of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40
(OKW.Nr.37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L(I) of 11.4.39.)

Herewith, as Part VI of the "Directive", instructions for the
economic war and the protection of our own economy are issued.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the Services will report to the Armed Forces High Command, on the measures taken in consequence of these instructions by 1st August 1939.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution:

| | | |
|--------------------|---|----------------------|
| O.K.H. | = | 1 (Pruef Nr. 1) |
| O.K.M. | = | 1 (Pruef Nr. 2) |
| R.d.L.u.Ob.d.L. | = | 1 (Pruef Nr. 3) |
| O.K.W. (W Stb) | = | 1 (Pruef Nr. 4) |
| O.K.W. (Ausl/Abr.) | = | 1 (Pruef Nr. 5) |
| O.K.W. (L) | = | 2 (Pruef Nr. 6 u. 7) |

[L]

Annex VI to
OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L Ia

Top Secret
By Officer Only

VI

Directives for the War Against the Enemy Economy (Economic Warfare) and Measures for the Protection of our own Economy.

I. *Introduction*

1. The most important instruments of the attack against the enemy economy are the Navy and Air Force. Their measures will be supplemented by the sabotage warfare (OKW (Abwehr)). It may become a mission of the Army, to widen our German living space by the occupation of enemy territories of special importance to our own economy.

The preparation of economic warfare measures is a responsibility of the GBW (Plenipotentiary for the Economy).

The OKW (WFA in coordination with the W Staff) will insure that uniform objectives are set for all measures against the enemy economy. The same applies for measures for the protection of our own economy.

2. In Section II and III of these Directives, outlines are issued for the economic warfare and protective measures for the contingencies [Faelle] "Frontier Defense" and "Weiss". From them, the preparations to be effected by the Services and the GBW will be derived.

* * * * *

III. Directive for "Fall Weiss".

1. The objective is to capture the Polish economic installations as intact as possible. They may be attacked only in case of immediate military necessity.

2. The quick occupation of the industrial districts of Polish-Upper-Silesia and Cieszyn [Teschen] is important for the war economy.

3. All sea-borne imports to Poland have to be prevented by the Navy. For this purpose the form of the trade warfare (Handelskrieg) against Polish imports is to be laid down in cooperation with the Foreign Office in accordance with the political situation. Of special importance here is the treatment of neutral flags and of goods which are possibly destined for Poland by way of neutral ports.

4. For the protection of the German economy, the measures for the case "Frontier Defence" apply where appropriate.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-122

[Extract from Naval War Diary.

Questionnaire on Norway Bases, 3 October 1939.]

3 Oct.

5. The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:

a. What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

b. Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

c. What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

d. Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they possibly already decisive advantages as supply positions?

(F.O.U-boats already considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment—and supply—bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily).

e. What decisive advantage would exist for the conduct of the War at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark e.g. Skagen.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-123

MOST SECRET

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. No. 44 1675/41 Most
Secret S.O. only, Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces /L (I Ops.)
Fuehrer's Hq, 7 Oct 41.

S.O. ONLY Access only through officer

14 copies

2nd copy

Reference: Army Supreme Command (Ops. Section) No. 41 244/
41 Most Secret dated 18 Sep 41

Naval Supreme Command. ops. 1690/41

Received: 7.10. Enclosures:

Please submit

[pencil note: by I a I f.]

[illegible markings]

I.ops [?] conference [?] with Group North etc. supplementary to
our note regarding Petersburg [?] Ia [initials] [Almost il-
legible marginal note in pencil]

To Army Supreme Command (ops. Section)

The Fuehrer has again decided that a *capitulation of Leningrad
or later of Moscow* is not to be accepted even if offered by the
enemy.

The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole
world. Just as in Kiev, our troops were subject to extreme dan-
ger through explosions with time-fuses, the same must be ex-
pected to a still greater degree in Moscow and Leningrad. The
Soviet radio itself has broadcast that the foundations of Lenin-
grad were mined and the city would be defended to the last man.

Extreme danger of epidemics is to be expected.

Therefore no German soldier is to enter these cities. Anyone
who tries to leave the city through our lines is to be forced to re-
turn under fire.

The exodus of the population through the smaller, unguarded
gaps towards the interior of Russia to be allowed. Before all other
cities are taken, they are to be softened up by artillery fire and air-
raids and their population forced to flee.

We cannot take the responsibility of endangering our soldiers'
lives by fire in order to save Russian cities, nor that of feeding
the population of these cities at the expense of the German home-
land.

The chaos in Russia will be all the greater; our administration and utilization of the occupied Eastern territories all the simpler the more the population of the cities of Soviet Russia flees to the interior of the country.

All commanding officers must be acquainted with this desire of the Fuehrer. (Leaving things as we find them and of course the purification of the population by reindoctrination would certainly relieve us to some extent of problems regarding the labor we may expect. Therefore it is to be supposed that the above ruling refers to the majority but not to the whole of the population.) [Red pencil note.]

Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed: Jodl.

Checked and found correct
[illegible notations]

FALK
Captain, General Staff

[pencil note:]

(Naval War Staff Book No. 1/Naval War Staff I ops. 1690/41
Most Secret S.O. only.

Berlin, 11 Oct 41.

1. Inform by writing: Group North Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group North. Ser. No. 1. Ser. No. 2. Kapitaen zur See Weygold. No.: Naval War Staff section [?] Ser. No. 3.

Subject: Future of the cities of Leningrad and Moscow.

As supplement to Naval War Staff Book No. 1/Naval War Staff I c 1601/1 Most Secret S.O. only dated 29 Sep 41 the following instruction of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to the Supreme Commander, Army is made known:

“ [?] (bis) aus Eingang”

II) Copy to Ib. Ser. No. 4.

III) [?] of Reconnaissance Force [?] with I ops.

Distribution: Naval Supreme Command (Ops. Section 1st copy, Naval Supreme Command (2/Naval War Staff) 2nd copy, Air Supreme Command—Air Ops. Staff 3rd copy, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Oprs. Staff Armed Forces 4th copy, Section L Copies 5-8, Armed Forces Propaganda 9th copy, Foreign Defense 10th copy, Foreign Section 11th copy, Economics Supply Office 12th copy, Reserve Copies 13-14.

Naval War Staff Book No. 1 Naval War Staff Ia 1601/41 Most Secret S.O. Only

Berlin, the 29th September 1941.

MOST SECRET

Disposal: S. O. Only Access only through officer

1. Inform by Writing: Group North Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group North Ser. No. 1, Ser. No. 2.

For distribution to: Naval War Staff Section [?] H. Q. [?] Ser. No. 3.

Subject: Future of St. Petersburg

I. In order to obtain a clear view of the measures to be adopted by the Navy in case St. Petersburg should be occupied or should surrender, the question of further military operations against this city was made clear by the Chief of Staff, Naval War Staff to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The result is reported as follows:

II. *The Fuehrer has decided to have St. Petersburg wiped off the face of the earth.* The further existence of this large town is of no interest once Soviet Russia is overthrown. Finland has also similarly declared no interest in the continued existence of the city directly on her new frontier.

III. The original demands of the Navy: that the dockyard—harbor—and other installations important to the Navy be preserved, are known to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, but in view of the basic principles underlying the operation against St. Petersburg, it is not possible to comply with them.

IV. The intention is to close in on the city and raze it to the ground by bombardments of artillery of all calibres and by continuous air attack.

Requests that the city may be handed over, arising from the situation within, will be turned down, for the *problem of the survival of the population and of supplying it with food is one which cannot and should not be solved by us.* In this war for existence, we have no interest in keeping even part of this great city's population. If necessary, a forced evacuation towards the Eastern territories of Russia may take place. [Blue pencil note]

V. The consequences arising from the extinction of St. Petersburg and relating to the measures for organization and personnel, already carried out or held in readiness, will be worked out at Supreme Command and the corresponding guiding principles will then be made known. If any suggestions on this subject are to be made at Group Command, it is requested that they be forwarded at the earliest possible moment to Naval War Staff.

[Pencil note: Should the situation develop in a manner contrary to expectation, the necessary organization must be set up afresh, for which purpose there will be time enough, in the present stage of the plans]

Additional note for Naval War Staff Section [?] only.

Further modification on the lines of Paragraph V is requested. The point is that forces becoming available should be placed if possible in still more important war-areas where there is need for them (e.g. South Eastern Region).

II. Copy to: Ib. Ser. No. 4

III. To I Ops for archives.

Head of Naval War Staff
1/Naval War Staff Ia

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-126

EXTRACT FROM OPERATION ORDERS 1 FOR THE
CAPITAL SHIP "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN"

Kiel, August 21st, 1939.

I *Position.*

(a) *Political.*

"Fall Weiss" means that the Polish Army shall be utterly broken and annihilated by surprise, in order to create a state of affairs in the East which meets the defence of the country.

The Free State of Danzig will be declared to be Reich territory on the outbreak of hostilities at the latest. Security measures will be taken in the Baltic and Kattegat against the intervention of foreign states. . . .

Draft signed ALBRECHT

pp Chief of Staff for Naval Group Command East.

Fein.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO OKW (L) BY VON
BRAUCHITSCH

Berlin, July 3rd, 1939.

The Supreme Command of the Army cannot agree to the measures which the Navy are intending to take *before* Y-hour—insofar as these could become known to the enemy—and requests that steps be taken to ensure that no measures of any kind which may prejudice a surprise attack be carried out by other sections of the Armed Forces before the time when the army crosses the frontier. The crossings of the frontier by the army takes place at dawn on Y-day. * * *

RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION WITH THE SUPREME
 COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES/LII ON TIME-
 TABLES FOR PREPARATORY MEASURES

[Undated]

1. The preparatory measures determined upon in timetable form will be submitted to the Fuehrer for approval. Each section of the Armed Forces can, at its own discretion, proceed with and carry out these measures, when approved, from the time fixed onwards.

2. The measures proposed by the Navy, including exercise in the transmission of orders and intelligence for Group Command East, present no difficulties, since they can be disguised as *practice* measures.

3. The following should be laid down uniformly for all sections of the Armed Forces:—

Y — 5 24-hour duty for the Senior Staffs, (Army, Group and "Wehrkreis" H.Qs.)

Y — 3 Sections of the Armed Forces may further extend 24-hour duty.

Y — 4 Switch over to "Martha" network.

Y — 2 Switch over, in the operation area, to the jamming networks of the two other sections of the Armed Forces.

An earlier time for putting the Martha network into operation is desired by the Navy as well as being requested by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Armed Forces Communications) so that the Post Office can deal with it in stages.

Y — 6 *Disguised* stopping of leave, *no* recalls, especially not from abroad.

Y — 2 Naval air units to come under the tactical control of the C.-in-C. of the Navy.

4. It is intended to switch over to the defence network from 3 August 1939.

[No signature]

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET, F.O. (U/B) &
 B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd, 1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Slk. by 12 August (Ink note—a decision on the sail-

ings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest * * *

[Initialled] F.A. Slk. 1/Slk.

Berlin 22.6.1939.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Re: Preparations for "Fall Weiss".

* * * * *

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a "preliminary time-table" for "Fall Weiss", based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this time-table.

The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:—

1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the manoeuvres scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn manoeuvres and for the exercise units it is intended to form for those manoeuvres.

It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments.

2. For reasons of security, the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.

3. It should be ascertained whether it appears to be expedient to transfer the S.S. Artillery Regiment to East Prussia and use it there for the purpose intended, in view of the fact that this regiment had only been formed a short time previously, or whether it seems more profitable to use an Army Artillery Regiment in place of an S.S. Artillery Regiment.

The result of the investigation should be communicated to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

4. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander will decide at the beginning of August whether the training ships of the Navy will put out according to plan.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel.

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFA NO. 170/39gk CHEFS. L.I.
MOST SECRET

Berlin, 31 August 1939.

8 Copies: 2nd Copy.
Known to Ob.d.M.
S.O. only [Stamp] Access only through an officer.

Direction No. 1 for the Conduct of the War.

1. Now that all the *political possibilities* of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany *are exhausted*, I have determined on a *solution by force*.

2. The *attack on Poland* is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Fall Weiss", with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

Date of attack—1 September 1939

Time of attack—04:45 [Inserted in red pencil]

This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

3. In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations. The neutrality assured by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland should be scrupulously observed.

and Denmark [red pencil note]

The German *land* frontier in the West is not to be crossed at any point without my express consent.

The same applies to warlike actions *at sea* or any which may be so interpreted.

(According to this, Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for the time being. [pencil note])

Defensive measures on the part of the Luftwaffe should *at first* be confined exclusively to the warding off of enemy air attacks on the frontier of the Reich. In doing so the frontier of the neutral states should be observed as long as possible when dealing with single aircraft and smaller units. Defensive operations should only be permitted over this neutral territory when, where French and English attacking squadrons are operating over

neutral states against German territory in considerable force, air defence in the West is no longer assured.

It is of special importance that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be informed with the least possible delay of any violation of the neutrality of their States on the part of our opponents in the West.

4. *If England and France open hostilities* against Germany, the task of those sections of the Armed Forces which are operating in the West is to uphold, while conserving their strength as far as possible, those conditions necessary for the successful conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within the scope of this duty, damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources allow. In any case I reserve to myself the order to commence *attack* operations.

(Warfare against Merchant Shipping [Green Pencil])

(See Directions to Groups, ships and U-Boats) [red pencil note]).

The *Army* is holding the West wall and is making preparations to prevent its being turned—the Western Powers violating Belgian or Dutch territory in doing so. If French forces move into Luxembourg, the frontier bridges may be blown up.

[Undecipherable note in green pencil]

In its warfare on merchant shipping the *Navy* is concentrating on England. To intensify the effect of this, a declaration of danger zones is to be expected.

The Supreme Command of the Navy announces in which areas of sea, and within what limits danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public declaration should be prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Office and should be submitted to me for approval through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Baltic should be secured against penetration by the enemy. The C.-C. of the Navy decides whether the approaches to the Baltic should be mined for this purpose.

(Address to * * * [Undecipherable] General Warning! [Red pencil note])

The primary task of the *Luftwaffe* is to prevent the French and English Air Force operating against the German Army and German "Lebensraum".

In waging war against England preparations should be made for the use of the *Luftwaffe* in causing damage to sea transport, the armament industry and troop transports to France. Full use should be made of favorable opportunities to make an effective attack on massed English naval units, especially on battle-

ships and aircraft carriers. The decision regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on the English motherland should be prepared, bearing in mind that whatever happens, inadequate success with part forces is to be avoided.

[sgd] A. Hitler

* * * [undecipherable]

(Warning? [Note in red pencil])

EXTRACT FROM MEMO OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE NAVY

TOP SECRET

To be carried out by the C-in-C of the Navy!

Berlin, 16th May 1939.

The C-in-C of the Navy,
B No. 1, SKL, Ia Op 48/39 Top Secret Chief Matter.
Chief Matter!

By Officer only! Vfg.

1. Copies to: Group East Copy No. 1, Station N for Group West Copy No. 2, *for information*: Fleet Copy No. 3, B.d.A. Copy No. 4, F.d.T Copy No. 5, F.d.U Copy No. 6, F.d.M Copy No. 7, F.d.Luft Copy No. 8, B.S.O. Copy No. 9, B.S.N. Copy No. 10, Luftwaffe General attd. to C-in-Navy. Copy No. 11.

Subject: Directive "Fall Weiss".

No Action.

* * * * *

1. *Directive by the Fuehrer*: The Fuehrer has issued the following directive:

"Fall Weiss"

Poland's present attitude necessitates military preparations being made over and above the protection of the Eastern Frontiers already dealt with, in order if necessary to eliminate all threats from this side for ever.

2. *Conclusions in the military field*: The Major aims in building up the German Army continue to be determined by the hostility of the Western democracies. "Fall Weiss" constitutes merely a completion, by way of precaution, of preparations, and should on no account be regarded as the forerunner of a settlement with our opponents in the West by force of arms.

The isolation of Poland will be maintained the more readily even after the outbreak of war, if we succeed in opening the war with heavy blows struck by surprise and followed up by rapid successes.

* * * * *

8. (a) * * * It can be expected that Y-hour will be a time in the early hours of the morning, two hours before it grows light (three hours before sunrise). This time of day is required by the Navy to carry out the measures she has to take, and is recognized by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

(b) With a view to maintaining, on a large scale, the routine of peacetime training, and to avoiding a premature exposure of the measures it is intended to take, a warning (preparation) period of 48 hours may be expected * * *

V. Date fixed for completion of preparations. According to the instructions of the Fuehrer, "Fall Weiss" should be so worked on that it can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards * * *

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET. F.O. (U/B) &
B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd.1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Slk. by 12 August [Ink note—a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August].

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest * * *

[Initialled] F.A. Slk. 1/Slk.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-127

DIRECTIVE NO. 25

Fuehrer's Headquarters,

27.3.41.

(1) The military Putsch in Jugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Jugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty for the time being, be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.

(2) It is my intention to force my way into Jugoslavia from the area comprising Fiume and Graz on the one hand and the area around Sofia on the other, moving in the general direction of Belgrade and South of this, and to contact and annihilate the Yugoslav army, also to cut off the extreme Southern part of Jugoslavia from the rest of the country, and to take it over as a base for the

continuance of the combined German and Italian offensive against Greece.

The approaching opening of the Danube to traffic, and the taking over of the copper mines at Bor are important for reasons of war economy.

An attempt will be made to persuade Hungary and Bulgaria to take part in the operations by holding out the prospect of regaining Banat and Macedonia.

The political internal crisis in Jugoslavia will be rendered more acute by the political assurances given to the Croatians."

* * * * *

A. HITLER.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-134

TOP SECRET

Top Secret! Only thru Officer!

Fuehrer HQ, 21 January 1941.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

WFSt No. 8/41 Top Secret

Top Secret!

Only thru Officer!

6 copies 2nd Copy

Enclosed please find a short resume of the speech made by the Fuehrer during the final conference with the Duce on 20 January 41, and a summary on the results of the conference held by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Jodl

—2 enclosures—

Distribution: OKH (GenStdH) 1st copy, OKM (SkI.) 2nd copy, Ob.D.L. (Iw.Fue.St. Ia) 3rd copy, OKW/WFSt 4th copy, L 5th copy, Aus. 6th copy.

TOP SECRET

Enclosure 1 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/41 top secret

Top Secret!

Only thru officer!

6 copies, 2nd copy

Result on the Conference of the Chief of the Supreme Command

of the Armed Forces with the Italian General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41

1. *Important Items from the Appreciation of the Situation by General Guzzoni.* 1. *Albania:* The most important Italian theatre of war. Though front not sufficiently secure to make it certain that the present line can be held against Greek attacks in all circumstances, no danger of Valona or Berat being lost. 21 divs. now in Albania. Intention is to send another 3 divs. from Italy. Intention to form a group for attack on the northern flank. Strength about 10 divs. (including 3 divs. still to be brought from Italy and 4 Alpine divs.) Will not be ready for attack before another 2½ months, since transport facilities do not make it possible to ship the 3 divs. or the personnel and equipment required for the reinforcement of the remaining divs any faster. Intention to attack with this group in direction Korica, from there, some units to carry out a flanking movement to Erseke in order to cause the collapse of the northern part of the Greek front, the main body to continue the attack in the direction of Florina as soon as supplies are safeguarded beyond Korica (only 1 road available). Abandoned intention of making an attack with a limited objective along the coast in the near future.

2. *Libya:* Intention for continuation of campaign: Holding of Tobruk as long as possible. Defense of the Derna-Eastern edge of the Djebel line, using the armoured unit stationed at Mekili for offensive action. Sending of reinforcements from Tripoli to Cyrenaica in order to strengthen the defense planned there, in case the situation in Cyrenaica continues to develop favourably, thus making it possible to hold the western part of Cyrenaica. If Cyrenaica cannot be held, defense of Tripoli. Italians believe that Tobruk can hold out for some time and that British will not advance upon Benghazi-Agedabia before the fall of Tobruk. The following reinforcements are earmarked for Libya:—Bringing the 3 divs. stationed in Tripoli up to full strength, transferring 1 armoured div. and 1 infantry div. (motorized) from Italy to Tripoli. Completion of these transports about 20 February 41.

3. *East Africa:* Situation difficult in the case of British attack, which is expected in the near future. Defense to the utmost intended. It is desirable to divert British forces from Libya to East Africa, even though it may render the situation in East Africa more difficult.

4. *Dodekanese:* Expected attack on Dodekanese has not hitherto taken place. Supplies in hand for about 3 months. Forces in Do-

dekanese weak [handwritten marginal note:—these ought to be considerably increased], nevertheless a certain offensive power in the case of a German attack upon Greece from Bulgarian territory (especially against British transports from Egypt into the Aegean).

II. Views on the Italian Appreciation of the Situation: 1. *Albania:* Very unlikely that the Italians will be able to muster the forces required for an attack within the time provided. A support of a German attack from Bulgaria against Greece must therefore be discounted. [Handwritten marginal note:—the German attack will however bring strong relief to the Albanian front.]

2. *Libya:* Whether or not Cyrenaica can be held cannot yet be determined. Unless the situation is basically changed, a loss also of Tripoli need not be feared, all the more since from May onwards large-scale operations will no more be possible, owing to the heat. [Handwritten marginal notes:—the loss of Morzuk (S) is evidently considered trifling. Contitio sine qua non:—no complications out of Tunis.]

3. *East Africa:* Duration of resistance in the case of a British attack cannot be estimated.

4. *Dodekanese:* No resistance of any signifiace is to be expected in the case of attack. Offensive action of the Italian forces stationed there against British transports to Greece cannot be counted on. [Handwritten marginal note:—ought to be built up in order to form an important complementary operation during the occupation of Greece.]

III. Employment of German Units in Libya and Albania: 1. *Libya:* Italians very warmly welcome the dispatch of the 5th light div. (motorized) composed as suggested. Shipment to Tripoli can begin approximately between 15 and 20 February; it will however be possible to carry out transports of equipment *before* that date.

2. *Albania:* Dispatch of a German unit is described by Italians as desirable, but not necessary. Dispatch of a corps impossible, as transport facilities inadequate. For reasons of transport dispatch of only *one* mountain div. with light equipment could be considered. Decision not urgent at the moment. Italian attack—unless *strong* Greek forces are moved from the Albanian front to the Bulgarian frontier—impossible in any case before the beginning of April, therefore German unit need not be sent before March. Consequently new *decision* whether a unit is to be sent, at the *beginning of March*. Preparations for making a unit available will however continue.

Enclosure 2 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/41 top secret

TOP SECRET

6 copies, 2nd copy

Top Secret Only thru officer

Speech by the Fuehrer on 20 January 1941

I. On 20 January at 1100 hrs., a report is made to the Fuehrer by the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and of the Armed Forces Operational Staff in the presence of General von Rintelen on the result of the military discussions with General Guzzoni and General Gandin.

II. At 1200 hours, the *Fuehrer* developed before a wider circle his thoughts and views on the situation.

Those present:—

on the German side

The Minister for Foreign Affairs

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff

General von Rintelen

Ambassador Schmidt

An interpreter from the Foreign Office

Colonel Schmundt

Freg. Kapt. von Puttkamer

on the Italian side

the Duce

Count Ciano

General Guzzoni

General Marras

General Gandin

Contents of the Fuehrer's Speech in Concise Form

Finland of great importance to us owing to the nickel findings unique in Europe. Russians promise to supply us with the quantity of nickel required, but only as long as they pleased. Therefore Finland must not be interfered with any more.

Demarche of the Russians on account of our massing of troops in *Roumania* has taken place and will be duly rejected. Russians always become insolent at a time when they cannot be harmed (winter).

The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:

a. an operation against Greece

b. protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey

c. safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.

Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.

Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.

For this reason—as well as owing to the difficulties of transportation which came to light during yesterday's military discussions it is not advisable *at present* to dispatch a German unit to Albania. If it remained stationary behind the front, psychologically undesirable reactions would result: Italians in heavy fighting—Germans look on from behind the front.

However if the German unit is employed, the war in the south-east, too, will be prematurely started.

As far as can be foreseen, *Turkey* will remain neutral; it would be very unpleasant if she declared her solidarity with Britain and put her airfields at Britain's disposal [handwritten marginal note: —Constantinopel-Constanza: 350 km].

General situation in the East can be judged correctly only from the situation in the *West*. The attack against the British Isles is our ultimate aim.

In this respect, we are in the position of a man with only one round left in his rifle; if he misses, the situation is much worse than before. The landing cannot be repeated, since too much equipment would be lost in the case of a failure. Britain would then have no need to worry any more and could employ the bulk of her forces at the periphery wherever she pleases. As long as the attack has not taken place, the British must always reckon with the possibility.

A landing can only be made under certain conditions which, however, did not exist in Fall:—no three consecutive days of good weather.

Apart from that, the general task in the West is the protection of our base from Kirkenes to the Spanish frontier, at the same time always keeping a group of forces in Southern France ready to step in if Britain should gain a foothold in Portugal.

The blocking of the Sicily passage by the air force is only a poor substitute for the possession of *Gibraltar*. We had made such preparations as would have ensured success. Once in possession of Gibraltar, we would be in a position to gain a foothold with strong forces in North Africa and thus put an end to Weygand's blackmail. If therefore Italy were after all to succeed in getting France to enter the war, this would be a great success and would

basically change the situation in the Mediterranean within a short space of time.

I don't see great danger coming from *America* even if she should enter the war. The much greater danger is the gigantic block of *Russia*. Though we have very favourable political and economic agreements with Russia, I prefer to rely on powerful means at my disposal. Very considerable parts of these are therefore tied down on the Russian frontier, thus preventing me from supplying the armament industry with sufficient manpower to bring the armament of the air force and navy to the highest possible pitch.

As long as Stalin lives, there is probably no danger; he is intelligent and careful. But should he cease to be there, the Jews, who at present only occupy second and third-rank positions might move up again into the first rank.

It therefore behoves us to be careful. The Russians are continually trying to work out new demands which they read into the agreements. That is why they do not like explicit and precise formulas in these.

It is therefore necessary to keep a constant eye on the Russian factor and to keep on guard, by means of strength and clever diplomacy. Formerly Russia would have been no danger at all; for on land she cannot imperil us in the least, but *now* in the era of the air force, the Roumanian oilfields can be turned into an expanse of smoking debris from Russia and from the Mediterranean, and the life of the axis depends on those oilfields.

In any case, we must not dispatch valuable units to places where they will remain inactive. Therefore we shall send to Libya not an armoured but an anti-tank unit, which can be transported more quickly and can still be employed before the hot period sets in. For employed it shall be:—we do not want to act like the British did in France. The tanks and the anti-tank guns in this unit penetrate any British tank which is in action there.

The troops are experienced have confidence in their weapons and are self-reliant that is very important in the fight against tanks. We have given the name "tank-hunters" to the anti-tank gunners also for psychological reasons. They are to seek out the enemy tank and battle it like the huntsman his quarry.

General statements on the factors which are decisive for *success* in modern warfare. In the course of these, reference to the importance of training in up-to-date methods of warfare which requires much time and effort and a highly efficient body of non-commissioned officers.

Importance of the air force and of the armoured warfare. The training of an armoured unit is beset with difficulties, it is least possible to form an armoured unit by improvisation. Even the conversion of a fully trained armoured unit to other weapons takes months.

We have not achieved our great successes with armoured troops by working with heavy tanks. We prefer medium tanks. The French had very much heavier tanks than we had.

Our greatest asset were our panzer-generals who have developed completely new tactics and have directed their units very cleverly and with an offensive spirit.

General reference to the importance of mines in land warfare. Examples:—mining of our west wall. Blockade by mines which were laid by the 16th army in the flank of our attack against France. By means of mines, a field of attack can be completely messed up.

Question of the Fuehrer about mines at Tobruk and whether further mines could not be brought in by U-boats.

Tanks lose all offensive spirit as soon as they encounter minefields. Great heroism by the engineer is required to remove or clear minefields.

Views on the war in the air and the comparison of German to British air raids.

It is necessary to have at one's disposal a mighty anti-aircraft weapon with a great ammunition supply for a moment may come when the war will be conducted almost exclusively by the air force and the navy.

Against heavily armed ships, only the dive-bomber is successful.

Fuehrer dwells on the excellent impression he has gained of *General Antonescu*. He really is a personality.

The Duce is of the opinion that his relations to the Legion are not good.

Fuehrer goes into generalizations on the subject of revolutions of which only the Fascist and the National Socialist ones have had an *immediately* constructive effect. In Roumania the predestined man was murdered before the outbreak and the first-rank leaders of the legion with him. Thus it came about that the leading man grow out of the Army, who started off the revolution and removed the king. He is inspired by glowing fanaticism, is ready for any battle for his country and will wage it with, without, or if necessary even against the Legion.

One man must be the Fuehrer, a head of State and beside him a leader of a movement are not possible. It would be best if Antonescu became simultaneously the leader of the Legion.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-135

HISTORY OF THE WAR ORGANISATION AND THE
SCHEME FOR MOBILISATION.

1. Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for mobilisation were forbidden, these were at first confined to a very small body of collaborators, and were at first only of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time (in the twenties): an "Establishment Order" [Aufstellungsordnung] Instructions for Establishment [Aufstellungsbestimmungen] the forerunners of the present day Scheme for Mobilisation, thus: an "Establishment Organisation" [Aufstellungsgliederung] adaptable "Instructions for Establishment" [veraenderliche Aufstellungsbestimmungen] which were drawn up for each A-year (cover name for Mobilisation year). They were drawn up by Administration Amtmann Heintze attached to the Fleet Division of that time (A.II).

As stated, the "Establishment Organisation(s)" of that time were to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in the form of men and materials. They provided nevertheless a valuable foundation for the establishment of a War Organisation as our ultimate aim.

2. The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming increasingly acute, compelled us, *instead of making theoretical preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.*

The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of Gdynia was made a basis, and the Fleet on active service was to be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential coastal and Flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus, in 1930, the Reinforcement Plan [Verstaerkungsplan] was evolved, consisting of the main part, drawn from the Establishment Order, Part A=Reinforcement Organisation [Verstaerkungsgliederung] Part B=Reinforcement Regulations [Verstaerkungsbestimmungen] Part C=(Filling of Posts for reinforcement scheme) [Verstaerkungsstellenbesetzungen] and Parts D to F (containing special instructions with regard to Air Forces, Intelligence Service and Coastal P.A.D.)

They were drawn up by Oberleutnant zur See (retired) von Rabenau and Amtmann Heintze, under the instructions of Inspecting Officer A. II m. Korvettenkaepitan von Bonin.

3. A fundamental change occurred when Adolf Hitler seized power. Even if the Reinforcement Plan had a positive basis in the form of men and material (it contained only batteries and auxiliary ships which were really prepared and could be made ready for service within 72 hours), the Establishment Plan with its theoretical structure still held good to meet the eventuality of the war not being concluded with the fall of Gdynia. Practical preparations for this, however, are left over till actual mobilisation.

Further, Reichschancellor Adolf Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, i.e. by the 1.4.38., Armed Forces, *which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power.*

Thus the Establishment Organisation 1938 was evolved as the provisional target of the Navy, drawn up by Oberleutnant zur See (retired) von Rabenau under the instructions of A.IIm. (Fregattenkapitaen von Bonin).

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-136

TOP SECRET

By Officer Only

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Berlin, 21 Oct 1938

10 copies 3rd copy
OKW L Ia No. 236/38 Top Secret

The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.

Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.
2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
3. The occupation of the Memelland.

1. Securing the Frontiers of Germany and Protection against
Surprise Air Raids

* * * * *

2. Liquidation of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia

It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for "Gruen"; they must however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time "Grenz-sicherung West" (The Measures of frontier defence in the West) can be carried out.

The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

a. *ARMY*: The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attacking army.

b. *AIR FORCE*: The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.

3. Annexation of the Memel District

* * * * *

Signed: Adolf Hitler
Authenticated /s/ Keitel

Distribution: OKH 1st copy, RdL & ObdL 2nd copy, OKM 3rd copy, OKW (including stock) 4th to 10th copy.

TOP SECRET

Typed by Officer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 24/11/38.

No. 241/38 top secret important L Ia.

Re:—The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 top secret important matter L Ia of 21/10/38.

10 Copies 3rd Copy.

Important Matter By hand of Officer Only.

[Handwritten] to be placed before the C-in-C

1st Supplement to Instruction dated 21/10/38

The Fuehrer has ordered:—

1. Apart from the 3 contingencies mentioned in the instructions of the 21/10/38, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise (“4). Occupation of Danzig”).

The preparations will be made on the following basis:—

Condition is a *quasi-revolutionary* occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favourable situation, *not a war against Poland.*

No. 3 of the “instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war” (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will come into operation.

Occupation by the *army* has to take place from East Prussia. The troops to be employed for this purpose must not simultaneously be earmarked for the occupation of the Memelland, so that both operations can, if necessary, take place simultaneously.

The *Navy* will support the army’s operation: by attack from the sea—according to detailed orders from the C-in-C Navy. The forces participating are to be instructed to co-operate with the army. The details of the support to be given by the navy are to be agreed between the branches of the armed forces.

How far *air force* units can collaborate in the occupation is to be investigated by the Reich Marshal of the Air Force and the C-in-C Air Force and to be agreed in direct co-operation with the other two branches of the armed forces.

The plans of the branches of the armed forces are to be submitted by the 10/1/1939.

2. No. 3 of the “instruction on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war” (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will

also apply for the "occupation of the Memelland" (part 3 of the instructions dated 21/10/38).

Distribution: OKH—1 (Copy No. 1 RdL u. ObdL—1 (Copy No. 2) OKM—1 (Copy No. 3) OKW—7 (Copy No. 4—10)
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-138

[Stamp] Supreme Command of the Navy. AI Op. 121 38 Re-
ceived 20 XII 38 Enclosures—

TOP SECRET

Only through officers

(Written by Officer)

BERLIN, 17.12.38

OBERKOMMANDO DER WEHRMACHT Nr. 248/38 WFA/L

Ia Top Secret Superior Officers only.

10 Copies 4th Copy

Ref. (Letter of) the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 Top Secret S.O. only L. Ia,
dated 21/10.38

Reference "Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia" the
Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the
assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.

To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely
an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time
Armed Forces *only*, without reinforcements from mobilisation.
The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that
the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by
adjustment within the units.

Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in
must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night
prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form
up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for
previous organisation should be limited to the minimum and will
be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements if
any, of single units and particularly of motorised forces, to the
troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the ap-
proval of the Fuehrer.

The Air Force should take action in accordance with the sim-
ilar general directives.

For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL.

Distribution: Supreme Command of the Army—1 (Copy 1), Reichminister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force—1 (Copy 3), Supreme Command of the Navy—1 (Copy 4), OKW—7 (Copies 2, 5—10).

[This copy, which is Copy No. 4, distributed to the Supreme Command of the Navy, is initialed by Frick E, Schniewind and Raeder.]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-139

TOP SECRET

S.O.

The Reich Minister of Defence
Nr. 1400/35 g.Kdos.L.Chef.

Berlin, 2nd May 1935.

2nd copy

[Note in blue pencil "By hand only"]

To: Chief of Army High Command
Chief of Navy High Command
Reich Minister for Air

For the operation, suggested in the last Staff Talks of the Armed Forces, I lay down the *Code name* "Schulung" (Training).

The supreme direction of operation "Schulung" rests with the Reich Minister of Defence as this is a joint undertaking of the three Services.

Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according to the following directives:

I. General. 1. The operation must, on issue of the *code word* "Carry Out Schulung", be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed.

Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed in the drafting of reports, drawings etc., and these officers only in person.

2. There is no time for mobilisation of the Forces taking part. These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with their peace-time equipment.

3. The preparation for the operation will be made without

regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success.

II. In particular, I request suggestions about the following points:

1. *High Command of the Army*:

a. How many divisions ready for action and what other suitable troops, including all motorized troops, can be made available for the operation? *Basis* of calculations:

Restriction to pure defence—if necessary delaying resistance—in the West.

Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there by the East Prussian divisions which will be transported there immediately by rail or sea.

b. Concentration area or areas and time taken by concentration.

c. Plans for the carrying out of the operation.

2. *High Command of the Navy*. Safe transport of the East-Prussian troops by sea if transport by land is not possible.

3. *Air-Force*. a. Support for the attack carried out under "Schulung" by the army.

b. Examination of the possibilities of further assistance to the defence in the West.

(signed) v.Blomberg

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-140

To A I op 23/35. [in pencil]

Appendix to "The Reich-Minister for Defense

No. 7/33 *secret Reich Ministry of Defense*.

Berlin, 25.10.1935.

Secret 114.

Directive for the Armed Forces in case of Sanctions.

1. The further development of the international situation created by Germany's giving notice of leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, can lead to the application of sanction measures against Germany.

It is not known which States will take steps towards sanctions. As long as the Council of the League of Nations does not decide upon joint action, France should first of all be considered. But France can induce Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia also to apply sanctions.

2. The sanctions of the opponents can be of various natures.

The Armed Forces will be *immediately* and directly affected by such measures as entail a *violation* of German Territory, particularly, therefore, if the enemy's forces break into, fly over or shell German land areas. The same applies at sea to the 3-miles zone [pencil margin-note—mine-laying] also in case of enemy measures against German naval forces in case of the *capture or sinking of German merchant ships*, in case of the blockade of the German coast as well as in case of attack on German coastal fortifications or places.

First of all an occupation of German territory is to be reckoned with.

3. The Government of the Reich is determined to *reply* to all enemy actions as described under *figure 2, with a local armed resistance, without regard to the chances of military success.* (for restrictions see figure 5. a) to c)). [Pencil margin note: Resistance.]

This resistance will be made only by the Army, Navy and Air Force and the other forces, which have been expressly described as components of and which are under orders of the Armed Forces. These other forces must comply with the conditions of Article 1.) of the Appendix to the Treaty regarding the laws and usages of land warfare of 18.10.1907.

4. In order to carry out armed resistance, the following emergency, and defensive measures of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, are visualized: *a.* Systematic formation of the A-Army [A-Heeres]. The whole Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force of the states [Laender] is, as a fighting body, at the disposal of the Chief of the Army High Command and under his orders. Defence-District-Command I (Wehrkr.Kdo.I) has at its disposal the East Prussian Provincial Police Force.

b. Systematic formation of the V-Navy [V-Marine] and its further reinforcement as material and personnel possibilities permit.

c. Systematic formation of the A-Air Force [A-Luftwaffe] including the passive air defence of the Reich. The air-forces

planned for co-operation with the Army and the Navy, as soon as ready, will be placed *under the orders* of the Commander in Chief of the Army *or Navy*. The field passive air defense troops [Feldluftschutz-truppen] planned for the Army will be available at first for the passive air defence of the Reich. I reserve for myself the time of placing them under the orders of the Chief of the Army Command.

5. The following tasks of the armed resistance to be offered are to be envisaged first. *a. on land*: The ensuring of the positioning of the A-Army against France-Belgium, against Poland and Czechoslovakia together with the Frontier Guards (the reinforced Frontier Guard—Survey Service included) and the Provincial and/or Emergency Police Force. In the West the line Roer-Rhine and the Black Forest, in the East of the Reich the position Hotzenplotz-Oder-Nischlitz-Obra and Pomerania must be held as long as possible. In the struggle against Czechoslovakia ground may be given only yard by yard. As far as East Prussia is concerned the present regulations remain in force. A concentration of forces of the Army in the demilitarized zone or their entry into the same requires my consent.

b. At sea: Protection of commerce in the North and Baltic seas. Securing of communication with East Prussia. Defence against enemy attacks launched from the sea and from the air against the German Coast. I reserve for myself the approval of all enterprises which have *not the character of armed resistance* (pencil note: see para 2) such as attacks against Gdingen, mining operations which exceed local or tactical purposes, as well as of *counter-measures* against an enemy *blockade* (marginal note in pencil; as long as the blockade has nothing to do with para. 2 or 3) and the opening of warfare against merchant and naval shipping.

c. in the Air: Defense of the air over Berlin and over the industrial part of central Germany, with Berlin as the center of gravity.

The employment of *Bombers* remains *reserved*.

I reserve for myself the approval of declaration of *restricted areas* for civil aviation.

signed. Blomberg.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-141

The Chief of Naval Command

B.Nr. A IIIb 2271/31 G.Kds (Stamp S.O.)

BERLIN, 10 February 1932.

To

S.O. Baltic Station, Kiel.

Fleet Command, Kiel.

Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces.

Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining, Kiel. (3 Copies)

Naval Arsenal, Kiel.

S.O. North Sea Station, Wilhelmshaven (repeated)

Dockyard Wilhelmshaven (repeated)

Subject: Torpedo—Armament of E-Boats.

“In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st E-Boat-Half-Flo-tilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats [Torpedotraeger] as it is not intended to count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us.”

I therefore order: 1. “S2” - “S5”, will be commissioned in the shipyard (Luerssen, Vegesack) without armament, and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I. [Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining] in agreement with the Naval-Arsenal, for the boat “S1” which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on completion of the practice shooting for fitting on another boat.

2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the Naval Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A. [Technical Research Establishment]. It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed, boats of the Half-Flo-tilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.

3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it.

(Signed) Raeder.

TOP SECRET [Rubber Stamp]

Top Secret only via officer [Rubber Stamp]

21 copies Proof No. 21

PART A

SECTION I

INTENTION OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND [Ob.d.H.]
AND ORDERS

1. *Intention of the Army High Command* The object of the operation is to *destroy the Polish Armed Forces*. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. *The intention of the Army High Command* is to prevent a regular mobilisation and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narev line. This is to be achieved by a concentric attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction of the Polish Army west of the Vistula-Narev Line with the elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defense on the part of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanized and motorized forces, but of waiting for the arrival of stronger, non-motorized units. The Army High Command will then give the correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.

The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands [A.O.K.] will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they can be carried out quickly.

2. For the execution of these missions, *Army Group South*, consisting of the 14th, 10th and 8th Armies, and *Army Group North*, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Armies, are formed. For distribution of forces see Sections II and III.

3. *First Missions of Army Group South*. *Army Group South* attacks from Silesia with the concentration of strong forces (10th Army) between *Zawiercie* and *Wielun* in the general direction of

Warsaw, scatters opposing Polish forces, and occupies as early as possible and with forces, as strong as possible, the Vistula on both sides of Warsaw with the aim, to destroy the Polish Forces, still holding out in Western Poland, in cooperation with Army Group North.

* * * * *

4. *First Mission of Army Group North.* Army Group North, beginning with Y-day, will establish the connection between the Reich and East Prussia, by cooperation of Pomeranian and East Prussian forces.

* * * * *

6. *Cooperation of the Air Force.* The Air Force will, beginning with Y-day, attack and destroy the *Polish Air Force* and its *ground installations.* * * *

7. *Cooperation of the Navy.* The navy will keep open the sea-lanes to East Prussia, as well as blockade Gdynia and the bay of Danzig.

8. *Crossing the Reich Frontier.* Army High Command (Ob.d.H) will order Y-day and the hour. With this time the crossing of, as well as flying over the Reich frontier by units of the army and units of the Luftwaffe, subordinated to the army, is permissible.

Supreme Commander of the Air Force will fly over the border with units of the Air Force at the same time.

All previous border violations are prohibited. The border guard, whose posting will follow X-order, is to be committed if necessary.

* * * * *

/s/ BRAUCHITSCH.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-147

[Extracts from a Directive signed by Hitler; Covering letter, over Jodl's name, not translated]

S. O. Only

Access only through officer.

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
WFSt/ Abt. L (I) Nr. 33 356/40 g. Kdos Chefs.

Headquarters of the Fuehrer

12 November 1940

10 copies, 2nd copy

Directive No. 18

Preparatory measures for the conduct of the war in the near future will be taken by the High Commands along the following lines:

1. *Relations with France* * * *2. *Spain and Portugal*

Political steps have been taken to bring about an early entry of Spain into the war. The object of the *German* intervention in the Iberian Peninsular [code name, "Felix"] will be to drive the British from the western Mediterranean.

To this effect,

a. Gibraltar must be seized and the straits closed.

b. The British must be prevented from establishing themselves on another spot in the Iberian Peninsular or the Atlantic Isles.

The preparation and execution of this operation are intended as follows:

1st phase: a. Reconnaissance teams (officers in civilian clothes) will complete the necessary preparations for the attack on Gibraltar and the taking over of airfields.

As regards camouflage and co-operation with the Spaniards, they will act in accordance with the security measures laid down by the Chief of Ausl/Abw.

b. Special units of the Ausl/Abw department will, in camouflaged co-operation with the Spaniards, protect the Gibraltar area against British attempts to enlarge the defended territory and/or to discover and interfere with the preparations in good time.

c. The units earmarked for this operation will be held ready at a considerable distance from the French-Spanish border and without premature disposal of units. For the mounting of the operation a preliminary warning will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French frontier (but only *after* the completion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Isles).

In view of the limited capacity of the Spanish railways, the Army will select chiefly motorised formations for the operation so that the railways are available for the transport of supplies.

2nd phase: a. Units of the Air Force, on short call by the observation posts of Algoiras, will carry out, from French soil, a surprise air attack on the British naval units lying in the harbour of Gibraltar at an advantageous moment and will afterwards land on Spanish airfields. [Blue pencil note: U-Boats will take up their positions.]

b. Shortly afterwards, the formations designated for use in Spain will cross the Spanish-French frontier on land and by air.

3rd phase: a. Attack to capture Gibraltar with German troops.

b. Disposition of forces for marching into Portugal in the event of the British setting foot there. The formations allotted

for this operation will march into Spain immediately behind the troops earmarked for Gibraltar.

4th phase: Support for the Spaniards, if necessary also from Spanish Morocco, in closing the straits, after the Rock has been captured.

The *strength* of the formations to be employed in the operation "Felix" is laid down as follows:

Army. The units earmarked for Gibraltar must be strong enough to capture the Rock, even without Spanish assistance.

In addition there must be available a smaller group to support the Spanish in the improbable event of an attempted British landing on another part of the coast.

For the possible invasion of Portugal, mainly mobile formations should be provided. [Marginal pencil note: "Mountain troops! No more!"]

Air Force. In the surprise air raid on the harbour of Gibraltar, the forces employed must be such as to guarantee full success.

For subsequent attacks on naval targets and support in the attack on the Rock, chiefly dive-bomber formations should be transferred to Spain. [Marginal pencil Note: "Bear in mind possibility of future use by us."]

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery, also to be used against ground targets, should be allotted to the Army formations.

Navy. U-Boats will be designated for attacks on the British Gibraltar squadron, especially after the surprise air attack, when the squadron will probably put to sea.

Preparations should be made, in conjunction with the Army, for a transfer of *individual* coastal batteries in order to support the Spanish in the closing of the Straits.

No Italian participation is foreseen.

The *Atlantic Isles* (in particular the Canary and Cape Verde Islands) will gain, through the operation against Gibraltar, increased importance in the conduct of the war at sea, both for the British and ourselves. The Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy and Air Force will examine how the Spanish defence of the Canary Islands can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be seized. [Marginal Note in pencil: "15/XI in hand. (Canaris-Chief aI)"].

I further request the examination of the question of the occupation of Madeira and the Azores as well as the advantages and disadvantages arising from this for our naval and aerial warfare. The result of this examination will be submitted to me at the earliest possible moment.

3. *Italian Offensive Against Egypt* * * *

4. *Balkans: C. in C. Army* will make preparations for the occupation from Bulgaria, of the *Greek mainland* North of the Aegean, should the necessity arise, thus creating conditions for the employment of German Air formations against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly against those British air bases which constitute a threat to the Rumanian oil field area.

In order to have ready forces equal to all these tasks and to keep Turkey in check, considerations and calculations should be based on the employment of an Army Group [Armeegruppe] of about 10 Divisions. It is not to be expected that the railway through Yugoslavia can be used for the assembly of these forces. To shorten the time required for the assembly, an early reinforcement, the extent of which will be suggested to me, of the German Military Mission in Rumania will be prepared.

C. in C. Air Force will prepare, in conjunction with the intended Army operations, for the use of German Air Force formations in the South Eastern Balkans and for the establishment of an aircraft reporting service at the southern frontier of Bulgaria.

The German Air Force Mission in Rumania will be reinforced to the extent which has been suggested to me.

Bulgarian wishes for military armament (deliveries of weapons and munitions) will be treated in an accommodating manner.

5. *Russia*. Political conferences have begun in order to clarify the Russian attitude in the near future. No matter what the result of these conferences will be, all the preparations for the East, already ordered verbally, will be continued.

Directives on this will be issued as soon as the basic operational plan of the Army has been submitted to and approved by me.

6. *Landing in England*. Since as a result of changes in the general situation there still may arise a possibility or a necessity to take up Operation Seelowe again in the spring of 1941, the three branches of the Wehrmacht must make an earnest effort to improve the basis for such an operation in every respect.

7. I expect reports from the Commanders-in-Chief on the measures laid down in this directive. The mode of execution and the synchronised timing of the individual operations will then be ordered by me.

Special measures will be taken to ensure secrecy by the restriction of the number of persons dealing with the matter. This applies particularly to the operation in Spain and to the plans relating to the Atlantic Isles.

[Signed] Adolf Hitler

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Headquarters
16th September 1941

WFSt/Section L(IV)Qu)
No. 002060/41 Most Secret
40 copies, 25th copy

Subject: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories

1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.

It can be seen that this is a *mass movement centrally directed by Moscow*, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.

In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that *nationalist and other circles* will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.

This creates an increasing *danger to the German war effort*, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.

2. The *measures taken up to now* to deal with this general insurrection movement *have proved inadequate*. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action *everywhere with the most drastic means* in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.

Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples can restore order.

3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following *general directions*: a. It should be inferred, in *every case* of resistance to the German occupying forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of *Communist origin*.

b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on *the first indication*, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be main-

tained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect. The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed.

c. The political relations between Germany and the country in which the disturbance is taking place, are no criterion for the censuring of the military authorities in occupation. Rather, it should be borne in mind and so represented in propaganda, that stern measures also rid the inhabitants of the Communist criminals, and are thus to their own advantage. Clever propaganda of this kind will consequently not result in the severe measures against the Communists having an undesirable reaction on the well-disposed sections of the population.

d. *Forces formed from the local inhabitants* will generally fail to accomplish such acts of violence. They should on no account receive further support, for this involves increased danger to our own troops. On the other hand, the fullest use can be made of rewards and remuneration for the population, in order to ensure their cooperation in a suitable way.

e. Where, in exceptional cases, *court martial proceedings* should be instituted in connection with Communist insurrections or other offences against the German occupying Forces, the most severe penalties are indicated. In this connection only the death penalty can constitute a real deterrent. In particular, acts of espionage, deeds of sabotage and attempts to enter the Armed Forces of a foreign power, should as a matter of principle, be punished by death. Sentence of death should also as a general rule, be passed in cases of illicit possession of arms.

4. *The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories* are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection.

Keitel

[Illegible initial]

| <i>Distribution:</i> | <i>Copies</i> |
|---|---------------|
| Armed Forces Commander South East | 1st |
| with Intelligence Section, Officer Commanding Serbia | 2nd |
| with Intelligence Section, Officer Commanding Salonica-Aegean | 3rd |
| with Intelligence Section, Officer Commanding Southern Greece | 4th |
| with Intelligence Section, Officer Commander Crete | 5th |
| Armed Forces Commander Norway | 6th |
| Armed Forces Commander Netherlands | 7th |
| Armed Forces Commander Eastern territory | 8th |
| Armed Forces Commander Ukraine | 9th |
| Armed Forces plenipotentiary with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia | 10th |
| Supreme Command of the Army (Ops Section) | 11th |
| (OQu IV) | 12th |
| (Gen. Qu) with Intelligence Section for | 13th |
| Military Commander France | 14th |
| Military Commander Belgium and Northern France | 15th |
| Military Commander with Government of Poland | 16th |
| Chief of Army Ordnance and BdE with Intelligence | 17th |
| Section for Officer Commanding German troops in Denmark | 18th |
| C-in-C of the Air Force (General staff of the Air Force) | 19th |
| Supreme Command of the Navy (Naval War Staff) | 20th |
| Armistice Commission Wiesbaden | 21st |
| Foreign Office for the attention of Herr Botsch Ritter..... | 22nd |
| Orders staff Frankfurt/O) (Verfuegungstab) | 23rd |
| Orders staff Breslau) via LIII | 24th |
| <i>Supreme Command of the Armed Forces</i> | |
| Armed Forces Ops Staff | 25th |
| Section L | 26th-32nd |
| Armed Forces Propaganda | 33rd |
| Foreign Department / Abwehr | 34th |
| Foreign Section | 35th |
| Abwehr III | 36th |
| Economic Ordnance Dept: (Wi Rue Amt) | 37th |
| General Armed Forces Dept. | 38th |
| WR [?] | 39th |
| Admin Officer with Government of Poland Cracow | 40th |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-150

MOST SECRET

Copy

Letter from the Fuehrer to General Antonescu

S. O. only

Access only through officer

18 June 1941

Your Excellency,

In connection with the matters discussed at our last conference,
I would like to inform you of this, my final opinion:

Russia's attitude, especially her daily increasing preparations

for attack, force me to employ the German armed forces in the near future to remove this threat to Europe, once and for all.

As I explained at our last meeting in Munich, I shall make every endeavour to see that on the one hand the undivided direction of this powerful attacking operation is undertaken by one person only, but that, on the other hand, the right of independent action and the opinions of the leading personalities of our allies, their people and their armed forces be respected to the highest degree.

To this end, I request that you, General Antonescu, allow me to inform you from time to time of those wishes that have to do with the Rumanian Armed Forces, the execution of which is considered absolutely necessary in the interest of the orderly course of the whole operation.

11th Army (A) HQ as a type of working staff of your Head Quarters would then convert these wishes into military orders as soon as the essential decisions have been made, and these will be issued with your signature.

Close liaison will therefore be maintained in that:

The *Chief* of the German Military Mission,

The *Chief* of the German Naval Mission and one liaison officer with the 4th "Luftflotte" are appointed to your Headquarters, while the assistant Chief of the Rumanian General Staff would be sent to 11th Army (A) HQ.

Furthermore, Liaison detachments on each side must be set up where necessary between the commands to be established.

The following duties will be assigned to the allied forces in Rumania for the initial period after the commencement of operations:

1. Defense of Rumanian territory against the penetration of Russian forces.

Special importance is attached to the protection of the oil fields, so vital to the combined direction of the war, and of, the harbour of Constanza and Danube bridge against air attacks, parachute operations and sabotage.

When the dispositions of our forces are decided upon, the fact must be taken into account that, according to the most recent reconnaissance, strong mobile units and armoured forces of Soviet Russia are situated in the southern part of Bessarabia and in the area of Czernowitz. Apart from these main duties, it is essential to deceive the enemy into thinking that an even *stronger* German-Rumanian advance will take place and to make use of favourable situations to gain bridge-heads east of the Pruth, which will make it easier to go over to the attack.

2. The most important duty of the Rumanian air force is the protection of Rumania and in particular the protection of the oil fields.

The Rumanian flying corps will be employed to support the Rumanian army units. It is therefore necessary that there be a clear distinction between their duties and those of the German "Flieger Korps" and of the reconnaissance units under the command of the German 11th Army.

3. As the German attacking operations proceeds in North Galicia, the enemy will sooner or later be forced to yield, even with the forces on the Rumanian frontier. Then the various groups of allied forces in Rumania will force the enemy back by an attack in cooperation with the air force, and will prevent them from making an orderly retreat across the Dnjester and contribute towards their extermination.

As regards the special duties to be undertaken by the Rumanian armed forces, I will take the liberty of submitting further proposals to you, General Antonescu, when the time is ripe.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-151

Commander-in-Chief of U-Boats,
Operations Department,
B.Nr. Most Secret SO 120

30.3.40.

Copy No. 1.

TOP SECRET

S. O.

Officer Only.

Operation order "HARTMUT"

[initialled by Fricke, among others]

(II. EDITION)

Occupation of Denmark and Norway

This order comes into force on the codeword "Hartmut" [Toughness]. With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity. The Day and Hour are designated as "Weser-Day" and "Weser Hour" and the whole operation is known as "Weseruebung".

Situation: The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side. The primary requisite for success once the land-

ing is accomplished is the hindering of enemy countermeasures, above all of troop landings, until an adequate number of troops has been put ashore. With this object orders have been given for the full commitment of all naval force * * *

II (5) The naval force will as they enter the harbour fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvick * * *

[Signed in draft] Doenitz
[Certified] Godt.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-152

TOP MILITARY SECRET

Naval War Staff

B.Nr.1. op 355/41 g.K. Only by officer!

Audience of C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 Mar [1941] 1600 hrs.

(Present: Chief of OKW, Gen. Jodl, Fregatten Kapitaen von Puttkamer)

* * * * *

Exam. No. 2

9. *Preparations for Marita* * * *

B. *Personnel Position* * * *

f. The C-in-C of the Navy asks for confirmation that *the whole* of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. *Fuehrer*: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

* * * * *

11. *Japan* [Raeder speaking] Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.

According to remarks by Admiral Nomura, Minister Matsuoka has grave doubts about the Russian question and wants to make inquiries particularly about that.

The C-in-C of the Navy recommends (during personal conversation with Hitler) that Matsuoka be advised regarding the designs on Russia.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-153

The Chief of the Naval Command Staff [Marineleitung]
Reg. No. A I st 1000/34 Gkdos

Berlin, 12 May 1934.

TOP SECRET

Copy No: 3

Armament plan [A.P.] for the 3rd. Armament Phase

1. General Preliminary Observations. 1. The *war tasks*, within the framework of the defence of the Reich, indicated to the Navy by the Reich Minister of Defence, form the *basis* for all military considerations and decisions.

2. The *war and operational plans* resultant from the war tasks provide the direction for a clearly defined *armaments target*.

3. The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the Armament Programme and provides:

a. For the *military leaders* a sound basis for their *operational* considerations and

b. for the *political leaders* a *clear picture of what may be achieved* with the military means available at a given time.

4. The A-Plan should accordingly be the *directing factor in the composition* of the *annual budget*.

5. Owing to the speed of military political development since Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army, the new A-Plan will only be drawn up *for a period of 2 years*. The 3rd A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36.

6. The 3rd A-Phase emphasizes reorganization. The expenditure becoming necessary owing to increases in strength of the correspondingly increased training activity lessens the amount available for purely A objects. In the meantime discomforts of all kinds (smaller barrack space and the forgoing of some ameni-

ties for instance) will have to be accepted in order to enable the existing gaps in our armaments to be filled as far as possible. By the skilled apportioning and exploitation of arms and equipment available and under issue, expenditure on costly training equipment must be kept within limits commensurate with the progress of the armament programme.

7. All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war *without any alert period*. Measures which require for their execution and completion a longer period than is envisaged in the "A" plan are temporarily withdrawn.

II. *Financial Basis*. 1. The following assumptions will form the basis for the preparations of the A.P.

| | Mill. R.M. | |
|---|------------|-----|
| Budget 34 amounting to | 396.— | |
| Budget 35 amounting to | 434.— | 830 |
| <hr/> | | |
| For current peacetime expenditure including Personnel | | |
| 1934 | 171.— | |
| 1935 | 190.— | 361 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Balance available for armament purposes of which for ship replacement construction | | 469 |
| 1934 | 148.— | |
| 1935 | 175.— | 323 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Balance for other Armaments | | 146 |

(s. Table in Appendix D)

2. The budget resources detailed in para II, I include *all* sources available for naval purposes (public budget, conversion budget, B budget, labour programme etc.)

III. *Armaments—Target (A-Target) for the 3rd A-phase (until 1.4.36)*

1. General * * *
2. In Detail * * *

IV. *Organization of the A.P.* 1. The material organization in the new A.P. is arranged according to the following groups.

- I = New Construction
- II = Air Defense (without munitions)
- III = Improvement on ships (Ship = incl. engine construction)
- IV = Improvement on ships (Armaments)
- V = Artillery—Munitions and Stores
- VI = Artillery measures
- VII = Torpedo measures
- VIII = Barrage measures
- IX = Signals measures
- X = Bases incl. Dock and Arsenal
- XI = 'J-' preparations (Supply)

XII = Training
 XIII = Accommodation and Clothing
 * * * * *
 V. *Order of Priority* * * *
 IV. *Execution of the R.P.* * * *

RAEDER

Distribution: A 5 copies, B 5 copies, E 1 copy, Fleet 1 copy, Stat. O. 1 copy, Stat. N. 1 copy, W.A.(L) 1 copy, T.A. 1 copy, Reserve 4 copies: 20 copies.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-155

Commander in Chief of the Navy
 MPA Nr. 2864g

Berlin, 11 June 1940

SECRET

* * * * *

The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in the Officer Corps are the Torpedo position and the problem whether the Naval building programme up to Autumn 1939 envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid from the first on the construction of U-Boats.

* * * * *

If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire Naval building programme has been wrongly directed and that from the first the emphasis should have been on the U-Boat weapon and after its consolidation, on the large ships, I must emphasize the following matters:

The building up of the fleet was directed according to the political demands, which were *decided by the Fuehrer*. The Fuehrer hoped *until the last moment* to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944/45. At that time the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-Boat superiority and a much more favourable ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the high seas.

The development of events forced the Navy—contrary to the expectation even of the Fuehrer—into a war, which it had to accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid from the start on the building of the U-Boat arm *appear* to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, training

and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I indicate however with pride the admirable and, in spite of the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic, far-reaching preparation for U-Boat construction, which made the immensely rapid construction of the U-Boat arm both as regards equipment and personnel possible immediately after the assumption of power.

(signed) Raeder

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156

Copy Nr. 274.

SECRET

The fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919-1935

Compiled by Captain Schuessler

Published by the High Command of the German Navy Berlin
1937

M. Dr. Nr. 352

Chapter IV, Page 75

Concealed Rearmament under the Leadership of the Government
of the Reich. (From 1933 until military freedom in 1935).

The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on the 30th of January 1933 was of decisive influence on the size and the shape of further rearmament. While the second chamber (Reichsrat) approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a one sided attitude towards the re-armament of the Armed Forces.

The Government took over the management of the re-armament programme upon this foundation.

Development of the Armed Forces

This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General v. Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the Armed Forces received far reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The whole organisation of the Reich was included in this work. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then

on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of the Accounting Office of the German Reich.

Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, (honorary Doctor), had received hereby a far reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of re-armament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty.

Besides the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credits for the provision of labor which were made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schuessler afterwards Commodore Foerste. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.

Declaration of military freedom

When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed Forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich the last mentioned limitation in re-armament works, namely the external camouflage was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for 1½ decades, and carried by the newly awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed Forces and as part of it the Navy can lead with full strength towards its completion the re-armament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-158

Admiral (Special duties) attached to C in C of the Navy
Reg. No. 90/45 SO only

On active service 20.2.45

SO only!

by officer courier only

Participation of the C in C Navy in Fuehrer's conference on the 19.2. at 1700 hours.

Note: The C in C Navy was not present at the Fuehrer's conference on 18.2.45.

1. The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should

renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but also the Western powers are violating International Law by their actions against the defenceless population and the residential districts of the towns, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and also through this measure to urge our people to resist to the utmost. The Fuehrer orders the C in C of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to report on this matter as soon as possible.

2. Chief of armed forces Operational Staff reports that information has been received on the supply of an enemy Army in the west, by transport gliders. In connection with this, the C in C Navy reports that according to a report of the submarine, stationed in the Hoofden, no large transports, but only smaller vessels like LST's and coastal vessels had been encountered in the convoy—route of Thames-Scheldt. Thus the suspicion arises that the enemy has withdrawn shipping from the Thames-Scheldt traffic, possibly having been sufficiently supplied there, in order to employ it in another place. In reply to a question by the Fuehrer, about his opinion on the possible place of redeployment of enemy shipping, the C in C Navy states, that a clear picture of this situation does not exist, and requests air reconnaissance of Antwerp and the ports on the east coast of England at the earliest possible opportunity.

The Fuehrer passes this request on to the Reichs marshal.

The representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the Fuehrer's Headquarters, SS Major General Fegelein, transmits the Reichsfuehrer's further inquiry as to when he can expect the arrival of the Panthers from Libau. The Fuehrer asks the C in C Navy, in addition to the foregoing question, as to when the infantry division departing from Libau would arrive. The C in C Navy explains, that all available shipping space had, according to requirements, been employed for transport problems, but that the question of what was loaded, and in what order individual organizations would be, was controlled by the army. The combat divisions must be given corresponding preference. This opinion is confirmed by the representative of the General Staff of the army (Lt. Col. GSC Hermani).

The Fuehrer adds, that in the long run one-sided preference for combat echelons was not possible, since these combat divisions could well dispense with their rear-echelon services such

as (supply columns, work-drops etc.) for several days, but not for longer periods of time.

Admiral (Special duties)

[Signature illegible]

Distribution: Copy No. 1 Chief of Naval War Staff, Copy No. 2 1/SKL Ib, Copy No. 3 Chief of Naval Defense, Copy No. 4 Chief of Naval Armament, Copy No. 5 Admiral at Fuehrer's Headquarters, Copy No. 6 Admiral (Special duties).

On active service 21.2.1945.

Admiral (Special duties)

Attached to Ob.d.M.

Reg. Nr. 100/45

TOP SECRET

S. O. only

Senior Officers only by officer courier!

Participation of C in C Navy in a Fuehrer Conference on 20.2.45 at 1600 hours.

1. In the course of the conference on further operational decisions concerning the army's operations in the East, the Fuehrer asks that the C-in-C Navy explain the importance of the ports of Stettin and Swinemuende for our own Naval warfare. The C-in-C Navy explains that Stettin and Swinemuende form the backbone for the supply of the fleet in the eastern Baltic Sea. In case of their loss, troop and supply transports in the Baltic would be limited exclusively to the ports of the western Baltic. Due to the long shallow water-routes and the considerable danger of mines in this area, this means approximately a doubling of the time for these runs and especially also as the security units would be quite a bit more heavily taxed by this. Especially since Swinemuende is the decisive base for the Naval Forces in this area. Also its loss would seriously affect the fight against the Russians in the central and western Baltic. The deep water areas east of Bomholm would be lost for submarine training which is still being conducted there, so that the submarines would have to depend exclusively on the very shallow area of the western Baltic, which, for that reason, is little suited for training. The loss of the shipyards of Stettin and Swinemuende would mean the curtailment of the already very much reduced capacity for repairs; and finally there would be a strong concentration of naval forces in the western Baltic which would expose them still more to air attacks. In short, the holding of the Stettin area is of utmost importance for the conduct of naval

warfare. The Fuehrer agrees with the explanations of the C-in-C Navy and makes his decisions for operational measures of the Armed Forces accordingly.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informs the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff [Chef WFSt] Col-General Jodl and the representative of the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. Even the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without announcement, and in any case to save face with the outer world.

The Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff [Chef WFSt] and Ambassador Hewel are in full agreement.

[Signature illegible]

Admiral (Special duties)

[illegible]

Distribution: Copy No. 1 Chief of Naval War Staff, Copy No. 2 1/SKL Ib, Copy No. 3 Chief of Naval Defense, Copy No. 4 Chief of Naval Armament, Copy No. 5 Admiral at Fuehrer's Headquarters, Copy No. 6 Admiral (Special duties).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-159

[Raeder's initials in green pencil].

[Red pencil note—To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy]

The War Minister and C-in-C of the Armed Forces

Berlin W35, 2.3.36.

Tirpitzufer 72-76

Telephone: B1

Kurfuerst 8191

W A No. 380/36 Most Secret L I

S.O. only

Written by an officer

To:

The C-in-C of the Army

The C-in-C of the Navy

The Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force

Supreme Command of the Navy

Reg. No. AI Op 14/36

1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following

decision: By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply to articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles which refer to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as obsolete.

2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of the demilitarized zone. In this connection I issue the following orders:

3. *a.* Re-forming his divisional staffs, the C-in-C of the Army is to move forward sections consisting mainly of the VI, IX and V Army Corps into the demilitarized zone in such a way that they will be transferred to permanent garrisons on the Rhine and east of it. Apart from that, one Infantry Battalion shall be transferred to Aachen, one to Trier and one to Saarbruecken. The Regional Police Inspectors West, South West, and South will come entirely under the orders of the C-in-C of the Army for the purpose of incorporating them into the army.

b. The Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force will transfer one fighter squadron each to the area around Cologne and Coblenz, and sections of the AAA into or near such towns on the Lower and Middle Rhine where the most important Rhine bridges are.

4. The movements are to be prepared and synchronized in such a way by the C-in-C of the Army and the C-in-C of the Air Force that the first Staffel, including the battalions assigned to Aachen, Trier and Saarbruecken, and the AAA guns arrive in the Rhine Valley at 1200 hours on Z-day and the first fighter squadron land at the same time.

A second Staffel, comprising all the remaining sections of the Army assigned to the demilitarized zone will follow within 24 hours. Orders for Z-day will be given at the appropriate time.

5. Marching orders for the troops which are to be transferred, are to be given as late as possible. Every precaution must be taken to shorten the period between the commencement of practical preparations for the actual move and the entry into the demilitarized zone.

The C-in-C of the Army will see to it that the responsible departments of the general and interior administration, of the Police Force, of the municipalities, and of the Party are not informed before 0800 hours on Z-Day about the billeting of Army and Air Force men in their area.

6. To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, military security or advance measures are *not* to be taken without my express orders.

On Z-Day, from 0800 hours until further notice, however it must be ensured that the command posts of the three services can commence work day and night at short notice. Persons on leave are not to be recalled.

7. If the other powers who have signed the Locarno Treaty reply to the transfer of German troops into the demilitarized zone with military preparations, I reserve the right to decide on any military counter-measures.

In the event of enemy frontier violations with offensive intent, action must be taken in accordance with instructions for taking up position and battle orders.

8. I request: *a.* timely information on instructions given in accordance with 3a and 3b.

b. to be informed continuously on the progress of the transfer of garrisons, starting on Z-Day at 1300 hours (W A. Abteilung L). Counter espionage is being given special instructions.

c. That suggestions be made to me as soon as possible, as to what advance measures should be put into operation during the first critical stages, in case military preparations by neighbouring states become evident.

signed Blomberg.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-161

[Memorandum by Raeder dated 10.1.43, and entitled "The Importance of German Surface Forces for the conducting of the War by the powers signatory to the Three Power Pact".] Page 5

In recognition of these causes, and of the technical progress achieved in the meantime, it was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944/45 such a strength that it would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power and range.

In 1939, the war having begun five years earlier, the construction of these forces was still in its initial stages. After the outbreak of war—in order to favour a rapid increase in the number of U-Boats—only those ships were made ready which were already on the verge of completion, because the construction of big ships is the work of years. The building of the three big ships was stopped.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-166

COMMAND OFFICE OF THE NAVY.

A II c 47134 Gkdos.

Berlin, 12 March 1934.

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers

Reference: A II c 5937/33 G.Kdos. BB 8800/33 G.Kdos.

It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG=Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the High Seas.

In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the ships will be referred to as "Transport ships O". It is requested that in future this designation only be used. * * *

* * * * *

12. The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1.4.35.

13. "A" [Branch of the Naval War Staff] request to be kept in constant touch with the preparations.

A [Signed in draft] GROOS.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-167

[Extract of a meeting between Raeder and Hitler on 18 March 1941]

NAVAL WAR STAFF

B. Nr. 1. op 355/41 g.K.

* * * * *

9.

B. *Personnel Position.*

f. The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. *Fuehrer:* The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

* * * * *

RAEDER.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-170

[A file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the High Command of the Navy.]

1. A 1,13 25 Aug [1939]. *The already started "Incident Weiss will be stopped at 2030 hours because of changed political conditions". (Close Friendship Pact England/Poland of 25 Aug noon, and information from Duce, that he would be true to his*

word, however, having to ask necessarily for large supply of raw materials.)

2. 31 Aug. *Decision for opening hostilities against Poland.* Falls at 1240 hours.

3. A 1,95 17 Sept. *Russian entry into Poland* is valued by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) as an event of the most far-reaching importance, the resulting possible effect for Germany of this must be estimated as being especially favorable.

4. C VII/39,9 23 Sept. *Navy Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme Commander* for the first time studies the question of Russia's participation in a) the cession of Submarines, b) the outfitting of auxiliary cruisers (Murmansk), c) the calling at Russian ports—*Fuehrer* will commission the foreign office with clarification of the questions.

5. A 1,163 25 Sept. There is no doubt about Russia's honest attitude. Russian government is *convinced of the necessity of cooperation with Germany* (Naval Attache Moscow, BL.186, 27 Sept.)

6. C VIII/39,86 28 Sept. Conclusion of German-Russian border and friendship pact (compare introduction)

7. A 2,28 3 Oct. *Naval Supreme Commander* orders examination of the possibilities of support by Russia for German naval warfare, to be forwarded to the foreign office. Foreign minister believes, that far-reaching support may be expected—Bases [Stuetzpunkte] in Norway with Russian help.

8. A 2,50 5 Oct. Threatening situation of German [Auslandsdeutsche] living in Estonia and Latvia, because of Russian demands—"The increase of Russian influence in the Baltic States is happening with the full accord of German political policy." The evacuation of Germans [Auslandsdeutsche], planned by the foreign office, with steamers and men-o'-war was not approved by the *Fuehrer* in agreement with the naval supreme command, since the situation is not as yet clear, and since the impression of misunderstandings between Russia and Germany must be avoided under all circumstances. On 6 Oct, calmer appraisal of the situation. Naval Supreme Commander orders on 9 Oct. lifting of the alert for the planned actions.

9. C VII/30,11 10 Oct. *Navy Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer:* Russia has offered a well situated base near Murmansk (Compare BL.23). One auxiliary cruiser in Murmansk for outfitting. *Naval Supreme Commander* points out value of the winning of Norwegian bases (Drontheim) with the *aid of Russian*

pressure. Fuehrer promises examination; refuses request to build or buy submarines in Russia for political reasons.

10. A 2,93 11 Oct. English-Russian trade agreement (lumber for rubber and zinc). Rubber and zinc via Russia just as important for Germany as lumber for England. Export of Russian lumber will take place on English or neutral ships from Murmansk, so that German interference remains possible. No damage intended at all by Russia against German economic warfare. (BL 170, 21 Oct)

11. A 2,35 17 Oct. Conference of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) with Naval Attache Moscow, discloses that far-reaching Russian support, as expected by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL). Repair of warships, outfitting of auxiliary cruisers at Russian yards—is not possible because of political and technical reasons. Preparations for “Base North [Basis Nord]” are in progress. Attache requests the immediate stoppage of espionage [Nachrichtenbeschaffung] against *Russia* through *neutral* states, to prevent Russian distrust.

12. A 2,193 24 Oct. Russia will fulfill in full accord with Germany’s policy all treaty obligations; she will not permit active hostile position of Turkey against us or *passage of English and French warships through the Dardanelles* (Report Ambassador Ritter).

13. A 2,203 25 Oct. Departure of German vessels from Murmansk; English and other ships are kept back by the Russians, until the German ships are safe.

14. A 2,205 20 Oct. Sharp Russian note against English blockade warfare.

15. C VIII 39,162 26 Oct. Opinion of the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) of the Russian wishes for the delivery of war material. Russian economic help is of decisive importance for us. Offer was made in such a generous form, that success of the English economic blockade appears impossible. Accordingly, generous reciprocation required from the German side as well.

16. C VIII/39, 164, 173 26 Oct. At the suggestion of Molotov, who has mentioned political apprehension concerning the appearance of German warships in the Finnish Gulf, German economic warfare is restricted in the Baltic to West of 20° East; Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) does not consider himself bound to this for the entire future (also, A 2,217).

17. A 2,249 31 Oct. Foreign Political speech by Molotov; permanent friendship between Russia and Germany; *sharp at-*

tacks against English blockade "in violation of International law".

18. C VIII/39,175 FF 2 Nov. The behaviour of the Russian Naval Command is generally cordial and cooperative. ("Base North [Basis Nord]", provisioning of merchantmen in Murmansk, aid in the return "Bremen"). ..*Naval Supreme Commander* finds himself repeatedly in a position to express his appreciation for that to the Russian Navy. Statement of the Russian naval commissar on occasion of the presentation of the communication from Naval Supreme Commander: "His answer would not consist of empty words, but actions, and only after their execution would he forward a reply to the supreme commander." (Compare C VIII/39 BL 177,200,203).

19. A 3,5 4 Nov. Demand of Russian economic delegation of delivery of ship hulls "Seyolitz", "Luetzow", continued construction with German help. *Naval Supreme Commander* basically desires greatest cooperation, however, rejects delivery of Seyolitz and decrease of our own building program in favor of assistance to Russia. Ship hull "Luetzow" will be made available. (C VII/39,26).

20. C VII 39,34 10 Nov. *Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer* rejects purchase of Russian submarines again, since he is convinced, that the Russian ships are in bad condition, and that the Russians "should not see any weakness with us".

22. C VII/39,43 25 Nov. *Situation conference of the Naval Supreme Commander in a session of department heads [Amtschefsitzung]:* Russia not able to act at the present time; *as long as Stalin in the government, a positive attitude certain.* Changes are possible after year of inner strengthening, especially in the event of the overthrow or death of Stalin. The expansion of Russian interests in the direction of the Gulf of Persia is supported by Germany. Northern states *under the pressure Germany/Russia* neutral.—Southeastern states *under the pressure Russia* neutral.—Germany in the East has no military ties. "For the first time in 50 years a one-front war is possible."

23. A 3,265 30 Nov. Begin hostilities *between Russia and Finland.*

24. A 4,13 3 Dec. Declaration by Molotov that the primary goals of Russia lie in *South-Eastern Europe and on the Black Sea.* Rapid solution of the Finnish problem is to be attempted *to free Russian forces for other missions.*

25. A 4,45 7 Dec. High Russian armament demands in re-

turn for economic aid, from the Navy among others "Luetzow", "Seyolitz", "Prince Eugen". According to the Fuehrer's decision, own armament may not be retarded under any circumstance. Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) considers besides "Luetzow" the delivery of plans for new construction and sample pieces.

26. C VII/39,49,56 8 Dec. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer*: Further sales of ships to Russia: *Fuehrer* rejects sale of "Syolitz" and "Prinz Eugen" and towers of "H" and "J". *Naval Supreme Commander* recommends delivery of "Bismarck" plans. *Fuehrer* reserves decision for himself. (Compare also A 4,60).—Moral burden for Germany as a result of Russian-Finnish conflict.

27. C. VII/39,58 12 Dec. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer*: *Naval Supreme Commander* desires a correct stand in the Russian-Finnish conflict; no support for Finland (by way of unreliable burden); advocates favoring Russia; points out the advantages offered by Russia. Increase of anti-German, pro-English feeling in Norway because of Russian-Finnish conflict. In several circles, the opinion exists that the partition of Norway between Russia and Germany has already been agreed upon (BL 68).

28. A 4,85 12 Dec. *Return "Bremen" from Murmansk*—Valuable Russian assistance.

29. C VIII/39, 248 FF 14 Dec. *Incident between Russian naval units and German steamers*. (Details and settlement see A 4, BL.86,87,129).

30. A 4,199 17 Dec. Chief, Naval Operations concludes from the weakness of Russian fighting power, as revealed in Finland, for our own attitude against Russia. . . . "not to over estimate in German actions and decisions the still noticeable impact of the colossus Soviet Russia—an impact that is noticeable despite the existence of the pact of friendship; but on the contrary to throw into the scale in all negotiations, the military and political strength of Germany—perhaps even more so than has been done in the past."

31. C VII 39,68 30 Dec. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer*: *Naval Supreme Commander* reports: Settlement of incidents during Russian Naval warfare against Finland (compare C VIII/39,248 FF)—Negotiation with Russia for the use of the Siberian sealanes by German warships; no difficulties anticipated. (BL.85).

32. A 4,225 31 Dec. *Evaluation of the Red Army by the German General Staff*: In quantity a gigantic military instru-

ment.—Commitment of the “mass”.—Organization, equipment and means of leadership unsatisfactory—principles of leadership good; leadership itself, however, too young and inexperienced.—Communication system bad, transportation bad;—troops not very uniform; no personalities—simple soldier good natured, quite satisfied with very little. Fighting qualities of the troops in a *heavy* fight, dubious. The Russian “mass” is *no* match for an army, with modern equipment and superior leadership.

33. A 5,62 10 Jan. German-Russian economic negotiations continue satisfactorily. Strong Russian interest in Naval deliveries.—“Luetzow”, heavy turrets, “Tirpitz” plans, naval instruments.—Naval Supreme Commander decides that compliance must depend basically upon the extent of our being dependent upon Russian shipments.

34. A 5,82 12 Jan. Chief Naval Operations (SKL) attaches importance to the utilization of the Siberian sealanes which also serve Russian economic interests: (Compare BL153, 19 Jan.)

35. A 5,205 25 Jan. Difficulties in German-Russian trade negotiations, because Russian government demands “reciprocal assistance”—that is to say: no performance without contemporaneous corresponding German performance.

36. C VII/40,91 26 Jan. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer* desires delay of delivery of ship hull “Luetzow” and construction plans “Bismarck” as long as possible; hopes with favorable course of war, “to get out of it all together.”

37. A 6,49 6 Feb. Favorable report of Naval Attache Moscow on Siberian sealane; utilization by auxiliary cruiser also considered “Ship 45”.

38. A 6,89 11 Feb. *Conclusion of German-Russian trade agreement.*

39. C VII/40,93 23 Feb. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander* proposes—now that the Russian trade agreement has been concluded—change of the 20° East limitation for German naval warfare in the Baltic (compare No. 16 above), (also look further under No. 43).

40. C VII/40,103 9 Mar. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander* suggests to inform the Russians during the occupation of Norway that Tromsøe is not occupied by the Germans which will be considered by the Russians as recognition for their interests. “Better, the Russians sit in ‘Tromsøe’ than the English”. Fuehrer prefers to have the Russians “not to sit so close”, believes that Tromsøe also should be occupied by us.

41. A 7,97 13 Mar. *On 12 Feb—Peace Russia—Finland.*
42. A 7,218 29 Mar. Speech by Molotov, contains sharp criticism of Anglo-French war policy and affirmation of the friendly relations Russia/Germany.
43. C VIII/40,159 1 Apr. Fuehrer orders that wishes of the Chief Naval Operations (SKL) for *lifting of the 20° East border* for warfare in the baltic will no longer be pressed for political reasons.
44. C VIII/40,169 5 Apr. (According to an attache report) the temporary *limitations in the use of "Base North [Basis Nord]"*—tanker "Jan Wellem" and *Molotov's attitude of refusal* in the question of the use of a far-eastern base are to be traced back to the present Russian nervousness because of the future position of England and France toward Russia. (Compare A 8,38).
45. C VIII/40,180 10 Apr. Russia declares herself *disinterested in the Norway* action; shows understanding for German measures.
46. A 8,154 16 Apr. Tension and border incidents between *Roumania and Russia.*
47. A 8,231 22 Apr. Russian intentions for the incorporation of the border states becomes recognizable.
48. A 9,2 1 May. English efforts for a trade agreement with Russia. Russian government unfavorable; she cannot discuss in any way limitations of its exports to other countries (compare also BL. 198 20 May).
49. C VIII/40,256 18 May. Auxiliary cruiser warfare in the Black Sea: Desires of the Chief, Naval Operations postponed because of unfavorable attitude of foreign office—deference to Russia, Balkan States, Turkey. (Compare also BL. 281)
50. A 9,210 21 May. According to report of Ambassador in Moscow, very positive position of the Russian press to the German successes of war (compare BL. 21,270: *Uneasiness because of German victory cannot be found*).
51. A 9,242 24 May. *Tension Russia/Roumania: Uneasiness* with regard to Russian entry into Bessarabia.
52. A 9,285 28 May. *Bessarabian question:* In the opinion of the foreign office, Russia is prepared for taking a hand in the Balkans, but for the time being no action is to be expected (Compare A 10,103).
53. A 9,295 29 May Russia refuses to receive the English special plenipotentiary for trade negotiations, Sir Stafford Cripps. (CR becomes later British Ambassador in Moscow—A 10,53).

54. C VII/40,221 4 June. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer*: *Fuehrer* describes as his further goal: after the defeat of France, reduction of the army, discharge of the older age classes, especially skilled workers. Emphasis on air corps and navy. *No talk about Russia as yet.*

55. A 10,43 5 June (Remark of B.). *Estimate of situation by Chief, Naval Operations*: Russia keenly appreciates German military successes, however, she fears after decisive victory by Germany, *German attack against Russia*. But allied victory is *not* desired either. *Active participation of Russia in the war is entirely out of the question because of military weakness and inner-political instability.* Stalin definitely determined not to sacrifice himself for the allies. Official policy of Russia toward Germany still absolutely correct. However, possibility of an attempt, to sabotage slowly the economic cooperation is not out of the question. Because of apprehensiveness of further development of the relationships to Germany, Russia considers further expansion of bases in the Baltic indicated; pressure on Lithuania, Estonia points to the attempted full domination of this area.

56. A 10,106 10 May. Naval Attaché, Moscow reports *noticeable cooling off and technical difficulties* on the part of the Russians; sees for that in apprehensiveness over English attitude in case of too strong leanings toward Germany and over *German attack* after victory over the western powers.

57. A 10,125 12 June. Russian demands on *Lithuania*; situation critical.

58. A 10,157 15 June. Russian ultimatum, followed by *entry into Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia*—This development in the opinion of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) was to be expected for some time.

59. A 10,197 19 June. Official notification about operations in the Baltic by Molotov was to “end all intrigues, by which the Western powers had attempted in the Baltic states, to sow distrust between Russia and Germany.”

60. A 10,270 20 June FF. *Russian entry into Bessarabia* imminent. By intervention of German Government and German pressure on Roumania, peaceful settlement was reached by cession of Bessarabia and North Boucovenia. (29 June).

C VIII/40,359 28 June. Chief, Naval Operations describes Russian action as “expected for some time”.—In one German note to Russia on 22 June 41, it is said: “The German Ambassador in Moscow declares to the Soviet government that the decision

comes to the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) 'entirely unexpectedly'".

61. A 11,50 5 July. In the Balkans *further Russian advances* with the goal of turning the land to Bolshevism feared.

62. A 11,62 6 July. Penetration of the Baltic by Bolshevism.

63. A 11,81 8 July. Contrary to contradictory foreign reports the foreign office emphasizes *correct, behaviour of Russian government* toward Germany.

64. A 11,108 10 July. Russia desires closer relationships with Bulgaria and further advances in the Balkans with Bulgarian help. Bulgaria remaining reserved as well as Roumania looking to Germany for support. Increasing Russian influence in Yugoslavia—Russian advances against Iran.

64a. C VII/40,226 11 July. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer*: Naval Supreme Commander requests timely notification in case of complications in the East to be able to protect the undefended Baltic coast against surprise actions.

65. A 11,153 14 July. Quietening in the Balkans after conclusion of the Munich negotiations between Germany/Italy/Hungary.

66. A 11,153 14 July. In cooperation with Russia preparations for the *departure of "Ship 45" by the Siberian Sealane*: (Compare BL.117)

67. A 11,235 21 July. Baltic States declare merger (Anschluss) with Russia.

68. C VII 40,251 21 July. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer*: *Fuehrer lectures*:

a. on America

b. on Russia, whose entry into the war, especially because of the aerial threat to Germany, could be very pleasant. Even though Russia views Germany's great successes with tears in her eyes, she herself has no intention to enter the war against Germany. It is naturally a duty to weigh the American and Russian question seriously. Rapid waging of war is in the German interest; but there is no urgent need for it. Material is plentiful, food supply is secure. The fuel situation is the most difficult, but as long as *Roumania and Russia* deliver, and hydro-electric works can be safeguarded against air attacks, it is not critical.

69. A 11,249 22 July. New demands by Russia on *Finland*.

70. A 11,261 23 July. Conference Stalin-Cripps: English attempt to *split Russia away from Germany* failed completely. According to Stalin's opinion, German successes do not threaten

Russia. *Relationships between Germany and Russia rest on fundamentals of national interests of both countries.* Russia objects to England's intervention in her foreign trade. No power can claim exclusive leadership in the Balkan States; Russia also *does not claim that.* Russia objects to exclusive role of Turkey in the Black Sea and the *Straits* (compare political overall picture 170/40).

71. A 11,330 28 July. Rumor about Russian ultimatum to Finland untrue according to foreign office. However, Molotov has complained about the anti-Russian attitude in Finland. Undoubtedly tried to influence the Finnish government to facilitate a later coordination (Gleichschaltung).

72. A 12,1 1 Aug. Speech by Molotov. Corresponds to speech referred to in No. 70: "Removed for Germany friction points in the East, and created assured certainty in the East"—but according to C VIII/40,407 threats against Finland.

73. A 12,41 4 Aug. According to Naval Attaché in Helsinki—depressed mood in Finland; hope that one day Germany would bring help to Finland after all.

74. A 12,143 12 Aug. Departure "Ship 45" *Via Siberian sealand with Russian assistance.*

75. A 12,149 13 Aug. Turkish anxiety because of Russian advances against Dardanelles and Roumania.

76. C VII/40,270 13 Aug. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer* desires stronger fortification of the North Norwegian Fjords, so that *attacks by the Russians (!)* these according to A 12,150 in case of a new conflict Russia—Finland—would be hopeless.

77. A 12,301 20 Aug. *Evaluation of Russian long distance aims by Chief Naval Operations (SKL):* Ice, free North-Atlantic port. Advance through the Balkans for the annexation of the Dardanelles and the domination of the Black Sea. Advance through Iran to the Persian Gulf. Strong pressure on Finnish internal policies. Subversive creation of disturbances. In Rumania, especially in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, panslavic-communist propaganda—partially successful. Strong activities by agents in Greece. Demands on Turkey unknown. Force of arms not expected at present. Russian behavior strongly dependent on further development of war. The political weight of the Axis should keep the peace of the Balkans. Economic deliveries by Russia are good beyond expectations. (Compare C VIII/40,461).

78. A 12,372 31 Aug. Russia reinforces troops on the Finnish border because of tense situation.

79. T.P. In August 1940, *begin of transfer of German troops to the Eastern border* (according to proclamation of the Fuehrer of 22 June 1941—T.P. of 23 June 1941). To No. 79 compare directive of Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) of 27 Aug. 40 in documents "See Lowe", directives of OKW I, 1 Volume, 1 Leaf 26: Transfer of 10 Divisions and 2 Armored Divisions to the Government General for the possibility of a necessary rapid action in the interest of a protection of the Rumanian oil fields.

80. A 13,102 8 Sept. Russian annoyance and *supposed deterioration of the relationship with Germany* as a result of the Vienna arbitration (Wiener Schiedsspruch) (30 Aug) with the border guarantee of Rumania directed mainly against Russia, and as a result of the uncertainty of German Eastern policy. Both is considered as merely temporary by the Germans. (Compare also A 12,352 and C VIII/40,488) F.

81. A 13,119 10 Sept. Since "Base North" is no longer needed after the occupation of Norway, appreciation by the Reich cabinet [Reichsregierung] and note of appreciation by Naval Supreme Commander for valuable Russian assistance, Russian government declares that they are satisfied that they could be of use to us. (Compare C VIII/40 BL 464/501).

82. A 13,155 12 Sept. Lecture by Naval Attaché in Moscow: Russian attitude, which was very reserved at the beginning, is now markedly friendly; reason for change not clearly understandable. Attaché emphasizes the obliging assistance at the departure "Ship 45" by the Siberian sealane—see also BL. 159,237—relates valuable observations on the good progress of the *Russian Naval rearmament*: numerous destroyers, submarines 2000 tons, three battle ships under construction in Leningrad; thus obvious connection to Russian demands for 2 sets of 38 cm double turrets.

83. A 13,196 14 Sept. Conference Naval Attaché in Tokyo with former Japanese Ambassador in Rome (Shiratori). Ambassador: Ambassador does *not believe in a long duration of the German-Russian understanding*, hopes for the joining of Germany with Japan for the destruction of Russia.

84. C VIII/40,516 18 Sept. Anti-German propaganda in the Red Army. Assumption of *German intentions to attack and thesis of the inevitable German-Russian conflict*. (Compare A 13,221: Distrust in the Supreme Soviets; Molotov expresses calming reassurances: "everything has been done for the security of the Russian western border")

85. A 13,349 26 Sept. Official Russian newspaper article em-

phasizes that Russia stands outside the present light for the Balkan peninsula "true to its peace and neutrality policy". Contrary to that, according to reports of the German Ambassador in Moscow, there is no doubt about the very strong Russian interest in the Balkans, where "nothing can be decided without Russia".

86. C VII/40,285 26 Sept. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander* presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. *The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the North will then be still necessary.* (Thus such an action must have been considered in the meantime: Remark of B.) *Fuehrer* agrees to these decisions. Russia will be induced to advance in the direction of Persia, India in order to find there an outlet to the ocean; that could be more important for Russia than the position in the Baltic. They too were of the opinion that Russia was seriously afraid of Germany's strength, he considers Russian-Finnish entanglements this year improbable.

87. 27 Sept. Conclusion of the *Three Power Pact*.

88. C VIII/40,549 29 Sept. *Three Power Pact*: Russian government sees in the treaty a recognition of Russian neutrality and peace policy (Compare A 14,1: Russian press brings very favorable comments, emphasizes adherence to present policy).

89. C VIII 40,561 6 Oct. Noticeable relaxation of tension between Finland and Russia. (Compare A 14,49)

90. A 14,71 7 Oct. England attempts to bring about cooling off of German-Russian relationship by negotiations Cripps/Molotov.

91. A 14,15 11 Oct. *German entry into Rumania*: England attempts, by alarming reports to influence Russia's attitude toward Germany, however, no signs of change of Russian attitude noticeable.

92. A 14,214 19 Oct. According to report by the German Ambassador in Moscow, the slight deterioration of German-Russian relationship—especially caused as the result of transit of German troops through Finland—appears to have been alleviated again. "Renunciation by Moscow of interference in Balkan interests permits very well the possibilities of compensation in other areas."

93. A 14,360 30 Oct. Russia's attitude with regard to the Italian-Greek conflict (start 28 Oct) does not give rise to any anxiety. Russia will continue to form the rear protection of the Europe-bloc. Economic deliveries run according to plan. Increasing relaxation of tension between Russia/Japan.

94. A 14,361 30 Oct. "OST FALL" [East case]—this word appears for the first time in the documents (Remark of B)—in the present development of the situation *is no longer considered likely*. Readiness for defense and preparations in armaments continue at an increased speed nevertheless.

95. C VII/40,147 4 Nov. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer* expects in case of advance in the Balkans for the support of Italy-Russia's neutrality. Question is to be talked over with Molotov in the near future. *Preparations for an Eastern incident (OST FALL) are to be continued.*

96. C VII/40,111 5 Nov. Anti-British position by Moscow in the question of the Danube Commission.

97. C VIII/40,624 10 Nov. Begin of negotiations with Molotov in Berlin.

98. C VII/40,162 14 Nov. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer* is "still inclined" to instigate the conflict with Russia. *Naval Supreme Commander* recommends *putting it off until the time after the victory over England since there is heavy strain on German Forces and the end of warfare not in sight*. According to the opinion of the Naval Supreme Commander Russia will not press for a conflict within the next year, since she is in the process of building up her Navy with Germany's help—38 cm turrets for battle ships, etc.;—thus during these years she continues to be dependent upon German assistance.

99. A 15,199 16 Nov. *Regarding conclusion of Molotov's visit*: Satisfactory course of the negotiations. At first no fixed treaty: Russia apparently ready to join the *Three Power Pact* after the clarification of several further questions. In detail: *Finland-problem*: "Careful" question by Molotov in *respect to annexation of Finland by Russia*. German standpoint declining, but ready for concessions in respect to exploitation of Petsamo-Nickel. *Poland-problem* not discussed. *Balkans*: Notification of Molotov on *contemplated German action* for the support of Italy; no objections by the Russians. Molotov's suggestion to create the possibility for *Russian influence in Bulgaria* similar to the German one in Rumania; not entered into by the Germans; however, Germany disclosed *disinterest about Turkish domination of the Dardanelles and understanding for Russian desires to own bases*

there; also for the regaining of the Kars-Ardahan areas from Turkey; in this sense, joint pressure on Turkey. Molotov agreeable to examination of the suggestion (compare in this connection the deviating description of this issue in the German note to Russia, 22 June 41—T.P. of 23 June—) *Iran*: German disinterest; Russians very reserved on this question. *Japan*: Molotov ready for understanding; however, first, thorough discussion of all problems, affecting both countries.

100. A 16,110 9 Dec. It is claimed that Russia has expressed *desires for guarantee* in Bulgaria. Bulgarian attitude (Report of German Embassy) disinclined.

[Translation note: the following Fuehrer directive is on a separate sheet, but should follow immediately after No. 100]

100a. Documents "Barbarossa", directives by the Supreme Command, Armed Forces (File No. V, 5). 18 Dec—*1st Fuehrer directive for "Barbarossa"*. It begins with the words "The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat *Soviet Russia* in a *rapid campaign* even before the end of the war against England. (Incident before the end of the war against England.) (Incident "Barbarossa") * * *" "The emphasis of the commitment of the *Navy* will remain directed unequivocally against England during an eastern campaign."

"If decided upon I shall order the assembly for action against Soviet Russia 8 weeks before the contemplated beginning of the operation.

"Preparation, which need a longer period, are—in case they have not as yet been done—to be started already now, and are to be concluded by 15 May 1941.

"It is to be emphasized, however, that the intentions of an attack are not noticeable

"The final goal of the operations is the shielding against Asiatic Russia on the general line Wolga/Archangelsk"

"In the course of these operations [Army operations] the Russian Baltic fleet will rapidly lose its bases, and thus will no longer be able to fight"

"All . . . orders, which are given, must be designed unequivocally in such a manner that they appear as *precautionary measures* just in case that Russia should change her attitude towards us."

Strongest secrecy is ordered "otherwise the danger exists that by a disclosure of our preparations, the execution of which is not yet determined as far as time is

concerned—most serious political and military disadvantages will result”

/s/ ADOLF HITLER

101. A 16,234 20 Dec. *Extensive evaluation of the situation by the Chief Naval Operations (SKL)*: Strengthening of the English position through unfavorable development of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and because of the help from the USA demands absolute concentration against England, therefore *serious doubts concerning “Barbarossa” before the defeat of England.*

102. C VII/40,204 27 Dec. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer*: Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic, which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval-air force construction, is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. *Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England.* Fuehrer desires all possible advancement of submarine construction; present construction figures (12 to 18 per month) are too low. *“Generally, however, the last continental enemy must be removed under all circumstances because of the present political development (Russia’s leaving to mix in Balkan affairs), before he could come to grips with England.* Thus the army must obtain the necessary strength. After that, full concentration on air force and navy can follow.”

Thus, the Fuehrer’s standpoint is contrary to that of the Naval Supreme Commander (Remark of B.)

103. A 16,302 28 Dec. *Naval Supreme Commander* reports in a situation conference as the Fuehrer’s opinion. The political situation is changed by Russia’s unreliability, as evident in the Balkan states; consequently rearmament of the army is necessary. Emphasis on navy and air force against England is not to be impaired.

1941

104. A 17,43 4 Jan. Roumanian government is convinced that Russia plans the annexation of the entire Moldan area—

hopes that Germany will prevent that by force of arms. Roumania's hope for the regaining of *Bessarabia* has not been set aside.

105. A 17,63 6 Jan. By way of Yugoslavia, it is reported that Russia attempts to influence Bulgarian foreign policy in reference to *not* joining the three power pact. (Compare BL. 107). Generally lively, diplomatic activity by Russia in the Balkans.

106. C VII/41,6 8 Jan. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer* declares; Russia's position in case of the imminent German action in Bulgaria not yet cleared. Russia needs Bulgaria for the assembly of troops against the Bosphorus. Hope on USA, Russia keeps England together. Diplomatic preparation by England in Russia recognizable; England's aim is to set in motion Russian power against us. Stalin is to be regarded as an ice cold blackmailer. With USA and Russian entry into the war, very great burden for our conduct of the war. *Therefore, every possibility of such a threat must be excluded from the very beginning.* If the Russian threat can be removed, we can continue the fight against England under very tolerable conditions. Russia's collapse means considerable relief of burden for Japan, and increased danger for USA.

107. A 17,119 11 Jan. Signing of new, far-reaching agreements between Russia and Germany (Economical, resettlement and border questions).

108. A 17,149 12 Jan. Russian government denies foreign reports that she agrees with entry and stay of German troops in Bulgaria. Question was never mentioned by Germany to Russia. Denials given cause for concern in Bulgaria. (BL.20).

109. A 17,160 13 Jan. Russian press stresses strongly the German-Russian economic agreement, and emphasizes *that the Anglo-Saxon powers would never succeed in disturbing the good relationship between the two powers.*

110. A 17,214 17 Jan. Russian request for embarkation of naval commission on German heavy cruiser for training purposes for cruiser "L" was turned down by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL), because cruiser is in operational use. However, Naval Supreme Commander agrees to the participation of Russian officers in yard test voyages. (BL.361)

111. A 17,232 18 Jan *Fuehrer anticipates disturbance of the relations to Russia* as the result of the Balkan operation. Fears for the Roumanian oil area.

112. A 17,255 20 Jan. *Speech of Stalin: He works untiringly for the strengthening of the Russian fleet and army. . . .* "The international situation is complicated and confused and even Russia is threatened by the danger of war."

113. A 17,287 22 Jan. Declaration in the House of Commons by Under Secretary of State Butler: England has repeatedly tried during the past year, to come to *closer political cooperation* with Russia. Russian government has not reacted on that.

114. A 17,324 24 Jan. In the relationship *Russia-Finland* again more serious difficulties now.—Measures for the protection of the Roumanian oil areas.

115. A 17,327 24 Jan. *Conference Fuehrer-Duce: Statements of the Fuehrer: great importance of Finland because of nickel resources; it shall not be touched any more. — Russian complaints because of German concentration in Roumania have been received but were rejected. Purpose of the German concentration: (a) Operations against Greece, (b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey, (c) Security measure and guarantee of Roumania. . . . USA even in case of entry into the war not a serious danger. Greater danger, despite favorable political and economic treaties, Russia. Therefore tying down of considerable forces on the Russian border. There is no danger as long as Stalin lives. . .*

116. A 17,359 27 Jan. Russia warns Finland that going together with any State other than Russia is causing concern.

117. A 17,401 30 Jan. Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) reports to Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) *intentions for naval warfare against Russia in case of "Barbarossa"*.

118. C VII, 41,12 4 Feb. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander explains operational plans in a Russian incident, emphasizes especially the necessity for the seizure of Murmansk/Polarnoje, so that England cannot take a foothold there. (See also BL.47) Makes requests for support by the Air Force, and also cooperation with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Sweden.*

119. A 18,34 5 Feb. Requests of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) for air support in case "Barbarossa" cannot be fulfilled completely because of lack of forces. Fuehrer points out as an especially important naval mission, *rapid organization of the supply line to Leningrad.*

120. A 18,32 11 Feb. According to a foreign press report, Russia is said to have told Bulgaria "she could not expect that Russia will have any further interest in her (Bulg) fate."

121. A 18,227 18 Feb FF. German reapproachment toward Russia's return of the seized Baltic ships. Measures for the protection of the west coast against English landings during "Barbarossa". Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta *even before "Barbarossa"*. Measures for the covering up of the preparations for "Barbarossa". Concentration movements against Russia are to be put forth as the "*greatest undertaking of deception of the history of war*, which serves to distract from the last preparations of the invasion against England. Even in the armed forces the impression is to be kept up that the invasion is being prepared further. Liaison contact with Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Roumania is to be made as late as possible. (Time requirement of Chief Naval Operations (SKL) compare BL.340)

122. A 18,295 23 Feb. Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 *after the execution of "Barbarossa"* (compare BL.231).

123. A 18,319 24 Feb. Proclamation by Marshal Timoshenko: the entire Soviet nation, despite the successes of the neutrality policy must keep itself in constant readiness for the danger of an enemy surprise attack!

124. A 18,383 28 Feb. F. Finnish General Staff still considers the Russian danger as very serious. Only Germany can beat Russia!

125. C VIII/41,93 28 Feb. From the political orientation of the Atlantic forces by the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL): Russia needs for the execution of her reform plans, a period of peace of several years. Russia's foreign policy is thus marked by her *will for neutrality, and avoidance of conflicts with strong opponent*.

126. A 19,4 1 Mar. German march into *Bulgaria*.

127. A 19,39 3 Mar. Preparations of the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) for Black Sea warfare in case of Russian intervention in the Balkan war.

128. A 19,53 FF 4 Mar. C VIII/41,97. Bulgaria's consent to the German entry is disapproved in Moscow; other reports also point to a *stiffening of Russian* attitude because of events in the Balkans; however, a basic change of the Russian attitude is not anticipated (compare to that also the German note to Russia of 22 June 41 IV). Bulgaria joins the Axis. Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) informs the General Staff of the Army that

possibilities of support for the army by naval warfare in the Black Sea in case of "Barbarossa" are only limited.

129. A 19,71 5 Mar. General Staff of the Army is also shown, upon inquiry, the difficulties of supply in the Baltic in case of "Barbarossa". According to Fuehrer directive, the emphasis of the Navy remains against England even in case "Barbarossa".

130. A 17,85 6 Mar. Issue of directive #1 for case "Barbarossa" by Chief Naval Operations (SKL).

131. A 19,209 15 Mar. According to report from diplomatic circles, improvement of relations between Russia and England.

132. A 19,224 16 Mar. Reports from agents: *Russians prepare for mobilization* on the Baltic coast.

133. A 19,233 17 Mar. Signs of Russian partial mobilization noticeable on the Western border.

134. C VII/41,53 18 Mar. *Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Supreme Naval Commander* reports that according to a statement by Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka has grave doubts because of the Russian problem—doubts relating to Japanese entry into the war—and he recommends that Matsuoka be informed about our own intentions in respect to Russia.

135. A 19,265 19 Mar. In case of "Barbarossa", *Supreme Naval Commander* describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the Navy Chief of the Supreme Command Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult, occupation of the Finnish northern area impossible according to report Dietl (PL.281, 20 Mar.)

136. A 19,294 20 Mar. After long negotiation, Yugoslavia joins the three-power pact, after restricting German concessions, German declaration of guarantee and promise of territorial gains (Exit to the Aegain). (Compare A 18,320).

137. A 19,307 22 Mar. USA press emphasizes cooling off of German-Russian relations, conviction that Russia will not let herself be drawn into war.

138. A 19,307 22 Mar. *Russian-Turkish non-aggression pact* in case of an attack by third power. According to C VIII/41,128, is considered as pointed at Germany.

139. A 19,344 25 Mar. Naval Attaché in Moscow points to the *considerable strength of the Russian fleet built or under construction*.

140. A 19,387 28 Mar. FF. Overthrow of the Government and formation of an anti-German government in Yugoslavia (Compare BL. 375). Russian request to make available German training personnel for cruiser "L". Chief Naval Operations (SKL) considers compliance feasible for military-political reasons.

141. A 19,423 31 Mar. In the revolution in Yugoslavia American machinations are strongly involved (Russians not mentioned, compare, however, proclamation of Fuehrer dated 22 June 41, T.C. of 23 June—Remark by B.)

142. A 20,27 3 April FF. According to a Roumanian report; the impression exists that certain agreements between Russia and Yugoslavia—offer of war material—have influenced developments there. In Yugoslavia, rising of pan-Slavic movement. (Compare BL.13).

Balkan Operations [translator's note: (foot note). Meant by that is probably the extension of operations to Yugoslavia (Remark by B.)] *delayed "Barbarossa" at first for about 5 weeks.* All measures, which can be construed as *offensive actions*, are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.

143. A 20,59 5 Apr. According to Roumanian diplomatic report, great anxiety in Russia about German attack, sympathy for Yugoslavia.

144. A 20,69 6 Apr. C VIII/41,141. *German entry into Greece, Yugoslavia.* Few hours before hand *conclusion of Russian-Yugoslavian pact of friendship*, evaluated as clearly pointed against Germany; considered as not too important by Chief Naval Operations (SKL), since there is no common border. "Position of Russia" at the moment is one of quietness and waiting; apparently firmly decided for neutrality toward Germany. (Compare German note to Russia of 22 June 41, Figure V).

145. A 20,99 8 Apr. Fear of Germany still a decisive factor of Russian policy, change in neutrality only anticipated in case of serious weakening of Germany; but increasing coolness unmistakable. (Compare BL.113, 9 April).

146. A 20,125 10 Apr. Russian war council, under Timoshenko: State of emergency and *increased military preparations for all units on the Western front.*

147. A 20,151 12 Apr. Russian attitude still not clear toward Balkan development, which is being regarded with dissatisfaction.—*Economically cooperative as before.* Signing of a new oil delivery treaty.

148. A 20,173 13 Apr. *Conclusion neutrality pact Russia/Japan.*

149. A 20,219 10 Apr. German Balkan successes lead to the "return of Russia to the previous correct attitude." Conclusion of Russian-Japanese pact "shows failure of the Anglo-American attempt to activate Russia against the three powers of the pact". English attempts, however, are being continued (BL.252). Russian attitude toward Germany further improved, however, military preparations on the Russian border proceed.

150. C VII/41,70 20 Apr. *Naval Supreme Commander with Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka's visit, and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact (14 April). Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, "that Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself." Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladivostok, and to cause her to attack Singapore. Above standpoint of the Fuehrer has effected Russia's position favorably, who is now behaving very correctly and does not expect an attack.*

Naval Supreme Commander asks "what opinion the Fuehrer has about the presently recognizable new Russian change of mind in a decisive pro-German sense". Fuehrer replies as above.

151. A 20,295 21 Apr. Relief of tension Russia-Finland (by Russia's giving in BL.315). Russia at present eager to avoid every incident.

152. A 20-341 24 Apr. Naval Attaché in Moscow reports considerable extent of rumors: danger of war Germany-Russia, fed by transient travellers from Germany. English Ambassador predicts as day of outbreak of war 22 June!

153. A 20,354 25 Apr. According to the declarations in the English House of Commons, no great progress in the improvement of Anglo-Russian relations; English efforts will be continued.

154. A 20,413 29 Apr. Moscow radio reports landing of four German transports with 12,000 men in Finland.

155. A 21,1 1 May. Proclamations by Stalin and Timoshenko on account of first of May, show that Russia is striving with all means at her disposal to keep out of the war, and on account of the fluid international to prepare for any eventualities. Further urgent war preparations and measures for the protection of the Russian western border (BL.14).

156. A 21,13 2 May. According to English press, Anglo-Russian negotiations for the conclusion of a political treaty have failed.

157. A 21,30 3 May. According to a report of the Naval Attaché in Moscow, no conspicuous or more extensive military preparations visible. (Compare, however, report by Ambassador BL.141).

158. A 21,51 5 May. English radio speaks of stronger indication of German attack on Russia.

159. A 21,66 6 May. Appointment of Stalin as chairman of the council of people's commissioners; according to the Chief Naval Operations (SKL) this means: concentration of the entire executive power, strengthening of the government authority and "desire to continue the present foreign policy, *avoidance of conflict with Germany.*"

160. A 21,28 7 May. The appointment of Stalin is evaluated in neutral countries—even in the USA—as *an indication of closer cooperation with Germany and of an all-inclusive agreement between Germany and Russia.*

161. A 21,125 10 May. Moscow withdraws diplomatic recognition from the Norwegian, Belgian, Yugoslavian representations (apparently a friendly gesture toward Germany)—compare BL.156. In the opinion of the Naval Attaché Stalin "*the bearer of German-Soviet cooperation!*"

161a. A 21,235 17 May. Evaluation of Russian policy in Turkish diplomatic circles: Russia wants to satisfy Germany by the last Russian declaration, by the expulsion of the diplomats of territories, occupied by the Germans, and above all, by extensive deliveries, and also to relieve all doubts on the political scene. One can count on a new German-Russian understanding, for the purpose of which Stalin took over the office of prime-minister!—(Report from the Embassy).

162. C VII/41,162 22 May. *Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Supreme Naval Commander* declares all preparations for the holding back of the war materials consigned to Russia have been made. In the near future it will be explained to the Russian navy that, because of our own need, there may be small delays in the deliveries, without endangering the whole. *Fuehrer* agrees.

163. A 21,439 29 May. Begin of the preparatory warship movements for "Barbarossa".

164. A 21,454 30 May. Demands urgently decisive offensive

Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 division is needed for that: "*This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London*"! Chief Naval Operations (SKL) agrees completely, and expresses himself in the same manner as stated below under No. 168.

165. A 22,29 4 June. Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia. Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany.

166. A 22,31 4 June. On suggestion of the commander of the submarines (B.d.V). Most economic use of submarines in the Baltic in case "Barbarossa"; bright nights; no unnecessary use for operations where Navy is not deciding; instead full use against England.

167. A 22,53 6 June. *Ambassador in Moscow reports. . . .* Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly—as far as can be recognized only defensive. *Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany as good.*

168. C VII/41,173 6 June. *Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) Observation on the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war:* This memorandum was presented to the Fuehrer by Naval Supreme Commander according to BL.124 in heavily condensed form and was submitted apparently mainly for the purpose of increased *Italian* conduct of the war in the Mediterranean; *it represents one of the most important documents of the war records.* It is yet to be determined whether and to which offices in the Fuehrer's headquarters, it was submitted. The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the near east. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present favorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the near east with help from the USA. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly, demands, however, that the undertaking "Barbarossa" "*which because of the magnitude of its aims, naturally stands in the foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces leadership, must under no circumstances hear*

to an "abandonment, diminishing a delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean." (BL.176). It states furthermore that, despite the strain on the German armed forces by the operation "Barbarossa", the complete operational exploitation of the great successes achieved lately "must be carried out at a time when the help of the USA for England has not as yet attained a decisive extent". (BL.179). In a note of the Chief First Naval District (1/SKL) of 18 Aug. 43, it says in this connection: "At that time, it was also the conviction of the Chief Naval Operations (SKL), that the war against Russia was inevitable, after Stalin had proved himself as a blackmailer by his behavior (Baltic States, Bessarabia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria). (Pencilled marginal note: Thus the Chief Naval Operations (SKL) did not know the real extortions?) About on 15 June the Fuehrer, in a dinner speech of 1½ hours, explained in the presence of all the higher commanders of the armed forces, in all inclusive, convincing explanation, that the eastern campaign was inevitable, and that we therefore must conduct it in a preventive and offensive manner to avoid that the Russians could overrun us at a later time after longer appropriate preparations, when we are tied down in other sectors. —" Certainly, the opinion which the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) then had has been decisively influenced by the generally spread confidence that the campaign against Russia could be completed victoriously in a few months. — (Remark by B.)

169. A 22,65 7 June. From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow. . . . All observations show, that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, *are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany*. The entire behavior of the government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany, prove the same thing.

170. A 22,121 12 June. London expects a *fundamental change of German-Russian relations* and sees a German explanation on the development of German-Russian relations.

171. A 22,123 12 June. Directive of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) to prevent German commercial ships, destined for Russian ports, from leaving by a fictitious reason.

172. A 22,138 13 June. According to Finnish reports, for the first time Russian patrol activity at the Western exit of the Gulf of Finland.

173. C VIII/41,247 14 June. Official declaration by the Russian Tass-agency, which turns against rumors of the coming

German-Russian war; emphasizes conscientious fulfillment of the pact by both parties — The declaration is evaluated by the German side, as an attempt to make Germany as the aggressor in case of a possible attack. (Compare A 22,149)

174. A 22,151 14 June. Speech by the *Fuehrer* before the highest armed forces of the commands about the background and intended execution of "Barbarossa" (compare No. 168, memorandum by the Chief, First Naval District (1/SKL))

175. A 22,154 14 June. Further Russian security measures in the Gulf of Finland. (Compare BL.205, 235)

176. A 22,161 15 June. Enemy and neutral press discuss tension in the German-Russian relationship. Some consider immediate impending German advance as inevitable. Compare BL. 172: *Stalin prepared to extreme concessions: leading army circles against further policy of compliance.*

177. A 22,165 15 June. On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations (SKL) (Compare BL.218,236) use of arms against Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.

178. A 22,179 16 June. Permission of veiled aerial observation of the operational area for "Barbarossa" by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL); violations of neutrality are to be avoided under all circumstances.

179. A 22,188 17 June. Directive of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL), that naval war measures in the case of "Barbarossa" are to be directed in such a way *that the main emphasis of the use lies still in the warfare against England.* Aim of the Baltic naval warfare to paralyze the enemy by our own initiative to avoid large own losses, and to increase our own freedom of movement. The lifespan of the Russian fleet depends after all on the progress of land operations.

180. A 22,195 17 June. *Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) confirms "D" day 22 June.*

181. A 22,203 18 June. On proposal of Chief Naval Operations (SKL), directive of the Air force, Supreme Commander, that Russian ships and port installations are to be spared during aerial attacks.

182. A 22,243 20 June. The Admiral South-East receives directive from the Chief Naval Operations (SKL) that the Black Sea missions are absolutely defensive, since Roumania, at first, is not to be considered as being in a state of war.

183. A 22,258 21 June. Reconnaissance of the Baltic theater of operations shows Russian readiness, laying of mine barriers, but no striking movements, no symptoms that Russians are set for imminent German operations. Apparently, battle ships still continue target practice! —

184. The contemplated German offensive mine barriers were laid according to plan, apparently unnoticed, the German submarines are in alert positions and assembling, also the S-flotillas. All shipping will be stopped from 2000 hours on.

185. A 22,267 22 June [1941]. *Begin of hostilities against Russia*. Our own operations were not disturbed by the enemy, although they are taking place in his immediate vicinity. The outbreak of hostilities has stimulated movements and activity of Russian Naval forces only moderately. Symptom of energetic offensive reaction against the German attack cannot be recognized on the evening of the first day on the enemy's side.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-171

Minutes of a meeting between the C-in-C of the Navy
and the Fuehrer on 1.7.44

"5 (b) Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody's lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings."

* * * * *

[signed] Doenitz

DISTRIBUTION: C-in-C of the Navy Copy Nr. 1, 1 SKL for circulation, subsequently to KTB Teil C Heft VII Copy 1 Copy Nr. 2, KTB Teil C, Heft VII Copy 2 Copy Nr. 3, Order Copy Nr. 4.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-172

MOST SECRET

FO U/B

Reg. No. Most Secret 111 S.O. only

[Stamp] S. O. Only Access only through an officer.

F.O. U/B

Order No. 1 for "Fall Weiss"

Mining Operation off the Peninsula of Hela

"I. *General Notes* 1. "Fall Weiss" comprises the task of de-

stroying the Polish Armed Forces by a surprise and lightning operation, and this includes the elimination of the Polish Naval Forces, the stopping of Polish maritime trade, and unobtrusive reconnaissance by the Navy of the Baltic and Kattegat,—also the Navy's protection of these against intervention by the forces of a foreign power.”

* * * * *

/Sgd/ Doenitz

DISTRIBUTION: Group East Copies 1-2, Fleet Copy 3, S. O. Reconnaissance Forces Copy 4, F. O. (U/B) Copy 5, F. O. (U/B) East Copy 6, *Chief of U-boat Flotillas* 6th U—Flotilla Copy 7, 3rd U—Flotilla Copies 8-10, S. O. (Naval Air Force) Copy 11, Spare Copies 12-15.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-174

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
WFA/Abt. L. Nr 22070/40 G. Kdos. Chefs.
[Initialled by Fricke]

Berlin, 1.3.1940

9 Copies 3rd. Copy.

MOST SECRET

TOP SECRET By Officer only

Directive for "Fall Weseruebung"

1. The development of the Situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces ("Fall Weseruebung"). This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic, further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain. The part which the Navy and the Air Force will have to play, within the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the interference of British Naval and air striking forces.

In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the "Fall Weseruebung" will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle, we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a *peaceful* occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments

at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and Air Force, will provide the necessary emphasis. If in spite of this resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it.

2. I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps, General d. I. [der Infanterie-of the Infantry] v. Falkenhorst (Commander of "Group XXI").

In questions of the conduct of operations the above named is directly under my orders. The Staff is to be completed from all the three branches of the Armed Forces.

The force which will be selected for the purpose of "Fall Weseruebung" will be under separate command. They will not be allocated for other operational theatres.

The part of the Air Force detailed for the purpose of the "Weseruebung" will be tactically under the orders of Group XXI. After the completion of their task they revert to the command of Ob.d.L. [Commander in Chief of the Air Force].

The employment of the forces which are under direct Naval and Air Force command will take place in agreement with the Commander of Group XXI.

The administration and supply of the forces posted to Group XXI will be ensured by the branches of the Armed Forces themselves according to the demands of the Commander.

3. The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place *simultaneously*. I emphasize that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures.

It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be *taken by surprise* by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.

In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives. The troops may be acquainted with the actual objectives only after putting to sea.

4. *Occupation of Denmark* ("Weseruebung Sued").

Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to Skagen and to the east coast. In Seeland bases will be captured

early on. These will serve as starting points for later occupation. *The Navy* will provide forces for the securing of the connection Nyborg—Korsoer and for swift capture of the Kleine—Belt—Bridges as well as for landing of troops should the necessity arise. She will also prepare the defense of the coast.

The Air-Force will provide squadrons, the primary object of which will be demonstrations and dropping of leaflets. Full use of the existing Danish ground defenses and air defense must be ensured.

5. *Occupation of Norway* ("Weseruebung Nord")

The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops as well as the transport of the forces which will have to be brought to Oslo in a later stage of the operation. She will escort supplies and reserves on the way over by sea.

Preparations must be made for speedy completion of coastal defence in Norway.

The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defence and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain.

6. Group XXI will make regular reports to the OKW concerning the state of preparations and will submit a chronological summary of the progress of preparations. The shortest necessary space of time between the issue of the order for "Weseruebung" and its execution must be reported.

Intended Battle Headquarters will be reported.

Code names: Wesertag—the day of the operation. Weserzeit—"H" hour.

(Signed) A. HITLER.

Distribution: O. C. Group XXI Copy No. 1, C. in C. Army Copy No. 2, C. in C. Navy Copy No. 3, C. in C. Air Force Copy No. 4, *Supreme Command Armed Forces*, Head W.F.A. [Wehrmachtsfuehrungsant—operational H.O. Armed Forces.] Copy No. 5, L. Section Copy Nos. 6-9.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-175

TOP SECRET

Berlin, 24.6.1937
S.O. only

[Stamp] Access only through an Officer.

The Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces.

No. 55/37 Most Secret, S.O. only L Ia

4 Copies 2d Copy.

Subject: "Directive 1937/38"

Reference: W.A. 36/36 S.O. Only L Ia of 26.6.36.

[Ink note—AI op. 34/37 Gkdos Chefs. Received 25.6.]

Written by an Officer.

*Outgoing documents of a fundamental nature, connected with this
matter are to be written by an officer.*

Enclosed "Directive for Unified Preparation of the Armed Forces for War" comes into force from 1.7.1937. At the same time the "Directive for the unified preparation for a possible war by the Armed Forces Office (W.A.) and the Army, Navy and Air Force" (W.A. 36/36 S.O. only L Ia of 26.6.36.) is superseded and is to be returned to the Armed Forces Office (L Ia) with covering letter by 10.7.37. (Marginal remark in ink:—Iop. 24/36).

I request you to let me know, by 1.9.37 the result of the deliberations which are to be instituted in accordance with part 3 of the directive.

v Blomberg

Distribution: Ob.d.H. (C. in C. Army) 1 Covering letter (Copy 1) 1 Directive (Copy 1) Ob.d.M. (C. in C. Navy) 1 Covering letter (Copy 2), 1 Directive (Copy 2) R.d.L. and Ob.d.L. (Reich Minister for Air and C. in C. Air Force) 1 Covering Letter (Copy 3) 1 Directive (Copy 3) W.A. (L) (Ordnance Dept.) (6) 1 Covering letter (Copy 4) 2 Directives (Copies 4 and 5)

(Remark in ink) : MI op. 34.37 Gkdos Chefs.

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, 55/37 *Most Secret*
S.O. Only L Ia

Berlin, 24 June 37.
 5 Copies Copy No. 2.

[Stamp] Top Secret Access Only through an Officer
Written by an Officer
 (Ink note—AI op 34/37 Gkds Chefs)

Directive

For the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war
 (Valid from 1.7.37 until presumably 30.9.1938)

Contents

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| Part 1. General Guiding Principles..... | 3 to 8 |
| Part 2. Probable Wars (Kriegsfalle) (Strategic Concentrations). 9 to 17 | 9 to 17 |
| Part 3. Special Preparations..... | 18 to 22 |

Part 1

General Guiding Principles

1. The *general political situation* justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Indications of this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the lack of preparedness for war of a number of States and of Russia in particular.

The intention to unleash a European War is held just as little by Germany.

Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German Armed Forces.

- a. to counter attack at any time
- b. to make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur.

Preparations of the Armed Forces for a possible war in the Mobilization Period 1937/38 must be made with this in mind. They must therefore be arranged to meet various possibilities and are subdivided into:

- a. General preparations (vide Section 2)
- b. Work, in the form of plans for strategic concentration, on hypothetical wars (Kriegsfalle) which, owing to their proba-

bility stand high on the list. In this, subordinate establishments should also play a part. (See Section 3.)

c. Special preparations in the shape of dissertations and deliberations which are generally confined, however, to the High Commands (Special preparations vide Section 4).

2. *General preparations* cover the following:

a. The permanent preparedness of the German Armed Forces for mobilization, even before the completion of rearmament and full preparedness for war.

b. Further work on "Mobilization without public announcement" in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise both as regards strength and time of attack.

c. Work on the transport of the bulk of the serving army from East Prussia to the Reich.

d. Preparatory measures in case German territory is violated suddenly by a foreign power with hostile intent."

* * * * *

3. Among the *probable wars* [Kriegsfalle] for which *concentration plans are being drafted are:*

I. War on two fronts with the main struggle [Schwerpunkt] in the West (Strategic Concentration "Rot")

II. War on two fronts with the main struggle in the South East (Strategic Concentration "Gruen")

For details, see Part 2 of the Directive.

4. *Special preparations* are to be made against the following eventualities:

I. Armed intervention against Austria (Sonderfall Otto)—(Ink note — dealt with)

II. Warlike complications with Red Spain (Sonderfall Richard)

III. England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us. (Sonderfall "Erweiterung—i.e. Extension of—Rot/Gruen")"

* * * * *

[Translator's Note: The following paragraphs state that the assumption is to be made that Germany will have no allies at first anyway, and that liaison must be carried out between branches on the basis of this directive, which covers only the opening stages of a war.]

The *Directive for the conduct of war* itself and the *designation of war aims* which depend on the political and thus also on the general military and economic situation at the beginning of a war, will come through me from the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander.

I Blomberg"

Part 2.

Probable Wars [*Kriegsfalle*]

(Strategic Concentrations)

I. *War on Two Fronts with the main struggle in the West.*
(Strategic Concentration "Rot")

* * * * *

[Translator's Note: *Suppositions* regarding the attitude of various countries are detailed. The opening of war may be in the nature of a surprise attack by the French Army and Air Force. The German Armed Forces must be prepared to employ their main strength in the West. Details of tasks of (a) Army, (b) Navy and (c) Air Force are given.]

II. [The whole of II is crossed out in pencil, and a handwritten note reads—"II is superseded by Ob.d.W. 94/37 dated 7.12.37"—translator's note]

War on two fronts with the main struggle in the South East
(Strategic Concentration "Gruen")

1. *Suppositions.* The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify such an action politically and in the eyes of international law must be created *beforehand.*"

* * * * *

[Translator's Note: Possible enemies and neutrals are then detailed.]

2. *The task of the German Armed Forces* is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear cover for this attack. The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia."

* * * * *

[Translator's Note: Section 3 details the tasks of Army, Air Force and Navy]

*Part 3.**Special Preparations.*

The following 'special cases' are to be considered inside the High Commands generally without consulting outside authorities.

I. (The whole of I is struck out and there is a marginal note—"superseded".) *Sonderfall "Otto"*

"Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy."

The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration.

Making use of the domestic political dissension of the Austrian people, there will be a march to this end in the general direction of Vienna and any resistance will be broken."

* * * * *

[Translator's Note: Four paragraphs omitted. "Otto" is to be prepared as an isolated action although "Gruen" may develop from it.]

II. *Sonderfall "Richard"* "Warlike complications with Red Spain".

In the Spanish Civil War lies the danger that, through accidental or provoked incidents, conflict may arise between Germany and Red Spain which can lead to a state of war between the two governments.

Preparatory deliberations to meet this eventuality are to be instituted only by the Navy. For the Army and Air Force it will remain a matter of assisting White Spain with material and personnel, as has been the procedure up to now. Sections of the Air Force may possibly be placed under the command of the Navy.

III. *Sonderfall "Erweiterung Rot/Gruen."* The military and political starting point used as a basis for strategic concentration plans "Rot and Gruen" may be rendered more acute if either England, Poland or Lithuania, or all three countries mentioned, join the side of our opponents from the beginning of the war.

Thereon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland.

Nevertheless deliberations are to be instituted by way of supplement to the strategic concentration plans "Rot" and "Gruen" to meet the eventuality of the failure of this intention of the political leadership.

The following *premises* are to be the basis for the deliberations:

a. England: England will employ all her available economic and military resources against us. She will at first support France with sea and air forces and eventually try to win Belgium and possibly Holland too as bases.

b. Poland: That Poland should take part in an opening of hostilities against us, if possible at the side of Russia, is, in view of the present political situation, more than improbable. Should it nevertheless come to this, then Poland's land concentration against Germany would take place in a form which is, in essence, known to us, in order to gain first of all East Prussia and, in conjunction with Czechoslovakia, Silesia.

With her Air Force she will, in addition to using parts of it against East Prussia, take part in a joint Czech and Russian attack against the Reich, and at sea she will cooperate with the Russian Fleet to cut communications between East Prussia and the Reich.

c. Lithuania: Lithuania will, above all, serve the Russian Air Force as an advanced base. An attack on land need only be reckoned with in combination with Poland or after the arrival of Russian Army forces in Lithuania.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-176

[Extracts from War Diary, Admiral Bachmann,
F.O.I.C., Western France]

10.12.42 About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS-Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to FOIC's Flag Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not been concluded. Interrogations up to date have produced important information concerning organization and training of the Commandos.

After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been directed to get approval direct from Headquarters.

1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service authorities at Fuehrer's headquarters to postpone the shooting for 3 days. Interrogations continued for the time being.

11.12.42 0030. Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit (*strength 1/16*) belonging to N.O.I.C. Bordeaux, in the

C-176

presence of an officer of the Security Service, Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer.

(Note in green pencil in margin opposite above entry: "Security Service should have done this. Phone FOIC in future cases.")

The operation was particularly favored by the weather conditions and the dark night.

(signed) BACHMANN

The following two signals refer to the shooting of prisoners:

1. C-in-C Navy Group West. Paris, 22.12.42.

To: FOIC, Western France.

Subject: Act of sabotage in Bordeaux harbor.

Ref. Gkdos 6447 of 15.12.42.

According to a previous signal, the shooting of the two saboteurs by a detachment from NOIC, Bordeaux, was carried out at 0030 on 11.12.42.

As the execution of saboteurs is a matter for the Security Service, it is ordered that in future cases delinquents are to be handed over to the Security Service to be shot.

2. F.O.I.C., Western France 31.12.42.

No. 6743 A1a.

To: Sea Defense Commandant, Gascogne.

N.O.I.C., Bordeaux

In future cases, it is ordered that saboteurs are to be handed over to the Security Service to be shot, as the execution of saboteurs is a matter for the Security Service.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-178

Berlin, 11. 2. 1943

Naval War Staff

New: Reg. No. 1. Skl Ii 446/43 Top Secret

requested by: 3rd Skl. 1219 g. of 2/1/43.

Top Secret

[Pencil note:] I suggest informing Chief 3/SKL-Ic—the subordinate commanders are informed.

Top Secret, to be transmitted by officer courier.

I Via Ia to be shown to 1./SKL (Naval War Staff.)

Subject: *Treatment of Saboteurs:*

From the notice given by 3/SKL (Naval War Staff) on February 1st 43 it has been discovered that the competent depart-

ments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone enquiry at 3/SKL proved that this Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of this situation, reference is made to figure 6 of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 42. (Appendix to volume No. 1. SKL I Ops 26 367/42 Top Secret of October 28. 42) according to which all commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.

The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18. 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1. SKL. 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of October 27.42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely because it is stated therein:

1. That, according to the Fuehrer's views the spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East *and* West may have pretentious consequences for our whole conduct of the war and

2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even *after* they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.

On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is not at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy "Commando Operations" would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered.

Practical difficulties may develop because of the definition of the term "sabotage units". The annihilation instructions, according to figure 5 of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 1942, do not apply to troops participating in *large scale* landing operations and *large scale* air borne operations. The criterion is to be found in that in the latter case an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or more people who land by sea or air or drop by parachute not to fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge or a railway installation, would fall into the category of those who must be annihilated.

It is to be assumed that Security III is acquainted with the Fuehrer order and will therefore reply accordingly to the objections of the Army General Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff. As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the C-in-C of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units.

II Ii

[Initials illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-179

BERLIN, 28 October 1942

Naval War Staff

Ref. No. 1 SKL I Op. 26367/42 Most Secret

To:—*See Distribution.*

Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.

This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction.

PP: In Draft signed:

WAGNER

Checked

TOP SECRET

Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942

The Fuehrer

No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt.

12 Copies

1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could other-

wise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the fact of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3. I therefore order: From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW Stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured—in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.

6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

Signed: Adolf Hitler.

Distribution:

General Army Staff, 1st Copy
 Chief of Army Armament and C-in-C Reinforcements, 2nd Copy
 Supreme Command of the Navy/Naval War Staff, 3rd Copy
 C-in-C Air Force/Air Force Ops Staff, 4th Copy
 C-in-C Armed Forces Norway, 5th Copy
 C-in-C Armed Forces Netherlands, 6th Copy
 C-in-C Armed Forces South East, 7th Copy
 C-in-C Armed Forces Eastern province, 8th Copy
 C-in-C Armed Forces Ukraine, 9th Copy
 C-in-C Armed Forces West, 10th Copy
 (Mountain) Army High Command 20, 11th Copy
 C-in-C German Troops in Denmark, 12th Copy
 C-in-C South, 13th Copy
 Panzer Army Africa, 14th Copy
 German General attached to H.Q. Italian Armed Forces, 15th
 Copy
 Reichsfuehrer—SS and Chief of German Police and for H.Q.
 Security Police, 16th-17th Copies
 Supreme Command Armed Forces/AWA, 18th Copy
 A/Ausl./Abw., 19th Copy
 W.R., 20th Copy
 Armed Forces propaganda, 21st Copy
 Armed Forces Ops Staff (Army) }
 (Navy) } Ktb, 22nd Copy
 (Air Force) }
 Organization }
 Qu(draft) } 23rd Copy

Note for Distribution:

These instructions are not to be distributed over and above
 the Battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services.
 After notification, those copies distributed over and above the
 Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must
 be withdrawn and destroyed.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-182

TOP SECRET

Berlin, 11th March 1938

2045 hrs.

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW L 1 a No. 427/38 Top Secret
C-in-C Navy [pencil note] has been informed

35 Copies

6th Copy

Re: Operation Otto

Directive No. 2

1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.

2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

I expect the set objectives to be reached, by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

[signed] Adolf HITLER

[initialled by Jodl and possibly Warlimont]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-189

Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the "KARLSRUHE".

1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement of D. and E. (defensive weapons).

Fuehrer's instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton (ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated.

2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore, from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 centimeter guns (like the King George class).

3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of U-boats completely secret, also in consideration of the Saar Plebiscite.

[Translator's note: This document is in Raeder's writing but is not signed.]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-190

Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the "EMDEN". [Memorandum of Raeder].

1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labour Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.

2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have 6 U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political situation in the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this point in mind and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence.*

* The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-191

Demands of F.O. U-boats and military possibilities of carrying them out.

Berlin, 22 Sept. 1939

1 Copy

1. *F.O. U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights.*

Previous instructions, permitting attacks on French war- and merchant-ships only as a defensive measure, purely French or Anglo-French convoys only North of the latitude of Brest, and for bidding attacks on all passenger ships, give rise to great difficulties for U-boats, especially at night. In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected,

the measures desired by F.O. U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.

In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without light. This instruction was approved on 21.9 by C-in-C Navy.

* * * * *

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-194

Berlin W. 35, 6 March 1936

Tirpitzufer 72-76 Telephone B1 Kurfuerst 8191

Reich Minister for War and C in C of the Armed Forces.

WA No. 415/36 Most Secret. L. Ib. S.O. only

Re: C in C Navy AI Op. Most Secret, dated 6 March 1936

Written by an Officer.

C in C Navy

B. Nr. AI op 16/36

To be shown to C in C Navy [pencil note]
[illegible notations]

To: C in C Navy

The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:

1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German Bay, not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-day onward, has been approved. C in C Air Force will instruct Air Command VI from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance aircraft to be at the disposal of the C in C Fleet.

2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat reconnaissance line, until the evening of 7 March. The immediate transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has been approved.

3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as the first counter-measures to be taken against military preparations of neighbouring states. It is far more essential to examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous measures could not be omitted.

By order

Sgd. KEITEL

Most Secret Top Military Secret

Berlin 6.3.36

C in C Navy
A.I. op. 100 Most Secret.
S.O. only

Written by an Officer.

[illegible notations]

Special Order.

1. This order will be forwarded by an authorized officer who has been instructed at the same time to pass on verbally procedures pertaining to this order.

2. Until special orders are issued, no measures showing military preparations are to be taken except those instituted by me personally.

3. *Measure "Ludolf"* Inconspicuous air reconnaissance in German Bay, carried out under S.O. Naval Air Forces in accordance with the instructions given by Fleet Command. Not over the line from Texel to Doggerbank and out of sight of land.

C in C Air Force will issue instructions to Air Command VI and to S.O. Naval Air Forces, who will carry out the duties allotted by the Fleet.

Measure "Urian" Setting up a U-boat reconnaissance line F.O. U-boats in accordance with the instructions given by Fleet Command. Out of sight of land and not further west than Hook of Holland—Lowestoft. The measure is to be carried out *unseen*.

4. After the entry has been made (7 March—Z day 1200), the following measures are to be taken:

a. There must be a staff-officer continually on watch at all higher staffs. The C.O.'s must be available at all times.

b. Military leaders as far as and including Flotilla-leaders are to be informed verbally and in detail, and the importance is to be stressed of keeping to the regulations issued by me in this order.

c. As far as this is possible by *inconspicuous* measures such taking over fuel, remaining in port instead of putting out to sea etc., the state of readiness may be increased.

d. Until further orders are issued, no measures except possible safety measures considered to be required, must be taken which could show outwardly any military preparations in case a conflict should arise, i.e. recall from leave, strengthening the watches, cessation of dockyard work, conspicuous movement of troops.

5. After the entry has been made the attention of the troops is to be drawn to the significance of the day by means of the

Fuehrer's speech and the official publications. Troops are to be informed that I expect the Navy responsibly conscious of the leader's decision, not to give a false picture to foreign nations of the Fuehrer's intentions and thereby render peaceful action more difficult, by celebrating and making a show of their war enthusiasm.

Their troops are to be instructed by their immediately superior officer. No special concentrations under higher ranking Commanding Officers are to take place.

6. As soon as specific advance measures are necessitated by the fact that neighbouring countries have become aware that military measures are being taken, special instructions will be issued. They will presumably be limited at first to the following measures, which can be prepared in great secrecy by the staffs:

a. Increasing the state of readiness of the Fleet (fuel, provisions, materials, personnel).

b. Concentration in assembly ports (focal point the North Sea as nothing can be expected at first from Russia owing to the ice).

c. Equipping of U-boats for duties in distant sea-areas (focal point channel, possibly single boats in the Eastern Baltic). (Marginal note: Equipping with "DE" for warfare in the Atlantic.)

d. Strengthening the air defense by manning the most important batteries with active personnel, drawing on the local reserve personnel.

e. Preparation of important auxiliary ships (mine-layers, etc.).

f. Increased measures for guarding (Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (coastal) etc.).

g. Preparation of protective barrages (keeping ready materials, preparing orders). Cessation of dockyard work and/or speeded-up completion of ships lying in the dockyard.

h. Assignment of reconnaissance staffels of the operational Air Force. Confidential instruction to shipping companies to delay German ships putting out to presumably enemy countries, until the situation permits a clear ruling being made.

7. Queries from shipping concerns, regarding the attitude to be assumed, can be answered as follows until new orders of 7 March. 1200 are issued:

At present, there is no cause to take special precautionary measures or to alter sailing plans.

C-in-C Navy
[illegible notations]

Distributions

Flotilla leaderCopy No. 1
 Admiral Commanding in the Baltic.....Copy No. 2
 Admiral Commanding in the North Sea.....Copy No. 3.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-195

Naval OPERATIONAL STAFF

Reg.No. 1/Naval OPERATIONAL STAFF(SKL)Ib 3714/44

top secret

The necessity of putting additional means at the disposal of the Navy and the Merchant Marine.

* * * * *

II. *Relief measures:* The existing measures to raise the capacity of carrying out repairs are not sufficient. It will ease the situation somewhat if manpower will be taken from shipbuilding and set to work on repair work. This is done at the present time. But this is only a temporary solution and can not become a permanent measure, as, otherwise, within a few months the new construction would cease entirely.

In order to improve the manpower situation I consider it necessary to expedite the transfer of still outstanding manpower to the ship-building-yards for the Hansa-Program. The manpower in question amounts to about 8,000 men, who were granted to the RKS, according to a verbal decision made at the occasion of the report to the Fuehrer at the end of September of this year, who, however have not as yet been furnished by the Plenipotentiary-General for the Arbeitseinsatz. Furthermore I propose reinforcing of the ship-yard crews by prisoners from concentration camps and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in submarine construction by the transfer of coppersmiths from the reduced locomotive construction to shipbuilding.

Lately the output of the shipyards has been reduced also through the shortage of coal and electric power. Therefore, I consider it necessary, that the ship-yards be given *priority* for the supply of coal, if possible to build a stock, and they should also be given *priority for the supply of electric power*. Finally I ask that the commissioner for Reichsdefense be requested that shortening of working hours, respectively stoppage of work on the ship-yards may be ordered only after the Reich Ministry for armament and war industry and the High Command of the Navy has been advised and has given approval so that they might make

use in time of any opportunities they have to eliminate the causes for these measures.

A question of particular importance is the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian ship yards. For political reasons decisive action has so far not been taken against this nuisance. While the output of the Scandinavian shipyard workers already amounts to only 75% of the German production, it becomes completely senseless to have ships built abroad, using up our valuable material and our scarce foreign currency if, for example, at present out of every eight new ships in Denmark seven are sunk through sabotage.

The guard kept by military and security service (SD) guards has, in spite of constant reinforcements, proved to be insufficient, above all, it has not been thorough for so long—e.g. the workers may not be searched for explosives on entering the shipyard. Measures for increased combatting the saboteurs themselves are being prepared by the Security service (SD).

* * * * *

2. 12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional manpower (security service agrees to this).

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-39

[Extract from the daily situation report by C. in C. South-West Italy) for 26 Jun. 44]

C. *Partisan Situation.* NORTH OF AREZZO Col. von Gablenz, a member of the staff of O.C. L of C area 10 Army, was captured by bandits. The entire male population of the villages on the stretch of road concerned was taken into custody. It was further announced that all these hostages would be shot if the captured Colonel were not set free within 48 hours.

* * * * *

28 Jun. 44

3. *Partisan Activities.* An undertaking by III/3 Brandenburg Regt against a partisan strong-point in the area 18/20 ended in the destruction of an arms and explosive dump and the release of 5 German soldiers.

As reprisal for the capture of Col. Freiherr von Gablenz so far 560 persons including 250 men have been taken into custody.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-43

NSDAP District Bremen
Holler Allee 79
Tre./H.
District-Organization-Leader

Bremen 26 March 1936

O—Circular—Nr. 41/36.

To all Local—[Ortsgruppen—] and Stuetzpunkt—Leaders.
Confidential
Subject: Reichstag elections on 29 March 1936

By virtue of a demand by the Secretary of the Interior, Party-member Dr. Frick, a report has to be made on civil servants who did not perform their duties in voting on 29 March.

As far as such cases are known in your Ortsgruppe or in your Stuetzpunkt you will report them to me by name till at the latest 3 June. The information will have to be correct under all circumstances. If there are any doubts in regard to the correctness or if there exists any suspicion that civil servants did not vote a note will have to be made with these names so that I can check with the lists here. A negative report will have to be made if necessary.

This circular has to be destroyed immediately after this matter is settled.

HEIL HITLER!

[illegible]

District-organization-Leader

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-44

Copy

Supreme Command of the SA.
Chief of Staff
Z No. 1393/33

SECRET

MUNICH
25 July 1933.
Distribution III

Re:—Publications on the SA.

Further to my instruction Z II 1351/33 dated 11 July 33, I find cause to ask all SA authorities to exercise the greatest caution with regard to any publicity given to the SA service not

only in the press, but also in the information and news sheets of the individual SA units.

Only during the last few days, the Reich Ministry of the Interior, at the request of the Foreign Office, has given strict instructions to all Reich authorities according to which the most severe control is to be exercised on all publications which might give other countries an opening to construe German infringements of the terms of the Versailles Treaty.

As is known from the Geneva negotiations, our opponents have piled up material collected in Germany and submitted to them, which they use against us on every occasion during the conferences.

From this point of view, the information sheets circulating among the subordinate SA units cause the liveliest concern. I hold all higher SA leaders responsible that any such internal information sheets appearing in the district of their command are submitted to the most stringent control *before they go into print*, and I feel compelled to draw attention to the *threat of a prosecution treason*, pronounced by official instructions issued in the last few days, in cases where such reports, printed no doubt in good faith, are publicized and therefore exposed to the danger of falling into the wrong hands.

On principle, picture of the technical specialized units of the SA and SS, in particular of the signal and motorized companies and possibly also of the separate air wings etc., are forbidden, such pictures enabling other countries to prove the alleged formation of technical troop units.

For Chief of Staff:—

SEYDEL

Gruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Central Department

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-46

BERLIN 18 Jan 43.

Reichsicherheitshauptamt
IVCC 2 Allg No 42 523

To All Police H.Q.
Head of Sicherheitspolizei and of Sicherheitsdienst.
Commanders of Sicherheitspolizei and of Sicherheitsdienst.
Representatives of Sicherheitspolizei and of Sicherheitsdienst in
BRUSSELS

For information to:
Senior SS and Police Leaders
Inspectors of Sicherheitspolizei and of Sicherheitsdienst
Departments I to VII.
Sections of Amt IV.

In addition to:
Section I B 3 (12 Copies)
Section II A 1 (2 Copies)
Section II C 3 (1 Copy)
Gst IV (2 Copies)

Ref Concentration Camp HERTOGENBOSCH.

Concentration Camp Hertogenbosch has been set up on the orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Head of German Police with effect from 5 Jan 43. The Camp will at first be used as a transit center for the deportation scheme at present in operation and will come into operation as an internment camp later.

The address is: H.W. Concentration Camp HERTOGENBOSCH, HERTOGENBOSCH, Holland.

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Karl *Chmielewski* is appointed Camp Commandant.

The requisite notification will be given as soon as the camp is available as an internment camp.

The order is not to be distributed down to Kreis and local police level.

Sgd. p.p. MUELLER
Certificate correct (Sgd) Reilich
Chancellery Official.

BERLIN 13 Mar 1943

Reichssicherheitshauptamt
IV C. Allg. No. 42 523

TO:

- (a) All Police H.Qs.
- (b) All Heads of the Sicherheitspolizei and of the S.D.
- (c) All Commanders of the Sicherheitspolizei and of the S.D.
- (d) The Representative of the Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei in BRUSSELS.

For Information to:

- (e) The Senior S.S. and Police Leaders.
- (f) The Inspectors of the Sicherheitspolizei and of the S.D.

- (g) The Departments I to VII.
- (h) Sections of Amt IV.
- (i) S.S. Wirtschafts—Verwaltungshauptamt, Amtsgruppe B—
Concentration Camp—ORANIENBURG.

In addition to:

- Section I B 3 (12 Copies)
- Section II A 1 (2 Copies)
- Section II C 3 (1 Copy)
- Gst IV.

Reference. Concentration Camp HERTOGENBOSCH

My order IV C 2 Allg 42 523 of 18 Jan 43.

Further to the above order I announce that reception of detainees in Concentration Camp Hertogenbosch can now take place. The camp is classed in categories I and II and can be reached via the German telephone exchange in Hertogenbosch. Tel. No. Helvoirt 231.

This order is not intended for circulation to Kreis and local police authorities.

Sgd. p.p. MUELLER
Certified Correct
Sgd BLEECK
Chancellery Official

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-50

Reich Security Main Office [RSHA]
IV C 2 A llg. No. 43 059

Berlin, 9 April 1943

To:

- (a) All State Police Headquarters
- (b) All Heads of the Security Police and of the SD
- (c) All Commanders of the Security Police and of the SD
- (d) The Representative of the Chief of the Security Police
and of the SD in BRUSSELS.
- (e) All Sections and Branches of Amt IV and Section II C 3.

For information to:

- (f) All Senior SS and Police Leaders.
- (g) All Inspectors of the Security Police and of the SD
- (h) The SS Economic-Administrative Main Office, Departmental Group D — Concentration Camps — ORANIENBURG.

In Addition:

- (i) Group I B (12 copies)
- (k) Group II A (2 copies)
- (l) Cst. IV (2 copies)

Subject: Concentration Camp, LUBLIN.

The former P.W. labor camp Lublin has been converted into a concentration camp, on orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. At the same time a women's section has been set up there, to which women may be allocated.

The camp will be classed as category I and II.

The new address is as follows:

Hq. Concentration Camp Lublin
12 Gartenstrasse
Lublin (General Government)

The telephone number is Lublin 3038

This order will not be distributed down to Kreis and local police level.

By order

/s/ MILLER

Certified correct

[SEAL]

/s/ BLEECK Chancellery Official

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-62

Muenster, 21 Jan. 1937

Telephone 26041/42.

The Inspector of War Production, Wkr VI

Br. Nr. 20/37—pers.

(Reply. See encls.

6/2/37.)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Dr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach,

Fried. Krupp A.G.

Essen.

Thomaestrasse.

The Reich Minister for War and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered that a Corps of Economic Leaders of War Production [ein Wehrwirtschaftliches Fuehrer Korps] be recruited with immediate effect.

The Economic Leaders of War Production in collaboration with the Armed Forces, are to be responsible for the preparing and carrying out of the mobilization of the armament industry and for directing it in time of war.

As regards their important task and duties within the armament industry they will correspond approximately to officers of the Reserve in the Army.

A selected small circle of these persons is to act in an advisory capacity to the Armed Forces in all important economic questions both during peace and war.

Subject to your approval I intend to propose to the Reich Minister for War that you should be nominated as Economic Leader for War Production.

It is necessary that certain personal documents should be furnished for this purpose, which I herewith attach with a request that you complete them.

- (1) A questionnaire.
- (2) 3 Card Index Cards (please complete only the right-hand column on the front and the left-hand column on the back of all 3 of them).
- (3) Declaration regarding unreserved attitude towards the National Socialist State.

At the same time I should be grateful if you could let me have:

- (a) 2 photographs signed on the bottom half (approx. 4 x 6 cm.)
- (b) Any existing documents regarding military career, (military identity card, extracts from Army nominal rolls, extracts from nominal rolls during active service, certificate of military service.)

May I ask to have the documents mentioned above mailed to my department, the Inspectorate of War Production Wkr VI, Muenster/Westf., Warendorferstr. 4, under "Confidential" cover.

Heil Hitler!

5 encls.

[signature illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-63

Copy

DECLARATION OF POLITICAL ATTITUDE

I herewith declare that I stand by the National Socialist conception of the State without reserve and that I have not been active in any way against the interests of the people.

I am aware that the correctness of this, my declaration, will be investigated and that any untrue statement will result in my dismissal from the post of Economic Leader of War Production [Wehrwirtschafts-Fuehrer].

I am aware that as a result of any further utterances or actions of mine which constitute an attack against the National Socialist conception of the State, I must expect, in addition to legal proceedings, my dismissal from the post of Economic Leader of War Production.

At the HUGEL,
ESSEN-HUGEL, 6 Feb 1937
(Sgd) Krupp Bohlen Halbach.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-64

Director of the Leading Department,
Certified Engineer JOSEF POECHLINGER
Press Representative of the Reichs
Minister, Dr. TODT.

Berlin, W.8. 12.3.41.
Pariser Place, 3,
Telephone No. 11 6481.

[note in pencil: For attention of Mr. Goerferns]
[Stamp: Reply given as per enclosure, 14.3.41].

Dr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach,
Essen.
at the Huegel.

Dear Dr. Krupp,

By request of the Reichs Minister, Dr. Todt, I am preparing to publish a presentation book for the German armament worker, in which he will be honoured on the account of his hard work for the German armament industry.

The structure of the book is as follows:—

- (1) Dr. Todt Introduction.
- (2) Josef Weinheber. Ode to the German Armaments Worker.
- (3) Josef Poechlinger. "The Meaning of Work".
- (4) M. Schulze-Fielitz (Reichs Ministry for Arms and Munitions), "The Organization of the German Armament Industry".
- (5) Reichs Department Leader Fuehrer (Chief Department of Technology, NSDAP). "The Employment of the Parties for the German Armament Industry".
- (6) ————— "Works Leader and Armament Worker".
- (7) Maier-Dorn, Reichs School Trustee of the National Socialist Union of German Technology. "Front Line Soldier and Armament Worker".

(8) Gauleiter Krebs. "Your Contribution to the Great Reich".

May I ask whether you would be prepared to compile the chapter "Works Leader and Armament Worker"? A work of approximately twenty typewritten pages would be sufficient, in which you would briefly and pleasantly describe, in your capacity of the best-known and most authoritative representative of the German armament industry, the relationship between the works leader and armament worker, as well as your observations, adventures and experiences in connection with the workers.

The article would have to reach me in about four weeks.

I shall be grateful for a brief notification whether you are prepared to take on this work.

Heil Hitler:
Yours very sincerely,
(Sgd.) POECHLINGER.

EXTRACTS FROM DRAFT OF ARTICLE ENTITLED "WORKS LEADER AND ARMAMENTS WORKS" DATED 5 APRIL 41.

Everybody can gather the significance of the outcome of the war for the Krupp works as well as for my wife and myself, without my writing about it at great length. It is general knowledge that hardly any works were so badly hit by the Treaty of Versailles as Krupp. At this point, once more, I should like to reiterate a few shattering figures. After the signing of the peace, values amounting to 104 million goldmarks were destroyed at our works. Nine thousand three hundred machines, with a total weight of 60,000 tons were demolished or destroyed amounting to nearly half of our entire machinery of November 1918. Eight hundred and one thousand, four hundred and twenty pieces of gauges, moulds, jigs and tools, with a total weight of 9588 tons were destroyed. Three hundred and seventy-nine plants, such as presses, hardening ovens, oil and water tanks, cooling plants and cranes were smashed.

In those days the situation seemed hopeless at times. It appeared even more desperate if one remained as firmly convinced as I was that "Versailles" could not represent the end.

Everything in me revolted against believing, and many many Germans felt likewise, that the German people should remain enslaved forever.

I knew German history only too well, and I believed, particularly with my experiences in other parts of the world, that I

knew the German people. For that reason, I never believed that, in spite of all existing evidence to the contrary, a change would come one day; I did not know, nor did I ask myself that question, but I believed in it; but owing to this—and today I can talk about these things, and this is the first time that I do so publicly and at length—owing to this, I emphasize, I, as the responsible leader of the Krupp Works, had to come to conclusions of great significance. If ever there should be a resurrection for Germany, if ever she were to shake off the chains of Versailles, then Krupp would have to be prepared.

The machines were demolished; the tools were destroyed; but one thing had remained—the men, the men at the drawing boards and in the workshops, who, in happy co-operation had brought the manufacture of guns to its last perfection. Their skill would have to be saved, these immense resources of knowledge and experience. The decisions of that period were, probably, amongst the most difficult ones of my life. Even though camouflaged I had to maintain Krupps as an armament factory for the distant future, in spite of all obstacles. Only in a very small and most trustworthy circle could I speak about the actual reasons which caused me to pursue this intention of reorganizing the works for the production of certain definite articles. I had to be prepared, therefore, to be generally misunderstood, probably have ridicule heaped upon myself—as it promptly occurred, of course—but never in my life have I felt the inner urge for my actions as strongly as in those fateful weeks and months of the years 1919-20. Just then I felt myself fully part of the magic circle of the solid community of the workers. I understood the sentiments of my workers, who until now had so proudly worked for Germany's defense and who now were suddenly to undergo what, from their point of view, meant some sort of degradation. I owed it to them, too, to keep my chin up, and think of a better future. Without losing time or skilled men the necessary preparations were made and measures taken. Thus, to the surprise of many people, Krupps concentrated on the manufacture of articles which seemed to be particularly remote from the activities of the weapon-smithy. Even the Allied spying commission was fooled. Padlocks, milk cans, cash registers, rail mending machines, refuse carts and similar rubbish appeared really innocent, and locomotives and motor cars appeared perfectly "peaceful".

In this manner, during years of unobtrusive work, we created the scientific and material conditions which were necessary in order to be ready to work for the Armed Forces of the Reich at the

right hour, and without loss of time and experience. Many a fellow worker will have had his own private thoughts and often have been without a clue, just why he was employed in this and that manner.

The whole reorganization, furthermore, was not only a personnel problem and of a purely technical character, but was also of immense economic significance. Our new production had to meet competition, far superior because of its considerable start.

* * * * *

It was my aim at all times, even when measures for the reduction of personnel were simply unavoidable, to maintain the nucleus of the workers at Krupp, whom we would need one day,—and nothing could deter me from that contention—for the purpose of rearmament.

* * * * *

After the assumption of power by Adolf Hitler I had the satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupp needed only a short period to get ready for the re-arming of the German people and that there were no gaps in our experience. The blood of our comrades had not been shed in vain on that Passion Saturday of 1923. Thus, many a time I was able to walk through the old and new work-shops with him and to experience the gratitude expressed in the cheers of the workers of Krupps.

We worked with incredible zeal during those years after 1933, and finally when war broke out, speed and output increased still further. We are, all of us, proud that we have thus been able to contribute to the tremendous successes of our Forces.

* * * * *

It may appear that this record of mine is of too personal a character. But when I spoke of myself and the business concern in my trust, when I spoke of my experiences and impressions during a long life, I only did so to make the subject "Works Leader and Armament Worker" more colourful and descriptive, in preference to treating it under general headings.

I am standing here not wanting to make myself an example, for many another man who has been put into his key position in the German armament industry through fate, and, I think, his suitability. Like the workers of Krupps, these workers, too, are doing their duty faithfully in many other works. I have always considered it an honour, as well as an obligation, to be the leader of an armaments plant, and I know that the workers of Krupps share these sentiments.

This, thanks to the educational work of the National Socialist Leaders of the State, this is the same everywhere in Germany. What I have said especially about the armament worker applies, and this I know, to simply every German worker; with the help of these men and women, working with all their hearts, cool heads and skilled hands for the great whole, we shall succeed whatever our fate may be.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-66

[This is the presentation certificate for the granting to Krupp of the Shield of the Eagle of the German Reich. A note found in the cover states "The Alderschild has been placed in the centre salon of the North wing of the Main Building." The certificate is worded as follows:]

In the Name
of
the German People
I confer upon
Dr e. c.
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach
the Shield of the Eagle
of the German Reich
with the inscription
"To the German Leader of Industry".
Berlin, 7 August 1940
The Fuehrer

[signed] A. HITLER.

[signed] WALTHER FUNK

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-75

Inspector of the Security Police and Security Service

IV 3. 2 — *Eichholtz 2* —

Dusseldorf. 12 December 1941

SECRET

To the Supreme Reich Security Dept.

— Dept IV —

To hand of SS Gruppenfuehrer Mueller.

To hand of SS Sturmbannfuehrer Hartl.

Berlin

Reference: Secret decree of the Reichsleiter Bormann regarding the relationship of National Socialism to Christendom.

HERE: Protestant Priest Wilhelm Eichholz, Aix-la-Chapelle.

Sub-Reference: Report from the Leading State Police Department, Aix-la-Chapelle dated 3.12.41 II B 2 No. 7472/41—.

Enclosures: 1 copy

1 photostat copy

A copy of a letter on the subject of "Relationship of National Socialism to Christendom" is amongst the written material found with the Protestant Priest Eichholz at Aix-la Chapelle. This is supposed to originate from Reichsleiter Bormann, (Paragraph (12) of the report of the leading State Police Department Aix-la-Chappelle.)

As far as this document is concerned it does, in fact, as I have ascertained, represent a secret decree of the Party Chancellery signed by Reichsleiter Bormann, in which Reichsleiter Bormann clearly points out that National Socialism and Christendom are incompatible and that the influence of the Churches in Germany, including the Protestant Church, must be eliminated. The decree was addressed to Gauleiter Dr. Meyer at Muenster on 6.6.41 under the file reference III D - Es.3320/2/F - 5050 g. in which connection a letter from Gauleiter Dr. Meyer dated 7.4.41 - Dr. M./Bo/I was referred to. I have ascertained that on the 7.6.41 the decree was also sent to the remaining Gauleiters, in this case without a reference to the correspondence with Gauleiter Dr. Meyer. (Circular letter 8/41 - Secret). The circular letter, however, in its first paragraph, the text of which is not yet available, contains a brief pointer to the events which have led to the basic decision of Reichsleiter Bormann. As far as is known to me this concerns a proposal on the part of the German Christians regarding the

setting-up of a Protestant Reichs Church. To this, Gauleiter Dr. Meyer has stated his attitude in a letter dated 7.4.41. Since this first paragraph of the circular decree addressed to all Gauleiters is missing from the document in possession of Priest Eichholz, it appears not unlikely that the original secret decree, addressed solely to Gauleiter Dr. Meyer, was already known to the Church departments.

A copy of the decree addressed to Gauleiter Dr. Meyer is attached herewith. Further, attached herewith is a photostat copy of the document found with the Priest Eichholz. It can be gathered from this that the text of both letters tallies exactly; the document found with Priest Eichholz is devoid of its letterhead and has no address. It is, of course, furthermore, not marked "Secret". A copy of the secret decree was obviously made by a source not yet known and, by means of this, multiplication was carried out by Protestant Church sources in the same form as that found in possession of Priest Eichholz.

On the strength of experiences in this district, the possibility must be taken into consideration that the representations of Reichsleiter Bormann, now that they are in the hands of confessional church circles, may be made known to hostile foreign countries since, through the numerous connections, they may also have reached Catholic sources. In my opinion, the affair confirms clearly the dangerous nature, expressed in the decree, of the Protestant Church and such ties of personalities within the Party.

I have arranged for Priest Eichholz to be arrested for the time being. His present explanation that all documents found on him had been sent to him anonymously is not creditable. It is to be assumed that he is aware of the source of such information or can at least guess, even if they should have been sent anonymously. It will therefore be attempted with all energy to ascertain whence Priest Eichholz has received this document. Further report will take place, for the time being, through State Police Department, Aix-la-Chapelle.

[signed] Dierkamp.

COPY

RELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND
CHRISTIANITY

National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable. Christian churches build on uncertainty of human beings and at-

tempt to preserve the uncertainty of as wide segments of the population as possible, for only in this way can Christian churches keep their power. As opposed to that, National Socialism is based on scientific fundamentals. Christianity has invariable tenets, which were set up almost 2000 years ago and have crystallized in dogmas incompatible with reality. National Socialism on the other hand must, if it is to fulfill its job in the future, always be organized according to the latest knowledge of scientific research.

Christian churches have always recognized the dangers which threaten their existence on account of exact scientific knowledge and therefore attempt by means of pseudo-science, such as theology is, to suppress or falsify scientific research by means of their dogma. Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the concepts of Christianity, which in their essential points have been taken over from Jewry. For this reason also we do not need Christianity.

No human being would know anything of Christianity if it had not been drilled into him in his childhood by pastors. The so-called dear God in no wise gives knowledge of his existence to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner in spite of his omnipotence leaves this to the efforts of the pastors. If therefore in the future our youth learns nothing more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are far below ours, Christianity will disappear by itself.

It is also strange that before the beginning of today's calculation time (calendar) nothing was known of this Christian God and that also since this moment most inhabitants of the earth never learned anything of this Christianity and therefore according to the standard Christian concept were damned from the beginning.

When we National Socialists speak of a belief in God, we do not understand by God, like naive Christians and their spiritual opportunists, a human-type being, who sits around somewhere in the sphere. We must rather open people's eyes to the fact that beside our small universe, highly important in the great universe there are an inconceivably large number of other bodies in the universe, innumerable additional bodies, which like the sun are surrounded by planets, and these in turn by smaller bodies, the moons. The force of natural law, with which all these innumerable planets move in the universe, we call the Almighty or God. The claim that this world force is concerned about the fate of every single being, of every smallest earth bacillus, can be influenced by so-called prayers or other astonishing things, is based

on a proper dose of naivete or (however) on a business shamelessness.

As opposed to that, we National Socialists impose on ourselves the demand to live naturally as much as possible, i.e., biologically. The more accurately we recognize and observe the laws of nature and of life, the more we adhere to them, so much the more do we conform to the will of the Almighty. The more insight we have into the will of the Almighty, the greater will be our successes.

It follows from the irreconcilability of National Socialist and Christian concepts, that a strengthening of existing confessions and every demand of originating Christian confessions is to be rejected by us. A differentiation between the various Christian confessions is not to be made here. For this reason also the thought of an erection of an evangelical National Church by merger of the various evangelical churches has been definitively given up, because the evangelical church is just as inimical to us as the Catholic Church. Any strengthening of the evangelical church would merely react against us.

It was a historical mistake of the German Emperors in the Middle Ages, that they repeatedly created order at the Vatican in Rome. It is always an error into which we Germans unfortunately fall too often, that we attempt to create order where we would needs have an interest in disunion and separation. The Hohenstaufens would needs have had the greatest interest in the disintegration of circumstances of Ecclesiastical power. From the standpoint of the Reich it would have been most favorable if not one pope but at least two, if possible even more popes had existed and mutually fought. Instead of this the German emperors and especially the Hohenstaufens repeatedly looked after order in the church, helped one pope to power over all other rivals, with the success that the emperors, as soon as the pope was again strong enough for it immediately received the first blows from "their" pope. The church however in strengthening its own position of power repeatedly used the particularism of the princes and later of parties and tied it up with all its strength.

In former generations leadership of the people lay exclusively in the hands of the church. The state limited itself to issuing laws and orders and primarily to administering. The real leadership of the people lay not with the state but with the church. The latter exerted via the priest the strongest influence on the life of the individual human being, of families and on the totality (of things). Everything which did not suit the churches was suppressed with unprecedented ruthlessness. For centuries the state

by the most various turns granted to the church the possibility of influence. It depended on the church, whether it would help the state or oppose it. The State was reduced to the aid of the church, it was dependent on it. The struggle of the German Emperors against the pope had to fail in the Middle Ages and repeatedly in modern times, because not the emperor, but the church had the leadership of the people in its hand.

This ideological dependence of the state on the church, the yielding of leadership of the people to the church, had become a matter of course, so that nobody dared to oppose seriously here. To consider this not as an incontrovertible fact from the beginning, passed as absurd stupidity until just before the Machtuebernahme [Hitler's rise to power, 1933].

For the first time in German history the Fuehrer consciously and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand. With the party, its components and attached units the Fuehrer has created for himself and thereby the German Reich leadership an instrument which makes him independent of the church. All influences which might impair or damage the leadership of the people exercised by the Fuehrer with help of the NSDAP, must be eliminated. More and more the people must be separated from the churches and their organs, the pastors. Of course the churches must and will, seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves against this loss of power. But never again must an influence on leadership of the people be yielded to the churches. This (influence) must be broken completely and finally.

Only the Reich government and by its direction the party, its components and attached units have a right to leadership of the people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the state, so must the possibility of church influence also be totally removed. Not until this has happened, does the state leadership have influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are people and Reich secure in their existence for all the future.

We would repeat the mistakes which in past centuries were fatal to the Reich, if we according to the knowledge of our ideological opponents of the Christian confessions were to contribute in any way to the strengthening of one of the various churches. The interest of the Reich lies not in conquering but in preserving and strengthening ecclesiastical particularism.

(signed) M. BORMANN
Reichsleiter

SECRET STATE POLICE.
SECRET STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT.
II B 2—1286/37S.

Berlin,
5 August 1937.

To all leading State Police Departments and State Police Departments.

For Information:—Government Presidents and Government Vice-Presidents in Prussia and the Ministries of the Interior and all regions except Prussia.

Reference:—Protective Custody for Bible Students [Bibelforschers].

Sub-Ref:—Nil.

The Reichs Minister of Justice had informed me that he does not share the opinion voiced by subordinate departments on various occasions, according to which, the arrest of the Bibelforschers after they have served a sentence, is supposed to jeopardize the authority of the Law Courts. He is fully aware of the necessity for measures by the State Police after the sentence has been served. He asks, however, not to bring the Bibelforschers into protective custody under circumstances detrimental to the respect of the law courts.

The Reichs Minister of Justice has instructed his subordinate departments in this connection that protective custody for Bibelforschers, when this has been decreed after the serving of a sentence or after the cancellation of an arrest order, will no longer be carried out in convict prisons which are under the administration of the Courts. At the same time, following my suggestion, he has instructed the departments concerned with the carrying out of the sentences, to notify the appropriate State Police Department of the impending discharge of Bibelforschers under sentence one month before they are discharged. Accordingly I order:—

(1) If a Bibelforscher has been acquitted as the result of a trial, or if part of the sentence is remitted because of remand, an arrest in court under my circular decree dated 22.4.37—II B 2/326/37 S—will not, for the time being, be carried out.

(2) If information regarding the impending release of a Bibelforscher from arrest is received from the authorities carrying out the sentence, my decision regarding the ordering of measures by the State Police, will be asked for in accordance with my circular decree dated 22.4.37, so that transfer to a concentration camp can take place immediately after the sentence has been served. Should a transfer into a concentration camp

immediately after the serving of the sentence not be possible, Bibelforschers will be detained in police prisons.

In each case immediate report must be made.

per pro Mueller.

Certified
(Sgd) (Signature)
Office Employee.

Secret State Police,
Secret State Police Department,
Dusseldorf.

Dusseldorf
23 August 1937

II B/80, 20/2119/I.B.V.

A copy is attached for your information and observation.

The contents of the circular decree dated 22.IV.1937—II B 2—326/37-S—quoted under (1) have been notified by circular letter dated 12.V.1937—II B/1035/37/80.20/I.B.V.

Appendix for the information of Sub-prefects:

Prints for the information of the Burgomasters are attached herewith.

(signed) Kanstein.
Certified correct
(signed) Ramme,
Police Office Assistant,

To the Service Departments, the Sub-prefects, the Police Administration Departments at Neuss and Viersen, and II D in this building.

For correctness of the copy
(signed) Berson,
Employee.

Copy

SECRET STATE POLICE
STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT

DUSSELDORF, 27 Apr 39

DUSSELDORF

II B 2119/37/80.20/JBV:

Reference: Protective Custody for Bibelforschers.

Subject: Reference my circular decree 15 Dec 37, file reference as above.

Bibelforschers have recently been released from detention after having served a sentence without an appropriate decision having been applied for from this department. I therefore draw your

attention once more to my circular decree dated 12 May 37—II B. 1035/38/80, 20/JBV—and that dated 23 Aug 37—II B. 80, 20/2119/JBV—and, in addition, point out the following.

1. In principle, all Bibelforschers are to be taken into protective custody after having served a sentence. Application for protective custody together with necessary details to be made to Service Department II D.

2. If, for exceptional reasons, Bibelforschers are to be released after having served their sentence, a detailed report giving the reasons for this, if necessary with the relative documents, is to be handed to Service Department II B, which will then report to Gestapo accordingly. If no instructions have been received on such a case on the day of the completion of the sentence, these Bibelforschers are to be taken into protective custody for the time being; further instructions will be awaited, since the Gestapo, as is apparent from the contents of the circular decree referred to above, has reserved itself the exclusive decision on the release of Bibelforschers who have served their sentence.

Para 2 of the above will apply even where the Bibelforschers have made convincing statements to the effect that they will not in future be active, or even where they have signed a document to that effect.

I request that the above directives are observed.

Appendix for information of Sub-prefects

Additional prints for the Burgomaster's attention.

(signed) Sommer.

Certified: Signature

Police Office Assistant

To the State Police Service Department.

Sub-Prefects of the Districts.

Police Administration, Neuss and Viersen.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-88

[From "65th Birthday" file, 1935]

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE NAVY,

Berlin 7 August 1935.

W.35, Tirpitzufer 72-76.

Dear Herr Krupp von Bohlen!

It is my heartfelt desire to express to you my sincere congratulations on your 65th birthday. I remember gratefully in this connection your great work for the Imperial Navy and thank you in similar manner now for having again placed at our disposal

for the reconstruction of the Navy your whole personality and your works.

In the hope that you may spend today in the best of health in the circle of your family, I remain, with sincere greetings and kind regards to your wife

and Heil Hitler!

Your very sincere,

RAEDER

Admiral Dr. H. C.

At the Hugel, Essen Hugel, 10 August 1935.

Dear Admiral,

May I express to you my warmest thanks for your kindly congratulations on the occasion of my 65th birthday.

I am particularly grateful to you for the kind recognition of my efforts in the past and the present. It will be my permanent endeavor in the future to maintain the Krupp works on such a level that they will be ready for the requirements of the Army and particularly the Navy at all times. I am happy that I am still able to contribute towards this.

My wife wishes to thank you very much for your kind greetings and remembrances, which she fully returns. I add my expression of the most sincere respect to hers and remain

with Heil Hitler!

Yours always very sincere,

Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-94

Manager and Armament Worker.

By Dr. G. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.

As the trustee of a chosen heritage it has been my understood duty to tie in with a proven tradition and to enter into it not only in formality but in spirit as well. It was not only the tradition of production but also of human leadership. I may admit it has not been particularly difficult for me to accustom myself to this new world, not only because I brought along the readiness of the heart but primarily because the other side, the workers themselves, have made it very easy for me.

The sapling which was once planted by Alfred Krupp and was nursed carefully by Friedrich Alfred Krupp, not to forget his

wife, my mother-in-law Margarethe Krupp, the sapling of loyalty and mutual trust had in the meantime grown to be a formidable tree whose branches and twigs were spreading afar. I stepped in under their protective shade and learned that a century of Krupp tradition has already borne prolific fruit. Since I was chosen to lead the concern they gave me their unreserved support and confidence, by "they" I do not only mean the managing circle with whom I naturally had the most dealings but also the mass of the Krupp workers. They were used to seeing in the Krupp family, which I now embodied next to my wife, not only the employer but also the leading co-worker. This made me proud and modest at the same time.

For 35 years now I have had the opportunity of getting to know the German armaments worker. It was in my blood to respect all honest work, but I may say that this appreciation was increased as my own perception and experience increased. Surely I would be the last one who would not be cognizant of the special importance of the mental labour in industry, the work of the planning construction engineer, the chief engineer, the research chemist and of the supervising administrator,—but year after year I recognized more clearly how immensely the executive group, that is simply the industrious worker with his will and knowledge, shares in the success: co-operation succeeds!

I was present at the tapping of furnaces and admired the calm energy with which the men tamed the unleashed elements, how they handled every operation with sure movements. I observed the comrades in the steel and rolling mills, in the casting mills, in the hammer mills and armour plate works. They were standing for a day or night shift in front of the glowing furnaces and the billowing fumes and calmly executed their hard work. They formed glowing ingots into rails, axles and wheels. Inattentiveness would have meant damage to the piece and a disadvantage to the concern, but they worked unperturbed and carefully; they prided themselves that every piece which was impressed with the three rings, our trademark, was good beyond any criticism. My esteem rose to the highest degree for the armaments workers in the literal sense of the word, the colleagues who were immediately concerned with the production and assembly of guns. Their great intelligence, skill and diligence was and is necessary if the highest demands are to be fulfilled. Responsibility is necessary even in the smallest detail so that, without saying empty phrases, I take off my hat to the achievements of the German armament worker in two wars.

At that time (1919) the situation appeared almost hopeless.

At first it appeared even more desperate if one was not, as I was myself, firmly convinced that "Versailles" did not mean a final conclusion. Everything within me—as within many other Germans—revolted against the idea that the German people would remain enslaved forever. I knew German history well, and, out of my experiences in the rest of the world, I believed to know the German kind; therefore, I never doubted that, although for the time being all indications were against it, one day a change would come. How, I never knew or asked, but I believed in it. But with this knowledge—and today I may speak about these things and for the first time I am doing this extensively and publicly—with this, as responsible head of the Krupp works, consequences of the greatest importance had to be taken. If Germany should ever be reborn, if it should shake off the chains of Versailles one day, the Krupp concern had to be prepared again. The machines were destroyed, the tools were smashed, but the men remained: the men in the construction offices and the shops, who in happy co-operation had brought the construction of guns to its last perfection.

Their skill had to be maintained by all means, also their vast funds of knowledge and experience. The decisions I had to make at that time were perhaps the most difficult ones in my life. I wanted and had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all opposition, as an armament plant for the later future, even if in camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most intimate circles about the real reasons which made me undertake the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production for I had to expect that many people would not understand me, that I would perhaps even be overwhelmed by ridicule, which was actually the case—but I never felt the inner obligation for all of my deeds and actions any stronger than in those fateful weeks and months of the years 1919 and 1920. Just then I felt myself drawn strongly into the magic circle of a firmly established works community. I understand the feelings of my workers, who to date had worked proudly for German arms and who now suddenly had to bear from their point of view, a certain decline of their position—it was my obligation to them not to lose hope, but to think of a brighter future.

Without arousing any commotion, the necessary measures and preparations were undertaken. Thus to the surprise of many people Krupp began to manufacture goods which really appeared to be far distant from the former work of an armament plant. Even the Allied snooping commissions were duped. Padlocks, milk cans, cash registers, track repair machines, trash carts and

similar "small junk" appeared really unsuspecting and even locomotives and automobiles made an entirely "civilian" impression.

After the accession to power of Adolf Hitler I had the satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupps stood ready, after a short warming-up period, to begin the rearmament of the German people without any gaps of experience,—the blood of the comrades of Easter Saturday 1923 had not been shed in vain. Since that time I was often permitted to accompany the Fuehrer through the old and new workshops and to experience how the workers of Krupp cheered him in gratitude. In the years after 1933 we worked with an incredible intensity and when the war did break out the speed and results were again increased. We are all proud of having thus contributed to the heretofore magnificent successes of our army.

The events of the present war especially crystallize the role which fits the relations between employer and employee. In an armament plant all members of the organization from the managing heads to the last unskilled labourer are defense workers; all serve one idea which is crystallized in the orders of the management. Their measures serve only one purpose: to produce a maximum of quantity and quality of armaments. That aim has a technical as well as a human side, only the latter concerns us at this moment, as closely as these two sides are related. Let us not deceive ourselves, the daily work, especially in a large concern, is no pure pleasure, and frequently the typically German will for the ethical foundation of all work is necessary to do this work willingly and cheerfully. Measures of various types, especially in the field of social welfare, enable the head of a concern to cultivate comradeship, as the best help in one's work since comradeship creates good cheer and pleasure in the work and also brings about mutual co-operation. The carefully nursed pride in the profession contributes much to an increase of achievements, and in a well managed concern this pride of profession automatically creates a pride in the concern. With this in mind many of our comrades have suffered through bad times in confidence that if all of us co-operate we will pull through.

In these areas threatened by air attacks the armament worker of 1941 is in the same immediate danger to his life as the soldier. Again I must attest that even under these unusual conditions he does his duty gallantly and calmly. He knows that the law of war means production on the home front—production even if it should be dangerous. That things are running without friction I ascribe, aside from the meritorious military leadership who reduces the threats of air attacks to a minimum, to mutual trust

between management and labour. Everyone of us knows that above business is the idea of service to the country.

Lest we forget at this point the woman, the German woman war worker who is also in our workshops doing her share to the utmost, let us respect these girls and women whose co-operation is helping us win the war.

I have always considered it to be an honour as well as an obligation to be the head of an arms factory and I know that the employees of Krupp share these feelings. Thanks to the educational work of the National Socialist Government this is the case all over Germany. I know that the things I have said here about the armament worker in particular hold true for every German worker. With these men and women who work for the cause with all their hearts, with cool heads and skilled hands, we will master every fate.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-96

February 21, 1944

Establishment of an Experimental Tank Factory by the Grusonwerk.

First a few facts about the development of tanks by Krupp. We have been manufacturing tanks since 1928, which means before rearmament. We started studying heavy tractors. Krupp built the first mass production tank, the Panzer I, which is also known as LaS. It was shown in public in 1935, the year when rearmament started, and made a great impression. We also originated the Panzer IV, or better the BW, which was especially at the beginning of the war, one of the prime factors in our rapid advances into enemy country, so that today we are fighting on the Atlantic coast, in the South, and East and not on German soil. Even today we use the BW-base for many self-propelled guns, assault-guns, anti-aircraft guns etc.

This war proved more and more that tanks and self-propelled vehicles are the deciding implements of war. This was recognized by several firms which were converted by the Army Ordnance [Heereswaffenamt] and tried their best to get into the business. Among them is especially the Firm Alkett, which receives a large subsidy from Hdl. Saur, for whom this efficient experimental station of 400 men represents a propaganda unit. Herr Hahne, the plant superintendent, was the first industrialist who received the Kitterkreuz for delivering assault-guns to the front in a very

short time. He did that by mounting field pieces on caterpillars.

Firm Krupp had better chances than any other firm, because it not only developed the tank, but it also has the best factories to make the guns, caterpillars, armour-plates, and other raw-materials. Other firms were able to get into a leading position, because they possess experimental tank factories, with an experienced staff in spite of the difficulties during war-time—we do not. For the last 15 years experts of Army Ordnance have mentioned the danger that the lack of an experimental factory will prevent Krupp from developing new models. I myself tried to develop such a factory.

Hdl Saur, who is one of the most important men in awarding new contracts, points out time and again that fast development of tanks through design is not as important as the speed with which experimental models can be produced for test purposes.

Since the construction department was shifted from Essen to the Grusonwerk, the undesirable separation of manufacturing and construction was eliminated and the liaison with the Ordnance improved. For the 40 different experiments which are planned for the Grusonwerk, including several new vehicles, there are only 5 to 16 workers available; part of them are foreigners. Mounted anti-aircraft guns, needed by Reichsminister Speer for immediate use by the army are among the planned experiments. Ordnance stated repeatedly that important experiments take too long, at least in competition with other firms like Alkett.

According to Director Mehner there are machines and buildings at the Grusonwerk. We lack the skilled workers. There is not even enough to produce the mass order of assault-gun which Hdl. Saur demanded.

We have to do everything we can in order that Krupp will be not only the leading firm in the manufacture of guns, but also in the war-essential tanks. To assure this I find it important that, in spite of all difficulties, an experimental plant will be erected which is completely separate from any manufacturing plant.

(sgd) WOELPERT.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-99

[Extract from a letter dated 11th November 1942, Krupp to Bormann.]

Dear Bormann,

Today I once again refer to my letter of the twenty-seventh of July acknowledging at the same time the receipt of your letter of

the thirty-first of the same month, and referring to the conversation which you have had with my son Alfried at the Fuehrer's HQ on the tenth of August with regards to the safeguarding of the firm Krupp for the future.

I should like to ask you first of all to express my warm thanks to the Fuehrer for his suggestion regarding the use of the costs of the first piece of the large equipment and for the renewed interest which is expressed for the firm of Krupp once more.

* * * * *

Furthermore,—with special reference to my personal letter attached hereto,—I should like to refer once more to the further contents of your conversation with my son at the Fuehrer HQ on which he has reported to me. You have asked me to make proposals to you which would secure the future of the unified existence of the Krupp works more than this is feasible today. In the enclosure No. 2 you will find a few thoughts which, to make them more easily understandable and under the assumption that the firm of Krupp is not the only one which has similar wishes for future safeguarding, I have shaped in the form of a draft law. The basic thoughts behind the law are easily discernible from the introduction. On considering this question we have ascertained that under the present laws the principal solution of the question cannot be carried out. We had to find an entirely new way, therefore, which, just as the law regarding heritage of agricultural property, creates entirely new legislation.

* * * * *

In conclusion I should like to draw your attention to a point which is important. The firm of Krupp will have to decide by the end of February 1943 whether it will make the modification of capital which is possible on the strength of the decree regarding surrender of dividends. Since this modification would be superfluous in the event of a law being published, and would be connected with unnecessary work and high costs, I would be grateful to you, therefore, if you could inform me beforehand whether the proposed way appears acceptable to the Fuehrer. With the old grateful admiration and with Heil Hitler I am

Your

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-101

REICHSLEITER MARTIN BORMANN.

Bo/Si.

Fuehrer Headquarters 21.11.1942.

Reply as per enclosure 25/11/42.

Copy made for Alfried von Bohlen.

Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, ESSEN, at the Huegel.

PERSONAL.

Dear Herr von Bohlen!

I have reported the contents of your letters of the 11/11 to the Fuehrer today. He instructed me to inform you that he would be readily prepared to arrange for any possible safeguarding for the continued existence of the works as a family enterprise; it would be the simplest to issue a "Lex Krupp" to start with.

Following my suggestion the Fuehrer instructed me to discuss the whole matter speedily with Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. I will give you further news as soon as possible.

Heil Hitler!

Your

(Sgd) BORMANN.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-106

ESSEN - HUEGEL.

At present at BADGASTEIN.

24 February 1943

Dear Reichs Minister [Lammers]

My son Alfred informs me that he, together with Dr. Joeden, had a discussion with State Secretary Kritzingler last Saturday, at which the member of the Cabinet Council, Herr Winnuhn, was also present. The conference had the splendid result that agreement was reached on the principal question. It appears that State Secretary Kritzingler had originally contemplated the formation of a family trust, whereas it was my intention from the beginning simply to carry out a transformation under commercial law, that is to say by disposing of the superfluous form of limited company. That we have to call for the assistance of the State in this connection is due to the fact that, so far as to preserve the unity of the business in one hand, a settlement as regards the Inheritance Legislation must be made, which differs from the regulations of the Inheritance law valid today. My thoughts in this respect are to impose moral obligations, to be supervised by the family council, on the owner, in the place of *claims* for legal entitlement of

a portion. Thus it should be achieved that legal disputes over this delicate question are avoided.

Furthermore, certain taxation questions arising from the transformation are to be clarified, without which the transformation would not be possible.

May I assume that State Secretary Kritzinger will report to you details of this discussion and will show you at the same time written records, which Dr. Joeden handed to him regarding the contents of the proposed Fuehrer decree.

Without doubt the matter, which is without precedent in economic life, will have to be discussed with the Reichs Minister of Justice and the Reichs Minister of Finance also. I would be extremely grateful to you if you, yourself, as already promised by State Secretary Kritzinger, would conduct this discussion. Owing to your being over-burdened with work it will, presumably, not be possible to settle the matter by the end of the first quarter, 1943, as I had hoped. I have, therefore, decided to postpone the date for the General Meeting, which should have taken place on the 31 March 1943, by three months in the hope that it will be possible by that time to carry out the plan.

May I assure you that I know how difficult, particularly in these present times, it must be for you to occupy yourself with this problem, which is really more a matter for times of peace than for times of war, and that I am most grateful to you for your assistance.

With best greetings and Heil Hitler!

yours always sincere,

KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-120

[This document contains the following note in the handwriting of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach:]

Handed over by the Herren Lammers and Bormann on 23 Oct 43 and has been given Alfried's and my consent.

Copy of the Fuehrer Decree regarding the family enterprise of the firm Fried. Krupp, dated

For 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family enterprise has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed strength of the German people. It is therefore my desire that it is preserved as a family enterprise. For this purpose I order:—

I.

The owner of the Krupp family assets is empowered to form a family enterprise with these assets and special rules will apply to its succession.

II.

The formation of the family enterprise and its statutes will be put in documentary form legally, or before a notary. The statute requires my consent which will be obtained through the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

III.

The respective owner of the firm will use the name Krupp before his family name.

IV.

The Reich Minister of Finance, in collaboration with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, is empowered to regulate the dues connected with the foundation of the family enterprise as well as the future succession of the business and the death duties and gift duties arising from the death of an owner and the transfer of ownership to another owner within the perception of this decree.

V.

The Reich Minister of Justice and the Reich Minister of Economy can—each for his own sphere of business and, where required, jointly—in collaboration with the Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery settle by decree through administrative channels any executive and supplementary regulations which may be necessary.

Fuehrer Headquarters the
Large Reich Seal.

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

Berlin W.8, 16 November 1943.

Voss Strasse 6

Rk. 12403 E.

At Present Field Quarters.

Postal Despatches to be sent to

the address in Berlin only.

To

Herr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach

Essen-Huegel

By hand.

Dear Herr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach:

On the twelfth of November the Fuehrer signed the decree regarding the family enterprise of the firm Fried. Krupp. The decree will be published in the Reich Law Gazette. For your provisional information I enclose a copy of the decree. Five certified photo-copies will be forwarded to you on completion. May I express my heartiest congratulations to you, your wife and the firm Fried. Krupp on the great honour which has been conferred on the merits of the firm Fried. Krupp with this recognition by the Fuehrer.

During my report to the Fuehrer I have also submitted to him the draft of the statute for the family enterprise Fried. Krupp in its attached form. The Fuehrer has given this form his agreement in principle. In particular, the Fuehrer has approved of the fact that in various parts of the statute—particularly in connection with the appointment of the successor—the co-operation of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the leader of the Party Chancellery, is proposed. This will have the consequence on the other hand, that, under figure VII, the alteration of the statute will also depend on the permission of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Leader of the Party Chancellery. Contact with the Department Ministers originally in this part of the draft will, if necessary, be established by the Reich Chancellery.

May I ask you to forward the statute to me after it has been certified by you, so that I may submit it to the Fuehrer for his agreement, necessary under figure II of the decree.

I have informed the Reich Minister of Finance and Justice, the Reich Minister of Economy and the Leader of the Party Chancellery, regarding the state of the matter.

It was a great pleasure to me that I could visit your wife and you at your beautiful property in Bluehnbach on the occasion of our last discussion on this matter.

Please remember me to your wife

Heil Hitler!!
Your very sincere
(Sgd.) Dr. LAMMERS.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-131

DOCUMENT PASSING THE FAMILY STATUTE SIGNED
BY HITLER AND LAMMERS

By virtue of my decree of 12 November 1943 (Reichsleiter-gasette 1 S. 655) I approve the statute of the family enterprise Fried Krupp of the 15 December 1943 (Roll of documents No. 458/1943 of the Notary in the district of the Supreme County Court, Hamm, Attorney at Law Dr. Walter Ballas at Essen).

Fuehrer Headquarters, 21 December, 1943,

The Fuehrer
(Signed) A. HITLER
Reichsminister of the Chief Reichs Chancellery,
(Signed) Dr. LAMMERS.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-135

29 December 1943

Mein Fuehrer!

By virtue of the decree of 12 November 1943 you have given your consent to the foundation of the Krupp family concern on special principles of succession, and on the 21 December 1943 you passed the statute of the family enterprise founded here at Essen on 15 December 1943. By this, you have made a wish come true, which my wife and I had had for years, and thus relieved our hearts of great worry over the future of the Krupp works. The preservation of the Krupp works in the hands of one person, and, thereby, the taking over of the full responsibility by one member of the family, had already been the wish of the Grandfather of my wife, Alfred Krupp. This aim had found clear expression in his testament when, to prevent any division of the ownership of the works, he stipulated the succession of inheritance for three generations in such a manner that only one of the future heirs, the oldest, was to inherit the factory property.

Following this basic conception of Alfred Krupp, my wife and I, also, desired to stipulate the succession of inheritance in that

manner, whereby, only one successor of our family would inherit the factory property. Since, however, limits have been imposed by more recent legislations on settling the succession of inheritance for any length of time—the nomination of a residuary legatee, according to the rules of the Citizens' Book of Law, becomes valid when 30 years have passed after the inheritance, unless a case of a residuary legatee has arisen before the end of that period—another way had to be found which would make this aim possible.

By your decree, Mein Fuehrer, this aim has now been achieved.

My wife and I, as well as the whole family, will be deeply grateful to you for this proof of your confidence, and we shall do everything that is within our power to equip our son Alfried, the present owner of the family enterprise, for the task of securing and, if possible, increasing the production of the Krupp works, both in peace and war, in your spirit and for the benefit of our people.

Our special thanks go to you, Mein Fuehrer, also for the great honour and recognition which you have awarded, in the introduction to your decree, to 130 years of work of Krupps, the work of Krupps done by many generations of faithful followers, and steered and directed by four generations of the family Krupp.

Your grateful,

(sgd) Bertha Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-138

Beyreuth, 27 July 1934

COPY

The Reich Chancellor.

Rk. 6798

To the Reich Ministers.

I decree that the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Reich Minister Hess, will have the capacity of a participating Reich Minister in connection with the preparation of drafts for laws in all Reich administrative spheres [Reichsressorts]. All legislative work is to be sent to him when it is received by the other Reich Minister concerned. This also applies in cases where no one else participates except the Reich Minister making the draft. Reich Minister Hess will be given the opportunity to comment on drafts suggested by experts [referentenentwurfen].

This order will apply in the same sense to legislative ordinances. The Deputy of the Fuehrer in his capacity of Reich

Minister can send as representative an expert on his staff. These experts are entitled to make statements to the Reich Ministers on his behalf.

(Sgd) Adolf HITLER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-139

National Socialist German Workers Party.
Munich, Brienner Street 45
Telephone: 54901 and 53844.
9 October 1934
SO/Sch

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Reich Ministry for the Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda. 12 Oct 34 Nm, I1400/9.10. Encls.
To the Reich Minister for the Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda

Berlin, W.8.
Wilhelmsplatz 8-9.

Reference: Participation in Legislation of the Reich.

By a decree of the Fuehrer dated 27 July 1934 I have been granted the right to participate in the legislation of the Reich as regard both formal laws and legal ordinances. This right must not be rendered illusory by the fact that I am sent the drafts of laws and decrees so late and am then given a limited time, so that it becomes impossible for me to deal with the material concerned during the given time. I must point out that my participation means the taking into account of the opinion of the NSDAP as such, and that in the case of the majority of drafts of laws and decrees, consult with the appropriate departments of the Party before making my comment. Only by proceeding in this manner can I do justice to the wish of the Fuehrer as expressed in the decree of the Fuehrer of 27 July 1934.

I must therefore ask the Reich Ministers to arrange that drafts of laws and decrees reach me in sufficient time. Failing this, I would be obliged in future to refuse my agreement to such drafts from the beginning and without giving the matter detailed attention, in all cases when I am not given a sufficiently long period for dealing with them.

Heil!
(Sgd) R. Hess

[Hand-written note:]

Berlin, 17 October 1934

1. The identical letter seems to have been addressed to all Reich Ministers. In our special field the decree of 27 July 1934 has hardly become applicable so far. A reply does not seem called for.

2. File in file 7B (?)

(Sgd)

R.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-140

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Berlin W.8. 12 April 1938

Wilhelmstrasse 78.

Rk. 7363 B.

Please quote this ref. No. *on all future correspondence.*

To the Reich Ministers.

In a decree of the Fuehrer dated 27/7/1934—Rk. 6798—and supplementary decree reported in my letter dated 6 April, 1935—Rk. 2749—a copy of which I enclose, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has ordered that the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Reich Minister Hess, will occupy the position of a participating Reich Minister as far as the preparation of drafts of laws and decrees, including all instructions about their being put into effect and instructions about their being carried out, and as far as they are published in the Reich Law Gazette, is concerned.

By order of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor I have the honor to inform you of a further supplementary decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor:

The Deputy of the Fuehrer will also have participation where the Reich Ministers give their agreement to State Laws [Landesgesetzen] and legislative ordinances of States under para. 3 of the first decree concerning reconstruction of the Reich of Feb 2nd 1934 (Reich Law Gazette, I, 81). Where the Reich Ministers have already, at an earlier date, been engaged in the preparation of such laws or legislative ordinances, or have participated in such preparation, the Deputy of the Fuehrer likewise becomes participating Reich Minister. Laws and legislative decrees of the Austrian State [des Landes Oesterreich] are equally affected hereby.

(Sgd) Dr. LAMMERS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-143

To the Major of the City of *Essen* Municipal Health Inspectorate
Bth/Sch. 30th June, 1942.

We send you enclosed the desired list

- a. for our workers' hostels
- b. for our prisoners' of war camps which also contain an indication of the nationalities accommodated in the workers' hostels and the prisoners' of war camps.

The medical supervision of all hostels is in the hands of chief medical officer Dr. Wiehle or his deputy. Apart from that, health care, as far as individual doctors are not working in the various workers' hostels, is exercised by doctors working under contract to the Krupp Works health insurance.

Daily consulting hours take place in the hostels as follows:—

| | |
|--|---|
| Workers Hostel Seumannstrasse 15 | Dr. Buechner, Altenessen, Altenessenstr. 275. Consulting hours daily except on Sundays from 8-9. |
| Workers Hostel Altenesenerstr. 68 | Dr. Buechner, Altenessen, Altenessenstr. 275. Consulting hours as above. |
| Bottroperstrasse 4-10 | Dr. Jaeger, Essen, Gneisenastr. 2, and Dr. Roth, Essen, Haus-Bergestr. 199. Consulting hours from 7.30-9 every other day. |
| Haedenkempstr. 30 (bar-racks) | Dr. Becker, Essen, Helenenstr. 78. Consulting hours from 8.30-9.30 at his rooms, for hostel inmates only. |
| Kraemerplatz (Russians' camp) | Dr. Diduch lives in the camp; his sole task is the medical care of the inmates. |
| Sulterkamp, Spenlestr. and Weidkamp (Russians' camp) | Dr. Lepin, lives at Sulterkamp Camp. |
| Seumannstr. (Russians' camp) | Dr. Kalernik. Lives in the camp. |
| Unterdorfstrasse 3-5 | Dr. Becker. Consulting hours as above. |

Miners from the Eastern territories are accommodated at the following hostels:—

- a. Workers' Hostel Seumannstr. 15 Poles, Russians.

- b. Workers' Hostel Unterdorfstr. 3-5. Croats, Ukrainians.
 c. Workers' Hostel Haedenkampstr. 30. Ukrainians.

Heil Hitler!

FRIED KRUPP.

Aktiengesellschaft

Accommodation Office

signed: Grawe Grosse-Thie.

List of Hostels and Camps kept by Fried. Krupp. Aktiengesellschaft, Accommodation Office, at Essen.

Copy.

List of the foreign workers and prisoners of war accommodated in our workers' hostels and prisoners' of war camps.

a. Workers' Hostels.

- | | |
|---|---|
| Ref. No. 1 Seumannstr. 15 | Belgians, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Italians, Yugoslavs, Croats, Poles, Protectorate, Russians, Slovaks, Spaniards, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Stateless. |
| Ref. No. 2. Koetting Altenessenerstr. 67. | Poles. |
| Ref. No. 3a Bottroper Strasse 4-10. | Frenchmen, Italians. |
| Ref. No. 4 Kerckhoffstr. 22. | Belgians, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Italians, Poles, Protectorate, Russians, Spaniards, Swiss, Ukrainians. |
| Ref. No. 5. Haedenkampstr. 30 | Ukrainians, Luxemburgians. |
| Ref. No. 6. Haedenkampstr. barracks. | Croats, Slovenes. |
| Ref. No. 7. Unterdorfstr. 3/5 | Croats, Ukrainians. |
| Ref. No. 8. Hafenstr. 2 | Poles. |
| Ref. No. 9 Holleplatz | Poles, Slovenes. |
| Ref. No. 10. Kraemerplatz | Russians. |
| Ref. No. 11. Weidkamp | Belgians, Dutchmen, Russians. |
| Ref. No. 12. Gaufeld | Dutchmen, Italians. |
| Ref. No. 13. Spenlestr. | Russians. |
| Ref. No. 15. Sulterkamp 70/70a | Russians. |

b. Prisoners' of War Camps.

- | | |
|--|---------------------------|
| Ref. No. 14 Ehrenzelle Frohnhauserstr. 93. | Russian prisoners of war. |
| Ref. No. 16. Hafenstr. 116a | Russian prisoners of war. |
| Ref. No. 3b Bottroperstr. 4/10 | French prisoners of war. |

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-151

Personal.

30 May 1933

Dear Mr President. [added in pencil, "Dr Schacht"]

As Dr Hoettgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you yesterday, it is proposed to initiate a collection in the most far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture and the banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the Fuehrer of the NSDAP in the name of "The Hitler Fund", which would replace collections in many cases separately organized of the various NSDAP organizations and the Stahlhelm. It has been decided to appoint a management council for this central collection; I have accepted the chairmanship of the management council at the unanimous request of the principal federations, inspired by the wish to collaborate with my full strength in this task which is to be a symbol of gratitude to the Fuehrer of the nation.

You were kind enough to promise me to obtain from Messrs Otto Christian Fischer, of the Reichskreditgesellschaft, Berlin, and Dr Mosler, of the Deutsche Bank und Diskonto-Gesellschaft, Berlin, full particulars and especially information on how far banks which are public corporations can participate in this task. Dr Fischer will get in touch with you within the next few days.

With the expression of my sincere esteem,

I am,

Yours etc.

(sgd) Krupp Bohlen Halbach.

[Extract from a Printed Circular]

Berlin, 1st June 1933.

ADOLF HITLER Fund of German Industry.

I.

In order to replace the numerous individual collections of the most diverse authorities and federations of the NSDAP, a central collection of all branches of German industry has been organized under the name of "Adolf Hitler Fund of German Industry". The management of the fund lies in the hands of a management council composed of representatives of the branches of industry concerned. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach has taken over the chairmanship of the management council.

The branches of industry have undertaken to raise within one year, more particularly during the period from 1st June 1933 to 31st May 1934, a fixed amount in the manner most convenient for

them in each individual case, and to remit the amounts collected to the management council.

The Reich Federation of German Industry and the Federation of German Employers' Associations request their member associations and firms to support the collection with all means at their disposal. We expect the energetic collaboration of all our organizations and of all undertakings and the personal active co-operation of their leaders. It is a case of acting quickly and generously, of making the administration simple and economical, and of avoiding all red tape.

* * * * *

For the Reich Federation of German Industry.
signed:—Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.

For the Federation of German Employers' Associations.
signed:—Koettgen.

[Extract from a Printed Sheet in a file from the Private Secretary's Office of Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach]

August 1933.

The "Adolf Hitler Fund of German Industry" rests upon an agreement between the Reich management of the NSDAP and leading representatives of the German Industry.

It is the purpose of the fund:—on the one hand to put at the disposal of the Reich leadership the funds required for the unified execution of the tasks which fall to the lot of the SA, SS, St, [Stahlhelm] HJ, political organizations, etc.

signed:—Rudolf Hess.

ADOLF HITLER FUND OF GERMAN INDUSTRY

Management Council

Berlin W 62, Burggrafenstrasse 11

Mail-book No. VIIa/15150.

Berlin, 2nd September, 1933.

To the federations themselves I address an urgent request to refrain from anything which might impede the participation of firms in the "Adolf Hitler Fund of German Industry" and beyond that to continue recruiting efforts at highest pressure.

The Chairman of the Management Council.

Signed: Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-152

Enclosure to K.M. No. 11925 of the 28th September, 1936.

Memorandum on the Conference at the Federal Ministry for National Defense in Vienna on 25th September, 1936, at 1030 hrs.

Those present were:—General (Infantry) Secretary of State Hugo Zehner, General (Engineer) Dr. Karl Leitner, Messrs. Pfirsch, Drott, Major Niessner.

I expressed to the Secretary of State the gratification of the firm of Krupp at being once again in a position to offer its services to the Federal Ministry for the supply of war material, after the long interval which the post-war period had imposed upon us. I made it clear that in spite of the obstacles put in our way by the Treaty of Versailles, we had never been inactive throughout the post-war period, but had drawn upon the experience of the war in the creation of new types, and that we had won the prizes for almost every type in the competitions organized by our War Ministry for the construction of new artillery weapons, so much so that the guns introduced into the German Army of to-day, such as the 8.8.cm anti-aircraft, the 10.5 cm field gun, the heavy field howitzer and beyond them the larger calibres have been made according to our pattern.

* * * * *

(signed) Pfirsch.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-154

FRIED. KRUPP A.G.

File:—1B71 — 50/1

K.M. No. 36206

Person dealing with Matter :—Cl

Copy to:— Kg—Pf—Mue—Ebh—Da—C12x—KV—Schi—Blu—
Rff—L1x—

Berlin, 23rd June, 1937.

Memorandum

by Mr. Reiff

on Conference in Berlin

on 22nd June, 1937.

Those present:— Major Olbrich }
 } from tank department 6
 } from F.K.
 } Reiff

re:—*Armour Plating for BULGARIA Order*

* * * * *

Major Olbrich showed himself aware quite evidently of the deeper reasons existing why Germany was anxious that this order should be booked

The danger that we would later receive fewer orders from the Army Weapons Department [Translator's note: lit. "HWA"], because perhaps between March and June some individual orders would have to be placed with other firms, I did not consider as excessive, since the office (i.e. the HWA Translator's note) would require large-scale supplies from July of next year onwards and since on the other hand we were motivated in this whole matter purely by the interest of the fatherland. * * *

Reiff.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-157

Copy

File No. 183 v.B.

25 April 1933.

Dear Mr. Reichs Chancellor!

Referring to the kind letter of the Secretary of State of the Reichs Chancellery, dated the 10th of this month, Ref No. 3646, I respectfully enclose herewith a statement which represents my views concerning the reorganization of the Reichs Association of German Industry and of the trade associations as a whole. I am also adding a synopsis of statements concerning the programme of the Reichs Association of German Industry in previous years.

The standpoint taken by the Reichs Association of German Industry concerning the question of reorganization of trade associations has been characterized, on the one hand, by the simplification and rationalization of all the industrial groups. This was aimed at in the widest circles of the Reichs Association and, last but not least, by myself. On the other hand, it was characterized by the wish to co-ordinate, in the interest of the whole nation, both economic measures and political necessity, adopting the Fuehrer conception of the new German State. Industrial associations should be formed which are as simple and powerful as possible, closest to present conditions, and retaining the valuable privilege of free industrial administration. For me, this standpoint is a political and economic necessity.

I feel convinced that this task of reorganization can be realized only through an active economic self-administration based upon the creative energies of each employer and employee, and recognizing the principle which combines the National Idea with National Responsibility. This should be done by the closest contact between the Reich Government and its representatives on one side and the Reichs Association on the other. In this respect I am convinced that the deciding factor leading to the

success of the reform is not to be found in the outward form of the organization itself but in the spirit, in which union between political leadership and economic necessity is established for the benefit of the State and people.

The presiding council of the Reichs Association of German Industry has entrusted me, as its chairman, with the task of reorganization in a resolution passed at its extraordinary session held on the 6th of this month. The Reichs Association of German Industry, dear Mr. Reichs Chancellor, puts itself at your disposal and at the disposal of the Reich Government for all necessary negotiations. At the same time I respectfully request the confidence and assistance of you and of the Reich Government in the task of reorganization which shall serve to render the trade association a most useful instrument towards the purpose of rebuilding a national economy.

Assuring you, dear Mr. Reichs Chancellor, of my highest esteem, I have the honour to be.

To: Reichs Chancellor
Hitler
Berlin.

Very respectfully yours,

KRUPP BOHLEN HALBACH.

Enclosure No. 1 to the letter of Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach to Reichschancellor Hitler, dated 25 April 1944.

On April 6 of this year the Presiding Council of Reichs Association of German Industry empowered me unanimously, as its Chairman, to establish contact with the Reichschancellor, the Government of the Reich and its officials, for the purpose of determining what measures shall be taken to simplify and remodel the trade associations.

By this unanimous resolution of the Presiding Council it is declared that:—

1. In view of the authority bestowed upon me to appoint representatives to deal with various problems on hand, I am solely empowered by the Reichs Association of German Industry to hold any necessary conferences with the Government of the Reich and its officials, and

2. under the same authority as in para (1) I am solely responsible on behalf of the Reichs Association of German Industry for all organizational reforms, especially those concerning personnel; which may result within the structure of the Reichs Association of German Industry.

By the resolution of the Presiding Council, the Reichs Association of German Industry has given me full powers which involve extraordinary responsibilities.

The following considerations led me to the acceptance of this extraordinary authority:—

The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I myself and the Board of Directors have cherished for a long time. I am convinced that, under the threat of the impoverishment of our people, the machinery of government must be simplified to the utmost. For the same reason I did not fail to recognize a long time ago the necessity of rationalizing our economic system.

Convinced that the opportunity of the hour must not be missed to obtain the best for our economic system I am employing the authority bestowed upon me by the Presiding Council to carry out a double task:—

1. In the negotiations with the Reichschancellor and his representatives, I shall make it my goal to co-ordinate, in the field of organization of industrial associations, the economically reasonable with the politically necessary.

2. In reorganizing the Reichs Association of German Industry I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new organization into agreement with the political aims of the Reich Government and at the same time to make it so rational and forceful that it can be an effective instrument of industrial enterprise, according to the relative importance of the industry.

The task of re-organization of industrial groups would be on too narrow a basis if in doing so I were to think solely of rebuilding the Reichs Association of German Industry. I know from my own experience how much individual firms suffer from circumstances of historical development which cause overlappings of industrial groups, frequently resulting in a lack of co-ordination in their formation.

This demands that we must also bring into the sphere of our coming tasks the numerous questions pertaining to the complex occupational formation of our economic system. The foremost aim of our economic system and especially of industry, must therefore be to eliminate organizations which are too complicated. In order to preserve the valuable privileges of free industrial self-management, the resulting organizations must be made as simple as possible.

After the Presiding Council of the Reichs Association of German Industry bestowed upon me the task of re-organization in

its resolution of April 6 of this year, it also stated that the still existing groups forming the Reichs Association of German Industry were to remain to some extent inactive until the task of reorganization undertaken by me is accomplished.

I intend to use the period until reorganization is complete by engaging especially qualified gentlemen as expert advisers for the solution of specific problems. Since the management of the Reichs Association of German Industry needs the guidance of enterprise itself, I intend further to form special committees of experts to study specific questions, as for example, questions of organization, question of the ethics in economic life, the examination of occupational aspects of trade policy, exchange and credit problems, as well as the field of taxation, etc. The decision of the Presiding Council specifies that I am to preside over all these committees that I am creating. As it is impossible for me to be present at all necessary meetings, I must have the authority to appoint various gentlemen as deputy chairmen.

As soon as my negotiations with the Reich Chancellor and his officials are concluded, and as soon as the proposed committees and the management of the Reichs Association of German Industry have drafted a plan for its reorganization, I shall summon the leading groups of the Reichs Association of German Industry to a special meeting. It will be the task of the meeting to lay the corner-stone for the new structure of the Reichs Association of German Industry.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-158

Bureau of Foreign Politics of the NSDAP.

Berlin SW 26 April 1933
Zimmer Str. 88.

Dr. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach,
Essen, Ruhr.
Auf dem Huegel.

Honourable Mr. von Bohlen,

Once more my most cordial thanks for not having shunned the inconvenience of the journey in order to participate at yesterday's small conference. I am glad to determine, on the basis of our discussion, that you too welcome the organization of an active counter-action abroad, in the interest of State and Economy, and express to you the highest thanks for the support of a monetary kind as well, which you have subscribed to our work. Very shortly a quantity of material will be sent to you promptly and

will subsequently be distributed throughout the world as part of a far reaching plan.

With the highest esteem
very respectfully yours

/s/ A. ROSENBERG.

Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Politics of the NSDAP.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-163

National Socialist German Worker's Party
Circular letter No. 141/41.

Fuehrer's H. Q. 5 Nov 41.

Subject: Burial of Bodies of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War by the Municipalities.

The Reich Minister of the Interior has addressed the following express-letter in this matter to the Reichs Town Governors and Presidents, which is attached as an enclosure. Please note.

Heil Hitler!

(S) M. Bormann.

1 enclosure

F.d.R:

Signed: DIEPGARDT [?!]

Distribution:

Reichsleiter

Gauleiter

Kreisleiter

Copy of a copy.

REICHS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
EXPRESS LETTER

IV e 10366/41

3991.

To the Reichs Town Governors in the Reich Districts (County Governors).

The Government Presidents and Vice Presidents.

President of the Police in Berlin.

The Mayor of the Reich Capital, BERLIN.

Not suitable for publication (not even in extract by the press).

Subject: Burial of Bodies of Soviet Prisoners of War by Municipalities.

Wherever the Army Service Departments request the burial of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War it is the duty of the Municipalities to carry out burials immediately after death certificates

have been signed by a doctor. It is left to the Municipalities either to make use of already existing grave yards or other suitable places.

The choice of a burial ground outside an existing grave-yard is subject to approval by the Health Department concerned and must be in keeping with the law and all applicable regulations, particularly health regulations, (as outlined by the circular decree of the Reichs and Prussian Minister of the Interior, etc. 18 Jan 37—V a I 31/37 (RMBliV.S.113), and by the resolutions of the Scientific Deputation for the Medical matters of 1 Nov 1890, regarding projects for the establishment and enlarging of burial grounds, and by the order regarding places for burial, (viz Gutt, The Public Health Service, volume I, second edition, page 239). Preparations will be started immediately to conform with these regulations. To establish death, medical officers of the army are to be called in whenever they can be reached. To save costs, Service Departments of the army will generally be contacted regarding transport of corpses (furnishing of vehicles) whenever possible. No coffins will be indented for the transfer and burial. The body will be completely enveloped with strong paper (if possible, oil - tar - asphalte paper) or other suitable material. Transfer and burial is to be carried out unobtrusively. If a number of corpses have to be disposed of the burial will be carried out in a communal grave. In this case, the bodies will be buried side by side (but not on top of each other) and in accordance with the local custom regarding depth of graves. Where a grave yard is the place of burial a distant part will be chosen. No burial ceremony or decorations of graves will be allowed. Where new graves are dug, the customary distance from existing graves will be observed. If the deceased Soviet prisoner of war suffered from a contagious disease, transfer and burial will be carried out in agreement with the local health department concerned. Rooms in which corpses were stored (railway sheds, mortuaries), and vehicles used for the transport of corpses are to be disinfected each time. Persons who have been ordered to lay out, transport and bury corpses must be instructed on the necessary hygienic measures—particularly disinfection after contact with corpses. Costs will be kept as low as possible. They will be collected quarterly by the Municipality from the Army Command Administration in whose district the Municipality is situated. Accounts will be enclosed. Furthermore, whenever a demand is submitted, it will be stated when and through which military service department the corpse was handed over to the Municipal author-

ities. I request immediate information of the service departments concerned. Spare copies attached.

F.d.R.d.A.

Signed: LEITL [?]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-167

File: 11/1, 22/1 Reference No. K.M. 44664 Date: 14th Oct. 37
Memorandum of Herr SONNENBERG on the meeting at ESSEN
On 12th of Oct. 37.

Present: representing Combined Services Intelligence [Abwehr-
Abtlg. des R.K.M.]
Representing KRUPP

Korvetten Kapitaen (E) MENZEL
Mue (part time)
Grm.
Sonnenberg

Subject: Exchange of Intelligence.

Menzel represents Intelligence [Abwehrabteilung] (in charge: Admiral Canaris) of the Combined Services ministry (R.K.M.); his department comes under the Defense office [Wehrmachtsamt] (in charge: General Keitel) and is divided into Counter-Intelligence and Intelligence proper, the latter having subsections for Army, Navy and Airforce.

Menzel asked for intelligence on foreign armaments (but not including matters published in newspapers) received by Krupp from their agents abroad and through other channels to be passed on to Combined Services Intelligence [Abwehrabteilung des R.K.M.]. They have been collaborating for some time in this way through frequent visits in a most satisfactory fashion with Messrs. Zeiss of Jena. Other firms were not mentioned, so it can be assumed that no contacts have yet been established with any of them.

On our part we undertook to supply information to the Combined Services Ministry (R.K.M.) as required. Apart from that it would be in the patriotic interest if Krupp were kept informed concerning foreign artillery weapons and new methods and constructions. Menzel agreed to that with the reservation that some information had to be kept secret for stringent reasons; he promised to do his best in this direction.

(Sgd) SONNENBERG
(Initialled) Grm.

File: 5S12, 5S34, 5S41. Reference No: A.K.24461 Date:
25 June 39
Report of Dr. CONN on his journey to BERLIN 11 June 1939 to
16 June 1939.
Subject: Intelligence and Information.

In order to get a general impression and to gain information generally, the following Officers were first contacted at the Admiralty (O.K.M.)

Kapitaen zur See Globig, information dept., naval armaments branch [M.Wa., Nachrichten]

Kapitaen zur See Meyer, Staff, naval armaments branch [M.Wa. Stab]

Fregattenkapitaen Menzel, Intelligence, naval sub-section [Abwehr, Abt.Marine]

Kapitaen zur See Arps, dept. A.III, naval information office, Admiralty [Marinenachrichtendienst]

Afterwards detailed discussions took place with Kapitaen zur See Globig and Fregattenkapitaen Menzel. On behalf of the Admiralty they expressed the wish for such visits to take place more frequently, say once in two months, in order to maintain closer liaison.

1. *Kapitaen zur See Globig* whom I had known for a long time, spoke to me quite frankly and openly. It is therefore impossible to embody parts of our discussion in this report. He does not appear to regard our "R" reports [R'Mitteilungen] as competition to the "Arms technology review" [Waffentechnische Nachrichten] compiled by him. He has been the naval armaments branch expert on foreign navies for years and promised me every assistance.

* * * * *

3. *Fregattenkapitaen Menzel*, Intelligence, naval subsection [Abwehr. Abt. Marine].

Similarly to Kapitaen zur See Globig he stressed the point that in view of the progressive disappearance of public and easily accessible sources of information, the information obtained through our representatives abroad was on increasing value. This method of obtaining intelligence would have to be followed up much more drastically than in the past. With Messrs. Rheinmetall it was working considerably better than at Krupps, which is partly explained by the fact that one of the ex-employees of Messrs. Rheinmetall is now working in the Intelligence branch and that he knows the executives of that firm and is able to maintain close liaison.

I quite agreed with him concerning the importance of this kind of intelligence report, but reminded him that with so large a business as Krupp it took obviously time to organize matters; also that most of our foreign agencies were directed by foreigners on whom one could only make limited demands in this matter and that finally it was to be avoided at all costs to lend support to the malicious rumours abroad that our agencies indulged in something akin to espionage.

Menzel's second point was that when our executives travelled abroad they should report, before leaving for information, and on return for a verbal discussion, to the Intelligence branch [Nachrichtenabteilung] at Berlin or at least to the Intelligence sub-branch [Nachrichtenstelle] at Cologne. Herr von Buelow on our staff had done so once, but otherwise it had hardly ever occurred.

My personal opinion is that we might be able to pick up quite a lot of useful information if we reported to Berlin.

His third point was a request to utilize foreign visitors for obtaining intelligence. I replied that this was being done already, but that it was necessary to proceed very carefully, to avoid arousing suspicion on the part of the visitors. I furthermore suggested that we should inform Intelligence of such visitors, if this is not being done already, to enable the Armed Forces to invite such foreigners as are considered suitable to a social or function. In the course of such meetings there would be ample opportunity to obtain information on this or that subject.

Menzel also mentioned that our information obtained from abroad would *not* be passed on to our competitors, if a request to that effect was being made at the time.

I gave him to understand that we were slightly disappointed with the collaboration with Intelligence [Abwehr abteilung] since we had supplied information, but had received none in return. Menzel explained that Intelligence was only a collating centre and that they were merely passing on information, the value of which they were unable to judge by themselves, to the departments concerned; any information for us would therefore have to come from those departments only. Exceptions were only made in the case of intelligence of universal importance such as e.g. the long range gun [Ferngesehuetz] some time ago.

This remark is important concerning the way in which we should present our information at Berlin. The departments receiving the information through Intelligence, must be able to see that it originates from Krupp, so that they might feel themselves under obligation to let us have some information in return. It

might be a good idea to forward our information simultaneously to Intelligence and the departments concerned or else to let Intelligence have one (or more) copies for the departments, thus at the same time saving clerical work.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-170

[A document found in the files of Fried. KRUPP A.G.]

8th May 1939.

SECRET

Memorandum by Herr Sonnenberg of a discussion in Berlin on the 5.5.1939.

Concerning: Foreign Anti-Aircraft guns.

Present:

| | | |
|----------------|---|----------------------------|
| Planetta | — | Wa.Prf. 10 S III |
| Capt. Reinlein | — | Wa.Prf. (part of the time) |
| Sonnenberg | — | F.K. |

While in Berlin for a discussion with the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, Dept.5., I also visited Prw. 10 S III. The following data, previously not known to us, of the English 9.4 cm. A.A. gun were mentioned:

| | | |
|------------------------------|---|-------------------|
| Overall length of the barrel | — | 4.099m. |
| Firing weight | — | 3914 Kg. or more. |
| Elevation | — | —5 + 85° |

Rapidity of firing up to 16 rounds per minute.

New Skoda A.A. guns, 4.7 cm., 7.5 cm. and 7.65 cm. were mentioned to me and photographs shown. The first named exists with a simple cross-shaped mounting and with wheels remaining attached to the mounting when in firing position. It was stated that it was not for the time being possible to let us keep photographs. Also I was not given any data. All three calibres appear to have mechanical ramming devices, and in any case the two heavier calibres also had muzzle brakes.

I have gained the impression that from no other side do the respective Army departments get such far reaching support in their investigation of foreign armaments as from Fr. Krupp.

(Signed) Sonnenberg.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-181

National Socialist German Workers' Party.
Gauleiter Westfalen—South clerical Dept. Ru/Z
Circular letter No. 83/37.

Reference:

Hereditary Health Law.

[Rubber Stamp of Kreisleiter
(Country Leader) for Siegerland
District acknowledging
receipt 23 Jan 1937]
Bochum, 21 Jan. 37

Following instructions of the Deputy Gauleiter, I herewith inform you, by copy, of a circular letter of the Deputy of the Fuehrer, dated 14 Jan. 1937, No. 10/37.

In the decree of the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, dated 22 Aug 36, regarding the application of the law for the prevention of descendants with hereditary diseases, Civil Service doctors are instructed to consult with Hereditary Health Law being instituted against a Party member. They will do so before making an application for sterilization on the grounds of congenital imbecility.

The question whether the person is an imbecile cannot be ascertained solely by carrying out an intelligence test, but requires detailed evaluation of the *whole* personality of the human being. This review shall not only take into consideration the knowledge and intellectual abilities of the presumed imbecile, but also his ethical, moral and political attitude. A number of Civil Service doctors have, up to date, attached little importance to the reviewing of the personality as a whole. They have, up to now, hardly ever called for or used information regarding the political conduct of the supposed patient with hereditary disease.

Now that the Party, by virtue of the decree of the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, is consulted in the proceedings on matters of hereditary diseases against Party members, it is the task of all Gauleiters to ascertain that the law regarding hereditary health will, in fact, be used in the sense in which it was designed. School masterly examination is not to be alone decisive in judging whether a person concerned is an imbecile. It is, in fact, to be ascertained as well, how the person concerned

behaves in daily life, whether he can meet the demands which life makes on an average person, and whether he can be regarded as a full member of the community. If the Gauleiter, on the basis of this examination of the personality as a whole of the Party member, comes to the conclusion that the Law For The Prevention of Descendants with Hereditary Diseases is applicable, he must then investigate whether the person about to be sterilized has achieved very outstanding merits for the National Socialist Movement. If the Gauleiter reaches this conviction and feels that he must use his influence to prevent the sterilization, he will report to this department, giving a detailed explanation of the reasons which speak against sterilization.

The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior has ordered that Civil Service doctors will report to him any cases where the opinion of the Gauleiter differs from that of the medical officer.

So as not to delay proceedings under the Hereditary Health Law unnecessarily, I also request information and explanation on each one of these cases, stating the reasons which have led to the difference of opinion.

The Department for National Health [Amt fuer Volksgesundheit] is to carry out preparations for the decision of any case concerning Hereditary Health which has to be put before the Gauleiter. *All matters of hereditary health will be treated as urgent and secret.*

Particular attention will be drawn in each case to the obligation of maintaining secrecy.

I request that reports be made to me from time to time regarding experience gained in dealing with matters of hereditary health.

I request you treat above exposition as strictly confidential, and only for your own personal information.

Heil Hitler

{signed} Ruschenburg {?}

Distribution:

Gauamtsleiter, [Regional Bureau Chiefs]

Gauinspekteure, [Regional Inspectors]

Kreisleiter, [Country Leaders]

Copy of a Copy.

Secret state police
State police station
Darmstadt
File No. II B 4 8521/38

Darmstadt, 7. Dec. 1938
Wilhelm - Glaessing - Str. 21

To the
SS - Section
Kassel.

Subject: Treatment of articles Secured during Protest Action
against Jews.

Ref: nil.

Enclosures: nil.

By order of the Prime Minister General Field Marshal Goering,
the Secret State Police Department, Berlin, has issued the fol-
lowing orders regarding articles which were confiscated and
secured:

1. The following applies to such articles, where the owner
can still be established:
 - a. Bonds [Wertpapiere], cash, jewelry, and articles for
common use of high value, are to be listed, stating the
owner, the value or estimated value, and reported to the
competent State Police Department. Bonds, cash and
jewelry, the value of which is less than 1.000. - RM are
to be returned to their owner against receipt. This also
applies to articles of common use, and objects of higher
estimated value if proof exists that the owner will emi-
grate in the near future. Contact must first be made,
however, with the appropriate agency of the President of
the Finance Department. My decision must be obtained if
particularly high values are involved.
 - b. Food and perishable articles of common use to the value
of not more than 1.000. - RM, are to be handed, against
receipt, to the competent local agencies of the Retail Trade
concerned, for further sales. Only such food and articles
of common use are excepted, where it can be proved that
they belong to an Aryan business owner. These articles
will be returned directly to the owners against receipt.
 - c. Stocks of clothing are to be returned to the owners after
consultation with local agencies of the retail trade con-
cerned.

2. For articles the owners of which can no longer be ascertained, the following applies:
 - a. Bonds, cash and articles of common use of high value (motor cars, furs and gowns) etc., will be delivered to the competent local agencies of the Finance President, against receipt. Lists will be submitted in duplicate.
 - b. Food and perishable articles of common use will be transferred to the competent local National Socialist Welfare (NSV) agencies against receipt, for the purpose of distribution under their own authority.
 - c. Where articles have already been handed to the National Socialist Welfare (NSV) under para 2(a), receipt on this transaction will also be submitted.

I draw your attention to the fact that delivery of the articles must be carried out in co-operation with the competent State Police Departments. For the district of the 83rd SS troop this will be the State Police Department Giessen. Duplicate receipts will be submitted to the competent State Police Department, regarding any valuables which have been delivered directly to any of the Service Departments mentioned above.

According to reports available here, it is likely that the appropriate notification has already been circulated by the office of the Reich Leader SS.

[Signature illegible]

Certified copy.

[Signature illegible]

SS - Sergeant.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-191

[Memorandum on the reconstruction of Krupps after the War 1914-1918, with special reference to armament exports.]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

Essen, 25 Mar 1941

Thoughts on the question of surrendering part of the income from such foreign business as can, under present circumstances, be conducted by drawing on army stocks and equipment and ammunition.

During the decades preceding the World War, Krupps supplied nearly all countries of the world with guns and artillery equipment and have achieved a paramount position and brilliant reputation. The Treaty of Versailles destroyed and mutilated not only

the armament production plants at Essen, but also prohibited the export of armaments. The liberation of the Reich from the shackles of Versailles enabled Krupp to recommence the export of armaments. The German Government had, in fact, pressed for the matter. Military-political and military-economic reasons were the cause. Krupp desired to come into the closest contact with the armament technical production of the world by means of these armament exports, so as to further the development of arms and at the same time to recapture foreign markets in order to secure additional work for their own workshops and to create employment for their workers in the event of a decrease in Wehrmacht orders. The revival of the armament export business was very difficult. The name "Krupp" still had the old appeal abroad and the reputation created during decades of supplying the best armaments was not destroyed, but the connection had been severed.

During 20 years of stranglehold on any possibilities of supplying foreign markets, the foreign competitors had found an entry for their products. Our former offices abroad had partly closed down in the post-war years, and had partly had to turn to other tasks. The formerly large export organization of the works existed no longer. Necessary experts were not available. The plant for export production was lacking. All this had to be reconstructed with considerable effort and considerable costs.

Krupp invested millions for this purpose. Plants were built and connections were restored, suitable representatives employed, journeys abroad undertaken, designers engaged, together with special employees for the cultivation and supervision of the export business. By using all the forces at his disposal and regardless of effort, costs and risk, considerable export contracts were secured, which served to obtain foreign currency or raw materials, and were, at the same time, politically desirable. The firm has successfully withstood all competition which it met with abroad, and it has never avoided necessary sacrifices. Apart from investments within the works, engagement of a large personnel and the creation of a foreign organization, it has expended the following sums on export business during the business years 1936/37 and 1939/40.

| | | |
|------------------------|---------|------------------|
| Costs for Development, | approx. | 10,000,000 — RM, |
| Costs on Marketing, | approx. | 9,000,000 — RM, |

The following orders were secured—

| | |
|---------|-------------------|
| 1935/36 | 37,500,000 — RM, |
| 1936/37 | 26,000,000 — RM, |
| 1937/38 | 128,500,000 — RM, |
| 1938/39 | 32,500,000 — RM, |
| 1939/40 | 32,000,000 — RM, |

Total orders rec'd., therefore, were app. 256,500,000—RM.

The contract with the Russians, amounting to approx. 123,000,000 RM, which was secured at the end of 1940 is not included. On these contracts, deliveries amounting to 95,000,000 RM were completed by the end of the business year 1939/40, leaving on the 30.9.40 orders amounting to approx. 161,500,000 RM still to be delivered.

These figures include orders amounting to approximately 37,000,000 RM, which cannot be executed owing to political considerations and approx. 94,000,000 RM which cannot at present be executed because of the war, or cannot be carried out in the normal manner.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-196

[Extract from note in file of Friedrich Krupp A.G. on subject of French foreign workers].

Manpower dept. [Arbeitseinsatz-A].
23rd September 1942.
Ref Dr.Lehm/Ka.

Memorandum

Subject: Conference with the chairman of the Comite General des Industries Mechaniques, M.GARNIER, concerning the recruiting of French Labour.

On the 16 September 1942 the contract for the mass recruiting of French workers was drafted with M.Garnier and will now appear in print. It has been agreed that as a start about 30 French volunteer workers would be supplied for the cast steel factory by the 30 September 1942.

M.Garnier desired to discuss a number of principal questions, which was done on 17 September 1942.

* * * * *

The following points were discussed: * * *

In how far the mass recruiting arrived at by us will be a real success remains to be seen, since Gauleiter Sauckel has made a demand to the French government for 150,000 French skilled

workers and 100,000 semi-skilled workers to be sent to Germany by 15 October 1942.

(sgd) LEHMANN.

Distribution: Messrs Goerens, Loeser, A.von Bohlen, E.Mueller, Ihn, Girod, BfA, Staff department.

Manpower dept. (Arbeitseinsatz-A)
21 December 1942

Memorandum

Subject: Recruiting of French workers.

1. General points and conference with Oberregierungsrat Dr. Servatius of the Provincial labour office Rhineland at Cologne.

During the first months of the coming year, a new levy of workers is to take place in France. In the course of this levy about 265,000 men are planned to be freshly drawn from within occupied France. This operation is to start about the first days of January.

* * * * *

In the presence of Herr Servatius a discussion took place in the office of Regierungsrat Bach, on the Economic Staff of the Military Commander of France, according to which our previous requirements have been cancelled and we will have to notify new requirements by return. These requirements will be dealt with within the quota allotted to the Provincial Labour office Rhineland, for our use. We discussed how far it would be possible for complete shifts of workers conscripted from French factories to be transferred to Essen. We are to collaborate as far as practicable in the splitting up of our requirements amongst individual military government offices and military police posts. So far as possible one of our representatives is to assist in the selection from amongst the conscripts.

* * * * *

4. *Accommodation of French workers.*

All authorities concerned in Paris and elsewhere in France repeatedly stressed the very great importance of good accommodation for French workers. Letters in which these Frenchmen complain about bad accommodation, treatment and food as well as shortage of labour in the factories are very harmful to the German recruitment programme and welcome to the enemy as propaganda material. Factories against which such complaints are made, may be excluded from receiving recruits at the next distribution.

Unfortunately complaints have also been received concerning Krupp. Documentary proof is to be produced. Everything possi-

ble must be done to refute such complaints and ensure that no justified grounds for a complaint exist in future.

(Sgd) LEHMANN.

Distribution: Messrs. Loeser, Goerens, A von Bohlen, Lorenz, Winters, Poethe, E. Mueller, Ihn, Beusch, Girod.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-201

Telegram

16.11.1933.

Kruppbohlen invited respectfully to a conference in the house of the President of the Reichstag, Friedrichebertstr on Monday February 20th 6 o'clock afternoon, during which the Reich Chancellor will explain his policies.

President of the Reichstag Goering, Minister of the Reich.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-203

[Speech of Hitler to Leading Members of Industry before the Election of March, 1933]

With the year 1918 a whole system collapsed. That it had to come about was often predicted, as much by economic leaders as especially, by Geheimrat Kirdorf. The revolution which the year 1918 brought us was only conditional. In any case it did not bring about the revolution such as in Russia, but only a new school of thought, which slowly initiated the dissolution of the existing order. Bismark's statement:—"Liberalism is the pacemaker of social-Democracy" is now scientifically established and proven for us. A given school of thought—thought direction—can unsuspectedly lead towards the dissolution of the foundation of the State. In our country also, a new direction of thought had gained ground which slowly led to internal disruption and became the pacemaker of Bolshevism.

Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound idea of authority and personality. Everything positive, good and valuable, which has been achieved in the world in the field of economics and culture, is solely attributable to the importance of personality. When, however, the defence of the existing order [des Geschehenen], its political administration, is left to a majority, it will go irretrievably under. All the worldly goods which we possess, we owe to the struggle of the chosen [Auserlesenen]. Would we have had the present conditions in the Middle Ages, the foundations of our German Reich would never have been laid.

The same mentality that was the basis for obtaining these values must be used to preserve these values. All values which make up the height of our culture originated from an entirely different mentality than that which seized its administration since 1918. The revolution is the first conclusion of a decade-old development of discord in our people. All over the world we experience this crisis of disunity. The people, however, react differently towards it, as for example in Russia and Italy. In the other countries, Germany included, this crisis, in its last possibilities and consequences, is not yet being recognized. Our people has not yet sufficiently recognized that there are two souls struggling for it. Our entire life is based upon common agreements. The smallest example of this is the family and it leads on up to the State. It is an impossibility that part of the people recognizes private ownership while another part denies it. Such a struggle splits the people. The struggle lasts until one side emerges victorious. When a man deserts his unit he can be punished. When, however, 15% to 20% disregard their oath of allegiance, the unit must fail as a military instrument. The same applies to a State, if 15% of the people deny the State as a permanent recognized social order, no sound system can be set up for the general public. Therefore, it is impossible to maintain Culture, Art, Religion and Science, if a large percentage of the Nation refuses to abide by the thoughts which created such a Culture. Justice also can only be established upon generally recognized theories. Therefore, it can also be Bolshevistic, if it has to protect the Bolshevist cause. Such a condition of discord leads slowly but surely to agony, to the death of an ideology. No two ideologies can continuously live alongside one another. In such struggles the strength of a people eats itself completely up internally and therefore cannot act externally. It does not rest. This condition of attrition lasts until one party emerges victorious or the State itself dissolves, whereby a people loses its place in history. We live in such times now, when the die must be cast, and when we must decide whether we want to adopt a form of life that supports the State or to have Communism. The latter is also thinkable. It is often being said that Communism is the last step of humanity. I believe the very opposite; it is the origin of human development. It represents the most primitive form of human life. The deeper one delves into nature, the more alike becomes its achievements, they become as in Communism more and more homogeneous. The Communist principle does not hold water. It is not by chance that one person accomplishes more than the other. The principle of private ownership which has slowly gone into the general conception of justice and

has become a complicated process of economic life, is rooted in this fact. The course which we have to take is clearly indicated. It is, however, not enough to say: We do not want Communism in (our) Economy. If we continue on our old political course, then we shall perish. We have fully experienced in the past years that Economics and Politics cannot be separated. The Political conduct of the struggle is the primary decisive factor. Therefore, politically clear conditions must be reached. As Economics alone has not made the German Reich so did politics not make Economics. But each one built steadily higher upon the other. As a hand-in-hand working of Politics and Economics brought us to our height, so meant the working against one another, as we experienced it after the revolution, continuous downfall. As I lay in the hospital in 1918 I experienced the revolution in Bavaria. From the very beginning I saw it as a crisis in the development of the German people, as a period of transition. Life always tears up humanity. It is therefore the noblest task of a Leader to find ideals that are stronger than the factors that pull the people apart. I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to search for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them in Nationalism, in the value of personality, in the denial of reconciliation between nations, in the strength and power of individual personality. On this basis I tried to reach an understanding between two souls struggling with one another within the German people. The struggle which I undertook was so much harder because it was conducted during a time when the law for the protection of the weak and decadent held true, a law under which every nation is doomed to perish. Of course, nothing is being accomplished by simple denial of such ways of thought, one has to offer new thoughts. If one rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced by something better.

For 40 years we are experiencing a continuous growth of Social Democracy. Bismark said shortly before he retired:—"If this keeps up, Marx must remain victorious".

The creative and decomposing forces in a people always fight against one another. In this struggle one side always gains ever greater heights than the other, and therefore I have been following the development of Social-Democracy with steadily growing concern and said to myself, we must come to a decision. I have repeatedly taken the occasion to point out to responsible people what dangers were threatening the German people. Time and again it was argued, amongst others, by von Seeckt, that at the present time this would mean civil war. And when, a few years

ago, the number of Socialist seats went back a little, I was told triumphantly:—"Look here, the danger is already over". They always comforted themselves with the hope that the Socialist movement would slow down by itself. The danger, however, cannot be overcome by such means. Human beings are nothing less but equal, and if human beings are not led, they drop back into the most primitive ancient state. It was this perception that moved me to found a new Nationalist movement, which after 14 years of struggle has become a leading force in the German Reich. We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must be introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes. For all this however, courage, and iron will and perseverance are essential.

We stand to-day facing the following situation:—Weimar imposed upon us a certain constitutional order by which they put us on a democratic basis. By that we were, however, not provided with an able governmental authority. On the contrary, as I criticized Democracy before, Communism had to bore its way constantly deeper into the German people. The result was an ever increasing tension, by which also—and that is almost the worst—the courts did not remain uninfluenced. Two fronts have thus shaped themselves which put to us the choice:—either Marxism in its purest form or the other side. One cannot assume the point of view and say:—the other side will gradually break through again. Such an attitude means defeat. When I wanted to act, I was advised to wait a while. But I did not agree to such tolerance. With the very same courage with which we go to work to make up for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we have withstood all attempts to move us off the right way. We have turned down the favour (benevolence) of the Catholic Centre Party [Zentrum] to tolerate us. Hugenberg has too small a movement. He has only considerably slowed down our development. We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other side completely. While still gaining power one should not start the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no further possible upward development, shall one strike. In Prussia we must gain another 10 seats and in the Reich proper another 33. That is not impossible if we throw in all our strength. Then only begins second action against Communism.

Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the outcome there will be no retreat [Rueckfall], even if the coming election does not bring about a decision. One way or another, if the election does not decide, the decision must be brought about even

by other means, [Eben auf einem anderen Weg fallen] I have intervened in order to give the people once more the chance to decide their fate by themselves. This determination is a strong asset for whatever must possibly happen later. Does the election bring no result, well, Germany won't go to ruin. Today, as never before, everyone is under the obligation to pledge himself to success. The necessity to make sacrifices has never been greater than now. For Economy I have the one wish that it go parallel with the internal structure to meet a calm future. The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht will not be decided at Geneva, but in Germany, when we have gained internal strength through internal peace. There will, however, be no internal peace until Marxism is eliminated [Erledigt]. Here lies the decision which we must go to meet, hard as the struggle might be. I put my life into this struggle day after day as do all those who joined me in this struggle. There are only two possibilities, either to crowd back the opponent on constitutional grounds, and for this purpose once more this election, or a struggle will be conducted with other weapons, which may demand greater sacrifices. I would like to see them avoided. I hope the German people thus recognize the greatness of the hour. It shall decide over the next 10 or probably even 100 years. It will become a turning point in German history, to which I pledge myself with glowing energy.

* * * * *

Goering:—He counted on it that with political appeasement, domestic economy will also quiet down. No experiments would be made. However, to attain the goal, all forces must be mustered on March 5th. Above all it is important to penetrate into the circles that are still disconcerted with Marxism and slumber uselessly in aggravation and bitterness. Most of the internal political obstacles have been removed after unity with the other groups of similar ideology was achieved under one plan. This present unity should be made deeper. No matter how the election comes out, the distribution of forces should remain the same. In the coming struggle everyone must perform in his own field. The German Nationals [Deutschnazionalen] will attack where successes can no longer be achieved by the National-Socialists. On the other hand the National-Socialists will be given a task which has no prospects for the others. Without doubt we must do the most work, for we must penetrate with our S.A. men into the darkest quarters of the cities and operate there from mouth to mouth and fight for every single soul.

Goering considered to some extent the great dangers connected with this election battle. He then led over very cleverly to the

necessity that other circles not taking part in this political battle should at least make the financial sacrifices so necessary at this time. These were so much more necessary because not even one penny of the taxpayers money would be asked for. Government funds would not be used. The sacrifices asked for surely would be so much easier for industry to bear if it realized that the election of March 5th will surely be the last one for the next ten years, probably even for the next hundred years.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-204

[Statement of Krupp Concerning Political Organization
of State and Economy]

MEMORANDUM

On the 20th of this month I expressed to Reich Chancellor Hitler the gratitude of approximately 25 industrialists present, for having given us such a clear picture of the conception of his ideas. I then emphasized that it would not be advisable to enter into a detailed discussion, but that I would like to underline 3 points with which all present would be in agreement: —

1. That it is highest time to finally clarify the questions pertaining to domestic politics in Germany.
2. That we, just as he, consider that the object of every regulation is to benefit the interest of the German people as a whole, not that of individual professions or classes.
3. That it is also our opinion that only in a politically strong and independent State could economy and business develop and flourish.

22 February 1933
KvB.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-206

V.B. No. 431.

vR/LB.

Essen, 12 October 1939
Representative's Office.

MEMORANDUM

*CONCERNS:—Distribution of Official Propaganda Literature
abroad with the help of our Foreign Connections.*

On the morning of October 11 the District Representative of Ribbentrop's private Foreign Office [Dienststelle Ribbentrop]

made an appointment for a conference by telephone. A Mr. Lackmann arrived at the appointed time, at 15.30 hrs. In answer to my question, with whom I was dealing and which official Bureau he represented, he informed me that he was not himself the District Representative of Ribbentrop's private Foreign Office, that a Mr. Landrat Bollmann was such and that he himself had come at Mr. Bollmann's order.

Mr. L. informed me that there exists a great mix-up in the field of Foreign Propaganda and that Ribbentrop's private Foreign Office [SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz, Berlin] wants to create a tighter organization for Foreign Propaganda. For this purpose the support of our Firm and *above all an index of addresses* [Adressenmaterial] were needed.

I informed Mr. L. that our Firm had put itself years ago at the disposal of official Bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the utmost. That we do not need a tight organization, that we had the desire to handle things our way, as we had up to now. Above all, we would not like to let our Address-index out of our hands, because only we could estimate, if, for what purpose and to what extent, our connections abroad could be put to use. Only by personal handling can our connections abroad be used and kept receptive to effective propaganda. With the present lively activity of the "Secret Service" it must be avoided, not only in the interest of our Firm but also in the interest of Germany as a whole, that our agents in neutral foreign countries would come through improper handling to the attention of the "Secret Service" and economically ruined by it within a short time.

I repeated that, due to all these reasons, we would like to refrain from giving out any foreign addresses. If additional distributions of propaganda literature were desired, a propaganda-leaflet should be sent to us, and after examining it, we would advise the official Bureau what quantity of such printed matter could be mailed abroad through us, at our expense, as heretofore.

Mr. Lackmann mentioned at the end that the distribution of an illustrated extra-edition was being prepared, in which the particulars concerning the safe departure of foreign diplomats from Warsaw shall be given publicity. Expense shall be met through advertisements; a full-page advertisement would cost 8.000 Marks. I had to repeatedly explain to Mr. L. that I am not competent concerning advertisements and I implied that we would hardly have any interest in such an advertisement.

[by stamp] v. Raussendorff.

TO:—Mr. Dr. Rademacher, General Office.

Mr. v. Buelow.

Mr. Martiny, Werba.

Mr. Loenne, Information Bureau.

Mr. Dr. Janssen, Berlin.

Mr. Grusonwerk.

Mr. Germaniawerft.

Mr. Friedrich-Alfred-Huette.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-208

26 April 1933.

PERSONAL.

Honourable Mr. Springorum,

As I told you by telephone, a conference was held yesterday in Berlin at the invitation of Mr. Alfred Rosenberg, the Chief of the Bureau for Foreign Politics of the NSDAP, Reich Headquarters, in the Kaiserhof, Berlin, during which the above-mentioned demonstrated how absolutely necessary it is to counteract—through clarification of factual conditions in Germany and the aims of the National-Socialist Party—the extensive, also economic damage abroad which would be created partly by misunderstandings, partly intentionally, by ill-meaning circles. At this conference it was underlined that the means for such counter-propaganda should be provided by the Government, that that, however, would be a slow process, so in order to become effective as soon as possible, since it appears absolutely necessary, German Economy should therefore be called upon to make such transition possible by providing at once a definite amount—1 million Marks was the sum mentioned.

I pointed out that it would not be possible for certain highly placed persons to tie themselves down to a promise right away, but that I would take the occasion to get in touch with the leading gentlemen of the Ruhr district in this matter.

I would be very grateful to you if you, as agreed by telephone, would write referring to me to Mr. Alfred Rosenberg whose address is as follows:—Alfred Rosenberg, Chief of the Bureau for Foreign Politics of the NSDAP, Reich Headquarters, Berlin SW 68, Zummerstrasse 88, in order to inform him that as a rule such matters are handled through you and that you would bring up the whole questions on May 8th. Should you decide, however, on the basis of your intended contact with Dr. Ernst Poensgen to remit a sum immediately, for my part I would be only too glad

to welcome it, because one may also say in this case:—"Whoever helps quickly, helps doubly!".

I hope to take up everything else orally soon.

With best greetings
Sincerely yours always
[stamp] KRUPP BOHLEN HALBACH.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-226

REICHS MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT AND
WAR PRODUCTION

Rue A-Artb O.I-Hoe/An

Nr. 1980 / 44

BERLIN, SO 16
10 Nov 44
Tel. No. 676141

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To:

1. The Chairman of the Armament Commission, with copies to:
Rue IN (RueKdo), WKB and Rue-Representatives.
2. DAF-Department SSV
3. DAF-Department for Employment.
4. Local Distribution A.1. plus Armaments Department Labour E.

Reference: Ensuring the Discipline and output of Foreign Workers.

The Reichs Minister for the Interior, in agreement with all Departments concerned, has issued an order for ensuring the discipline and output of the foreign workers, dated 25 Sep 44, attached herewith. This order is brought to the notice of all armament departments.

It is not essential to notify factories, but it may be advisable to inquire at factories whether this order is known to the factory managers.

By order.
(sgd) Dr. HUFFAUER.

Encls.

Certified: LANGNER

Copy

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

REICHS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

File Ref Pol. S IV B—310/44 dated 25 Sept 44.

Decree for Ensuring the Discipline and Output of Foreign Workers.

Several million foreign workers are employed in the territory of the greater Reich. Up to the present, on account of just and correct treatment, and sufficient feeding, accommodation and welfare, they have made a considerable contribution to the total German working and output capacity. The present developments at this time, when the most serious decisive battle is being waged, demand the ensuring of the order and discipline amongst the foreign workers under all circumstances, together with the prevention of acts of sabotage, forming of resistance groups and revolutionary gatherings, etc.

It is of particular importance that not only the present good output should be secured, but also that further working reserves should be freed, which, without doubt, can still be obtained from these millions of foreign workers. Care must be taken, furthermore, that no intellectuals or other dangerous elements amongst the foreigners can begin to influence German works members in a defeatist or even pacifist sense. In agreement with the departments concerned, I therefore decree:

1. It is the duty of works managers and foremen to observe any developments of the frame of mind amongst foreign workers with particular care. Close co-operation between departments of the Party, the State and Industry, with departments of the Secret Police, is absolutely necessary for this purpose.
2. All men and women of the NSDAP, its subsidiaries and affiliated bodies in the works, will, in accordance with instructions from the Kreisleiters be warned by their local group leaders, and be put under obligation:
 - a. to play their part in keeping foreigners under the most careful observation. They will report the least suspicion to the works foreman, which he will pass on to the Defence Deputy, or, where such a deputy has not been appointed, to the Police Department concerned, whilst at the same time, reporting to the works manager and local group leader.
 - b. to exert untiringly and continuously their influence on the

foreigners, both in word and deed in regard to the certainty of German victory and the German will to resist, thus producing a further increase of output in the works. Party members, both men and women, and members of Party organization and affiliated bodies must be expected more than ever before, to conduct themselves in an exemplary manner.

3. Propaganda within the works is to be increased. Foreign workers must be particularly influenced by means of camp newspapers, posters, leaflets and loudspeakers in the spirit of the German fight for existence so that a final stop is put to the increasing number of rumors which are circulating amongst them. The Gau Trustee of the DAF will issue detailed instructions in co-operation with the Gau Propaganda leader and the leader of the Gau Dept. for Social Questions.
4. The Defence Deputies appointed by the Secret State Police after investigation by the Party, are responsible for defence questions within the works and will have both the principal and the auxiliary professional work protection squad under their command. Wherever it appears necessary in the interest of a coordinated political policy the Defense Deputies will be called together by the Kreisleiters after consultation with the leader of the Secret State Police, and will be informed of the political situation. In the case of larger and particularly important works, the Secret State Police in collaboration with the Party, where necessary will arrange a strengthening of the work protection squad by suitable forces of the Party and the Army (war, wounded, convalescents, etc.).
5. In order that the tasks of the Defense Deputies may be fulfilled and in accordance with the instructions issued by the Reichs Leader SS and Leader of the Reichs Organization, works, personnel will be subordinate to the Defense Deputies in the event of danger. Organization and the power to issue orders within the works are not affected by this. So as to avoid any dissension amongst these members of the works (compare figure 2) who are members of the NSDAP every effort must be made to organize collectively all the forces concerned and they must place themselves actively at the disposal of both propaganda and security. The Gau Trustee of the DAF will take the necessary steps.
6. If outside help becomes necessary, this will be called for by the Defense Deputy through the nearest police department.

Arrangements made in that respect must be made known to the works foreman. To avoid delay in calling such outside help, provisions must be made for the event of a breakdown of the Signals Service.

The Party executive concerned must be informed by the works foreman by the quickest possible means whenever the work protection squad is brought into action or outside help is called for.

7. The works manager, together with his Defense Deputy and works foreman is responsible that the works are held during disturbances by the use of his own forces until outside help arrives. In no circumstances is it permissible to accept any demands, nor the least signs of yielding be shown.
8. Appropriate measures to meet similar conditions, if necessary, and wherever conditions demand, are to be taken in agriculture, public transport, etc.

(sgd) Heinrich HIMMLER.

Certified copy: (sgd) Kerl

Chancellery Employee.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-229

[EXTRACT FROM A PAMPHLET "JUDGES' LETTERS"]

Information Pamphlet on the Reichs Ministry of Justice.

Confidential

5. *Concealment of Jewish Identification.*

Judgment of a Lower Court of 24th April 1942.

The Jewish proprietress of a boarding house failed to apply for the name SARA to be added to her own name in the official Telephone Directory. The Lower Court condemned her to a fine of RM30 or ten days' imprisonment. Reason given is: According to the decision of the District Court, Jews are obliged to have their names supplemented with the name SARA in the telephone book. The Jewess was therefore to be punished. The leniency of the punishment was explained by the fact that individual judges had sometimes not given their decisions along the lines laid down by the District Court.

Confidential.

No. 1, 1 Oct. 42.

GERMAN JUDGES.

According to the ancient Teutonic conception of justice, the leader of the Nation was also its supreme judge. If, therefore,

the Fuehrer invests the authority of a judge on a third person, it not only implies that this person receives his judge's power from the Fuehrer and is responsible to him, but it also proves the close relationship between leadership and the duties of a judge.

* * * * *

I, therefore, decided to issue "Judges' Letters" which will be sent to all German judges and Attorney Generals. In particular these "Judges' Letters" will contain such findings, which, in my opinion, deserve to be specially discussed in view of their results or grounds for judgment. I propose to show by means of these findings how a better decision could, and should have been made. On the other hand, it is proposed to point out correct decisions of sufficient importance to the community.

The contents of the letters are confidential. They will be handed to all Judges and Attorney Generals by the departmental chiefs, against receipt.

I am convinced that the "Judges' Letters" will contribute considerably towards the creation of a German corps of judges, homogeneous in spirit.

Berlin, 1 Oct 42.

(Sgd) Dr. Thierach.

Reichs Minister of Justice.

No. 4

CRIME AGAINST FOREIGN CURRENCY LAWS BY A JEW.

Judgment by a County Court of 26 May 42.

The accused, a 36 year old Jew, took over the textile business of his deceased father in 1936 and emigrated to Holland in 1938. In 1941 he was arrested at Amsterdam.

* * * * *

The County Court decided that "for the reasons stated by the accused" a particularly serious case under para. 42 of the Foreign Currency Law of 4 Feb. 44, and para. 69 of the Foreign Currency Law of 12 Dec 38, did not exist. It sentenced the accused to a total imprisonment of two years, and fined him 9,000 RM. The time spent in prison on remand will be deducted from the sentence.

The judgment, in considering the reasons for the sentence, is weighing up the mitigating circumstances and states that the accused was, in principle, without previous conviction; that he had been under certain amount of stress owing to the action of his father and the stubbornness of his sister. One crime had inevitably been followed by another. Furthermore, by making a confession he had greatly assisted in clarifying the whole evidence.

The lengthy period of criminal conduct is then quoted as an aggravating factor, as well as the fraudulent conduct towards German authorities. Certain demands made of former employees are also stressed.

COMMENTS BY THE REICHS MINISTER OF JUSTICE

In deciding the sentence, the Court is using the same considerations which would be applied if the accused had been a German national. This is not admissible. A Jew is an enemy of the German people who has plotted, stirred up and prolonged this war. Thus he has brought endless misery upon our German nation. He is not only of a different, but also of an inferior racial type. Justice demands that equal measures must not be applied to the unequal and that this racial point of view must not be overlooked in deciding the sentence. In passing a sentence on the accused, who was—as is typical for a Jew—a profiteer to the detriment of German interests, it ought to have been considered first and foremost that he had extracted considerable values from the German people over a period of years. Like all of his race, he deliberately and selfishly damaged vital German interests by ruthlessly profiteering and fraud. He has abused German hospitality which had enabled him and his father to accumulate a considerable fortune, and finally did not hesitate to entice Germans who were economically dependent on him, to commit grave breaches of the Foreign Currency Laws, which endangered their entire existence. The question of whether or not this was a particularly serious case, should have been examined with a view to the general aspect of the German people. It did not suffice in this connection to refer to the unconvincing statements of the accused himself who was certainly not under compulsion during all those four years, but who was acting in his own interest and on his own initiative. The typically Jewish conduct which is damaging National interests, calls for the sternest judgment and the most severe punishment. In view of those reasons considerations of the psychology of the Jew and his family should have been a matter of utter insignificance.

* * * * *

No. 3, 1 Dec 42.

REFUSAL TO GIVE THE GERMAN SALUTE BY A SCHOOL CHILD.

Decision of a juvenile court on 21 Sept 40.

An 11 year old girl attracts attention by constantly refusing the Hitler salute in school. She states that the reason is her religious conviction and even quotes passages from the Bible. At

school she shows no interest if questions are asked, which refer to the Fuehrer. The parents, who have another 6 year old daughter, approve of the child's conduct and refuse persistently to influence the child to the contrary. They, too, refuse the Hitler salute and refer to a quotation from the Bible "Do nothing with thy hand raised because this displeases the Lord". They adhere to this in spite of admonitions by the Court and by the director of the school. The mother completely refuses to talk to the child about it. The father agrees to talk it over with the child but the decision is to be left to her. Altogether the parents show signs of being opposed to the National Socialist State. They do not possess a single Swastika flag. They have not arranged for their child to join the Hitler Youth. They have been barred from the NSV, because they have not made any donations in spite of a sufficient income by the husband. All the same, they deny being opponents of the National Socialist Movement.

The department for the care of Juveniles has recommended that, owing to this attitude, the parents should be deprived of their jurisdiction over their children; the juvenile court had declined, and has merely decreed protective supervision.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-230

[Instructions for issuing steel switches to Krupp camps]

Herrn Gottlob: 3.1.45

The steel switches (birches) have been delivered. How shall they be distributed?

80 pieces (switches)

Seger

Herrn Sager, the 80 steel switches (birches) may be distributed as follows:

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| Frintroperstrasse | 2 |
| Luscherhofstrasse | 6 |
| Voerde Ost | 10 |
| Voerde West | 5 |
| Dorsten | 10 |
| Lintorf | 10 |
| Mulheim | 5 |
| Weidkamp | 15 |
| Kraftstrasse | 17 |

Kupke

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-233

Camp Voerde West I

Would you please inform the camp catering department on the attached pro-forma the personnel figures for the camp and kitchen; German and Foreign separately, according to the position on 15 October 1944 to the 20th of this month including sick and those on leave.

Special importance is attached to the completion of column "working time which must be done." It is to be considered that foreigners must work 12 hours on principle out of which, one hour counts as a break and consequently will not be paid.

German personnel and Foreign workers are to be shown separately by salary and wage numbers; the foreign workers will be shown by numbers only.

Chief Camp Directive,
Camp Catering Dept.
17.10.44.

Children's section inclusive.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-238

Gefolgschaftswesen, 28.7.44

File Note No. 10

Reference:—*Assignment of Detainees.*

Foundation for the reports:—Visit of the Director of Distribution of workers of the Weimar-Buchenwald Concentration Camp, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Schwarz on 26.7.44.

Participants in the visit to the Works and Camp:—Herr Trockel, in the subsequent conference, Dr. Lehmann, Holve and Trockel.

Herr Schwarz came on behalf of his Commandant SS Standartenfuehrer Pister to talk over with us, the question of employment of K.1 Detainees. He pointed out that the employment of men could not be reckoned with for a considerable period. Our last request was for 700 women.

Whilst visiting the Humboldtstrasse Camp, which we had in mind for the accommodation of K.1 Detainees, Herr Schwarz thought that this camp was too spacious for the women. He suggested that only five of the southern barracks on the west side of the camp together with a few slit trenches should be wired off and so make a proportionately small camp for the proposed number of which could easily be kept in view.

In Rolling works No II where 300 women are to be employed it was shown that, after a thorough examination, led by Herr Braun, employment here was possible and suitable. Herr Schwarz

asked that a simple wire fence at the most 2 meters high be erected between the pillars to separate the K.1 Detainees from the other foreign workers. Herr Braun will see that this is carried out.

No special door is needed for the railway entrance, a hurdle suffices. On the question of safety measures, Herr Hauptstuermfuehrer Schwarz was most obliging.

Women can only be employed on the day shift in the Electrode work shops and then only 50.

An examination of the spring work-shop, under the direction of Herrn Engerisser showed that it was not possible to employ the 150 women already applied for, as it is not possible to separate them from the other foreign workers. That is a principle condition for their employment. Herr Schwarz declared that in spite of the consideration of our wishes he was unable to allow employment here owing to the fact that the works were not easily controlled visually.

In armour building shop 4, it is also not possible to have a completely separated employment squad. The final result was that at the moment the places ready for employment are:—

Rolling works II with 300 women

Electrode work-shops with 50 women

As not less than 500 women would be assigned, we agreed that the figure should remain at 500 women in order that the assignation should not be endangered. The SS also place a further 20 administrative personnel such as doctors, nurses, cobblers, tailors, etc. at our disposal so that the figure of 500 women is now raised to 520. Employment bureau J must try to find work for the remaining 150 detainees as quickly as possible.

The hall near the rolling works no II which we had in mind for accommodation of the detainees was thought by Herr Schwarz to be an excellent place. He suggested that the 520 Hungarian Jewesses which we had asked for, should be accommodated here on the 1st floor and the camp in the Humboldtstrasse be abandoned. According to his experience this should be possible. The ground floor could then be used as an air-raid shelter in air raids. The very few building alterations which are necessary in this hall would be talked over with Herrn Holve. The main things are the erection of a barbed wire fence in front of the hall which allows a small exit and the erection of a small barracks for the Commander of the guard and his duty office and for the German female guard personnel. In the hall itself 2 rooms for each 5 German guards are to be erected on the 1st floor, windows to be put in, building of closets so that the detainees have no need to go

down stairs at night. Furthermore, washing accommodation is to be made for the detainees.

Rolling works II will let the clothes of the detainees be washed in a room which is already available outside their accommodation.

Chief Camp Directive will take over the catering for the detainees and guards according to the agreement made on 5.7.44 between Herr SS Standartenfuehrer Pister and Herr Kupke.

The SS are providing a guard consisting of guard commander and 10 men. For 520 women we have to name approx 45 German women who will be sworn in to the SS, given 3 weeks training in the women's camp at Ravensbrueck and then given full official supervision duties by the SS. A leaflet for the obtaining of women as forewomen is attached.

The obtaining of these German female guards will be the most difficult problem presented to us by the assignment of K.1 detainees. An inquiry at the Essen Labour Exchange, director Dr. Simon, has shown that we cannot obtain such people through the Labour Exchange. Therefore we must obtain them from our own works. Rolling works II and the Electrode work-shop will make an effort to obtain up to 30 German women out of their personnel, each in relation to the number of detainees asked for, who are willing to sign on for the above mentioned purpose and who are also fitted for it.

In case the departments requiring employees cannot obtain the required number of German women as security personnel it would be necessary to draw them from other departments.

The transfer of the 520 women asked for could only take place after the training of the German women, therefore in practice, in 4 weeks at the earliest.

Signed TROCKEL.

1. Enclosure.

Distribution: Herr A.v. Bohlen, Janssen, Houdremont, E. Mueller, Ihn, v. Buelow, Lehmann, Hanke, Hintz, Holve, *Kraus*, Kupke, Hozgen (WwI) Braun (WwII) Engerisse (Spring work-shop), Waluner (Electrode work-shop) Trockel.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-242

Dr. Engineer F. Springorum.

Dortmund 2 May 1933

Max Eythstrasse 4.

To: Dr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Auf dem Huegel/Essen.

Dear Mr von Bohlen:

I thankfully confirm receipt of your two letters of April 26th

and May 1st of this year. I informed Mr Rosenberg on Saturday that, for the time being, I could put 20,000 Marks at his disposal, and furthermore, that I would bring up the question on the 8th of this month, at a confidential (Engeren) meeting of Industrialists.

To clear myself, I am returning to you Mr Rosenberg's letter, of which I have taken cognizance.

Very truly yours,
/s/ SPRINGORUM.

Enclosure.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-249

NOTES ON CONFERENCE WITH MESSRS. GRASSMANN,
DR. FUSS AND KRAFT HELD ON 9th DEC. 1942.

Concerning:—*History of War Economy.*

I gave the gentlemen a short report on the result of the previous discussions I had with Mr. von Brackel, mentioned particularly that, as Mr. von Bohlen had told me—peculiarly enough, the Wehrmacht had solved the intended close connection between its Historian charged with the writing of this war's History and the Reich Economic Board [Reichwirtschaftskammer], which had undertaken the collecting of material for a History of War Economy. What the reasons for this step are, I should certainly hear from Mr. von Brackel.

I asked Mr. Kraft to select some Krupp books and to send them, as I had promised to Mr. von Brackel, for the History Library of the Reich Economic Board.

Mr. Kraft then reported about the collections of material for the History of Krupp during the last war; under very strong pressure from Mr. von Bohlen, notes which came in soon after the previous war were sorted out in about 40 subjects and put together by the department heads who specialized in the subjects in question. Only two copies each exist of these compositions.

On the basis of these notes Mr. Berdrow then edited, in type-written form, a comprehensive summary also consisting of just a few copies. All these compositions have so far been treated as strictly secret and have been made available to leading officers of our firm only on very rare occasions. Mr. V.B. had firmly reserved the right to publish such a work.

For the period of transition from 1919 up to rearmament, A.K. has undertaken various tasks in order to keep up the Company's activity in the field of artillery, in the sense of observing activities

in that field in the rest of the world (relation: Bofors) and then also for the production of artillery material, within and to a certain extent also beyond, the limitation established by the peace dictate.

Only very little material about the present war reaches Mr. Kraft for the time being (mostly about air raids). Mr. Grassmann, however, collects very eagerly for A.K. notes about material important as a basis for a future comprehensive history of Krupp's activity, specifically in the field of artillery.

It was clear to us that it is absolutely essential to collect even now material for this future History, but the difficulty lies however in the fact that at the present time our gentlemen are extraordinarily busy. On the other hand it should be considered that whatever can be collected and consolidated now with relatively little effort must later, after several years, be accomplished only by multiplication of efforts.

Therefore we are of the opinion that no later than after the visit of Messrs von Brackel and Dr. Treue, all Executive Officers should be called upon by the Board of Directors to collect even now, just as A.K. does it, valuable historical material. It would be of importance, however, to determine according to which fields, laid down briefly and to the point, the material should be collected. As a basis for this, the approximately 40 fields according to which the material was collected for the last war could be used. Mr. Kraft will make this breakdown available to us in the near future. We then could very well decide which fields should be designated for this History. It would then be correct to ask the respective gentlemen to name for their departments a special confidential Liaison Officer from the Historical Section, who would collect the material for the departments. Mr. Kraft will travel to Berlin on another matter at the beginning of January and will, on this occasion, give Mr. von Brackel to read one or two compositions of the previous war, after permission is received from Mr. von Bohlen.

It will have to be considered whether the reading should not take place in the building of our Agency in order to maintain the principle of not letting these documents out of our hands. Mr. Kraft will, at the same time, discuss matters with Mr. von Brackel in the spirit of this note and eventually hold further conferences. Copies: Mr. Kraft through Dr. Fuss, Mr. Grassmann.

/s/ von Buelow

Mr. Kraft.

Could we get together perhaps on Thursday next week in order to consider the approximately 40 themes on the previous war on

hand, the breakdown for this war, and in connection with it: which subjects are to be selected for the "History".

12 December 1942.
/stamp/ von BUELOW

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-251

[MEMORANDUM OF MR. LIEBERMAN DATED
27 SEPTEMBER 1945]

I confirm under oath the contents of this memorandum which I have compiled about the concentration camp at Auschwitz, and of which an English copy has been presented to me. I sign in your presence the eight pages of this document.

I should like to give the following additional details of this memorandum:

I was arrested on the 11 Aug 1942 at Lille, in my capacity as an agent for the passenger service and not as a Jew. I was taken to the prison of St. Gilles where I stayed nine weeks. I had been arrested by members of the G.F.P. During my stay in St. Gilles I was five times interrogated. On the occasion of three of these interrogations I was violently beaten with the fist or with the nod, particularly in the face, which necessitated medical attention for five days.

As no proof could be found regarding my secret activities I was transferred to the Gestapo as a Jew. The Gestapo called for us at St. Gilles in a prison van and I was transferred to the military camp at Dossin a Malines. I and five of my companions were beaten and ill-treated by a civilian and two soldiers in uniform, who were with us in the lorry.

2. I stayed in Malines for several hours. I was then attached to a transport of 1,500 people, men, women and children. On leaving we all drew 250 grammes of bread for a journey of four days and five nights. We had been previously robbed of all the food stuff which we possessed. The journey took place in passenger wagons as well as in goods trucks. I, personally was one of 80 in a cattle truck. We did not get a chance of lying down during these four days. Two of my companions died on the way.

Being locked up in these wagons I was not in a position to see whether any person was thrown off any of the wagons.

Arriving at our station, which was three kilometers away from the camp itself, and situated in a wood, we were thrown out of the wagons with an unheard of brutality. We were then in a state of exhaustion caused by this particularly painful journey, and due to the fact that we had with us old people, sick people, women

and children of all ages, down to the age of four and five months. I have personally seen children lying all along the embankment who had been kicked on to the slope by SS, whilst other SS men prevented the mothers taking care of the children. During two-and-a-half months I was employed in this station unloading potatoes, and I had ample opportunity of witnessing similar scenes over and over again, often several times a day the children abandoned on the platform were subsequently collected by prisoners and SS men and taken to the gas chambers, which were 50 meters away from the station. The gas chambers were camouflaged as shower baths. On the right hand side there was an entrance for men and on the left hand side an entrance for women, but once undressed, men, women and children assembled again inside the gas chamber. When a transport arrived a percentage of three to fifteen of the able-bodied men and women were separated and sent to the labour camps of Birkenau and Auschwitz. The remainder were taken to the gas chambers. Up to 1944 no child was retained for work at the camp. From 1944 onwards a small percentage of male children between the ages of 11 and 13 escaped the gas chamber.

3. As already mentioned, I was one of a working party whose duty it was to unload potatoes at the station. We had at this time no contact with the prisoners of the big camp. We were separated in quarantine but housed together with another working party which was serving the crematorium and the gas chamber. It is due to this fact that I know how things occurred.

The men and women entered the so-called bath room and undressed separately to avoid panic. Once they were undressed they entered by separate doors in the central chamber. This chamber could take 3,000 people. The gas was released through sprays of the showers and from bombs which were thrown through apertures which were designed to allow for that procedure. Death occurred within five minutes. On certain days when enormous transports arrived at the station of Birkenau 42,000 people were gassed. Once the gassing process had been completed, the floor of the chamber opened automatically and the corpses fell into the subterranean chamber where prisoners in charge of extracting the teeth or cutting hair of a certain length, took over. On several occasions I have myself seen in the evening, after a good day's work, the gold teeth or the hair which came from the corpses and which had been kept by the prisoners who lived with us in quarantine. Once the gold teeth had been recovered, the corpses were loaded on to a moving belt and transported to cremation ovens, through subterranean gangways. There were four

ovens, a big one and three small ones, which were capable of burning 400 corpses in five minutes. Later on, when the number of corpses outdid the capacity of the ovens, trenches were dug and the corpses thrown in saturated with petrol. I have personally seen these trenches and smelled the stench of the combustion. I have equally been able to visit the gas chamber and the crematorium, when I was detailed to clean up on a day when they were not in use.

It so happened that one of the prisoners who worked at the station recognized a member of his family amongst new arrivals. He threw himself on his father and told him that he was going to die. Both were immediately beaten to death by the SS.

On another occasion, a very beautiful woman who was perfectly well aware of what was going to happen to her, succeeded, the billet of the block leader where she had been conducted under the pretext of having to wait, in taking his revolver and killing him and herself. After this 400 women were selected in the camp of Birkenau and executed as a reprisal. I have personally seen these women before they entered the gas chamber.

I have no photographs of the gas chamber or crematorium of Birkenau in my possession.

4. Due to my employment of unloading at the station I knew of the gas, called "Cyclon". This gas was kept in little bombs which were themselves kept in metal cylinders. They were marked "Cyclon Gas I.G.V. from Hamburg to Auschwitz".

When corpses were burnt, they were put on a platform, five adults being placed longways whereas corpses of children were put aside as one could place double their number on the platform. This explains the SS use of the word "abrechnung", which means "accounting".

I have never seen the trolleys for the transport of corpses personally, nor have I seen the ovens operating; but as I have already mentioned, several of the working party, which was serving the gas chambers and ovens lived with us and have given me all the details. This special working party was called Sonderkommando [special commando]. A certain Jacob Weinschein of Paris, who is a survivor of this commando, is personally known to me. He escaped death because he was in hospital when his companions were gassed. In point of fact members of this commando were, themselves, put to death in the gas chamber after two or three months of employment. I know this fact, which was witnessed by the new commando which replaced them and whose first task it was to gas their predecessors. They were selected from the new arrivals, who were completely ignorant of the pro-

cedure in operation. They told us that they had to transport the corpses of their gassed comrades, who had been tattooed on the first day of work.

As soon as the Red Army approached in August 1944, the ashes from the cremation ovens were exhumed by the prisoners by order of the SS. I have held a handful of these ashes myself. I have seen them carried to the edge of a river which crossed the camp. The work was not carried out by the sonderkommando but by several hundreds of prisoners of the camp itself.

5. "Kanada" was the name for the commando whose task it was to discharge the luggage of the new arrivals. Those who belonged to it were those in quarantine, that is to say, who did not live in the big camp but in the small camp where we, ourselves, were living, together with a sonderkommando, but not in the same barracks. They were made to load the luggage on to lorries which were then driven to an unknown destination by the SS, and sometimes on to waggons to a destination in Berlin. Like all those who were in quarantine, they were earmarked to be executed, after a certain time. As regards the incident which I have mentioned in my memorandum on page 5, which took place in August 1944, it was related to me by witnesses who took part in the procedure.

6. Moll was one of those who selected the persons for the gas chamber and those who were to go to the big camp on arrival of fresh transport. He amused himself by beating the prisoners with indescribable violence. These scenes repeated themselves continually. Moll was a real sadist. I have seen him personally, stopping on several occasions in front of the crematorium which was still smoking, and pointing with his finger to the scene and addressing himself to Schillinger, Rapportfuehrer [translator's note: in charge of roll call], who was also outstanding for his brutality. Later on, when I stayed in the big camp I witnessed almost daily, how Moll, Schillinger and Block Leader Porecki amused themselves by beating and brutally treating prisoners returning from the mines after sixteen hours of work. They always handled a kind of rubber truncheon which was inlaid with a steel rod.

To mention one of the thousand incidents: once, when a party returned from work, one of the 200 prisoners failed to lift his cap in the prescribed manner; the complete party was made to stay outside and do physical exercises by way of punishment. This was in mid-winter.

7. I know that there were approximately 30,000 women in the women's camp because I had established certain contacts with

the women who came to collect potatoes. When I was transferred to the big camp I was able to continue that contact by talking through the barbed wire which separated us from the neutral zone which ran between the camps of the women and the camps of the men.

As regards the German personnel which were responsible for the running of the camp, I can only give those details which are contained in my memorandum, except in respect of the identity of (i) Hauptsturmfuehrer Schwarz and (ii) Obersturmfuehrer Schotel [Captain SS, and Major SS respectively]. When I arrived in 1942 they were both in office and were supervising the assembly of the camp. They were signing the execution warrants of the persons selected at general roll calls approximately every fortnight by Obersturmbannfuehrer Fischer, who was a military medical officer: in order to be sent to the gas chambers for the execution of those condemned to be hanged, or shot by a firing party.

Schotel left in 1943 in order to take over a different camp, whereas Schwarz remained until January 1945, when we were evacuated to Buchenwald. I have already referred to the death of Schillinger, who was killed by a beautiful woman. I was told of this incident by witnesses who survived the transport; I knew the condemned as an actress and dancer.

8. The "capos" were designated by the SS. In order to become a Capo it was necessary to distinguish one-self by killing prisoners. Moll, Porecki and Schillinger, would say, for instance, when 200 detainees were leaving the camp and the capo made his report, that there were 50 too many, or in other words that 150 were to return. It was then up to the Capos to kill them or to have them killed by other prisoners who, themselves, would then have a chance of becoming capos.

I know the names of Thien, Daniusch, Georges Burzyk, Otto Pelz, Simmermann, Kotular and others because they were boasting about it in general, and particularly about the number of prisoners they had put to death. As a reward they received cigarettes. I know that Georges Burzyk, who has killed one of my best friends of the name of Helm, a native of Brussels, by trampling on his stomach in front of my very eyes, has several thousand murders on his conscience.

I have no knowledge of any special reasons which might have been responsible for the betterment of conditions in the camp in 1943.

I had occasion to talk to women and men who had undergone

experimental operations such as abortion, artificial insemination and castration. The names are no longer in my mind. The facts which I am reporting have been told to me by the victims or by personal witnesses.

I am absolutely certain that they are correct.

The Czechoslovak camp was situated between the camp of quarantine and the big camp. I was able to see it from the big camp where I lived at that time. I then learned from witnesses who happened to be in the camp of quarantine, and who succeeded in passing that information on to me that all inmates of the camp had been gassed.

The incident of the 25 December 1942, which I reported in my memorandum was witnessed by me from the window of the block where I was living and which enabled one to see the big camp.

* * * * *

I was beaten and brutally treated on various occasions. I have twice received 25 strokes with a truncheon on the buttocks, once because I had failed to salute an SS man from the camp. The fact that I have escaped death, which was the eventual fate of all inmates of the block of quarantine, is due to my speaking six languages, particularly the Polish language. As the camp was situated in Polish territory, and knowledge of that language was an absolute necessity, I was chosen as an interpreter in the mines, to act as intermediary between the Polish workers and the Dutch, Belgian and German prisoners.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-253

ESSEN 3 October 1945

SWORN STATEMENT

The undersigned, Peter Guttersohn of Essen-West Bock Muehlweg 2, born 22.12.1898 makes the following voluntary statement:—

I have been employed by Krupp since 1912, and since 1930 in the Machine Construction shop No 9, without a break. We received the first Russian civilian workers at the end of 1942 and the first Russian PsW. at the beginning of 1943, who were trained as auxiliary and skilled workers in our works. The Russians worked to everybody's general satisfaction so that we were partly astonished at the results which the firm of Krupp had obtained with the Russians. It often happened that Messrs. Gustav and

Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach visited our works personally and were able to see for themselves that Russian Ps.W. and civilian workers were manufacturing war materials. The workers did not receive any working clothes and therefore they had to work in their ordinary clothes. It is understandable that these suits were very soon filthy and raggy. Many of these workers commenced work without shoes. After a few days they then received wooden clogs from Krupps. The appearance of the workers was very good when they first came to our works, but after they had been working with us for a few months, their faces were white and distorted. The feeding of the Russian Ps.W. was very bad. They received one meal a day which was distributed at mid-day and consisted of water soup with cabbage. It was impossible for the people to do heavy manual labour on this food. We have often given the people potatoes and sandwiches secretly although we were forbidden to do so. The maltreatment of the prisoners commenced the day they came to us. They were hit with clenched fists and kicked in the seat. Comrades who distributed the food told me that when the Russians scrambled for the remains of the water soup after lunch, they were beaten with truncheons and fists. I have seen myself that Works Manager Wunsch struck one or two Eastern workers in the face and kicked their seats so that the workers fell to the ground owing to the maltreatment.

I could observe how the Russian PsW were de-loused regularly every 3 or 4 weeks and taken to Dellwig for a bath. One can draw from this that the camps were in terribly neglected condition. The Russians had to march 5 or 6 kilometers in all weather. I saw that if a Russian walked slowly, he was driven on by kicks and blows and many of them had water in the feet owing to their being undernourished. I could also note that some of them collapsed on the way back and then lying one on top of the other they were taken back on a barrow. This was the general manner in which the firm of Krupp treated these beings from the beginning of 1943 until the last minute without anyone having bothered to put an end to these misdeeds.

Signed Peter GUTERSOHN.

J. W. L. Rathborne, Major

[Stamp] President

Mil Gov

ESSEN

Sept. 20th 1945.

Rene Koenigsberg born 25. 12. 1925

Agnes Koenigsberg born 31. 8. 1927

We Rene and Agnes Koenigsberg were chosen by the employers of the firm Krupp and brought to Essen. We only know the names of three of them: managing director Braun, Hammerschmith and Meusel. We came most of the journey on foot and the rest on the railway guarded by SS men.

In Essen we were working at the firm Krupp in Walzwerk 2. Our work was very hard at first we were working at a forge. Later the factory was bombed and burnt down and we were made to clear all the heavy rubble away and carry heavy irons and stones.

Our home was in a cellar without windows and very little air. Along with us in the same cellar lived five hundred more girls. We slept on the floor without a bed and only one blanket which we had also to use as an overcoat during the day and often it was wet through with the rain, when, we had no chance to dry it as we had no fire. Many of the girls contracted T. B. We had no water to wash in and very little to drink, sometimes none at all.

This year we had a prison frock given to us and a pair of wooden shoes which were soon worn out; when we had to go to work in our bare feet till we got some more. We were not issued with gloves and had to handle frozen steel. Many girls died from frost bite, hunger and beatings. We got only one meal a day which consisted of soup and a piece of bread; this had to suffice us for heavy work. If we were too tired to work and had to sit for a rest, a guard would take our numbers and the result would be no food at all that day; this happened many times. The same used to happen if we did not walk to the factory from the camp vice versa quick enough, a distance of eight kilometers. We worked at the firm Krupp seven months 12 hours in a day and for this we received no pay at all.

We were guarded by SS men and women who, if they were not satisfied with our work, took our number and reported us to the Commandant who was noted for his cruelties; he punished us by beatings, starving us and cutting our hair. His name was Oscar Rikk.

We did not get medicine when we were ill and so often went to work with fever or worse.

Three weeks before the Americans liberated us, an SS guard told us that we were being taken to Buchenwald where in case of losing the war he would have five minutes left in which to kill us.

so the night after some of us made an escape; those who stayed behind were taken to Buchenwald.

[signed] Rene Koenigsberg

[signed] Agnes Koenigsberg

[seal]

Military Government

Summary Court

Essen

130

DET

[signed] C. E. Long, President

Major

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-265

ESSEN 3 October 1945

SWORN STATEMENT

Witness: Heinrich Ruhnau, Essen-Borbeck Drogenstrasse 27, born 26.8.01.

The undersigned was employed in the Krupp Factory since 1923 with a break of 2 years (1932-1934) and declares the following voluntarily:—

The first P/Ws came to Krupp from Western Europe at the end of 1941 and were instructed immediately as turners (turning gun barrels) and welders (electric welding of armour plating) in No II mechanical workshops and No 4 armoured construction shop where important war materials were manufactured.

The first transports with Russian P/Ws and East women workers arrived in Krupp's factories at the end of 1942. These also were put to work immediately and also taught as turners and welders for the systematic manufacture of war materials. Later, these foreigners became known as very able workers.

The position of the Russian P/Ws and Eastern workers from their arrival until the occupation by Allied troops can only be described by one word "Slavery". From the beginning, in 1942, when the first Eastern workers arrived at Krupp's works and through which the Krupp works had already profited by the excellent help of these people, bullies and people to guard them were employed who were generally party members. I can remember cases from the very first of East workers being mishandled by beatings and kickings. I have seen with my own eyes at Gate 91 of Krupp's works Eastern workers kicked to their feet who, tired out, after 10 hours heavy work, sat down and waited for their camp guard. I can also remember the case of an Eastern worker being beaten over the whole body with a rubber tube.

During the whole time from 1942 until the day the Americans entered Essen, I don't know of one case where the Firm of Krupp published one notice or gave verbal instructions that these terrible mishandlings must stop.

Furthermore, I don't know of any one case when Russian prisoners who were ill and who lay on the dirty earth were given any medical assistance which one would say was a human necessity.

[Signed] Heinrich RUHNAU
 J. W. L. Rathborne, Major
 [Stamp] President
 MIL GOV
 ESSEN

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-267

SWORN STATEMENT

We, the undersigned Heinrich Tiedtke, Karl Hanke, Johann Berek, all from Essen, declare the following voluntarily.

In the spring of 1942 we received the first Russian Ps.W. in the Spring manufacturing shop. In most cases they were farm workers, who naturally were not familiar with the armament industry.

We saw that the column leader Franz Krick (who was sentenced by the Americans to 9 months prison in May 1945) beat the Russians almost daily with a rubber truncheon and kicked them to such an extent, that a few Russians always collapsed exhausted after such a procedure. In order to revive them he poured a bucket of cold water over them. Further, Krick relieved the Russians of large quantities of potatoes, which they had brought with them for their own needs, during the change of shifts and took the potatoes home with him.

Not only Krick alone, but also the Nazi column leaders Hubert Roth (at present working in the police station at Essen as prisoner of the military authorities), Ewald Lobowski (escaped) and Kurt Wagner (whose whereabouts is unknown) took part in the maltreatment of Russians.

Essen, 27th September, 1945.

[signed] Heinrich Tiedtke,
 Karl Hanke,
 Johann Berek.

Mil. Gov. stamp.
 C. E. Long, Major,
 President.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-270

Ignitor Workshop, 7th April, 1942.

W/Sp.

Copy:—KMT.

Copy:—Mr. Surff.

Employment.

Re foreign workers.

In the course of last week, due to the fact that the foreign workers, especially Poles, could not be relied upon to appear at work, there was an extraordinary decrease in production, loss of money and fines did not obtain the desired results.

Especially during short (bank) holidays we were not able to find a responsible person in the camp Seumannstrasse, to whom we could have referred. We ourselves are short of guards to fetch the Poles from their camp, and to guard them overnight. Our production is greatly endangered. Therefore, for the time being, we named a few reliable Poles as overseers. If it is not possible to get some sort of order amongst the foreigners within the next few days, in this way, we shall be forced to get rid of the unreliable elements and in that case we shall have to have a greater number of new workers sent to us. There are difficulties with the Italians, because of the supposed insufficient administration of the Bottsopposhr Camp. In order to ascertain whether the constant complaints of the Italians have any foundation, it is vitally necessary, once and for all, for a responsible body to see that everything is in order.

We draw your attention to our letter to Mr. Hintz of the 31.3.42.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-271

Essen 20.10.42.

Krupp Hospital.

Chief doctor.

To Mr. I H N.

It has already been pointed out several times at conferences that the clothing for Eastern workers, men and women, is not sufficient. With regard to the cold weather, the camp physician today called our attention to fact that *the number of colds is going up because of the question of insufficient clothing.*

Many of the men and women *still have to go barefooted.* They have *no underwear* and it often happens that people who wear foot bandages because of injuries walk bare footed on these bandages.

If help does not follow quickly, a further rise is to be expected in the number of sick people due to the cold weather although this is avoidable.

(Signed) Wiele

Footnote in pencil:—

Wv for next conference on labour supply.

COPY OF DOCUMENT D-272

21 Sep 45

STATEMENT

I, Elisabeth Roth, was born in Uzhorod in Tchechoslovakia on 7th Aug. 1923. After the occupation by the Nazis I was transported by them together with my family, father, mother, two sisters and brothers, to Auschwitz Concentration Camp. On arriving there one sister and myself were separated from the rest of my family who were done to death in the gas chamber. All personal belongings, including clothes were taken away and we were issued with prisoners clothes. Our heads were shaved. After six weeks in Auschwitz we were taken to Gelsenberg concentration camp and in August 1944 were taken to Essen concentration Camp.

In this camp we had to get up about 3 a. m. stand up for two hours whilst roll call was being made and then marched six kilometers to Krupps factory, Waizwerk 2. We arrived there about 7 a. m. and immediately started to work till 5 p. m. with one hours rest from 12 to 1 p. m. Then we marched back to camp and if somebody could not keep up during these marches, he or she was punished by getting no food or being beaten up. During the hard winter months we had to do these marches without shoes if we had none. My work in this factory was extremely heavy. I was working on ovens hardening steel, this up 23rd October when after a heavy air-raid we had to clear debris out of the damaged factory. Our main and *only* meal was given us at about 7.30 p. m. consisting of one plate of soup and a hunk of bread. After heavy raids there was no water and in order to further increase our misery at such times the soup was excessively salted so that we could not even eat that. At times those returning from work at the factory received no food at all as punishment, for what we never knew. Our accommodation was a damp cold cellar without light. We were so cramped in there that when any one wanted to turn whilst sleeping those next to him had to turn as well. We each had only one blanket which in cold and wet weather we also used to wrap ourselves in during the long marches to and from work.

When the American Army approached Essen I got to know that we were all to be transported to Buchenwald concentration camp, so I with my sister and four others stole out of the camp at 11 p. m. during a heavy air attack on 15th April 1945, whilst the guard was in the air-raid shelter.

P.T.O.

The next day 500 girls were transported to Buchenwald.

The names of the works managers were:—

Braun, Hammerschmidt.

Moizel,

Schmitz.

and the names of the S.S. women were:—

Martha Herman, of

Essen-Kray.

[signed] Elizabeth Roth

[signed] Ernestin Roth

[Seal] MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SUMMARY COURT ESSEN

130 DET

[signature illegible] PRESIDENT

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-274

Essen 1.10.45

INTERROGATION

I, Max Ihn, born 25.1.1890 make the following declaration voluntarily, today, 1.10.45.

Previously I was a regular officer. I retired and on 15 September 1919 I went to Dusseldorf to the Employer's Association. In 1931, I transferred to Hamm. On 1 June 1933, I began my activities with the firm of Krupp in Essen.

There at first I deal chiefly with matters concerning the black coat employees. In October 1935, I became the commissioner of the War Ministry for Counter-Intelligence and was directly under that department. From 1935, I was responsible for dealing with incoming letters containing secret instructions and handling and dealing with War Materials or correspondence and such like matters and finally with counter-espionage. When I first joined the firm in 1933, I was responsible to Mr. Buschfeld who was my superior. He was a member of the directorate. After his death Dr. Loser became his successor. My last superior was Director Janssen, to whose department I belonged and to whom I sent reports on my work. I made these reports mostly, however, verbally. Until 1943, the remedying of Tarrif difficulties and single questions (complaints which came from the work people) be-

longed to my sphere of work. Further, I had to look after all workers (including Eastern and Foreign workers), the transmission of regulations regarding pay and catering.

I was engaged with workers questions since 1939. Amongst these were Personnel Administration, Wage Office, Welfare, Advertising and Press under Mr. v Buehlow Arbeitseinsatz "A" (labour supply) and the works protection. I was in contact with Mr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen on business matters and often received direct orders from him.

From 1943 onwards, Oberlagerfuehrung (Chief camp direction) Co-operative stores, hospitals and the administration of houses came under my control. Further, also matters of administration which were the responsibility of a specialist. The guarding and feeding of foreigners was also under me; PsW were not under me but the military.

On 31 March 43, I became a deputy member of the directorate. I now came into contact with Mr Alfred Krupp.

About 1000 black coat workers came under my direct care. In 1943, there were about 15,000 black coat workers in the whole of the Cast Steel Works, about 55,000 workers (including foreign workers) so that about 70,000 people were employed in all. The highest number of foreign workers was about 20,000. I have named this figure from my own knowledge and not from the letter from Mr. Kupke in which he told me he had said 20,000 foreign workers during his interrogation by the Field Security Section. The working hours for these foreigners was laid down by the works, in other words, I was responsible for it. Youths were employed amongst them from 14 years onwards.

Foreign workers arrived for the first time in 1941/42. The first concentration camp prisoners arrived in the summer or autumn of 1944 although the firm of Krupp had already asked for a number of them, between 1,100 and 1,500 on 22 September 1942. I was responsible for the employment of these people as well as for the correspondence which was written relating to the obtaining of concentration camp prisoners. Since I cannot remember from whom I received the order to carry on the correspondence about concentration camp prisoners, I must take the responsibility for it. The victualling of all camps, including special and concentration camps was also under me. I admit that, at first, there were many complaints from the foreign workers about the bad feeding whilst later on complaints were received about the food from time to time. I knew that steel birches had been distributed in the works (but not in the camps). I was in-

formed that workers were beaten up in the works and camps. I informed the directorate about these cases, but I spoke specially to Mr. Janssen about these occurrences and gave orders that beatings were not allowed. I admit that mishandlings had taken place in Mr. Loeser's time.

The 520 concentration camp prisoners who were employed by Krupp were ordered by me on instructions from the Directorate. The enquiry about these was talked over by the Directorate in my presence and quite possibly Mr Alfried Krupp von Bohlen was present. As far as I know, these prisoners came from Buchenwald. I talked to the Buchenwald Camp Commander personally here at Krupp's once, and he informed me of the conditions under which we could employ concentration camp prisoners. Mr. Lehmann travelled to Buchenwald on my orders, in order to settle the conditions under which we could employ the prisoners. I did not know that Krupp had employed 22 concentration camp prisoners from Auschwitz.

The concentration camp prisoners were housed by Krupp in wooden barracks in the Humboldtstrasse. I was informed about what happened in this camp. I repeat that in 1942 I was responsible for matters concerning workers (German and Foreign). Even then the conditions in the camps were such that Gauleiter Schlessmann wrote saying that if conditions were not altered he would take action himself. Dr. Loeser talked over the conditions at that time with Mr Gustav Krupp von Bohlen.

Workers who were incapable of work were taken away. Dr Janssen suggested that the 500 Jewesses who were employed at Krupp's should be taken away before the occupation and that was back to Buchenwald. I assume that Mr Alfried Krupp von Bohlen must have known about it. When I was taken ill on 22 February 1945, I gave Mr. Lehmann the order to send these people back to Buchenwald. I did know that there were confidence men of the firm in the factory and camps who made reports on occurrences in the camps.

Only people in the camps who had appeared at work received food. I know from a report by Mr. Kupke in which he drew my attention to the fact that, during his interrogation by the Field Security Section, he gave the number of foreign workers as 20,000. I did not take the figure which I gave from Kupke's letter.

The handling of the special camps was under Mr von Buelow's control. The assertion by Kupke and Lehmann that I was frequently in the camps and that I was fully informed of the occurrences in the camps (also about the maltreatment and bad feeding) is true.

/s/ IHN.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-277

ESSEN—Stadtwald, 21 Sep 45

SWORN DECLARATION.
CONCERNING Rosa KATZ, Stadtwald, Schellstr, 12.

I, Rosa Katz, born on 18th Feb. 1918, in Budapest, was fetched from the concentration camp Gelsenberg by employees of Krupps. Only the name of two are known, Braun and Hammerschmidt. We mostly came on foot to Essen and travelled only a small distance by tram. For a few weeks I worked with a crane in rolling mill No. 2, but later I had to do heavy physical work, such as clearing debris and carrying heavy iron and sheet metal.

About 500 of us, Jewish girls, were squeezed into a cellar, where there was no room to put up beds. The only possibility was to sleep on the floor, close to each other. There were neither windows nor any other means of getting fresh air. Further, there was no water to wash ourselves or our clothes, which we had to wear for weeks on end. During the period of working at Krupps we received neither clothes nor any pay for the work done. During summer and winter alike, on the coldest days as well as in rain, we had to march 6 to 7 km. to work. We had neither warm clothing nor shoes, which caused many deaths.

The diet consisted of one meal in the evening. It was impossible to eat this food, which was not sufficiently cooked, dirty and raw. We received soup, 2 to 3 potatoes, one thin slice of black bread, which was very often mouldy, with a very thin spread of margarine. Also margarine was not given every day.

Under such conditions we found it impossible to do the heavy physical work. We were guarded by women and men SS guards, who paid particular attention to seeing that no one rested for one moment. If someone did rest for a moment she was beaten up with an iron rod, after which, resulted her body being covered with weals.

Three weeks before the American Army liberated us an SS guard said to us "We will kill you at the last moment". When we heard this we 6 girls took the opportunity to flee the camp during a heavy air attack. The remainder were sent by the Krupp administration to the concentration camp at Buchenwald to be exterminated.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-278

Works Catering Department. 19. March 1942.

To:—Dr. LEHMANN, Employment office.

In connection with our letter of today re the complaints of the 10.3.42 from No. 2 Rolling Mill about for French Ps.W., we think it necessary to point out the following once again.

It is well known that serious difficulties exist in the supply of food, also the very large cut in rations of the 6th of April. The French Ps.W. especially take advantage of every opportunity to refuse work. They know how to reduce production cleverly with reference to their insufficient rations whilst German workers taking the same attitude, will have to expect serious punishments.

With regards to the times ahead it seems desirable to us, to draw attention to the authorities concerned, with the necessary pressure, to the fact that only severest treatment of the French prisoners of war will ensure that they maintain their performance (in the interest of production) even with the present food position, which is the same for German workers.

Signed.

Copy to:—Catering Administration.

Dr. Beusch

Mr. Ihn.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-279

Essen, 1st October, 1945.

SWORN STATEMENT

Re:—the case of works foreman Wilhelm John, Oberhausen, Muelheimerstrasse 368, who was employed until the end of the war in the die shop.

The witness, Alexander Haverkarte of Essen, West Onckstrasse, 52, born 23.4.06 makes the following sworn statement:—

Foreman John, who was employed in the die shop and sawing room, was in charge of the Russian workers, both civilian and Ps.W. The Russians were employed in the works making war materials; U boat parts, machine gun barrels and aeroplane weapons were manufactured. Foreman John was very brutal to the Eastern workers and in many cases, the Russians came to me and complained about the bestial maltreatment which they were subjected to daily. I know of one occurrence which I saw myself. John beat 3 Russian Ps.W. with a rubber truncheon on the whole of their body in a terrible and bestial manner, without having any grounds for doing so. I knew the people as industrious workers and had never complained to Foreman John about them.

Until the time I left the Krupp works, I never knew if any member of the administration ever brought Foreman Wilhelm John to answer for his responsibilities.

[Signed] Alexander HAVERKARTE.

J. W. L. RATHBONE, Major
President.

[Stamp]
MIL GOV
ESSEN.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-280

17 June 1942

Memo of Mr. Clausenitzer about conference in Essen on the 17.6.1942.

Present were Messrs:

HINTZ,
Dr. LEHMANN,
Dr. FRANKE,
FRISCH,
Dr. MULLER and
CLAUSENITZER.

Ref: Need for and obtaining of workers for the cast steel works.

The immediate necessity for workers at the beginning of June was 7,136 men (compared with 8,164 men at the beginning of May 1942). Movements of the workers since the 1.5.42 are as follows:

| Date | Complete number of workers (*) | from when called up to army | Remainder | Plus P.O.Ws. | Total number of workers employed at the time |
|------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|--------------|--|
| 1.5 | 55,515 | 9,206 | 46,309 | 1,460 | 47,769 |
| 1.6 | 58,054 | 9,854 | 48,200 | 1,342 | 49,542 |
| 8.6 | 58,377 | 9,847 | 48,530 | 1,334 | 49,864 |

(*) Working members does not include black coat workers, charwomen, messengers, etc., clerks and those called up for the army and Reich Labour Service but it includes service men on leave, apprentices, women, and foreign civilians.

Approximately 2,900 foreigners were assigned in May, from the 1st to the 17th of June 1942 approximately 1,600 foreigners arrived. It is to be hoped that the assignments for June, reach the level of the previous month. The distribution to the various

works will be carried out according to the papers put forward by Mr. Hintz, and will be compared with the requirement of the works which are on hand. In future the assignments to the works will be done proportionately according to their requirements. Arrangements for special jobs through the Labour Exchange will be dealt with if possible though compromises will be necessary, to accomplish the required limitation of nationalities in the various works.

There is an assignment of 550 Italians in view until the end of June; when and in what number further assignments will arrive (most of all Russians) is still open.

Possibilities for housing:—Altogether accommodation is being built for 26,500 people.

So far there is accommodation ready for 10,500 people.

Accommodation for 100 people is being readied daily which means accommodation for 2,500 people monthly. Altogether there is accommodation for 13,000 at our disposal at from the 15.7.42. Of these 10,500 will be in use by the end of June. The 800-1,000 people who are expected during June can be accommodated.

The continuation of the building of barracks depends on a sufficient number of workers being at our disposal. The transfer to the works of Italians now working must be assured from the Italians who are to arrive or from any other assignments of suitable workers in order to make sure that the building of barracks continues on the same scale as shown above. In future conferences will take place twice monthly at AK always on the 1st and 15th of the month, at which papers on the following points will be produced:—

Position of working members (excluding charwomen, messengers and clerks, and people called up for the army or Reich Labour Association, but including service men on leave, apprentices, women, foreign civilians and P.O.Ws) at the beginning of the half monthly report.

New admissions (German and foreigners)

Departures (to the army)

Position of working members at the end of the half monthly report.

Immediate requirements at the beginning and the end of the half monthly reports.

The next conferences timed for 1.7.42 will now take place on or approximately 7.7.42.

[Signed] CLAUSENITZER.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-281

Ignitor Workshop, 13.7.42.

W/Sp.

Copy:Mr. Surff.

Copy:KMT.

Mr. Rerff.

Ref:—urgent production A.Z. 23 (Pr).

Referring to the production of 100.000 A. Z. 23 (Pr) in July and the request of Lt.Col. v.Hedel to state the reasons for this hindrance, we reply as follows:—

We have already, without regard to lack of reserves, fixed the capacity of our machines to 100.000 ignites per month, and we are doing everything to reach those production figures as quickly as possible.

The increased production to 100.000 ignites asked for in the above letter, will not succeed in July, because the preliminary work for ignitor parts and means of production could not be pushed forward enough, also, because of the lack of skilled labour, which is getting worse through the call up, and also because of the fact, that the foreign labourers are only available two to three months after they have been asked for by us. The question was about Italian and Polish labourers, and lately about 33 Russian boys between 14 and 20 years of age. In addition foreign skilled workers arrived as 4 turners, 2 repair fitters and 1 merchant.

The distribution of the workers on arriving in the factory depends on the urgency of production, and the ignitors are not to take first place. Arrangements for the Ignitor workshop have to go via the General plenipotentiaries (bevollmachtigter) and the Labour Exchange with corresponding instructions. The working ability of foreigners is not furthered by the acknowledged bad food conditions in the larger Ruhr towns (compare National Zeitung of the 12.7.42).

In spite of these difficulties, we overcame the setbacks which constantly appeared, which were mostly caused by the new and unskilled foreigners, and kept the production figures as promised on 24. 4.

We were able to get 3 skilled German workers from other shops. At the moment a movement is on foot to try and obtain whole groups of skilled French workers as the supervisors and foremen. We are taking part in the movement and hope to get 30 turners and 15 fitters on the supervision, and later another 30 turners so it will give us the opportunity to substitute the automatic lathes and turning lathes which are especially missed. Any

D-281

advice about the arrival of these people has as yet, not been received.

Regarding the production of 100,000 ignitors, please remember; that we are moving for quite a considerable time on a very rocky ground, and that the loss of one machine or a few men can make itself noticed in an immediate drop in production.

We expect a noticeable addition in general safety when the thread cutting machine promised by chief weapons engineer is available, and when substitute Press Moulds are available the production of which, already has been started.

signed.

Essen.

16.6.1942.

Ref:—workers for production of Ignitors.

Please inform Mr. Bautz via i rue mun 2/5, that the number of assigned Russian male and female, is not correct. No workers were specifically assigned for producing ignitors. Our director Eberhardt or director Rerff, will confer on this matter with Captain Abendroth on 17.6.42.

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1946—693259