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George Washington to John Matthews, October 4, 1780

As Congress has already allowed the alternative of raising men for twelve months, opinions on the propriety of the measure can be of no avail; but since you have done me the honor to ask mine I have no scruple in declaring I most firmly believe that the Independance of the United States never will be established till there is an Army on foot for the War; that if we are to rely on occasional or annual Levies we must sink under the expence; and ruin must follow.

From an opinion which seems to have influenced Congress, that men cannot be drafted for the War (but which, with due deference to their judgment I think is a mistaken one, as it seems to be a prevailing sentiment as I have heard, that Nothing but an Army on a permanent footing will do). Gentn. unacquainted with the true state of facts, and struck with the magnitude of the bounty which in the first instance must be given to induce men to engage for this period, without attending to the Sum which is given for a years service perhaps in reality for a much less time, tho a Year may be mentioned as the ostensible term, and that this sum is more than doubled at every New inlistment; without considering the immense waste of Arms, ammunition, Stores, Camp utensils &ca. incidental to these changes; without adverting to the pay and subsistence of two sets of men at the same instant (the old and New levies) and the expence of marching and counter-marching them to and from Camp; Without taking into the acct. the interruption which agriculture and all kinds of handicrafts meet with, by which [our Supplies are lessened and] the prices are considerably increased; And (wch. is of the greatest importance) without considering the difference between a healthy Army (which is generally the case of one composed of old Soldiers, and a sickly one, which is [commonly the case with respect] to the New, and the lives lost in acquiring a seasoning, [and without considering that in all exchanges of privates prisoners of War, we give the Enemy a certain permanent force and add but little and some times nothing to our own strength, as the terms of service of those we receive in exchange are already expired, or terminate often soon after. Without attending I say to these things, which are remote, and require close investigation, and a recurrence to the public expenditures to be masters of them, they conclude, that the bounty necessary to engage men for the War is beyond our abilities, reject it, and adopt another system which involves ultimately ten times the expence and infinitely greater distress. While in the one case we should have a well disciplined Army, ready at all times and upon all occasions to take advantage of circumstances; in the other, the most favourable moments may pass away unimproved, because the composition of our Troops is such that we dare not in the beginning of a campaign attempt enterprizes on Acct. of the rawness of the men, nor at the latter end of it because they are about to leave us (after the immense toil and pains wch. the Officers have taken to teach them their duty) and we have another set to attend to.

From long experience and the fullest conviction, I have been, and now am decidedly in favr. of a permanent force; but knowing the jealousies wch. have been entertained on this head; Heaven knows how unjustly, and the cause of which could never be apprehended were a due regard had to our local and other circumstances, even if ambitious views could be supposed to exist; and that our political helm was in another direction, I forbore to press my Sentiments for a time; but at a moment when we are tottering on the brink of a precipice, silence would have been criminal.

The amendment proposed by you for keeping the old levies in the field till the new should arrive would certainly be a most desirable thing if it could be accomplished; but I doubt the practicability of it; for if there is not a definite term fixed with the men we could as easily get them for the War; and if there was a period fixed, altho the condition of a relief should be annexed to it (which more than probably would be kept as much as possible out of their sight) We never should be able to retain them; desertion therefore, and a genl. loss of public Arms, would be the inevitable consequence of an attempt to detain them after they had compleated what they conceived to be the term of their engagement.

I felt much pain in reading that part of your letter which speaks of the reception of the Comee. of Co-operation in Congress. At a time when public harmony is so essential; when we should aid and assist each other with all our abilities; When our hearts should be open to information, and our hands ready to administer relief; to find distrusts and jealousies taking possession of the Mind, and a party spirit prevailing is a most melancholy reflexion, and forebodes no good.

George Washington to John Cadawalader, October 5, 1870

We are now drawing an inactive Campaign to a close. The beginning of which appeared pregnant with events, of a favourable complexn, I hoped, but hoped in vain, that a prospect was displaying which wd. enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me to domestic life. The favourable disposition of Spain; the promised succour from France; the combined force in the West Indies; The declaration of Russia (acceded to by other powers of Europe, humiliating to the Naval pride and power of Great Britain); the Superiority of France and Spain by Sea in Europe; The Irish claims and English disturbances, formed in the agregate, an opinion in my breast (which is not very susceptable of peaceful dreams) that the hour of deliverance was not far distant; for that however unwilling Great B: might be to yield the point, it would not be in her power to continue the contest. but alas these prospects, flattering as they were, have prov'd delusory, and I see nothing before us but accumulating distress. We have been half of our time without provision and are like to continue so. We have no Magazines, nor money to form them, and in a little time we shall have no Men, if we had money to pay them. We have lived upon expedients till we can live no longer. In a word, the history of the War is a history of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system and (economy. It is in vain however to look back, nor is it our business to do so. Our case is not desperate, if virtue exists in the people and there is wisdom among our rulers; but to suppose that this great revolution can be accomplished by a temporary army; that this Army will be subsisted by State supplies, and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, is, in my Opinion absurd and as unreasonable as to expect an Inversion in the order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it was necessary, it could easily be proved to any person of a moderate share of understanding, that an annual Army, or any Army raised on the spur of the occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is, in various ways which could be enumerated, ten times more expensive than a permanent body of Men, under good organization and military discipline, which never was, nor never will be the case of New Troops. A thousand arguments, resulting from experience and the nature of things, might also be adduced to prove, that the Army, if it is to depend upon State supplies, must disband or starve; and that taxation alone (especially at this late hour) cannot furnish the mean to carry on the War. Is it not time then to retract from error, and benefit by experience? or do we want further proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciously adhered to?

You seem to regret not having accepted the appointment of Congress to a command in the American Army. It is a circumstance that ever was, most sincerely, regretted by me, and it is the more to be lamented as we find an Officer high in rank, and Military reputation capable of turning apostate, and attempting to sell his Country. Men of independent spirit and firmness of mind, must step forth to rescue our affairs from the embarrassments they have fallen into, or they will suffer in the general Wreck. I do not mean to apply this more to the Military than civil line. We want the best, and ablest men in both.

To tell you, if any event shd. ever bring you to the army, and you have no commd. in it equal to your merit; nor place more agreeable to your wishes than being a member of my family, that I should be happy in seeing you there, would only be announcing a truth which has often been repeated and wch. I hope you are convinced of.
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View the original documents by clicking on the links above. Both letters are from George Washington Papers. Use your browser's Back Button to return to this point.