Intelligence units in Washington. Because there wasn't much
cartographic work involved, I became the liaison between our
outfit and its British counterpart and made occasional trips
across New Delhi seeking their aerial coverage. When I asked for
specific photography (of a certain section of Burma, for example)
I was directed to a jumble of boxes wherein aerial photo prints
were stored willy-nilly. It was a way to inhibit Americans from
finding out much about British sorties over forbidden China but I
suspect it was more an example of "muddling through."

The biggest local user of our photography was the
O.S.S. which was frequently dropping agents behind Japanese lines
from Burma (now Myanmar) to Vietnam (then French Indo-China.) One
officer was especially interested in low-level pictures of Saigon
so that operatives would be familiar with the city when parachuted
in but part of the information sought was to find suitable sites
where Pan American Airlines could set up civilian facilities (so
as to get the jump on their competitors) once the war was over.
Thus, not all efforts were directed towards winning the war just
as our Kunming section heard that not all supplies, flown to
Chiang Kai-shek over "The Hump" (ranges east of Burma) or trucked
via the Burma and Ledo Roads, all of which were hazardous, were
used against the Japanese; some were stashed for later use in the
war against the Chinese Communists that all expected. To angered
GIs there, the U.S. became "Uncle Chump from over the Hump."

On days off during all of our tour in New Delhi a small group
of us took in all we could from local hikes and day-long Sunday
excursions in a company vehicle through the countryside to a few