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Book/Printed Material Bargaining power in marriage earnings, wage rates, and household production

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Title

  • Bargaining power in marriage earnings, wage rates, and household production

Summary

  • "What determines bargaining power in marriage? This paper argues that wage rates, not earnings, determine well-being at the threat point and, hence, determine bargaining power. Observed earnings at the bargaining equilibrium may differ from earnings at the threat point because hours allocated to market work at the bargaining solution may differ from hours allocated to market work at the threat point. In the divorce threat model, for example, a wife who does not work for pay while married might do so following a divorce; hence, her bargaining power would be related to her wage rate, not to her earnings while married. More generally, a spouse whose earnings are high because he or she chooses to allocate more hours to market work, and correspondingly less to household production and leisure, does not have more bargaining power. But a spouse whose earnings are high because of a high wage rate does have more bargaining power. Household production has received little attention in the family bargaining literature. The output of household production is analogous to earnings, and a spouse's productivity in household production is analogous to his or her wage rate. Thus, in a bargaining model with household production, a spouse's productivity in home production is a source of bargaining power"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

  • Pollak, Robert A., 1938-
  • National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

  • Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2005.

Headings

  • -  Marriage--Economic aspects
  • -  Sexual division of labor
  • -  Wages

Notes

  • -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/8/2005.
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Also available in print.
  • -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  • -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

  • HB1

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2005617313

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Pollak, Robert A, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Bargaining Power in Marriage Earnings, Wage Rates, and Household Production. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. https://www.loc.gov/item/2005617313/.

APA citation style:

Pollak, R. A. & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (2005) Bargaining Power in Marriage Earnings, Wage Rates, and Household Production. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2005617313/.

MLA citation style:

Pollak, Robert A, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Bargaining Power in Marriage Earnings, Wage Rates, and Household Production. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/2005617313/>.