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Book/Printed Material Judicial lobbying the politics of labor law constitutional interpretation

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Title

  • Judicial lobbying the politics of labor law constitutional interpretation

Summary

  • "This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

  • Iaryczower, Matías
  • Spiller, Pablo T. (Pablo Tomas), 1951-
  • Tommasi, Mariano, 1964-
  • National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

  • Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2005.

Headings

  • -  Judicial process--Political aspects
  • -  Labor laws and legislation
  • -  Labor laws and legislation--Argentina
  • -  Law--Political aspects
  • -  Lobbying
  • -  Lobbying--Argentina
  • -  Pressure groups
  • -  Pressure groups--Argentina

Notes

  • -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/28/2005.
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Also available in print.
  • -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  • -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

  • HB1

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2005618311

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Iaryczower, Matías, Pablo T Spiller, Mariano Tommasi, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Judicial Lobbying the Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. https://www.loc.gov/item/2005618311/.

APA citation style:

Iaryczower, M., Spiller, P. T., Tommasi, M. & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (2005) Judicial Lobbying the Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2005618311/.

MLA citation style:

Iaryczower, Matías, et al. Judicial Lobbying the Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/2005618311/>.