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Book/Printed Material Minorities and storable votes

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Title

  • Minorities and storable votes

Summary

  • "The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desidered over a series of binary decisions. By cumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only of its strength of preferences is high and the majority's strength of preferences is low. The result is that aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

  • Casella, Alessandra
  • Palfrey, Thomas R., 1953-
  • Riezman, Raymond Glenn
  • National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

  • Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2005.

Headings

  • -  Elections--Mathematical models
  • -  Minorities
  • -  Voting--Mathematical models

Notes

  • -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/13/2005.
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Also available in print.
  • -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  • -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

  • HB1

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2005620343

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Casella, Alessandra, Thomas R Palfrey, Raymond Glenn Riezman, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Minorities and Storable Votes. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. https://www.loc.gov/item/2005620343/.

APA citation style:

Casella, A., Palfrey, T. R., Riezman, R. G. & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (2005) Minorities and Storable Votes. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2005620343/.

MLA citation style:

Casella, Alessandra, et al. Minorities and Storable Votes. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/2005620343/>.