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Book/Printed Material Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth : Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future

About this Item

Title

  • Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth : Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future

Summary

  • This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.

Names

  • Mumford, Andrew, 1983-
  • Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

Created / Published

  • Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, [2011]

Contents

  • Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience.

Headings

  • -  Counterinsurgency--Great Britain
  • -  Guerrilla warfare--Great Britain
  • -  Military doctrine--Great Britain--History--20th century
  • -  Military doctrine--Great Britain--History--21st century
  • -  Great Britain--Military policy

Notes

  • -  "September 2011."
  • -  Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-26).
  • -  Description based on print version record; resource not viewed.

Medium

  • 1 electronic resource (vii, 26 pages)

Call Number/Physical Location

  • U241
  • Advancing strategic thought series

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2023692747

Rights Advisory

  • This is non-restricted, fully open content that may be accessed on and off of the Library of Congress campus, with no restrictions, by an unlimited number of users

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Mumford, Andrew, and U.S.. Strategic Studies Institute Army War College. Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth: Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future. [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011] Pdf. https://www.loc.gov/item/2023692747/.

APA citation style:

Mumford, A. & Army War College, U. S. S. S. I. (2011) Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth: Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future. [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College] [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2023692747/.

MLA citation style:

Mumford, Andrew, and U.S.. Strategic Studies Institute Army War College. Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth: Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future. [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011] Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/2023692747/>.