On March 5, 2024, the United States Court for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the District of Columbia’s dismissal of claims by former miners and their representatives against five tech companies, alleging violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA). (Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., No. 21-7135(D.C. Cir. 2024).) The circuit court disagreed with the District Court’s determination that the plaintiffs lacked standing but agreed that the case should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief.
Background to the Case
The plaintiffs in the case were four former cobalt miners, seven legal representatives of children who were formerly cobalt miners, and five representatives of child cobalt miners who were killed in mining operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The plaintiffs sued five tech companies — Apple, Alphabet, Dell Technologies, Microsoft, and Tesla — alleging that they violated the TVPRA by participating in the global cobalt supply chain. The plaintiffs claimed that the tech companies purchased cobalt from large international suppliers to manufacture rechargeable lithium-ion batteries and that the subsidiaries of the suppliers obtained cobalt using informal mining in the DRC, which relies on forced labor. According to the plaintiffs, “participants in the cobalt market intentionally use a murky supply chain to obscure the extent to which they rely on forced labor.” The plaintiffs also asserted common law claims for unjust enrichment, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court granted the tech companies’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The District Court also held that the plaintiffs lacked standing; that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the tech companies “participated in a venture”; that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege forced labor under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1590; and that 18 U.S.C. § 1595 did not apply extraterritorially. (Doe 1 at 3–7.)
Standing
To demonstrate standing the plaintiffs needed to show that they “suffered an injury in fact,” that the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of an independent action of some third party not before the court,” and that “the injury is redressable by a favorable decision of the court. (Doe 1 at 8 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).) The plaintiffs also needed to demonstrate standing for each type of relief they sought, which in this case included both monetary damages and injunctive relief. (Doe 1 at 8.)
The plaintiffs demonstrated an injury in fact, because they were miners or representatives of miners who suffered physical injuries or death while mining, and physical injuries are “tangible harms” that are “concrete and particularized.” (Doe 1 at 8–9 (citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203–4 (2021); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).) They also demonstrated that the injury was traceable under the TVPRA because, at the pleading stage, the court assumes that the plaintiffs’ view of the statute is correct. Here the plaintiffs understood the TVPRA to impose liability on anyone who participated in a venture that benefitted from forced labor, and they claimed that the tech companies benefitted from participating in a venture with the cobalt suppliers. (Doe 1 at 10.) The circuit court also found that the injury could be redressed through monetary damages but not through injunctive relief. (Doe 1 at 15–16.) The court noted that compensation has been recognized by the Supreme Court as redress for physical harm. (Doe 1 at 15 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)).) However, injunctive relief would not be appropriate because enjoining forced labor in the DRC would depend on the compliance of third parties not before the court, as the tech companies do not directly control the use of forced labor in cobalt mining, and the plaintiffs did not present evidence that they needed the injunction to avoid being victims of forced labor again. (Doe 1 at 15–17.)
Claim for Relief Under the TVPRA
Because the circuit court determined that the plaintiffs were able to establish standing as to their claim for monetary damages, it turned to the merits of the case. The plaintiffs claimed that the tech companies participated in a venture that facilitated forced labor and, “as major purchasers of cobalt, had sufficient market power to dictate the conditions at the mines.” (Doe 1 at 20.) The court stated that the TVPRA does not define “participation” or “venture,” so it relied on dictionary definitions of the terms to define participation in a venture to mean “taking part or sharing in an enterprise or undertaking that involves danger, uncertainty, or risk, and potential gain.” (Doe 1 at 20.) The court held that the tech companies did not participate in a venture under this definition, because they had only a buyer-seller relationship with the cobalt suppliers and did not share in the risks or profits of the suppliers’ use of forced labor. (Doe 1 at 21.) The plaintiffs argued that the tech companies had the influence to force the suppliers to change their mining practices, but the court found this argument unpersuasive, as the only control that the tech companies had, according to the complaint, was to stop purchasing cobalt. (Doe 1 at 23.)
Common Law Claims
The plaintiffs also brought common law claims of unjust enrichment, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming that the tech companies were jointly and severally liable for common law tort claims due to their participation in a venture with the cobalt suppliers. (Doe 1 at 24.) The circuit court agreed with the District Court’s determination that the tech companies did not participate in a venture, so they affirmed the dismissal of the common law claims.
Sarah Friedman, Law Library of Congress
April 3, 2024
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