On August 27, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a U.S. resident who never obtained citizenship was subject to removal despite the government’s 21-year delay in canceling his certificate of citizenship. (Lall v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 20-205 (3d Cir. 2024).)
Background to the Case
In 1988, at the age of fifteen, petitioner Gary Lall came to the U.S. from Trinidad and Tobago on a non-immigrant visitor visa. He was legally adopted by Harrack and Tara Lall, who became naturalized U.S. citizens in 1975 and 1979, respectively. Lall became a lawful permanent resident at age 17 and applied for derivative citizenship as the child of U.S. citizens.
By the time he was interviewed by an Immigration and Naturalization (INS) examiner, Lall was eighteen years old. His application was approved and he swore the oath of allegiance. The INS examiner filled out a report and recommendation stating that Lall was a citizen, and Lall was issued a certificate of citizenship that said he became a citizen on April 5, 1991. A few months later, INS sent the State Department a memo stating that Lall was not entitled to derivative citizenship because he was over eighteen at the time he was interviewed. Although the memo stated INS was taking action to revoke Lall’s citizenship, Lall was not notified that his certificate of citizenship was being revoked until 21 years later while serving a sentence for a drug conviction. Lall was deported to Trinidad and Tobago in January 2021. (Lall at 3-10.)
Statutory Eligibility for Citizenship
When Lall applied for citizenship in 1991, the three pathways for becoming a citizen were outlined in sections 320, 321, and 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1433). But he did not, in fact, satisfy the statutory requirements for any of the pathways. (Lall at 12.) Lall did not meet the requirements for section 320 because his parents were not U.S. citizens at the time of his birth in 1973. Section 321 required that the applicant reside in the U.S. in the custody of his adoptive parents at the time of their naturalization, but Lall was not in the U.S. when his adoptive parents were naturalized in the 1970s. (Lall at 7.) Section 322 required his parents to file a form on his behalf before he turned eighteen, which they did not do. (Lall at 8.)
As Lall did not meet the statutory requirements of citizenship, the court concurred that he never became a naturalized citizen, despite the issuance of the Certificate of Citizenship. (Lall at 12-13.)
Equitable Estoppel
Lall also argued that even if he did not meet the statutory requirements for citizenship, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be used to recognize his citizenship. (Lall at 14-15.) The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that the petitioner “establish (1) a misrepresentation; (2) upon which he reasonably relied; (3) to his detriment; and (4) affirmative misconduct.” (Lall at 15, quoting Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006).) The court rejected Lall’s argument that the doctrine applied to his case, because only Congress can establish rules for naturalization. (Lall at 15). Congress set forth statutory requirements for citizenship, and the court did not have the authority to circumvent these requirements and declare Lall a citizen using its equitable powers. (Lall at 16.)
Sarah Friedman, Law Library of Congress
September 9, 2024
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