

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EAST EUROPE, WEST EUROPE, AND
THE SOVIET UNION

SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1985

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

PART 2 OF 5



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1986

56-834 O

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[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible, appearing to be a list of publications or a detailed table of contents for the Appendix section.]

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, at 2:06 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Hon. Larry Pressler (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pressler, Pell, and Biden.

Senator PRESSLER. We are very pleased to welcome you to the second session of our series of seven hearings on the United States-European relations. The overall title of the series is a provocative one: "Is NATO Still the Centerpiece of U.S. Foreign Policy? Should it Be?"

Many of the issues most crucial to the United States and our European allies through the 1990's, whether they are bilateral, NATO-related, or East-West, will be examined in these seven sessions.

We look forward to your contribution to this effort.

This afternoon we have two guests. The first will be Mr. Robert M. Gates, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Intelligence.

Mr. Gates was appointed Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, effective September 1, 1983. As such, he serves as the Director's principal advisor on intelligence analysis. He also directs the preparation of all national intelligence estimates prepared by the intelligence community. Mr. Gates also continues to serve concurrently as Deputy Director of Intelligence for the CIA. As such, he directs the CIA's component which is responsible for all analyses and the production of finished intelligence.

We will hear from him first.

But first, I would like to say that this meeting is a closed meeting and everyone present must have the proper security clearance. If anyone knows of anyone who does not have that proper clearance, please speak up, and we will not proceed with them present.

[No response.]

Senator PRESSLER. With that background, I will call on Mr. Gates for his statement.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN McLAUGHLIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EUROPEAN ANALYSIS, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE; JOHN KRINGEN, CHIEF, SUBVERSION ANALYSIS BRANCH, FOREIGN SUBVERSION AND INSTABILITY CENTER, OFFICE OF GLOBAL ISSUES, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Mr. GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The statement itself is classified "secret." We will make an effort, subsequent to the hearing, to sanitize the testimony so that it can be used in the report of the subcommittee.

We are here today to brief on Soviet active measures, or covert action in Western Europe.

Soviet active measures are covert operations designed to shape public opinion in foreign countries on key political issues. These measures are targeted at opinion-makers, such as political leaders, the media, and influential businessmen, as well as the public at large.

They embrace a range of activity, which include: placing disinformation in the press; surfacing forged documents; planting rumors; promoting causes through parties or front groups; and shaping policy through agents of influence.

Typically, the KGB and other Soviet organizations implement active measures through their officers posted to foreign countries who, in turn, employ local assets.

KGB officers use diplomatic, commercial, or journalistic cover. Journalism is the preferred cover for active measures officers because it allows easy access to senior policymakers.

Soviet active measures cannot be divorced from other, more overt policy tools, such as propaganda and diplomacy. When Moscow decides to wage a political influence campaign, it commits resources across the board.

Articles covertly placed in the foreign media, for example, are often later cited in Soviet propaganda as proof of Soviet claims.

Moscow's ability centrally to orchestrate their political influence activities, both overt and covert, is unique in the world. Moreover, in conducting covert activities, Moscow is singularly advantaged in the ready ability of its intelligence organizations to call upon the service of academic, commercial, diplomatic, and journalistic colleagues.

The effectiveness of Soviet active measures derives from their scope and this systematic, coordinated approach.

The first handout that you have illustrates the nature of this relationship.

[The information referred to follows:]

Soviet Political Influence Activities

Politburo-Approved Programs

Covert Activities (Active Measures)

Forgeries

Placement of Articles

Funding of Political Groups

Manipulation of Local
Communist Parties

Use of Front Groups

Agents of Influence

Overt Activities

Propaganda
(e.g., TASS, Novosti)

Official Sponsorship of
Conferences, Visits

Party-to-Party Ties

Diplomacy

Economic Assistance,
Agreements

Military Assistance,
Agreements

Coordination
in
Strategy
and
Tactics

Senator PRESSLER. Is this the handout?

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

Western Europe is an ideal laboratory for active measures because its societies are open and its governments sensitive to public opinion. Active measures are used to exploit vulnerabilities in West European political life by feeding ideas, guidance, and financial support to disaffected elements of the politically active public.

Let me turn now to resources committed to Soviet active measures.

The Soviet resource commitment to both covert and overt political influence activities is very large.

We estimated in 1982 that the total Soviet annual expenditure for such activities was in the range of \$3 to \$4 billion. We have seen no evidence that the level of Soviet activity has lessened in recent years.

Three organizations are principally responsible for these activities; the KGB, the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and the Soviet Party's International Information Department.

Precise estimates of the personnel and financial resources that the KGB devotes to these activities are not available.

According to several of our knowledgeable defector sources, however, service A, the active measures component of the KGB, has some 700 officers in the field and at headquarters.

The International Department of the Communist Party is responsible for dealing with nonruling foreign Communist parties, front organizations, and clandestine broadcasting.

Working under the Politburo, the International Department formulates the party line to be used in foreign political influence activities. We estimate it has 150 to 200 people working in Moscow with approximately 25 desk officers on Western Europe alone.

Senator PRESSLER. What is it that has that many people?

Mr. GATES. The International Department of the Communist Party.

Senator PRESSLER. Of the KGB?

Mr. GATES. Of the Communist Party overall. They have about 150 to 200 people in Moscow, but about 25 working on Western Europe.

The organization also has representatives abroad, and we have identified field representatives in several West European countries.

The International Department plays a key role in formulating the tactics that foreign parties and front groups use in Soviet-backed campaigns. In the anti-INF campaign from 1980 to 1983, for example, the International Department worked closely with several West European Communist Parties, instructing them on the lines to take, tactics to use, targets to influence, and so on.

The International Information Department of the Soviet Communist Party exercises oversight of the international dimensions of Moscow's propaganda apparatus, including the TASS and Novosti wire services, Radio Moscow, the major Soviet dailies, and the Information Departments of the Soviet Embassies.

The headquarters staff of this group is small, but the propaganda apparatus that it oversees has been growing dramatically. Just as an example, TASS operations have grown significantly in the last

15 years, from some 62 foreign subscribers in 60 countries now, to some 300 foreign news agencies and broadcast companies in 93 countries.

RESOURCE CAPABILITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Western Europe is clearly one of Moscow's major targets for active measures and Soviet activities there have a long history.

On a worldwide scale, there is probably no part of the world in which the Soviets are more committed or active. Thus, the Soviets have in place an impressive resource base in Western Europe to undertake covert action, as well as espionage and the theft of advanced technology.

The core of this effort is the estimated more than 700 diplomats stationed in Western Europe. Based on what we have seen elsewhere, we estimate that about a third of these are intelligence officers. These, of course, can call on other members of the Embassy staff to assist them.

This sizable Soviet presence is augmented by an estimated more than 1,200 diplomatic representatives from East European countries.

The Soviets also fully avail themselves of the several U.N. organizations—

Senator PRESSLER. Now, when you say from East European countries, are you saying that the people Czechoslovakia and Hungary send are essentially Soviet agents and that they would do what they are told?

Mr. GATES. They are responsive to Soviet tasking, yes, sir.

Senator PRESSLER. So, if you meet a diplomat in the United States or any place in the world who is from an East European country, a high level diplomat, he probably would respond to Soviet orders?

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

It may be direct or it may be indirect, through his own intelligence service. But if the Soviet Union tells that ambassador to approach so-and-so, or to do business with that journalist, or to collect this kind of information, he will do that.

Senator PRESSLER. So, if it is a sensitive matter, as 90 percent of the matters might be on trade or things that aren't considered sensitive, but the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, for example, if I were having lunch with the Hungarian Ambassador, or the Bulgarian, or the East German, there is a very good chance that if they wanted to relay something, probably not to me but to somebody else, they would do it. That is, the Soviet Ambassador would call him and tell him to do something and he would do it?

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

The Soviets also fully avail themselves of several U.N. organizations in Western Europe. Approximately 560 Soviets are associated with U.N. organizations in Europe either as diplomats assigned to the United Nations or as members of the U.N. staff.

A number of these have been identified as intelligence officers engaged in a variety of covert activities, including running active measures operations.

The Soviets also have in place a substantial apparatus outside their Embassies and the United Nations, Soviet press representation in Western Europe is significant.

Recent estimates indicate that there are more than 200 Soviet press representatives in West European countries, with substantial numbers in Finland, France, and West German.

Defectors report that as many as 70 or 80 percent of TASS bureau personnel would be intelligence officers. For example, in a six-man TASS office, three reporters may be KGB, two GRU—that is the Soviet military intelligence organization—and only one, usually the bureau chief, a trained, full-time journalist.

Such intelligence connections are not limited to TASS. Novosti, the foreign bureaus of Izvestia and other news organizations also provide cover for intelligence officers.

Soviet press representatives author articles in the Western press.

In July, for example, a former TASS correspondent authored an article in a Danish Communist newspaper alleging that U.S. bases in Greenland would be used in the Strategic Defense Initiative Program and that such use would violate the ABM treaty.

In virtually every West European country, the Soviet bloc also has commercial representation. At least 11 European countries have more than 10 such firms. While these firms engage in a wide variety of legitimate business activities, they also engage in covert activities and in recent years, Soviet managers of these firms have been expelled or arrested in Italy or Belgium.

It is standard Soviet practice to use commercial firms as conduits for covert funding to political organizations. Trade with Moscow provides a ready opportunity to cover such funding through paper transactions that misrepresent the goods exchanged.

For example, the quality and quantity of goods sold to the Soviet Union are sometimes overstated, with the excess being kicked back to the firm's owners or a designated third party.

Several West European Communist parties currently receive substantial funding through these sorts of arrangements.

To cover its tracks, the Soviets can engage in complex international financial transaction. Funds for one West European Communist Party, for example, were channeled through a Soviet firm in another country.

Senator PRESSLER. By a "Soviet firm," do you mean a business that the Soviets buy, or an import-export firm, or something like that?

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir—or an organization like the Soviet trading organization, like Amtorg, that operates in this country. Also shipping firms as well. That sort of thing.

Moscow's covert activities or covert efforts to manipulate the West European political scene are performed against a backdrop of substantial and increasingly sophisticated propaganda operations.

According to USIA, Soviet "informational" activities in Western Europe are substantial, with an across-the-board effort that employs radio broadcasting to Western Europe in more than 20 languages, cultural activities, and distribution of Soviet books and periodicals, the Soviet friendship societies in virtually every West European country. In addition, clandestine radio stations in East Germany broadcast to Turkey.

The Soviets are experimenting with satellites to broadcast directly television programs to audiences in Western Europe. While these transmissions require special reception equipment and are now limited to Russian-language domestically-oriented programs, Moscow has now the technical ability to make direct transmissions to virtually all areas of the world. These programs, which are available free, are already being broadcast on cable television in Sweden.

The Gorbachev regime plainly is more astute than its predecessors in manipulating public perceptions. In their public dealings, both Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have already demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how to use the Western media. Moreover, Gorbachev seems to be preparing to revamp the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

According to a variety of intelligence reporting, Moscow derives considerable benefit from using the intelligence services of its allies to support Soviet active measures abroad.

In some cases, like covert press placements, allied participation broadens and reinforces the impact of Soviet efforts. In other instances, such as foreign political influence operations, they give Moscow more effective entree.

The East European services are probably more useful whether they have special access to specific target groups or countries.

East Germany's ability to exploit its cultural and commercial ties to penetrate thoroughly West German society is pretty apparent.

East European emigre organizations throughout Western Europe are particular targets of certain allied services, like the Poles and the Czechoslovaks, to influence public opinion and Western European politics toward the East.

Many East Europeans can often operate less obtrusively than the Soviets because of their reputation for being "Western-oriented," for example, the Hungarians and sometimes the Poles.

East Europeans also play a significant role in doing Moscow's bidding inside various front organizations, active in Western Europe. Moscow has tried to lend an aura of "international" legitimacy to many of these organizations by basing them in Eastern Europe, for example, the World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague.

The World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the International Union of Students, for example, are all heavily staffed by East Europeans who help orchestrate political influence and propaganda campaigns against the West.

The degree of direct KGB oversight of Bloc active measures and other intelligence operations varies according to its relationship with a given service and the specific program.

[Deleted.]

Moscow sometimes formulates blocwide plans of action with a formal division of labor among its allies. [Deleted.]

Turning to Soviet priorities in Western Europe right now, historically Moscow's activities in Western Europe have been primarily directed toward weakening support for NATO preparedness and strategic force modernization. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, for example, the Soviet conducted major campaigns against deploy-

ment of the enhanced radiation weapon, or neutron bomb. We estimated in 1981 and 1982 that the Soviets perhaps had put as much as \$100 million into that campaign.

They also have conducted campaigns against the intermediate range nuclear forces.

In late 1984, the Soviets made the President's Strategic Defense Initiative the latest target in their efforts to interfere with Western strategic programs.

Soviet propaganda strategists also see the campaign against SDI as an opportunity to revitalize the West European peace movement after an extended period of inactivity, following INF deployment in Germany in 1983.

The campaign's effect on Western European audience is almost certain to be a factor in the evolution of Soviet bargaining tactics at the Geneva talks, as exploitation of the peace movement was in earlier INF negotiations.

We are beginning to see the kind of coordinated activity against SDI that characterizes a major Soviet campaign. The Soviets have tasked their fronts to turn their attention to the SDI issue, and we are already seeing the results. The World Peace Council, a Soviet front based in Helsinki, has held a series of conferences in Helsinki, Athens, and Vienna to engage peace movement representatives in discussions on disarmament.

The West Berlin Communist Party, long prominent in the peace movement, exploited the May observances marking the 40th anniversary of VE day by inserting anti-SDI themes into demonstrations and marches.

The Moscow World Youth Festival held this summer featured heavy press play on the anti-SDI theme.

Soviet front organizations have scheduled high visibility anti-SDI conferences in Western Europe and elsewhere well into 1986. The number and scale of these activities imply the infusion of a large amount of money.

To make their criticism of SDI more authoritative, the Soviets are using scientists to take the lead in defining the SDI issue.

I might mention here that some of the Soviet scientists who signed full page ads in several United States newspapers and took out other advertisements in the United States and Western Europe are, in fact, some of the leading scientists in charge of the Soviet SDI-type technology weapons programs.

[Deleted.] Moscow has appointed a leading expert on German affairs to the Vienna-based International Institute of Peace, a front specializing in contacts with the European scientific community.

The Soviets are planning to bring their anti-SDI campaign to the U.N. General Assembly this fall, and the publicity this generates will be replayed in Europe.

The Soviets are already seeking support from U.N. delegates for a variety of draft resolutions to prohibit the "Militarization of space."

Beyond SDI, we expect that the Soviet will continue long-standing efforts to exacerbate tensions within the NATO alliance, with particular emphasis on Greece and Spain.

In Greece, Moscow has sought to incite anti-NATO sentiment by working through the pro-Soviet Communist Party, which is very active in the peace movement.

In Spain, the Soviets, hoping to derail continued Spanish membership in NATO, are continuing their efforts to increase the level of anti-United States and anti-NATO propaganda.

Western Europe is also important to Moscow as a court of public opinion on issues not necessarily confined to its geographic boundaries. For example, Soviet worldwide campaigns to attack the CIA, spread disinformation about Western use of chemical and biological weapons, create support for "nuclear free zones," foster pro-Soviet attitudes among the world's youth, and create doubts about the circumstances surrounding the shootdown of the KAL jetliner, all receive considerable attention in Western Europe.

Over the past year or so, we have seen substantial increases in propaganda and front group activity in Western Europe on behalf of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The extent of these activities suggests funding by the Soviets or their allies.

Let me now turn to the techniques the Soviets use for active measures in Europe. First I will discuss forgeries.

The shock value and transient credibility of forgeries continue to make them a popular type of active measure.

Our records indicate that in each of the last three years, there have been about 10 identifiable forgeries and fabrications worldwide, an increase over previous years.

Recent forgeries, for example, have attempted to raise public concern about INF deployment. They have attacked the investigation of the Bulgarian connection in the Papal assassination attempt and raised questions about United States policy toward both Chile and South Africa.

About half of the forgeries, which include alterations of actual documents and fabrications of books and fliers, involve targets in Europe.

The quality of forgeries ranges from the very sophisticated to the very crude.

One of the more sophisticated efforts was a series of letters purportedly from Deputy Secretary of Commerce Brown to a number of European firms in late 1984. That is the second item in your handouts. There is a facsimile of the forgery.

[The information referred to follows:]

Forgery



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

23 Nov 84 08 37

111

October 24, 1984

Eingegangen 52

23 NOV 1984

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32A2	_____
32A3	_____
32A4	_____
32A5	_____
32A6	_____
32A7	_____
32A8	_____
32A9	_____
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32A50	_____

Dear Sirs,

Most probably you are very well aware of the fact, Eastern Bloc countries are eager to purchase more and more High Technology articles which directly or indirectly can be used by the army, so against the Free World.

Keeping this in mind and to develop an appropriate marketing and trade policy conception in accordance with the political decisions brought to hinder or cease the export of High Technology products to these countries, we ask for your cooperation in giving us some information of interest:

We would appreciate to receive the list of articles you produce or trade with that are on the COCOM list. We would be particularly pleased if you could indicate the presumable volume of sales to the Warsaw Pact countries and to Australia, Finland and Switzerland. Do you have any idea of what is the volume of your High Technology articles sales through Western European and other channels that in the end turn up in Eastern Bloc countries?

Secretary Baldrige and I both feel that more frequent contacts in the future can offer a closer connection with businesses directly or indirectly engaged in the sometimes slippery East-West trade.

I feel that your contribution might be of further assistance to us in resolving problems emerging from the trade of High Technology articles.

Sincerely,

Clarence J. Brown
Clarence J. Brown
Deputy Secretary of Commerce

·CJB/qlf

[Deleted.]

Senator PRESSLER. Where is the second item in that handout?

Mr. GATES. Here it is, right here [indicating].

Senator PRESSLER. OK. Thank you.

This was not sent by Mr. Brown at all, was it?

Mr. GATES. No.

This letter purportedly sought detailed information on their dealings with bloc countries.


These letters, intended to create resentment among the European governments and business communities about U.S. Government interference, were altered reproductions of a letter sent to a European addressee some months earlier.

Substantially less sophisticated was a flyer from a fictitious organization called "The German Section of the Moral Majority," that warned French delegates on their way to the Western-sponsored International Youth Conference in Jamaica of a purported AIDS epidemic there. That is the next item, the next handout.

[The information referred to follows:]



Fabrication



Halte à la propagation du SIDA !

C'est à l'ordre du jour. Ce fléau nouveau de l'humanité, connu sous le sigle SIDA (syndrome immuno-déficient acquis) a fait aux États Unis plus de 3 500 mille morts et leur nombre croît chaque jour de manière terrible. Les cas du SIDA ont été enregistrés dans 33 pays du monde entier. Hélas, ce ne sont pas seulement les homosexuels, qui sont frappés par cette maladie, parmi les victimes il y a des gens intègres et même des nouveau-nés.

Les malades deviennent des proscrits de la société, la comparaison avec les malheureux, contaminés par la lèpre ou la peste au Moyen-Age, n'étant pas exagérée. D'après les recherches scientifiques, le SIDA est une maladie contagieuse d'origine, virale de provenance des États Unis, de la Jamaïque et de l'île de Haïti. Les voies de transmission du SIDA sont encore discutées parmi les spécialistes. Il est quand-même sûr que les contacts sexuels ne représentent pas le moment dangereux exclusif. Il se peut que des années passent avant que la maladie ne frappe et le porteur du virus sans malaise peut contaminer des milliers de gens, la maladie se répand comme une avalanche.

Aujourd'hui, faute de prévention, la seule possibilité de se protéger c'est d'éviter les pays d'origine du SIDA, c'est à dire notamment la Jamaïque et l'île de Haïti et d'observer scrupuleusement la corde moral éternel. De votre part appelez aux gouvernements, institutions scientifiques et églises qu'ils mettent à la disposition des moyens suffisants pour lutter contre l'épidémie en question!

Le majorité morale
section allemande

Translation

HALT TO THE SPREAD OF AIDS!

It is on the agenda. This new scourge of mankind known under the acronym AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) has caused more than 3,500 thousand deaths in the United States and their number grows in a terrible manner each day. Cases of AIDS have been recorded in 33 countries of the whole world. Alas, it is not only the homosexuals who are afflicted by this illness; among the victims there are upright persons and even some newborn.

The ill persons are proscribed by society; the comparison with the wretches infected with leprosy or the plague of the Middle Ages not being exaggerated. According to scientific research, AIDS is a viral disease of contagious origin coming from the United States, Jamaica and the island of Haiti. The methods of transmission of AIDS are still being discussed among the experts. It is, in any case, certain that sexual contacts do not represent the only dangerous aspect. It is possible that years will pass before the disease strikes, and the carrier of the virus, without discomfort, can infect thousands of persons; the disease spreads like an avalanche.

Today, lacking a cure, the only possibility of protecting oneself is to avoid the countries of origin of AIDS, that is, mainly Jamaica and the island of Haiti, and to scrupulously observe the common moral code. On your part, call on the governments, scientific institutions and churches to make available sufficient resources to struggle against the epidemic in question!

The moral majority
German section

Mr. GATES. In recent years, European journalists have become more skeptical about purported documents that they receive. Many major newspapers in Western Europe now contact U.S. embassies about their authenticity.

Consequently, while efforts are first made to surface forgeries in the establishment European press to give them greater credibility, they often end up first either in the Third World or leftist European press.

Turning now to media manipulation, forgeries are but one example of Soviet efforts to manipulate the media in Western Europe and elsewhere.

The Soviets and their allies place a wide variety of items in the print and broadcast media, using both overt and covert means.

The methods employed include: providing to newspapers at nominal charge a TASS news service ticker; overt cultivation of journalists through friendship, entertainment, and trips to the Soviet Union; publication-for-hire schemes, in which clandestine payments are made to journalists for each item that is published or broadcast. In addition, in many West European countries, the Soviets also have their own networks for distributing Moscow-published books and periodicals.

Moscow's media manipulation activities are coordinated efforts targeted against specific objectives. These campaigns may vary in terms of timeframe, geographic focus, and whether they are offensive or defensive in nature. But they are planned activities, intended to support major Soviet policy objectives.

Some Soviet campaigns are programs that Moscow has conducted for many years. Its decades-long effort to discredit the CIA and to spread disinformation about Western use of chemical and biological weapons are examples.

Other campaigns are tied to major Western policy decisions. The current campaign against SDI is illustrative.

Finally, some of Moscow's efforts are short term and reactive. Often these are defensive efforts to limit damage from developments often unfavorable to Moscow. For example, there is the current Papal assassination trial and the Soviet shootdown of the KAL passenger plane.

While firm data are not available, we believe that the Soviets are less successful in planting items in the mainstream West European media than they are in the Third World, particularly in Africa and South Asia.

[Deleted.]

Mr. GATES. This does not mean, however, that Soviet efforts to insinuate their perspectives into the Western European media have been without success.

In one West European country the financially hard-pressed national news service receives the low cost TASS service. Consequently, it is not uncommon to find TASS items in the [deleted] press, reported as "news" without any commentary.

In another West European country the Soviets have been successful in cultivating several journalists who are conduits for pro-Soviet articles and books.

In Italy, the Soviets have established a large and successful network for distributing Soviet publications, many of which are pub-

lished in Italian. These are sold cheaply and sometimes given away.

While many of these are cultural rather than politically oriented, a recent USIA poll suggested that perhaps as many as 8 percent of the Italian population reads them.

And in Malta, the government-controlled newspapers and television are heavily influenced by the Soviets. Large number of news items, including those about U.S. policies, are TASS items.

Senator PRESSLER. How did they get such a good foothold in Malta? Is it through the Labor Party?

I know they have a foothold in there. How did they exercise control in Malta?

Mr. GATES. Primarily as a result of former Prime Minister Mintoff's desire for closer commercial relations with the Soviets, with ship repair and so on.

Senator PRESSLER. I see.


Thank you.

Mr. GATES. Let me talk for a moment about the use of front groups.

You have a foldout that illustrates some of the front groups in Western Europe.

[The illustration referred to follows:]

Soviet International Fronts: Spotlight On Western Europe



Mr. GATES. The activities of Soviet front groups in Western Europe have a long history. Most of the major Soviet-controlled front groups, such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of Democratic Youth were established in the 1940's and 1950's. They all have affiliates in Western Europe and most of them have substantial West European representation.

Nevertheless, the hallmark of Moscow's recent approach to front group activity has been flexibility. Heavy Soviet involvement of the anti-INF campaign caused some members of the peace movement to distance themselves from the more obviously Soviet-controlled fronts and Moscow has responded.

In 1983, Moscow apparently dropped its demand that peace groups give unerring support to the Soviet policy line and is encouraging its supporters to join in the formation of broad coalitions, [deleted], even if they criticize the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets appear to be experimenting with ad hoc committees and forums in Western Europe designed to influence non-Communist groups. [Deleted.]

Another element in the evolving Soviet peace strategy is the private peace conference. Such conferences are set up with Soviet assistance by individuals with no ties to governments or peace groups. For example [deleted], industrialists and former government officials participated in a conference organized in 1984 by a West European businessman who derives a considerable portion of his income from trade with the U.S.S.R.

The United States Embassy reported that the Soviet participants included a retired KGB general, the local KGB chief, and a KGB officer under journalistic cover.

These new efforts carry some risks for the Soviets. For instance, when the World Peace Council, as part of its efforts to expand its contacts with the non-Communist peace movement, attended the July 1984 convention of the broad-based European Nuclear Disarmament movement, it was strongly criticized by Western peace groups. Nonetheless, we expect these sorts of activities to continue.

As part of Soviet efforts to exploit the peace issue in order to bring public pressure to bear on United States arms controls positions, diverse Moscow-supported front groups are preparing for a wide variety of activities in Western Europe.

The World Peace Council will sponsor a World Congress for Peace in Copenhagen next year, which will be its contribution to the U.N.'s International Year of Peace.

The Congress, as now planned, would discuss prevention of an arms race in outer space, and will seek to promote nuclear free zones and a freeze on strategic offensive weapons, two well-known Soviet proposals.

The Dublin Committee, and affiliate of the World Federation of Trade Unions, will convene a conference in Helsinki this fall to publicize the case for converting Northern Europe into a nuclear free zone.

Generals for Peace and Disarmament [deleted], an affiliate of the World Peace Council, is composed of former high-ranking NATO and Warsaw Pact officers, and recently held a press conference in Bonn to release a book that argued against INF deployment.

Let me turn now to manipulation of local Communist parties.

In addition to its networks of front groups, Moscow seeks to use the Communist parties in Western Europe and elsewhere to support its influence programs.

We know, for example, that in recent years local Communist parties in several West European countries were pressured or directed to engage in peace movement activities. Such directives are frequently accompanied by Soviet funding.

While it would much prefer to tap into mainstream media outlets, Moscow also uses local Communist party newspapers and magazines in its efforts to shape opinion.

The Communist Party of Luxembourg is one of the most pro-Soviet in Europe. Its daily newspaper, which is funded by the East German Communist Party, is a regular outlet for Soviet disinformation. [Deleted.]

Senator PRESSLER. Is that read outside of Luxembourg?

Mr. GASTES. I don't think so.

Senator BIDEN. In Luxembourg, is it well known?

Mr. McLAUGHLIN. Yes, it is well known. [Deleted.]

Senator PRESSLER. But does anybody pay any attention to this paper in Luxembourg?

Mr. KRINGEN. It matters less that they pay attention to it there than that these things get picked up somewhere else, without [deleted] being attributed to them. They can say that it appeared in the Luxembourg press and can therefore get circulated around the Third World.

Mr. GATES. [Deleted.]

The Soviets once provided covert funding for an Italian Communist Party newspaper in return for more favorable coverage on international affairs. When word of their involvement began to leak out, they stopped the funding.

[Deleted.]

If the local party is not receptive to Soviet guidance and direction, the Soviets often attempt to identify pro-Soviet individuals or groups with whom it can work.

In recent years, the Soviets have tried to develop more friendly leaderships in the several West European Communist parties.

In Spain, for example, the Soviets have concentrated their efforts on building a pro-Soviet Communist Party of the Spanish peoples in opposition to the Eurocommunist-oriented Spanish Communist Party. [Deleted.]

The apparent objective of the effort is to establish a means of Soviet control over the rather diffuse Spanish peace movement.

Fragmentary evidence suggest that, as with its fronts, Moscow is directing its party allies in Europe to concentrate its energies on SDI. For example, Soviet party and government officials have approached Communist Party officials in at least two West European countries about strategies for attacking SDI.

Turning to the use of international organizations, the U.N. Secretariat and Soviet diplomatic missions—

Senator BIDEN. May I ask you a question first?

That is no surprise to anybody, is it? I mean, the intelligence community knows it, and the public at large. I just came back from Berlin, and Germany, and everybody, the guy at the grocery store

knows, everybody knows that. I mean, whether you walk into a hotel and you are walking upstairs with a guy carrying your bags or you meet with the newspaper editor of the newspaper editor—both of which I did, frequently—just everybody knows that.

Mr. GATES. The activity and Soviet relationship with these Communist parties is, in my judgment, the least surprising aspect of this whole Soviet effort.

What is less well known is the degree to which these groups which, from our perspective here in Washington, may seem insignificant, for example, will become silent partners in major demonstrations or major campaigns. For example, you may have a church group [deleted] that is unaware of any Soviet or Communist involvement in its activities. It may not be aware that some of the funding for posters and for getting out the crowd and so on may actually have been carried out under the auspices of one of these Communist parties, which otherwise has very little influence of its own.

These Communist parties, in fact, recognize that and attempt in effect to piggyback onto the efforts of more legitimate groups and help fund those and give them more prominence than they might otherwise have.

That really is the only part of the activities of the Communist parties in Western Europe that I think would come under that.

Senator BIDEN. I guess what I am driving at is this.

I am not suggesting that what you are saying is not factual. But I am asking, in a sense, what difference does it make?

Let me put it in another way.

It would worry me a great deal if the Soviet Union were able to manipulate, in the sense that they could change the direction of the thinking of otherwise legitimate groups—the Dutch Church, whomever—in the words, if the Soviets took what was an indigenous initiative and tried to expand it. Do you follow me?

Mr. GATES. I do, Senator. Let me just give you a couple of examples.

In effect, this is kind of the conclusion of our briefing here, but I will go ahead and offer it now.

Where these things matter is where the issue is close or closely contested, and what you have is, in effect, a giant political action committee that is able to run funds and information and support into these campaigns in an area where it could make a difference, where it would not start something or would not provide a decisive edge, but where, if it is close, it could provide the difference.

Let me just give you two examples of where we are very worried that it will make a big difference.

One is on the Dutch decision on the deployment of INF, which is a very close call. [Deleted.]

Senator BIDEN. And has been for 5 years.

Mr. GATES. Yes.

The government is very sensitive to that.

The second is the referendum on Spanish participation in NATO where popular polls generally indicate a slight plurality opposed. So this activity could provide the margin that could make the difference.

It might not be a large margin, but would be enough.

Senator BIDEN. I apologize for the interruptions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Not at all. Go ahead, please.

Senator BIDEN. Does it make a difference in the sense that, if I could make a somewhat inappropriate analogy, in the United States, in our campaigns for reelection, let's say my campaign for reelection, if American labor were flush with money and we didn't have the election laws that we have, then they could, at the last minute, pour into my campaign a million dollars. Is that the kind of thing you are talking about?

I guess my question then is if, in fact, everyone in Delaware knew that labor was pouring in a million dollars, it would have a countervailing impact. I have to sit here and think about whether or not the negative impact of people knowing labor put that money into my campaign, or, in your case, the NICPAC put in on your behalf, Larry—I am deliberately picking something that is not so—but if NICPAC put in a half million dollars on your behalf, you would have to sit there and weigh whether that would hurt more than help, as I would have to do the same.

Mr. GATES. I think the key issue is that in many instances they will not know.

Senator BIDEN. OK. That is my last question, then. Is the most important way to deal with this to expose it, that is, expose it not in an expose sense, that this is something that is so pernicious, but to establish it as a stated fact?

Do you understand what I am saying, what I am driving at?

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. You see, when I meet with the Europeans, which my colleague and I do frequently, and have for the last 13 years, they are not at all surprised, whether they are political leaders, business leaders, or labor leaders. None is surprised that the Soviet Union was involved in the funding of the peace movement. In at least an ancillary way, in the way we are talking about it now, it did not surprise anybody.

What they overreacted to and resented was our inclination to characterize it as the peace movement being or having been generated by and the product of Soviet manipulation.

So we lost our credibility in my opinion, when we went over there and yell "the commies are coming."

If we had gone over and said look, you have 10 percent of the people involved in this peace movement in fact funded by Communists, and indirectly, therefore, you are being funded by them, et cetera, but we acknowledge that this is a genuine, spontaneous movement of a portion of an element of the population, then we have much more credibility, I think, to expose it.

But our tendency—and I don't mean you, I am talking about we politicians—we, who take the facts you give us and turn them into policy, we, in my view, try to make it look like—and I think it backfired, though not enough, thank God, to cause us to lose—but we made it look like we were trying to make the bishops and everyone else look like they were the dupes of and in control of the Soviet Union.

Do you understand what I am saying? I am not doubting what you fellows tell me.

I have been on the Intelligence Committee for 8 years, though I am no longer on it now. I do not doubt the numbers. I mean, I sometimes doubt the spin on the ball that we are giving it.

For example, this forgery letter is real, it happened. But, thank God, they don't know how to speak English. This is typically Soviet. Just read the letter.

Now, if there is any educated businessman, but the European businessman is probably not educated enough to understand how badly written this is, but if this landed on my desk, I would look at it and say my goodness, that Deputy Secretary of State must have been a machinist before he took this job.

Mr. KRINGEN. May I say something about this letter?

Seven firms responded to that and gave it a legitimate response.

How this first came to our attention was when the West German Government approached our Embassy to complain about United States Government interference in the West German economy by asking these kinds of things.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I am not suggesting that some do not. But just think of how dangerous they would be if they knew what they were doing.

I mean, really, just think of how dangerous they would be if they could solve the simple problem of having someone literate write the letter. Instead of having 7 out of the however many they were sent to, you would have 70 responding in that case.

The only point I am trying to make is this, and this is something I hope you will take back to your colleagues.

I really think there is a growing consensus here in the Congress. The old-line liberals and the old-line conservatives are, in fact, going to soon become a thing of the past in this outfit, in my view. What you are having emerge is a much more pragmatic group of women and men in both parties, who are much more centrist than we have had in the past as a body, who, in fact, truly do fear the Soviets, who, in fact, really are worried about them, and, in fact, believe we have to have a significant increase in defense and intelligence capability, but also are very much put off by—and this is not what you are doing, this is just to make a point—the chicken-little-sky-is-falling thing—do you understand?

So, I think we have a phenomenal opportunity to set into motion a foreign and defense policy in this country over the next 10 years that is much more in line with the vital interests of the United States than we have had in the past 30 years. The world has changed so damn much, there is going to be a new policy and a whole new ballgame out there.

So, my plea to you is this. As you put the spin on the ball, you are going to get a lot further if you look at the makeup of this body.

I will digress for a minute.

I facetiously said back in 1978, when we had that big thing about the circumstances under which we would send a CIA agent into a domestic operation, a political operation, of a friend. We are in classified session, but I won't go any further than that. But we have, on occasion, wanted to know what was happening even among friends.

I facetiously said to the then-director of covert operations why don't you first send that person into their home congressional district in an election year and have them analyze the outcome of that race and give it to you, and then you could judge their ability to make judgments about what is happening in the European country where you are sending them.

I was being a bit facetious, but not too facetious. The credibility of the agency among that group of people—you go back and look and assess whether I am right or wrong about the changing makeup of the Republican and Democratic Parties of this body—if you can come to the conclusion that I have, that things are much more centrist than they have been as a whole in the past, and there is a real chance for a bipartisan foreign policy here, then you may be more inclined, you in the editorial sense—

Senator PRESSLER. Excuse me, Joe, but I have to leave to vote. Senator BIDEN. Oh, yes, that is right. Let me conclude.

I guess what I am saying is that this is the time for the soft-sell salesman. Just say these are the facts, and then add the spin that you always add on. I don't mean that in a derogatory sense. I mean "spin" in that you give us an assessment. Just say I think this is what it means. It hurts us marginally, and this is the margin by which it hurts. Otherwise, you will not get people to listen up here.

Do you understand the point I am trying to make?

I am not asking you to accept it, just to understand it.

Mr. KRINGEN. I do understand it, but one contrary point I would raise is what is significant about these activities is not this bit or that bit, but rather the whole situation. You can say the Communist parties don't matter or forgeries don't matter and so forth, but it is the larger context.

Senator BIDEN. But I think they do matter.

Mr. KRINGEN. Let me give one illustration of the kind of problem we recently ran into, which was the allegation that the U.S. Government and the CIA in particular were responsible for the death of Indira Gandhi. Those charges, which surfaced in leftist newspapers, never got really widespread play.

Nevertheless, it caused the Secretary of State to go virtually worldwide to say that it was not true.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with you.

By the way, I am not suggesting that the collective impact of this is not something that we should be concerned about.

If you go back and look at my record on this whole question of infiltration in Europe and the relationships and the effect or impact of them, I am concerned about it.

All I am saying to you is I think in order to get other people up here to look at it and listen to it more, you have to put it into focus.

I would argue that the reason why we did not get more of a response to what the Soviets are doing in the peace movement in Europe is we initially painted it as if, my god, this is a total thing. The administration denied it was an indigenous movement.

You know, Russia could have flipped off the end of the Earth and you still would have had at least 80 percent of those folks still doing what they are doing. It would still be dangerous, very dangerous.

As a matter of fact, it is too dangerous for us to give away the argument when we overstate it like that.

Mr. GATES. Let me skip to the bottom line of this briefing, which was in terms of providing the context that you are talking about, we say, or I was preparing to say, that it is often difficult to determine the precise effects of Soviet political influence activities. Typically, they seek to capitalize on existing sentiment within the countries and cause and effect is hard to establish.

Their resources do not guarantee success, but in a close election or legislative battle, they could spell the difference.

These activities are designed to exploit internal conflicts and doubts in the expectation that these will tip public opinion and government policy. They did not create the anti-INF sentiment in Western Europe, but their organizational and financial support for peace demonstrations enlarged the scope of protest activities.

Senator BIDEN. I really have to go upstairs to vote.

Have you voted yet, Claiborne?

Senator PELL. Yes; I have just voted.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I have to leave to vote. I will be right back.

I hope we can write Russian better than they can write English.

[Laughter.]

[Pause.]

Senator PELL. Gentlemen, let me wish you good luck. I really do not want to interrupt. I have to meet with Secretary Shultz at 3 p.m. and regret not being able to stay.

Senator PRESSLER. Gentlemen, let us continue.

Mr. GATES. Let me turn now to the Soviet use of international organizations.

The U.N. Secretariat and Soviet diplomatic missions to international organizations continue to be a critical component of Moscow's propaganda and active measures campaigns. The Soviets have already made extensive preparations to exploit the U.N.'s International Year of Peace in 1986 and the 40th anniversary of the United Nations later this year. U.N. Under Secretary General Ustinov, a Soviet National, is responsible for Year of Peace activities; his staff is already soliciting funds and organizing meetings for nongovernmental organizations.

In Geneva, Soviet Ambassador Sytenko, a former U.N. Under Secretary General in charge of disarmaments can be expected to employ Soviet mission and U.N. personnel to promote anti-United States propaganda on arms control issues. For example, a retired Soviet U.N. employee has for some time been organizing the U.N. staff union into "disarmament" groups to endorse the Soviet line.

Additionally, Soviet missions to international organizations continue to provide convenient cover for agent of influence and other covert operations involving West European security issues.

French journalist Pierre-Charles Pathe, an agent of influence, was handled by Soviets assigned to the Soviet delegation to UNESCO in Paris. More recently, Arne Treholt, then a member of Norway's U.N. delegation, passed classified NATO documents to his KGB case officer at the U.N. library in New York.

Turning to agents of influence, the use of agents of influence is one of the most important, and most subtle, instruments of Soviet active measures programs against Western Europe. The task of the

agent of influence is to introduce Soviet policy positions into foreign governmental, business, or intellectual opinion in such a way that it cannot be attributed to Moscow. The successful agent of influence, therefore, is very difficult to detect.

Moscow's ultimate objective is to develop agents of influence at the highest levels of foreign governments. If such agents also engage in espionage, they can provide the Soviets with substantial political leverage by divulging sensitive policy information.

The most recent West European case on record is Arne Treholt, the former Norwegian government official who was convicted this June of espionage.

Treholt gathered information for the KGB from 1974 to 1983, and represented the Norwegian government in negotiations with the Soviets.

Now, let me turn to the West European government response.

In many respects, I think this gets to some of the points that Senator Biden was making.

West European governments, according to United States diplomats, are well aware of Soviet active measures, and their intelligence and security services routinely exchange information on them in regional and international forums.

Nonetheless, West European governments generally have not expelled Soviet officials solely on the basis of their activities and active measures.

A prominent exception was the Swiss closure of the Novosti press office in 1983 because the office drafted the text of the "Swiss Appeal in Favor of Peace and Against Atomic Death," coordinated the collection of signatures, and organized demonstrations in the streets. [Deleted.]

Generally, West European governments have preferred to take indirect actions against Soviet active measures by "leaking" information to the press.

[Deleted.]

West European governments have reacted much more forcefully to other Soviet covert activities—espionage and illegal acquisition of advanced technology. Since 1975, West European governments have been responsible for more than half of all the expulsions of Soviet diplomats worldwide. I might just insert here that over the last 5 or 6 years, some 430 Soviets, KGB officers, have been expelled worldwide.

Between 1981 and 1984, they expelled more than 150 Soviet citizens from Western Europe, including France's public expulsion of 47 diplomats in 1983.

I might call to your attention to the British expulsion of another 25 today.

The reluctance of West European governments to be more aggressive in dealing with Soviet active measures certainly reflects their perception that Moscow's attempts to obtain military and industrial secrets pose the larger threat. But other factors are important as well.

The difficulty in demonstrating the illegality of Soviet political influence activities. There are, for example, no legal prohibitions against West European Communist Party sponsorship of "peace rallies," even if they are funded by the Soviets. The belief that the

West European populations are unlikely to be swayed by Soviet overt propaganda or active measures and that the peace movement would continue even if Soviet manipulation were to cease is another.

Also is the desire not to jeopardize relations with Moscow over activities that many officials consider to be "part of the game."

In terms of overall impact, it is often difficult to determine the precise effects of Soviet political influence activities. Since typically they seek to capitalize on existing sentiment within the countries, cause and effect is hard to establish. The difficulty in tracing the impact of Soviet activities does not mean that there are no effects.

One way to think about Soviet efforts is to think of them as the activities of a giant political action committee. This Soviet political action committee has an impressive set of resources: a large budget; a cadre of experienced campaign strategists and activists; its own massive public relations organization; freedom from any constraints on disclosure of its activities; willingness of those it opposes; and an ability to place covert agents within opposing organizations.

All of these resources do not guarantee success, but in a close election of legislative battle, they can spell the difference.

Soviet political influence activities in Western Europe are designed to exploit internal conflicts and doubts in the expectation that these activities will tip public opinion and government policy in directions favorable to Moscow.

The Soviets did not create the anti-INF movement in Western Europe, but their organizational and financial support for peace demonstrations enlarged the scope of the protest activities and made it more difficult for West European governments to accept INF deployment.

While the Soviet anti-INF campaign did not dissuade the West German, British, and Italian Governments from accepting deployment, the organizational dependence of West European peace groups on Soviet-controlled fronts helped to inhibit strong criticism of Moscow for deploying the SS-20's, giving the INF debate a strong anti-United States flavor.

Soviet forgeries and disinformation activities have been successful in forcing Western governments to respond defensively to their allegations. While Moscow is now experiencing more difficulty in getting its forgeries into the Western press, rarely is a single disavowal sufficient to stop such charges from surfacing again. Moreover, denial of these allegations often serves to give them credibility.

In some cases, all the Soviets are interested in is raising doubt about an issue. In the case of the Soviet campaign regarding the shutdown of the KAL jetliner, the Soviets probably never realistically expected to reverse opinion in their favor, but to create enough public doubt to make it respectable to voice the other side of the issue. And they did that.

Nonetheless, the Soviets are, by no means, "flawless" in the execution of their political influence campaigns. Heavy-handed Soviet efforts to control the peace movement agenda in the INF debate alienated many noncommunist groups, with effects that continue today. And, despite expending much time and effort to influence

West European populaces, the Soviets lost considerable support when they walked out of the Geneva talks in November 1983.

They are now trying to recoup those losses in the current anti-SDI campaign.

In conclusion, let me just say, as I mentioned earlier in the hearing, that there are two areas where the combined effect of these activities cause us considerable worry. First is in the Dutch decision on deployment to be taken later this year. Second is the forthcoming possible Spanish referendum on NATO membership.

It is our view that greater public awareness here and abroad of these kinds of Soviet active measures, the techniques and activities as described in the hearings, will help to inhibit their appeal and effectiveness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

I have some questions. But first, let's hear the opening statement of our second distinguished guest, who is the Deputy Director of the FBI in charge of the Intelligence Division, Mr. James H. Geer.

[Pause.]

I guess we are not going to hear from the FBI until we finish with your agency. So let me begin with my questions.

Of the \$3.5 to \$4 billion annually invested by the Soviets in their active measures efforts, how much is spent in Europe or Europe-related efforts? Is the percentage directed toward Europe increasing? If so, why?

Mr. KRINGEN. Those numbers that we have provided are really gross estimates of overall levels of activity. In terms of being able to divide it up in terms of regional focus, I do not think we are in a position to do that.

Senator PRESSLER. Is that the total amount they have spent?

Mr. KRINGEN. That is the total amount they spend on a worldwide basis.

Senator PRESSLER. Which of the many Soviet targets are the most susceptible to manipulation: the peace movements, the media, churches, or public opinion?

You did cover some of that. Specifically, what are we doing to alert these targets at home and abroad to the danger of Soviet active measures.

I did note that in your testimony you said that we would use leaks to the media to expose it.

Mr. GATES. West European governments?

Senator PRESSLER. I am sure when there is a forgery we go ahead and say so?

Mr. GATES. Yes.

Senator PRESSLER. But if it is a hard one, without being negative, that is, to prove it, it is probably hard to respond directly in some cases. Is that right?

Mr. GATES. That is right.

To take the most blatant case, where it is difficult to combat, if you will, the big lie, I think the case that strikes me the most is that of KAL, where there is not a shred of support for the Soviet position of an intelligence mission. Here in the United States the oversight committees have affirmed that fact, and all governments have supported it outside—that is, the allies and so on.

Nevertheless, in the European press, and, closer to home, you nevertheless see a constant stream of articles raising doubts about the nature of that flight. That is one of the more egregious examples.

So, these forgeries, even if denied, continue to have a life of their own, resurfacing elsewhere, perhaps in the Third World or someplace else, once they have long lost their effectiveness in Europe itself.

Senator PRESSLER. In which of our allied states has the greatest damage been done by Soviet active measures, and why?

You cited the upcoming elections on NATO and you have cited the INF.

Mr. GATES. The Dutch basing decision.

Senator PRESSLER. Tell me about the upcoming elections in Spain? When are those elections, roughly, and what is going on? What are the Soviets doing there?

Mr. GATES. In running for office, the now Prime Minister, Gonzalez, pledged to conduct a popular referendum on whether Spain should join NATO. At the same time, Spanish public opinion polls generally indicate a slight plurality against NATO membership.

Senator PRESSLER. I have never seen any Soviet students in the United States or in England who are genuine exchange students. They don't send any real students outside their country, do they, unless they are absolutely sure of them?

Mr. GATES. That's correct.

It is not much of an exaggeration, but the kind of academic exchange that we so often hear about, particularly in the context of technology transfer, is that the United States, for its part, will send a 23-year-old graduate student to the Soviet Union to do research on Pushkin and we will get back a 40-year-old scientist who wants to work at the Stanford Linear Accelerator.

The kinds of students that they send over are very heavily weighted toward science and technology.

Senator PRESSLER. Do they send many students here?

Mr. GATES. Well, "students," we always have to put that in quotes because they all often are much older than what we would consider students to be. They are people in their thirties and early forties. Our view is that they often are intelligence officers or at least report to intelligence officers.

Senator PRESSLER. Do many of them defect when they are over here? Probably not.

Mr. GATES. Mr. Geer would have a better view of that. But my impression is that it is not a very large number.

Senator PRESSLER. How do they get trained people? I mean, to work in the media, you have to be pretty skillful. Of course, it was pointed out by Senator Biden that some of their English translations are not good. I guess Helene von Damm's letter, the forgery there, was in a different kind of German than she would speak, or something like that.

But, in spite of those mistakes, it takes fairly sophisticated, trained, experienced people to work as newsmen or with the media. Where do they train them?

Mr. GATES. Well, they have regular schools for journalism. I can say that the training that concerns us is the training in agitation

and propaganda that the Soviets offer. That is the subject for a full course of study in various party schools. There is ample opportunity for these people to get training in how to exploit the Western media, how to use propaganda, and so on.

I am sure that many of them who are not directly employed by the KGB or by the GRU receive ample training from those organizations.

Senator PRESSLER. There is no way to major in journalism, then—or there probably is, but they would get their training with their agency?

Mr. GATES. That's right.

Senator PRESSLER. It has been argued that there is a substantial intelligence threat stemming from foreign nationals hired by the United States abroad. For example, in the United States Embassy in Moscow, the United States employs 214 Soviets and the Soviets employ only a handful of Americans in their Embassy in Washington.

Would congressional legislation, such as Leahy's amendment to the authorization bill, be helpful in reducing this threat?

Probably you would not want to comment on specific legislation at this time. But, in general, do you have any comment?

Mr. GATES. Well, I would just say, as a general proposition, obviously having foreign nationals, particularly Soviets, work for us poses a variety of problems. There are different points of view within the government.

Senator PRESSLER. These are the sorts of questions that I would ask Mr. Geer also.

The language in the fiscal year 1985 authorization bill required the Central Intelligence Agency to establish counter-intelligence as a separate career service within the CIA. The intent was to toughen-up the CIA's counter-intelligence activities, without subjecting CIA officials to sanctions from co-workers once they are rotated out of counter-intelligence work back into normal agency activities.

Would such a separate career service be helpful?

Mr. GATES. I really would defer to my colleagues in the clandestine service on that, Mr. Chairman. I don't really know the answer to that.

I know that in creating a counter-intelligence analysis capability, in the assessment side of the house, we have established it independent of our Soviet office. We established that independent of the Soviet office so that we could take an independent look at these kinds of counter-intelligence analytical problems, at least from the analytical side, and do so without the people who are doing that feeling like their careers were being judged by the people who do some of the very work that they are assessing for deception and disinformation.

Senator PRESSLER. A recent bill by Senator Roth was directed toward limiting travel within the United States by Soviet nationals.

Would this be helpful?

Mr. GATES. Again, that would be a question more appropriately directed to Mr. Geer. I will only say that the assessments of the nature of Soviet activities in New York, as associated with the United Nation, were the product or were based on work that we

have done and provided to Senator Roth and the Senate Select Committee.

Senator PRESSLER. Gentlemen, I thank you very much. We appreciate your briefing very much.

Mr. GATES. It was our pleasure, sir.

Senator PRESSLER. We will now continue our hearing with the FBI.

Our second distinguished guest is the Deputy Director of the FBI in charge of the Intelligence Division, Mr. James H. Geer.

Mr. Geer entered duty with the FBI as a special agent in May 1964. He served on the investigative staff of the House Appropriations Committee and has supervised the Laboratory Division as well as the Inspection Division.

He served also as section chief of the Intelligence Division before being named Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director of that division, and subsequently as the Deputy Director.

We welcome you here, sir.

Do we now have anyone in the room who is not cleared for this briefing? We are still in a closed session.

Mr. BLITZ. Everyone is cleared, sir.

Senator PRESSLER. All right. Everyone is cleared.

You may begin.

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. GEER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY PHIL PARKER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION; JIM MILBURN, SUPERVISORY INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALIST; AND BOB MORAN, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Mr. GEER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee here.

I have prepared a brief opening statement which, if you permit, I would like to go through.

Let me start with some items that you have perhaps covered already in previous testimony.

The term "active measures" is a literal translation of a Russian phrase that is used by the Soviets to describe covert or deceptive intelligence operations designed to advance Soviet foreign policy objectives and discredit the United States.

The Soviets utilize a wide range of techniques and practices in active measures campaigns, including: Forged documents, written and oral disinformation, cover influence or manipulation of the media, use of foreign Communist parties, and the manipulation of a network of international Communist front organizations and their national affiliates.

In the United States, Soviet intelligence officers actively target and seek to cultivate influential American citizens, United States Government officials, journalists, and political activists. Much of this activity is overt in nature, although Soviet intelligence officers are always alert for the opportunity to recruit Americans who are in a position to facilitate or assist Soviet active measures operations.