IS ZIONISM THE SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH PROBLEM?

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PREFACE

The following pages are taken from the series of memoranda prepared by the Arab Office in Jerusalem for submission to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry in March, 1946. These memoranda were divided into three parts:

Part A: a survey of the Arab point of view in regard to the problem of Palestine.

Part B: a historical and analytical survey of the problem and the various proposals for its solution.

Part C: a series of brief notes and essays on specific questions.

The present pamphlet is taken from Part C. It is a self-contained work, but it does not attempt to cover the whole problem of Palestine. It confines itself to one question only: even if a Jewish State could be established in Palestine, would that solve the Jewish problem as the Zionists claim?

The opinions expressed in this pamphlet are personal and should not be taken as being necessarily those of the Arab Office or any other organization.

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First of all it is necessary to ask what the Jewish problem is.

A superficial view would be that it is simply a question of some thousands or millions of individuals who do not wish to or are unable to live in the countries where they are at present to be found, because of temporary political and social conditions, and for whom some other place of residence should therefore be provided where they can live more happily and safely than at present. If this were the whole Jewish problem, then the solution would be a simple technical matter; it would merely be a matter of counting the number of individuals who want a refuge, providing economic opportunities or finding empty spaces for them, and making the necessary financial and legal arrangements.

The Jewish problem, however, is much more complicated than this. It is the problem of a group whose members, differing as they do in many respects, are yet united to one another by profound ties of emotion and the spirit, and which has excited and still excites the distrust, suspicion or at least bewilderment of the peoples among whom it lives: a complex of emotions which has found expression in Europe in the last ten years in such severe persecution that many members of the group are no longer able, or when they are able are no longer willing, to live in Europe.

It is best to approach this problem by trying to understand the reasons for the special attitude of the world towards the Jews. At once two extreme views can be dismissed. On the one hand is the view of those who would blame everything upon the Gentile persecutors. They are motivated, so this group maintains, by irrational hatred of the different and the weak; or they are moved by religious prejudice, and see in the Jews those who murdered and who still deny Christ; or they are stirred to action by the machination of a ruling class which wishes to retain its own authority and to divert attention from more real and urgent problems.

This is the theory held, instinctively or explicitly, by many Jews whom centuries of life in the ghetto have taught to regard the Gentile world as a pack of wolves waiting to fall upon them. It is the theory also of a certain type of Christian with a guilty conscience about the treatment of the Jews in Christendom. It has an element of truth in it (it would indeed be difficult to propound a theory which had no truth in it at all); but by itself it does not suffice to explain what is to be explained. It does not make clear why these irrational emotions and prejudices have continued for so many hundreds of
years, why they have been directed upon the Jews with greater intensity than on any other minority group, and why in spite of persecution and of being scattered all over the world the Jews have continued to exist as a self-conscious group.

At the other extreme stand those who believe that persecution and hatred are wholly the fault of the Jews, because of some essential and extraordinary wickedness on their part. The type of wickedness ascribed to the Jews varies according to the intellectual fashion of the age: in our present age of socio-economic obsession they are accused of being the driving force behind world-capitalism and world communism. Often they are accused of being involved in a conspiracy for the subversion or domination of the world, and thus persecution of them is given the appearance of self-defence.

Such theories too are not wholly devoid of truth. It may be true, as M. Maritain has pointed out, that the Jews are at the heart of the world's unrest, carrying an element of dissatisfaction and restlessness wherever they go. It may be true also that persecution and the consciousness of being unwanted have brought to the front certain bad characteristics which otherwise might have remained undeveloped. Nevertheless it would still have to be explained why the Jews of all people have this peculiar wickedness, and why they have reacted in this way to persecution whereas other persecuted groups have reacted in wholly different ways.

Properly to understand the situation it is necessary to go much deeper into the problem than either of these two theories. The origin of the Jewish problem is to be found in their consciousness of having a special mission in the world, which sets them apart from other human beings and lays special burdens on them; the mission of bearing witness to God before all nations and of obeying the Law in every action of their lives. Their claim to have such a mission is rejected by the Moslem and Christian worlds, which regard the Jewish mission, at least in its original form, as having come to an end. This consciousness of a mission, and the rejection of it by the gentile world, persist in changed forms even among those who have cut themselves loose from traditional Judaism, Christianity or Islam. This is the fundamental cause of the abnormality of the Jews, and of their failure to enter into full communion with any of the peoples among whom they dwell and establish a normal moral relationship with them, that is to say a relationship of trust, respect and the recognition of equality. In certain political and economic circumstances, this abnormality has led to more or less violent persecution of the Jews; but persecution has never destroyed the Jewish people or induced them to abandon their traditions, because of the strength and prevalence of their sense of mission. The abnormal position and history of the Jews has bred in them certain characteristics—suspicion, cliannishness, a sense of insecurity and inferiority—which themselves in turn have become contributory causes of persecution.

In the medieval community, whether Christian or Moslem, the Jews were treated as wholly external, and on that basis they often (although by no means always) succeeded in establishing a satisfactory relationship with the outside world. In Spain, for example, there were mutual tolerance and respect between the Moslem and Jewish communities, and a stream of cultural influences flowed between them which fertilized the lives of both. Many bad things have been said about the "ghetto" system, and the system may have had its incidental hardships; but it is important not to forget that the Jews were not forced into the "ghetto." The "ghetto" and its equivalent, the "millet-system" in the Ottoman Empire were the natural form of society for a separate religious group in an age when it was universally accepted that society should be organized on the basis of a specific religion, and that law derived from religious belief and was essentially personal.

Even in more modern times there have been places and periods when the Jews were able to establish a satisfactory relationship with their community. This has been so to some extent in the British Empire, in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the United States of America and in those countries of Europe where the democratic tradition is firmly established. The Jews have been able to participate fully in the life of the community and have enjoyed equal rights as citizens, while at the same time retaining if they so wanted something of their communal life and traditions and their consciousness of difference. They have been able to do this for a number of reasons: because of the strength of democratic ideas in these countries; because some of these communities were heterogeneous ones in which diverse groups were able to retain their individuality and were held together by a principle which transcended difference; and because a large proportion of the Jews, while retaining perhaps certain traditions and the warm ties of blood, lost their intense attachment to their religion and their sense of a continuing mission, which either died out completely or was translated into the neutral language of "culture."

In the greater part of the European continent, however, certain developments have taken place in the course of the last few generations or so which have made it impossible for the Jews to establish a new relationship to replace that of the "ghetto." First there has been a change in the basis of the state. Throughout Europe there has been an attempt to rebuild the state on the basis of the united and homogenous nation; the traditions and "spirit" of the nation determine the structure and policy of the government, and the state's claim to the loyalty of its citizens finds its ultimate sanction in the consciousness of belonging to the national community and the willingness to work and sacrifice for the nation. Now the Jews have an ambiguous relation to the European nations. Although they may speak the language of the nation among which they dwell and may have mastered its culture, the claims which the homogenous nation-state make upon its members are such that not all Jews, with the best will in the world, are able adequately to respond to them; and even those who succeed in doing so are not always accepted by their fellow-citizens as fully members of the nation.
Secondly, there has been a change in the whole nature of Western culture and society. They have become lay, “scientific,” universal and relativist. In consequence there has been a change both in the attitude of Western men towards the Jews, and in that of the Jews towards the Western community. Emotionally Europeans have tended to lose their dislike of Jews; it is more difficult than it was to feel an instinctive dislike for those who deny what one holds to be true and affirm what one believes to be untrue. On principle, too, hatred of Jews as such has become inadmissible; even Europeans who still dislike Jews or at least are indifferent to them, yet feel compelled to treat them as equals and accord them full civil and political rights, as a necessary consequence of certain universal principles in which they believe, the liberal, democratic, humanitarian principles which have become the ordinary currency of Western political thought.

On the other hand, the change in European thought and society has altered the situation of the Jews. It has opened up to them the possibility, real or illusory, of individual assimilation, of merging fully into the surrounding world without any open act of apostasy or conversion, and so of losing what distinguishes them from their neighbors. The possibility of and urge to assimilation however conflict with the lingering remains of Gentile exclusiveness, with the much greater family and group exclusiveness of the Jews, and with the Jewish sense of mission; and thus an ambiguous and divided state of mind is produced.

Alongside the changes in the basic principles of thought there went fundamental changes in the class-structure of European society. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe the Jews had long been confined to middle-class urban occupations, had been merchants, petty tradesmen and craftsmen, and in these occupations they had possessed a disproportionately large share and in some countries a virtual monopoly. In the last few generations, however, an indigenous middle-class has been arising, which is thrown naturally into competition with the Jewish middle-class; and this rise of a middle-class has coincided, at least in the last three decades, with extreme economic dislocation and periods of depression, during which the opportunities of profit have been restricted and competition has become more intense.

To these factors yet another must be added: the general malaise of the European soul in these last decades, a malaise of which Hitler was the product and symbol, and which found expression in the cult of strength, the hatred of revealed religion and the worship of unreason: all of them factors which, taken in conjunction with those described above, could lead easily to violent anti-Semitism.

The consequence of all these developments was the failure of Jews and Gentiles in most parts of Europe to establish a satisfactory moral relationship with one another. The Jews (with the exception of the comparatively small number who have been successfully assimilated) are torn in two directions, between the universal European community to which in many ways they belong and their own Jewish community; they suffer from a sense of being excluded from the world; they are obsessed by the consciousness of being Jews, and this obsession often leads to self-hatred; they are insecure in the world, and seek frantically and despairingly for security; since they are not at ease, the seeds of genius in them can only with difficulty, if at all, come to fruition.

The Gentiles for their part are abnormally conscious of the Jewishness of the Jews, are everlastingl aware of their difference; they are unable to accept them instinctively as part of their community, but demand that they should prove and justify themselves; they are ready to ascribe every abnormality or defect of individual Jews to their Jewishness, and to blame the whole of Jewry for it; in face of the restlessness and insecurity of the Jews they themselves feel insecure and uneasy.

In these circumstances, political and social discrimination is bound always to be present, in some form and to some extent; and at periods of general strain and dislocation persecution is likely to arise. Moreover the misfortunes of the Jews in one country are likely to react upon their position in other countries where circumstances are different. The persecution of Jews in Europe for example has reacted upon their situation in the United States, both by example and more directly because Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants from Europe have brought with them an attitude to the Jewish problem which has been moulded by the circumstances of Europe.

The Zionist proposals for dealing with the Jewish problem may be summed up as follows:

(1) The abnormality of the Jewish relationship with the Gentile world is due to one fact above others: to the homelessness of the Jews. If Central and Eastern Europe the Jewish problem could be settled if the Jews could become a nation like other nations, living at ease in a territorial home of their own, possessing the attributes of independent statehood and entering as equals the community of nations.

(2) This territorial home cannot be anywhere except in Palestine, because of the religious and sentimental ties which still bind the Jews to Palestine and because the work of building up a national home has already begun there and cannot be begun again somewhere else.

(3) Even if the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine did not cure the Jewish problem in the deeper sense, at least it would save the Jews from the consequences of their present homelessness; it would protect them from persecution such as they have suffered in Europe in recent years.

(4) There is no other hope for a solution of the Jewish problem, so long as the Jews are living dispersed among alien communities, have an abnormal social and economic structure and in short are not fully a nation like other nations.

These contentions will be examined one by one.

(1) To begin with it may be questioned whether the Jews could become a nation like all other nations through settlement in Palestine or in any other way. If the preceding analysis is correct, the abnormality of the Jews is not due primarily to their social and economic
condition, but to their sense of a continuing mission and to a certain transmitted mentality to which it has given rise. Not merely will that mentality continue to exist if they return to Palestine, but it is even likely to be intensified. It is obvious that the Jewish sense of mission and exclusiveness are weakest in those countries where Jews are given the full rights of citizens, are able to mix freely with non-Jews and live scattered among them, and strongest in countries where the Jews are socially and physically isolated. In a Jewish State, with an exclusively Jewish social environment and an education which lays overwhelming emphasis on Jewish tradition, is it likely that the citizens will lose those distinctively Jewish characteristics from which the Jewish problem derives? The possibility of this happening could only be maintained by those, be they Jews or others, who accept the extreme theory discussed at the beginning of this paper, that the Jewish problem is due entirely to the Gentiles.

It is probable, indeed, that the problem would change its form, but the change would not necessarily be for the better. Both general considerations and the evidence of present tendencies in Jewish political and cultural life suggest that in a Jewish State the sense of mission would lose the religious form which is proper to it, and would even lose the intellectual-aesthetic form which it has taken among the assimilated Jews of the modern Dispersion, and would take instead a purely politico-economic national or racial form of a type which has been only too common in the last few decades. The Jewish State would thus tend from the beginning to have an abnormal relation to the other members of the community of nations. Although the relations between individuals and the state might become normal, and to that extent the burden of the Jewish problem on the individual be eased, the relation between the State and other states would be abnormal, and this in turn would react upon the state of mind of the individual citizen.

Nor is it so easy as Zionist propagandists maintain for the Jews to shed their special characteristics. Even if the Zionist thesis were true, and Jewish abnormality was due solely to Jewish homelessness, it would still not be necessarily true that the Jews would get rid of their abnormality by securing for themselves a home. In the life of nations and individuals alike, an effect may persist along after its cause has disappeared; one cannot wipe out the effect of a phase of the past by a change of place or by trying to take up life again where one left off. The Jews who enter the Jewish State will bring with them all the characteristics which they have acquired in the Dispersion, and it will take generations under the most favourable conditions to get rid of them.

Moreover, even if the establishment of a Jewish State were to solve the problem of the Jews who became citizens of it, it would also be necessary to consider its probable effects upon the Jews who remained outside it and who would almost certainly be far more numerous than those who entered it. The Zionists contend that it would improve their position: it would give them an object of corporate pride and devotion which would make easier their life in exile, and would strengthen their Jewish consciousness; in times of persecution the state would help them, either by diplomatic protection or by giving them a refuge. It is at least equally probable, however, that exactly the opposite would occur. The establishment of a Jewish State might tranquillize the inner life and enrich the thought and emotion of the small minority of Jews who feel themselves to be completely alien to the surrounding world, and it might have no effect upon the state of mind and loyalties of the other small minority who are to all intents and purposes assimilated. But for the vast majority of Jews who are divided between two worlds and two loyalties, who cannot and do not want to be completely assimilated and yet who belong in many ways to the lands of their residence, the establishment of a Jewish state would increase their self-division and inner conflict.

Not only would it intensify their struggle, but it would extend its scope. Politically it would raise the question of loyalties in an acute and practical form. Culturally also it would raise the problem of self-division in a way in which it has not been raised throughout the centuries during which the Hebrew language was only used for religious purposes and there was no Hebrew secular culture.

Even if the creation of a state had no effect upon the state of mind of the Jews in the outside world, it would still affect their position. It would increase the doubts and distrust which non-Jews already have in regard to the loyalty of their Jewish fellow-citizens and make it harder for a Jew to convince his neighbours to accept him as a full member of the community. It would make impossible what is already difficult enough, the life of the Jew who wants to be assimilated.

It would moreover serve as an additional excuse for anti-Semitism: "the Jew is a foreigner, who does not belong here." or "the Jew has his own country, let him return to it." Nor is it at all certain that the Jewish State would be able to help him in his hour of need. It would be, by world-standards, a weak, third-rate state, whose diplomatic action might not be of much avail as against more powerful states. It might very well hesitate about offering refuge to a large number of refugees from outside, whose coming would dislocate its social and economic life; and even if it wanted to offer them refuge it might be unable to do so, because of lack of room or the opposition of non-Jewish elements inside the state or surrounding it.

One further doubt may be expressed: even if the claims of the Zionists were justified, and the Jews in Palestine made a normal life for themselves, perhaps they and the world would lose more than they gained. They would lose their international culture, their sensitiveness and understanding; they would lose also their sense of mission and with it that urge to create and to reform which has helped, these last hundred years, to fertilize the genius of Europe.

(2) Even if it were admitted that the Jewish problem could be solved by the concentration of the Jews in a single territory in which they should possess self-government, it would still have to be proved that Palestine is the only possible region of settlement, that is to say
that "territorialism," i.e., large-scale Jewish settlement in other regions, is impracticable.

Two sets of reasons might be advanced to prove its impracticability: 

(a) It might be said that territorialism is impossible because the governments of the world are unwilling to place suitable regions at the disposal of the Jewish settlers. Whether this is true or not it is not for the Arabs to say. If it is true, however, it is tantamount to admitting that all nations feel as the Arabs of Palestine do about large-scale Jewish immigration, but that the Arabs can be coerced into acquiescence while other nations cannot. Such an assertion would rest upon a low conception of political morality, and would in any case be untrue; the Arabs can no longer be coerced into passive acceptance of whatever policy the Great Powers wish to impose upon them.

(b) Alternatively it might be said that territorialism is impossible because no suitable region of settlement exists. From the strict economic point of view this is not true. There are regions of North and South America and Australia which are less fully developed and less thickly populated than Palestine. The small areas of Palestine, on the coast and in Esdraelon, where intensive cultivation is possible with a comparatively small capital investment are already being fully exploited. There remain the hill-country, which is already thickly populated and can only be intensively cultivated at great expense, and the Negeb where development is only possible if adequate water-supplies can be obtained, and where investigations so far made have not revealed the existence of such supplies.

Climatically too there are countries more suitable than Palestine for settlers long accustomed to the climate of Europe; and there are parts of the world where they would have closer cultural ties with the non-Jewish population than in Palestine. Zionists at this point fell back upon two alleged advantages of settlement in Palestine which, they claim, would not be found in other countries. First, they would say, the idea of the return to Palestine arouses more enthusiasm than would any other scheme of settlement, and without such enthusiasm the work of construction cannot be carried out. This might have been true in days when Zionism was a luxury and only those Jews who were Zionists in the first place would go to Palestine. But in present circumstances the question is one of finding immediate refuge for those Jews who can no longer live in Europe. Will not the idea of saving the European Jews from further privation and giving them the possibility of a new life be sufficient to generate enthusiasm? Until the imposition of severe restrictions upon entry into the United States, many more Jews emigrated to America than to Palestine; did they work with less enthusiasm or success in building their new life in America than their brothers in Zion?

Secondly, the Zionists might say, Palestine offers Jews the possibility of ultimate independence and self-government. In other suggested
whole Arab world. The Jewish State will thus find itself forced into an attitude of enmity towards the Arab States: from a sense of isolation and danger, as a preliminary to crushing its Arab minority, because of its need for markets and finally (should persecution break out again and large-scale immigration seem necessary) by the pressure of population. It will be tempted to follow a policy of expansion and of alliance with whatever Great Power seems most likely to help it. This will increase the enmity of the Arab world towards it. In such circumstances, will the Jews be much more secure than in the European dispersion, or half as secure as in North or South America or the British Commonwealth?

(4) The critic of Zionism may be called upon to suggest an alternative solution for the Jewish problem. Such a demand, however, presupposes that the Jewish problem can be solved by the policy of governments. This is not in fact true. If the analysis contained in these pages is correct the Jewish problem, deeply considered, springs from the persistence among the Jews of a feeling of being a peculiar people, of being set apart from other peoples in order to fulfil a special destiny in the world. If the Jews should lose this feeling, then there would be no obstacle to their assimilation; the Jews would disappear and with them their problem of establishing normal relations with the rest of the world. So long, however, as they retain their sense of difference and of mission, so long will there continue to be a tension between them and their neighbours, a tension which is always likely to cause difficulties to Jewish individuals as well as to Jewish communities, and which may, given certain political or economic conditions, lead to more or less severe persecution. In these circumstances, assimilation is still possible for individuals, but not for the Jewish people as a whole.

This tension is always liable to have such results, but they are not inevitable. There is an "abnormal" tension of suspicion, hatred and unfitness, but there can also be "normal" tension of mutual respect, trust and acceptance. The achievement of such a tension is ultimately a problem of individuals and of hearts, but there are certain political, economic and social factors which would help in its achievement. Among them the following may be mentioned:

(i) The spread of genuine democratic ideas among the European nations. During the era of the French Revolution, the Jews were treated with tolerance not out of special love or regard for them, but because to have treated them badly would have contradicted the principles which the revolutionary governments professed. In the same way in a genuinely democratic community even those who do not like Jews are restrained from venting their dislike by respect for the overriding principles of liberty and equality.

(ii) Specific and formal guarantees, constitutional or international would be of no efficacy in a wholly authoritarian State, but they are of real if limited effect in a state in which public opinion and respect for law exist. They help to create certain standards and thus teach the citizen-body what sort of behaviour to expect from their rulers.

(iii) The provision of judicial or administrative machinery for the examination and redress of grievances is also not without its effects. At times of large-scale persecution, undertaken deliberately by the Government for political purposes, all such machinery would be swept aside; but such times are rare, and normally what is to be feared is minor and local discrimination, due to the malice or tactlessness of particular officials or to specific misunderstandings; such local problems if tackled immediately and on the spot may yield easily to treatment, but if left to fester may have more than local effects.

(iv) It is essential for the world's tranquillity that the conception of homogeneous nationalism which has dominated Europe during the last decades should be modified, and should give way to a conception of the State which admits of cultural, local and other differences. The false idea that the strength of the state depends on its homogeneity should be replaced by the understanding that the strongest state is that in which loyalty and the will to work together are reconciled with the greatest possible degree of communal, local and individual diversity.

(v) Something may perhaps be expected from the spread of left-wing movements in Europe, which will inculcate ideas of equality and of those ties of common interest which override national, racial or sectarian differences.

(vi) In all this work, it is for the Great Powers to take the initiative and use their influence in this matter. Almost the whole of Europe will be dependent upon the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., both politically and economically, for many years to come. All three Great Powers have a record in regard to the Jews which is considerably better than that of most other states; all have gone far, in different ways, towards solving their Jewish problems; and they could, did they so wish, make good treatment of the Jews one of the conditions of their extending help to the Governments of Europe

(vii) In so far as those measures did not make life tolerable for the Jews of Europe, and large numbers of them still wanted or were compelled to emigrate, emigration should be controlled by the United Nations, on the principle that all member-States should be asked to bear a share of the burden proportionate to its population and economic resources, and that no territory not a member of the United Nations should be forced to bear a disproportionate share without the consent of its indigenous population.

(viii) Individual emigration by itself will not be enough. It is also necessary to provide facilities for those Jews who wish to emigrate in groups and to preserve their Jewish communal life in their new places of residence. For a number of years investigations have been proceeding with a view to discovering suitable places for Jewish settlement. The most promising seem to be Western Australia, Tasmania and Brazil. The United Nations should encourage these and similar projects and do everything they can to facilitate group emigration.
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