

QUIET OF MOUNTAIN - BRIG. GEN. HAMMAR 1950

*Chas. M. ...*

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1777  
War

THE  
PROCEEDINGS  
OF A

COURT OF ENQUIRY,

HELD AT THE SPECIAL REQUEST



OF

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSIAH HARMAR,

TO INVESTIGATE HIS CONDUCT, AS COMMANDING OFFICER

OF THE

EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MIAMI INDIANS,

1790:

The same having been transmitted by Major General ST. CLAIR, to the SECRETARY of the UNITED STATES, for the DEPARTMENT of WAR.

*Published by Authority.*

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PHYSICS 309

LECTURE 10: QUANTUM MECHANICS

THE SCHRÖDINGER EQUATION

10.1

THE WAVEFUNCTION

10.2

THE HEISENBERG UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

10.3

THE HARMONIC OSCILLATOR

10.4

10.5



Fort Washington, September 24, 1791.

SIR,

109 6. 2 89  
I HAVE the honor to enclose to your Excellency the Proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, which sat agreeably to the General Order of the 14th instant,—“ To enquire into the personal conduct of Brigadier General Harmar, commanding officer on the late expedition against the Miami Indians.”

THE Court have taken the utmost pains to investigate the subjects committed to them, and have expected that some persons would have attended from Kentucky, on the occasion, as mentioned in your Excellency's letter of the 15th.—Finding no personal evidence come forward from that quarter, have this day closed their proceedings, and present to your Excellency their opinion as *specially directed*.

THERE are some Depositions handed in, but, as they are not authenticated under the seal of any court of record, or by the Prothonotary of any county, the Court conceive they can only subjoin them to the proceedings for information to your Excellency, as they have been to the Court,—they are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4.

I have the honor to be,  
with great respect,

Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

RICHARD BUTLER, Major General,  
PRESIDENT.

His Excellency Major General  
ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.

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# PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF ENQUIRY,


Held at FORT WASHINGTON, September 15th, 1791,

Agreeably to the order of the 14th inst. of which the following is a copy.—

“ A Court of Enquiry, of which Major General Butler is appointed President, and Lieutenant Colonels Gibson and Darke, members, will sit to-morrow 12 o'clock, at the south east Block-house Fort Washington.”

Major-General RICHARD BUTLER, President.

Lieutenant Colonels GEORGE GIBSON, }  
WILLIAM DARKE, } Members.



After Orders, September 14th, Head Quarters.

“ LIEUT. WARREN, of the 2d United States regiment, is appointed to record the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, directed to sit at Fort Washington, by the orders of this day.”

W. SARGENT, Adj. General.

The Court met agreeably to the above order, and were duly sworn according to law.—The following letter was read from his Excellency Major General *St. Clair*, directed to Maj. General *Butler*, President of the Court of Enquiry.—

Fort Washington, September 15th, 1791.

SIR,

THE Court of which you are appointed President, is ordered for the purpose of enquiring into the conduct of Brigadier General Harmar, the commanding officer upon the late expedition against the Miami Indians.

In the course of your investigations, all the circumstances of the campaign from the time the army departed, until it returned to Fort Washington, are to be taken into consideration. These will embrace the personal conduct of the General,—the organization of the army,—the orders of march, encampment and battle,—the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, the 19th and the 21st of October, and whether the said detachments were duly supported, and if not, the reasons which prevented the said support. The articles of war specify, that Courts of Enquiry shall not give their opinion on the merits of any case; excepting they shall be specially thereto required.—This seems to be one of the cases in which an opinion is requisite; you will therefore please, Sir, to take the opinion of the Court on all and every of the points above specified, and convey the same to me when the Enquiry shall be closed.

Some evidences have been expected from Kentucky—whether they will attend or not I cannot inform the Court; but the principal officers of the Militia, who served in the army of General Harmar, have had notice, that the Court would meet this day.—I have heard from none of them, excepting Lieutenant Colonel Trotter, who writes to me that his attendance is doubtful—that Colonel Hall is gone to the atlantic States, and he believes Colonel M'Mullen likewise.”

Brigadier General Harmar being called upon for his Evidences, furnished the Court with a list of persons, whereupon the Court ordered them to be summoned to attend.—The Court then adjourned to meet at 3 o'clock P. M.

Three o'clock P. M.—The Court met agreeably to adjournment.

The Gentlemen who were summoned, not being ready to give in their evidences, the Court adjourned to meet at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning.

SEPTEMBER 16th.—The Court met agreeably to adjournment, and Major Ferguson being called in and sworn, deposed as followeth:—That, some time about the 15th July, it was determined to carry on an expedition against the Miami villages. One thousand militia from Kentucky, and five hundred from Pennsylvania, with what could be collected of the 1st United States regiment, and one company of artillery, was to form the army. The militia from Kentucky began to assemble at Fort Washington about the middle of September; those were very ill equipped, being almost destitute of camp kettles and axes; nor could a supply of these essential articles be procured. Their arms were generally very bad, and unfit for service—that as he was the commanding officer of artillery, they came under his inspection, in making what repairs the time would permit, and as a specimen of their badness, he informed the Court, that a rifle was brought to be repaired without a lock, and another without a stock. That he asked the owners what induced them to think, that those guns could be repaired at that time? and they gave him for answer, that they were told in Kentucky that all repairs would be made at Fort Washington. Many of the officers told him, that they had no idea of there being half the number of bad arms in the whole district of Kentucky, as was then in the hands of their men. As soon as the principal part of the Kentucky militia arrived, the General began to organize them; in this he had many difficulties to encounter.—Colonel Trotter aspired to the command, altho' Colonel Hardin was the eldest officer, and in this he was encouraged both by men and officers, who openly declared, unless Colonel Trotter commanded them, they would return home. After two or three days the business was settled, and they were formed into three battalions, under the command of Colonel Trotter, and Colonel Hardin had the command of all the militia. As soon as they were arranged, they were mustered; crossed the Ohio, and on the 26th, marched and encamped about ten miles from Fort Washington. The last of the Pennsylvania militia arrived on the 25th September.—These were equipped nearly as the Kentucky, but were worse armed, several were without any. The General ordered all the arms in store to be delivered to those who had none, and those whose guns could not be repaired.—Amongst the militia were a great many hardly able to bear arms, such as old infirm men, and young boys; they were not such as might be expected from a frontier country, viz. the smart active woodfman, well accustomed to arms, eager and alert to revenge the injuries done them, and their connections. No—there were a great number of them *substitutes*, who probably had never fired a gun. Major Paul, of Pennsylvania, told him, that many of his men were so awkward, that they could not take their gunlocks off to oil them, and put them on again, nor could they put in their flints so as to be useful, and even of such materials, the numbers came far short of what was ordered, as may be seen by the returns. That on the 31st September, the General, with the continental troops, marched from Fort Washington, to join Colonel Hardin, who had advanced into the country, for the sake of feed for the cattle, and to open the road for the artillery. On the 3d October, the whole army joined, and was arranged in order of march, encampment, and battle; these would appear by the orderly-book, with this difference in the encampment, the space they were to occupy, when in order of battle, which was to be open, was always to be filled up with their fires, nor was any intervals to be left between battalions. This was done to prevent in some measure the cattle and horses from getting out of camp; and the centinels round camp had orders not to let the cattle or horses pass out after dark, just before which time they were brought within their fires. Those precautions, aided by the care and industry of Mr. Wells and his assistants, succeeded well in preventing loss

of cattle—he was informed there were only two oxen lost from the time the whole army took up the line of march, until it returned to Fort Washington;—but he was sorry to say, it was not the case of the pack-horses, the generality of the people employed in that department were ignorant of their duty, indolent, and inactive; nor was it in the power of the General to remedy these defects.—The shortness of the time for assembling and organizing the army, put it out of his power to look about and select fit characters, he was of course obliged to take those that offered.—After he was in the woods it was out of his power to exchange them for better, and punishments for neglect of duty was out of the question. The principles upon which the horses were employed, induced the drivers who were chiefly parties in the business, to lose and otherwise destroy them, rather than return them to their owners; by this means the proprietors had a high appraisement paid them for their horses, and daily pay for services, until they were lost; by adding to the above the negligence of centinels, he accounted for the number of horses lost, which in his opinion it was out of General Harmar's power to prevent.—After the army was arranged, they continued their march without any material occurrence, until the 13th, when the horse fell in with two Indians, and took one of them prisoner, who informed that the Indians were not in force at the Maumee village.—This day they reached a place called the *French Store*, at which place a Frenchman, who was then with the General as a guide had lived. He informed that the village was about ten leagues distant. From this place, on the morning of the 14th Colonel Hardin was detached with 600 men, to endeavor to surprize the Miami village; the army moved at the same time, and although it rained the whole day, they continued their march with diligence until late.—The horse were ordered to be tied up this night, to enable the army to move early the next day, which it did. This diligence of the army on its march induced him to believe, the General was endeavoring to guard against any disaster that might happen to Colonel Hardin, which he was of opinion would have been in his power; for Colonel Hardin had not gained more than four miles of the army, on the first day's march.—On the 17th, the army arrived at the Miami village; here were evident signs of the enemy having quitted the place in the greatest confusion. Indian dogs and cows came into their camp this day, which induced to believe the families were not far off.—A party of 300 men, with three days provision, under the command of Colonel Trotter, was ordered as he understood, to examine the country around their camp, but contrary to the General's orders returned the same evening.—This conduct of the Colonel's, did not meet the General's approbation, and Colonel Hardin, anxious for the character of his countrymen, wished to have the command of the same detachment for the remaining two days, which was given him.—This command marched on the morning of the 19th, and was the same day shamefully defeated.—Colonel Hardin told him that the number which attacked him, did not exceed 150, and that had his people fought, or even made a shew of forming to fight, he was certain the Indians would have run. But on the Indians firing, which was at a great distance, the militia ran, numbers throwing away their arms, nor could he ever rally them; Major Ray confirmed the same. He did not know what influenced the detachment on the 21st. But from the enemy being flushed with success on the 19th; it became necessary if in his power to give them a check, to prevent the army from being harrassed on its return; which they might have done; will readily be granted by every one who has the least knowledge of the Indians, and an army encumbered with cattle and pack-horses, much worn down; and altho' the detachment was not so fortunate, as was reasonably to have been expected, yet, he firmly believed it prevented the Savages from annoying their rear, as they never made their appearance after. With respect to supporting that detachment, which consisted of four hundred chosen troops, he always believed them superior to one hundred and fifty Indians, which was the greatest number as yet discovered, had it not been

for misconduct and disobedience of orders by the officers who were on the command. He understood that Major Ray's battalion had been advanced to cover them, which was as many as could possibly have been spared, taking into view, that those in camp could not be depended on, and many were without arms, having thrown them away. To support with the whole army, was impracticable; the pack-horses, being weak and greatly reduced in numbers. The artillery horses very much reduced, and unable to undergo much more fatigue, but at the certain loss of the artillery; as it was, they were obliged to send to Fort Washington for horses to assist in hauling it in. The march of the army was regular and well conducted, as was possible to be done with militia. With respect to the General's conduct, report says, that he was intoxicated all the campaign, and unable to execute the important duties of his station; he had mentioned his commanding the artillery, which was posted at the head of the centre column, and here the General chiefly was during the march, of course he had an opportunity of seeing, and being with him through the day; in the morning he received his orders from him, and when they halted to encamp, he chiefly pointed out the ground where the artillery should be posted; his duty called him often to his tent, before they marched in the morning, and after they halted in the evening, in short, had he been given to drunkenness, he had as good an opportunity of seeing it, as any other officer in the army.—Yet he declared, that from their leaving Fort Washington, until their return, he never saw General Harmar intoxicated, or so as to render him unfit for the execution of any duties.—In him, and his abilities, as an officer, he placed the greatest confidence, never doubting in his orders, but obeying with cheerfulness, being conscious they were the production of experience and sound judgment.

Question 1st. *By the Court.*—What were your reasons for thinking punishment for neglect of duty, out of the question?

Answer. The state of the army being such, that it obliged the General not to do any thing that would tend to irritate the militia.

Question. *By the Court.* Is it your opinion that the organization of the army was a judicious one, such a one as was well calculated for the security of the troops?

Answer. It is my opinion, that it was the most judicious organization that could be made, and calculated for the interest of the United States.

Question. *By the Court.* Is it your opinion, that the order of encampment was a judicious one, and, that the extreme parts were so disposed as were calculated to give security to the army and its appendages?

Answer. I think no better disposition could have been made.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think the order of battle calculated so as to have been easy of execution and easily formed?

Answer. I think it was the best that could have been formed, and well calculated for covering the appendages of the army.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you know the General's motives for making the detachments of the 14th, 19th and 21st October?

Answer. I do not know the General's motives for making the detachment of the 14th, but I suppose it was for the purpose of surprizing the *Maumee* village, as we had taken an Indian the day before, who gave us information, that the Indians were in great confusion there, and that they were not in force, and very much divided in their councils. We expected to surprize them before they separated.

Question. *By the Court.* What were the movements of the army after that detachment was made?

Answer. We continued our march next day until an express arrived to inform us that the Indians had evacuated the village, when we halted.

Question. *By the Court.* What was the distance between the main body and the detachment?

Answer. About four miles.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think that the army was within supporting distance when that detachment was made?

Answer. On the first day we were.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you know what induced the General to make the detachment of the 19th?

Answer. The day preceding that on which the detachment was made, Indian dogs and cattle came into our camp, which led us to believe the Indians were near us, more especially as they had left their village in such haste. I suppose it was for the purpose of examining the country around the camp. A detachment of 300 men under the command of Col. Trotter, with three days provision, was made on the 18th, with orders to continue out three days, but which nevertheless returned into camp the same evening. The General appeared displeased at their disobedience of orders; Col. Hardin wishing to retrieve the character of the militia, asked the General's permission to take out the same detachment on the 19th, which was granted.

Question. *By the Court.* What motives led Col. Hardin at such a distance as 15 miles from camp?

Answer. I understood that he got on the trails of the Indians, and that he had discovered an Indian on horseback, about one mile from where he fell in with their main body.

Question. *By the Court.* Upon hearing of the defeat of that detachment, did you understand that the General ordered any support?

Answer. I don't know that he did, the first intelligence of the defeat was brought us by those who were defeated, late in the evening.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you know the motives for the detachment of the 21st, either from the General himself or any of his confidential officers?

Answer. I do not know from the General, but it was my opinion, as well as that of other officers, that the defeat of the 19th had so panick struck the army, that had the Indians attacked on the retreat, it might have been lost, which induced the General to send the detachment in the rear.

Question. *By the Court.* Had the General ordered another detachment upon the ground, where the defeat of the 19th happened; do you think the Militia would have gone, or would they have mutinied?

Answer. I am rather inclined to think they would not have gone.

Question. *By the Court.* With respect to the general conduct of General Harmar in the course of the campaign, is it your opinion that it was judicious; and in every respect commendable?

Answer. I do think it was perfectly so; I have the greatest confidence in, and good opinion of his military abilities.

Captain *Strong* being sworn, deposed—That he knew of no circumstance during the whole campaign that could in his opinion, affect the military character of the General.—That the organization of the army, appeared to his judgment, extremely judicious, and such he believed was the general opinion of the officers.—That the order of march seemed to him no less judicious, and military in all parts—that the order of encampment and battle, met if he mistook not, with the approbation of every officer able to judge of it—that the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th and 21st October, appeared to him to be a question that could only be answered by the General, or perhaps by his confidential officers, or those more immediately attached to his person—that he had reason to believe, that those detachments were not properly supported, but it was his opinion at the same time, that the fault lay not with the General, who had given orders in each case, that were not complied with, at least until it was too late.

Question. *By the Court.* With respect to support in the action of the 21st, was there any support ordered that you know of?

Answer. I was present when the order was given to Major *Ray* to move with his battalion to support Major *Wyllys*.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you know what distance they marched for that purpose, or how long they were gone from the army?

Answer. I do not recollect perfectly how long, but I think it was not long.

Question. *By General Harmar.* Is it your opinion that the making the detachment under Major *Wyllys* was attended with good consequences to the army, or not?

Answer. I think it was attended with useful consequences to the army.

The Court then adjourned to 3 o'clock P. M.

Three o'clock P. M.—The Court having met agreeable to adjournment—

Lieutenant *Hartshorn* was sworn, and deposed—That he knew of no circumstances during the whole campaign that could in his opinion affect the military conduct of the General—that the organization of the army appeared to his judgment extremely judicious, and such he believed was the general opinion of the officers—that the order of march seemed to him no less judicious and military in all its parts—that the order of encampment and battle, met if he mistook not with the approbation of every officer able to judge of it—that the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th and 21st of October, appeared to him to be a question, that could only be answered by the General, and perhaps by his confidential officers, or those more immediately attached to his person—that as to the question of support, he had reason to believe the detachment was not properly supported, but it was his opinion at the same time, that the fault lays not with the General, who had given orders in each case, that was not complied with at least until it was too late.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you know, Sir, in the course of the campaign, from the time the army left Fort Washington, until its return to that place, any circumstance that could militate against the military character of the General?

Answer. I know of none.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you know of any unnecessary delays?

Answer. None at all, far from it, every thing was done to get forward the army.

Question. *By the Court.* Does any instance of inebriety in the General, come within your knowledge during the course of the campaign?

Answer. I know of none.

Question. *By the Court.* So far as you are a judge of the organization of the army, do you think it was proper and judicious?

Answer. So far as I could judge, I think it was extremely judicious.

Question. *By the Court.* Had you any conversation with the officers of the army on the subject of the organization of the army?

Answer. I had, and with those who I think were judges, who thought it to be very good.

Question. *By the Court.* Did the arrangement of march appear to be so connected, as to be able to support each other in case of attack?

Answer. I think it did, and seemed no less judicious and military in all its parts.

Question. *By the Court.* Did the extreme parts of the encampment appear to be so formed, as to be competent to cover the main body of the army in case of attack by the enemy?

Answer. Perfectly so.

Question. *By the Court.* Was you in the first engagement of the army?

Answer. I was in the action of the 19th October.

Question. *By the Court.* Was you in the detachment of the 14th?

Answer. I was not.

Question. *By the Court.* Did the order of battle on the 19th appear to you to be a judicious one?

- Answer. I think it was not a judicious one.
- Question. *By the Court.* Who was the officer who commanded the troops in that action?
- Answer. Colonel *Hardin*.
- Question. *By the Court.* In what manner did you attack the enemy, was it in columns, or did you display in any regular order?
- Answer. We were attacked in front of columns.
- Question. *By the Court.* When you were attacked, were you ordered to display, or form in any regular order?
- Answer. No.
- Question. *By the Court.* In what manner did you oppose the enemy when you were attacked?
- Answer. By endeavouring to form the line to charge them.
- Question. *By the Court.* What troops came within your notice that attempted to form when charged?
- Answer. Not more than 30 federal troops and 10 militia.
- Question. *By the Court.* How many militia had you?
- Answer. I don't know.
- Question. *By the Court.* What became of the rest of the militia?
- Answer. They gave way and ran.
- Question. Do you think that if the militia in that action had been properly formed and in time, that they would have been sufficient to have beat the enemy?
- Answer. They were.
- Question. *By the Court.* Do you know the motives for making the detachment on the 14th?
- Answer. It was supposed for the purpose of gaining the *Maumee* village before the Indians left it, as we were informed they were preparing to leave it.
- Question. *By the Court.* Is that your own opinion?
- Answer. It is, and was the general opinion in camp.
- Question. *By the Court.* What was the result of the action of the 19th, were the continental troops and the 10 militia defeated?
- Answer. They were cut to pieces except 6 or 7.
- Question. *By the Court.* Do you know from Head Quarters, or from any principal officers of the army, what were the motives for making the detachment of the 19th?
- Answer. It was for the purpose of overtaking a party of Indians, whose trails had been discovered.
- Question. *By the Court.* Was there any attempt made to support that detachment from the main body?
- Answer. Not that I know of.
- Question. *By the Court.* What was the distance between the main body of the army and the detachment attacked?
- Answer. Fourteen or fifteen miles.
- Question. *By the Court.* From the conduct of the militia, do you think that the General had a right to expect any great support from them, if he had been attacked?
- Answer. I don't think he had.
- Question. *By the Court.* Was you in the action of the 21st?
- Answer. I was not.
- Question. *By the Court.* Do you know the motives for making the detachment of the 21st?
- Answer. It was for the purpose of seeing if any Indians were in the village.
- Question. *By General Harmar.* Did you not think, that the detachment sent back under Major *Wyllis* competent to engage any body of the enemy?
- Answer. It was sufficient for any body of Indians in that country.

Question. *By General Harmar.* To what cause was it owing, that the detachment did not succeed so perfectly as I could have wished for?

Answer. Because they did not obey your orders, they did not march at the time they were directed.

Question. *By General Harmar.* Upon the first intelligence do you recollect any support I ordered?

Answer. I recollect you ordered a battalion, I think under Major *Ray*.

Ensign *Morgan* being sworn, deposed, as followeth—That as he did not join the army under the command of General Harmar until the 13th October, he was unacquainted with its progress until that time, when the army appeared in good order. As he was an ensign, and carried the standard every fourth or fifth day after his joining the army, he was frequently near the General, and always observed, as far as he could judge, the greatest propriety of conduct.—As to the organization of the army, the order of march, encampment and battle, they are perfectly explained in the general orders—As to the motives which influenced the General in sending out the different detachments of the 14th, 19th and 21st, he was unacquainted—the opinion he took up concerning the one of the 14th was, that the General finding the army discovered, resolved to make a push for the towns before they were abandoned, and as he could not do it with his whole army formed the detachment on the 14th under Colonel *Hardin*; the motive for the detachment on the 19th he was utterly unacquainted with, that of the 21st as he supposed, was to pick up any straggling Indians who might have come to the towns, to see what they had been about, but without an idea of the Indians being in force.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think that the party of militia that were attached to Major *Wyllis'* detachment, was sufficient to have defeated the Indians if they had done their duty?

Answer. If they had been together, I think they were.

Question. *By the Court.* What time did you return to the army from the action of the 21st?

Answer. About 5 o'clock P. M. The action commenced soon after day-light.

Question. *By the Court.* Did you see any thing of the detachment under Major *Ray* on your return?

Answer. I saw only a party 3 miles from camp, under Captain *Craig* that were going to our support.

Question. *By the Court.* What was the disposition of the militia after you returned to the army, were they well affected to the service and orderly?

Answer. I think they were very disorderly, and very inattentive to their duty, and some appearances of mutiny among them, with both officers and men, and turned out upon one occasion particularly, to oppose a punishment that had been ordered by the General.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you remember any thing of General *Harmar's* ordering his cannon to fire upon them?

Answer. I remember that General *Harmar* once said, that if the militia behaved again, in so scandalous a manner, that he would order his cannon to fire on them.

Ensign *Britt* being sworn, deposed—That with respect to the personal conduct of General *Harmar*, he knew that he was indefatigable in making arrangements for the execution of the plans which had been formed for the expedition; and he also knew that the difficulties were great which the General had to encounter in organizing the militia, and in endeavouring to establish that harmony, which was wanting in their commanding officers Colonels *Hardin* and *Trotter*; which he accomplished apparently to their satisfaction—that he was at all times diligent in attending to the conduct of the officers in the different departments of the army, and that he was always ready to attend to such occurrences, as were consequent to the same, and the

necessary exertions to have his orders carried into execution were not wanting ; but that there were great deficiencies on the part of the militia, either owing to the want of authority in some of their officers, or from their ignorance or inattention—that the generality of them, scarcely deserved the name of any thing like soldiers—that they were mostly *substitutes* for others, who had nothing to stimulate them to do their duty—that as to the dispositions for the order of march, form of encampment, and order of battle, they were matters which he being a young officer could say little about ; he presumed they would answer for themselves—that the General's motives for detaching Colonel *Hardin* on the 14th October when they were told they were but 10 leagues from the Indian towns, he supposed to be, from information they received by a prisoner who was taken on the 13th, that the Indians at the *Maumee* village were in great consternation and confusion, and the prospects were, they might be easily defeated if found in that situation—that in order to support this detachment, the horses of the army were ordered to be tied up at night, so that the whole army might be ready to march early in the morning, which was done accordingly, and that when Colonel *Hardin* reached the village, the main body was not more than 5 or 6 miles in his rear—that the detachment under Colonel *Trotter* was ordered to reconnoitre for 3 days the neighbourhood, to endeavour to find out the Savages, who had fled from their towns—that this party returned the evening of the same day they started, and next morning Colonel *Hardin* marched with the same party and fell in with the Indians—that an engagement ensued, in which he was routed, owing to the cowardly behaviour of the militia under his command—that the motives which he conceived led to detaching the party under Major *Wylls* on the 21st were, that the Indians having avoided engaging the whole army, would collect at their towns, and harass the rear and flanks, as much as possible on its return, and a stroke at them before they could assemble in large bodies, would prevent their doing it with much effect—that the party accordingly met with the Indians, and a battle followed in which numbers were killed on both sides—that the moment the news of this arrived in camp Major *Ray* with his battalion of Kentucky militia, was ordered to march to the support of Major *Wylls*, but that he did not proceed far before he returned.

Question. *By the Court.* Did you at any time in the course of the campaign perceive that General *Harmer* was intoxicated ?

Answer. I did not, I lived in the General's family and should have known it, had any thing of that kind happened.

Doctor *Allison* being sworn, deposed—That the organization of the army, the orders of march, encampment and battle, were questions which would be more amply answered by a reference to the orderly book, than they could be from the mere relation of an individual, or from any other official information—that as to the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th and 21st October, those were questions, which if answered at all, must be merely speculative opinions, which it was not always prudent to divulge, nor would they in his judgment, be admitted as evidence, or even perused by any tribunal, and therefore were nugatory, and as he had not the honour of being in the cabinet, it was utterly out of his power to give any other—that as soon as the news arrived of the misfortune of the third detachment, a reinforcement was immediately ordered by the General, but whether it actually set out, or what induced it to return, he could not say, or whether sufficiently strong, he did not conceive himself a judge. His situation as surgeon, prevented a minute attention to every, or indeed any of the arrangements of the army ; yet, as far as they came within his view, or knowledge, they were judicious and uniform, that every attention was paid to the army by the General in every situation, that every step was taken by him, that prudence and military knowledge could suggest, the circumstances of the army would permit, or that necessity required.

Lieutenant *Denny* being sworn, deposed—That General *Harmar* began his preparations for the campaign soon after the 15th July, and that every day was employed in the most industrious manner, that the calculations for provisions, horses and stores, were immediately made out, and orders given accordingly, that great exertions were used by Captain *Ferguson* to get in readiness the artillery, and military stores, and indeed every officer was busily engaged under the eye of the General, in fitting out necessary matter for the expedition, but particularly the Quarter-Master, not a moment's time appeared to be lost—15th and 16th September the Kentucky militia arrived, but instead of seeing active rifle-men, such as is supposed to inhabit the frontiers, they saw a parcel of men, young in the country, and totally unexperienced in the business they came upon, so much so, that many of them did not even know how to keep their arms in firing order, indeed their whole object seemed to be nothing more than to see the country, without rendering any service whatever. A great many of their guns wanted repairs, and as they could not put them in order, our artificers were obliged to be employed, a considerable number came without any guns at all—Kentucky seemed as if she wished to comply with the requisitions of Government, as ineffectually as possible, for it was evident that about two thirds of the men served only to swell their numbers—19th September a small detachment of Pennsylvania militia arrived, and the 25th of September Major *Doughty* with two companies of federal troops joined them from Muskingum—Governor *St. Clair* had arrived from New-York the 22d, and the remains of the Pennsylvania militia came on the 25th. The militia last mentioned were similar to the other, *too many substitutes*. The General lost no time in organizing them, tho' he met with many difficulties—the colonels were disputing for the command, and the one most popular was least intitled to it. The General's design was to reconcile all parties, which he accomplished after much trouble. The Kentuckians composed three battalions, under the Majors *Hall*, *M'Mullen* and *Ray*, with Lieutenant Colonel Commandant *Trotter* at their head. The Pennsylvanians were formed into one battalion under Lieutenant Colonel *Trumbley*, and Major *Paul*, the whole to be commanded by Colonel *John Hardin*, subject to the orders of General *Harmar*—That on the 26th September the militia marched on the rout towards the Indian towns—the 30th the General having got forward all the supplies that he expected, he moved out with the federal troops, formed into two small battalions under the immediate command of Major *Wyllys* and Major *Doughty*, together with Captain *Ferguson's* company of artillery, and three pieces of ordnance. On the 3d of October General *Harmar* joined the advanced troops early in the morning, the remaining part of the day was spent in forming the line of march, the order of encampment and battle, and explaining the same to the militia field officers. General *Harmar's* orders will shew the several formations. On the 4th the army took up the order of march as is described in the orders. On the 5th a reinforcement of horsemen, and mounted infantry joined from Kentucky. The dragoons were formed into two troops; the mounted rifle-men made a company, and this small battalion of light troops were put under the command of Major *Fontaine*. The whole of General *Harmar's* command then may be stated thus—

3 Battalions of Kentucky militia	}	1133
1 ditto Pennsylvania ditto		
1 ditto light troops mounted ditto		
2 ditto federal troops		320

Total 1453

The line of march was certainly one of the best that could be adopted, and great attention was paid to keep the officers with their commands in proper order, and the pack-horses, &c. as compact as possible. The order of encampment appeared to be well calculated, not only for defence, but to preserve

the horses and cattle from being lost; however, notwithstanding every precaution was taken, and repeated orders given to the horse-masters, to huddle well their horses, and directions to the officers and men not to suffer any to pass through the lines, many of them, owing to the carelessness of the militia, and the scarcity of food, (tho' great attention was paid in the choice of ground) broke loose and strayed thro' the lines after night, and even passed the chain of sentries which encircled the camp and were lost. Patrols of horsemen were ordered out every morning by day-light, to scour the neighbouring woods, and to bring in any horses that might have broke through the lines, and a standing order directed the pickets to turn out small parties, and drive in every horse. This was done he believed, to expedite the movement of the army. There was no less attention paid to securing the cattle, every evening when the army halted, the guard which was composed of a commissioned officer and thirty or thirty-five men, built a yard always within the chain of sentries, and sometimes in the square of encampment, and placed a sufficient number of sentries round the enclosure, which effectually preserved them, there was not more than two or three head lost during the whole of the campaign—On the 13th of October early in the morning a patrol of horsemen captured a Shawanee Indian—On the 14th October Colonel Hardin was detached with 600 light troops to push for the Miami village, he believed that this detachment was sent forward in consequence of the intelligence gained of the Shawanee prisoner, which was, that the Indians were clearing out as fast as possible, and that if they did not make more haste, the towns would be evacuated before their arrival. As it was impossible for the main body of the army, with all their train, to hasten their march much, the General thought proper to send on Colonel Hardin in hopes of taking a few, before they would all get off. This night the horses were all ordered to be tied up, that the army might start by day-light, on purpose to keep as near Colonel Hardin as possible, the distance to the Indian towns when the detachment marched a-head was about thirty-five miles—On the 15th every exertion was used to get forward the main body this day, they found that the advanced party had gained but very few miles—On the 16th in the evening met an express from Colonel Hardin who had got into the village, informing the General that the enemy had abandoned every place. On the 17th about noon, the army arrived at the Omee towns—On the 18th Col. Trotter was ordered out with three hundred men, militia and regulars, to reconnoitre the country, and to endeavour to make some discoveries of the enemy; he marched but a few miles, when his advanced horsemen came upon two Indians and killed them; the Colonel was contented with this victory and returned to camp. Colonel Hardin was displeas'd because Colonel Trotter did not execute his orders, and requested the General to give him the command of the party, it was granted, and accordingly Hardin marched next morning, but he believed he had not two thirds of his number when two miles from camp, for to his certain knowledge, many of the militia left him on the march and returned to their companies. Whether he knew it or not he could not tell, but that he proceeded on with a determination to trace some fresh signs of the enemy—he believed the plan was merely to gain some knowledge of the Savages. He at length came upon a party not exceeding one hundred, but was worsted, owing entirely as he was informed to the scandalous behaviour of the militia, many of whom never fired a shot, but ran off at the first noise of the Indians, and left the few regulars to be sacrificed, some of them never halted until they crossed the Ohio. The army in the mean time was employed burning and destroying the houses and corn, shifting their position from one town to another—that on the 21st of October the army having burned five villages, besides the capital town, and consumed or destroyed near twenty thousand bushels of corn in ears, took up the line of march on the rout back to Fort Washington and encamped about 8 miles from the ruins—that about nine o'clock P. M. the General ordered out 400 choice men, militia and regulars,

under the command of Major Wyllys to return to the towns, intending to surprize any parties, that might be assembled there, supposing that the Indians would collect to see how things were left. The General had felt the enemy, knew their strength, and calculated much upon the success of this enterprize—that it was the general opinion the force of the Savages was nothing equal to this detachment, and unless by some such means, there was no possibility of getting any advantage of them, however the best laid plan was in some measure defeated, by the disobedience of the militia, who ran in pursuit of small parties, and left Major Wyllys unsupported—the consequence was, that the Major with most part of the regulars were killed, and our loss was equal if not greater than the savages—that the intention of this detachment was evident to all the army, and would have answered the fullest expectations, provided a due obedience had been observed on the part of the militia—to provide against disobedience of orders was what he believed no one would think of, and had it not been the case the Major in his opinion might have returned crowned with laurels. That the main body waited for the return of this detachment but to their mortification about eleven o'clock A. M. of the 22d a fellow who ran back from the field, gave them information of Major Wyllys's misfortune—General Harmar immediately dispatched Major Ray with his battalion to the assistance of the parties, but the Major did not get the length, before he met Colonel Hardin returning to camp with his wounded. He was led to believe that about this time, the General lost the confidence he had in the militia, those of them among the dead, were of the best men, that the effective strength was very much reduced by sickness and otherways—the regular troops did not furnish more than two hundred they were in his opinion very insufficient, and he was also clearly of opinion, that had the enemy made an attack upon their camp that evening or the morning following, the militia were so panick struck that very few of them would have stood, the consequences that would have happened, stared every person with horror, the sick and wounded, and all the stores, artillery, &c. would have fallen a prey to the savages—that this was also the opinion of several of the principal officers who advised General Harmar of the danger of attempting to return to the towns, from the time it would take up, and the probability that the delay would give the savages time to collect from distant quarters. He observed that the 22d October was employed in fixing biers for the wounded, and in making repairs. He also observed that the frost had destroyed the food early on their march out and that the horses of the army were now become very much reduced, so much so, that it was utterly impossible for the main body to perform any thing rapidly, and to get back upon the road which they had so lately passed, was attended with difficulty, he said that the greatest attention was paid, the little army was kept compact, and vigilance was the word from all who had any reputation to lose—That the militia on their return began to be refractory, shewing great signs of a revolt, discharging their pieces in open defiance of the general orders, some of them however were detected and punished, which gave umbrage and was afterwards the cause of many ill-natured reports, spread without any foundation, to injure the General's reputation. He further observed that the army returned by slow marches, back to Fort Washington—That General Harmar's conduct during the campaign, was observed to be sober, steady, and attentive to the service, and as his duty required him to be frequently near the General, should certainly have discovered it, had he been at any time intoxicated, as has been reported. Every evening as duly as the army halted, the General made his remarks for that day, and issued orders for the movement and arrangements for the next, and every morning he was found among the first prepared for the field.

The Court adjourned to to-morrow morning 9 o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 18th, 9 o'clock, A. M.—The Court met agreeably to adjournment, and again adjourned to September 19th, at 3 o'clock P. M.

SEPTEMBER 19th, three o'clock P. M.—The Court having met again, adjourned to to-morrow morning 9 o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 20th.—The Court having met according to adjournment—

Major *Ziegler* being sworn, deposed,—That some time had elapsed before the different corps and battalions could be organized, on account of rank—the militia officers disputing for the command; and after a good deal of exertion by General Harmar, they commenced their march on the 30th September 1790. The militia under Colonel Hardin, having been sent on a few days before, and on the 3d October, they joined the militia, and took up their line of march, and encamped as mentioned in the General's orders. He observed that the orders of march and encampment, motions, &c. &c. were such as would have done honor to the first officers either in America or Europe. All necessary precautions were observed to gain the point General Harmar set out for. On the 14th October he was ordered to advance with Colonel Hardin commanding 50 rank and file of the federal troops, being part of six hundred men—at ten o'clock they took up their march, and before they left the ground the rest of the army was ordered to parade and follow them, which he remembered to have seen the army from an eminence, as he inclined towards the left, with the column to which he was attached. The 15th about three o'clock P. M. they arrived at the Miami villages, and at the same time Colonel Hardin sent an express to General Harmar, to inform him that the villages were evacuated. It was his opinion that the motives for this manœuvre was in consequence of a *Shewanuse* which they took a few days before, and who acquainted the General that the Indians were ready to move away, the army arrived the 17th—in the forenoon and that day as well as the rest they were all busy in destroying the Indian corn, &c. &c. He further observed that on the 18th Colonel Trotter was detached with three hundred men of militia, including thirty federal troops, but that the Colonel returned the same day without bringing any information, and that on the morning following, Colonel Hardin took command of the same party, and advanced to procure some knowledge of the enemy, and on his discovering the enemy those which were in the rear would not come up and support those engaged in front, and very few of those in front, stopped but ran and the militia fled in a shameful manner, and the few federal troops not supported, fell a sacrifice; the Major said that a serjeant of militia behaving very improper at that time, could not be bro't to trial, on account of a brother of his being a captain, and who made parties that would have been attended with bad consequences, should he be punished, as his brother declared he would raise some men, and bid defiance. That, on the 21st October 1790, after they had destroyed a great quantity of corn and five or six villages, they took up their line of march towards Fort Washington, and at night Major Wylls was detached with four hundred choice men, in hopes to surprize a body that might be at the ruins—this party was supposed to be sufficiently strong for any number of the enemy embodied. Major Wylls marched in three columns with intention to join with the right and left columns, at the Miami village, but that the column under the command of Major M'Mullen fell in with a small party of Indians, they followed them and disobeyed the orders of Major Wylls, in pursuing them and leaving the others unsupported, and so was the left wing, which would not have been if they had joined him, as he supposed it to be sufficiently strong for that party. He also remembered very well being on picket, or commanding one of the wings as captain *au Carrée*, when the first men arrived with the intelligence, that their party had gained ground—and at that very instant General Harmar ordered Major Ray with his battalion to the assistance of those engaged, lest that information should not prove true, but he went two miles or two and a half then meeting the scattered detachment, returned to the great surprize of General Harmar—that the success of the

detachment was defeated in a great measure by the militia running a-head, and leaving Major Wylls unsupported.—The army remained this day in dressing and fixing the wounded—the militia behaving so bad in several instances, destroyed every confidence the General had in them, otherwise he would have returned with the army, but as things were situated, it would have been running too great a hazard. The army returned back to Fort Washington, nothing appeared wanting on the part of the General, every attention was paid to the army to guard against surprize. The Major observed that there had been very injurious reports, spread about General Harmar, but if he was to be credited, he knew of nothing that could be alledged against him, or that could possibly injure his reputation, in any respect, the good of the service, appeared to be his constant study.

Question. *By the Court.* I think, Sir, you said that on the 15th at three o'clock P. M. you arrived at the Miami village, what did you do after your arrival there, were the militia in good order?

Answer. When we arrived we were very much fatigued, having marched twenty-eight miles that day, I directed that my own men should not go thirty yards from camp. The militia like a rabble strolled into the neighbouring villages, in parties of thirty or forty after plunder, such was the situation that one hundred and fifty Warriors might have beat us off the ground.

Question. *By the Court.* Did you see any desire in the militia to return to the ground where Major Wylls was defeated, or do you suppose they would have gone had they been ordered to go?

Answer. I suppose they would not have gone—they appeared to be panick struck.

Question. *By the Court.* Are you of opinion that the personal conduct of the General was regular, steady and tended to the good of the service?

Answer. Undoubtedly so, and very much to the credit of the General.

Question. *By the Court.* From your long knowledge of service do you think that from the complexion of the troops General Harmar had to organize, that the formation of the army was judicious?

Answer. I think it was.

Question. Do you think that the order of march and encampment, was calculated to secure every part of the army and its appendages?

Answer. Yes, very much so.

Question. *By the Court.* From your experience, do you think that the order of battle directed by General Harmar was judicious?

Answer. Yes, perfectly so.

Captain *Doyle* being sworn, deposed—That previous to the campaign going out last fall every day was employed in the most industrious manner—on the arrival of the Kentuckey militia they were all much disappointed, that instead of seeing complete rifle-men, many were armed with old muskets, much out of repair—the General immediately ordered them repaired with all expedition. He referred the Court as to the line of march, to the General's orderly book, and informed the Court, that the personal conduct of the General through the campaign was uniform and steady, and that had the General's orders been strictly obeyed, he was confident he must have come home with honour. As to what influenced the General to make detachments he could not say—he was in the detachment of the 14th October, and that the behaviour of the militia in that detachment, was very disgraceful, they ran from town to town in pursuit of plunder, contrary to orders, and on the arrival of General Harmar at the town two thirds of them dispersed in the same manner—the General ordered cannon to be fired, merely to collect them, and he at the same time harrangued the officers informing them of the ill-consequences of such conduct. That the General's not returning to the village after the ill-succes of the last detachment, he believed was owing to his not having confidence in his army. At that time there was a great rumour in camp, the general voice was for

returning, their horses were much worn down, and the militia shewed great signs of revolt. The reports that the militia circulated after their return home, and which was much to the prejudice of General Harmar, was he believed owing to the General's having a few of them punished for disobedience of orders, he thought it certain, that they had no grounds for their ill-natured reports, and that General Harmar would have been justifiable in arresting one or two of the most popular field-officers, and sending them home with disgrace—but a thing of that kind he observed would have broke up the army. He knew of no part of the General's conduct during the whole of the campaign, that could be censured, without it was shewing too much lenity to the militia, and thanking them for their conduct, when they merited punishment.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think that the sending the detachment under Major Wylls tended eventually to the preservation of the army?

Answer. I think the Indians would have harrassed us very much on our return if that detachment had not been made.

Question. *By General Harmar.* Did the enemy annoy the army at all after that detachment was made?

Answer. No they did not.

Question. *By General Harmar.* Did we see any Indians afterwards?

Answer. We did not.

Lieutenant *Sedam* being sworn, deposed—That he had the honour of serving under General Harmar last fall on a campaign against the Indians of the Maumee village, and that he saw nothing in his conduct, but what he thought was very proper, that relative to the organization of the army, he was but little acquainted, and therefore referred the Court to the General's orderly book—that he was entirely unacquainted with General Harmar's motives for sending out the different detachments, and if those detachments were not properly supported, it did not appear to him to be the fault of the General, for the militia were a poor set, and behaved very ill upon all occasions—that after the first action, he heard Major Paul of the Pennsylvania militia say—he hoped General Harmar would not put any confidence in them, for he was sure they would not fight.

Question. *By General Harmar.* When I was upon the return at *Chilicothée*, I ordered one of the militia to be whipped, I was informed that Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen said I had no right to punish them—did you hear me reprimand them for that conduct?

Answer. After the man was punished, I heard you say to Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen, that you would send them both home with disgrace, for their bad conduct.

Ensign *Armstrong* being sworn, deposed as follows—That the militia being ordered into battalions and organized in which he knew the General met with great difficulty—that the order of march and encampment could be better ascertained by a reference to the orderly book, than any thing he could add on the subject—that the conduct of the militia in every instance seemed calculated to obstruct every measure adopted by General Harmar—that the conduct of the General in every particular was perfectly consistent and uniform, and every step taken by him appeared to be the dictates of prudence and sobriety—that what induced the General to send out the detachments was wholly unknown to him, and therefore unanswerable by him.

Captain *Armstrong* being sworn, deposed—That on report being made to General Harmar, by Major M'Mullen and others, that the tracks of women and children had been seen on the route leading towards the Kickapoo towns, a North-west course, and supposing the enemy had left their families and baggage not far distant from camp, Gen. Harmar, on the morning of October 18th, detached Colonel Trotter, Colonel Hall, Major Ray, and Major M'Mullen, with thirty federal troops, the mounted infantry, part of the cavalry, and a detachment of militia, amounting in the whole to 300 men.—After they had



proceeded about one mile, the cavalry gave chase to an Indian, who was mounted; him they overtook and killed—before they returned to the column, a second one appeared, on which the four field officers left their commands, and pursued, leaving the troops near half an hour without any directions whatever.—The cavalry came across the second Indian, and after wounding one of their party, killed him also.—When the infantry came up to this place, they immediately fell into confusion, which he gained permission to leave them some distance on the road, where he formed an ambuscade.—After he had been some time at his station, a fellow on horseback came to him, who had lost the party in pursuit of the first Indian; he was much frightened, and said he had been pursued by fifty mounted Indians.—That on his telling this story to Colonel Trotter, notwithstanding his observations to him, he changed his route, marched in various directions until night, when he returned to camp.—That on their arrival in camp, General Harmar sent for him; and after answering him many questions, ordered one subaltern and twenty militia to join his command.—With those he crossed the river St. Joseph about ten at night, and with a guide proceeded to an Indian town, about two miles distant; where he continued with his party until morning of the 19th.—His party fired upon an Indian and retook from him two horses.—About nine o'clock he joined the remainder of the detachment under Colonel Hardin.—They marched on the route Colonel Trotter had pursued the day before, and after passing a morass about five miles distant, they came to where the enemy had encamped the day before.—Here they made a short halt, and the commanding officer disposed of the parties at a distance from each other; after a halt of half an hour, they were ordered to move on, and Captain Faulkner's company was left on the ground; the Colonel having neglected giving him orders to move on. After they had proceeded about three miles, they fell in with two Indians on foot, who threw off their packs, and the brush being thick, made their escape.—He then asked Colonel Hardin where Captain Faulkner was? He said he was lost, and then sent Major Fontaine with part of the cavalry in search of him, and moved on with the remainder of the troops.—That some time after he informed Colonel Hardin, a gun had fired in their front, which might be considered as an alarm gun, and that he saw where a horse had come down the road, and returned again; but the Colonel still moved on, giving no orders, nor making any arrangements for an attack.—That some time after he discovered the enemy's fires at a distance, and informed the Colonel, who replied, that they would not fight, and rode in front of the advance, until fired on from behind the fires; when he the Colonel retreated, and with him all the militia except nine, who continued with him, and were instantly killed, with twenty-four of the federal troops—that seeing his last man fall and being surrounded by the savages, he threw himself into a thicket and remained there three hours in day-light, during that time he had an opportunity of seeing the enemy pass and repass and conceived their numbers did not amount to one hundred men—that some were mounted, others armed with rifles, and the advance with tomahawks only—he was of opinion that had Colonel Trotter proceeded on the 18th agreeable to his orders, having killed the enemy's sentinels, they would have surprised their camp and with ease defeated them, or had Colonel Hardin arranged his troops, or made any military disposition on the 19th, that they would have gained a victory, their defeat he therefore ascribed to two causes, the un-officer-like conduct of Colonel Hardin (who he believed was a brave man) and the cowardly behaviour of the militia—many of them threw down their arms loaded, and he believed that none except the party under his command fired a gun. What he saw of the conduct of the militia on that day, and what he felt by being under the command of a man who wanted military talents, has caused him to determine, that he would not willingly fight with the one, or be commanded by the other. That he referred the Court to the orderly-book which pointed out the line of march, encampment and battle.

Question. *By the Court.* Are you clearly of opinion that if the militia had done their duty, they were fully competent to have defeated the Indians?

Answer. I think they were fully so.

Question. *By the Court.* According to your ideas, as an officer of experience was the formation and arrangement of the different corps of the army by General Harmar at the commencement of the expedition judicious?

Answer. I think they were.

Question. *By the Court.* Did the line of march appear to you to be a judicious one, calculated for the protection of the army in all its parts?

Answer. I think so.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think the mode of encampment was calculated both for defence and protection?

Answer. As much so as any one that could possibly be adopted.

Question. *By the Court.* What was your opinion of the General's order of battle?

Answer. I think it was a judicious one.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think that the making the detachment of the 21st was in its consequences useful to the return of the army?

Answer. I can judge from circumstances only that we were not harrassed by the enemy afterwards.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you know if any detachment was made for the purpose of supporting Major Wyllys?

Answer. As soon as information of the Major's misfortune arrived in camp, the General ordered all the troops under arms, but whether any detachment was made from them or not I don't know.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you suppose that if General Harmar had ordered the army back, the militia would have gone?

Answer. I am of opinion that if a serious attack had been made, that in fifteen minutes the militia would have deserted us and left the federal troops and artillery to be sacrificed.

Question. *By General Harmar.* Do you recollect the proceedings of the militia at *Chilicothée* on our return?

Answer. I recollect your saying to Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen, that you would post them in their country, for their un-soldier-like conduct and that they ought to be hanged.

Ensign *Shamburgh* being sworn, deposed—That the organization of the army under General Harmar was, as far as he was capable of judging in military affairs, exceedingly well—That the march, encampment and order of battle were also in his opinion very well planned—that he was not capable of judging of the motives, which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th and 21st October, but it was his opinion, at that time, that the General was apprehensive, that, as the Savages had been successful in the preceding engagements, they would harrass his army on his return, in consequence thereof he ordered the party commanded by Major Wyllys in order to check them, which he believed had its effect—he recollected that the different detachments sent out were numerous and he believed sufficient to fight such number of Indians as were then together, if the commanding officers thereof had taken more precaution, he had been told at the time that Major Ray was ordered to support Major Wyllys, but he could not determine whether that officer had obeyed his orders. He observed that the loss of so many pack-horses, was owing to the neglect of horse-masters, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the General on that head, it appeared to him as if they were parties concerned, and glad to lose their horses, because they had a very great appraisement for the same. He observed that he did duty in the ordnance department at that time, and had fifty pack-horses under his direction, which gave him an opportunity to know the negligence and incapacity of both horse-masters and drivers.

Question. *By General Harmar.* Do you think after the last detachment was

made under Major Wyllys and the remains of his party returned to camp, that the militia would have gone back if they had been ordered?

Answer. I think not.

Question. *By the Court.* Was the appearance of the militia after the action of the 21st orderly or disorderly?

Answer. Very disorderly.

Question. *By the Court.* Was there any particular cause ascribed that you heard of for their disorderly conduct?

Answer. Not that I know of, the militia both officers and men seemed determined to go home, and said frequently that ten federal regiments should not keep them.

Question. *By the Court.* Did you observe whether the militia were as well treated as the federal troops?

Answer. Perfectly the same.

Ensign *Gaines* (who was captain of horse in General Harmar's expedition) being sworn, deposed—That on the expedition he was almost every evening at General Harmar's tent until the 24th October, when he was detached forwards to Fort Washington, and that during the whole time he did not see General Harmar in the least intoxicated with liquor, but that on the contrary the General conducted the army in a manner which in his estimation did him great honour. He further observed, that he had served on a number of expeditions against the Savages, undertaken by the militia of Kentucky, and that he never saw in any of them, the like good order and military arrangement which accompanied General Harmar's expedition—he also observed that the people in Kentucky never alledged any charge against General Harmar, until Colonel John Hardin had acquitted himself, before a Board of Enquiry of several charges exhibited against him, respecting his conduct on that expedition—that the populace finding nothing they could say to the prejudice of the Colonel would be believed, levelled their malice at General Harmar. He did not conceive that any thing would have been said against the General in that country, if a Baptist preacher's son who resides there had not been whipped in the army for disobedience of orders.

Question. *By the Court.* I think you say you have been in several expeditions against the Indians—did the militia who were with General Harmar conduct better or worse, than those in other expeditions?

Answer. Much better, Sir.

Question. *By the Court.* Was you in the action of the 19th?

Answer. I was.

Question. *By the Court.* Is it your opinion, that if the militia had been properly arranged in that action, and would have fought, that they would have been sufficient to have defeated the Indians?

Answer. Yes—for it appeared to me that the Indians were surprized—that if Colonel Trotter on the preceding day had not returned, he most certainly must have been in their camp, and completely defeated them; for I had taken two of their spies the day before, which appeared to be the only two they had out.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think that if General Harmar had ordered the army back, after the action of the 21st, that the militia would have gone?

Answer. They would not have gone willingly. I think in that case there would have been danger of mutiny. When the militia of Major Wyllys' detachment were ordered to march, they appeared to be unwilling to go, and some were so much so—as to cry.

Question. *By the Court.* Is it your opinion, that the movement of the detachment under Major Wyllys, had a good effect in securing the army from being attacked and harrassed on its return?

Answer. I think it had a very good effect.

Question. *By the Court.* Did the Indians ever attack you afterwards?

Answer. Not while I continued with the army.

Captain *Asheton* being sworn, deposed—That the organization of General Harmar's army was a source of trouble and difficulty, arising from disputes among the militia officers for precedency; but when effected, was in all its parts systematical.—That the organization of the army, the order of march, encampment, and battle, when duly considered, cannot fail to raise the General in the estimation of every military man.—That it had been safely reported, that the General was in a state of intoxication nearly the whole of the campaign. This he asserted to be a malicious falsehood; and he averred, that his personal conduct, during that time will ever do him honour.—He said the motives which influenced the detachments of the 14th, 19th and 21st October, could only be accounted for by the General himself: but he supposed, that the detachment under Col. Hardin, was sent in consequence of information gained from a prisoner taken on the morning of the 13th, and from a Frenchman employed as a guide, who reported, that it was something more than half a day's ride from a place called the French Store (at which place the army encamped the night of the 13th) to the Maumee villages.—This detachment was supported by the whole army, and moved off the ground at the same time with as much rapidity as possible, and arrived at the villages on the 17th, where the army encamped. On the morning of the 18th, I mounted guard in front of the encampment. In the course of that day, I was informed that a detachment of 300 men was ordered out under Colonel Trotter, with three days provision, with orders to scour the country; but they returned the same evening to camp, without effecting any thing. Colonel Hardin, disgusted at the conduct of Colonel Trotter, and anxious to retrieve the lost honour of his countrymen, solicited the same command, which was granted. He marched on the morning of the 19th, while he was yet on guard, and was defeated the same day by the Indians.—He could not say what influenced the General to send out a detachment on the 21st, but he observed that the Indians were flushed with success in the action of the 19th.—That it had become necessary to give them a sudden check, in order to prevent the army from being harrassed on its return; and that if this was the General's intention, he was fully persuaded it had it's desired effect. On the 21st, the army marched eight miles from the Maumee villages on it's return; late that night a corps of 340 militia, and sixty of the federal troops under the command of Major Wyllys, were detached, that they might gain the vicinity of the Maumee villages before morning, and surprize any Indians who might be found there. The detachment marched in three columns, the federal troops in the centre, at the head of which he was posted, with Major Wyllys and Colonel Hardin in his front—the militia formed the columns to the right and left. From several delays, occasioned by the militia's halting, they did not reach the banks of the *Omee* till some time after sun rise. The spies then discovered the enemy, and reported to Major Wyllys, who halted the federal troops, and moved the militia on some distance in front, where he gave his orders and plan of attack to the several commanding officers of corps—those orders were not communicated to him—that Major Wyllys reserved the command of the federal troops to himself. Major Hall with his battalion was directed to take a circuitous route round the bend of the *Omee* river, cross the Pickaway Fort (or St. Mary's) which brought him directly in the rear of the enemy, and there wait until the attack should commence with Major M'Mullen's battalion, Major Fontaine's cavalry, and Major Wyllys with the federal troops, who all crossed the *Omee* at, and near the common fording place. After the attack commenced, the troops were by no means to separate, but were to embody, or the battalions to support each other as circumstances required. From this disposition it appeared evident, that it was the intention of Major Wyllys to surround the enemy, and that if Colonel Hall, who had gained his ground undiscovered, had not wantonly disobeyed his orders, by firing on a single Indian, the surprize must have been complete. The Indians then fled with precipitation, the battalions of militia pursuing in different directions. Major Fontaine made a

charge upon a small party of Savages; he fell the first fire, and his troops dispersed. The federal troops who were then left unsupported, became an easy sacrifice to much the largest party of Indians that had been seen that day. It was his opinion that the misfortunes of that day, were owing to the separation of the troops, and disobedience of orders. After the federal troops were defeated, and the firing in all quarters nearly ceased, Colonel Hall and Major M'Mullen, with their battalions, met in the town, and after discharging, cleaning and fresh loading their arms, which took up about half an hour, proceeded to join the army unmolested. He was convinced that the detachment, if it had been kept embodied, was sufficient to have answered the fullest expectations of the General, and needed no support; but that he was informed a battalion under Major Ray, was ordered out for that purpose.

Question. *By the Court.* Is it your opinion, that if the General had ordered the army back, that the militia would have gone?

Answer. I do not think they would.

Lieutenant *Kersey* being sworn, deposed—That when the militia arrived at Fort Washington, they were formed into battalions and properly organized. He knew that General Harmar had a great deal of difficulty to get them arranged; their arms and accoutrements were in very bad order. He wished to refer the Court to the General's orderly book for information relative to the order of march. In his opinion General Harmar's conduct was uniform, steady, and sober during the whole expedition. He was also of opinion, that the detachment of the 14th, was in consequence of information received from a prisoner, taken the morning before, which was, that the enemy were running away; and the detachment of the 19th, was to gain some knowledge of them, and the detachment of the 21st, was to surprize and take advantage of them; which in his opinion would have happened, had the militia attended to the directions and plan laid down for that enterprize. He observed that the reduced state of the pack-horses, notwithstanding every attention was paid to secure and keep them in good condition, rendered it impossible for the army to take any advantage of the enemy.—The militia had proved that they were not to be depended upon; their dastardly behaviour in three instances, destroyed every confidence the General had in them. He therefore determined to return, and not to hazard another engagement unless the enemy came in reach of the main body. That the army took up the march to return to Fort Washington, and it was with great difficulty that the General kept them together until they arrived there.

Question. *By the Court.* From your knowledge of service, is it your opinion that the organization of the army was judicious?

Answer. I think it was.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think that all the movements of the army were so connected, as to be able to sustain each other in case of attack by the enemy?

Answer. I think they were.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you think, that through the course of the campaign, the General's conduct was open and decisive throughout?

Answer. I think it was.

Question. *By the Court.* Was the conduct of the militia tolerably regular, on their advance towards the Maumee towns?

Answer. It was more regular than it was on the return; but it was very irregular.

Question. *By the Court.* Do you suppose that it was necessary to make the detachment of the 21st, in order to prevent the Indians harrassing the army on its return?

Answer. I think it was, and for that purpose.

Question. *By the Court.* If the General had ordered the army to return to the towns, after Major Wylls's misfortune, would the militia have gone?

Answer. I think they would not—they would have mutinied.

Question. *By the Court.* Was the army harrassed by the Indians after the 21st on its return?

Answer. Not to my knowledge, I believe there was not one seen.

The Court adjourned to meet at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning.

SEPTEMBER 21st.—The Court met according to adjournment.

Major *Heart* was sworn, and deposed—That General *Harmar's* conduct on his expedition in October 1790, was at all times steady, calm, and deliberate, and was always attentive to the arrangements and applications made to him, and to the informations given, as far as came under his observation—that he was often at his quarters and marched in front of the right column, which was generally within fifty yards of him—that the organization of the army being published in the daily orders, would speak for itself, he however never heard an individual find fault with it, during the campaign, or point out any defects, except in the commissary and pack-horse departments, and in those the execution, and not the arrangements were found fault with—that the order of march was in three columns, covered with front, rear and flank guards, which order was generally preserved, and as well executed, as could be expected with a body composed mostly of militia, and embarrassed with pack-horses—that the encampment was in a square with the baggage, horses, cattle and stores in center—guards were posted in such manner as to form a line of sentries round the whole, field officers appointed to dispose those guards, and to see duty well done, and they were so disposed as to prevent surprize, and had the horse department followed orders would have secured the horses—as they had not occasion to form the line of battle, he could not determine how it would have been executed, but it was simple, easy to be understood, and universally approved—With respect to making the detachments he had never been in council, and could only assign such motives as offered themselves at the time from a concurrence of circumstances—The detachment of the 14th he presumed at that time was made in consequence of information obtained from a prisoner, that the Indians were confused and distracted in their councils, and was designed to surprize them, prevent their concerting measures to unite, and attack them and not give them time to secure their provisions and property, and that the desired effect was answered, so far as to prevent their securing so much as they would otherways have done—The whole army was put in motion the moment the detachment moved off, and followed with as much rapidity as artillery and stores would admit of, to support the detachment—That the detachment of the 19th was made in consequence of repeated information of having discovered a trail of men, women, and children, and on the fullest assurance as he was then informed, that the detachment was adequate for attacking the party they were in quest of, a corps de reserve was ordered but never came up, it was dark before information was brought to the General that the party were defeated, and a support could not be sent that night—a detachment was ordered to march next morning, but for what purpose, he could not say.—The detachment of the 21st he had every reason to believe was made on the general system, viz. to find the enemy, and give them a check, to prevent their attacking and harrassing the army, on the retreat, and on that principle the detaching was inevitable—he did not know that any support was ordered, he was on the left, but he knew that the greater part of the detachment came in very soon after the intelligence of the defeat was brought, and it was too late for giving any assistance. He did not expect that the General would make a detachment to support them, after the repeated proofs that the militia would not stand, and he presumed the situation of the horses would not admit of returning with the army. He supposed the detachment calculated to cover itself, and doubtless would have happily succeeded, had the right and left columns obeyed the orders which it is said, Major *Wylls* had given. He knew of no one circumstance in the General's conduct during the expedition

which ought to injure his reputation, and tho' the misfortunes of the 21st were to be lamented, yet he believed the salvation of the remainder of the army, the baggage and stores, were due only to the making that detachment.

Question. *By the Court.* On the arrival of the troops in camp who were defeated on the 21st, do you think from the state of mind the militia were in, that if the General had ordered the army back the militia would have gone?

Answer. I do not know whether they would or not, but if they had gone, and not having any place to retreat to, I am of opinion they would have fled as soon as they were attacked and have left the federal troops to be sacrificed.

The Court then adjourned to to-morrow morning nine o'clock.

SEPTEMBER 22d.—The Court having met according to adjournment directed the Recorder to write the following letter to his Excellency General St. Clair.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Court of Enquiry now sitting in this place, to inform your Excellency that the Court have gone through the examination of all the witnesses, that have been adduced, and that those from Kentucky that were referred to in your Excellency's letter to the President of the Court have not appeared—the Court are now ready to close their proceedings, unless your Excellency has information of any further evidence being ready, of which the Court beg to be informed.

I have the honor to be,  
with the most perfect respect,  
your Excellency's

Fort Washington,  
September 22, 1791.

most obedient servant,

WINSLOW WARREN,  
*Recorder to the Court.*

*To his Excellency General St. Clair.*

To which letter his Excellency General St. Clair sent the following answer.

*Fort Washington, September 22, 1791.*

SIR,

YOU will please to inform the Court, that I know of no evidences here, other than those that have been before them, and that it is not probable those from Kentucky will come forwards, I therefore see no reason why the proceedings should not be closed.

I am, Sir,  
your very humble servant,

*Mr. Warren,*  
*Recorder to the Court of Enquiry.*

AR. ST. CLAIR.

Soon after the following letter was received.

SIR,

SINCE I wrote to you a moment ago, I have been informed that it is probable, more testimony will be offered to the Court in the course of this day. If the Court then have not already closed their proceedings, I wish they would be pleased to defer it until to-morrow morning, of which you please to inform them.

I am, Sir,  
your humble servant,

September 22, 1791.

AR. ST. CLAIR.

*Mr. Warren.*

To which the following answer was returned.

Fort Washington, September 22, 1791.

SIR,

I AM directed by the President of the Court of Enquiry, to inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the last letter with which you was pleased to honor them, they have adjourned, to meet to-morrow nine o'clock A. M.

I have the honor to be,

Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

WINSLOW WARREN.

*His Excellency General St. Clair.*

The Court then adjourned to September 23d, nine o'clock A. M.

SEPTEMBER 23d.—The Court met according to adjournment—and no further Evidences appearing, came to a resolution to close their proceedings.

The Court having deliberately considered the Evidence before them separately, and aggregately, are unanimous in the following opinion :

*First.* That the personal conduct of the said *Brigadier General Harmar*, was irreproachable.

*Second.* That the organization of the army, was calculated to support harmony, and give mutual confidence to the several parts.

*Third.* That the order of march (a copy of which is annexed to these proceedings) was perfectly adapted to the country through which the army had to pass.

*Fourth.* That the order of encampment and battle (plans of which are also subjoined) were judicious, and well calculated to give security to the camp, energy to the troops, in case of attack, and simple in it's execution.

*Fifth.* That there were just reasons for the detachments of the 14th and 19th of October; that the detachment of the 21st, was made on good principles, and had the designed effect of securing the return of the army, and preventing the enemy from harrassing their rear—That the General had ordered support for the said detachment in time, but that his orders were not properly executed—And that the conduct of the said *Brigadier General Josiah Harmar* merits high approbation.

RICHARD BUTLER, Major General,  
PRESIDENT.

Attest,

WINSLOW WARREN, Lieut. and Adjutant  
to 2d United States Regiment, Recorder }  
to the Court.

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
The Depositions No. 1, 2, 3, 4, have been handed in and read to the Court; they have thought proper to subjoin them to their proceedings for your Excellency's information.

# GENERAL ORDERS.

*Camp about thirty-one miles from Fort Washington, on the waters of the Little Miami,—October 3, 1790.*


AS the Army is now assembled, the following line of march is to be observed, viz.

## ORDER OF MARCH.




The following is the Order of Encampment.

# ORDER OF ENCAMPMENT.



The following is the Order of Battle.

# ORDER OF BATTLE.



## NUMBER I.

Territory of the United States, }  
 North-west of the River Ohio. }

CALEB WORLEY, of the county of Fayette, in the district of Kentucky, Lieutenant in Colonel Paterfon's battalion of Kentucky militia, maketh oath and faith——That this Deponent served as Lieutenant in a battalion of Kentucky militia, commanded by Major M'Mullen, on the late expedition undertaken against the Savages of the Omee towns—and that he, this Deponent had very frequent opportunities of seeing and conversing with Brigadier General Harmar, who commanded the whole forces so employed. And this Deponent saith, that he never did, to the best of his knowledge, see the said General Harmar in a state of intoxication, nor wanting in that duty and attention, which he owed to the safety and order of the troops under his command. And further saith not.

G. WORLEY.

SWORN the fifth day of May one thousand }  
 seven hundred and ninety-one, at Cin- }  
 cinnati in the county of Hamilton, before }  
 me George Turner, one of the judges in }  
 and over the territory aforesaid. }

G. TURNER.

## NUMBER II.

Territory of the United States, }  
 North-west of the River Ohio. }

JOHN THORP, superintendant of artificers in the army of the United States, now serving at Fort Washington in the county of Hamilton, maketh oath and faith, That he this deponent commanded the corps of Pioneers on the late expedition against the Omee towns under the command of Brigadier General Josiah Harmar ;—that during the whole march of the forces so under the said General Harmar's command, both advancing and returning, it appeared to him this deponent, that the said General conducted himself in a regular and truly military manner :—that the General's deportment was on all occasions no less regular, becoming and military, while in camp, than on the march, to the best of this deponent's knowledge and belief; and that, although it was a part of this deponent's duty to attend personally on the General early every morning, and also at the encampment every night, yet he this deponent does not remember that he ever perceived the said General Harmar in a state of intoxication during the whole expedition, but, on the contrary, verily believes, that he, the said General Harmar's conduct throughout the expedition, was marked with great sobriety and eminent vigilance.

JOHN THORP.

SWORN at Fort Washington aforesaid, the }  
 twenty-seventh day of April in the year }  
 of our Lord one thousand seven hundred }  
 and ninety-one, before me, one of the }  
 judges in and over the territory aforesaid. }

G. TURNER.

NUMBER III.

Territory of the United States }  
North-west of the River Ohio. } s.

WILLIAM WELLS, of the North-Bend in the county of Hamilton, Esquire, one of the judges of the common-pleas held in and for the said county, and superintendant of Commissary's stores during the late expedition against the Omee Savages, being duly sworn, maketh oath and faith as follows, that is to say: First this deponent, faith that the duties of his late appointment as superintendant aforefaid, required him to be about the person of the General commanding the troops on that expedition, every morning and night—and that the said commanding General (Josiah Harmar, Esquire) uniformly appeared to him this deponent in a state of sobriety competent to the transaction of any business pertaining to his station. And farther this deponent faith not.

WILLIAM WELLS.

SWORN at Cincinnati in the county of Hamilton, }  
and territory aforefaid, this nineteenth day of }  
May one thousand seven hundred and ninety- }  
one, before me George Turner, Esquire, one }  
of the judges in and over the said territory. }

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NUMBER IV.

The AFFIDAVIT of Colonel JOHN HARDIN, taken in consequence of a Court of Enquiry to be held at Fort Washington, respecting the conduct of Brigadier General Harmar, on the expedition against the Maumee Towns, in October 1790.

THIS deponent being first sworn, deposeth and faith,—That on his arrival with the Kentuckey militia at the mouth of Licking, he commenced an acquaintance with General Harmar, found from his conversation that he had the good of his country and the expedition very much at heart; business was carried on regular and with as much expedition as the nature of the case would admit. About the first of October we proceeded on our march: after the line of march was formed the General issued his orders regularly, and observed very strictly that they were executed; on our march there was an Indian prisoner taken, who gave information, that the Indians and French were repairing the old fort at the Maumee town, and that the Indians were not likely to get any of the neighbouring tribes to join them; this prisoner also informed us they did not know that General Harmar had any artillery: After receiving this information the General and this Deponent consulted upon the matter, and it was agreed to detach six hundred men, leaving all their heavy baggage and march rapidly to the towns, hoping that the enemy would fly to their fort provided the artillery was not discovered; and that six hundred rank and file would be sufficient to keep them in their fort until General Harmar arrived with the artillery and balance of the army. Accordingly when the General was informed by the guides, that they were within thirty or thirty-five miles of the towns, there was a detachment ordered to make ready with all possible expedition; those orders were so pleasing to the officers that they disputed who should go, and some cast lots in order to settle the dispute; this deponent being honoured with the command, left the General with his detachment, and saw him no more until he arrived at the Maumee village, which he thinks was about three or four days after he left him, during which time he heard no complaints of General Harmar. After the General's arrival at the Maumee village and the Indians all fled, he expressed a very great desire to make

his route by the Weaw towns on the Wabash; for this purpose there was a council ordered to be held, but before the council met, finding the Indians had stole the night before a number of the pack-horses and some of the light-horsemen's horses, there was a stop put to the business, and the thoughts of the route by the Weaw towns laid aside. There was an old French captive that was taken informed us the Indians were scattered in the woods, and were not able by any means to fight us, and that they had not got any assistance from other tribes; this induced this deponent to solicit the General for a command of about three or four hundred men, to range the woods for ten or twelve miles, which he granted, and ordered the three hundred men to be furnished with three days provisions, these orders were as pleasing to the officers and soldiers as the former; Colonel Trotter insisted he had been promised a command, and as it appeared this would be productive of something very clever, he wished to be indulged with the command of the detachment then ordered out, which was granted by the General, this deponent consenting thereto; Colonel Trotter marched on the morning of the 18th of October, equipt for a tour of two or three days, in order to hunt up Indian camps; he returned on the evening of the same day, at the time the General and the deponent was about fixing of guards in order to captivate any of the enemy that might come to steal horses: the General appeared much displeas'd with the conduct of Colonel Trotter and ordered the same party out again that evening, and for this deponent to go next morning and take charge of them; this deponent agreeable to the orders given, collected what he could of the party next morning, and after proceeding about ten miles fell in with a party of Indians, who began a very brisk fire on the detachment, who retired without making but very little resistance, notwithstanding all the exertions to prevent them:—this deponent when he returned to camp informed the General what had happened, that it was owing to the cowardly behaviour of the militia, and insisted on another party's being sent to the battle ground; the General informed this deponent he would let him know in the morning. Accordingly he told him that he had not compleated the object that he was ordered to do, and that if any thing should happen to prevent him, he should be reflect'd on, as he had been in possession of the towns so long and had not destroyed them, that he would first give orders for that purpose, and then he would be better able to judge what was best to be done; on the morning of the 20th orders were given for destroying of the towns, which was executed accordingly; at this time the men appeared more timid than before; the General told this deponent he thought it would not answer a good purpose to go to the battle ground, as the mens spirits appeared to be very low at the hearsay of so many men being killed, and that the sight of the mangled bodies would make them much more so, and the Indians if not able to fight us would be gone, and that he should give orders to take up the line of march to Fort Washington: accordingly on the morning of the 21st we left the towns and began our march for the mouth of Licking, in about eight or nine miles encamped. The night being very clear and the moon giving light, this deponent informed the General that he thought it would be a good opportunity to steal a march on the Indians, as he had reason to believe they returned to the towns as soon as they knew the army had left it. The General did not appear fond of sending a party back, but this deponent urged the matter informing the General that as he had been unfortunate the other day he wished to have it in his power to pick the militia and try it again, and at the same time endeavoured to account for the mens not fighting, and desired an opportunity to retrieve the credit of the militia; the General appeared not to be of opinion the enemy would return so soon, but told this deponent he might take about one hundred men and go back; this deponent replied he did not wish to go back with less than five or six hundred men; the General answered that the troops were very much fatigued, and that it would not answer any valuable purpose to send so many men; this deponent

then left the General; in about half an hour he was sent for, when the General informed him that he intended to send Major Wylls back with all the federal troops that could be spared, saying at the same time they were the men that would stand to the work, and that he wanted about one hundred of your best militia; after some conversation between the General and this deponent, the latter went to Major Wylls and told him he did not like his going back with so few men, the Major also thinking the number too few, wished this deponent to speak to the General on the subject, which was done; Major M'Mullen and Major Hall were then sent for and the design made known to them; they both appeared well pleased with the affair; it was then proposed what number of men would be sufficient, this deponent recommending from four to six hundred, they both concluded that four hundred men was fully sufficient; the General seemed perfectly satisfied that any number of troops that were thought adequate to the purpose should be ordered; accordingly four hundred men consisting of sixty regulars, three hundred foot militia and forty horsemen rank and file properly officered were ordered to be ready to march at midnight; this deponent was honored with the command of the militia. The troops marched agreeable to orders about two o'clock, and after proceeding to the towns they fell in with a party of Indians, a battle ensued (the result of which is generally known) as they returned, about one and a half miles before we got to camp, this deponent sent a horseman forward to inform the General what was done, and very shortly after he had dispatched this horseman, met Major Ray with about thirty men, who inform'd him there had come a horseman into camp, and had acquainted the General that the party was nearly all cut off, that the General had sent him with what men he could get out of the militia to meet what had escaped of the detachment, that those with him was all that would turn out; this deponent informed the Major otherwise and requested him to wait until Major M'Mullen, Major Hall, and Major Ormsby should come up, that they were but a small distance behind and he would go forward to the General. When this deponent arrived at camp and informed the General what was done he appeared to be well satisfied; he also asked the General if he would not send back another party to keep possession of the battle ground, he replied he would not divide his army any more, when this deponent insisted on the whole army's marching back (no person being present except the General, Major Doughty and this deponent) the General answered; you see the situation of the army, we are now scarcely able to move our baggage, it will take up three days to go and return to this place, we have no more forage for our horses, and if the Indians intend to collect, which he apprehended they would from their success on the 19th, it would give them a great opportunity; that they had got a very good scourging, and he would keep the army in perfect readiness to receive them should they think proper to follow, and finally concluded that under the present circumstances, it was best to move forward to Fort Washington, and if the Indians did follow he would make every exertion in his power to defeat their intentions; Major Doughty appeared perfectly to agree with the General in opinion. The bounds of the camp were made less; the army continued at the same camp until next morning, orders were given to march at the usual hour which was eight o'clock, during this time this deponent never heard any person express a desire to go back to the towns, except two soldiers of Major Ray's party by the names of Miller and Hammond. Next morning at the hour appointed to march the General moved with the front of the army and halted at a very small distance, litters not being ready for all the wounded; this deponent with the rear-guard and many others did not leave the camp until ten o'clock, when they moved on and joined the army, the whole then proceeded on towards Fort Washington, with as much regularity as was observed in going out, until we came to the old Chilacothy on little Miami, when a number of the militia contrary to orders fired off their guns, this deponent endeavoured to put a stop to such disorderly behaviour,

and commanded that those offenders that could be taken should be punished agreeable to general orders, and having caught a foldier himself in the very act of firing his gun, ordered a file of men to take him immediately and carry him to the six pounder, and for the drummer to tye him up and give him six lashes; this deponent was shortly after met by Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen, and a number of militia foldiers, who in an abrupt manner asked him by what authority he ordered that foldier whipt, he replied in support of general orders; on which a very warm dispute ensued between Colonel Trotter, Major M'Mullen and this deponent; the General being informed of what had happened came forward and gave Colonel Trotter and Major M'Mullen a very severe reprimand, ordered the federal troops to parade, and the drummer to do his duty, swearing he would risque his life in support of his orders, the man received the number of lashes ordered, and several that were confined were set at liberty; numbers of the militia seem'd much pleas'd with what was done; this intended mutiny being soon quash'd the army proceeded in good order to Fort Washington. When the army arrived at the mouth of Licking the General informed this deponent he had determined to arrest some of the militia officers, for their bad conduct and send them home with disgrace; but this deponent opposed his intention, alledging that it would be a disgrace to the whole militia, that he would perhaps stand in need of their assistance on some future occasion, and it would sour their minds and cause them to turn out with reluctance, and that his discharging them generally with honor perhaps would answer a better purpose, the General readily indulged the request of this deponent. This deponent further observes, that during the expedition he never heard officer nor foldier find fault or give the most distant hint of being displeas'd with the General's conduct in any respect, nor charge him with cowardice or drunkenness, and expected the General had given general satisfaction, and what more confirm'd his opinion, was after their arrival at Fort Washington the General invited all the field and some other officers to dine with him, amongst whom was Colonel Trotter, Major Doughty, Major Hall, and Major M'Mullen; dinner being over wine was introduced, the General stepping out on some occasion Major Hall propos'd drinking his health, it was unanimously agreed to, and with as much cheerfulness as any other health that was propos'd; this deponent continued at Fort Washington a few days after, and never heard any person speak a disrespectful word of General Harmar, or find fault in the least with his conduct whilst on the expedition. When this deponent returned home in Kentuckey, hearing such reports respecting the expedition was much amazed, but concluded it arose from a want of knowledge and proper information or from prejudice. This deponent further saith, that he looked on General Harmar to be a very brave and experienced officer. And further saith not.

JOHN HARDIN.

NELSON, } s.

THIS day came Colonel John Hardin before me a justice of the peace for said county, and made oath, that the above affidavit was just and true to the best of his knowledge, and subscribed his name in my presence. Given under my hand this fourteenth day of September one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one. JOHN CALDWELL.

I have read the above affidavit, and what comes within my knowledge of it, I know to be true, and the rest I believe to be true. Given under my hand this fifteenth of September one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one.

STEPHEN ORMSBY.

SWORN to before me a justice of the peace for Nelson county.

BENJAMIN FRYE.



