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FUNDING “NON-TRADITIONAL” MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE ALLURING MYTH OF A PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF THE PURSE

Colonel Richard D. Rosen

THE ARMED FORCES AS A MODEL EMPLOYER IS CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE SERVICE OF PROCESS ON MILITARY MEMBERS

Major Alan L. Cook

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 Since 1958, the *Military Law Review* has been published at The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. The *Military Law Review* provides a forum for those interested in military law to share the products of their experience and research and it is designed for use by military attorneys in connection with their official duties. Writings offered for publication should be of direct concern and import to military legal scholarship. Preference will be given to those writings having lasting value as reference material for the military lawyer. The *Military Law Review* encourages frank discussion of relevant legislative, administrative, and judicial developments.

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CITATION: This issue of the *Military Law Review* may be cited as 155 MIL. L. REV. (page number) (1998). Each issue is a complete, separately numbered volume.

POSTAL INFORMATION: The *Military Law Review* (ISSN 0026-4040) is published at The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army: Charlottesville, Virginia. Periodical postage is paid at Charlottesville, Virginia, and at additional mailing offices.
INDEXING:

* The primary Military Law Review indices are volume 81 (summer 1978) and volume 91 (winter 1981).

* Volume 81 included all writings in volumes 1 through 80, and replaced all previous Military Law Review indices.

* Volume 91 included writings in volumes 75 through 90 (excluding Volume 81), and replaces the volume indices in volumes 82 through 90.

* Volume 96 contains a cumulative index for volumes 92-96.

* Volume 101 contains a cumulative index for volumes 97-101.

* Volume 111 contains a cumulative index for volumes 102-111.

* Volume 121 contains a cumulative index for volumes 112-121.

* Volume 131 contains a cumulative index for volumes 122-131.

* Volume 141 contains a cumulative index for volumes 132-141.

* Volume 151 contains a cumulative index for volumes 142-151.

Military Law Review articles are also indexed in A Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and Government; Legal Contents (C.C.L.P.); Index to Legal Periodicals; Monthly Catalogue of United States Government Publications; Index to United States Government Periodicals; Legal Resources Index; three computerized databases—the Public Affairs Information Service, The Social Science Citation Index, and LEXIS—and other indexing services. Issues of the Military Law Review are reproduced on microfiche in Current United States Government Periodicals on Microfiche by Infodata International Inc., Suite 4602, 175 East Delaware Place, Chicago, Illinois 60611.
SUBMISSION OF WRITINGS: Articles, comments, recent development notes, and book reviews should be submitted typed in duplicate, double-spaced, to the Editor: Military Law Review, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1781. Authors also should submit electronic copies on 3 1/2 inch computer diskettes, preferably in Microsoft Word format.

Footnotes should be typed double-spaced, and numbered consecutively from the beginning to the end of a writing, not chapter by chapter. Citations should conform to The Bluebook, A Uniform System of Citation (16th ed. 1996), copyrighted by the Columbia, Harvard, and University of Pennsylvania Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal; and to Military Citation (TJAGSA 6th ed. 1997). Masculine pronouns appearing in the text will refer to both genders unless the context indicates another use.

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When a writing is accepted for publication, the Editor of the *Military Law Review* will provide a copy of the edited manuscript to the author for prepublication approval. Minor alterations may be made in subsequent stages of the publication process without the approval of the author.

Reprints of published writings are not available. Authors receive complimentary copies of the issues in which their writings appear. Additional copies usually are available in limited quantities. Authors may request additional copies from the Editor of the *Military Law Review*.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of recent back issues are available to Army legal offices in limited quantities from the Editor of the *Military Law Review*. Bound copies are not available and subscribers should make their own arrangements for binding if desired.

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FUNDING “NON-TRADITIONAL” MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE ALLURING MYTH OF A PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF THE PURSE

COLONEL RICHARD D. ROSEN

Every [military] undertaking must be, at least ought to be, regulated by the state of our Finances . . . ; without this disappointment, disgrace, and increase of debt will follow on our part; exultation and renewed hope, on that of the enemy.

December 1995: 20,000 U.S. troops join a 60,000-person NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia to enforce the terms of peace accords negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, the previous month. The military annex to the peace accords provides that a two-lane, all-weather road will be built through a Bosnian-controlled corridor between the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo and the Bosnian city of Gorazde. Existing roads between Sarajevo and Gorazde run through Bosnian Serb-held territory and are


unacceptable to the Bosnian government. The peace accords do not specify who is responsible for building the road, and NATO asks U.S. military forces to help with the construction, even though the road will be in the French IFOR sector. The first critical issue faced by military planners is determining what funding authority (if any) the United States can use to assist the construction effort.

- **September 1994:** The United States commits troops to Haiti as part of a multi-national force to restore the country's democratically elected government. Upon entering Haiti, U.S. officials find Haiti's government—including its judiciary—in disarray. The State Department asks the Department of Defense (DOD) to assist in rebuilding Haiti's judicial system. Military planners must first decide whether a proper source of funds exists for such a mission.

- **August 1994:** Thousands of Cuban refugees are detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay when the Clinton Administration reverses the United States' long-standing liberal immigration policy for Cuban asylum seekers. At Guantanamo: the Cubans join thousands of Haitian migrants already in detention. United States military personnel are tasked with caring for the migrants. In addition to other fiscal chal-

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6. NATO Chief to Seek U.S. Help on Bosnia Road Project in French Sector, Inside the Pentagon, Mar. 14, 1996.


lengths\textsuperscript{13} and keeping the peace in the migrant camps, military planners must find a lawful source of DOD funds from which to provide migrants with comfort items and recreational equipment, ranging from shoes to volleyballs.

I. Introduction

A. The Growing U.S. Involvement in “Non-Traditional” Operations

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States increasingly has committed its armed forces to so-called “non-traditional” missions, engaging in manifold operations “other than conventional battlefield warfare.”\textsuperscript{14} From major undertakings, such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, to minor engagements, such as the placement of military-to-military contact teams in Eastern Europe, such operations have become a “dominant claimant on military resources.”\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, these non-combat activities have become integral components of the strategy of peacetime engagement.\textsuperscript{16}

Several factors explain this growing involvement of America’s military in non-combat operations:

\textsuperscript{12} John F. Harris, \textit{At Guantanamo, Military Mission Is in Retreat: As Cuban Detainees Pour in, Refugee Accommodations Become Base’s All-Consuming Goal}, Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 1994, at A21.


\textsuperscript{14} JENNIFER M. TAW \& JOHN E. PETERS, OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY 2 (1995); Collin G. Shackelford, Jr., \textit{Military Operations Other Than War, Swords \& Plowshares}, Winter-Spring 1994, at 18; William Rosenau, \textit{Non-Traditional Missions \& the Future of the U.S. Military}, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 32 (1994) (“Congress, the military services, and civilian national security officials have come to view non-traditional missions as increasingly important activities for the armed forces.”); General John M. Shalikashvili, Remarks for the CARE 50th Anniversary Symposium (May 10, 1996), in 1 ARMY SPEECH FILE SERVICE 15, 16 (1997) (since Desert Storm, the military has conducted nearly forty operations).

\textsuperscript{15} CARL H. GROOTH, JR. \& DIANE T. BERLINER, PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY CRITERIA 1-1 (1993).

\textsuperscript{16} NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT \& ENLARGEMENT 11-12 (1996); NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 8-12 (1995). \textit{See also} ARMY VISION 2010, at 9 (1997) (“The frequency of demands for land forces will increase as the Army is called upon to support peacetime engagement activities . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS, at 13-1 (14 June 1993) [hereinafter FM 100-5] (“The Army’s primary focus is to fight and win the nation’s wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat.”).
First, since the end of the Cold War, ethnic, religious, cultural, and social antagonisms—which the superpowers had successfully suppressed—have suddenly exploded to the surface in a series of conflicts, frequently accompanied by enormous human suffering. According to General Shalikashvili.

Today, some three dozen ethnic, tribal or religious-based conflicts dot the globe. Our hopes for a new world order have been drowned in a seemingly endless disorder. Far from being the end of history, the end of the Cold War marked the rebirth of instability in many countries. The instability, in turn, has bred calamity, and calamity, in turn, has bred human tragedy.17

Second, the end of the superpower rivalry has both accommodated international intervention in such conflicts,18 and enabled the United States to commit forces to the operations on a scale that would have been unthinkable during the height of the Cold War.” “U.S. strategic interests are being defined more broadly than ever, to include not only the desire to foster democracy, but to secure ‘peace,’ human rights, and relief from suffering.”20 As a result, the U.S. military is no longer simply viewed as an instrument of deterrence; it is also deemed “a force for constructive change at home and abroad.”

Consequently, “non-traditional” operations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, have become the routine rather than the exception.22 And while the United States has tried to develop a rational policy for engaging in such operations, notably Presidential Decision

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20. Taw & Peters, supra note 14, at 2; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.

Directive 25 (PDD-25), which establishes criteria for committing forces to peace operations, it has not been wholly immune from the so-called “CNN Effect,” which impels intervention in conflicts where human misery and suffering receive widespread press coverage and resulting citizen outcry.

Third, armed forces—particularly the U.S. military—possess capabilities that make them uniquely suited to responding to humanitarian crises. These include “robust transportation; command, control, communications, and intelligence hardware; and a general capacity to operate independently in a wide variety of environments.” Thus, when disaster strikes, civic leaders traditionally turn to military establishments.

Finally, evolving notions of “humanitarian intervention” to halt human rights abuses or to restore democratic governments have undermined traditional concepts of national sovereignty, making military intrusions into the internal affairs of nations more palatable.

In practice, there are cases of internal repression in which states responsible for violations of human rights invoke sovereignty to shield their actions, and there are situations of highly destructive but essentially self-contained civil conflict. Under these circumstances some argue that in a world in which sovereignty is rapidly eroding, a state’s failure to protect internationally guaranteed human rights should now constitute grounds for intervention, regardless of whether international peace is threat-


25. Shackelford, supra note 14, at 19; see also Rosenau, supra note 14, at 33.


ened. More radical arguments assert the existence of an emerging norm of democratic governance, further justifying intervention by linking the existence of democratic regimes to reduced probabilities of war.28

While these newly emerging concepts of humanitarian intervention are not without their critics,29 their growing acceptance makes U.S. military involvement in such missions increasingly likely.

The military’s traditional role of preparing for and fighting the nation’s wars will undoubtedly continue to define defense budgets and funding mechanisms;30 however, America’s military also will find itself increasingly absorbed in operations unrelated to its core missions.

B. Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations

All non-combat operations are “non-traditional” in that “they diverge from a widely shared assumption about the central purpose of the military”—to apply violence.31 Admittedly, in this sense the term “non-traditional” is somewhat of a misnomer. “There are almost no conceivable

28. Kimberly Stanton, Pitfalls of Intervention: Sovereignty as a Foundation for Human Rights, 16 Harv. Int’l Rev. 14, 15 (1993). See, e.g., Tyagi, supra note 24, at 884: But an unrestricted reliance on sovereign consent cannot be allowed to arrest the growth of new international human law. It would be unfair to say that in the absence of consent of the host state the international community has no right to intervene to prevent apartheid, genocide, ecocide, starvation, deaths, or practices that shock the conscience of the international community.


30. See Samuel P. Huntington, Keynote: Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military, in Non-Combat Roles, supra note 22, at 6-7:

Throughout our history... [the] non-military uses of the armed forces have never served as the justification for the maintenance of the armed forces. The overall size, composition, organization, recruitment, equipment, and training of the armed forces have been justified by the needs of national security and the military missions, the combat missions, which the armed forces may have to perform.

roles for the American military in this new phase of national security that the American military have not performed in some earlier phase.32

For purposes of this article, however, “non-traditional” operations are those missions (or parts of missions) that—absent special statutory authority—are beyond the scope of traditional appropriations for the training and operations of the U.S. military;33 that is, they are operations that may not ordinarily be funded out of the operations and maintenance accounts (O&M) of DOD and the military services.34 Generally, they are operations entailing assistance to or peacetime engagement with other nations and

32. Huntington, supra note 30, at 5. See also Rosenau, supra note 14, at 39 (“[P]rior to World War II, . . . the military was employed to carry out a variety of challenging, often highly political tasks that no other institutions in American society were capable of performing.”); Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy & Policy 81 (1973) (describing how the U.S. Military Academy initially justified its existence by emphasizing civil engineering, rather than “strategic thought,” so that Army officers “could do useful work in peace”); Groth & Berliner, supra note 15, at 1-1 (“so-called non-traditional missions have been undertaken by the U.S. Military for many years”); Frederick C. Cunz, Dilemmas of Military Involvement in Humanitarian Relief, in Soldiers, Peacekeepers, supra note 26, at 1, 2 (noting the earliest recorded instances in which military personnel were employed to provide humanitarian assistance predate Alexander the Great); cf. Jim Miller, Operations Other Than War: A Historical Perspective, Military Police, Aug. 1994, at 4-5 (recounting 20th century instances of U.S. military involvement in domestic humanitarian operations).

33. In this regard, “non-traditional” operations are not co-extensive with military operations other than war (MOOTW); however, many operations described as MOOTW are “non-traditional.” See, e.g., National Military Strategy of the United States 8-12 (1995); The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, ch. 3 (16 June 1995); FM 100-5, supra note 16, at 13-4 to 13-8. Some MOOTW missions, such as strikes and raids, are combat operations and properly funded from O&M accounts.

34. The major appropriations provided in the DOD’s annual appropriations acts are Military Personnel (salaries); see, e.g., DOD Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Title I (1996) (part of the Omnibus Appropriations Act for 1997); Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, see, e.g., id. Title IV; Procurement, see, e.g., id. Title III; and Operations & Maintenance, see, e.g., id. Title II. Congress appropriates for military construction by separate act. See, e.g., Military Construction Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-196 (1996).

Operations and Maintenance funds are intended for such objects as training, exercises, deployments, and operating and maintaining installations. The Department of Defense’s appropriations acts (which permit specific sums of money to be taken from the Treasury) and authorization acts (which allow money to be appropriated) describe O&M funds as available for expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the operations and maintenance of the armed forces and other DOD activities and agencies. See, e.g., id.; National Defense Authorization Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 301, 110 Stat. 2475 (1996).
their militaries. Included are such activities as humanitarian assistance, foreign disaster relief, combined exercises, military-to-military contacts, foreign military education and training, and support of coalition partners during multilateral operations. One of the “most perplexing issues” faced in planning such operations is determining how to pay for them.35

While Congress controls federal spending through a variety of statutory mechanisms,36 three central principles govern the expenditure of appropriations: first, the expenditure must be for a lawful purpose;37 second, the obligation of funds must occur within the time limits applicable to the appropriation;38 and third, the expenditure must be within the amounts appropriated.39

The primary focus in determining funding options for “non-traditional” operations is the first central principle, which is embodied in the purpose statute. First enacted in 1809,40 the purpose statute confines the expenditure of public funds to the object or objects for which they were appropriated.41 The statute states simply that “[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.”42 The statute is a key means by which Congress exercises its constitutional control over the federal purse.43

35. Terry, supra note 23, at 128.
38. Id. § 1502(a).
39. Id. § 1341(a)(1)(A).
40. Act of March 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 535, see also 1 General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 4-2 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law]. An earlier version of the purpose statute appeared in 1797 as part of a measure for naval appropriations. Sponsored by Albert Gallatin, it provided that “sums shall be solely applied to the objects for which they are respectively appropriated.” 1 Stat. 508-09 (1797); see also 6 Annals of Cong. 2349 (1797). The provision was rejected the following year. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War: and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 Law & Contemporary Probs. 12, 17 n.19 (1976).
41. 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, supra note 40, at 4-2.
42. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a).
43. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7: “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law, . . .” See also Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343,1353 (1988) (quoting R. Berger, Executive Privilege 113 (1974)) (“[l]egislative supremacy over the public fisc implies ‘the right to specify how appropriated moneys shall be spent’ . . . .”) [hereinafter Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse].
When Congress makes a lump-sum appropriation, the agency may use the funds in the manner it deems proper, provided the use comports with the general purpose of the appropriation. Moreover, where the "appropriation is made for a particular object, by implication it confers authority to incur expenses which are necessary or proper or incident to the proper execution of the object . . . ." The expenditures must bear, however, a logical relationship to the appropriation charged.

Thus, an agency may not expend its appropriations in a manner not contemplated by Congress. This means that, unless otherwise authorized by statute, neither DOD nor the military services may use their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to pay for activities unrelated to the operation or maintenance of the armed forces. The problem posed by "non-traditional" missions is that they are, in significant part, unrelated to the actual cost of operating and maintaining the U.S. military. While costs associated with U.S. military participation in the operations may be payable as ordinary O&M expenses (e.g., transportation and food for U.S. forces), absent special statutory authority, other mission-essential costs generally may not (e.g., humanitarian supplies, support to coalition militaries).

How, then, does DOD fund such operations? Under what authority may it pay the costs of "non-traditional" missions? Over the last fifty years, acting under its constitutionally derived power over appropriation, Congress has enacted a potpourri of statutory authorities for "non-

44. 65 Comp. Gen. 800, 804 (1986).
47. See generally 1 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 40, at 4-2. Violation of the Purpose Statute does not necessarily trigger adverse consequences, provided other funds are available for the expenditure. Where, however, no other funds are authorized for the purpose in question (or those funds authorized have been exhausted), the expenditure constitutes a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), which carries criminal penalties. 31 U.S.C. § 1350. See 63 Comp. Gen. 422, 424 (1984).
traditional” operations, which are scattered through titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code and in various DOD and foreign operations authorization and appropriations acts.50

This crazy quilt of authorities does not, however, always furnish a basis for funding the “non-traditional” operations U.S. forces are called on to perform. The armed forces are increasingly asked to accomplish missions beyond the scope of existing funding authorities. Several examples are described at the beginning of this article. For this reason, perhaps the

49. See supra note 43. To the extent the U.S. role in an operation entails the donation, lease, or sale of U.S. military supplies and equipment, Congress also acts under its constitutional authority to dispose of federal property. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2: “The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”

50. By way of illustration, DOD has permanent statutory authority (assuming sufficient appropriations exist) to provide humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) in conjunction with military operations, 10 U.S.C. § 401; to transport humanitarian supplies either on a space-available or a fully funded basis, id. §§ 402, 2551; to furnish foreign disaster relief where necessary to prevent the loss of lives, id. § 404; to detail military personnel to western hemisphere governments to assist in military matters, id. § 712; to pay the travel and other expenses of Latin American officers and students to promote Latin American cooperation, id. § 1050; to pay travel expenses of defense personnel of developing countries to attend bilateral or multilateral conferences, id. § 1051; to pay the incremental expenses of developing countries participating in combined military exercises with U.S. forces or engaging in training with U.S. special forces, id. §§ 2010-2011; and to provide excess non-lethal equipment for humanitarian relief, id. § 2547. The Department of Defense also has limited contingency funds to meet unforeseen needs, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “CINC” Initiative Fund, 10 U.S.C. § 166a, which, among other things, allows the Chairman to provide combatant commands funds to carry out certain non-traditional operations.


The United Nations Participation Act (UNPA) allows the President to authorize support to U.N. operations not involving the employment of the armed forces under article VII of the U.N. Charter. This support includes the detail of up to 1000 military personnel and the provision of supplies, services, and equipment (preferably on a reimbursable basis). UNPA § 7, 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1 (1994); see also Exec. Order No. 10,206, 16 Fed. Reg. 529 (1951).
most difficult and time-consuming task confronting DOD lawyers involved in the planning and execution of military operations ("operational lawyers") is discerning a lawful (i.e., congressionally sanctioned) source of funds to accomplish the mission. Over the course of such operations, DOD lawyers may find congressional funding authority lacking for any one of several reasons. For example, given the proliferation of "non-traditional" operations and the novel roles U.S. forces are increasingly called upon to play, Congress may fail to envision a particular mission and to authorize or appropriate the funds required. Another example is that Congress may envision and authorize a particular mission, but not appropriate any money to accomplish it. Finally, Congress may envision a particular mission, but explicitly proscribe the expenditure of funds to accomplish it, usually because it opposes the particular operation.

What if no funding authority exists to perform a presidentially directed mission? What if Congress refuses to provide a statutory authority or declines to appropriate funds under an existing authority? What if it expressly proscribes the expenditure of appropriations for a particular mission? If the mission is deemed essential to national security, does the President have the power to...
ident have the inherent authority to direct expenditure of the necessary funds?

Basic high school civics teaches that the answer is "no." The traditionally accepted maxim is that Congress alone controls the "power of the purse," and that only Congress may permit the expenditure of money from the Treasury.54 Thus, absent Congress' consent, the President may not spend public funds.

In recent years, however, a number of commentators have questioned the exclusivity of Congress' power over the purse. Their arguments range from an asserted constitutional inability of Congress to delimit presidential discretion in foreign and military affairs through the appropriations process—either by riders on appropriations55 or by refusing to appropriate funds56—to the more radical contention that the President has an independent constitutional authority to spend money, particularly for military operations.57

54. E.g., ROLLIN BENNETT POSEY, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 82 (1965) ("Congress has sole power to determine the funds available each year for expenditure by the executive agencies."); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & JACK WALTER PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 464 (6th ed. 1966) ("[B]y far the greatest weapon of Congress in maintaining control over the executive branch is its power to appropriate money.").


To operational lawyers, the proposition that presidential spending authority exists independent of Congress is particularly alluring. During military operations, intense pressure exists to find fiscal tools—any fiscal tools—to accomplish the mission. The notion that either congressional inaction or congressionally prescribed prohibitions may be disregarded is indeed seductive. If the proposition is sustainable, it would greatly simplify the operational lawyer’s job, ensuring that, at least in situations the President deems essential to national security, funding authority will always be available.

The arguments of those who assert such authority have gradually filtered into the legal offices of the national security establishment. As a result, DOD operational lawyers and their agency counterparts on the other side of the Potomac have engaged in discussions over whether the President has the inherent power to spend money in the absence of an appropriation or in spite of an express limitation on spending authority.

Of course, it is one thing to advocate such a power in the pristine environment of the law review or the law school, and another to advise civilian and military decision-makers to rely on such authority for military operations. And while operational lawyers may have considered the proposition, they have not (in my experience) relied (at least entirely) on an independent presidential spending authority.

In preparing this article, I had hoped to identify a sound legal basis for advising military decision-makers to rely on an inherent presidential authority—at least when the President finds an operation essential to national security. Much to my chagrin, however, neither the Constitution nor the nation’s experience supports such a conclusion. Congress’ power to appropriate—while not plenary—is certainly exclusive,

This article examines arguments propounded in support of an independent presidential spending power, exploring whether they are sustainable in light of the Constitution’s text, the intent of the Constitution’s Founders, the body of custom developed under the Constitution, and the

decisions of the courts. It concludes that these arguments are incorrect: the President does not possess an independent power of the purse.

Finally, the article considers the President’s options when no statutory funding authority exists to sustain an operation and concludes that his choices are four-fold: (1) the President can seek congressional sanction for the operation; (2) the President can abandon the operation; (3) the President can direct the use of a reimbursable funding mechanism; or (4) if national security interests are sufficiently critical, the President can spend money in the absence of an appropriation and hope either that Congress ratifies the action or that he has adequate capital to withstand the resulting political maelstrom.

II. Arguments for an Independent Presidential Spending Authority

Arguments posited to support an independent presidential spending authority generally fall into two broad categories. First, there is the argument that Congress may not unduly fetter the President’s constitutional activities (usually foreign or military affairs) by imposing restrictions on appropriations or by refusing to appropriate the funds necessary to carry out the activities. Some who assert this position (but not all) also contend that when Congress — through the appropriations process — interferes with the President’s constitutional responsibilities, the President may lawfully expend the funds necessary to fulfill those responsibilities despite either the restrictions imposed or the absence of appropriations. Second, there is the even bolder argument that, apart from anything Congress may or may not do to obstruct the President’s constitutional activities, the President has an autonomous, constitutionally based authority to expend public moneys. In other words, presidential spending authority is not dependent upon the “constitutional misconduct” of Congress — it exists wholly independent of Congress.

As to the first argument, a number of commentators contend that Congress may not use its appropriations power to prevent the President from performing constitutionally mandated responsibilities, either by restrictive conditions on appropriations or by failing to appropriate at all. Just as Congress may not use its appropriations power to enact bills of attainder or to intrude upon the President’s power to grant pardons, “the appropri-
ations power cannot be invoked to legitimate a violation of a constitutional principle such as the doctrine of separation of powers.”60 Defining the President’s constitutional power over the nation’s foreign and military affairs broadly, these scholars seemingly deem suspect any congressional attempt to circumscribe, through the appropriations process, presidential discretion over foreign policy or the employment of the armed forces.61

To be sure, the views advanced are not monolithic. Some perceive Congress’ “power of the purse” to be narrower than others.62 Moreover, some commentators distinguish between a failure to appropriate funds for a particular object and the imposition of conditions on appropriations made.63

Finally, several who are critical of Congress’ attempt to dominate executive discretion through the appropriations process admittedly do not suggest a presidential spending authority independent of Congress. Even though they claim that Congress may not restrict the President’s exercise of his constitutional prerogatives through the appropriations process, they do not necessarily advocate presidential spending in the absence of appropriations or in violation of restrictions on appropriations, even when essential for the President to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities.64 The assertion of such independent authority is, however, certainly explicit or implicit in the arguments of many of these commentators.65 To the extent presidents assert the power to disregard unconstitutional laws, these arguments certainly serve as a predicate for presidential spending without congressional sanction.66

Regarding the second argument, a few commentators have boldly advocated the existence of a presidential authority to spend without congressional approbation, regardless of whether Congress has acted unconstitutionally. Denying that Congress’ power of the purse is exclusive, they discern an independent presidential spending power from the Constitution.

60. Moore, supra note 55, at 146; see also Emerson, supra note 55, at 33; Panel Discussion, The Appropriations Power, supra note 55, at 642 (Geoffrey Miller).
61. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 55, at 32-33; Bryan, supra note 56, at 597; Moore, supra note 55, at 146; Turner, supra note 55, at 120; Symposium, Executive Power, supra note 56, at 200-01 (Orrin Hatch); Panel Discussion, The Appropriations Power, supra note 55, at 630 (William Barr).
62. Compare LeBoeuf, supra note 55, at 485 (arguing Boland amendments constitutional), with Note, Beyond Institutional Competence, supra note 56, at 164 (arguing versions of the Boland amendment unconstitutional).
63. See LeBoeuf, supra note 55, at 475; Wallace, supra note 55, at 326.
Most notable is Gregory Sidak, who argues that the term “Appropriations made by Law” in the appropriations clause extends beyond laws simply enacted by Congress, but also encompasses appropriations made by the President under article II. To Sidak, “Appropriations made by Law” is not limited to legislation; the term only requires “legal authorization” for the expenditure of funds—“that is, [the expenditure] must be constrained by the rule of law, however defined.”

64. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 56, at 605; Moore, supra note 55, at 152-53 (advocating court challenges to unconstitutionally restrictive appropriations). In this regard, even the most ardent supporters of Congress’ appropriations power admit possible limits on Congress’ power to use appropriations to intrude upon “the independent constitutional activities” of the President. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings at the Commander in Chief, 80 Va. L. Rev. 833, 921-22 (1994) (discussing possible congressional restrictions on the presidential authority to rescue Americans) [hereinafter Raven-Hansen & Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings]; Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, supra note 43, at 1350-51 (“Congress is obligated to provide public funds for constitutionally mandated activities—both obligations imposed upon the government generally and independent constitutional activities of the President.”). But they do not espouse a presidential authority to spend money in the absence of an appropriation. Raven-Hansen & Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Storm, supra note 51, at 132 (“[T]wo constitutional wrongs do not make a right.”); Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, supra note 43, at 1351-52 (“[E]ven where the President believes that Congress has transgressed the Constitution by failing to provide funds for a particular activity, the President has no constitutional authority to draw funds from the Treasury to finance the activity.”).

65. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 55, at 33 (asserting that Congress may not use its appropriations power to restrict military operations): Turner, supra note 55, at 120 (defending presidential action in the face of the Boland amendments); Wallace, supra note 55, at 493 (advocating refusal of President—on a sparing basis—to abide by unconstitutional appropriations conditions); Panel Discussion, The Appropriations Power, supra note 55, at 654-56 (William Barr) (apparently asserting presidential authority to spend in spite of limits placed on appropriations); id. at 643,653 (Geoffrey Miller) (stating President may expend funds even in the absence of appropriations).

66. See LeBoeuf, supra note 55, at 493 (President should refuse to abide by funding limitations deemed unconstitutional); see generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 267-72 (1994); Wallace, supra note 55, at 493 (discussing presidential authority to refuse to execute unconstitutional statutes).

67. Sidak, supra note 57, at 1185: “The incurring of a charge against the Treasury in the course of performing each of those article II duties is lawful Executive action regardless of whether Congress has appropriated adequate funds for that purpose.”

68. Id. at 1170-71 (emphasis added); see also Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289, 344 n.263 (1995) (asserting Bivens awards should be payable without congressional action because they constitute “an appropriation made under the Constitution”).
Sidak contends that “[t]he assignment to the President of enumerated duties and prerogatives in article II implicitly confer[s] on the President the ability to have the funding necessary for him to carry out those duties and prerogatives.” In other words, the President cannot be made to rely just on those appropriations Congress offers. He writes:

The Constitution itself must give the President the ability to fund the exercise of his enumerated prerogatives, for otherwise the recurring statement in article II that the President “shall have Power” to perform certain explicit responsibilities would become meaningless whenever Congress refused him the necessary appropriation of funds.

Thus, Sidak concludes that the President must be permitted to spend “enough unappropriated funds to produce the minimally necessary level of public output required by the faithful performance of his article II duties or the reasonable exercise of his article II prerogatives.”

Another apparent proponent of an independent presidential spending authority is David Lewittes. While admitting Congress’ power to raise and support armies, Lewittes asserts that once Congress has collected money through its power to tax and has raised an Army, the President has absolute discretion in deciding how to use the forces at his disposal unfettered by congressional controls (including financial).

Once tax dollars are collected and soldiers are raised—except insofar as there is a constitutional limitation for the use of standing armies for a period of two years and a constitutionally delegated authority to Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces—Congress’ control over the men and money ceases and is placed fully in the hands of the President.

Lewittes argues that Congress has no constitutional authority to spend money; its “power of the purse” embodies only the authority to levy
taxes. He contends that Congress may not use this power of taxation to impede the President’s war powers. “Congress has a duty to make certain that the United States has sufficient funds to provide for the common defense . . . . It cannot, by failing to collect taxes necessary for national security, obstruct the President’s obligation to defend the nation.”

Whatever the ultimate boundaries of the spending authority under Lewittes’ hypothesis, it is clear that the President would be able to expend funds for any “non-traditional” operations deemed essential to national security regardless of the absence of congressional funding authority.

III. The Exclusive Congressional “Power of the Purse”

Although a tempting proposition to an operational lawyer, the notion of an independent presidential spending authority is inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Constitution’s Framers, and the country’s experience under the Constitution. While a theme for academic debate, it is certainly not a proposition to be relied on in finding funding options for military operations, particularly when expenditures in the absence of appropriations generally constitute violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, a criminal statute.

The Constitution’s text confers upon Congress exclusive power over the federal purse. Indeed, nothing in the text remotely suggests that Congress shares this power with either the executive or judicial branches of government. To the extent the text leaves any room for doubt, however, its “legislative history” does not. Those who drafted and ratified the Constitution clearly understood that, among the three branches of government, Congress alone would exercise the power of the purse. The historical context in which the Founding Fathers worked—particularly the previous century and a half of British, colonial, and state governmental experience—

73. Id. at 1158 (footnote omitted); see also Emerson, supra note 55, at 32: [O]nce Congress has decided how many personnel should be enlisted or what arms should be procured, the President may station those troops and position those weapons in such parts of the world as he determines essential to the national defense . . . without any geographical or time limitations imposed by Congress.

74. Lewittes, supra note 57, at 1156-57 n.313.

75. Id. at 1158.

and the Founders’ contemporaneous statements and debates lead to no other conclusion.

Finally, although presidents have, at times, spent money not appropriated by Congress, in the more than two centuries since the Constitution’s ratification, presidents, Congress, and the courts have steadfastly acknowledged the exclusivity of Congress’ appropriations authority. Practice under the Constitution has been compatible with both the text and the Founders’ intent. Even on those relatively rare occasions that presidents have spent funds without prior congressional approbation, they have always returned to Congress—hat in hand—seeking an appropriation to cover their expenditures.

A. The Constitutional Text

In considering the notion of an independent presidential spending authority, the natural starting point is the Constitution’s text. Those who espouse an independent presidential spending authority find no support for the proposition in the words of the Constitution itself. The Constitution does not grant Congress plenary power over the nation’s purse, in the sense that Congress’ appropriations authority is unrestricted. It does bestow upon Congress, however, an authority over appropriations that is exclusive of the coordinate branches of the government.

1. Congress

The Constitution’s only express boundaries on Congress’ appropriations power are the prohibitions against diminishing the salaries of federal judges and the President and the requirement that appropriations for the Army be limited to two years. The appropriations power is also subject to other restrictions found in the Constitution, such as the bill of attain-
der clause\textsuperscript{82} and the first amendment’s free speech\textsuperscript{83} and establishment\textsuperscript{84} clauses. These constitutional limitations on the appropriations power, however, only circumscribe congressional discretion over the expenditure of public funds. They do not shift spending authority to a coordinate branch of government.

Nor does the remainder of the constitutional text provide a foundation for an independent presidential spending power. The principal constitutional provision is the appropriations clause itself, which states: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . ."\textsuperscript{85} While the clause is not a source of congressional power — Congress’ power to spend is found elsewhere in the Constitution\textsuperscript{86}—it does, as Professor Stith points out, “affirmatively obligate Congress to exercise the power already in its possession.”\textsuperscript{87}

The appropriations clause conditions the expenditure of public funds on “Appropriations made by Law,” connoting that legislation is a prerequisite to federal spending. Sidak’s assertion that “Appropriations made by Law” means that expenditures need only be constrained by “the rule of law” cannot be squared with the plain language of the text. In every other instance in which the Constitution alludes to the making of laws, it does so in the context of legislative action,” and nothing in the Constitution implies that appropriations are any different. The Constitution requires that Congress approve appropriations using the same constitutional procedures followed in enacting any other statute.\textsuperscript{89}

Enacting laws is, of course, a legislative power,\textsuperscript{90} and the Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress alone.\textsuperscript{91} “[T]he President possesse[s] no independent law-making power.”\textsuperscript{92} By its commonly understood terms, then, the appropriations clause means that the President may not spend public funds for any purpose (including national security) unless Congress first passes a law permitting the expenditure.\textsuperscript{93} The clause belies

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Federal Communications Comm’n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
  \item \textsuperscript{85} U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, supra note 43, at 1348; see also Office of Personnel Mgt. v Richmond, 496 U.S. 414.435 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
\end{itemize}
the notion that the President may spend money without Congress’ approval.

The Constitution also provides Congress with authority to spend money—that is, the power to permit and regulate, by statute, the expenditure of public funds. As noted above, Congress’ spending power is not derived from the appropriations clause; rather, it is found elsewhere in the Constitution.\(^94\) In fact, while few dispute the existence of such congressional authority,\(^95\) disagreement does exist about the power’s constitutional underpinnings.

88. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“Congress may at any time by law make or alter . . . Regulations [enacted by the states for the selection of Senators].”); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (describing how a bill becomes a law); id. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (“Congress shall have the Power [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); id. art. II, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto law shall be passed.”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President . . . .”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (for crimes not committed within any state, “the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed”). See also id. art. VI, cl. 2, which makes the Constitution, “and the Laws of the United States made in Pursuance thereof,” and treaties “the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”


The conventional wisdom is that the spending power flows from the general welfare clause of the Constitution, which provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." In United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court held Congress' spending authority is necessarily coupled with the power to tax:

The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare. Funds in the Treasury as a result of taxation may be expended only through appropriation (Art. I, § 9, cl. 7). They can never accomplish the objects for which they were collected unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax. The necessary implication from the terms of the grant is that the public funds may be appropriated "to provide for the general welfare of the United States." These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used. The conclusion must be that they were intended to limit and define the granted power to raise and expend money.

93. See, e.g., Office of Personnel Mgt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990) ("Money may be paid out only through an appropriation made by law; in other words, the payment of money from the Treasury must be authorized by statute."); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) ("The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress."); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (The appropriations clause "means simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress."); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) (The President "cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United States, except expressly authorized by act of Congress."); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850) ("It is a well-known constitutional provision, that no money can be taken or drawn from the Treasury except under an appropriation made by Congress."); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978) ("[T]he Constitution expressly provides only one method—congressional enactment—for the appropriation of money.").

94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

95. But see Lewites, supra note 57, at 1156-57 n.313.


97. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

98. Id. at 65; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (per curiam); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); State v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989); Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 461 (1992).
Interpreted as being co-extensive with the Constitution’s general welfare clause, the scope of Congress’ spending power is potentially vast.\(^9\) An appropriation will pass constitutional muster, even if not used to secure an object listed in one of Congress’ enumerated powers (e.g., regulation of commerce, establishment of post offices and post roads),\(^10\) if the expenditure provides for the general welfare or common defense. Albeit consistent with the constitutional text, this expansive construction of the spending power was not preordained. The scope of the power was the subject of sharp debate from the time of the Constitution’s ratification,\(^11\) and was not finally resolved (by the Supreme Court at least) until the 1936 \textit{Butler} decision. Since then, however, Congress has used the power to secure ends it could not otherwise achieve through coercive legislation relying on one of its enumerated powers.\(^12\)

Although a distinct minority, some perceive that Congress’ authority to approve the expenditure of public funds flows from other constitutional provisions. For example, Professor Stith views the necessary and proper clause as being the source of congressional spending authority.\(^13\) Professor David Engdahl offers the fascinating proposition that Congress’ spending authority flows from the property clause,\(^14\) which, among other things, grants Congress the power to “dispose of . . . Property belonging to the United States . . .”\(^15\) The relative merits of the hypotheses about the general source of Congress’ spending power are beyond the scope of this article; the key is that the Constitution gives to Congress the power to spend.

\(^9\) Edward S. Corwin, \textit{The Spending Power of Congress—Apropos the Maternity Act}, 36 \textit{HARV. L. REV.} 548, 580 (1922-23): “We must conclude that into the ‘dread field’ of money expenditure the court may not ‘thrust its sickle’; that so far as this power goes, the ‘general welfare’ is what Congress finds it to be.”


I would ask those who reason thus, to define what ideas are included under the terms, to provide for the common defense and general welfare? Are these terms definite, and will they be understood in the same manner, and to apply to the same cases by everyone? No one will pretend they will. It will then be a matter of opinion, what tends to be the general welfare; and the Congress will be the only judges in the matter.

Finally, Congress’ spending authority also appears (at least implicitly) in several of its enumerated powers. For example, Congress has the powers to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” which enable Congress to appropriate funds required for the armed forces.

The constitutional text provides Congress an impressive array of powers over the public purse. Congress has the authority to direct the expenditure of public funds, whether from the general welfare clause, the necessary and proper clause, the property clause, or its enumerated powers (such as the army and navy clauses). Congress’ spending power is bracketed by key housekeeping provisions that secure the integrity of the appro-

102. This is especially true with respect to the states. Congress has used its spending power to induce desired state action by offering states money and placing conditions on their receipt of funds. The states have a choice of accepting the funds along with the conditions or refusing the money altogether. Importantly, the conditions imposed need not serve one of Congress’ other enumerated powers—the spending must only be for the “general welfare.” See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,206 (1987); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127,143 (1947); see generally Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 102 (“Congress may . . . spend federal funds for any purpose that can be thought to contribute to the general welfare, even though none of Congress’ delegated legislative powers encompasses the subject of the expenditure.”); Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 1109 (“[T]he spending power . . . is an independent grant of power to Congress, available for, but not restricted to, the implementation of its other powers.”); Aviam Soifer, Truisms That Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment & the Spending Power, 57 U. COLO. REV. 793,793-94 (1986) (“It is also a truism . . . that the power granted to Congress to spend for the general welfare extends beyond purposes explicitly mentioned elsewhere in the constitutional text.”).

103. See, e.g., Stith, Congress’ Power at the Purse, supra note 43, at 1348 (“Congress’ power to appropriate originates in article I, section 8. The concept of ‘necessary and proper’ legislation to carry out ‘all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States’ includes the power to spend public funds on authorized federal activities.”); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 77, at 591. This was also Madison’s view. See Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 17, 1830), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 493 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND]. Of course, if spending authority derives solely from the necessary and proper clause, Congress could only appropriate for objects essential to carrying out its enumerated powers or powers constitutionally vested in the other branches. It would not have the “free-wielding” authority to spend enjoyed under the “general welfare” clause.


105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see supra note 49.

106. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. The Constitution temporally limits appropriations for the Army to two years.

107. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
The appropriations process, the most important being the appropriations clause, which ensures public funds are not spent except as statutorily directed by Congress through the exercise of its spending power. 108

2. The President

By contrast, with respect to a presidential spending power, the constitutional text is absolutely silent. Nothing on the face of the document confers upon the President the power to appropriate money from the Treasury.

The Constitution arguably bestows broad powers on the President, particularly in the area of foreign and military affairs. He is the commander in chief of the Army and Navy, and of the militia (National Guard) when called into federal service; 109 he makes treaties, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; 110 he appoints ambassadors, consuls, and other public ministers, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; 111 he receives ambassadors and other public ministers; 112 and he faithfully executes the laws. 113 Missing from the catalogue of presidential powers, however, is the authority to spend money to carry out these constitutional activities. The Constitution does not provide the President a “necessary and proper” clause, entitling him to take all actions required to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. Indeed, the Constitution vests that responsibility in Congress. 114

Only article II’s vesting clause counsels caution in writing off too quickly the possibility of an autonomous presidential spending authority, and this is because the clause’s meaning is not entirely clear. 115 The vesting clause states that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.” 116 There has been considerable debate over whether

108. Another is the requirement that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
109. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
110. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
111. Id
112. Id. art. II, § 3.
113. Id.
114. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power to make all laws “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”) (emphasis added).
116. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
the clause affords the President any substantive powers or whether it is merely descriptive of his office.\textsuperscript{117} Regardless of the merits of that debate, however, the question at hand is whether (assuming the clause has substance) the “executive Power” includes the power to appropriate and spend public funds. Intuitively, the answer, of course, is no. Not only does the rest of the constitutional text fail to support such a conclusion, the notion that the power of the purse resides in the executive branch is incompatible with centuries of combined British and American experience. To the extent the clause is ambiguous, however, it remains for the next section to examine whether the Framers intended the nation’s executive power to include the power to spend.

The concept that the President enjoys an independent power to direct the expenditure of public funds is contrary to the text of the Constitution. Without exception, the Constitution’s spending provisions empower Congress, not the President, with this authority, and the appropriations clause unmistakably prohibits the President from drawing money from the Treasury for any purpose without prior congressional approval.

B. The Founders’ Understanding of the Power of the Purse

The constitutional text leaves little room for doubting the exclusivity of Congress’ power over the nation’s purse. To the extent questions remain, however, the Founding Fathers’ understanding of the spending power—as gleaned from their statements and debates as well as the historical context in which they worked—confirms this conclusion.

Over reliance on the intent or understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution is, of course, treacherous. Such intent is generally difficult to discern,\textsuperscript{118} and its relevance to the ultimate document is quite often enigmatic.\textsuperscript{119} Even the Framers themselves could not agree about the intended meaning of the constitutional text.\textsuperscript{120} These difficulties notwithstanding, the Founders’ writings, especially when considered in light of

\textsuperscript{117} For example, compare Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 91, at 1196-1200 (arguing “vesting” clause is a substantive grant of presidential power), with Martin S. Flaherty, \textit{The Most Dangerous Branch}, 105 \textit{Yale L.J.} 1725, 1788-92 (1996) (questioning substantive nature of “vesting” clause).

\textsuperscript{118} Youngstown Sheet \& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring): “Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”

their personal experience and the historical influences upon them, can shed light on the meaning of the Constitution’s text. This is particularly true with respect to the spending power, since the Founders uniformly recognized congressional primacy over the nation’s purse.

1. Historical Influences

Those who drafted and ratified the Constitution did not work in a vacuum. While they may have been driven in part by self-interest, the Founders were also unquestionably influenced by their personal political experiences—both before and after the Revolution—and by their knowledge of history, chiefly British and American.121

a. The British Experience

While the Founding Fathers considered the historical experience of a number of nations, they were affected principally by Great Britain.122 “The Americans who drafted and adopted the Constitution were overwhelmingly British by origin and were exposed continuously to British institutions and government.”123 Other than their own experience with colonial and state governments and under the Continental Congress and Articles of Confederation,124 the Founders took most of their lessons from the British experience.125

120. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT & THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS ix (1988). An early example is the “Pacificus-Helvidius” letters between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. The letters were triggered by President Washington’s 1793 neutrality proclamation in the war between France and Great Britain. At issue was Washington’s authority to declare and enforce neutrality without Congress’ approval. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 208-11; ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 111-15 (1976); Bruce Stein, Note, The Framers Intent & the Early Years & the Republic, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413,466-71 (1982). Many Americans, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, believed the country’s 1778 alliance with France was still in effect and obligated the United States to come to France’s aid. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 209; SOFAER, supra at 112-13; Stein, supra at 468,478; 15 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 64-65 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985). In response to the resulting public outcry, Hamilton justified the proclamation in a series of newspaper articles under the name “Pacificus.” He asserted that the Constitution bestowed upon the President extensive authority over foreign affairs. See, e.g., Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969). Responding at the urging of Jefferson and writing under the name “Helvidius,” Madison took a more circumscribed view of presidential power and argued for a dominant congressional role in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Helvidius No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), in 15 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 64-65 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985). Importantly, both Hamilton and Madison were members of the Constitutional Convention, yet were unable to agree about fundamental divisions of constitutional power.
The evolution of British representative democracy and the power of the purse are inextricably intertwined. English monarchs traditionally used Parliament as a means of raising revenues, usually to finance their military adventures. Over the centuries, British Parliaments began to use this revenue-raising authority to exact legislative concessions from the Crown, threatening to withhold funds if their demands were not met. Parliamentary insistence on a voice in governing the nation inevitably led to struggle with the monarchy, which was not eager to surrender its royal prerogatives. The struggle came to a head during the reign of the Stuart kings

121. See 1 WILLIAM M. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 13 (1974); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 52 (1981). The admonitions of Professor John Phillip Reid regarding reliance on history are illuminating: "History and precedent should not be confused. History is evidence, and precedent is authority; to mix the two can produce misleading distortions." JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 135 (1987). History can, however, "provide[] evidence of precedent and is one of the sources from which precedent is drawn, a source in which precedent and custom blend. History can also clarify precedent by illustrating the roots of legal doctrine that precedent supports." Id.; see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 124 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring & dissenting) ("History continues to be a wellspring of constitutional interpretation."); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.) ("[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic, living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking their words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.").

122. REVELEY, supra note 121, at 53.

123. SOFAER, supra note 120, at 6; see also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (most Framers were trained in English law and traditions).

124. SOFAER, supra note 120, at 15.

125. Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925) (Taft, C.J.) ("The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted."); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 468 (1888) ("The interpretation of the constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in light of its history."); John C. Yoo, The Continuation & Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding & the War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 170, 197 (1996) ("The English Constitution provides the starting point, for the Framers were Englishmen who consistently referred to the system of their former nation when they designed their own government."); see also ELIAS HUZAR, THE PURSE & THE SWORD 22 (1950); REVELEY, supra note 121, at 53; Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance & "Unconstitutional" Laws: Revising the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST'L L.Q. 865, 872 (1994); but cf. WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETE RRAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & THE POWER OF THE PURSE 11 (1994); SOFAER, supra note 120, at 6 (noting hazards of relying too heavily on British historical experience in divining Framers’ intent because of unsteady course of parliamentary power and the possible inaccuracy of the Framers’ understanding of British history).
in the 17th century. By the end of the century, the nation had suffered a protracted civil war, one king had lost his head, another had been deposed in a bloodless coup, and the supremacy of Parliament had been established. By the time of the American Revolution, Parliament’s dominance over the British public fisc was complete.126

(1) Early History: Magna Carta to the Tudors

The origins of parliamentary control of the purse and the concomitant limitations on the monarchy’s authority to raise and expend revenues are obscured by the mists of time. Some trace the beginnings of limited monarchical control over the purse to the Magna Carta.’’127 Included in the Charter was a limitation on the king’s authority to raise revenues without the consent of the “common council”:

No scutage or aid shall be imposed in our kingdom except by the common council of our kingdom, except for the ransoming of our person, for making our oldest son a knight, and for marrying our oldest daughter, and for these purposes it shall be only a reasonable aid; in the same way it shall be done concerning the aids of the city of London.128

Of course, the barons who forced King John to accede to the Charter at Runnymede Meadow in the summer of 1215 and who comprised the “common council” were not Parliament—the first Parliament would not meet for another half century.129 Moreover, the original Charter lasted only sixty-six days. Pope Innocent III decreed that the confrontation leading to the Charter “violated the fundamental precept of feudal loyalty to a paramount lord,” and since King John was a vassal of the Holy See, it was also a “rebellion against the Church itself.”130 Consequently, Innocent declared the document “vile and wicked,” and forbade, upon pain of excommunication, its enforcement.131

127. See, e.g., Albert H. Putney, United States Constitutional History and Law 45-46 (1908); see generally Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 12.
129. Id. at 271
130. Id. at 101.
131. Id.
The Magna Carta was reissued and reconfirmed on several subsequent occasions, first by John’s son, Henry III, but the provision limiting monarchical levies was not included in later versions. Probably the most important legacy of the Magna Carta is its legend, rather than its contents, which dealt mainly with the parochial concerns of the barons who impelled its issuance. “[T]aken for granted and seldom studied” by the 14th century, the Magna Carta was revived in later centuries as “a rallying-point for those who suspected kings of placing themselves above the law.”

By the reign of King Edward I at the end of the 13th century, parliamentary government began to take root. Edward recognized the need for larger assemblies to raise necessary tax revenues for war. In 1297, Parliament demanded that Edward confirm the great charters in return for the substantial taxes needed to carry out military programs in Scotland and Flanders. The Charter of Confirmation, sealed on 25 November 1297, affirmed the exclusive right of Parliament to authorize or refuse taxes.
Edward I did not, however, surrender all of his sources of revenue. The Confirmation excluded "ancient aids and prises due and accustomed" revenues traditionally due the king without consent. Thus, provided the king could live within his means, he did not need Parliament. The king’s revenues usually fell short, however, in times of war.

It was not until the middle of the 14th century that Parliament authorized its first specific appropriation, to be used for war in Scotland, France, and Gascoign. In the beginning of the 15th century, the Commons asserted the right to consider all revenue bills before the Lords, although it was not able to secure its claim for another two hundred years.

When called, Parliament sometimes petitioned the king to address certain demands in consideration for needed revenue, and during the reign of Henry VI “submitted for his assent documents in the exact form of the enactments which they required.” By 1485, Parliament was a necessary party to the enactment of statutes, and the preambles to Acts from that time onward reflected the assent of the Commons and the Lords. Still, the king initiated most legislation and occasionally amended bills after they had passed through Parliament. Parliament did not play a major role in governing the nation, its major function being imposing taxes on the king’s subjects. By the reign of the Tudors, “parliamentary action was rather the medicine of the constitution than its daily food.” In the matter of finance, however, the Commons was becoming supreme.

138. 25 Edw. 1, c. 5, 6 (1297), cited in, Note, The War-Making Powers: The Intentions of the Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 B.U. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1970) [hereinafter Note, The Intentions & the Framers]; see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 12; Reid, supra note 121, at 138. The Parliament of 1295 ("the Model Parliament") split into different "houses," including "the commons," whose name derives from the fact "they were the ‘communities of communities,’ the representatives of the county courts and boroughs.” Clark, supra note 132, at 130-31.
139. 25 Edw. 1 c. 5, 6 (1297).
140. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 12.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; Note, The Intentions & the Framers, supra note 138, at 6.
144. Note, The Intentions & the Framers, supra note 138, at 7; see also 2 Hallam, supra note 126, at 247-51.
145. Clark, supra note 132, at 163-64.
147. Id.; see generally May, supra note 125, at 869-70.
The Tudors

Parliament matured as an institution under the Tudors; however, religious—rather than financial—issues were the principal catalyst. The monarchy turned to Parliament in its confrontation with the Roman Catholic Church. Working with Parliament, Henry VIII divorced his wife, Catherine, in the face of papal objection. As friction with Rome intensified, Henry VIII, with Parliament’s help, destroyed Rome’s authority over the English church, installing himself at its head. Parliament continued to support claims of monarchical supremacy over the Church during the reign of Henry VIII’s son, Edward VI, who “chose Parliament as the instrument of his action.”

On Edward’s death, Catherine’s daughter Mary, a Catholic, ascended the throne and attempted to restore the position of the Church. She recognized that “[o]nly in Parliament could the revolution be undone.” While Mary’s Parliament’s acceded to some of her demands, it refused to enact her program in its entirety. For example, Parliament repealed Edward VI’s ecclesiastical legislation, but it refused to reinstate papal authority, restore ecclesiastical property, or revive ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Importantly, by its involvement in the nation’s religious struggles, Parliament gained invaluable experience in the business of state, and was converted into a body “capable of asserting a necessary, and ultimately a dominant, place in the constitution.”

Although religious issues were largely responsible for Parliament’s increasing role in British government during the 16th century, Parliament’s control of the purse always loomed in the background. With rising prices and dwindling income, the Crown was rapidly approaching the day it would have to depend on Parliament for financial sustenance and the “loss of financial independence endangered the very foundation of personal rule . . . .”

149. See id. at 44; Note, The Intentions & the Framers, supra note 138, at 7.
150. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 269 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1765); KIER, supra note 146, at 162-63. This Parliament—known as the “Reformation Parliament”—sat in intervals from 1529 to 1536, “the longest duration yet recorded.” KIER, supra note 146, at 58.
151. KIER, supra note 146, at 72.
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id. at 76.
154. Id. at 136; see also GOUGH, supra note 135, at 67.
155. KIER, supra note 146, at 146; BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 13.
(3) The Stuarts

The causes of the 17th century struggle between Parliament and the Crown were multifaceted, but problems connected with royal revenue were at the root of the difficulties.\textsuperscript{157} Parliament’s power of the purse was the instrument by which it brought the monarchy to its knees, establishing for Britain a representative democracy.

James I’s problems with Parliament arose early in his reign. Crowned in 1603, he met his first Parliament in 1604 seeking needed revenue.\textsuperscript{158} Parliament not only refused James the money demanded, it also attacked revenues the Crown derived from non-parliamentary sources, further imperiling the King’s fiscal position.\textsuperscript{159}

To bolster his financial situation, James tried to exploit every type of revenue “to which any claim might be asserted[,]” such as the imposition of fines for encroaching on royal forests or for violating proclamations against building in London and rental income from Crown properties.\textsuperscript{160} Most profitable, however, were the duties on imports that James imposed in 1606 as a matter of royal prerogative.\textsuperscript{161} These duties were upheld by the Court of the Exchequer in \textit{Bates Case} in 1606,\textsuperscript{162} emboldening the King to increase this form of revenue, making it an important element in the fiscal system.\textsuperscript{163} While a successful source of revenue, the import duties further exacerbated tensions between Parliament and the Crown. Parliament naturally disliked anything that enabled the king to raise funds

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Kier, supra note 146, at 146.
\item See Kier, supra note 146, at 180; Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 13.
\item Clark, supra note 132, at 259.
\item Id. at 261-62; Kier, supra note 146, at 181.
\item Kier, supra note 146, at 181.
\item Id.; Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 13.
\item Kier, supra note 146, at 181-82. In the case, Chief Baron Fleming distinguished the import duty from a tax on a subject, for which parliamentary consent was required. He held that the duty was imposed upon the “goods of the Venetians” who sold them, and not “within the land, but only upon those which shall after be imported . . . .” J.P. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution 55 (2d ed. 1986). The court deemed the king’s authority to impose the duty to be absolute:

\begin{quote}
Whereas it is said that if the king may impose, he may impose any quantity what he pleases, true that this is to be referred to the wisdom of the king, who guideth all under God by his wisdom, and this is not to be disputed by a subject.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.}
\item Clark, supra note 132, at 261; Kier, supra note 146, at 182.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
without its consent, but its attempts to debate the impositions were met with royal hostility, and in 1610, James I dissolved his first Parliament.

Between 1610 and 1614, James’ financial situation deteriorated, and in 1614 he convened his second Parliament. James had no more luck with his second Parliament than with his first. Instead of granting the revenue the King requested, Parliament debated a bill against impositions. Seeing little likelihood of getting the money he required from Parliament, James I quickly dissolved his second Parliament.

Thereafter, James attempted to rely on his own resources rather than Parliament and, for a time, generally succeeded by reforming the royal household and public expenditures and by raising revenue through such means as customs duties and the sale of monopolies. Once called, however, Parliament was certain to be provoked by the manner in which James I sustained the government; thus, “the Crown’s new position . . . was secure only if the meeting of Parliament were indefinitely delayed.” James’ highly precarious situation could not survive the “greatest risk of any political system — the risk of war.”

The threat of war came from continental Europe in 1621 when James I became entangled in the politics surrounding the Thirty Years War. He called Parliament to provide an extraordinary grant of supply to conduct necessary military and diplomatic efforts. Instead, Parliament used the occasion to pay off old scores, including the King’s resort to “unparliamentary taxation.” Parliament also expanded the scope of the debate, venturing into areas that had been the exclusive province of the Crown. In

164. Clark, supra note 132, at 261.
166. Kier, supra note 146, at 183 (noting James made every effort to improve his finances, including the sale of the newly invented title of baronet); see generally Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Age of Expansion 219 (1968).
167. Clark, supra note 132, at 269; Kier, supra note 146, at 183; Kenyon, supra note 162, at 26.
168. Clark, supra note 132, at 269; Kenyon, supra note 162, at 26.
169. Clark, supra note 132, at 269. Kier indicates that this constituted the last opportunity for “amicably readjusting the financial relations of Crown and Parliament under peace-time conditions.” Kier, supra note 146, at 183.
170. Kier, supra note 146, at 183-84; see also Yoo, supra note 125, at 210.
171. Kier, supra note 146, at 184.
172. Id
173. Id at 185; Kenyon, supra note 162, at 26.
bitter exchanges with the King, Parliament asserted for the first time freedom of speech within the House—infuriating James, who tore out the offending parts of the House Journals—and challenged the Crown's discretion in other areas, including the conduct of foreign policy. Without getting the revenue he needed, James again dissolved Parliament.

James' last Parliament, called in 1624, was equally unaccommodating. Although he offered concessions, inviting Parliament to provide foreign policy advice, Parliament still refused to grant all of the revenue requested. Thus, James (and later his son, Charles I) was forced to resort to various extra-parliamentary means to raise the money required, including demands on maritime districts for ship-money, sales of Crown lands, and forced loans.

Parliament's struggle with the Crown came to a climax under the rule of Charles I, who proved even more inept at handling the Commons than his father. Managing to blunder into a war with two implacable enemies, Spain and France, Charles convened his first Parliament in 1628. Parliament insisted, however, on redress before supply, ultimately presenting the King with the Petition of Right, which, among other things, squarely addressed the King's resort to taxation without Parliament's consent:

They do therefore humbly pray your most excellent Majesty that no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax or such like charge without common consent by act of parliament, and that none be called to make answer or take such oath or to give attendance or be confined or otherwise molested or disquieted concerning the same or for refusal thereof.

175. Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original Intent & the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 529, 547 (1974); see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 13; Kier, supra note 146, at 186; Kenyon, supra note 162, at 26; Yoo, supra note 125, at 210.
176. Kier, supra note 146, at 188; Kenyon, supra note 162, at 27.
177. Kier, supra note 146, at 190.
179. Kier, supra note 146, at 192.
180. Petition of Right (1628), in Kenyon, supra note 162, at 70; see also Reid, supra note 121, at 139-40.
Needing revenues to pursue the war, Charles I assented to the Petition.\textsuperscript{181} The war soon ended, however, and Charles dissolved Parliament not to reconvene another for eleven years.\textsuperscript{182}

Charles was determined to rule without Parliament. To finance his government, he turned to various (now familiar) extra-parliamentary means, including import duties; sales of forest rights, royal properties, and monopolies; fees from compulsory knighthoods; and ship-money.\textsuperscript{183}

Of all forms of monarchical taxation, ship-money was the cause celebre. Ship-money was originally levied on seaport towns to support the naval forces that protected the towns’ maritime interests. Charles extended the tax to inland counties.\textsuperscript{184} A wealthy inland landlord, John Hampden, challenged the tax, refusing to pay it. As in Bates Case, the Court of the Exchequer, upheld the authority of the Crown to impose the tax under his prerogatives for national defense.\textsuperscript{185} In ruling for the Crown, one judge, Sir John Finch, used language uncomfortably similar to that used by advocates of an independent presidential spending power, asserting that Parliament could not, through its power of the purse, prevent the king from exercising his regal responsibilities:

The power of laying this charge is, by the policy and fundamental laws of this kingdom, solely invested in the King . . . . Acts of Parliament may take away flowers and ornaments of the crown.

\textsuperscript{181} Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 13; Kier, supra note 146, at 192.

\textsuperscript{182} Id. In dissolving Parliament, Charles I warned his subjects not to “get carried away” with the Petition of Right, reminding them they still owed obedience to the Crown:

Yet let no man hereby take the boldness to abuse that liberty, turning it into licentiousness; nor misinterpret the Petition [of Right] by perverting it to a lawless liberty, wantonly or forwardly, under that or any other colour, to resist lawful and necessary authority. For as we will maintain our subjects in their just liberties, so we do and will expect that they yield as much submission and duty to our royal prerogatives, and as ready obedience to our authority and commandments, as hath been promised to the greatest of our predecessors.

His Majesty’s Declaration to all his Loving Subjects, of Causes which moved him to Dissolve the last Parliament (Mar. 10, 1629), in Kenyon, supra note 162, at 73.

\textsuperscript{183} Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 14.

\textsuperscript{184} Id.; Clark, supra note 132, at 282; Kier, supra note 146, at 202; Putney, supra note 127, at 61; Yoo, supra note 125, at 210.

\textsuperscript{185} Case of Ship-Money Between the King & John Hampden (Hampden’s Case), in 3 Howell’s State Trials 825, 1224-27 (T.C. Hansard, London, 1809) [hereinafter 3 State Trials]; see also Clark, supra note 132, at 282-83; Kier, supra note 146, at 206. Hampden’s ship-tax assessment was 20 shillings. 3 State Trials at 856
but not the crown itself; they cannot bar succession. . . . No act of parliament can bar a king of his regality, as that no lands should hold him; or bar him of the allegiance of his subjects . . . therefore acts of parliament to take away his royal power in the defence of his kingdom are void . . . ; they are void acts of parliament, to bind the king not to command the subjects, their persons and goods, and I say their money too: for no acts of parliament make any difference.  

**Hampden’s Case** was to prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for the King because it produced an inevitable backlash once Parliament reconvened.

For Charles I, as for his father, war proved to be the insurmountable barrier to extra-parliamentary rule. In 1640, triggered by religious discord, Scotland rebelled and its army invaded England, forcing Charles to call parliament to raise needed supplies. On 3 April 1640, Parliament met and immediately made known that it considered the “Scottish invasion . . . less important than the invasion of English liberties in the name of Prerogative.” Parliament saw the Scottish war and Charles’ need for money as an opportunity to rectify grievances building during the past eleven years of extra-parliamentary rule,

In a speech to the Commons on 17 April 1640, John Pym, the House’s leader, outlined Parliament’s grievances. Dividing the grievances in three parts, Pym spoke out against wrongs committed by the Crown against the privileges and liberties of Parliament; wrongs in matters concerning religion; and wrongs in connection with unlawful taxation. Pym condemned in detail extra-parliamentary taxation, including import duties; sales of knighthoods, monopolies, and public nuisances; ship-money; and military charges and impositions upon counties. Parliament refused all supply until its grievances were addressed. The King dissolved Parliament on

186. 3 STATE TRIALS, supra note 185, at 1224, 1235.
187. Id. at 1254-55; see also KIER, supra note 146, at 206: “Their decision perhaps did the King more harm than good, opening up as it did a prospect of unlimited prerogative taxation on a plea of emergency which could never be rebutted.”
188. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 14; KIER, supra note 146, at 207; PUTNEY, supra note 127, at 62.
189. KIER, supra note 146, at 210; see also PUTNEY, supra note 127, at 63.
190. Pym’s speech on Grievances (Apr. 17, 1640), in KENYON, supra note 162, at 183-87. Capping the list of grievances was the demand that Parliament ought to be called once a year. Id at 188.
191. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 14; CLARK, supra note 132, at 287, KIER, supra note 146, at 210.
May 1640, three weeks after it had convened, thus ending the so-called “Short Parliament.”192

Charles’ efforts to fight Scotland without parliamentary supply proved disastrous. His sources of revenue had virtually “dried up,” and “[t]he army was unprovided, mutinous, and unreliable.”193 The Scottish invasion progressed with no effective force to stop it.194 Charles had no choice but to call Parliament again.

In November 1640, the famous “Long Parliament” convened. Because Charles desperately needed revenue to deal with the Scots, Parliament clearly had the upper hand, and it used it. “During its first session (1640-41) the Long Parliament dismantled . . . the personal rule of Charles I . . . .”196 Using its power of the purse as leverage, Parliament impeached two of the King’s advisors together with Sir John Finch and other judges in Hampden’s Case.197 It enacted the Triennial Act, which required that Parliament be summoned at least once every three years and circumscribed the king’s authority to prorogue or dissolve Parliament without the consent of both houses.198 Parliament also turned to the King’s extra-parliamentary taxation, prohibiting ship-money and customs duties without parliamentary grant, and reversing the Court of the Exchequer’s holding in Hampden’s Case.199 Charles had no choice but to accept all of the “measures thrust upon him by a unanimous opposition.”200 As Professors Banks and Raven-Hansen state: “capitalizing on national-security driven demands for money, Parliament forced Charles to sell prerogative rights in exchange for money grants.”201

192. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 14; CLARK, supra note 132, at 287; KIER, supra note 146, at 210.
193. CLARK, supra note 132, at 288; see also BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 14.
194. CLARK, supra note 132, at 288.
195. KIER, supra note 146, at 212.
196. TREVOR-ROPER, supra note 166, at 236.
197. 3 STATE TRIALS at 1262, 1299; KIER, supra note 146, at 213; Bestor, supra note 175, at 548.
198. 16 Car. I, c. 1 (1641), in KENYON, supra note 162, at 197-200.
199. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 14; CLARK, supra note 132, at 288; KIER, supra note 146, at 214.
200. KIER, supra note 146, at 214.
201. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 14; see also SOFAER, supra note 120, at 7; REVELEY, supra note 121, at 53.
Increasingly emboldened, the parliamentary majority eventually pushed the King too far. In late 1641, a sharply divided Parliament enacted the “Grand Remonstrance” on the state of the kingdom, demanding a parliamentary role in the selection of the King’s ministers and in affairs of the Church, demands to which the Crown would not accede.202 Charles responded in early 1642 with articles of impeachment against five leaders of the Commons, including John Pym.203 On 4 January 1642, Charles appeared at Westminster, with a posse in tow, to arrest the members. Forewarned about the King’s intentions, the members had earlier fled to London.204

From that point, events spiraled out of control. Amidst rising tension and civil disorder, Charles fled London on 10 January. Parliament demanded control of the militia out of fear “the armed forces might be used to intimidate the Commons.”205 When the King refused to surrender control of the armed forces, Parliament enacted the Militia Ordinance authorizing an army under parliamentary control.206 The country erupted into civil war between the Crown and Parliament, resulting in Charles’ military defeat in 1646 and his execution for treason on 30 January 1649.207

(4) Commonwealth, Restoration, the “Glorious Revolution,” & Beyond

By 1649, the parliamentary army held real power in England.208 Under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell, it established a military dictatorship and puritan oligarchy.209 The “Long Parliament” continued to sit, but

202. The Grand Remonstrance (1641), in Kenyon, supra note 162, at 201-17; see also id. at 181; Clark, supra note 132, at 291; Gough, supra note 135, at 77.
203. See The impeachment of Five Members (Jan. 3, 1642), in Kenyon, supra note 162, at 217-18. Among other things, Charles accused the members of “traitorously endeavor[ing] to subvert the law and government of the kingdom . . . ,” of making “foul aspersions” upon the king and his government, of alienating the affections of the king’s subjects, of attempting to cause the army to mutiny, of inviting a foreign power to invade England, and of levying war against the king.
204. Clark, supra note 132, at 292; Kenyon, supra note 162, at 182.
205. Bestor, supra note 175, at 594.
206. Militia Ordinance (Mar. 5, 1642), in Kenyon, supra note 162, at 219-20. By the Ordinance, Parliament appointed the lieutenants of the army, ordered them to suppress the rebellions and insurrections in the kingdom, and to answer to Parliament alone. Though the causes of the civil war were varied, “the precipitant of actual hostilities was the conflict over command of the militia.” Bestor, supra note 175, at 549-50 n.64.
207. Clark, supra note 132, at 303; Kier, supra note 146, at 222.
208. Kier, supra note 146, at 222.
209. Id.
in 1648, acting under Cromwell’s orders, the Army expelled a number of the King’s supporters, and the remaining remnant was called the “Rump.”210 The Rump promptly abolished the monarchy and the House of Lords and declared England a Commonwealth.211 In 1653, Cromwell dissolved the “Long Parliament,” thirteen years after it first convened.212

After Cromwell’s death in 1658, the Commonwealth was unable to sustain itself for long.213 On 4 April 1660, acting on suggestions conveyed from one of Cromwell’s generals, Charles II (son of the late King) issued the Declaration of Breda, which, subject to the approval of a free Parliament, declared a general pardon, freedom of conscience and conversation in matters of religion, and safeguards for property.214 On these terms, a new Parliament assembled on 25 April 1660, and Charles II entered London on 29 May.215

Charles II ascended the throne with Parliament’s consent and subject to the gains made by the Long Parliament through 1641.216 Parliament “possessed an indisputable sovereignty in legislation and taxation.”217 And while the Crown initially controlled the expenditure of revenue,218 its grasp on appropriations was growing tenuous. The revolutionary Long Parliament had exercised this power and many of its members who sat in the parliaments of Charles II no longer viewed the authority as sacrosanct.219 Indeed, the performance of English forces in the war against the Netherlands “awakened doubts as to the wisdom of entrusting the Crown with control of large sums,”220 and led to the enactment of an early form of purpose statute, the Commission for Public Accounts, by which the

210. Id.; Clark, supra note 132, at 303.
211. Id; supra note 132, at 304.
212. Id. at 308; Kier, supra note 146, at 225; Trevor-Roper, supra note 166, at 236.
213. Kenyon, supra note 162, at 305; Kier, supra note 146, at 228.
214. Declaration of Breda (Apr. 4, 1660), in Kenyon, supra note 162, at 331-32. The general, George Monck, commander of the Army of Scotland, was an advocate of constitutional government. He and his army had earlier marched south, reconvened the Long Parliament, and forced it to readmit its expelled members and consent to its own dissolution.
215. Id. at 305.
216. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 125, at 15; Kenyon, supra note 162, at 360; Kier, supra note 146, at 231.
217. Kier, supra note 146, at 231.
218. Id. at 236.
219. Id. at 233.
220. Id. at 249.
Commons insisted on the appropriation of supply and the accounting of expenditures.\textsuperscript{221}

Charles II died in 1685, having governed without Parliament since 1681.\textsuperscript{222} Charles’ brother, James II, succeeded to the throne. James quickly provoked confrontation with Parliament.\textsuperscript{223} The fact that he and his wife were Catholics did not help his cause. When he could not obtain requested revenue from Parliament without conditions, he prorogued and then dissolved the body, never calling it again.\textsuperscript{224}

Tensions mounted, primarily over religious issues, such as James’ attempt to place Catholics in high offices and his ordered arrest of Anglican bishops, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, for refusing to read a Declaration of Indulgences in their churches.\textsuperscript{225} James’ actions set in motion a reaction that would cost him the throne.\textsuperscript{226}

In June 1688, seven peers offered the Crown to James’ nephew, William of Orange.\textsuperscript{227} William collected a small army, landed in England, and by Christmas, James was in France and William firmly in charge of the British government. James’ overthrow—the “Glorious Revolution”—had been quick and practically bloodless.\textsuperscript{228}

Since no Parliament then existed (William, still being a foreign prince, was unable to call one), an informal assembly of peers, members of the Commons of Charles II’s parliaments, and London authorities sent out writs summoning a convention. The convention offered William, and his wife Mary, the throne.\textsuperscript{229} Thus, when William and Mary assumed the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221} 19 & 20 Car. II, c. 1 (1666), in KENYON, supra note 162, at 366-70; BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 125, at 15; KIER, supra note 146, at 229. See also 18 & 19 Car. II, c. 13 (1666), in KENYON, supra note 162, at 366 (prohibiting diversion of funds appropriated for salaries and wages of military personnel); Yoo, supra note 125, at 212 (“Instead of voting lump sums to the Crown, Parliament began to appropriate funds specifically for the army and to forbid the transfer of money from other accounts for military purposes.”).
\item \textsuperscript{222} CLARK, supra note 132, at 326; KIER, supra note 146, at 261.
\item \textsuperscript{223} 2 HALLAM, supra note 126, at 274-76.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Id. at 276.
\item \textsuperscript{225} CLARK, supra note 132, at 327; 2 HALLAM, supra note 126, at 293-94; KIER, supra note 146, at 264-66.
\item \textsuperscript{226} SOFAER, supra note 120, at 7.
\item \textsuperscript{227} KIER, supra note 146, at 267.
\item \textsuperscript{228} CLARK, supra note 132, at 328.
\item \textsuperscript{229} 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 150, at 147-49,209; 2 HALLAM, supra note 126, at 293-94; KIER, supra note 146, at 269.
\end{itemize}
throne, they did so without any constitutional standing but that conferred upon them by the Convention.230 The whole basis for the monarchy had transformed — William and Mary owed their Crown to the people and not to some divine right.231

The new King and Queen promptly consented to the Bill of Rights of 1689.232 A key grievance expressed in the statute was that James II had levied “money for and to the use of the Crowne by [pretence] of prerogative for other time and in other manner than the same was granted by Parliament.”233 To rectify the Crown’s usurpation of parliamentary authority, the Bill of Rights reserved to Parliament alone the power of the purse. A precursor to the Constitution’s appropriations clause, the statute provided that “levying money for or to the use of the Crowne by [pretence] of prerogative without grant of Parlyment for longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted is illegal.”234

Other enactments similarly solidified Parliament’s hold on finances. The first annual Mutiny Act (1689) prohibited the maintenance of a standing army in peacetime without periodic parliamentary renewal (usually annual).235 “Thereafter, the decision to raise a standing army required statutory authority.” Consequently, the monarch had to allow parliaments

230. KIER, supra note 146, at 269.
231. HALLAM, supra note 126, at 305:
Our new line of sovereigns scarcely ventured to hear of their hereditary right, and dreaded the cup of flattery that was drugged with poison. This was the greatest change that affected our monarchy by the fall of the house of Stuart. The laws were not so materially altered as the spirit and sentiment of the people . . . . The fundamental maxims of the constitution, both as they regard the king and the subject, may seem nearly the same; but the disposition with which they were received and interpreted was entirely different.

Together with the Act of Settlement of 1701, “the rights of the actual monarch, of the reigning family, were made to emanate from the parliament and the people.” Id. at 306-07; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 150, at 210-11. A new coronation oath pledging to “gov- ern according to the statutes in Parliament agreed upon” was also prescribed. CLARK, supra note 132, at 328.

232. CLARK, supra note 132, at 329; see also Yoo, supra note 125, at 213 (The Bill of Rights was imposed on William and Mary “as the price for their throne.”).
233. 1 W. & M. c. 30 (1689).
234. Id. The Bill of Rights also prohibited the raising or keeping of a standing army in the kingdom in peacetime without the consent of Parliament. Id. See Bestor, supra note 175, at 554.
235. 1 W. & M. c. 5 (1689); see KIER, supra note 146, at 268.
236. Yoo, supra note 125, at 213.
to convene lest authority for their armies would lapse. In addition, Parliament increasingly scrutinized military expenditures; “[e]stimates of probable expenditure were regularly laid before them, and the supply granted was strictly appropriated to each particular service.”

Parliament also breathed new vitality into the Commission for Public Accounts. While giving the Crown some flexibility, particularly in time of war, Parliament generally insisted on a controlling voice over the expenditure of revenue:

The great and fundamental principle, as it has long been justly considered, that the money voted by parliament is appropriated, and can only be applied, to certain specified heads of expenditures, was introduced . . . in the reign of Charles II . . . . From the Revolution it has been the invariable usage. The lords of the treasury, by a clause annually repeated in the appropriations act of every session, are forbidden, under severe penalties, to order by their warrants any money in the exchequer, so appropriated, from being issued for any other service . . . . This has given the house of commons so effectual a control over the executive power, or, more truly speaking, has rendered it so much a participator in that power, that no administration can possibly exist without its concurrence.

Through the reigns of Anne and the Hanoverian kings and up to the American Revolution, Parliament, notably the House of Commons, used its power over appropriations to assume a preeminent role in British government. By means of its control over finance, the Commons “asserted its power to inquire into all details of administration, and into the conduct of the King’s ministers . . . .” By the time the Framers began to draft the United States Constitution, the primacy of Parliament in the British Constitution had become secure. Importantly, the power of the purse was the foundation of its dominance.

238. 2 Hallam, supra note 126, at 329.
239. See supra note 221, and accompanying text.
241. 2 Hallam, supra note 126, at 329-30.
242. 10 Holdsworth, supra note 126, at 34.
The House of Commons in the eighteenth century was the predominant partner in the constitution. It had gained this position, and held it, first by reason of its exclusive control over finance, and, secondly, by reason of its representative character. Its exclusive control over finance enabled it to criticize all the acts of the executive government, to stop projects of which it disapproved, to force the executive to adopt policies of which it approved, and to supervise the methods adopted to carry them out. . . . [O]n matters which stirred the nation, the House of Commons was able to exercise a decisive influence on the executive government.243

Control over the public purse was the cornerstone of British representative democracy. It served as the instrument for parliamentary supremacy, compelling monarchs to surrender their royal prerogatives in exchange for the revenue required to sustain their administrations, particularly their military adventures. It was also an end in itself, ensuring that taxes would not be raised except with the consent of the taxpayers; later, taxpayers would also have a voice in how their money was spent.

Significantly, the Framers gave close attention to Britain’s historical experience, particularly the lessons of the 17th century.244 These lessons would be reflected in the constitutional provisions giving Congress, rather than the President, the power over the nation’s purse.

b. Colonial Experience

The conflicts between Parliament and the Crown over the power of the purse and, ultimately, predominance in the government, were replayed in the American colonies in struggles between the royal governors and provincial assemblies. The colonists believed that, as Englishmen, “they had a right to share in making laws and laying taxes through agents of their own election.”245 Legislatures throughout the colonies assumed the power to tax. Through their control of revenues, the legislatures were able to wrest concessions from the royal governors at the expense of the governors’ prerogatives, including the authority to designate how tax moneys would be spent. By the middle of the 17th century, the power of the purse enabled legislatures to dominate colonial government.

243. Id. at 584-85. “As against the King and his government . . . the financial control of the House of Commons was complete. It was this control which enabled the House to supervise the whole field of executive government.” Id. at 588.


British authorities intended the royal governor to be the focal point of colonial administration and government.246 The royal governor’s authority was “vice-regal” in character, in that he was the agent or representative of the British monarch.247 He governed according to the commission and instructions received from the Crown.248

Since the governor’s ability to wield absolute power was not in accord “with the old English tradition that legislation and taxation should be guarded by a representative body[,]” it could not long survive after the initial footholds had been secured in America.249 In 1619, the first representative assembly—the House of Burgesses—was formed in Virginia, and thereafter legislative assemblies arose in the other colonies.250 Colonial governments were traditionally tripartite systems, administered by the royal governor; a non-elective council, which advised the governor, acted as an upper legislative house, and served as the highest appellate court in the province; and a locally elected assembly, which was the lower house.251

Friction between the elective assemblies and the royal administration was inevitable. At the root was disagreement over the very legal foundation of the representative bodies. To the British government, colonial legislatures were creatures of royal prerogative and owed their existence to the grace of the Crown.252 To the colonists, the legislative assemblies existed as a matter of their fundamental rights as Englishmen to have a voice in their governance, particularly the imposition of taxes.253 The colonists’ view carried, of course, profound consequences, for once they asserted that their elected assemblies existed by virtue of rights derived independent of the Crown, the argument that the king could not legally circumscribe the assemblies’ legislative authority was not far behind.254

248. Id. at 93-94. The royal commission, which set out the governor’s authority, was generally published when the governor assumed office. The instructions told the governor how he was to exercise his power and were not usually published. Id. Taken together, the commissions and instructions “may be regarded as the constitution of the province.” Id. at 95.
249. Id. at 36.
250. Id at 36-40.
251. Labaree, supra note 245, at 134, 159.
252. J. Greene, supra note 246, at 15; Labaree, supra note 245, at 174-75.
253. J. Greene, supra note 246, at 14; Labaree, supra note 245, at 174-75.
254. See Labaree, supra note 245, at 177.
With regard to revenue, the official British position was that only Parliament could impose taxes in the colonies; however, because Parliament did not undertake to tax the colonies directly until 1764, the authority fell to the colonial legislatures.\textsuperscript{255} Given their own constitutional struggles of the 17th century, the British authorities “were most reluctant to allow any legislation or taxation in the colonies without an assembly.”\textsuperscript{256} Had Parliament imposed taxes earlier—before the colonial legislatures fully took root—it might have possibly averted the provincial assemblies’ financial supremacy.\textsuperscript{257} In any event, by 1764, the opportunity to tax the colonies from England had long passed, and when Parliament attempted to impose taxes, it triggered bitter opposition that ultimately led to the American Revolution.\textsuperscript{258}

The colonial legislatures’ most important possession was their power to tax,\textsuperscript{259} and by the end of the Seven Years’ War, their control over money bills was exclusive.\textsuperscript{260} Like the Crown, provincial governors could not sustain their administrations without tax revenues and were financially dependent on the assemblies.\textsuperscript{261} Colonial legislatures exploited this financial dependence to enhance their powers at the expense of the governors’ prerogatives by withholding needed revenues unless the governors acceded to the conditions attached to them.\textsuperscript{262}

The colonial legislatures were not content with just raising revenues; they also wanted to decide how the revenues would be spent. This was contrary to the Crown’s concept of their role: it envisioned the local assemblies would simply grant money, and the royal governors alone

\textsuperscript{255} J. Greene, \textit{supra} note 246, at 51; Labaree, \textit{supra} note 245, at 269; \textit{see also} Reid, \textit{supra} note 121, at 141-42 (noting consent-to-tax doctrine was integral part of governance of early colonies).

\textsuperscript{256} Labaree, \textit{supra} note 245, at 175.

\textsuperscript{257} Id. at 296, \textit{but see} J.P. Reid, \textit{supra} note 121, at 142-44 (indicating even early colonists would have resisted direct parliamentary taxation).

\textsuperscript{258} Reid, \textit{supra} note 121, at 105, 144-46. Colonists viewed Parliament’s attempts to tax them as involving not only the principle of taxation without representation, but also as an attack upon the financial supremacy their legislatures had won by years of struggle. Labaree, \textit{supra} note 245, at 296.

\textsuperscript{259} J. Greene, \textit{supra} note 246, at 51.

\textsuperscript{260} Id. at 70. The governors’ councils never seriously tried to initiate such measures and met with little success in attempting to amend them. Labaree, \textit{supra} note 245, at 135.

\textsuperscript{261} Labaree, \textit{supra} note 245, at 212.

\textsuperscript{262} J. Greene, \textit{supra} note 246, at 49.
would decide how to spend it.\textsuperscript{263} The Crown’s notion that the power to spend would reside in the executive was never realized.

A scheme which reduced the elective body to a mere money-granting agency could meet with no more permanent success among Englishmen on one side of the Atlantic than among those on the other. Consequently, the assemblies began to make the same encroachments upon the executive control of finance in the colonies that the seventeenth century House of Commons made in England.\textsuperscript{264}

By the outbreak of the American Revolution, colonial legislatures exercised the same authority over finances that the Commons did in Britain. They alone were responsible for raising revenues and for making appropriations.\textsuperscript{265} Moreover, perceiving their role as the “constitutional guardian of the people’s money,” a majority of colonial legislatures even assumed control over the appointment of the provincial treasurers.\textsuperscript{266} In such cases, the royal governor played almost no role in provincial finance.\textsuperscript{267}

Through their control of the colonial fisc, the assemblies extended their authority over other areas of colonial administration, both civil and military.\textsuperscript{268} Royal governors had no choice but to accept legislatively imposed conditions on appropriations or do without needed revenue.\textsuperscript{269} In a number of cases, assemblies even held governors’ salaries hostage to their demands, further diminishing the governors’ authority.\textsuperscript{270}

The Founders took notice of how the colonial legislatures had used the power of the purse to bring royal provinces under republican control.

\textsuperscript{263} Id at 87-88; LABAREE, supra note 246, at 274.

\textsuperscript{264} LABAREE, supra note 245, at 275; see also Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 838, 842 (1987) (“[T]he colonial legislatures learned that they could control disbursements as well as revenues by stipulating in tax bills the purposes for which the money they granted would be used.”).

\textsuperscript{265} LABAREE, supra note 245, at 308; see also J. GREENE, supra note 246, at 106.

\textsuperscript{266} E. GREENE, supra note 247, at 182.

\textsuperscript{267} Id at 185.

\textsuperscript{268} J. GREENE, supra note 246, at 51; E. GREENE, supra note 247, at 188-89; LABAREE, supra note 245, at 308-10.

\textsuperscript{269} Id.

\textsuperscript{270} See E. GREENE, supra note 247, at 173-74, which cites a number of examples. The Framers’ were clearly cognizant of this practice, proscribing the diminution of presidential and judicial salaries during their tenure. U.S.\textsc{const.} art.\textsc{ii}, \textsc{cl}. 7; art.\textsc{iii}, \textsc{cl}. 1.
The responsibility of the royal governor to the home government had placed him in much the same relationship to the local assemblies as that in which the Stuart kings had been to the Commons. It had therefore seemed necessary to the colonists to utilize every agency, and especially the control over purse strings, to force concessions from the executive branch . . . . In these struggles the popular assemblies were the bulwark of popular liberties; the executive departments the instrumentalities of British control. This attitude of mind could not fail profoundly to affect the original American concept of republican executive power.271

The Founders’ “original” concept of executive power would eventually be tempered by their experiences under the Articles of Confederation and their post-Independence state constitutions.272 However, the concept that control over the public fisc—both taxation and appropriation—was a legislative power had become firmly entrenched. Over the course of the previous two centuries, Americans and Englishmen alike had used the legislative power of the purse to forge representative democracies. These historical experiences unquestionably shaped the Founders’ views,273 and ultimately led to the Constitution’s provisions granting Congress exclusive power to tax and spend.

These experiences also formed the environment for the appropriations clause. By 1776, both the British and colonial governments conditioned the expenditure of tax revenue on the approval of the elected houses of their legislatures.274 Neither the Crown nor the royal governors could spend revenues without legislative approval. The appropriations clause incorporates this hard-won practice in the Constitution. Viewed in its his-

272. Id. at 52, 74.
Public finance was a more controversial subject in the eighteenth century than it is now . . . . [Eighteenth century Americans] reserved for economic factors a higher role in shaping the general institutions of society. The power of the purse was to them the determinant of sovereignty and upon its location and extent depended the power of government, the existence of civil rights, and the integrity of representative institutions. Their basic premise was that popular control of taxation was also an instrument with which to enlarge the sphere of private liberty against the authority of the state.
274. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 313 (1920) (“Not a penny of revenue can be legally expended except under the authority of some Act of Parliament.”).
torical context, the clause was intended to make congressional approval a prerequisite to the expenditure of public funds.

\[\text{c. Experience Under the Articles of Confederation & Early State Constitutions}\]

With the Revolution and the break from England, Americans translated their antipathy towards the executive branch—which they identified with the royal governors and the king—into positive constitutional enactments. With few exceptions, early state constitutions either made executive departments subservient to the legislatures or effectively eliminated them altogether. Under these charters, the legislatures quite naturally controlled the fiscal levers of government. Americans soon discovered, however, that an unrestrained legislature could be as tyrannical as an unrestrained executive and began to restore executive power. As they did, Americans implanted safeguards in their constitutions—generally in the form of appropriations clauses—to ensure the power of the purse remained within the legislative sphere.

The Articles of Confederation similarly rejected a formal executive, conferring upon the Continental Congress both the legislative and executive powers of the Confederation. While the absence of an executive department proved administratively inconvenient, the fundamental defect of the Confederation was its lack of effective political power. The Confederation was at the mercy of thirteen—nearly autonomous—states; it relied on them for its support, but they could, with impunity, refuse to furnish it.

The Continental Congress never acquired a power to tax and was wholly dependent on the states for its financial subsistence, including (until 1783) the conduct of the War for Independence. State contributions were perpetually inadequate, contributing in large measure to the ineffectiveness and virtual collapse of the Confederation. The Founders’ response to the Confederation’s fiscal feebleness was to bestow upon Congress a strong power of the purse, by furnishing it with independent constitutional authority to raise and appropriate revenue.

\[\text{(1) Articles of Confederation}\]

The Articles of Confederation do not offer much of an object lesson in the centuries-old struggle between legislative and executive departments for control of the public fisc, as the Articles had no executive and virtually lacked a power of the purse. First proposed by Benjamin Fran-
klin on 21 July 1775, the Continental Congress approved the Articles of Confederation on 15 November 1777, sending them to the states for ratification. The letter transmitting the Articles prophesied the pitfalls inherent in a confederation of loosely attached states. Apologizing for the delay in completing the Articles, Congress noted the obstacles involved in devising a constitution that would accommodate “the opinions and wishes of the delegates of so many states, differing in habits, produce, commerce, and internal police.” Congress urged the states to consider the Articles immediately and dispassionately with an understanding “of the difficulty of combining in one general system the various sentiments and interests of a continent divided into so many sovereign and independent communities.” In spite of Congress’ call to consider the Articles “without delay,” over three years passed before the last state (Maryland) ratified the Articles in February 1781. The Articles formally took effect on 1 March 1781.

The Articles established Congress as the single branch of national government. Comprised of members appointed by and representing the state legislatures, Congress exercised the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government. The Articles did not establish a formal executive. While they did provide for a president, he was merely a presiding officer who exercised no executive or administrative powers.

275. See generally Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1771.
276. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 195 (July 21,1775) (GPO 1905). Franklin’s draft, which established a “United Colonies of North America,” bestowed upon the Continental Congress (inter alia) the power to determine war and peace, to send and receive ambassadors, to enter into alliances, to resolve disputes between colonies, and to create new colonies. Expenses were to be defrayed out of the “common Treasury,” supplied by each colony in proportion to the number of males between 16 and 20. Congress lacked the power to tax; colonies would levy taxes according to their own laws.
277. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 907 (Nov. 15, 1777) (GPO 1907). For a description of the drafting process, see Eric M. Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers & Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confederation Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 783, 797-800 (1993).
278. 9 JOURNALS, supra note 277, at 932-34 (Nov. 17, 1777).
279. Id at 933.
280. Id at 934.
281. Id at 934.
283. 19 JOURNALS, supra note 282, at 213-14.
The Articles empowered Congress to appoint “committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States . . .”287 Congressional committees did not administer the government well. The system strained Congress, which had to discharge both legislative and executive duties, and it produced delays inevitable from such a “double burden.”288 To rectify these problems, in 1781, Congress created executive departments, including the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Superintendent of Finance, and the Secretary of War, to administer the government.289 These departments were not, however, part of a separate executive branch; instead, they were “mere appendages of the legislature.”290

While the Continental Congress’ inability to perform executive functions successfully was a factor contributing to the call for a new constitution,291 it was not the Confederation’s major shortfall. Its fundamental weakness was a lack of political power. States retained their “sovereignty, freedom and independence and every power, jurisdiction and right” to the extent they were not expressly delegated to the United States “in Congress assembled.”292 The Articles described the Confederation as simply a “firm league of friendship.”293 While the “locus of sovereignty” under Confederation has been hotly debated,294 it is clear the states controlled the balance of political power. As Merrill Jensen noted in his study of the Articles of Confederation, “the fundamental difference between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of 1787 lies in the apportionment of power between the states and the federal government. In the first, the bal-

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284. 1 FARRAND, supra note 103, at 133 (June 6, 1787) (Remarks of George Mason) (“Under the existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States not the people of the States: their acts operate on the States not on the individuals.”) (emphasis in the original); see also Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 891,892-93 (1990).

285. ARTS. OF CONFED, art. IX, cl. 5.

286. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 6 (1972) [hereinafter FISHER, PRESIDENT & CONGRESS], In judicial matters, Congress served as “the last resort on appeal in all disputes” between two or more states (ARTS. OF CONFED, art. IX, cl. 2) and was empowered to appoint “courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and . . . for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures.” Id. art. IX, cl. 3.

287. ARTS. OF CONFED, art. IX, cl. 5.

288. FISHER, PRESIDENT & CONGRESS, supra note 286, at 5, 11; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 77, at 601; Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers & the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991,993-94 (1993).

289. 19 JOURNALS, supra note 282, at 42-43 (Jan. 10, 1781); id. at 126-28 (Feb. 7, 1781); see also FISHER, PRESIDENT & CONGRESS, supra note 286, at 12; SOFAER, supra note 120, at 23-24; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 77, at 601-02.

ance of power was given to the states, and in the second, to the central government.”

The greatest obstacle to an effective national government was the virtual independence of the states. Writing to James Madison in late 1786, George Washington lamented that “[t]hirteen Sovereignties pulling against each other, and all tugging at the federal head will soon bring ruin on the whole . . . .” In detailing the defects of the American political system in preparation for the Constitutional Convention, James Madison listed the states’ failure to comply with constitutional requirements and their encroachment on federal authority as the first two vices of the Confederation.


292. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. II.

293. Id. art. III; see also MAX FARRAND, THE FATHERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 52 (1921) [hereinafter FARRAND, FATHERS OF THE CONSTITUTION].

294. Clinton, supra note 284, at 892. For example, John Adams perceived Congress to be a “diplomatic assembly” rather than a legislature. Thomas Jefferson disagreed, asserting that the states and Congress shared sovereignty. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Feb. 3, 1787), in 11 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 176-77 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954). An early decision of the Supreme Court in Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrator, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795), supported Jefferson’s point of view, holding the Continental Congress—inven before ratification of the Articles of Confederation—had the authority to constitute appellate tribunals in prize cases. The Court stated that, with regard to foreign states, the Continental Congress alone was sovereign. Id. at 80-81. See also 1 FARRAND, supra note 103, at 323-24 (June 19, 1787) (Remarks of Rufus King) (states not sovereign entities because they do not possess the “peculiar features of sovereignty,” such as the powers to make war or peace or to deal with foreign nations); RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 244, at 28 (citing Rutgers v. Waddington).


The Confederation’s weakness was most evident in its inability to obtain the resources required for government operations. The absence of this authority was intentional. “Popular control of taxation was deemed the very foundation of representative government and the only protection of the rights of citizens[,]” and state control of revenues was viewed as a necessary curb on the authority of the national government.298 Thus, the Confederation depended upon the states for its subsistence.

The Articles provided that the “charges of war” and other expenses of the central government were to be defrayed out of a common treasury to be “supplied by the several States, in proportion to the value of all land within each State . . . .”299 Nothing, however, could compel the states to comply with the requisitions. “[T]he Articles conferred on Congress the privilege of asking for everything, while reserving to each state the prerogative of granting nothing.”300

The revenue problem began early, before the ratification of the Articles, manifesting itself in Congress’ inability to supply the Continental Army.301 Congress ultimately turned over supply of the army to the states.302 Efforts in 1781 to equip Congress with the authority to raise revenues directly went down to defeat when one state, Rhode Island, withheld its consent.303 A similar attempt in 1783, which was linked to the so-called “Newburgh Conspiracy,” in which the army presented a strongly worded and vaguely threatening remonstrance to Congress demanding immediate pay,304 was unsuccessful when New York withheld its consent.305
With the end of the war, support for the Confederation reached its nadir. The impetus to enhance the federal government’s power to raise revenues dissipated, and states became even more disinclined to satisfy requisitions. By 1786, a congressional committee reported that the amount of revenue the Confederation received was insufficient for even the “bare maintenance of the federal government on the most economical establishment, and in time of profound peace.” A year later, James Madison observed:

[T]he present System neither has nor deserves advocates; and if some very strong props are not applied will quickly tumble to the ground. No money is paid into the public Treasury; no respect is paid to the federal authority. Not a single State complies with the requisitions, several pass them over in silence, and some positively reject them. The payments ever since the peace have been decreasing, and of late fall short even of the pittance necessary for the Civil list of the Confederacy. It is not possible that a Government can last long under these circumstances.

The precariousness of the federal government’s financial predicament was exemplified in 1786 by Congress’ inability to provide promised military support to Massachusetts to suppress a rebellion in its western counties. The insurrection was spawned when the state, attempting to satisfy debts, imposed an onerous tax burden on its citizens. Many were unable to pay, leading the state to execute against their property. The state’s

304. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 291-93 (Dec. 1782) (GPO 1922): Our distresses are now brought to a point. We have borne all that men can bear—our property is expended—our private resources are at an end, and our friends are wearied out and disgusted with our incessant applications. We, therefore, most seriously and earnestly beg, that a supply of money be forwarded to the army as soon as possible. The uneasiness of the soldiers, for want of pay, is great and dangerous; any further experiments on their patience may have fatal effects.

305. FARRAND, FATHERS OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 293, at 87-88; FERGUSON, supra note 273, at 156-58, 161; RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 282, at 313,317-19,338; Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 303, at 489.


307. 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 74 (Feb. 15, 1786) (GPO 1934). The committee warned that “the crisis has arrived” when the American people had to decide whether to support the Confederation or “hazard” its existence. Id. at 75.


309. 3 EDWARD CHANNING, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 483-95 (1937); FERGUSON, supra note 273, at 245-46.
action triggered unrest, which erupted into violence when a force of armed citizens under Captain Daniel Shays tried to intimidate local courts to prevent them from acting against the tax debtors and threatened the federal arsenal at Springfield.\footnote{310}

In October 1786, Congress authorized raising troops to help Massachusetts suppress the \textit{insurrection}.\footnote{311} By February 1787, only one state—Virginia—had honored the requisition needed to sustain the force. This prompted Charles Pinckney to move to stop the enlistments because Congress could not pay the troops, thereby creating a potentially more dangerous situation.\footnote{312} Although Pinckney’s motion failed,\footnote{313} the rebellion ended before effective federal assistance could be \textit{rendered}.\footnote{314}

Scholars disagree about the actual impact Shays’ Rebellion had in impelling the Constitutional \textit{Convention}.\footnote{315} It probably served as a catalyst for change.\footnote{316} It certainly was exploited by proponents of a strong national government.\footnote{317} Most significantly, the Rebellion illustrated the Confederation’s financial impotence.

\footnote{310. \textsc{Channing}, \textit{supra} note 309, at 485; \textsc{Ferguson}, \textit{supra} note 273, at 247.}
\footnote{311. 31 \textsc{Journals of the Continental Congress} 895-96 (Oct. 21, 1786) (GPO 1934). In raising the troops, Congress acted under the pretext of mounting an expedition against hostile Indians. \textit{Id.}; see also \textsc{Farrand}, \textit{Fathers of the Constitution}, \textit{supra} note 293, at 95; \textsc{Sofaer}, \textit{supra} note 120, at 24-25.}
\footnote{312. Notes on \textit{Debates} in Congress (Feb. 19, 1787), \textit{in} 9 \textsc{Papers of James Madison} 276 (Robert Rutland ed., 1975): Mr. Pickney in support of his motion entered on the Journal, for stopping the enlistment of Troops, argued that we had reason to suppose the \textit{insurrection} in Massts., the real tho’ not ostensible object of this measure, to be already crushed: — that the Requisition of 500,000 dollars, for supporting the troops had been complied with by one State only \textit{viz} Virginia, and that but in part: — that it would be absurd to proceed in the raising of men who could neither be paid clothed nor fed, and that such a folly was the more to be shunned, as the consequences could not be foreseen, of embodying and arming men under circumstances which would be more likely to render terror than the support of Government. We had, he observed, been so lucky in one instance, meaning the disbanding of the army on the peace, to get rid of the armed force without satisfying their just claims; but that it would not be prudent to hazard the repetition of this experiment. \textit{See also} 32 \textsc{Journals of the Continental Congress} 62-63 (Feb. 19, 1787) (GPO 1934).}
\footnote{313. 32 \textsc{Journals}, \textit{supra} note 312, at 64 (Feb. 19, 1787) (GPO 1934); Notes on \textit{Debates} in Congress (Feb. 19, 1787), \textit{in} 9 \textsc{Papers of James Madison} 279 (Robert Rutland ed., 1975).}
\footnote{314. \textsc{Farrand}, \textit{Fathers of the Constitution}, \textit{supra} note 293, at 94-95.}
\footnote{315. \textit{See} Ackerman & Katyal, \textit{supra} note 303, at 498.}
When the Framers convened in Philadelphia in May 1787, they were unquestionably influenced by the fiscal infirmity of the Confederation, recognizing that the national government could not subsist on the whims of the states. Thus, they provided the federal government, acting through Congress, a strong power of the purse.

(2) Early State Constitutions

While experience under the Articles of Confederation galvanized support for a strong national government that could subsist independently of the states, experience under early state constitutions inspired a system of separate legislative, executive, and judicial powers that included sufficient checks and balances to ensure one department did not dominate the other.

With the initial exception of New York, state constitutions drafted after independence “included almost every conceivable provision for reducing the executive to a position of complete subordination.” Americans soon realized, however, “that legislatures could be tyrannical, too,” and ensured that the national constitution included checks on the poten-

316. Farrand, Fathers of the Constitution, supra note 293, at 95-96; Andrew C. Mclaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 141 (1936); Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 32 (1928); Clinton, supra note 284, at 897; Raven-Hansen & Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings, supra note 64, at 893.

317. Fergusson, supra note 273, at 249.

318. See Mclaughlin, supra note 316, at 147; Prakash, supra note 300, at 1965.

319. See Fisher, President & Congress, supra note 286, at 17; Goldsmith, supra note 121, at 15-16; Thach, supra note 271, at 49; Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1763-69. In this regard, early state constitutions served as models for the federal Constitution. Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 30-31:

By far the greatest influence that the experience of the states had on the deliberations of 1787 lay . . . in the area of constitutional theory itself. For when the framers set about designing the new national government, the crucial lessons they applied were drawn from their observation of the state constitutions written since independence. It was in the drafting of these charters, rather than the Articles of Confederation, that the revolutionaries had expressed their original notions of republican government. . . . The states had served, in effect, as the great political laboratory upon whose experiments the framers of 1787 drew to revise the theory of republican government.

tially overbearing legislative branch.\textsuperscript{321} They also altered their state charters to enhance the independence and powers of the executive and judicial departments.\textsuperscript{322}

Importantly, while fortifying executive autonomy and authority, drafters of later state constitutions steadfastly viewed the power of the purse to be legislative in character. In no instance did they afford governors a power to spend state funds without prior legislative authority. Furthermore, in most cases, they took affirmative steps to secure legislative control over state treasuries, usually via appropriations clauses, or by legislative appointment of state treasurers, or both. Late eighteenth century Americans unquestionably understood that the powers to tax and spend were legislative, not executive, powers.\textsuperscript{323}

On 10 May 1776, the Second Continental Congress recommended to the respective assemblies and conventions of the United Colonies, where no government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs have hitherto been established, to adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in part, and America in general.\textsuperscript{324}

Between 1776 and 1787, all but two of the thirteen states enacted new constitutions.\textsuperscript{325} Two states—New Hampshire and South Carolina—ratified two constitutions during the period, and four states (including South

\textsuperscript{320.} Thach, supra note 271, at 28; see also Goldsmith, supra note 121, at 15; Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 250-52; Gordon S. Wood, State Constitution Making in the American Revolution, 24 Rutgers L.J. 911,914-15 (1993).

\textsuperscript{321.} Reveley, supra note 121, at 57-58; see also Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 250. By 1787, many of the Constitution’s framers mistrusted the legislative department at least as much as they did the executive. See Fisher, President & Congress, supra note 286, at 18; Thach, supra note 271, at 52.

\textsuperscript{322.} Goldsmith, supra note 121, at 15; Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 252-53.

\textsuperscript{323.} Indeed, over the course of the last 221 years, all but a handful of states have incorporated appropriations clauses in their constitutions. Without apparent exception, the states have uniformly interpreted these provisions to proscribe governors from expending public funds absent legislative approval. See infra notes 675-88 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{324.} 4 Journals of the Continental Congress 342 (May 10,1776) (GPO 1906). Congress ordered the resolution published on 15 May 1776. Id. at 358.
Carolina) adopted new constitutions within five years of ratification of the United States Constitution.

The drafters of these state constitutions undoubtedly believed in a system of separated powers. They were heavily influenced by Montesquieu, who had several decades earlier expounded as essential to political liberty the division of government into three distinct departments: the legislative; the executive “in respect to things dependent on the law of nations”; and the executive “in regard to matters that depend on the civil law,” which he characterized as the “judiciary power.”

Montesquieu perceived political liberty as “a tranquillity of the mind” that each person has about his own safety, and that “in order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.” Montesquieu believed that combining any of the three powers in any one man or body necessarily jeopardized political liberty by making people apprehensive about the actions of those exercising the power.

Several early state constitutions explicitly professed adherence to the principle of separated powers. For example, the Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 ordained that “the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each

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326. Bernard Schwartz, Curioser and Curioser: The Supreme Court’s Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 587, 588 (1990) (observing that in England, despite Montesquieu, separation of powers was only a political theory, but “[i]n the United States, it was elevated to the level of constitutional doctrine as soon as full separation from the mother country made a new governmental structure necessary”); see also Francis D. Wormuth & Edwin D. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War 8 (2d ed. 1989); Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 252; Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1764.


328. Id. Montesquieu did not equate political liberty with the right of people to act in any manner they please; instead, “[l]iberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.” Id. at 150.
other." The Georgia Constitution of 1777 decreed that the three departments of government "shall be separate and distinct so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to the other."

While professing adherence to the principle of separated powers, most early state constitutions did not contain the checks and balances necessary to preclude legislative usurpation of executive authority. The first state constitutions either dispensed with true executives or established executives beholden to the state legislatures for their offices. Moreover,

329. For example: "[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Id. at 151-52. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation & Powers: Some Early Versions & Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211,214 (1989) (Montesquieu advanced a "functional concept" of separation of powers: "separation is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition of liberty. Its absence promotes tyranny.") [hereinafter Casper, Separation of Powers].

330. MD. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rts., art. VI.

331. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. I; see also N.H. CONST. of 1784, part I (Bill of Rights), art. XXXVII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rts., art. IV; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rts., § 5.

332. 1 FARRAND, supra note 103, at 26-27 (May 29, 1787) (remarks of Edmund Randolph) ("Our chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitution. It is a maxim which I hold incontrovertible, that the powers of government exercised by the people swallows up the other branches. None of the constitutions have provided a sufficient check against democracy."); 2 id. at 73-74 (July 21, 1787) (remarks of James Madison) ("Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex."); see also Williams, supra note 319, at 583 (observing that the "F'ennsylvania Constitutionalists were acutely aware of the separation, and the differences among, governmental powers. It was the not yet fully understood concept of checks and balances which they associated with monarchical government that they rejected"); Wood, supra note 320, at 917 (noting that the drafters of the state constitutions invoked Montesquieu not to limit the legislatures, "but rather to isolate the legislatures and the judiciaries from the kind of executive manipulation and 'corruption' of members of Parliament that characterized the English constitution").

333. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VII ("president or chief magistrate" chosen for three-year term by house of assembly and council); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXV (governor chosen annually by house of representatives and senate); N.H. CONST. of 1776 (no executive department); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VII (governor chosen annually by general assembly and legislative council); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XV (house of commons and senate select governor annually); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19 (president and vice president chosen annually by joint vote of council and house of representatives); S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. III (general assembly selects legislative council; legislative council and general assembly jointly choose president and vice president annually); VA. CONST. of 1776, ¶ 6 (governor chosen annually by house of delegates and senate). See also Adams, supra note 319, at 6-8; Casper, Separation of Powers, supra note 329, at 216-17; Wood, supra note 320, at 915-16.
while most state constitutions typically stated that the state’s executive authority was vested in the governor, the governor’s authority was often quite limited. Most state charters, including those establishing popularly elected executives, conditioned executive discretion on the advice and consent of an executive or privy council, which was either selected by the legislatures or popularly elected. Only New York established a popularly elected governor not subject to the advice and guidance of an executive council. In addition, a number of charters reserved to the legislatures the authority to appoint officials—including military and naval officers—who executed the laws of the state.

Early state constitutions clearly contemplated that legislatures would exercise the power of the purse. In spite of their already enfeebled governors, a number of state charters included provisions ensuring the powers to raise and expend revenue remained insulated from the executive. Several


335. Del. Const. of 1776, arts. VIII, IX (governor exercises power subject to advice and consent of four-member legislatively selected privy council); Ga. Const. of 1777, art. XIX (governor exercises executive power with advice of executive council); Md. Const. of 1776, arts. XXVI, XXXIII (governor exercises executive power subject to advice and consent of legislatively selected council); Mass. Const. of 1780, part II, ch. 2, § 3, arts. I, II (legislatively selected council assists governor perform executive functions); N.H. Const. of 1784, part II (Council) (council drawn from the legislature advises state president); N.J. Const. of 1776, art. VIII (privy council derived from members of popularly elected council provided to advise governor); N.C. Const. of 1776, arts. XVI, XVIII, XIX (legislatively selected council of state provided to advise governor); Pa. Const. of 1776, § 3 (supreme executive power vested in president and popularly elected executive council); S.C. Const. of 1776, art. IV (legislatively selected privy council advises president); Va. Const. of 1776, ¶¶ 6, 8 (legislatively selected council of state advises governor). See Rakoje, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 252; Adams, supra note 319, at 6-8; Casper, Separation of Powers, supra note 329, at 217; Wood, supra note 320, at 916.

336. N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XVII (“supreme executive power and authority” vested in governor popularly elected to three-year term). See generally Goldsmith, supra note 121, at 16-17; Soffer, supra note 120, at 17, 19.

337. Del. Const. of 1776, art. XVI; Mass. Const. of 1780, part II, ch. 2, § 4, art. I; N.H. Const. of 1776, ¶¶ 5, 9, 10, 11; N.H. Const. of 1784, part II (president and council select military officers; legislature appoints other officials); N.J. Const. of 1776, art. X; N.C. Const. of 1776, art. XIV, S.C. Const. of 1776, art. XXIII; S.C. Const. of 1778, art. XXX; Va. Const. of 1776, ¶ 12. In New York, the legislature appointed the state treasurer, N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XXII, and the governor appointed military officers. Id. art. XXIV. The constitution established a council consisting of senators and the governor to select state officials not otherwise provided. Id. art. XXIII. See generally Rakoje, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 252; Casper, Separation of Powers, supra note 329, at 217; Wood, supra note 320, at 916.
state constitutions expressly forbade the raising of revenues except with the legislative consent; some required money bills to originate in the lower legislative assembly. With regard to expenditures, a few states (including New York) gave the legislatures authority to appoint state treasurers, thereby ensuring the state treasury would remain responsive to the legislative branch.

Finally, states began to include appropriations clauses in their constitutions, explicitly forbidding the expenditure of funds from state treasuries except as permitted by the legislatures. For example, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 provided that the state “president or chief magistrate” could only draw from the treasury such “sums of money as shall be appropriated by the general assembly . . .” The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 similarly limited the expenditure of state funds:

No moneys shall be issued out of the treasury of this commonwealth and disposed of . . . but by warrant under the hand of the governor for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary defense and support of the commonwealth, and for the protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.

Likewise, North Carolina only permitted its governor to “draw for and apply such sums of money as shall be voted by the general assembly, for the contingencies of government, and be accountable to them for the same.”

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338. For example, Maryland’s 1776 Declaration of Rights decreed “[t]hat no aid, charge, tax, fee, or fees, ought to be set, rated, or levied, under any pretence, without consent of the Legislature.” MD. CONST. of 1776, Decl. Of Rts., art. XII. See also MASS. CONST. of 1780, part I (Decl. of Rts.), art. XXIII; N.H. CONST. of 1784, part I (Bill of Rts.), art. XXVIII; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 41.

339. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VI; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. X; MASS. CONST. of 1780, part II, ch. 1, § 3, art. VII; N.H. CONST. of 1776, ¶ 6; N.H. CONST. of 1784, part II (House of Reps.), ¶ 8; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VI; S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VII; VA. CONST. of 1776, § 5.

340. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, part II, ch. 2, § 4, art. 1; N.H. CONST. of 1784, part II (Secretary, Treasurer, Commissary-General); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XII; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII; VA. CONST. of 1776, § 17.

341. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VII. Delaware’s 1792 constitution also included an appropriations clause. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 15 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . .”).
Not long after independence, states with weak executive departments began to discover that unrestrained legislatures could be equally as oppressive as unchecked executives. While their constitutions gave “lip service” to the concept of separation of powers, their legislatures easily overrode these “paper barriers” to encroach upon both executive and judicial authority. For example, Louis Fisher recounts a 1784 study of Pennsylvania legislative abuses, which described how the state assembly invaded the rights of property, caused entry into homes without warrants, deprived citizens of trial by jury, and restrained the writ of habeas corpus. Pennsylvania’s experience was not unique. “Time and time again [state] legislatures interfered with the governors’ legitimate powers, rejected judicial decisions, disregarded individual liberties and property rights, and in general violated the fundamental principles that led people to create their constitutions in the first place.”

The Founders’ unsatisfactory experience with unfettered legislative power not only influenced the framing of the United States Constitution, it also resulted in new state charters that attempted to restore the balance between the branches of government. Restricting gubernatorial access to state treasuries was seemingly superfluous when state governors either did not exist or were politically powerless; however, as states began to strengthen their executive departments, they recognized also a need to pre-

342. Mass. Const. of 1780, part II, ch. 2, § 1, art. XI (emphasis added). The constitution designated the state legislature as the “General Court.” Id. part II, ch. 1, § 1, art. I. Massachusetts’ courts later construed this provision to mean that the power to appropriate money is exclusively legislative in nature. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 612, 19 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1939); Opinion of the Justices, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 593, 594 (1866). The constitution also gave the legislature the power to raise taxes, to be issued and disposed of by warrant, under the hand of the governor of this commonwealth, for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for public service, in the necessary defense and support of the government of said commonwealth, and the protection and preservation of the subjects thereof, according to such acts as are or shall be in force within the same.

343. N.C. Const. of 1776, art. XIX (emphasis added).

344. See supra note 332 and accompanying text; see also Fisher, President & Congress, supra note 286, at 17; Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1765.

345. Fisher, President & Congress, supra note 286, at 19.

346. Wood, supra note 320, at 922; see also Reveley, supra note 121, at 57; Sofaer, supra note 120, at 18-19; Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1763.

347. See supra note 344.

348. Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 244, at 252-53; Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1768.
serve legislative dominance over public finance. Therefore, at the same time states enhanced executive authority, they reinforced their legislatures' hold on the state fisc, principally by proscribing the expenditure of funds except as directed by legislative enactment.

In its constitutions of 1789 and 1798, Georgia gradually increased the autonomy of its executive, but in 1798, also included a constitutional provision prohibiting the withdrawal of money from the treasury or the public funds of the state “except by appropriations made by law.”

Pennsylvania enacted a new constitution in 1790, creating a popularly elected governor who held the state’s executive power. The new constitution also provided that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.” Similarly, by its constitution of 1784, New Hampshire established a bona fide executive, and simultaneously restricted access to the state treasury by directing that:

No monies shall be issued out of the treasury of this state, and disposed of, . . . but by warrant under the hand of the president for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary support and defense of this state, and for the necessary protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.

South Carolina revamped its charter in 1778 and again in 1790, strengthening the governor’s authority. Both charters included the pro-

349. For example, the governors’ term of office was increased from one to two years, and the executive council was eliminated. Compare Ga. Const. of 1777, arts. XIX-XXIII, with Ga. Const. of 1789, art. II, § 1; Ga. Const. of 1798, art. II, § 1. Georgia did not establish a popularly elected governor until 1824. Id. art. II, § 2 (1824).
351. Pa. Const. of 1790, art. II, §§ 1, 2.
352. Id. art. I, § 21.
353. N.H. Const. of 1784, (Executive Power — President) ¶¶ 1, 2, 7, 8, 9.
354. Id. (emphasis added) (Executive Power — President) ¶ 14. Like Massachusetts (see supra note 342), New Hampshire courts later interpreted this provision to prohibit the governor from spending state funds absent “some existing act or resolve of the legislature authorizing such payment.” Opinion of the Justices, 75 N.H. 624, 626, 75 A. 99 (1910).
355. For example, the 1778 constitution increased the governor’s term of office from one to two years (S.C. Const. of 1778, art. VI) and the 1790 constitution eliminated the legislatively selected privy council. S.C. Const. of 1790, art. II, § 1. South Carolina’s 1865 constitution made the governor an elective office. S.C. Const. of 1865, art. II, § 2.
scription that “no money [shall] be drawn out of the public treasury but by the legislative authority of the State.”

By the turn of the eighteenth century, more than half the states had incorporated appropriations clauses into their constitutions. The other states did not revise their charters until the nineteenth century, and when they did, all but Rhode Island included appropriations clauses. Similarly, the first new states admitted after ratification—Kentucky and Vermont—inserted appropriations clauses in their state charters.

When the Constitution’s Framers convened in Philadelphia in May 1787, they were heirs of a legacy of legislative dominance over public finance. Centuries of British and colonial history and the Framers’ own experience under their state constitutions served as the backdrop to the Constitutional Convention. By 1787, the power of the purse was uniformly recognized as legislative, not executive, in character. Even when Americans realized a need for strong executives to balance legislative power, they made certain the power to raise and expend revenue remained exclusively within the legislative sphere. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that with little debate, the Framers provided Congress exclusive control over the federal fisc. Indeed, it would have been startling had they done anything else.

2. The Constitutional Convention

The Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia in May 1787, with the Confederation and Continental Congress bereft of supporters.

357. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 15; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I § 24; MASS. CONST. of 1780, part II, ch. 2, § 1, art. XI; N.H. CONST. of 1784 (Executive Power- President) ¶ 14; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 21; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 17.
358. Except Massachusetts, which continues to be governed by its 1780 charter. See Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 132 N.E. 65 (1921).
359. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, ¶ 17; Md. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 32; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § 6, ¶ 2; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VII, § 8; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 3; Va. CONST. of 1830, art. IV, § 26. See infra notes 670-74, and accompanying text.
361. Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 3; Vt. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 17.
362. See Casper, supra note 89, at 8: “On the whole, the fiscal provisions of the state constitutions confirm our understanding that during the founding period money matters were primarily thought of as a legislative prerogative.”
resources, and respect. In a March 1787 letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison related the desperate hopes placed on the Convention:

What may be the result of this political experiment cannot be foreseen. The difficulties which present themselves are on one side almost sufficient to dismay the most sanguine, whilst on the other side the most timid are compelled to encounter them by the mortal diseases of the existing Constitution. These diseases need not be pointed out to you, who so well understand them. Suffice it to say, that they are at present marked by symptoms which are truly alarming, which have tainted the faith of the most orthodox republicans, and which challenge from the votaries of liberty every concession in favor of stable Government not infringing fundamental principles, as the only security against an opposite extreme of our present situation.\(^{363}\)

Although the Convention convened with the Continental Congress’ blessing,\(^{364}\) a number of states committed delegates to the Convention even before the Continental Congress acted.\(^{365}\) And while the Convention’s congressional charter was quite narrow—to amend the existing Articles of Confederation\(^{366}\)—the Convention, in fact, devised an entirely new structure of national government.\(^{367}\)

As discussed, a principal defect of the Articles of Confederation was the absence of an effective national power of the purse. The Continental


\[^{364}\] See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 73-74 (Feb. 21, 1787) (GPO 1936). The Continental Congress was responding to a September 1786 report of commissioners from an abortive convention in Annapolis, Maryland, to consider national commerce and trade reforms. When delegates from only five states appeared, the Annapolis convention decided too few states were represented and adjourned. In doing so, however, it urged that a convention of states with a much broader mission convene in Philadelphia the following May “to take into consideration the situation of the United States [and] to devise such further provisions as shall appear to be necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union . . . .” 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 678,680 (Sept. 30, 1786) (GPO 1934).

\[^{365}\] WARREN, supra note 316, at 40-41.

\[^{366}\] The Continental Congress directed that the Convention meet for “the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union.” 32 JOURNALS, supra note 364, at 74 (emphasis added).
Congress could not raise revenue directly; instead, it had to rely on requisitions to the states. In practice, the states had absolute discretion to determine whether they would satisfy requisitions, refusing to honor them more often than not.

The Framers generally accepted the concept that the national government should have authority to obtain revenue directly (without relying on the states). However, the means by which revenue should be raised was the subject of heated debate, centered principally on whether the House of Representatives alone—to the exclusion of the Senate—should exercise the power. Significantly, from the beginning of the Convention, delegates considered the authority to appropriate revenues in conjunction with the mechanism by which revenues would be raised, clearly indicating that they deemed the power to spend money intertwined with the power to raise money. Since the power to tax belonged exclusively to representative assemblies, the Framers obviously perceived the expenditure of funds similarly legislative in character.

This is hardly surprising. Since the reign of Charles II, Parliament asserted the power to direct the expenditure of the revenues it authorized, an assertion that grew in momentum and force following the “Glorious Revolution” and passage of the English Bill of Rights. Colonial assemblies—asserting the rights of Englishmen—likewise acquired dominion over provincial expenditures as a product of their power to tax. The delegates’ state legislatures also held both the powers to raise and expend tax revenues.

367. That the Convention exceeded its congressional charter caused some delegates consternation. E.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 103, at 177 (June 9, 1787) (Remarks of William Patterson):

The Convention . . . was formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs . . . .
That the amendment of the confederacy was the object of all the laws and commissions on the subject; that the articles of the confederation were therefore the proper basis of all the proceedings of the Convention. We ought to keep within its limits, or we should be charged by our constituents with usurpation.

The Convention also did not bother, as the Continental Congress had directed, to return to Congress for its approval upon completing its work. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 244, at 102.

368. Even the conservative “New Jersey Plan,” which advocated amending the existing Articles of Confederation, made provision for federal revenue independent of the states. 1 FARRAND, supra note 103, at 243.
The issue of control over the national fisc was initially enmeshed with the controversy over the method of representation in the Senate, which became the subject of the Convention’s “Great Compromise” between large and small states. On 2 July 1787, the Convention reached an impasse over the formula for Senate representation. The Convention had earlier voted for proportional representation in the House of Representatives.

In an attempt to break the deadlock, the delegates appointed a Committee of Eleven (the “Grand Committee”), comprised of a delegate from each state. On 5 July 1787, the Grand Committee issued its report, recommending—as part of the compromise giving states equal representation in the Senate—that both the power to raise and to appropriate money be reserved exclusively to the House of Representatives. Included was the first version of the appropriations clause considered by the Convention:

That all Bills for raising or appropriating money and for fixing the salaries of the Officers of the Government of the United States, shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature [House of Representatives], and shall not be altered or amended by the second Branch [Senate]—and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first Branch [House of Representatives].

Thus, as originally conceived, the appropriations clause was designed to secure the House of Representatives’ dominance over government finance, and to ensure that it alone could authorize the expenditure of public funds, even to the exclusion of the other branch of the legislative department—the Senate.

On 24 July 1787, the Convention appointed a five-member Committee of Detail “to report a Constitution conformable to the Resolutions
passed by the Convention . . .” 374 The Committee of Detail received no “policy-making authority”; its draft document simply reflected decisions already reached by the Convention. 375 On 6 August 1787, the committee reported its draft constitution to the Convention. With respect to the powers of taxation and appropriation, the Committee of Detail changed the style, but not the substance, of the Grand Committee’s provision:

All Bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the Officers of the Government, shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives. 376

The question of whether money bills should originate in the House garnered discussion, but was ultimately accepted. 377 By contrast, the question of whether the Senate should have a role in government finance was the subject of heated argument, notably between large and small states. 378 On 13 August, the Convention rejected the provision precluding Senate participation in bills to raise and appropriate money. 379


374. 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 372, at 317 (Aug. 24, 1787). The Convention agreed to establish the Committee the previous day. Id. at 311 (Aug. 23, 1787).

375. Clinton, supra note 284, at 906.

376. 2 FARRAND, supra note 103, at 178 (emphasis added).

377. 1 Id. at 526-29 (July 5, 1787), 543-47 (July 6, 1787); see also WARREN, supra note 316, at 274-77. It passed on 6 July 1787 by a five-to-three margin. 1 FARRAND, supra note 103, at 539, 547. Over half the states had similar provisions in their constitutions. See supra note 339, and accompanying text.

378. 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 372, at 388-95; see supra note 373.

379. 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 372, at 395.
On 31 August 1787, the Convention selected a new committee of eleven to consider “parts of the Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of Reports as have not been acted on” (including the yet to be resolved issue of Senate participation in money bills). The committee of eleven issued its report on 5 September 1787, recommending the Senate be empowered to alter or amend tax bills originated in the House, and to participate fully in spending bills. The committee continued to link the appropriations clause to Congress’ authority to raise revenue, but recast the provision to reflect the proposed Senate role:

[A]ll Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of representatives and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate: No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.

The recast provision abandoned the reference to the House’s exclusive role in framing appropriations bills. The Senate became a full partner in originating, amending, and enacting bills to spend public funds. This necessitated a shift in the focus of the appropriations clause, which now recognized that joint action of both houses of Congress was required before money could be drawn from the treasury rather than simply the action of the House. The Convention acceded to the new provision on 8 September.

Also on 8 September 1787, the Convention established a Committee of Style “to revise the stile and arrange the articles which have been agreed to by the House.” The Committee of Style reported on 12 September 1787. For the first time, the appropriations clause was split from the origination clause and inserted in article I, section 9, taking its present form: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”

Importantly, while Convention delegates expressed disagreement over the relative roles of the House of Representatives and Senate in public finance, they never wavered from the understanding that both taxation and appropriation would fall within the exclusive domain of Congress. The

380. Id. at 502.
381. 2 Farrand, supra note 103, at 505 (emphasis added).
382. Id. at 545.
383. 2 Debates in the Federal Convention, supra note 372, at 538.
384. Id. at 549.
only question was whether the House would exercise the power of the purse to the exclusion of the Senate.

Gregory Sidak suggests that “the scant discussion of the appropriations clause at the Constitutional Convention does more to cast doubt than to remove it when determining whether the Framers intended Congress to have the exclusive ability to approve the disbursement of public monies.”

This contention lacks merit for several reasons.

First, Sidak overlooks the fact that the appropriations clause was an integral part the delegates’ extensive debate over which house of Congress would exercise control over bills to raise and appropriate revenue. The Framers considered the clause in the context of allocating the constitutional power to tax and spend. That the delegates did not discuss the appropriations clause in connection with an autonomous presidential power to expend public funds is understandable: the thought likely never occurred to them.

In constructing the appropriations clause, the Framers did not write on a “clean slate.” The lessons of British and colonial history as well as their own experience under colonial and state charters guided their work. By 1787, the exclusivity of legislative control of the purse was accepted doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic. Appropriations clauses were not novel; the English Bill of Rights, enacted nearly a century earlier, contained such a provision, as did the constitutions of several states. The notion that the executive department should share the power of the purse would have been alien to the Convention delegates, if not downright outlandish.

Second, this conclusion is even more compelling when one considers that the Framers contemplated the power to spend in association with the power to tax; even the most ardent supporters of an independent presidential spending power do not dispute that the latter is exclusively legislative in character. The Framers obviously perceived the spending and taxing

385. Sidak, supra note 57, at 1171; see also James D. Humphrey II, Note, supra note 57, at 206 (“[O]ne need only consult the debates of the founders to see that Congress’ spending control is not absolute in every circumstance, and that disputes about executive spending in emergencies are not new.”).

386. 1 W. & M. c. 30 (1689).

387. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, part II, ch. 2, § 1, art. XI; N.H. CONST. of 1784, (Executive Power- President) ¶ 14, N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art X VI.

388. See, e.g., Lewittes, supra note 57, at 1156-57.
powers to be two sides of the same coin, and in allocating powers among the coordinate departments, they did not separate taxing and spending. Indeed, not until the Committee on Style (which was tasked only to “stile and arrange” the articles already agreed to by the Convention\(^{389}\)) rearranged the Constitution in the final days of the Convention was the appropriations clause detached from the origination clause.

Third, the Framers also considered the appropriations clause in the context of the legislative process. The origination clause, to which the appropriations clause was attached for most of the Convention, referred to bills for raising revenue or appropriating money, and the debate centered on the Senate’s role in the process of enacting those bills into law.\(^{390}\) In penning the term “appropriations made by law,” the Framers must have similarly envisioned legislation passed either by the House alone (early in the Convention) or jointly by the House and Senate (in the final version).\(^{391}\)

Fourth, it is utterly inconceivable that the Framers would have intended the President to share the power of the purse without at least one delegate making mention of the fact during the deliberations. The Framers were certainly not reticent about such matters, as their clash over the Senate’s participation in money bills illustrates. Given the centrality of public finance in eighteenth-century political thought—the view that the power of the purse was tied directly to the “existence of civil rights and the integrity of representative institutions”\(^{392}\)—one would expect at least a modicum of discussion.

In this regard, the historical record of the Convention is wholly devoid of any indication the Framers meant to confer upon the President authority to expend funds without the prior congressional approval. As observed above, only the Constitution’s vesting clause could possibly serve as a textual source of presidential spending authority.\(^{393}\) Unfortu-

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389. 2 Debates in the Federal Convention, supra note 372, at 538.
391. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
392. Ferguson, supra note 273, at xiv-xv; see also 1 Farrand, supra note 103, at 342 (June 20, 1787) (Remarks of Roger Sherman) (“money matters [are] the most important of all . . .”); 2 Debates in the Federal Convention, supra note 372, at 390-91 (Aug. 13, 1787) (Remarks of James Wilson) (“War, Commerce, & Revenue were the great objects of Gen. Government. All of them are connected with money.”).
393. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
nately, the clause was inserted without debate, and has become what
Charles Thach described as the “joker” in the constitutional deck. For
the Framers to have intended — without comment — for the vesting clause
to include a presidential appropriations authority, the term “executive
power” (which is what is “vested”) must necessarily have been viewed in
the eighteenth century as including the authority to appropriate funds. Of
course, that simply was not the case.

Fifth, the Convention delegates did, in fact, express their understand-
ing that Congress alone would control the purse, voicing concerns about
possible presidential encroachments on the spending power and the danger
that the power might be exercised elsewhere than in the representative
assembly. For example, in contemplating a possible presidential veto,
Benjamin Franklin voiced the fear that the president might use the power
to extort money from the treasury. George Mason warned against plac-
ing the “purse and the sword” in the same hands.

In advocating a Senate role in money bills, James Wilson remarked that,

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394. 2 Debates in the Federal Convention, supra note 372, at 461 (Aug. 24, 1787); see also Warren, supra note 316, at 525-26.
395. Thach, supra note 271, at 138.
396. See Monaghan, supra note 92, at 22-23 (Whatever “residuum” of executive authority is included in the vesting clause is what remained of executive power “after the [Constitution’s] enormous reallocation of former Crown powers to Congress or the Senate.”). The only check on Congress’ appropriations power given the President is the veto. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see Wolfson, supra note 264, at 844.
397. Id. at 103, supra note 103, at 99 (June 4, 1787) (Remarks of Benjamin Franklin): He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legis-
islature, under the proprietary Government of Pena. The negative of the
Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law
whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An
increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition;
till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on
the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might
actually receive the former before he should sign the latter . . . . He was
afraid, if a negative should be demanded, till at last eno’ would be gotten
to influence & bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will
of the Executive.
398. Id. at 144 (June 6, 1787) (Remarks of George Mason). Mason was concerned
about the legislature exercising both powers at once since the Convention had not yet
agreed upon the executive’s authority. See also id. at 346 (June 20, 1787) (Remarks of
James Madison).
[w]ith regard to the purse strings, it was to be observed that the purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of the H. of Rep., the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur in untying, and of what importance could it be which untied first, which last.399

Wilson did not discern a “third string,” to be controlled independently of Congress by the President, but obviously believed Congress alone could permit access to the treasury.

Elbridge Gerry, who opposed giving the Senate a role in the fiscal process, argued: “Taxation and representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses.”400 Similarly, John Dickinson urged the delegates to consider the lessons of British history before surrendering the power of the purse to a nonrepresentative body: “Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English Constitution . . . . And has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills to the immediate representatives of the people.”401

Madison moved to empower the Senate to enter treaties of peace without presidential approval, fearing the President, who “would necessarily derive so much power and importance from a state of war,” might be tempted “to impede a treaty of peace.”402 Responding to Madison’s motion, Nathaniel Gorham “thought the precaution unnecessary as the means of carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President, but of the Legislature.”403 The following day, opposing a two-thirds requirement in the Senate for peace treaties, Gouverneur Morris argued that congressional control over peace was preferable to the more traditional, but “disagreeable mode, of negating the supplies for the war.”404

As the Convention debates reflect, the Framers presupposed legislative control of the purse. They perceived such control as essential to rep-

399. 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 372, at 390 (Aug. 13, 1787).
400. Id. at 391 (Aug. 13, 1787) (emphasis added).
401. Id. at 393-94 (Aug. 13, 1787) (emphasis added). Dickinson believed, however, that the Senate should have the power to amend money bills, as was the case in a number of states. Id.
402. Id. at 530 (Sept. 7, 1787).
403. Id. (emphasis added).
404. Id. at 533 (Sept. 8, 1787) (emphasis added).
resentative democracy and as an important check on the President, particularly his power to engage the nation in war.  

Finally, the suggestion is made by Sidak and others that the Framers would not have given the President broad constitutional responsibilities and then permitted Congress to hold the exercise of those responsibilities hostage by refusing to appropriate the funds necessary to carry them out. Gregory Sidak puts it most persuasively, writing:

The Framers would not have assigned to the President such responsibilities as the making of treaties, the commanding of the armed forces, and the faithful execution of the laws if they expected Congress could selectively veto the execution of these functions by defunding them. There must exist an implied power for the President to obligate the Treasury, at least for the minimum amount necessary for him to perform the duties and exercise the prerogatives that article I imposes on his office.

As sympathetic as one might be to this view, it is clear from the records of the Convention and the historical setting in which the Framers worked that this is exactly what the Framers intended. Indeed, this view carries implications Convention delegates would have not only rejected, but found patently abhorrent. To have conceded a presidential authority to spend money— independent of congressional authorization — the Framers would have effectively relinquished any congressional check on the President (except impeachment).  

405. See Yoo, supra note 125, at 268.

406. Sidak, supra note 57, at 1253; see also id. at 1172 ("[O]ne interpretation of the appropriations clause that finds no historical support in the 1787 proceedings . . . is one claiming that the ability to authorize the disbursement of public funds was a power granted exclusively to Congress, so as to give Congress in effect a veto over the Executive in its performance of any of its constitutionally assigned functions."); LeBoeuf, supra note 55, at 475 n.126 ("Since Congress cannot repeal the Constitution, it cannot accomplish the same end by failing to appropriate funds necessary to enforce the Constitution."); Bryan, supra note 56, at 597 ("Surely, Congress cannot limit, condition, or withhold an appropriation to regulate and control independent executive functions."); cf. Panel Discussion, The Appropriations Power, supra note 55, at 653 (Geoffrey Miller) (President can spend money in absence of appropriation if required to carry out constitutional responsibilities.).

407. See Russell Dean Covey, Note, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: Separation of Powers & Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE L.J. 1311, 1330 (1996) ("Congress would be helpless to . . . limit executive discretion if the President had an independent authority to appropriate funds.").
Sidak, for example, would limit such presidential authority to the “minimum amount” required to fulfill constitutional responsibilities; however, the President alone would seemingly judge what constitutes the “minimum amount,” effectively negating congressional input into presidential activities. Moreover, the federal government’s resources are finite, and Congress must decide how to allocate scarce resources among competing programs, both domestic and foreign. By drawing money from the Treasury without congressional approval, the President essentially would dictate national spending priorities, compelling Congress either to abandon programs it might have deemed a higher priority or to raise taxes or the national debt to meet the increased funding requirements.

Further, once such implied presidential spending authority is acknowledged, nothing logically confines its application to expenditures related to foreign affairs or national security. For example, acting under the “Take Care” clause, the President might deem congressional appropriations for the environment, welfare, or education insufficient to fulfill constitutional requirements or statutory directives, thereby impelling expenditures on his own authority.

And what if the Treasury did not have sufficient funds to satisfy the expenses the President believed necessary? If Congress cannot “veto” the President’s constitutional activities by refusing appropriations, how can it logically do so simply by refusing to raise taxes sufficient to fund those activities? Does the President have the authority to levy the taxes or incur the debt required to fulfill his “minimum” responsibilities?

Charles I and his judges believed the executive had such authority, but Charles was beheaded and his judges were impeached defending the principle. As heirs of both British and American notions of representative democracy, built on the foundation of exclusive legislative control of tax-

408. “Minimum,” in Sidak’s view, is not necessarily equivalent to “cheap.” He might, for example, find procurement of President Reagan’s proposed anti-ballistic missile defense system—a program costing billions of dollars—to be encompassed by the President’s implied spending authority. Sidak, supra note 57; see also supra note 71.
409. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3 (The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”).
411. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
the Framers would have unquestionably repudiated such a concept out of hand.412

3. The Ratification Debates

The conclusion that the Framers intended Congress alone to exercise the power of the purse becomes even more apparent when one considers the ratification debates. Conducted from 1787 to 1789,413 James Madison later judged the ratification debates to be more important than the Convention for defining the provisions of the Constitution: “If we were to look . . . for the meaning of [the Constitution] beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution.”414

Two arguments lodged by the Anti-Federalists were central to Congress’ control over appropriations,415 and the Federalist responses to them further elucidate the Founders’ intent to make Congress’ control exclusive.

412. Confronting an analogous argument—that Congress was constitutionally constrained to provide funds for the President’s diplomatic establishment—Albert Gallatin responded:

The doctrine is as novel as it is absurd. . . . Though there is no clause which directs that Congress shall be bound to appropriate money in order to carry into effect any of the Executive powers, some gentlemen, recurring to the metaphysical subtleties, and abandoning the literal and plain sense of the Constitution, say that . . . we . . . are under a moral obligation in this instance to grant the money. It is evident that where the Constitution has lodged the power, there exists the right of acting, and the right of discretion.

7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1121-22 (Mar. 1, 1798).

413. Clinton, supra note 284, at 910. By the time the First Congress met in 1789, eleven states were members of the Union. Currie, The First Congress, supra note 361, at 833-34. Of the original thirteen states, North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet ratified the Constitution. In November 1789, North Carolina, which had earlier withheld ratification, entered the Union. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 244, at 128. Rhode Island ratified the document in March 1790. Id.

414. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 776 (Apr. 6, 1796):

[Whatever] veneration might be entertained for the body of men who formed our Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracle guide in expounding the Constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and vitality were breathed into it by the voice of the people speaking through the several State Conventions.

415. This is not to suggest the Anti-Federalists spoke with one voice; they were not a monolithic group. See Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39, 64 (1989).
First, the Anti-Federalists asserted that the establishment of a strong national government, which held both the powers of the purse and of the sword, would invite tyranny capable of oppressing the states. For example, Goudy from North Carolina asserted during the state convention:

The subject of our consideration therefore is, whether it be proper to give any man, or set of men, an unlimited power over our purse, without any kind of control. The purse-strings are given up by this clause. The sword is also given up by this system. Is there no danger in giving up both? . . . When the powers of the purse and the sword are given up, we dare not think for ourselves. In case of war, the last man and the last penny would be extorted from us. That the Constitution has a tendency to destroy state governments, must be clear to every man of common understanding.

In a similar vein, contending the Constitution created a national government without “a single federal feature in it,” Patrick Henry argued in the Virginia convention that,

...the sword and the purse included every thing of consequence. And shall we trust them out of our hands without checks and barriers? The sword and purse are essentially necessary for the gov-

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416. At the core of the Anti-Federalists’ politics was a close and active relationship between the citizen and his government . . . . Because [these] political values could be realized only in a relatively small community, the Constitution made the fundamental mistake in shifting the locus of power from the states, where genuine republican power was possible, to a central government, where it was not. Jennifer Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitution, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 340, 343, 345 (1982) (book review); see also Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Representation, & Party, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 12, 26 (1989) (“Anti-Federalists insisted that representation be rooted in small communities and local forums . . . .”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of the Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 905 (1985) (Anti-Federalists viewed “sweeping language” of the Constitution as leading “inexorably to the effective consolidation of the states into a single body politic with a single, omnipotent government.”); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 74, 93 (1989) (Anti-Federalists believed “[a] centralized government. . . . would destroy effective liberty and self-rule, which was necessarily local.”).

417. 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 93 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) (Ayer Co. 1987) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates].
ernment. Every essential requisite must be in Congress. Where are the purse and sword of Virginia? They must go to Congress. What has become of your country? The Virginian government is but a name . . . . Where are your checks? The most essential objects of government are to be administered by Congress. How, then, can the state governments be any check upon them?418

Second, Anti-Federalists assailed the creation of an executive, particularly one that would command the armed forces.419 For example, in his now-famous speech to the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry declared:

Your President may easily become king . . . . Where are the checks in this government? . . .

If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how easy is it for him to render himself absolute! The army is in his hands, and if he be a man of address, it will be attached to him, and it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the first auspicious moment to accomplish his design; and, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this happens? I would rather infinitely— and I am sure most of this Convention is of the same opinion— have a king, lords, and commons, than a government so replete with insupportable evils. If we make a king, we may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people, and interpose such checks as shall prevent him from infringing them; but the President, in the field, at the head of his army, can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master . . . .420

In Pennsylvania, the Anti-Federalist “Philadelphiensis” similarly equated the President to a monarch because of his command of the nation’s military forces:

Who can deny but the president general will be a king to all intents and purposes, and one of the most dangerous kinds too; a king elected to command a standing army? Thus our laws are to

418. 3 Id. at 395-96; see also 2 id at 375 (Remarks of Mr. Lansing) (“[W]herever the revenues and the military force are, there will rest the power: the members or the head will prevail, as one or the other possesses these advantages.”); 2 id. at 376-77 (Remarks of M. Smith) (powers should be divided between state and central governments).

419. See Yoo, supra note 125, at 273.

420. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 417, at 59.
be administered by this tyrant; for the whole, or at least the most important part of the executive department is in his hands.421

Miller of North Carolina challenged vesting the President with command of the armed forces, arguing Congress should direct the military instead. He thought that,

his influence would be too great in the country, and particularly over the military, by being commander-in-chief of the army, navy, and militia . . . . He considered it as a defect in the Constitution, that it was not expressly provided that Congress should have the direction of the motions of the army.422

The Federalists responded to the Anti-Federalist attack by stressing legislative supremacy in the new government, particularly congressional control over the public fisc.423 James Madison answered the claim that the Constitution invited tyranny by putting both the purse and the sword in the hands of the national government by reminding Virginia convention delegates that placing both powers in the hands of the same government did not violate the “maxim” of separated powers. Instead, the “maxim” only required that the purse and the sword not be held by the same person or body. The Constitution, he assured, sufficiently separated the powers by

421. Philadelphiaensis, Essay IX, Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal (Feb. 16, 1788), in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 57, 58 (John R. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also An Old Whig, Essay V, Philadelphia Indep. Gazetteer (Nov. 1, 1787), in 13 id. at 538 (President to become king by virtue of his powers); Cato, Essay IV, N.Y. Journal (Nov. 8, 1787), in 14 id. at 7, 10-11 (arguing President more powerful than a king); Letter from William Dickson to Robert Dickson (Nov. 30, 1787), in 14 id. at 311, 312 (easy for President to become king with investment of “Sole command of Armies and no Rival to Circumvent him”); Curtiopolis, Essay, N.Y. Daily Advertiser (Jan. 18, 1788), in 15 id. at 399, 401 (in criticizing military authority of President, stated: “should he hereafter be a Jew, our dear posterity may be ordered to rebuild Jerusalem”); Tamony, Essay, Virginia Indep. Chron. (Jan. 9, 1788), in 15 id. at 322, 323-24 (commander-in-chief power will make the President a king); Luther Martin, Genuine Information IX, Baltimore Md. Gazette (Jan. 29, 1788), in 15 id. at 494, 498 (President can become king through command of army, navy, and militia); Extract of Letter from William Pierce to St. George Tucker (Sept. 28, 1787), reprinted in Gazette of St. of Ga. (Mar. 20, 1788), in 16 id. at 442, 445 (“most solid objection” to the new Constitution is the authority given to the President, which is as great as possessed by the King of England).

422. 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 417, at 114.

423. See Pious, supra note 290, at 39; Sofaer, supra note 120, at 41; Yoo, supra note 125, at 279-80; see also Major Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 Mil. L. Rev. 83, 128-29 (1993) (describing debates over the “purse” and the “sword”).
ensuring they were not in the hands of the same governmental department. Significantly, he stressed that, as in Great Britain, the legislature alone held the constitutional power of the purse:

[T]he honorable gentleman [Patrick Henry] has laid much stress on the maxim, that the purse and sword ought not to be put in the same hands, with a view of pointing out the impropriety of vesting this power in the general government. But it is totally inapplicable to this question. What is the meaning of this maxim? Does it mean that the sword and purse ought not to be trusted in the hands of the same government? This cannot be the meaning; for there never was, and I can say there never will be, an efficient government, in which both are not vested. The only rational meaning is, that the sword and purse are not to be given to the same member. Apply it to the British government, . . . [t]he sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse in the hands of Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist . . . The purse is in the hands of the representatives of the people. They have the appropriation of all moneys.424

Federalists likewise emphasized Congress’ control of the purse as the principal check on the President, particularly in his role as commander-in-chief. For example, George Nicholas opened the Virginia convention with an obvious reference to the appropriations clause, telling delegates that Congress’ “consent is necessary to all acts or resolutions for the appropriation of public money.”425 Attempting to alleviate fears of the executive, Nicholas traced the history of Parliament to establish the importance of the power of the purse in limiting executive authority:

The House of Commons have succeeded also by withholding supplies; they can, by this power, put a stop to the operations of government, which they have been able to direct as they pleased. This power has enabled them to triumph over all obstacles; it is so important that it will in the end swallow up all others. Any branch of government that depends on the will of another for supplies of money, must be in a state of subordinate dependence, let it have what other powers it may. Our representatives, in this

424. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 417, at 393 (emphasis added). In New York, Alexander Hamilton replied in a like manner: “[W]here the purse is lodged in one branch, and the sword in another, there can be no danger, . . . These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system, but only to its separate branches.” 2 id at 349. 425. 3 id. at 15.
case, will be perfectly independent, being vested with this power fully. 426

Also trying to reassure the Virginia delegates about the Constitution’s constraints on the executive, Edmund Randolph stated that the President “can handle no part of the public money except what is given him by law.” 427 Clearly, neither Nicholas nor Randolph were concerned about the President’s reliance on Congress for the funds needed to carry out his constitutional responsibilities. Indeed, presidential dependence on Congress for financial support was central to their defense of the Constitution.

In North Carolina, Richard Dobbs Spaight answered delegate Miller’s fear of executive despotism flowing from the President’s command authority by observing that “it is true that the command of the army and navy was given to the President; but that Congress, who had the power of raising armies, could certainly prevent any abuse of that authority in the President—that they alone had the means of supporting armies…” 428 During the South Carolina debates, Charles Pinckney defended Article II of the Constitution by downplaying the President’s power, noting: “He is the commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces, but he can neither raise nor support forces by his own authority.” 429 T. Dawes of Massachusetts similarly met arguments against the possibility of standing armies under the Constitution by observing the legislature alone could raise and support them. 430

Outside the state conventions, the Federalists advanced similar positions. For example, in an early defense of the presidency, Tench Coxe, writing as “An American Citizen,” emphasized the relative weakness of the new executive, including that “[h]e shall have no power over the treasuries of the state.” 431 In a later essay, Coxe delineated the power of the House of Representatives, observing that under the Constitution, “[w]ithout their consent no monies can be obtained, no armies raised, no

426. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
427. Id. at 201.
428. 4 id. at 114 (emphasis added).
429. Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
430. 2 id. at 97-98.
431. An American Citizen, Essay I: On the Federal Government, Philadelphia Indep. Gazetteer (Sept. 26, 1787), in 13 Documentary History, supra note 421, at 247, 251 (emphasis in the original); see also An Impartial Citizen, Petersburg Va. Gazette (Jan. 10, 1788), in 8 id. at 293, 295 (“Nor can [the President] appropriate the public money to any use but what is expressly appropriated by law.”).
The Federalist Cassius answered assertions about the inadequacy of the House of Representatives’ power by claiming: “How can it be said that they want power, when no act, however, trivial, can take place without their assent, and not one shilling of the public money can be touched without their approbation?”

In *The Federalist Nos. 24* and 26, Alexander Hamilton addressed fears of a standing army by pointing to the constitutional necessity of legislative appropriations to raise an army, remarking that Congress could not lawfully vest the executive with permanent funds for this purpose. Likewise, Hamilton remarked in *The Federalist No. 78* that the executive “holds the sword of the community[,]” but “[t]he legislature commands the purse . . . .”

James Madison defended the ability of the House of Representatives to fend off encroachments by the other branches, comparing it to the House of Commons and highlighting its constitutional authority to refuse absolutely to provide the supplies required by other government departments:

The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse— that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and gradually reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown

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434. *The Federalist* No. 24, at 158 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); id. No. 26 at 171 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Oct. 8, 1877), in 10 Papers of James Madison 188-89 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1977) (“President is to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, but Congress are to raise and provide for them . . . .”); Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast (Dec. 24, 1787), in 14 Documentary History, supra note 421, at 193,203 (“remember that in the United States a standing army cannot be raised or kept up without the consent of the people, by their representatives in Congress . . . .”) (emphasis in the original).

prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.436

Like the record of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates demonstrate the Founders meant for Congress alone to exercise the power of the purse. Further, that the Founders could have intended the President to share in the authority to draw funds from the treasury without generating an outcry from the Anti-Federalists is simply unimaginable. The Anti-Federalists were highly concerned about the President assuming monarchical powers and becoming a despot.437 They also were not reluctant to voice their objections to the Constitution in the strongest terms, including the document’s provisions governing control of the nation’s purse strings.438 Surely had the Anti-Federalists supposed the Constitution permitted the President to appropriate money without Congress’ approval—a power long denied the British king—they would have reacted like sharks sensing blood.439

Nothing in the Federalists’ public utterances supports the conclusion that they envisioned the President exercising independent spending authority. Their comments uniformly reflect their belief that Congress alone would control the nation’s purse. Their defense of the Constitution was based on this very principle.

436. The Federalist No. 58, at 359 (James Madison), (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also James McHenry, Address to the Maryland State House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), in 14 Documentary History, supra note 421, at 279, 283-84 (describing effect of appropriations clause).

437. See supra notes 420-21 and accompanying text.

438. For example, Anti-Federalists criticized the Senate’s role in the fiscal process because senators were not representatives of the people. See, e.g., George Mason, Essay, Centinel (Nov. 21, 1787), in 14 Documentary History, supra note 421, at 149, 150; Cincinnatus, Essay IV: To James Wilson, Esq., N.Y. Journal (Nov. 22, 1787), in 14 id. at 186, 188 (criticizing fact that Senate exercises power that House of Lords cannot, because this power “has been guarded by the representatives of the people there, with the most strenuous solicitude as one of the vital principles of democratic liberty”).

C. Custom: The Spending Power in Practice

Before money can legally issue from the Treasury for any purpose, there must be a law authorising an expenditure and designating the object and the fund.440

The President of the United States cannot spend a nickel. Only Congress can authorize the spending of money.441

1. The Significance of Custom

Writing in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,442 Justice Felix Frankfurter observed:

Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.443

Thus, custom—or long-standing practice—serves as a reference in discerning the meaning of the constitutional text. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the usefulness of custom in interpreting the Constitution. In the 1803 case of Stuart v. Laird,444 the Court answered a challenge


442. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

443. Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also ANN VAN WYNE N THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 8 (1982) (“[T]he Constitution is only an outline of government. Its lacunae may be filled by governmental practices which take place within its word boundaries.”).

444. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
to the use of Supreme Court justices as circuit justices by refusing to overturn a practice that had started with the Judiciary Act of 1789\(^{445}\) and had been acquiesced in ever since.\(^{446}\)

Thereafter, the Court has not been reluctant to rely on custom or usage as a tool of constitutional interpretation, particularly in adjudicating the boundaries of executive and legislative power. Since both the President and Congress are capable of protecting their own constitutional turf, the Court has generally acceded to the long-standing arrangements reached by the two coordinate departments of government. This deference is exemplified by *United States v. Midwest Oil Co.*\(^{447}\) At issue was the President’s authority to withdraw public lands that Congress, by general statute, had opened to public acquisition. Noting that presidents had, by executive order, reserved federal lands from the public without congressional objection over the previous eighty years, the Court refused to disturb the practice:

> Government is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department—on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself—even when the validity of the practice is the subject of the investigation.\(^{448}\)

\(^{445}\) Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 74-75.

\(^{446}\) *Stuart v. Laird*, 5 U.S. at 309:

> To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under [the Constitution] for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irrefutable answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now be disturbed.

\(^{447}\) 236 U.S. 459 (1914).

The Court has been especially solicitous of practices having their origin in the first executive administration and Congress after ratification. The construction placed upon the Constitution by “men who were contemporaneous with its formation” has been accorded considerable weight because many of the nation’s early leaders, both in the executive department and in Congress, were members of the constitutional and ratification convention. Thus, practices begun “virtually coincident with the birth of the Nation suggest[] that the Framers intended to permit such acts.”

Of course, custom has its limits. Foremost, of course, is “[t]hat an unconstitutional action [that] has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.” The spending power is a case in point. The Constitution vests, in unmistakable language, exclusive authority to appropriate public funds in Congress. In such circumstances, presidential spending in the absence of congressional approval is not precedent, it is simply usurpation of congressional authority.

In addition, custom must be predicated on objective discernible criteria. With respect to questions relating to boundaries of presidential power, isolated actions or mere declarations of authority by the executive are insufficient to establish a usage upon which the Court will rely; rather, the Court requires a long-standing practice about which Congress has knowledge and in which it acquiesces. In this regard, Professor Michael Glennon provides a useful three-part test in applying custom to separation of


450. Glennon, supra note 119, at 67.


453. See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 474; Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 690; American Int’l Group, Inc., 657 F.2d at 443; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution 70 (1990).
powers issues: (1) “the custom in question must consist of acts; mere assertions of executive or legislative authority to act are insufficient”; (2) “the other branch must have notice of its occurrence”; and (3) “that branch must have acquiesced in the custom; a custom . . . must have been intended by both political branches to represent a juridical norm.”

Using Professor Glennon’s formulation as a guide, proponents of an independent presidential spending authority find little solace in historical practice. While Congress and the President have frequently clashed at the fringes of the appropriations power, no President has ever directly challenged Congress’ appropriations authority by asserting a constitutional prerogative to spend public funds. Moreover, while presidents have, during times of national emergency, spent money without prior congressional approval, they have never claimed their actions were lawful or that they possessed the constitutional authority to spend funds independent of Congress. Instead, on each occasion, they have returned to Congress to seek approval for the expenditures.

2. General Practice

Except for the qualified veto, presidents did not exercise a formal role in the formulation of appropriations and spending priorities until well into the twentieth century. Early congresses viewed the Secretary of the Treasury as an arm of the legislative department in regard to their taxing and spending powers, and depended upon the Secretary to determine the sums required for the administration and defense of the nation. In 1795, after Alexander Hamilton’s resignation, executive department secretaries began transmitting their spending estimates directly to Congress, “bypassing both the Treasury and the President, a decentralization that lasted more than a century.”


455. See Eli E. Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign Relations, 286 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145 (1953). Of course, it is also highly unlikely that Congress would acquiesce in such an assertion if it were ever made.

456. See Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President & the Law, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 322-23 (1952) [hereinafter Wilmerding, The President & the Law].


458. Fisher, President & Congress, supra note 286, at 86-88; Casper, supra note 89, at 9-10.
With the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,\footnote{460} the President finally assumed a formal role in the formulation of federal budgets. The Act required that he submit a proposed budget, including tax and spending legislation, to Congress annually.\footnote{461} The Act also established the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) to assist the President in his responsibilities.\footnote{462} The President’s new statutory role did not, however, give him an executive power of the purse; Congress alone still determined funding levels and the objects for which expenditures could be made.\footnote{463}

Moreover, when, as a result of his new responsibilities, the President became overly dominant in the budget debate—essentially setting the framework for spending priorities—Congress enacted the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974\footnote{465} to level the playing field and preserve its prerogatives over the nation’s purse strings. The Act gave Congress the tools to reestablish control over the budget, particularly by creating the House and Senate budget committees and the Congressional Budget Office, both of which enabled Congress to plan fiscal policy.\footnote{466}

Even with the statutory authority to propose spending priorities, Presidents have acceded to Congress’ power to dispose of their proposals. Moreover, Congress has not acquiesced in an overly powerful presidential voice in the appropriations process, protecting its prerogative through the

\footnote{459} PIOUS, supra note 290, at 257; see also 1 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 40, at 1-9; Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593, 602 (1988) [hereinafter Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution].

\footnote{460} Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20. For a discussion of the events leading up to the Act, see FISHER, PRESIDENT & CONGRESS, supra note 286, at 97-103.

\footnote{461} Budget & Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 201, 42 Stat. 20; see also 1 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 40, at 1-9; Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution, supra note 459, at 602.

\footnote{462} Budget & Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 207, 42 Stat. 22; see also PIOUS, supra note 290, at 257-58; 1 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 40, at 1-9 to 1-10.

\footnote{463} “There is no question both from the text of the Act and the legislative history that the budget is nothing more than a proposal to Congress for the Congress to act upon as it pleases.” Local 2677, American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 73 (D.D.C. 1973) (footnote omitted); see also Devins, supra note 457, at 999-1000.

\footnote{464} Id.; 1 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 40, at 1-10.


\footnote{466} Mikva, supra note 89, at 7.
enactment of statutory mechanisms needed to secure its centrality in the process.

Friction has also perennially existed between the legislative and executive departments over the manner in which Congress exercises its appropriations authority and the manner in which the executive department spends appropriated funds. For instance, early spending legislation spawned controversy over the appropriate degree of specificity in appropriations acts. The first appropriations acts were very general, prompting some members of Congress to protest about a usurpation of their spending authority. Later acts became more detailed, triggering complaints from the executive department about being hamstrung by legislative minutiae. Congress also often complained about the executive practice of shifting funds from one appropriation to another. These are disputes, however, at the edge of congressional power; none reach the core

467. The first appropriations act was remarkably short, providing:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there be appropriated for the service of the present year, to be paid out of the monies which arise, either from the requisitions heretofore made upon the several states, or from the duties on impost and tonnage, the following sums, viz.*

- A sum not exceeding two hundred and sixteen thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of the civil list, under the late and present government;
- A sum not exceeding one hundred and thirty-seven thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of the department of war;
- A sum not exceeding one hundred and ninety thousand dollars for discharging the warrants issued by the late board of treasury, and remaining unsatisfied; and
- A sum not exceeding ninety-six thousand dollars for paying pensions to invalids.

Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 95. (emphasis in original).

468. For example, Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania complained that:

a general appropriation of above a half a million dollars — the particulars not mentioned — the estimates on which it is founded may be mislaid or changed; in fact, it is giving to the Secretary [of the Treasury] the money for him to account for as he pleases. This is certainly all wrong. The estimate should have formed part of the bill, or should have been recited in it.


469. *See Corwin, supra* note 115, at 150.

470. Letter from Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 5, 1798), in *21 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton* 396,397 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974): “The management of the Treasury becomes more and more difficult. The Legislature will not pass laws in gross. Their appropriations are minute; Gallatin, to whom they yield, is evidently intending to break down this department, by charging it with impractical detail.”
issue of Congress’ exclusive control over expenditures. Further, they generally demonstrate Congress’ unwillingness to surrender any of its appropriations authority to the executive.

On occasion, presidents have vetoed or otherwise objected to appropriations containing various conditions or riders that presidents have perceived as infringing upon their constitutional prerogatives. Importantly, presidential objections in such cases are directed towards the offending condition or rider — which are usually peripheral to the authority to expend funds — rather than the appropriation itself. Presidents have not traditionally ignored express prohibitions on the expenditure of money contained in appropriations acts, and where offending riders and appropriations are inseparable, presidents have refused to expend the money appropriated. Unconstitutional conditions on appropriations have not served as “Get Out of Jail Free” cards, enabling presidents to expend money with impunity, irrespective of legislative restrictions.

For example, President Buchanan protested an 1860 appropriation for the completion of the Washington Aqueduct because the act directed that the money be spent under the superintendence of Captain (later Major General) Montgomery C. Meigs of the Army. Buchanan believed the designation of Meigs interfered with his “clear right . . . to command the Army and to order its officers to any duty he might deem most expedient for the public interest.” Perceiving that Congress had not intended to

471. For example, in 1793, Congressman Giles attempted to censure Alexander Hamilton for mixing the sums appropriated to satisfy debts owed to France and Holland:

The application of appropriations is the most sacred and important trust the Legislature can confer. If they may be made to bend to the will or projecting policy of a Financier, there is an end of all security and confidence . . . [W]here money is appropriated solely to a special purpose, as in the case of the loans, he who executes the law has no degree of power over the appropriation.

3 ANNALS OF CONG. 920-921 (1793). Giles’ resolutions were ultimately defeated. Id. at 963; see also Wilmerding, The Spending Power, supra note 468, at 24-26; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 650-53 (1996). In 1797, Albert Gallatin objected to the Secretary of War’s expenditure of funds inconsistent with the estimates provided by his department, 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2039 (1799), ultimately leading to the first, albeit short-lived, purpose statute. See supra note 40. Congressman Claiborne similarly took exception in 1801 to commingling of appropriations by the Secretary of State, successfully calling for an investigation of the expenditures. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 324 (1801). In 1817, John C. Calhoun assailed the Secretary of War’s use of appropriations for objects not contemplated by Congress: “We have the sole power to raise and apply money. It is the sinew of our strength. Not a cent of money ought to be applied, but by our direction and under our control.” 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 958 (1817).
stop the project in the absence of Meigs, Buchanan interpreted the statute as only expressing a preference for the officer and not conditioning the project’s completion upon his presence.474

In 1876, President Grant objected to language in an act appropriating money for the consular and diplomatic service requiring the closure of certain diplomatic and consular offices. Grant believed the statute’s directive infringed upon his constitutional prerogatives to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.475 The President acknowledged, however, Congress’ authority to terminate the salaries and expenses of the diplomats and consuls he appointed:

It is within the power of Congress to grant or withhold appropriation of money for the payment of salaries and expenses of the foreign representatives of the Government. . . .

. . . In calling attention to the passage which I have indicated I assume that the intention of the provision is only to exercise the constitutional prerogative of Congress over the expenditures of the Government and to fix a time at which the compensation of certain diplomatic and consular officers shall cease . . . .476

472. Meigs had begun to work on the project in late 1852. HARRY C. WAYS, THE WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT 5 (1995). He gained many friends in Congress over the years, in part because of his work on the Capitol extension (notably the dome). Id. at 33; RUSSEL F. WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMY 69-73, 102 (1959) [hereinafter WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL]. This was not the last time Congress demonstrated such confidence in Meigs. An 1882 appropriation for the construction of the Pension Office Building (now the National Building Museum) provided the building was to be built under Meigs’ supervision. Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 433, 22 Stat. 324. Secretary of War Robert Todd Lincoln duly appointed Meigs to manage the project. WAY, supra at 39.

473. 5 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 597, 598 (James D. Richardson ed., GPO, 1897) [hereinafter RICHARDSON]; see also WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, supra note 472, at 104-05.

474. 5 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 598-99. On 18 September 1860, Meigs was relieved from the project and sent to command Fort Jefferson, Florida, in the Dry Tortugas (WAY, supra note 472, at 38) but by 21 February 1861 — after Lincoln took office — Meigs was back at work on the Aqueduct. Id.; WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, supra note 473, at 129. On 13 June 1861, Meigs received a promotion to Brigadier General and was appointed Quartermaster General of the Army. WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, supra note 473, at 165.

475. 7 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 377.

476. Id. at 377-78.
In a 1933 opinion to the President, the Attorney General considered a provision of a bill prohibiting refunds of illegally or erroneously collected taxes in excess of $20,000 without the approval of a joint congressional committee. The Attorney General deemed the provision an unconstitutional usurpation of executive authority. Because the authority to spend the money appropriated was intertwined with the need for joint committee approval, the Attorney General opined that, absent another source of funds, the executive could not issue tax refunds in excess of $20,000:

If this bill is spread upon the statute books through receiving your approval or being passed over a veto, not only would the proviso respecting the power of the joint committee to authorize refunds be void, but the deficiency appropriation for payment of refunds would fall with it. . . . In my opinion the appropriation for tax refunds and the proviso attached to it must stand or fall together. Who can say that Congress would have made this appropriation without this proviso? I have no basis for this assumption. If the Congress makes an appropriation attaching to it an invalid condition, we would hardly be justified in rejecting the condition as void and treating the appropriation as available. The safe course is to treat the two as inseparable.

The result is that if this bill should take the form of a statute the Secretary of the Treasury would be confronted with the fact that the appropriation for tax refunds, as well as the proviso attached to it, and would not be available for the payment of refunds, with the result that if no prior appropriations are available, payment of all refunds of any amount would stop until further appropriations for that purpose were made by the Congress.477

To similar effect is a 1990 Office of Legal Counsel opinion reviewing a rider to an appropriation for international conferences that proscribed the expenditure of funds for any United States delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe without including members of Congress. The Office of Legal Counsel viewed the rider as unconstitutionally encroaching on the President’s foreign affairs authority. Rather than simply opining that the President had the authority to expend the appropriation in spite of the rider, Legal Counsel took pains to demonstrate that the provision’s legislative history indicated that Congress would have approved the appropriation even without the condition.478

These opinions are entirely consistent with the views expressed by the executive department over the last two centuries. As one early Attorney General stated:

The constitution declares that “no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law,” . . . This I consider as an explicit inhibition upon the President and all others to draw from the treasury any portion of the public money, until Congress shall have directed it to be done; and the expression in the clause of the constitution just quoted . . . clearly indicates that Congress shall also declare the uses to which the money to be drawn from the treasury is to be applied. The President, therefore, has no power, under the constitution, over the public treasure, except to apply it in the execution of the laws . . . Whenever he applies it without the directions of Congress expressed in some legislative act, or against such directions, he assumes upon himself power not conferred by the constitution. 479

Administrations have, thus, recognized the need for congressionally approved funding for such diverse activities as raising and supporting the armed forces, 480 fulfilling contracts, 481 compensating executive appointees, 482 and satisfying the terms of treaties. 483 Significantly, presidents have even acquiesced in funding restrictions delimiting their discretion over national security and the employment of military force, perhaps best exemplified by the congressionally ordered cut-off of funds for the Vietnam War. 484 Defense Department appropriations acts are replete with similar, albeit less spectacular, restrictions on the use military appropriations, to which presidents have also historically complied. 485 Where the conditions imposed are particularly egregious, presidents may veto the legislation, 486 but they have not asserted the authority to expend money in spite of them.

Unlike some modern academicians, presidents have not claimed that Congress cannot constitutionally restrict appropriations either by specifying the purposes for which the money is to be spent or by prohibiting

expenditures for particular objects.\footnote{See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 30, 87 Stat. 732 ("No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended to finance military or paramilitary operations by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos; or Cambodia."); DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-155, § 806, 87 Stat. 615 (1973) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon enactment of this Act, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress."); DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-437, § 839, 88 Stat. 1231 (1974) ("None of the funds herein appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.").} Indeed, while they may chafe at such restrictions, presidents have historically acceded to them.


\footnote{484. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 30, 87 Stat. 732 ("No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended to finance military or paramilitary operations by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos; or Cambodia."); DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-155, § 806, 87 Stat. 615 (1973) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon enactment of this Act, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress."); DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-437, § 839, 88 Stat. 1231 (1974) ("None of the funds herein appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.").}
3. Deficiency Expenditures

Two executive practices do strike at the heart of Congress’ appropriations authority and merit separate consideration: expenditures by executive departments in excess of appropriations, and emergency expenditures by presidents in the absence of appropriations. Congress has expressly forbidden the former, and presidents have not asserted an independent spending authority based on the latter; thus, neither practice adds a gloss to the meaning of the Constitution’s appropriations provisions such that Congress’ exclusive authority to approve the expenditures is placed in doubt.

a. Coercive Deficiencies & The Anti-Deficiency Act

During the nation’s first century, executive agencies often ignored congressionally prescribed funding limits, spending their appropriations at “whatever rate seemed proper to them.” The agencies would thereby create “coercive deficiencies” in appropriations accounts, imposing “a moral and political, if not [a] legal, obligation upon Congress to enact supplemental appropriations in order to avoid or reimburse deficiencies in various line-item accounts.”

Congress certainly took notice and animadverted against the practice. For instance, in 1798, Albert Gallatin condemned a $50,000 deficiency incurred by the War Department, stating: “The Secretary of War was not justified in expending more in these contingencies than was appropriated (except in case of necessity), otherwise the Secretary of War, and not Congress, regulated the expenditure of money.” In 1808, the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, John Randolph, refused to make good an unauthorized expenditure of $5 1,000 for construction of the south wing of the Capitol. After further inquiry and a plea by President Jefferson, Congress eventually approved the necessary appropriation over Randolph’s objection.

486. For example, in 1879, President Rutherford B. Hayes vetoed an Army appropriations act that included a prohibition against the employment of federal forces to enforce the newly enacted Fifteenth Amendment and the voting-rights legislation enacted pursuant thereto. 7 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 523. President Hayes fully recognized that his veto would, for the time being, cut off money for the Army. Id. at 530-31.
487. See GLENNON, supra note 119, at 291.
488. WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER, supra note 468, at 65.
489. Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution, supra note 459, at 610.
490. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1317 (1798).
491. 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 1973 (1808).
In 1819, Henry Clay decried the executive agencies’ growing habit of ignoring spending limitations:

Are we to lose our rightful control over the public purse? It is daily wrested from us, under high-sounding terms, which are calculated to deceive us, in such manner as appears for approbation rather than censure and practice. So extended was the practice, . . . that there is scarcely an officer, from the youngest menial in the service of the Government upwards, that does not take upon himself to act upon his responsibility.\(^{493}\)

John Sherman blasted the deficiencies incurred by the executive department in the years following the Mexican War, declaring:

[T]he Executive is gradually sapping the foundation of the Government and destroying the constitutional power of the House. Instead of a representative Republic, we are degenerating into a bureaucracy governed by red tape and subaltern clerks.

. . . We have the undoubted power over supplies, and yet the President so acts as to leave us no discretion. He created the necessity for expenditures. . . .\(^{494}\)

Ultimately, Congress’ anger turned to action. In 1870, Congress attempted to foreclose coercive deficiencies statutorily by enacting the Anti-Deficiency Act. It forbade any executive department from spending funds or involving the government in contracts in excess of appropriations:

That it shall not be lawful for any department of the government to expend in any one fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year, or to involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of such appropriations.\(^{495}\)

\(^{492}\) Wilmerding, The Spending Power, supra note 468, at 68-71.

\(^{493}\) 35 Annals of Cong. 816 (1819) (emphasis in the original).

\(^{494}\) Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 2433 (1858).

\(^{495}\) Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 251. Earlier statutes had also forbidden contracts and purchases, in excess of appropriations, except as authorized by law, without much apparent effect. See, e.g., Act of May 1, 1820, ch. 52, 3 Stat. 568; Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 84, 12 Stat. 220.
The statute did not, however, deter the deficiencies, as executive agencies continued to expend their appropriations before the end of the fiscal year expecting Congress to furnish the sums needed to carry them through the end of the year.\textsuperscript{496} Lucius Wilmerding described the practice as so pervasive that “in some instances it became habitual for the departments to estimate and for Congress to appropriate on what might be called the installment plan.”\textsuperscript{497}

By 1905, Congress had finally had enough. It amended the Anti-Deficiency Act by prohibiting all “obligations” (not just contracts) in the absence of adequate appropriations, by requiring agencies to apportion their appropriations over the fiscal year to ensure sufficient funding for the entire year, and by prescribing criminal penalties for violations of the Act.\textsuperscript{498} Faced with more deficiencies,\textsuperscript{499} Congress again strengthened the Act the following year, limiting waivers of apportionments to “extraordinary emergencies or unusual circumstances that could not be anticipated at the time the apportionments were made.”\textsuperscript{500} Senator Hemenway, one of the Act’s sponsors, stated that the intent of the amendments was to re-establish Congress’ control over appropriations:

The Departments of Government have grown into the habit of ignoring the acts of Congress. The Appropriations Committees would sit for weeks and work out what they believed the different Departments ought to expend along various lines, and the Departments would pay no attention to the acts of Congress, but simply use any sum of money they saw fit to use, and come back to Congress in the way of deficiencies and say, “Why, here, the money is expended. What can we do?” As a general rule Congress would appropriate and make good the deficiency, the tendency being simply to ignore the Congress of the United States and turn this Government over to the different Departments to run at their own good will.

\textsuperscript{496} Robert N. Nutt & Gary L. Hopkins, \textit{The Anti-Deficiency Act (Revised Statute 3679) & Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis}, 80 MIL. L. REV. \textit{51, 58} (1978); see also \textit{Wilmerding, The Spending Power}, \textit{supra} note 468, at 140 (“Soon it could be said that the [executive] departments had become the appropriating authorities and that Congress had sunk to be the mere register of their determinations. Only in theory did Congress remain supreme.”).

\textsuperscript{497} \textit{Wilmerding, The Spending Power}, \textit{supra} note 468, at 142.

\textsuperscript{498} \textit{Act of Mar. 3,1905}, \textit{ch. 1484, § 4}, 33 Stat. 1257.

\textsuperscript{499} 40 \textit{CONG. REC.} \textit{9785} (1906).

\textsuperscript{500} \textit{Act of Feb. 27, 1906}, \textit{ch. 510, 34 Stat. 49}.
. . . I think it is time that Congress should look to it that the Departments of the Government shall not control matters of appropriation, but that Congress shall control them.\textsuperscript{501}

While even the strengthened Act did not eliminate all deficiencies,\textsuperscript{502} it did signal the Congress’ determination to end the executive practice of coercive deficiencies.\textsuperscript{503} The Anti-Deficiency Act strictly prohibits making or authorizing expenditures or obligations exceeding available appropriations and involving the government in contracts or obligations for the payment of money before appropriations are made, unless otherwise authorized by law.\textsuperscript{504} The Act prescribes administrative and criminal sanctions for violations.\textsuperscript{505} It also requires agencies to apportion funds to ensure expenditures will not exceed appropriations,\textsuperscript{506} and similarly provides penalties for exceeding apportionments.\textsuperscript{507}

Thus, the executive department practice of spending in excess of appropriations has never assumed the mantle of custom. Although it usually covered the deficiencies, Congress never acquiesced in the practice, proscribing the conduct in 1870 and criminalizing it in 1905. Further, had executive agencies supposed the President had the authority to expend money independent of Congress, there would have been no need to seek

\textsuperscript{501} 40 CONG. REC. 9786 (1906). A co-sponsor, Senator Hale, likewise stated: 
I hope that in time the Departments will take notice that it is Congress which provides the money; that it is the discretion of Congress that sets the amount of money, and that no Secretary and no understrapper in a Department has any business to beset Congress and importune for more appropriations than Congress has given.  
\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{502} See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. 2977-81 (1927) (deficiency caused by use of Department of Agriculture funds intended to fight hoof-and-mouth disease to buy Florida farmers seed following hurricane); \textit{see also} WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER, supra note 468, at 145.  
\textsuperscript{505} \textit{Id.} §§ 1349, 1350. Government officials or employees violating the Act may receive “appropriate administrative discipline including, when circumstances warrant, suspension from duty without pay or removal from office.” They are also subject to imprisonment (two years) and fines ($5000). The Act also requires an immediate report to Congress of every violation. \textit{Id.} § 1351.  
\textsuperscript{506} \textit{Id.} §§ 1512-15.  
\textsuperscript{507} \textit{Id.} §§ 1517-19. The sanctions for spending or obligating in excess of apportionments are the same as those imposed for exceeding appropriations. \textit{See supra} note 505.
congressional approval of funds to cover their deficiencies. In short, coercive deficiencies were the product of administrative indolence rather than executive assertions of an independent presidential spending authority.

One aspect of the Anti-Deficiency Act deserves further scrutiny, namely the manner in which the executive has interpreted the Act’s application during lapses in appropriations. Appropriations measures are not always enacted before the end of a fiscal year and the lapse of the prior year’s appropriations, resulting in a “funding gap.” Recent years have seen such lapses occur with increasing regularity. For instance, in 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1990, the government endured funding gaps ranging from several hours to three days. In late 1995 and early 1996, a budget deadlock between the President and Congress produced a particularly severe appropriations gap, lasting for several weeks and causing the partial shutdown of the federal government.

The Attorney General has issued two key opinions to guide the executive department through the funding gaps: a January 1981 opinion by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, and a August 1995, opinion by Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger. The opinions focus on the provision of the Anti-Deficiency Act permitting expenditures or obligations in excess or in anticipation of appropriations otherwise “authorized by law.”

For the most part, the opinions are unremarkable. They provide that appropriations lapses will not interrupt government activities funded by multi-year or indefinite appropriations, activities expressly authorized continued obligation or contract authority by statute, and activities “authorized by necessary implication from the specific duties imposed on agencies by statute.”

512. Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 509.
514. 1981 Opinion, supra note 511, at 5; Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 509, at 3-4.
More problematic is the opinions’ suggestion that an appropriations lapse and the Anti-Deficiency Act cannot deprive the President “of authority to obligate funds in connection with those initiatives that would otherwise fall within the President’s power.” In this regard, the 1981 Opinion, in particular, is enigmatic. Although acknowledging the President “cannot legislate his own obligational authorities,” the 1981 Opinion also asserts that the Anti-Deficiency Act cannot prevent the President from obligating the funds required to carry out his constitutional responsibilities, seemingly suggesting the President derives such obligational authority from his own constitutional powers rather than acts of Congress. While refusing to “catalogue” the types of responsibilities contemplated, the Attorney General cites as illustrative the President’s pardon power and “his conduct of foreign relations essential to the national security.”

Not only is the opinion internally inconsistent — proffering the notion of a presidential obligational authority in one sentence and denying it in another—it also raises serious constitutional issues about the President’s role in the spending process. First, it assumes, an independent presidential obligational authority based on the circular logic that if the President has constitutional responsibilities he must necessarily have the obligational authority to carry out those responsibilities. The opinion does not, however, identify the doctrinal source of such authority.

Of course, neither the President’s pardon power nor his foreign affairs responsibilities carries an authority to obligate the treasury. With regard to pardons, while Congress may not use its control of the purse strings to interfere with the President’s authority to issue pardons, it may withhold the funds needed to make recipients of pardons financially whole. Nor does the President derive any constitutional authority to obligate funds

515. 1981 Opinion, supra note 511, at 6; Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 509, at 4. An example is the “Feed & Forage” Act, which permits, even in the absence of an appropriation, contracts or purchases necessary for the current year for the clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, and medical care of the armed forces. 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1994); see also 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 124 (1876).

516. 1981 Opinion, supra note 511, at 6; Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 509, at 4. An example is the work required to ensure the flow of Social Security checks, benefits which are derived from an indefinite appropriation.

517. 1981 Opinion, supra note 511, at 6; see also Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 509, at 4.

from his responsibility to carry out the nation’s foreign policy; rather, Congress alone enjoys this power.\textsuperscript{525}

\textsuperscript{519.} \textit{Id.} at 6-7. For instance, the opinion states:

\begin{quote}
[T]he question must consequently arise, upon a Government-wide lapse in appropriations, whether the Anti-Deficiency Act should be construed as depriving the President of authority to obligate funds in connection with those initiatives that would otherwise fall within the President’s powers . . . .
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
. . . [T]he Anti-Deficiency Act is not the only source of law or the only exercise of authority for an initiative that obligates funds in advance of appropriations. \textit{The President’s obligatory authority may be strengthened in connection with initiatives that are grounded in the peculiar institutional powers and competency of the President . . . .}
\end{quote}

. . . In sum, I construe the “authorized by law” exception . . . as exempting from the prohibition . . . not only those obligations in advance of appropriations for which express or implied authority may be found in the enactments of Congress, but also those obligations necessarily incident to presidential initiatives undertaken within his constitutional powers.

\textit{Id.} (emphasis added); see also L. Gordon Crovitz, \textit{The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes One Spending Bill}, 18 \textit{Pep. L. Rev.} 43, 54 (1990); Sidak, supra note 57, at 1189 (characterizing the 1981 Opinion as supporting an inherent presidential authority to appropriate money). The 1995 memorandum seemingly backs away from this view of presidential power. Citing \textit{Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer}, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the memorandum states that “[t]his power should be called upon cautiously, as the courts have received such executive branch assertions skeptically.” Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 509, at 5 n.4.

\textsuperscript{520.} 1981 Opinion, supra note 511, at 6-7 & n.10.

\textsuperscript{521.} The 1981 Opinion is also inconsistent with an opinion issued by the Attorney General only a year earlier. Addressing the legal effect of a funding gap on the government, the Attorney General took a “hard line” against any obligation of funds by agencies except as authorized by statute:

\begin{quote}
[O]n a lapse in appropriations, federal agencies may incur no obligations that cannot be funded from prior appropriations unless such obligations are otherwise authorized by law. There are no exceptions to this rule under current law, even where obligations incurred earlier would avoid greater costs to the agencies should appropriations be enacted.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{522.} Feld, supra note 521, at 985. The General Accounting Office defines the phrase “authorized by law” to require explicit statutory authority to incur obligations in excess or in advance of appropriations. \textit{2 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW} 6-53 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter \textit{2 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW}]. The authority must be more than just authority to undertake an activity, since “everything government officials do should be authorized by law.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{523.} United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
Second, the 1981 Opinion juxtaposes the Anti-Deficiency Act with the President’s constitutional responsibilities, but fails to mention the appropriations clause in the equation. Perhaps the Opinion means to distinguish the term “obligational authority” from the actual expenditure of money. To the extent the Attorney General contemplates presidential obligations that impose legal liabilities on the Government,\textsuperscript{526} however, the distinction is meaningless. If presidential obligational authority does something less than bind the treasury, it is no authority at all. The Opinion may also intend to differentiate between obligations in anticipation of appropriations during a funding hiatus and obligations in the complete absence of appropriations. If the President has a constitutionally based obligational authority, however, it should not matter whether or not Congress is expected to appropriate funds.\textsuperscript{527}

In any event, to the extent the 1981 Opinion asserts that, in the absence of statutory approbation, the President has the constitutional authority to obligate federal funds (and that there is a constitutional imperative for Congress to satisfy the obligations made), the opinion is flatly incorrect. Constitutionally, the President is only guaranteed an undiminished salary.\textsuperscript{528} If, for whatever reason, Congress does not appropriate the funds needed to carry out the President’s responsibilities, he may constitutionally obligate only those funds otherwise authorized by those laws enacted by Congress.

\textsuperscript{524} Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877); The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1873); Hart’s Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459 (1880), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); see also Feld, supra note 521, at 983-84.

\textsuperscript{525} See Nobleman, supra note 455, at 145:

Whether the Founding Fathers intended to vest control over foreign relations in the President or in the Congress has been the subject of controversy since the birth of the Republic. Whatever their intentions may have been, when they wrote into the Constitution the clause “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law,” they gave to the Congress a means of exercising control concerning which there can be no doubt.

\textsuperscript{526} 2 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 522, at 7-3.

\textsuperscript{527} 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 224,228 (1980):

There is nothing in the language of the Antideficiency Act or in its long history from which any exception to its terms during a period of lapsed appropriations may be inferred. Faithful execution of the laws cannot rest on mere speculation that Congress does not want the Executive branch to carry out Congress’ unambiguous mandate.

\textsuperscript{528} U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 7.
b. Emergency Expenditures

Presidents have occasionally spent public funds without an appropriation during serious emergencies that could not await congressional action (usually because Congress was not in session). In such cases, presidents have not assumed the authority to appropriate funds without Congress; instead, they have recognized the extra-constitutional nature of their expenditures, returning to Congress for the appropriations required to cover their spending. Several examples illustrate the practice.

On 7 August 1794, George Washington responded to a request from Associate Justice James Wilson to put down an insurrection in western Pennsylvania—triggered by a federal excise tax on whiskey—by ordering the insurgents to disperse and giving notice of his intent to call up the militia if they did not do so by 1 September. The insurgents ignored Washington’s proclamation, and the President requisitioned 15,000 troops from the governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia.

Accompanied by Alexander Hamilton, Washington met the assembling Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where he assumed personal command and helped organize and prepare the troops for immediate movement on the insurgents. Washington led his forces to Bedford, Pennsylvania, where they joined the Virginians and Marylanders under “Light Horse” Harry Lee, the governor of Virginia.

529. FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, S. Doc. No. 67-263, at 26-27 (2d Sess. 1922) [hereinafter FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES]. The region’s farmers, having no near market for their grain, converted much of their grain into whiskey, and “the still was the necessary appendage of every farm.” Id. at 26. Thus, the farmers did not look kindly upon the whiskey excise tax and stoutly resisted its payment by assaulting tax collectors and engaging in general lawlessness. Id. at 27.

530. 1 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 158-60.

531. “It is averred by some writers that the insurgents looked upon the proclamation with contempt, regarding it as a piece of bravado unworthy of their notice . . . . Suffice it to say it was received with derision and . . . . the outrages continued without abatement.” FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, supra note 529, at 29.

532. Id.; see also Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, which authorized the President to federalize the militia on notification by an associate justice of the incidence of disobedience too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or the powers vested in the U.S. marshals. See also FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 484, at 16.

533. WEIGLEY, supra note 32, at 101; FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, supra note 529, at 30-31.

534. Id.
Washington turned command over to Lee with detailed instructions for suppressing the insurrection, which—when faced with overwhelming force—quickly dissolved.535

Congress, which was not in session, had not anticipated the President’s call-up of the militia and had not appropriated funds for such a purpose. To pay for the expedition, Washington used money that had been appropriated for the army, expecting Congress to provide the necessary funds when it returned.536 Albert Gallatin later criticized Washington’s failure to call a special session of Congress to obtain the funds required for the operation:

Although the President of the United States was authorized to call out the militia in order to suppress insurrections, no money was appropriated for that service. When the western insurrection took place, until Congress had covered the expenditures of the expedition on the 31st of December 1794, the expenses were defrayed out of moneys appropriated for the military establishment. . . . But, as the militia called out to suppress an insurrection make no part of the military establishment, the expenses attending such a call were not amongst the various objects enumerated in the law making appropriations for the military establishment. . . . The moneys drawn out of the Treasury on that occasion were paid out of a fund appropriated for other and distinct purposes; they were not drawn agreeable to the Constitution, in consequence of any appropriations made by law.537

In any event, the President told Congress what he had done, and “Congress commended him and appropriated the money to cover the cost of the expedition.”538 Importantly, Washington did not assume the authority to expend funds without Congress’ approval, immediately seeking the requisite appropriation as soon as Congress returned to session.

535. **Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances**, supra note 529, at 31-33.
Ironically, it was Thomas Jefferson—with Albert Gallatin as his Secretary of the Treasury—who first spent significant sums of money in the complete absence of an appropriation. On 22 June 1807, the British warship *H.M.S. Leopard* attacked the American frigate *Chesapeake* as it left port at Hampton Roads, *Virginia*.\(^{539}\) Anticipating a possible war with England and with Congress in recess, Jefferson ordered certain military purchases even though no appropriations had been made for that purpose.\(^{540}\) When Congress reconvened in late October, President Jefferson recounted the events of the summer and sought ex post facto approval of the expenditures he had made:

The moment our peace was threatened I deemed it indispensable to secure a greater provision of those articles of military stores with which our magazines were not sufficiently furnished. To have awaited a previous and special sanction by law would have lost occasions which might not be retrieved. I did not hesitate, therefore, to authorize engagements for such supplements to our existing stock as would render it adequate to the emergencies threatening us, and I trust that the Legislature, feeling the same anxiety for the safety of our country, so materially advanced by this precaution, will approve, when done, what they would have seen so important to be done if then assembled. Expenses, also unprovided for, arose out of the necessity of calling all our gunboats into actual service for the defense of our harbors; all of which accounts will be laid before you.\(^{541}\)

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539. 1 Richardson, *supra* note 473, at 414. The British vessel attempted to search the *Chesapeake* for deserters from the British navy. When the *Chesapeake’s* captain refused to permit the search, the *Leopard* fired three broadsides, killing 3 Americans and wounding 18. Thereafter, British seamen boarded the *Chesapeake* and removed four sailors who had purportedly deserted from British warships. After attempting unsuccessfully to surrender to the British, the *Chesapeake* returned to Hampton Roads. H.F. Pulker, *The Shannon* and the *Chesapeake* 9-12 (1970). This was not the last indignity the *Chesapeake* was to suffer. On 1 June 1813, the *Chesapeake* was defeated and captured in an engagement with the British warship *H.M.S. Shannon* off Boston Harbor. *Id.* at 52-63.

540. Wilmerding, *The Spending Power*, *supra* note 468, at 9. Congress had adjourned on 3 March 1807. Henry Adams, *The Life of Albert Gallatin* 357 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879). Although Gallatin favored calling Congress into session, Jefferson declined because of the “unhealthiness” of Washington during the summer. *Id.* at 358; see also Raymond Walters, Jr., *Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier & Diplomat* 195-96 (1957). Jefferson also ordered the dispatch of a vessel to America’s “China trade” to warn of possible war. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 2, 1807), in 1 *Writings of Albert Gallatin*, *supra* note 537, at 356-57. Gallatin financed the mission by directing the collector of Baltimore to make the necessary advances, “relying on the sanction of Congress if our existing appropriations were not sufficient . . ..” *Id.*
When Congress returned to session, it ultimately enacted an appropriation to cover Jefferson’s expenditures, but not before heated debate over the propriety of the President’s actions. John Randolph used the opportunity to tweak the Administration, particularly Gallatin, who had objected to similar expenditures by Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Randolph quoted at length from Gallatin’s A Sketch of the Finances of the United States, in which Gallatin criticized Washington for spending money not appropriated by Congress, and chastised the Administration for failing to call Congress into session:

Mr. R. allowed that the crisis which occasioned the extraordinary expenses in question was an imminent one. It was so critical, that Congress ought to have immediately convened, in order that they might have given authority by law for these extraordinary expenses, and for adopting such measures as national feeling and honor called for.

Other members of Congress were also critical of the President’s expenditures, and even Jefferson’s supporters acknowledged that the House was under no obligation to appropriate the funds requested. Jef-

541. 1 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 416.
543. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 835 (1807); see supra note 537 and accompanying text.
544. Id. at 823. Randolph also stated that “[h]e felt extremely reluctant to vote large sums for support of our degraded and disgraced Navy, for expenses, too, that had been illegally incurred.” Id.
545. Id. at 819-20 (remarks of Congressman Quincy) (expressing puzzlement over the source of funds used to pay for the supplies and materiel); id. at 847-48 (remarks of Congressman Gardener) (stating it could not be doubted the President had violated the Constitution, but he would vote for the appropriation, “not as a precedent, or to encourage any Department in the unauthorized use of the public treasure, but because he thought the measure proper”).
546. Id. at 823 (remarks of Congressman Fisk) (“[I]t simply rested with the House to say whether this appropriation should be made or withheld.”); id. (remarks of Congressman G.W. Campbell) (“The question now was, whether the House would sanction these expenditures or not.”); id. at 826 (remarks of Congressman Smilie) (“If [the members] believed that the conduct of the Executive had not been correct, they would not vote for the appropriations.”); id. at 827 (remarks of Congressman Dana) (“The . . . question was on the particular subject: should they advocate the expenditures for these particular purposes, supposing they had perfect information on the subject.”).
gency to warrant immediate expenditures, the President acted outside the Constitution, gambling that Congress would later bless his actions.\textsuperscript{548} Writing several years later, Jefferson explained that on great occasions government officers sometimes have to violate the law to protect the nation, but that they do so at their own risk:

It is incumbent on those only who accept great charges, to risk themselves on great occasions, when the safety of the nation, or some of its very high interests are at stake. An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one who should do it in cases for which they were not intended, and which involved the most important consequences. The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives.\textsuperscript{549}

Thus, Jefferson’s emergency expenditure without an appropriation does not represent an assertion of a constitutionally based presidential spending authority. Neither Jefferson nor Congress viewed the episode in such a manner.\textsuperscript{550}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{547.} \textit{Id.} at 847 (remarks of Congressman Cook): “It was merely a question of expediency with the House whether they would sanction the measures which had been adopted; the President had not bound them to do it, and they were at liberty to act as they chose.”


\item \textsuperscript{549.} Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), \textit{in} 12 \textsc{The Writings of Thomas Jefferson} 418,421-22 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).

\item \textsuperscript{550.} \textit{See} Wilmerding, \textit{The President \& The Law}, \textit{supra} note 456, at 328-29: Jefferson knew that the law of necessity was not law in the ordinary acceptation of that term. He did not subscribe to the exploded notion of the tendency of acts for the public good being sufficient to make them legal. And so he was careful to point out that a man who takes upon himself the responsibility for an act outside the written law must get an acquittance from Congress or suffer whatever consequences may follow from a deliberate and open breach of the law.

\textit{See also} Raven-Hansen \& Banks, \textit{From Vietnam to Desert Storm}, \textit{supra} note 51, at 131. Jefferson clearly appreciated the limits of his authority. When faced with a potential conflict with Spain in 1805, he turned to Congress for instructions, recognizing that “the course to be pursued will require the command of the means which it belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or deny.” 1 \textsc{Richardson}, \textit{supra} note 473, at 388, 390; \textit{see also} Glennon, \textit{supra} note 119, at 287.
\end{itemize}
At the outbreak of the Civil War, President Lincoln “authorized and directed his Secretary of the Treasury to advance, without requiring security, $2,000,000 of public money” to three private citizens to be used “in meeting such requisitions as should be directly consequent upon the military and naval measures necessary for the defense and support of the Government . . .”551 Responding to a congressional censure of his former Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, for similar deeds, Lincoln told Congress in May 1862:

There was no adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall at once into ruin or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity.

. . . I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such misdirection occurred to me as objections to those extraordinary proceedings, and were necessarily overruled.552

Confronting an unprecedented national crisis, Lincoln took a series of actions wholly without constitutional sanction — from blatantly disregarding court orders553 to enlarging the size of the armed forces.554 In meeting the emergency, however, Lincoln never claimed his actions were lawful.555

551. 6 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 77, 78.
552. Id. (emphasis added); see also CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 231-32 (1939): “The President dug into the Treasury for millions of dollars — without due and requisite authority of Congress.”
553. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 153 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (Taney, C.J.).
Lincoln ignored one law and constitutional provision after another. He assembled the militia, enlarged the Army and Navy beyond their authorized strength, called out the volunteers for three years’ service, spent public money without congressional appropriation, suspended *habeas corpus*, arrested people “represented” as involved in “disloyal” practices and instituted a naval blockade of the Confederacy — measures which, he later told Congress, “whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity; trusting then as now that Congress would readily ratify them.”  

Lincoln spent public funds without an appropriation because he believed the exigencies of the growing rebellion dictated no other course. And when Congress convened, Lincoln laid before it what he had done and sought the appropriations necessary to cover his expenditures. Although Lincoln unquestionably viewed his actions as necessary, he did not assert they were constitutional, freely acknowledging — particularly with regard to his expenditures — that he had acted without legal authority.

In 1926, following a devastating hurricane which occurred while Congress was not in session, President Coolidge directed his Secretary of Agriculture to assist the farmers in storm-stricken areas of Florida by purchasing seed, fertilizer, and other items. The Secretary of Agriculture made advances to the Florida farmers using $253,000 appropriated for the eradication of hoof-and-mouth disease. Coolidge later sought congressional sanction for his actions. The President’s actions, albeit ratified, were subject to harsh criticism from members of the House. Congressman Byrnes noted the complete absence of legal authority for the expenditures:

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557. Randall, supra note 554, at 36-37 n.14; but see Symposium, *Executive Power*, supra note 56 (Eugene V. Rostow) (“In my view, the emergency prerogative powers Lincoln exercised should be considered constitutional because they were necessary, in his judgment, under the circumstances.”).

It seems that, acting under the authority of the President of the United States, the Secretary of Agriculture, without the slightest authority of law, took from the appropriations for the foot-and-mouth disease and loaned it to farmers in Florida for the purpose of buying seed. There was not the slightest authority of law for doing that. The money was appropriated by Congress for a specific purpose. Merely because there was a million or more dollars in that fund did not authorize the President or the Secretary of Agriculture to use that fund for purposes other than those provided by Congress.559

Congressman Garrett observed that the President was calling upon Congress “to ratify an illegal act [applause] done in the name of an emergency, with the doer of it himself declaring what was the emergency . . . . This is a proposition which profoundly touches the elemental functions of government, the matter of keeping separate the legislative and the executive branches of government.”560

As in the case of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, President Coolidge and his supporters did not claim the expenditures were lawful (otherwise it would have been unnecessary to seek congressional sanction); instead, they stressed the severity of the emergency and the humanitarian nature of the spending.561

Nothing in the historical record reflects a pattern of practice demonstrating a presidential power of the purse. Presidents have neither asserted such a power nor attempted to exercise it. Nor has Congress given any indication it would acquiesce in such a practice; it has jealously guarded the nation’s fisc, criticizing and statutorily thwarting perceived executive encroachments on its prerogatives. Thus, custom does not support the notion of a presidential power of the purse.

D. The Appropriations Power in the Courts

Neither federal nor state courts have construed constitutional appropriations clauses as affording executives the power to spend public funds outside the laws enacted by the legislative departments. Courts have uni-
formly held that the power to appropriate is exclusively legislative in character. While federal courts have recognized boundaries surrounding Congress’ appropriations authority—namely that Congress cannot exercise its authority in contravention of specific constitutional limitations—they have not held that Congress may not use its power of the purse to foreclose presidential activities, including those relating to foreign policy and national defense. Practice in the state courts has paralleled the federal experience. Working with similar appropriations provisions, the states have uniformly recognized that their constitutional spending schemes mandate exclusive legislative control over state finances.

1. Federal Courts

a. Congress’ Exclusive Appropriations Authority

The federal courts have consistently interpreted the appropriations clause as conferring on Congress—and Congress alone—the power of the purse. Writing in his *Commentaries on the Constitution*, Justice Joseph Story noted that the meaning of the clause in this regard was manifest:

The object [of the appropriations clause] is apparent upon the slightest examination. It is to secure regularity, punctuality, and fidelity in the disbursement of public money. As all the taxes raised from the people, as well as the revenue from the other sources, are to be applied to the discharge of the expenses, and debts, and other engagements of the government, it is highly proper, that congress should possess the power to decide, how and when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded power over the public purse of the nation; and might apply all its monied resources at his pleasure.562

Story’s understanding of the appropriations clause is consistent with the views taken by the federal courts. An early illustration is *Reeside v. Walker*,563 in which the petitioners sought mandamus against the Secretary of the Treasury to recover money assertedly owed as a consequence of a successfully litigated set-off claim against the United States. The Supreme

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563. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850).
Court held that, absent an appropriation, not even the President had the authority to satisfy the claim:

No officer, however high, *not even the President*, much less a Secretary of the Treasury or Treasurer, is empowered to pay debts of the United States generally, when presented to them . . . . The difficulty in the way is the want of any appropriation by Congress to pay this claim. It is a well-known constitutional provision, that no money can be taken or drawn from the Treasury except under an appropriation made by Congress . . . .

*However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned.*

To similar effect is *Hurt’s Case*, involving the impact of a post-Civil War presidential pardon on a money claim against the United States. At issue was a statute barring reliance on presidential pardons as a basis for claims against the government by persons who had assisted the Confederacy. The claimant was the beneficiary of such a pardon and sued the United States for the price of supplies sold to the government before the War. Denying the claim, the Court of Claims held that “[t]he absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only to the people.”

Thus, federal courts have consistently construed the appropriations clause to require an act of Congress for money to be drawn from the Treasury. The mere absence of a statutory prohibition against a particular expenditure is not sufficient; rather, the Constitution mandates affirmative action by Congress via a statutory enactment. In short, the appropriations clause bars both the executive and judicial departments from spending public funds without congressional approval. Moreover, because Congress alone may permit expenditures of public funds, courts have generally held that the coordinate departments are subject to any conditions or

564. *Id.* at 291 (emphasis added); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569-70 (1962).
565. 16 Ct. Cl. 459 (1880), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886).
566. *Id.* at 481, citing Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 571.
567. *Id.* at 484. Affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court declared that no presidential pardon could ever authorize payments out of a general appropriation “of a debt which a law of Congress had said should not be paid out of it.” Congress alone must decide whether to satisfy the claim. Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886).
restrictions Congress imposes in connection with its appropriation of funds.

Furthermore, the federal courts have not discerned an executive power of the purse emerging from the President’s constitutional responsibilities. For instance, courts have held that presidents may not—by exercising their executive power of the purse—violate the appropriation laws. "Money may be paid out only through an appropriation made by law; in other words, the payment of money from the Treasury must be authorized by statute." Office of Personnel Mgt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990); see also Knot v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 164 (1877); City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); Haskins Bros. & Co. v. Morgenthau, 85 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 588 (1936); Stitzel-Weller Distillery v. Wickard, 118 F.2d 19, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Cummings v. Hardee, 102 F.2d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 637 (1939); Cloutier v. Morgenthau, 88 F.2d 846, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1937); American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 542, 546 (1991).

569. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (plurality decision): “The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.”

570. “The provision of the Constitution . . . that ‘No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law’ was intended as a restriction upon the disbursing authority of the Executive department . . . .” Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937); see also Richmond, 496 U.S. at 425, 428; United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 299 (1854) (“The secretary of the treasury is inhibited from directing the payment of moneys not specifically appropriated by law.”); Holder v. Office of Personnel Mgt., 47 F.3d 412, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Government agents cannot bind the Government to make monetary payments contrary to statutory rules.”); National Ass’n of Reg’l Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Government agencies may only enter into obligations to pay money if they have been granted such authority by Congress.”); cf. Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Dep’t of Defense, 87 F.3d 1356, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), requiring government officials receiving money to place it in the Treasury, is derived from the appropriations clause and is intended to prevent the executive from spending unappropriated funds.); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (Absent congressional authorization, the executive cannot take private property because “it usurps Congress’ constitutionally granted powers of law-making and appropriation.”).

571. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569-70 (1962); United Serv. Auto. Ass’n v. United States, 105 F.3d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1997); City & Houston, 24 F.3d at 1428; Maryland Dep’t of Human Resources v. Dep’t of Agric., 976 F.2d 1462, 1482 (4th Cir. 1992); Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Walker v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1990); Costle, 564 F.2d at 590 n.16; Stitzel-Weller Distillery, 118 F.2d at 22; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 906 (Cl. Ct. 1976); Hetfield v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 419, 422 (1933); Major Collin’s Case, 15 Ct. Cl. 22, 35 (1879); Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865, 871 (D.N.J. 1976); Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945), aff’d, 154 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1946).
cising their power to grant pardons\textsuperscript{573} or to enter into executive agreements\textsuperscript{574}—bind the United States to expend public funds. As the Supreme Court in \textit{Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond} noted: “Any exercise of a power granted by the Constitution to one of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid reservation of congressional control over funds in the \textit{Treasury}.”\textsuperscript{575}

\textbf{b. Checking National Security Initiatives Through the Power of the Purse}

Admittedly, Congress’ power of the purse is not boundless; “Congress’ exclusive power of appropriation does not trump the rest of the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{576} In \textit{United States v. Lovett},\textsuperscript{577} for example, Congress attempted, via an appropriations rider, to block the salaries of three named government employees suspected of being communist sympathizers.\textsuperscript{578} The Supreme Court held the rider constituted an unlawful bill of attainder because it “accomplished the punishment of the named individuals without a judicial trial.”\textsuperscript{579} In like decisions, the Court has held that Congress may not exercise its appropriations authority so as to violate other positive constitutional restrictions, such as the compensation clause,\textsuperscript{580} and the first amendment’s free speech\textsuperscript{581} and establishment clauses.\textsuperscript{582}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{573} Knote, 95 U.S. at 164; The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1873); \textit{Hart’s Case}, 16 Ct. Cl. at 482-85; \textit{In re} North, 62 F.3d 1434,1435 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
\item \textsuperscript{574} Edwards, 580 F.2d at 1058.
\item \textsuperscript{575} Richmond, 496 U.S. at 425.
\item \textsuperscript{576} Panel Discussion, \textit{The Appropriations Power}, supra note 55, at 646 (Kate Stith); \textit{see also} Louis Fisher, \textit{Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President} 221-23 (1985) (hereinafter Fisher, \textit{Constitutional Conflicts}); \textit{1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law}, supra note 40, at 1-5.
\item \textsuperscript{577} 328 U.S. 306 (1946).
\item \textsuperscript{578} Id. at 305 n.1, citing Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1943, § 304, 57 Stat. 431,450.
\item \textsuperscript{579} Id. at 316.
\item \textsuperscript{580} United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
\item \textsuperscript{581} Federal Communications Comm’n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
\end{itemize}
From these explicit restrictions on Congress’ powers, a number of commentators propound the thesis that Congress’ appropriations authority is similarly limited by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In other words, Congress “may not use the appropriations power to impair the President’s ability to perform duties or exercise prerogatives the Constitution imposes on him” either by restrictions attached to appropriations acts or by a failure to appropriate adequate funds.583 Included in the catalogue of presidential powers immune from circumscription by Congress’ power of the purse are the executive’s authority over foreign affairs and national defense.584 Those who advocate such a thesis have constructed a “house of cards”, but their thesis is fundamentally flawed.

First, by analogizing specific, explicit constitutional limits on Congress’ authority (such as the bill of attainder clause) to the ill-defined concept of separation of powers, the thesis necessarily assumes the President — wholly independent of Congress — has plenary discretion over the nation’s foreign and defense policies in which Congress may not meddle.585 Neither the constitutional text nor the federal courts’ interpretation of it, however, supports such a conclusion.

On its face, the Constitution grants Congress, not the president, the “dominant role” in formulating foreign and military policy.586 Article I bestows upon Congress the powers to collect taxes “for the common Defence”; “to regulate commerce with foreign nations”; “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”; “to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”; “to raise and support Armies”; “to provide and maintain a Navy”; “to make

583. Sidak, supra note 57, at 1206-07; see also Emerson, supra note 55, at 33; LeBoeuf, supra note 55, at 475 n.126; Moore, supra note 55, at 146; Panel Discussion, The Appropriations Power, supra note 55, at 631,642 (William Barr, Geoffrey Miller); Bryan, supra note 56, at 596-97.
584. See HENKIN, supra note 86, at 113; HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM. DEMOCRACY & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 91, at 31-32; Moore, supra note 55, at 146; Sidak, supra note 57, at 1185; Bryan, supra note 56, at 602; cf. Lewittes, supra note 57, at 1158 (arguing Congress has the duty to raise the necessary revenues to fund presidential defense initiatives).
585. See Emerson, supra note 55, at 33; Moore, supra note 55, at 146; Lewittes, supra note 57, at 1158; Sidak, supra note 57, at 1206-07; Symposium, Executive Power, supra note 56, at 200-01 (Orrin Hatch).
586. KOH, supra note 453, at 75; see also FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 484, at 6; GLENNON, supra note 119, at 72; HENKIN, supra note 86, at 67.
rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”; “to provide for calling forth the Militia”; “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”; and “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by [the] Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

The President’s powers are seemingly skimpy by contrast.588 He is empowered to make treaties, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; to receive ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls; and to execute faithfully the laws of the United States. The President is also the commander in chief of the Army and Navy and the Militia (National Guard) when called into the service of the United States.

Given Congress’ broad textual authority over foreign policy and national defense and the paucity of enumerated presidential powers, it is difficult to discern when or how Congress can ever step over the line separating the branches, other than by a direct assault on the President’s core powers (for example, by attempting to appoint someone other than the President to command United States military forces).590 Nothing in the

588. See, e.g., Reveley, supra note 121, at 29: “If we could find a man in the state of nature and have him first scan the war-power provisions of the Constitution and then look at war-powers practice since 1789, he would marvel at how much Presidents have spun out of so little.”
590. Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (Congress may not interfere with presidential authority to issue pardons.). The obvious defect in an analogy between specific constitutional limitations on Congress and the amorphous separation of powers concept is noted in Raven-Hansen & Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings, supra note 64, at 888:

Lovett and its progeny . . . involved explicit constitutional prohibitions But the only relevant textually explicit prohibitions pertaining to national security appropriations (when neither individual nor state rights are involved) are the Appropriations Clause and the two-year limit on appropriations for the Army, the former directly and the latter at least indirectly restraining the Executive. Although the Constitution also makes numerous express assignments of affirmative national security powers, these are chiefly to Congress.

(emphasis in the original; footnotes omitted).
text remotely suggests Congress is bound to provide financial support to the President’s foreign policy and military adventures; indeed, the Constitution unquestionably contemplates, through such provisions as the war clause, that Congress be given a significant voice in the decision-making process.\footnote{591}

Nor have the federal courts so broadly defined the President’s foreign and military affairs prerogatives vis-a-vis Congress. In this judicial arena, Congress is unbeaten.

\footnote{591. See, \textit{e.g.}, Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 608, 618 (1850) ("wide difference between the power conferred on the President of the United States, and the authority and sovereignty which belongs to the English Crown"); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 923 (4th Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996) ("There is nothing timid or half-hearted about [the] constitutional allocation of authority. Rather, the Constitution states fully and directly that the governance of military affairs is a shared responsibility of Congress and the President."); \textit{ELY}, \textit{supra} note 452, at 10 ("In language and recorded purpose the War Clause made an unmistakable point that needed no further gloss: Acts of war must be authorized by Congress."); \textit{FISHER}, \textit{PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER}, \textit{supra} note 484, at 9 ("The framers empowered the President to be Commander in Chief, but that title must be understood in the context of military responsibilities Congress authorizes."); \textit{GLENNON}, \textit{supra} note 119, at 85 ("[I]t is for Congress to determine the policy reasons for which armed forces will be used. The President is precluded from doing so."); \textit{HENKIN}, \textit{supra} note 86, at 80 ("The Founders considered the power of war too important to entrust it to the President alone . . . ."); \textit{HENKIN}, \textit{CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY \& FOREIGN AFFAIRS}, \textit{supra} note 91, at 31 ("History supports few limitations on the power of Congress in foreign affairs other than the Bill of Rights, and history gives no support for any presidential authority to flout congressional legislation . . . ."); \textit{KOH}, \textit{supra} note 453, at 76 (Founders rejected "the English model of a king who possessed both the power to declare war and the authority to command troops."); \textit{SCHLESINGER}, \textit{supra} note 556, at 3 ("The Founders were determined to deny the American President what Blackstone had assigned to the British King — ‘the sole prerogative of making war and peace’."); \textit{Berger}, \textit{supra} note 77, at 82 ("[T]he Constitution conferred virtually all of the war-making powers upon Congress, leaving the President only the power ‘to repel sudden attacks’ on the United States.’"); Bestor, \textit{supra} note 175, at 535 (Constitution intended to ‘require the joint participation — the co-operation and concurrence — of all several branches in the making and carrying out of any genuinely critical decision.’); Charles A. Lofgren, \textit{War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding}, 81 \textit{Yale L.J.} 672, 700 (1972) ("[T]he grants to Congress of power over the declaration of war and issuance of letters of marque and reprisal likely convinced contemporaries . . . that the new Congress would have nearly complete authority over the commencement of war."); Abraham D. Sofaer, \textit{The Power Over War}, 50 \textit{U. Miami L. Rev.} 33, 33 (1995) ("Under our Constitution, Congress, not the President, has the ultimate power over war."). [hereinafter Sofaer, \textit{The Power Over War}]; William Van Alstyne, \textit{Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam}, 121 \textit{U. Pa. L. Rev.} 1, 9 (1972) ("[T]he lodgement of the power to declare war in Congress forbids the sustained use of armed force abroad in the absence of prior, affirmative, explicit authorization by Congress.").}
In no case touching on foreign relations has the Supreme Court invalidated an act of Congress because it impinged upon the President’s sole power under the Constitution. In two hundred years of dispute between the President and Congress over war and peace, commitment and neutrality, trade embargoes and arms sales, Congress has never lost before the High Court.\textsuperscript{592}

Early court decisions defined presidential power over foreign policy and defense narrowly, generally confining presidential discretion to the terms of positive statutory enactments. The quintessential example is \textit{Little v. Barreme},\textsuperscript{593} which involved a congressional enactment meant to restrict American commerce and navigation with France. The statute authorized the President to order the Navy to seize American ships going to French ports.\textsuperscript{594} The President, through the Secretary of the Navy, ordered U.S. naval vessels to seize all suspected American ships going to or from French ports. Following his orders, the commander of the U.S. frigate Boston, Captain George Little, captured a suspected American ship—the Flying Fish—going from a French port near the island of Hispaniola.\textsuperscript{595}

In a lawsuit brought by the owners of the Flying Fish, the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts ordered the captured vessel returned and awarded damages against Captain Little in the sum of $8504. The court held that even if the Flying Fish was an American vessel, since it had been captured going from, rather than to, a French port, Little had exceeded his authority under the statute.\textsuperscript{596}

Little appealed the judgment claiming he merely followed the President’s orders.\textsuperscript{597} While sympathizing with Little’s plight, the Supreme Court refused to overturn the damages award, holding that the President was without authority to exceed the limits on captures imposed by the statute: “\textit{[T]he legislature seems to have prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be carried into execution, was to exclude a seizure of any vessel not bound to a French port.}”\textsuperscript{598} That presidential discretion in execut-

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592. \textit{Glenlon}, supra note 119, at 13; \textit{see also Henkin}, supra note 86, at 72.
593. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
594. \textit{Act of Feb. 9, 1799, § 5}, 1 Stat. 613, 615.
595. The captured vessel was, in fact, Danish. \textit{Id.} at 176.
596. \textit{Little}, 6 U.S. at 175-76.
597. \textit{Id.} at 175.
598. \textit{Id.} at 177-78.
ing the nation’s foreign and military policy was at issue was simply irrelevant.599

In a similar vein, in United States v. Smith,600 Colonel William Smith engaged in actions to overthrow Spanish rule in the province of Caracas and was duly indicted for violating a statute prohibiting military expeditions against nations with which the United States was at peace.601 Smith offered to prove that his actions were approved by the executive department and subpoenaed the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Navy, and two other officers to appear at his trial. When they refused to appear, Smith moved to compel their attendance, proffering their expected testimony by affidavit.602 Sitting on circuit in New York, Justice William Patterson denied Smith’s motion, holding the testimony sought would be irrelevant since the President was without authority to sanction a violation of the statute:

Supposing then that every syllable of the affidavit is true, of what avail can it be on the present occasion? Of what use or benefit can it be to the defendant in a court of law? Does it speak by way of justification? The President of the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize to do what the law forbids. If he could, it would render the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure; which is a doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet any supporters in our government. In this particular, the law is paramount. Who has dominion over it? None but the legislature; and even they are not without their limitation in our republic. Will it be pretended that the President could rightfully grant a dispensation and license to any of our citizens to carry on a war against a nation with whom the United States are at peace?603

599. Id. at 179; see also The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824) (In the absence of statutory authority, executive officers are not permitted to seize vessels suspected of evading customs laws.). According to Professor Wilmerding, Congress later reimbursed Captain Little for the “damages, interest, and charges” assessed against him. Wilmerding, The President & the Law, supra note 456, at 324 n.6. Under current law, Captain Little would have likely been personally immune from liability under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4653 (codified at and amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679).

600. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y.1806) (No. 16,342).


602. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1229.

603. Id. at 1230.
Both **Little** and **Smith** are consistent with other early decisions judging the legality of executive action in foreign and military affairs by the statutory framework established by Congress.\(^{604}\) Later court decisions tended to view presidential discretion over foreign policy and national defense in broader terms, but never at the expense of congressional authority. For example, *Durand v. Hollins*\(^{605}\) involved a lawsuit against the captain of the naval vessel *Cyane* in his individual capacity for damages arising out of an

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604. Silas v. Talbott, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (“The whole powers of war [are], by the constitution of the United States, vested in Congress . . . .”); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 45 (1800) (Congress empowered to authorize limited war). This deference to congressional enactments is particularly true with respect to maritime prize cases. See The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421, 528 (1814) (“The right of capture is entirely derived from the law . . . . It is a limited right, which is subject to all the restraints the legislature has imposed, and is to be exercised in the manner which its wisdom has prescribed.”); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 129 (1814) (“[T]he power of confiscating property is in the legislature.”).

Early administrations acknowledged Congress’ central role in foreign affairs and national security, often refusing to take action without congressional approbation. During the nation’s “quasi-war” with France in 1798, after Congress authorized the arming, equipping, and employing of ships to protect U.S. commerce but before it authorized the naval war with France, the Secretary of War issued to the commander of U.S. naval forces rules of engagement limited to purely defensive operations, stating, “as Congress possess exclusively the Power to declare War; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water, and as neither has yet been done, your Operations must accordingly be partial & limited.” 1 OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS, NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE QUASI-WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES & FRANCE 77 (1935); see also REVELLEY, supra note 121, at 278; Sofaer, *The Power Over War*, supra note 591, at 50-51. In an 1805 message to Congress, President Jefferson described Spanish incursions into the Louisiana territory recently purchased from France, stating he had instructed the armed forces to protect U.S. citizens and patrol the borders, but that “Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war.” Thus, he awaited Congress’ authority “for using force in any degree which could be avoided.” 1 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 388,389. In 1825, asserting that it was within the “constitutional competency of the Executive” to decide whether the United States should be represented at a meeting of American states assembled in Panama, President John Quincy Adams nevertheless acknowledged that he required “the sanction of both Houses to the appropriation, without which [U.S. participation] can not be carried into effect.” 2 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 318. In his 1831 State of the Union Address, President Andrew Jackson informed Congress about Argentine threats to U.S. vessels engaged in fishing and commerce in and around the Falkland Islands, noting he had taken measures to protect the ships, but submitted the matter to Congress “to the end that they may clothe the Executive with such authority and means as they may deem necessary for providing a force adequate to the complete protection of our fellow-citizens fishing and trading in those seas.” 1 *THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS* 344, 352 (Arthur M. Schlesinger ed., 1966). See generally WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 326, at 28; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 443, at 31-35.

605. 8 F. Cas. 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1860) (No. 4,186).
1854 bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua, because of a purported affront to an American diplomat.606

The court, speaking through Circuit Justice Nelson, found for Hollins, expounding a broad presidential authority to protect American lives and property abroad. Importantly, the court deemed the military actions to have been consistent with general statutes establishing the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Navy,607 and had no occasion to address how the case might have turned had Congress prohibited such activity.608

In the Prize Cases,609 the Supreme Court upheld President Lincoln’s blockade at the onset of the Civil War absent a declaration of war, holding the Confederacy’s actions created a state of war that “[t]he President was bound to meet. . . in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with aname . . . .”610 The Court also noted that Congress ultimately ratified the President’s actions “at the extraordinary session of the Legislature of 1861.”611 The Court was never confronted with a claim that Congress was without authority in the matter.612

The most sweeping judicial declaration of presidential authority over foreign relations is Justice George Sutherland’s opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.613 The case itself dealt with a rather straightforward issue of the permissible scope of delegation of legislative authority. In response to the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, Congress passed and the President signed a joint resolution authorizing the President to prohibit arms sales to the combatants if he found that such a prohibition would “contribute to the reestablishment of peace between the countries.”614 The statute provided criminal penalties for violating a presidially issued embargo.615

Pursuant to the resolution, President Franklin Roosevelt issued an embargo proclamation.616 Curtiss-Wright and others were subsequently

606. A bottle was thrown at him. GLENNON, supra note 119, at 74.
607. Durand, 8 F. Cas. at 112.
608. See GLENNON, supra note 119, at 75.
609. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635,669 (1862).
610. Id. at 669.
611. Id. at 670.
612. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 556, at 64-65.
613. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
614. Id. at 312.
615. Id. at 312, citing Act of May 28, 1934, ch.365, 48 Stat. 811.
indicted for conspiring to sell arms to Bolivia in violation of the joint resolution and presidential proclamation. The defendants demurred to the indictment, asserting, inter alia, that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its legislative authority to impose the embargo to the President.

The Court had before it the narrow question of whether Congress had exceeded its authority by delegating to the President responsibility for determining whether an arms embargo would help re-establish peace between Bolivia and Paraguay. A year earlier, the Court had deemed delegations of legislative authority in domestic matters unconstitutional. Justice Sutherland’s opinion differentiated between international and domestic affairs, holding Congress had greater flexibility to delegate power outside U.S. boundaries, including enactment of the joint resolution in question.

Although this determination resolved the issue at bar, Sutherland launched into an expansive exposition of presidential authority over international affairs, opining (in obvious dicta) that the President possessed foreign policy powers not dependent upon legislation:

It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.

Sutherland’s opinion, which has been characterized as “a muddled law review article wedged with considerable difficulty between the pages

616. Id. at 312-13.
617. Id. at 311.
618. Id. at 314.
620. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329 (“It is enough to summarize by saying that, both upon principle and in accordance with precedent, we conclude there is sufficient warrant for the broad discretion vested in the President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute will have a beneficial effect upon the reestablishment of peace in the affected countries . . . .”).
of the United States Reports,” is the subject of intense academic criticism. Significantly, nothing in the case’s narrow holding suggests that Congress may not, through legislation in general (or appropriations in particular), circumscribe the President’s discretion over foreign policy or national defense. As Justice Jackson observed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:

[Curtiss-Wright] recognized internal and external affairs as being separate categories, and held that the strict limitation does not apply with respect to delegations of power in external affairs. It was intimated that the President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress.

Curtiss-Wright's progeny does not dictate a different result. A few examples are illustrative. In C.&S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Co., the Supreme Court held that presidential determinations on applications for certificates for overseas and foreign air transportation under the Civil Aeronautics Act were not subject to judicial review. Since the President derived his authority from a comprehensive legislative scheme for

621. Id. at 319-20. Because Curtiss-Wright and its co-defendants were charged with a crime, it is difficult to imagine how President Roosevelt could have possibly acted without legislative sanction in this case. Since early in our history, the Supreme Court has held that federal court criminal jurisdiction derives solely from statute. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467, 476 (1853).


623. See, e.g., id.; FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 484, at 58; Koh, supra note 453, at 94; Raoul Berger, The President’s Unilateral Termination & the Taiwan Treaty, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577, 589-95 (1980); David Cole, Youngstown v. Curtiss-Wright, 99 Yale L.J. 2063, 2081-82 (1990) (book review); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis & Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 Yale L.J. 467, 490 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale L.J. 1 (1973); Stein, Note, supra note 120, at 583-89; see also IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR REPORT, supra note 441, at 388-90.

624. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Far, 383 F.2d 167, 182 (2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting argument that Curtiss-Wright precluded Congress’ passage of Hickenlooper Amendment, which barred federal courts from refusing to consider, on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine, claims predicated upon a foreign state’s expropriation of property); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 212-13 (2d ed. 1988) (Congress retains power to limit executive action in foreign policy within its enumerated constitutional grants of power.).

625. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
regulating air carriers, by which Congress gave the President plenary discretion to award overseas and foreign air transportation certificates, Congress’ authority to impede presidential action was not in question.

At issue in Dames & Moore v. Regan, was President Carter’s measures taken under the Executive Agreement with Iran to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis. In various executive orders and regulations, the President “nullified attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against Iran that may be presented to an International Claims Tribunal.” The Court found statutory authority for the nullification of attachments on Iranian assets and the order directing the assets transfer to Iran; however, it could not find similar authority for the suspension of claims against Iran. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the President’s actions, holding they were consistent with “the general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area.” Importantly, the Court did not hold that the President could have taken action in contravention of statute: “Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.”

Thus, neither the text of the Constitution nor the federal judiciary’s interpretation of it support the proposition that Congress has no role to play in international or military affairs, or that Congress may not, by legislation, circumscribe executive discretion in these areas. To the contrary, while Congress may not prevent the President from exercising his constitutional duties, it may influence or even dictate how the President discharges those duties.

Second, presupposing the existence of an exclusive presidential authority over foreign and military policy, the thesis also necessarily assumes that Congress is barred by the concept of separation of powers from using the purse to frustrate presidential foreign and military prerogative.

The argument that Congress may not check the President’s foreign policy and war powers through its control of the purse strings echoes the

627. Id. at 660.
629. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675
630. Id. at 678.
claims of the Stuart monarchs and their judges, who similarly claimed Parliament could not impede royal prerogatives by withholding needed revenue.633 To suppose Congress cannot limit presidential foreign and defense policy initiatives through its appropriations authority is to turn our constitutional scheme on its head; congressional restraints on executive prerogatives through the power of the purse are the cornerstone of British and American representative democracy and—as understood by the Founders—a fundamental precept in the constitutional scheme.

Moreover, Congress has historically rejected the contention that it is obligated to provide financial support for the President’s foreign and military policy initiatives. The issue came to a head early in the nation’s history when the House of Representatives balked at furnishing the money necessary to carry out the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States (Jay Treaty).

The Jay Treaty was signed in London on 19 November 1794, and ratified by the United States on 14 August 1795.634 Although President Washington proclaimed the treaty on 29 February 1796,635 not all of the

631. Id. at 680. The Court highlighted the limited character of the decision and its dependence on apparent congressional approval:

Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities. . . . But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say the President lacks the power to settle such claims.

Id. at 688. For a criticism of Dames & Moore’s reliance on congressional acquiescence rather than positive legislation, see Lee R. Marks & John C. Grable, The President’s Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 68 (1982). Other Supreme Court cases have similarly upheld executive department practices that are consistent with broad statutory charters and in which Congress does not object. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Conversely, when Congress enacts legislation the President is bound by it even if it touches foreign or military policy. The Court has long recognized, for example, that Congress may abrogate treaties or executive agreements by subsequently enacted statutes. See, e.g., La Abra Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 721 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884). Thus, if it can muster a veto-proof majority, Congress can change the nation’s international commitments wholly independently of the President.

632. See supra notes 583-85.

633. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
treaty’s provisions could be put into effect until Congress voted appropriations for various commissions established by its terms.636

Some in the administration and in Congress believed that Congress, and the House of Representatives in particular, was constitutionally constrained to provide the funds necessary to execute the treaty. For example, Alexander Hamilton believed that if the House was able to refuse the requisite appropriation, it would be capable of frustrating treaties made in accordance with the Constitution. In a letter to Rufus King, Hamilton stated:

The Treaty Power binding the Will of the nation must within its constitutional limits be paramount to the Legislative power which is that Will; or at least the last law being a Treaty must repeal an antecedent contradictory law . . . .

. . . .

. . . that claiming that a right of assent is sanction for the House of Representatives, destroys the Treaty making Power & negatives two Propositions in the Constitution to wit I that The President with the Senate are competent to make Treaties. II That a Treaty is Law.637

By letter to George Washington two weeks later, Hamilton sent a proposed reply to a House request for documents about the treaty, which asserted that until the treaty was repealed through the full legislative process, the House had to furnish the requisite means to execute the treaty:

[T]he House of Representatives have no moral power to refuse the execution of a treaty, which is not contrary to the constitution, because it pledges the public faith, and have no legal power

634. 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 245 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter MILLER].
635. Id. at 245-274.
636. See Jay Treaty, arts. 5, 6, 7, in id.; at 249-53, establishing commissions to resolve (1) a boundary dispute regarding the St. Croix River, (2) outstanding debts owed British merchants, and (3) damages to U.S. citizens and merchants for “irregular or illegal Captures or Condemnations of their vessels.” Article 8 of the treaty required that the United States and Great Britain jointly defray the expenses of the commissions. Id. at 253.
to refuse its execution because it is a law—until at least it ceases to be a law by a regular act of revocation of the competent authority.\textsuperscript{638}

The majority of members of the House of Representatives were not, however, prepared to be “rolled” by the administration, and demanded a voice in the treaty process insofar as legislation, such as an appropriation, was necessary to carry it into effect. For example, George Nicholas observed that, while Britain’s king held that nation’s treaty power, the House of Commons controlled the funds required to execute treaties. Nicholas declared that the House of Representatives similarly had the discretion to determine whether to enact appropriations measures needed to carry a treaty into effect: “The President and Senate possessed the Treaty-making power; for they possessed it with qualifications, in matters of money; and unless the House chose to grant the money, it was so far no Treaty.”\textsuperscript{639}

Congressman Heath likewise noted that the power of appropriations belonged to the House, “and that the money of the people should not be voted out of their pockets without giving them the utmost satisfaction, for passing laws to this effect.”\textsuperscript{640} Albert Gallatin thought that “[t]he power of granting money should be exercised as a check on the Treaty-making power.”\textsuperscript{641}

To exercise its legislative authority, on 24 March 1796, the House formally sought copies of the President’s instructions to Secretary Jay together with other relevant documents about the treaty.\textsuperscript{642} On 30 March, President Washington flatly refused to comply with the House’s request, stating that, because the House of Representatives played no role in the treaty-making process, the requested documents were not relevant to any matter under the cognizance of the House.\textsuperscript{643}

\textsuperscript{638} Enclosure to a Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 29, 1796), in \textit{id.} at 85, 98.

\textsuperscript{639} 5 \textsc{Annals of Cong.} at 446 (Mar. 7, 1796).

\textsuperscript{640} \textit{Id.} at 448.

\textsuperscript{641} \textit{Id.} at 474 (Mar. 9, 1796).

\textsuperscript{642} The Resolution stated: \textit{Resolved,} That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the Minister of the United States, who negotiated the Treaty with the King of Great Britain, communicated by his Message of the first of March, together with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said Treaty. \textit{Id.} at 426 (Mar. 7, 1796). The resolution passed on 24 March 1796. \textit{Id.} at 759.
The House of Representatives was not, however, to be deterred. On 7 April, it enacted, by a large majority, a resolution that staked a substantive role for the House in legislation needed to execute a treaty:

Resolved, That, it being declared by the second section of the second article of the Constitution, ‘that the President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate concur,’ the House of Representatives do not claim any agency in making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law to be passed by Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon, as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good.644

Having proclaimed its position, on 30 April 1796, by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight, the House passed the appropriations required to carry the Jay Treaty into effect.645

The position taken by the House of Representatives in April 1796 has prevailed.646 This is exemplified today by Congress’ continuing refusal to appropriate the money needed to satisfy dues assessed against the United States under the United Nations Charter, although the United States is bound by treaty to pay the dues.647 Since the late 1970s, Congress has threatened to withhold or has actually withheld payment of U.N. assessments against the United States.648 In spite of Clinton Administration denunciations and pleas,649 Congress has refused the appropriations

643. 1 RICHARDSON, supra note 473, at 194 (Mar. 30, 1796).
644. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (Apr. 6, 1796). The resolution passed by a vote of 54 to 37. Id. at 782.
645. Id. at 1291. See Act of May 6, 1796, ch. XVII, 1 Stat. 459.
646. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 206; HENKIN, supra note 86, at 109, 114; Nobleman, supra note 455, at 153.
required to bring the United States’ account current.\footnote{650} In addition, the Clinton Administration has fully acknowledged legislative supremacy in this matter by informing the Secretary General of the United Nations that he must reach an accommodation with Congress before receiving the requested U.S. contributions.\footnote{651}

The federal courts have not disturbed this division of authority between the President and Congress. No federal court has ever held that Congress is obligated to fund the President’s foreign or military policy initiatives or that a congressional withholding of funds was unconstitutional. In fact, courts have consistently recognized Congress’ authority to withhold appropriations, even when needed to satisfy court-imposed judgments.\footnote{652}

While the courts may very well prevent Congress from obstructing presidents from performing their core responsibilities, they have never been inclined to dictate to Congress the appropriations required to fulfill presidential policy initiatives. As Justice Jackson put it in \textit{Youngstown}: “While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army and navy to command.”\footnote{653}


\footnote{651. John M. Goshko, \textit{U.N. Reform Pits U.S. and Third World}, \textit{Wash. Post}, Mar. 10, 1997, at A-1. Other recent examples of direct congressional interference with presidential foreign and military policy initiatives include Congress’ cut-off of funds for the Vietnam War (\textit{see supra} note 484) and its prohibition against aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. \textit{See supra} note 53.}

\footnote{652. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,570 (1962) (citing 1933 study noting instances of Congress’ refusal to pass appropriations to satisfy Court of Claims judgments); \textit{see also supra} note 571; Paulsen, \textit{ supra} note 66, at 305-06: “[T]he courts may not order Congress to appropriate funds, either to pay a money judgment against the United States or as a remedy for some other constitutional violation. They can award a judgment, but they cannot constitutionally require Congress to pay up.”}
c. Presidential Appropriations Authority

Some commentators assert that the President may draw needed revenue from the Treasury to carry out his responsibilities if Congress affirmatively attempts to frustrate his policies or simply does not furnish him the financial means to pursue national security interests. However, no federal court has come close to suggesting the President may appropriate money on his own constitutional authority.

The absence of judicial precedent in support of such an assertion is, of course, hardly surprising. Such a ruling would fly in the face of the express terms of the appropriations clause and the centuries-old tradition of legislative supremacy over the public fisc. Moreover, while judicial invalidation of an indiscreet appropriations rider restricting executive flexibility in national security affairs is certainly comprehensible, the means by which a federal court might fashion relief in the event Congress simply refused to appropriate funds is much more difficult to fathom.

In such a case, a court would seemingly have a couple of options. First, it could attempt to direct Congress to enact the requisite appropriations measures. Such an order, however, would be almost certainly unenforceable. How could a federal court coerce Congress into enacting such legislation? Attempt to hold the institution in contempt if it refuses?

653. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 630 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Corwin, supra note 115, at 252 (“If Congress cannot be persuaded to back presidential policy by bringing these powers to its support, then—the idea of a presidential coup d’etat being dismissed—that the policy fails, and that is all there is to it.”). Absent violation of an explicit constitutional provision, the federal courts are generally unwilling to intrude into or permit challenges to congressional spending decisions. See, e.g., Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907).

654. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

655. The federal courts have construed the appropriations clause to be a restriction on the executive. E.g., Cincinnati Soap, 301 U.S. 308. On the other hand, the courts have held that the executive is obligated to spend money appropriated by Congress. E.g., Iowa ex rel. State Hwy. Comm’n v. Brinegar, 512 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1975); Guadamuz v. Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1973); National Council of Community Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973); Local 2677, American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 73 (D.D.C. 1973); see also Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts, supra note 576, at 236-37; Mikva, supra note 89, at 12-13.


657. Some commentators have seemingly advocated such a role for the federal judiciary. See supra note 64.
Punish just those members who speak out or vote against the measure? Neither measure is conceivable nor constitutional.659

While the federal courts have, on occasion, issued orders directing state and local governments to raise taxes and spend funds,660 the Congress is a co-equal department of government (thereby spawning separation of powers issues)661 and a much more formidable adversary. Any attempt by a federal court to dictate how Congress should vote on a particular issue would be met with certain resistance and probable noncompliance,662 particularly since the President would likely resort to the courts only if he had failed to secure desired funds from Congress. Worse, Congress might retaliate by attempting to curtail jurisdiction over such issues.663


661. Frug, supra note 659, at 750; but see Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d 1096, 1119-21 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (Congress may not constitutionally refuse to appropriate funds needed to eliminate de facto discrimination in District of Columbia schools).

A court might also issue a declaratory decree authorizing the President to draw needed money from the Treasury or simply issue a mandatory injunction directing the disbursement of the funds. How a court might reconcile such a decree with the plain language of the appropriations clause, however, is problematic, unless it construes the Supreme Court’s declaration in Cooper v. Aaron—that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution “is the supreme law of the land”—to mean that judicial edicts represent the positive legislation envisioned by the appropriations clause.

Aside from being blatantly inconsistent with the text and prior understanding of the Constitution, judicial intrusion of this nature poses a myriad of other problems. For example, how would a court decide how much money is required to carry out the President’s foreign and military policy initiatives? Would the court balance the President’s petition for funds with competing priorities for the nation’s scarce resources? If sufficient funds are not available, would the court raise the debt ceiling? Order an increase in taxes? Or perhaps direct the President to take the money from other, congressionally approved programs? Commentators have recognized, in other contexts, that the judiciary is not well-suited to decide these kinds of fiscal issues. Judicial involvement in such decisions is not only inherently undemocratic, but involve budgetary decisions that “are quintessentially legislative because they involve the reconciliation of competing national priorities, which courts are unsuited to make.”

While one may certainly imagine courts directing such relief, given centuries of practice and precedent to the contrary, the likelihood of such federal judicial intrusion into the appropriations process is remote.


664 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).

665. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text; see also Paulsen, supra note 66, at 225 (assertion in Cooper v. Aaron that Supreme Court’s decisions are the “supreme law of the land” and that other branches are bound by them is wrong).
2. **State Courts**

Even before the Constitutional Convention, the states had experience with appropriations clauses and the allocation of the power to expend public funds between governmental departments. After ratification, all but a handful of states appended appropriations clauses to their state charters, and over the last 221 years, most have had the occasion to interpret the provisions in their courts.

Of course, the manner in which states construe their appropriations clauses and distribute state spending power (at least since ratification) is not directly relevant to the meaning of the Constitution’s appropriations clause. One would think, however, that if (as a number of commentators claim) an appropriations clause, properly interpreted, permits the executive to expend public funds independent of the legislative department, at least some states would have construed their constitutions in such a manner. In other words, of the forty-eight states that have, or that have had, appropriations clauses in their constitutions since 1776, at least one should have recognized an autonomous executive spending authority. This, however, is not the case. Without apparent exception, states have construed their constitutions so as to afford their legislatures exclusive dominion over the public fisc.

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667. See supra note 387.

As noted above, at the time the Constitution was ratified, several states had already incorporated appropriations clauses into their constitutions, and by the turn of the 18th century, more than half of the states had them. Thereafter, nearly every state included appropriations clauses in their charters. Most of the state provisions were similar—with some variation—to the United States Constitution’s appropriations clause; other

669. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.

670. See, e.g., Ala. Const. of 1819, art. VI, § 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of an appropriation made by law . . . .”); Ala. Const. of 1865, art. IV, § 37 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . .”); Ala. Const. of 1867, art. IV, § 37 (same); Ala. Const. of 1875, art. IV, § 33 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriations made by law . . . .”); Ark. Const. of 1836, art. VII, General Provisions, § 3 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of an appropriation made by law . . . .”); Ark. Const. of 1864, art. VIII, § 4 (same); Ark. Const. of 1868, art. X, § 8 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury until the same shall have been appropriated by law.”); Ark. Const. of 1874, art. XVI, § 12 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury until the same shall
have been appropriated by law, and then only in accordance with said appropriation.”); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 23 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . . ”); COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. V, § 33 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriations made by law . . . ”); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 11, § 15 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . . ”); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 15 (same); FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. VIII, § 3 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of an appropriation made by law . . ."); FlA. CONST. of 1865, art. VIII, § 3 (same); FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XIII, § 4 (“No moneys shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 4 (same); GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 24 (“No money shall be drawn out of the treasury or from the public funds of this State, except by appropriations made by law . . .”); GA. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § 6, cl. 2 (“No money shall be drawn out of the treasury of this State, except by appropriation made by law . . . ”); GA. CONST. of 1877, art. III, § 7, ¶ 11 (same); IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. VII, § 13 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); ILL. CONST. of 1816, art. II, § 20 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 26 (same); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. III, § 17 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . ”); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 111, § 24 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law”); KAN. CONST. of 1858, art. X, § 1 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 2 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . . ”); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. VI, § 5 (“Wu money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law . . . ”); LA. CONST. of 1845, art. VI, § 93 (“Wo money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of specific appropriations made by law . . . ”); LA. CONST. of 1852, art VI, § 94 (same); LA. CONST. of 1864, art. VII, § 96 (same); LA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 104 (same); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 43 (same); LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 45 (same); ME. CONST. of 1819, art. V, part 4th, § 4 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but by warrant from the Governor and Council, and in consequence of appropriations made by law . . . ”); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 20 (“Wu money shall be drawn from the treasury of the State, except in accordance with an appropriation made by law . . . ”); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 32 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury of the State by any order or resolution, nor except in accordance with an appropriation by law . . . ”); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. XII, § 4 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIV, § 5 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); MICH. CONST. of 1857, art. IX, § 9 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury of this State except in pursuance of an appropriation by law.”); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. VI, § 8 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of an appropriation made by law . . . ”); MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. VII, § 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of an appropriation made by law . . . ”); MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 26 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except on appropriations made by law.”); Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 31 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . . ”); Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 6 (“No money
shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . . .”); Mo. Const. of 1875, art. X, § 19 (“No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State, or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law . . . .”); Mont. Const. of 1889, art. XII, § 10 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); Neb. Const. of 1867, Finance, § 1 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”); N.J. Const. of 1844, art. IV, § 6, ¶ 2 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but for appropriations made by law.”); N.Y. Const. of 1846, art. VII, § 8 (“No moneys shall ever be paid out of the Treasury of this State, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . .”); N.C. Const. of 1894, art. III, § 21 (same); N.C. Const. of 1868, art. XIV, § 3 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); N.C. Const. of 1876, art. XIV, § 3 (same); N.D. Const. of 1889, art. XII, § 186 (“No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law . . . .”); Ohio Const. of 1802, art. I, § 21 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); Okla. Const. of 1907, art. 5, § 55 (“No money shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State, nor any of its funds, nor any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law . . . .”); Or. Const. of 1857, art. IX, § 4 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); Pa. Const. of 1790, art. I, § 21 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); Pa. Const. of 1838, art. I, § 22 (same); S.C. Const. of 1778, art. XVI (“No money shall be drawn out of the public treasury but by the legislative authority of the State.”); S.C. Const. of 1790, art. I, § 17 (same); S.C. Const. of 1865, art. I, § 24 (same); S.C. Const. of 1868, art. II, § 22 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . .”); S.C. Const. of 1895, art. X, § 9 (“Money shall be drawn from the treasury only in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); S.D. Const. of 1889, art. XII, § 1 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriation by law . . . .”); Tenn. Const. of 1796, art. I, § 21 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); Tenn. Const. of 1834, art. 11, § 24 (same); Tex. Republic Const. of 1836, art. I, § 25 (“No money shall be drawn from the public treasury but in strict accordance with appropriations made by law . . . .”); Tex. Const. of 1845, art. VII, § 8 (“No money shall be drawn from the public treasury but in strict accordance with appropriations made by law . . . .”); Tex. Const. of 1866, art. VII, § 8 (same); Tex. Const. of 1868, art. XII, § 6 (“No money shall be drawn from the public treasury but in pursuance of specific appropriation made by law . . . .”); Va. Const. of 1850, art. IV, § 26 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of appropriations made by law . . . .”); Va. Const. of 1864, art. IV, § 24 (same); Va. Const. of 1870, art. XIII, § 186 (“No money shall be drawn from the State treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law . . . .”); Wash. Const. of 1889, art. VIII, § 4 (“No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law . . . .”); W. Va. Const. of 1861, art. VIII, § 4 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . .”); Wyo. Const. of 1889, art. III, § 35 (“Money shall be paid out of the treasury only on appropriations made by the legislature . . . .”); art. XVI, § 7 (“No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law . . . .”).
states were more inventive.671 Today, all but three state constitutions (Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Utah) include some form of appropriations clause. Most state provisions are similar to the federal Constitution’s appropriations clause.672 Several states have modernized the language of their constitutions to reflect unequivocal legislative control of the trea-

671. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, part II, ch. II, § 1, art. XI:
No monies shall be issued out of the treasury of this commonwealth, and disposed of... but by warrant under the hand of the governor for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary defence and support of the commonwealth; and for the protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.

N.H. CONST. of 1784, (Executive Power-President) ¶ 14 XI:
No monies shall be issued out of the treasury of this state, and disposed of... but by warrant under the hand of the president for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary defence and support of the state; and for the protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.

N.H. CONST. of 1792, Executive Power, § LVI:
No moneys shall be issued out of the treasury of this State, and disposed of... but by warrant under the hand of the governor for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary defence and support of the State; and for the protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.

672. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 72 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriations made by law...”); ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 13 (“No money shall be withdrawn from the treasury except in accordance with appropriations made by law.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 5 (“No money shall be paid out of the State Treasury, except in the manner provided by law.”); ARK. CONST. art. V, § 29 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of specific appropriations made by law...”); CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 (“Money may be drawn from the Treasury only through an appropriation made by law...”); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 33 (“No moneys in the state treasury shall be disbursed therefrom by the treasurer except upon appropriations made by law...”); CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (“The treasurer shall receive all monies belonging to the state, and disburse the same only as he may be directed by law.”); FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1C (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); GA. CONST. art. III, § 9, ¶ 1 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except by appropriation made by law.”); HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (“No public money shall be expended except pursuant to appropriation made by law.”); IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 13 (“No money shall be drawn from
the treasury but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); Ind. Const. art. X, § 3 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); Iowa Const. art. III, § 24 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); Kan. Const. art. II, § 24 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law.”); Ky. Const. § 230 (“No money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); La. Const. art. VII, § 10 (“Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, money shall be drawn from the state treasury only pursuant to an appropriation made in accordance with the law.”); Me. Const. art. V, pt. 3, § 4 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in consequence of appropriations or allocations authorized by law.”); Md. Const. art. III, § 32 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the State, by any order or resolution, nor except in accordance with an appropriation by law . . . ”); Mich. Const. art. IX, § 17 (“No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); Minn. Const. art. XI, § 1 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury of this state except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”); Mo. Const. art. IV, § 28 (“No money shall be withdrawn from the state treasury except by warrant drawn in accordance with an appropriation made by law . . . ”); Mont. Const. art. VII, § 14 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”); N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2 (“No money shall be drawn from the State but for appropriations made by law.”); N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 7 (“No money shall ever be paid out of the state treasury or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . ”); N.C. Const. art. V, § 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law . . . ”); Ohio Const. art. XI, § 22 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law. . . . ”); Okla. Const. art. V, § 55 (“No money shall ever be paid out of the state treasury, nor any of its funds, nor any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . ”); Or. Const. art. IX, § 4 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law . . . ”); Pa. Const. art. III, § 24 (“No monies shall be paid out of the Treasury, except on appropriations made by law . . . ”); S.C. Const. art. X, § 8 (“Money shall be drawn from the treasury of the State or the treasury of any of its political subdivisions only in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”); S.D. Const. art. XII, § 1 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury, except upon appropriations made by law . . . ”); Tenn. Const. art. II, § 24 (“No public money shall be expended except pursuant to appropriations made by law . . . ”); Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 6 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in pursuance of specific appropriations made by law . . . ”); Va. Const. art. X, § 7 (“No money shall be paid out of the State treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law. . . . ”); Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 4 (“No money shall ever be paid out of this state treasury, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . ”); W. Va. Const. art. X, § 3 (“No money shall be paid from the treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law . . . ”); Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 2 (“No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”); Wyo. Const. art. XVI, § 7 (“No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law.”).
sury\textsuperscript{673} or have retained entirely unique clauses.\textsuperscript{674}

With seeming uniformity, state courts have defined their constitutions, appropriations clauses to mean that legislatures alone possess the authority to spend public funds. The common understanding in the states is that legislative control of the purse is the keystone of representative democracy and essential to preventing executive despotism. For example, the California Supreme Court declared in \textit{Humbert v. Dunn}:

The limitation that “no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law” is taken literally from the constitution of the United States. Its object is to secure to the legislative department of the government the exclusive power of deciding how, when, and for what purposes the public funds shall be applied in carrying on the government. . . . It had its origin in Parliament in the seventeenth century, when the people of Great Britain, to provide against the abuse by the king and his officers of the discretionary money power with which they were vested, demanded that the public funds should not be drawn from the treasury except in accordance with express appropriations therefor made by Parliament. . . . and the system worked so well in correcting the abuses complained of, our forefathers adopted it, and the restraint imposed by it has become a part of the fundamental law of nearly every state in the Union. To the legislative department of the government is

\textsuperscript{673} \textit{Del. Const.} art. VIII, \S 6(a) (‘No money shall be drawn from the treasury but pursuant to an appropriation made by Act of the General Assembly.’); \textit{Ill. Const.} art. VIII, \S 2(b) (‘The General Assembly by law shall make appropriations for all expenditures of public funds by the State.’); \textit{N. Mass. Const.} art. IV, \S 30 (Except interest or other payments on the public debt, money shall be paid out of the treasury only upon appropriations made by the legislature.’); \textit{N. D. Const.} art. X, \S 12 (‘All public moneys . . . shall be paid out and disbursed only pursuant to appropriations first made by the legislature . . .’); \textit{Vt. Const.} ch. II, \S 27 (‘No money shall be drawn out of the Treasury, unless first appropriated by act of legislation.’).

\textsuperscript{674} \textit{Mass. Const.} pt. 2, ch. 2 \S 1, art. XI (‘No monies shall be issued out of the treasury of this commonwealth . . . by warrant under the hand of the governor for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary defence and support of the commonwealth; and for the protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.’); \textit{N. H. Const.} pt. 2, art. LVI (‘No moneys shall be issued out of the treasury of this State, and disposed of . . . by warrant under the hand of the governor for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary defence and support of the State; and for the protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.’).
entrusted the power to say to what purposes the public funds shall be devoted in each fiscal year . . . 675

To similar effect is the decision of the Indiana Supreme Court in Ris-tine v. State ex rel. Board of Commissioners, in which the court, referring to the struggles in seventeenth century England over control of the purse, concluded:

The system established was, that all the money in the treasury was to be specifically appropriated and specifically applied. This new and important principle, as English historians call it, thus practically established in that country, is adopted in this State as part of our fundamental law. “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.” And the abuse to corrected by the establishment of the principle, was the exercise of official discretion in paying out the public money. The purpose to be accomplished, was the giving to the legislative power alone the right, and imposing upon it the duty, of designating periodically, the particular demands against the State, or other objects, to which the moneys in the treasury shall be, from time to time, applied, and the amount to each. 676

The Nevada Supreme Court expressed the identical view of the power of the purse in State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers, stating:

As the fruit of the English revolution in 1688, which sent the king to Versailles and changed the succession to the throne, [the appropriations clause] had its origin in the British Parliament when the people of Great Britain, to provide against the abuse by the king and his officers of the discretionary power with which they were vested, demanded that the public funds should not be drawn from the treasury except in accordance with express appropriations made by Parliament . . . . The provision that no moneys shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law requires that their expenditure shall first be authorized by the legislature, which stands as a representa-tive of the people. 677

675. 84 Cal. 57, 59, 24 P. 111, 111-12 (1890).
676. 20 Ind. 328, 336 (1863) (emphasis in the original)
677. 29 Nev. 469, 474-75, 91 P. 819, 820 (1907).
Nor have state courts hesitated to uphold legislative control of appropriations in the face of attempted encroachments by state governors. In *Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm*, the governor — citing an emergency — claimed authority to transfer funds appropriated for one executive department to another. In making this claim, the governor relied on arguments closely analogous to those asserted by proponents of an independent presidential Spending authority. First, the governor asserted the authority to transfer funds between appropriations based upon his inherent constitutional authority to administer the executive branch of the state government. Second, the governor contended that the state’s appropriations clause gave him authority to transfer funds between appropriations.

The Colorado Supreme Court flatly rejected the governor’s arguments, holding that the legislature’s control over the expenditure of state money was exclusive:

We conclude that the transfers between executive departments here undertaken impermissibly infringed upon the General Assembly’s plenary power of appropriation, and, therefore, cannot be deemed to fall within the inherent authority of the Governor over the state budget. However accurate the perception of the executive branch that emergency conditions existed might have been, the means ultimately chosen in good faith to remedy those conditions were not within the inherent authority of the chief executive.

Even in those states whose constitutions do not include an appropriations clause, state courts have been unwilling to find an inherent executive authority to transfer funds. In *Colorado General Assembly*, the governor directed the transfers of about $2.5 million from the accounts of various departments to the Department of Corrections. The governor deemed the transfers essential because the legislature was not in session and because the state had to comply with a federal court order and complete construction of a new maximum security facility.

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679. *Id.* at 508. The governor directed the transfer of about $2.5 million from the accounts of various departments to the Department of Corrections. *Id.* The governor deemed the transfers essential because the legislature was not in session and because the state had to comply with a federal court order and complete construction of a new maximum security facility. *Id.* at 711, citing *Ramos v. Lamm*, *485 F. Supp.* 122 (D. Colo. 1979), aff’d, *639 F.2d 559* (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, *450 U.S. 1041* (1981). The governor also directed, on his own authority, the expenditure of funds received by the state in a court settlement with Standard Oil of California. *Id.* at 513.

680. *Id.* at 519.

681. *Colo. Const.* art. V, § 33: “No moneys in the state treasury shall be disbursed therefrom by the treasurer except upon appropriations made by law, or otherwise authorized by law. . . .”

682. *Colorado General Assembly*, *700 P.2d* at 522.

683. *Id.* at 522-23.
authority to spend public moneys without prior legislative approbation. In *Colbert v. State*, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the asserted authority of the governor to call in bonds before they were due. The governor claimed that the expenditure of state funds to satisfy the bonds fell within the power vested in him by the state constitution. Although Mississippi’s 1890 constitution did not contain an appropriations clause, the court refused to hold that the governor had the discretion to direct the expenditure of state funds without legislative approval, deeming such an assertion of authority to be wholly inconsistent with republican government:

It is maintained on behalf of the state with great earnestness and force of reasoning that the discretion reserved to the state was an executive discretion, pertaining strictly to the executive department of the government, belonging by its very nature, to that particular magistracy, and not requiring any legislative grant to vest in the governor as chief executive. We cannot concur in this opinion. We have not so learned the law. The principle contended for is contrary to the genius of republican government. Under all constitutional governments recognizing three distinct and independent magistracies, the control of the purse strings of government is a legislative function; indeed, it is the supreme legislative prerogative, indispensable to the independence and integrity of the legislature, and not to be surrendered or abridged, save by the constitution itself, without disturbing the balance of the system and endangering the liberties of the people.

The court refused to read the absence of an appropriations clause as overturning the fundamental precept of legislative control over the purse:

We cannot be persuaded that the omission from the constitution of 1890 of [an appropriations clause] indicates a purpose upon the part of the great jurists and publicists who framed the instrument to abrogate this essential principle of constitutional govern-

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684. 86 Miss. 769, 39 So. 65 (1905).
685. *Id.* at 777. Mississippi’s constitutions of 1817, 1832, and 1868 included appropriations clauses. Miss. *CONST.* of 1817, art VI, § 8 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of an appropriation made by law. . . .”); Miss. *CONST.* of 1832, art. VII, § 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of an appropriation made by law. . . .”); Miss. *CONST.* of 1868, art. IV, § 26 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury except on appropriations made by law.”).
ment . . . [W]e are constrained to believe that the constitution regards the legislature as the sole repository of power to make appropriations of money to be paid out of the state treasury. We can no more infer the possibility of an appropriation by executive action of moneys for the payment of public debts than we could the levying of taxes by executive action for the same purpose. If the one may be inferred, the other may also, and thus the entire constitutional scheme for legislative control over the public revenues be subverted.\textsuperscript{687}

These are not isolated examples: states have uniformly interpreted their constitutional schemes—particularly their appropriations clauses—to command exclusive legislative supremacy over the power of the state purse.\textsuperscript{688} When considered in conjunction with the identical interpretation that federal courts have given the appropriations clause in the United States Constitution, the fact that not one state has construed its charter to permit an independent executive authority to expend public funds is powerful indicia that such a power simply does not exist—not has ever existed—in American government.

IV. Presidential Options in the Absence of Appropriations

As seductive as the thought may be, when operational lawyers are without statutory appropriations authority for non-traditional military operations, reliance on an inherent presidential funding power is not an acceptable alternative. All expenditures must be predicated upon an explicit legislative foundation. The notion that a President may spend or obligate funds on his own inherent authority is pure myth.

What options, then, does the executive have when confronted with an essential mission and no congressional authority to pay for it? Aside from innovative applications of the existing statutory framework\textsuperscript{689} the most obvious alternatives are either entreaties to Congress for the required funding authority or abandonment of the operation.

The executive followed both paths in deciding upon a means of building the road from Sarajevo to Gorazde mandated by the Bosnia Peace Accords.\textsuperscript{690} With regard to the armed forces’ participation in building the road, after toying with and rejecting the notion of an independent presidential spending authority, U.S. military involvement was ultimately forsaken

\textsuperscript{687} Id. at 778-79.
688. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 244 Ala. 386, 13 So. 2d 674, 677 (1943) (legislative authority over appropriations cannot be delegated); Crane v. Frohmiller, 45 Ariz. 490, 496, 45 P.2d 955, 958 (1935) (“[L]egislature is supreme in matters relating to appropriations.”); Dickinson v. Clibourn, 125 Ark. 101, 105, 187 S.W. 909, 910 (1916) (primary purpose of appropriations clause is to prevent the expenditure of public money absent legislative enactments); Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341, 349 (1858) (“[T]he power to collect and appropriate revenue of the State is one peculiarly within the discretion of the Legislature.”); People ex rel. Hegwer v. Goodykoontz, 22 Colo. 507, 511, 45 P. 414, 416 (1896) ([T]he object of the appropriations clause “is to prohibit the expenditures of public funds at the mere will and caprice of the crown or those having the funds in custody, without direct legislative sanction therefore . . . .”); State v. American Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 298 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. Ch. 1972) (constitution forbids spending public funds without appropriation and the power to appropriate cannot be delegated); State ex rel. Kurz v. Lee, 121 Fla. 360, 384, 163 So. 859, 868 (1935) ([T]he appropriations clause gives to the legislature “the exclusive power of deciding how, when, and for what purpose the public funds shall be applied in carrying on the government.”); Gurnee, Jr., & Co. v. Speer, 68 Ga. 711, 712 (1882) (treasurer has no authority to expend public money without an appropriation); Epperson v. Howell, 28 Idaho 338, 343-44, 154 P. 621, 623 (1916) (“[N]o money may lawfully be paid from the treasury except pursuant to an act of the legislature expressly appropriating it to the specific purpose for what it is paid.”); West Side Org. Health Serv. Corp. v. Thompson, 79 Ill. App. 179, 191, 392, 394 P. 414, 416 (1979), rev’d on other grounds, 79 Ill. 2d 503, 404 N.E. 2d 208 (1980) (“[T]he General Assembly is vested with the ultimate authority to determine both the level and allocation of public spending.”); May v. Rice, 9 Ind. 546, 547 (1883) (state auditor has no authority to draw money from the treasury without an appropriation made by law); Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 857, 146 N.W.2d 626, 635 (1966) (“It is for the General Assembly to enact laws governing expenditure of state funds . . . .”); Martin v. Francis, 13 Kan. 220, 228 (1874) (Appropriations clause means “that no money that may rightfully be in the State treasury shall be drawn therefrom except in pursuance of an act of the legislature specifically authorizing the same be done . . . .”); Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins, 709 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Ky. 1986) (Purpose of the appropriations clause “is to prevent the expenditure of the State’s money without the consent of the General Assembly.”); Department of Health & Hosps. v. Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 665 So.2d 748, 752 (La. App. 1995) (citing lapse of appropriations and unavailability thereafter without legislative sanction as basis for finding irreparable injury to enjoin transfer of funds back to the treasury); Weston v. Dane, 53 Me. 372 (1865) (treasurer cannot pay out state money without an appropriation made by law); Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 310 Md. 437, 453, 530 A.2d 245, 252 (1987) (power to expend public money vested solely in legislature); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 302 Mass. 605, 612, 19 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1939) (“The power to appropriate money of the Commonwealth is a legislative power. Under the Constitution it can be exercised only by the General Court and in the particular manner prescribed.”); Musselman v. Governor, 448 Mich. 503, 522, 533 N.W.2d 237, 246 (1995) (only legislature has the authority to appropriate funds from the treasury); State ex rel. Chase v. Preus, 147 Minn. 125, 179 N.W. 725 (1920) (legislature must approve appropriation of state funds); State ex rel. Blakeman v. Hays, 49 Mo. 604, 605 (1872) (Treasurer can pay out state funds “only and as, the law-making power shall direct.”); State ex rel. Journal Publ’g Co. v. Kenney, 9 Mont. 389, 396-97, 24 P. 96, 97 (1890) (tracing legislative control of purse to Magna Carta and English Bill of Rights, deems appropriations power exclusively legislative); State ex rel.
Pearson v. Cornell, 54 Neb. 647, 656, 75 N.W. 25, 28 (1898) ("The constitution forbids the drawing of a single dollar from the state treasury except when authorized to do so by specific appropriation."); Norcross v. Cole, 44 Nev. 88, 91-92, 189 P. 877, 877 (1920) ("Except as limited by the constitution, the legislature has plenary power in authorizing the expenditure of public funds for public purposes."); Opinion of the Justices, 75 N.H. 624, 626, 75 A. 99, 100 (1910) ("[I]t is clear that the governor has no authority to draw his warrant upon the treasury in a particular case, unless there is some existing act or resolve of the legislature authorizing such payment."); City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 148,411 A.2d 462, 469 (1980) ("New Jersey courts have consistently adhered to the principle that the power and authority to appropriate funds lie solely and exclusively with the legislative branch of government."); Gamble v. Velarde, 36 N.M. 262,266, 13 P.2d 559, 562 (1932) (Appropriations clause "is to insure legislative control, and to exclude executive control, over appropriations."); People v. Tremaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 38, 168 N.E. 817, 820 (1929) ("It is . . . so well settled that the State Legislature is supreme in all matters of appropriations that the recital of the details of the strife for legislative supremacy would serve no useful purpose"); State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 4, 153 S.E.2d 749, 758, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 828 (1967) (Appropriations clause "states in language no man can misunderstand that the legislative power is supreme over the public purse."); Campbell v. Towner County, 71 N.D. 616,623, 3 N.W. 2d 822,825 (1942) (legislature must appropriate funds for there to be disbursements by the treasurer); State v. Medbery, 7 Ohio St. 522,528 (1857) ("The sole power of making appropriations of the public revenue is vested in the General Assembly."); Edwards v. Childers, 102 Okla. 158, 160, 228 P. 472, 474 (1924) (appropriations clause intended to curb executive, not legislative discretion); Brown v. Fleischner, 4 Or. 132,136 (1871) (treasurer has no authority to pay warrant except upon appropriation made by law); Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449,468-69,391 A.2d 595,604 (1978) (governor has no authority to spend appropriation for one program on another); In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d 550, 553 (R.I. 1984) (implying that the appropriations authority belongs exclusively to legislature, except as restricted by the federal or state constitution); Butler v. Ellerbe, 44 S.C. 256, 22 S.E. 425 (1895) (assumes legislative authority to appropriate); Cutting v. Taylor, 3 S.D. 11, 17, 51 N.W. 949, 951 (1892) ("With the legislature rests the right and the duty to provide for disbursing the public funds."); State ex rel. Weldon v. Thomason, 142 Tenn. 527,534-35,221 S.W. 491,493 (1919) (legislature has plenary authority to appropriate public funds and is not answerable to the coordinate branches of government); Terrell v. Middleton, 108 Tex. 14, 30-39, 191 S.W. 1138,1148-49 (1917) (Hawkins, J., concurring) (legislative power over appropriations exclusive and cannot be delegated); City of Montpelier v. Gates, 106 Vt. 116, 121, 170 A. 473, 474 (1934) (Appropriations clause "is not and was not intended to be a restriction on the power of the Legislature over public revenue. It is the province of that body to cast the appropriation in a mold of its own making."); State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1, 14 (1917) ("It is well understood that [appropriations clauses] — and they are common to most, if not all, of our written constitutions — are mandatory, and that no moneys can be paid out without the sanction of the legislative body."); Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 178 W. Va. 291, 296 n.8, 359 S.E.2d 124, 129 n.8 (1987) ("[T]he legislature alone is empowered to appropriate State funds."); State ex rel. Bd. of Regents v. Zimmerman, 183 Wis. 132,139,197 N.W. 823,826 (1924) ("So long as the legislature keeps within the limits of the state and federal constitutions and the treaties of the land its power to appropriate public money is almost unbounded."); State ex rel. Henderson v. Burdick, 4 Wyo. 272,276, 33 P. 125, 126 (1893) (citing appropriations clause, deems phrase “appropriations made by law” equivalent to “appropriations made by the Legislature”).
as unachievable under existing funding authorities.691 In the meantime, the Department of State secured congressional authorization for funding a basic surface road.692 The cost of the permanent paved road was left to international donors.693

Failing to acquire congressional funding for an operation, the executive may also turn to reimbursable funding authorities, which permit DOD to provide needed military support by shifting funding responsibility either to other federal agencies694 or to the international community.695 The latter

689. Two of the examples at the beginning of the article are illustrative. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. With regard to rebuilding the Haitian judiciary, civil affairs personnel—who are statutorily designated special operations forces (10 U.S.C. § 167j(5)—conducted the mission under 10 U.S.C. § 2011, which authorizes DOD O&M funding for special operations force training of a friendly nation’s security forces, which DOD deemed to include a country’s judiciary. See generally Memorandum from Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to Asst. Adm’r for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., subject: Judicial Mentors Program—Haiti (Feb. 19, 1995) (copy on file with author). The Department of Defense furnished tennis shoes, recreational equipment, and other comfort items to refugees at Guantanamo using the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's CINC Initiative Fund, 10 U.S.C. § 166a, which is the Chairman’s contingency account for the emergent requirements (such as contingency operations) of the commanders of the unified commands (10 U.S.C. §§ 161-66). The purchase of the recreational and comfort items was essential to preserving peace in the refugee camps and, consequently, to the security and safety of U.S. forces running the facilities.

690. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.

691. Except for U.S. participation as part of an overall NATO mission to survey the route to ensure NATO protection for future construction efforts. See Message from Secretary of Defense to Commander in Chief, European Command, subject: Public Affairs Guidance—US. Engineers to B-H for Survey of Gorazde Road (May 3, 1996).


694. Illustrative statutory mechanisms are the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, which permits one federal agency to place an order for goods and services with another federal agency, or section 632 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2392, which authorizes, inter alia, the State Department to use its funds to obtain DOD’s support under Foreign Assistance Act or Title 10 authorities.

695. Several statutory means exist for reimbursable support. Two more commonly used are section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2357, which allows federal agencies to furnish materiel and services to friendly countries and international organizations on an advance-of-funds or reimbursable basis, and sections 21 and 22 of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2761-62, under which other nations and the UN may enter foreign military sales contracts with the United States to purchase defense articles and services. See generally Defense Management Institute, The Management of Security Assistance 43 (1995).
approach is exemplified by the United States’ Exercise *Fairwinds* in Haiti, by which U.S. military engineers have assisted in the reconstruction of the Haitian infrastructure—notably its roads and water-distribution system—while passing on the costs to non-U.S. sources.

Shortly after its intervention in Haiti, the United States considered various approaches to contributing visible support to the newly restored, democratically elected government, particularly refurbishment of its physical infrastructure. The U.S. military has organic engineering capabilities, which can furnish both the expertise and manpower needed to accomplish such a mission. Moreover, by deploying to Haiti, U.S. military engineers gain invaluable training in an austere environment unavailable in the United States. The General Accounting Office has previously opined that—no matter how valuable the training opportunity—the U.S. military may not engage in construction activities absent explicit statutory authority. The United States’ Statute, however, explicitly prohibits using any appropriated funds for construction absent specific congressional authorization. The General Accounting Office has previously opined that—no matter how valuable the training opportunity—the U.S. military may not engage in construction activities absent explicit statutory authorization.

Under the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) program, DOD has limited statutory authority to provide construction assistance in developing nations; however, the assistance is limited to such basic construction—performed in conjunction with military operations—as building rudimentary surface transportation systems (e.g., dirt roads) and drilling wells. The engineering support needed to rebuild Haiti’s physical infrastructure greatly exceeded the rudimentary assistance permitted under the HCA program. Consequently, to fund the construction, DOD turned to a reimbursable funding authority—section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act—which authorizes federal agencies to furnish commodities and ser-

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697. 41 *U.S.C.* § 12 (1994): “No contract shall be entered into for the erection, repair, or furnishing of any public building, or for any public improvement which shall bind the Government to pay a larger sum of money than the amount in the Treasury appropriated for the specific purpose” (emphasis added).


700. Memorandum from Legal Counsel, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Director, J-7, subject: Scope of Permissible Road Construction under Humanitarian & Civic Assistance (HCA) (Dec. 5, 1995) (copy on file with author).

vices to friendly countries and international organizations on an advance-of-funds or reimbursable basis. Using section 607, the United States and Haiti entered a formal agreement whereby U.S. engineer units deployed for training (at U.S. expense) and Haiti paid the incremental costs of construction performed by the units (primarily using money furnished by the international community). 702

Finally, if a situation is sufficiently grave and an operation is essential to national security, the President has the raw, physical power—but not the legal authority—to spend public funds without congressional approval, after which he or she can either seek congressional approbation or attempt to weather the resulting political storm. To the President’s immediate advantage is the fact that the only sure means of directly stopping such unconstitutional conduct is impeachment. 703 Congress could, however,


703. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500-01 (1866); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524,610 (1838). A President who intentionally expends public funds without an appropriation made by law likely commits an impeachable offense. Criminality, in the term’s strict sense, is not a prerequisite. Serious and intentional disregard for the law, including encroachments on legislative prerogatives, constitute likely grounds for impeachment. See Tribe, supra note 624, at 291; JOHN R. LOBOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 126-31 (1978). While the President could also be indicted for violating the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1530(1994), nothing on the face of the Constitution prohibits a President from pardoning himself or herself in the event of such a prosecution, with the exclusion of impeachment proceedings. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. Some have argued, however, that implicit in the pardon power, is a prohibition against presidential self-pardons. See Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779,781 (1996); see also James V. Jorgenson, Note, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345 (1993) (advocating limits on pardon power to prevent President from escaping accountability for illegal acts).
certainly make a President’s life miserable through other means, such as denying requested legislation or appropriations, delaying confirmation of presidential appointments, and conducting public investigations into the President’s actions.

While a lawyer’s natural tendency is to turn to the judiciary in the event of such unconstitutional behavior, the courts represent little more than “speedbumps” to a President determined to ignore the law. Other than moral suasion, federal courts are powerless to stop a President intent on disregarding their judgments. The federal judiciary, in this regard, is akin to the Vatican, about which Joseph Stalin once derisively asked: “The Pope! How many divisions has he got?”

The political, not the judicial, process is the ultimate check on a President intent on violating the Constitution; in the end, Congress must protect its own constitutional turf. Writing in dissent in *Korematsu v. United States*, Justice Jackson recognized the limits of judicial power:

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704. I do not mean to slight the “moral force” of the federal judiciary, which has made it the supreme “source of constitutional dogma.” *Jackson*, *supra* note 666, at x; see also *Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch* 29-33 (1962) (describing the “mystic function” of the Supreme Court). Should a President choose to ignore a court’s command, however, the court is physically incapable of compelling compliance with its order. *Jackson*, *supra* note 666, at ix. This is the lesson of *Ex parte Merryman*, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487), in which military officers at Fort McHenry, Maryland, acting upon Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, intentionally disobeyed a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Taney and barred from the fort the marshal who attempted to serve it. Taney acknowledged his impotence in producing compliance with the writ, stating: “I have exercised all the power which the constitution and laws confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me to overcome.” *Id.* at 153; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, *The Merryman Power & the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation*, 15 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 81, 105 (1993) (“Supreme Court (and lower court) judgments are enforced by the executive branch as the law of the land only because (and only so long as) the executive branch decides to treat them that way.”) (emphasis in the original).


But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me wholly delusive . . . . The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.\textsuperscript{708}

On the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue, irrespective of either their innate physical ability to draw funds from the Treasury or the circumstances that impel them to do so, presidents who spend without statutory authority do so unconstitutionally. Admittedly, in times of national emergency, the American people may expect their presidents to take all steps necessary (even though illegal) to preserve the nation and its citizens. As President Lincoln observed in referring to the extreme measures taken during the Civil War: “Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?”\textsuperscript{709}

That a President’s unlawful actions may be compelled by a national emergency does not, however, provide a legal safety-net. Emergencies neither create power\textsuperscript{710} nor “redistribute the powers of government allocated by the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{711} Like Jefferson and Lincoln, presidents who deem it essential to spend public funds without an appropriation must be willing to put their offices on the line and either seek congressional ratification of the expenditure or be prepared to accept the adverse consequences of their actions, including eviction from the White House.

There are certain circumstances which constitute a law of necessity and self-preservation and which render the salus populi supreme over the written law. The officer who is called to act upon this superior ground does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the Constitution, but his station makes it his duty to incur that risk. As for Congress, when expenses are incurred without its sanction, it is discretionary with it to approve or disapprove the conduct of the officer con-

\textsuperscript{708} Id. at 248.
\textsuperscript{710} Home Bldg. \& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,425 (1934); see also Youngstown Sheet \& Tube, 343 U.S. at 650-51;\textit{Ex parte} Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). Justice Sutherland’s dissent in Blaisdell is especially apropos: “If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned. 290 U.S. at 483.
\textsuperscript{711} Wormuth \& Firmage, supra note 326, at 12.
cerned. If it approves, a bill is passed to cover the expenditure; if it disapproves, the officer must bear the loss or disgrace.\footnote{712}

Consequently, if all else fails and an operation is sufficiently important to national security, operational lawyers may turn to the President to direct the expenditure of funds without congressional authorization; however, in doing so, they must realize that the President gives such direction in certain contravention of the Constitution and, absent subsequent congressional approbation, places the office at risk.

V. Conclusion

As U.S. military involvement in non-traditional operations accelerates and the novelty of missions proliferates, operational lawyers will be confronted increasingly with the challenge of discovering lawful mechanisms for funding the operations. Discerning innovative means of applying existing authorities, turning to other agencies or the international community for financial support, and pursuing congressional authorization for operations where none exists constitute the paths operational lawyers are destined to follow in meeting the challenge.

Looming in the background—ever present—is the siren song of an inherent presidential spending power. In time of crisis, when pressure to discover a spending source becomes crushing, the song is extraordinarily

\footnote{712. \textit{Wilmerding}, \textit{supra} note 468, at 12. Writing several years later, Professor Wilmerding re-emphasized the point: 
\textit{The Founding Fathers, it is important to understand, were not “so strait laced, as to let a nation die or be stifled, rather than it should be helped by any but the proper officers.” On the contrary, they thought it incumbent on those who accept great charges to risk themselves on great occasions, when the safety of the nation or some of its high interests were at stake. But—and here is the significant point—they never confounded acts which the law says may be lawfully done in a case of necessity with acts done in violation of the law for the public good. They never presented that acts of the latter type were legal acts. When, in some cases of urgent necessity, they ventured to act without law or against law, they boldly took a responsibility; they ran the risk of the law, sometimes the risk of their fortune in damages; then they hastened to acknowledge on the records of the legislature that they had done a thing, meritorious indeed, but illegal; and asked the legislature to cover them with an indemnity.} \textit{Wilmerding, The President \& the Law, supra} note 456, at 322-23 (footnote omitted); see also \textit{Lobel, supra} note 548, at 1389-90; \textit{Monaghan, supra} note 92, at 36, 38; \textit{supra} notes 548-49,556, and accompanying text.}
alluring—the temptation to rely upon such authority very real. But the notion that the President is constitutionally empowered to spend public funds without congressional authorization is fantasy. Albeit interesting grist for the law review and academic seminar circuit, it is hardly an authority upon which operational lawyers should rely in advising the nation’s civilian and military leadership. Nothing in the text, history, practice, or judicial construction of the Constitution leads to any other conclusion.

To be sure, emergencies may arise that so threaten U.S. interests as to make immediate action—including spending without congressional authority—imperative. In such situations, the President may find it essential to direct spending without an appropriation made by law. But the President, and those who advise the President, should recognize that such expenditures contravene the clear and explicit terms of the appropriations clause and are patently unconstitutional. When emergencies necessitate spending without prior congressional approval, the President must be prepared to seek subsequent congressional ratification or face the political consequences of the unlawful conduct.
THE ARMED FORCES AS A MODEL EMPLOYER IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE SERVICE OF PROCESS ON MILITARY MEMBERS

MAJOR ALAN L. COOK

Any parent who is avoiding his or her child support should listen carefully: We will find you, we will catch you, we will make you pay. . . . People who bear children. . . have an absolute responsibility to take care of them. . . .

I. Introduction

With these words, the President of the United States signaled a crackdown on federal employees, including military personnel, who dodge their child support obligations. Prior to this action, several news releases proclaimed that there were more than 100,000 nonpaying parents on the federal payroll, most of whom work for the DOD. These numbers were potentially embarrassing to President Clinton. The President had promised tougher child support enforcement during his campaign, made it a central part of his welfare reform plan, and discussed it during his first


3. Id.
State of the Union address.\(^7\) To avoid embarrassment, the President had little choice but to respond swiftly.\(^8\)

4. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for the figure of more than 100,000 nonpaying parents on the federal payroll. The Department of Defense (DOD) internally took exception to this number, asserting that the HHS used flawed methodology to attain it. The DOD estimated the actual number of the DOD employees who were in arrears or not paying on their child support to be about one-third the number reported by the HHS.

The author derived this information from his former position within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. One of the many responsibilities of this office includes oversight of child support enforcement matters within the DOD. From the author’s perspective, the DOD did not openly protest the figures because it recognized that child support enforcement measures can be improved within the DOD and throughout the federal government. However, it is unfortunate that the HHS did not provide a more accurate figure in light of the adverse effect such numbers have on the public’s perception of the DOD. This is not the first time that the HHS has used flawed data:

Despite nearly 20 years of performance reporting, program data remain seriously flawed because of OCSE’s (Office of Child Support Enforcement within the HHS) failure to establish adequate reporting standards and the states’ limited reporting capabilities. The resulting lack of accurate and consistent data hinders meaningful planning, analysis, performance measurement, and management improvement. For example, an unduplicated caseload count is difficult to obtain.


5. Nonpaying parents are commonly referred to as “deadbeat parents.”


7. See Clinton Order, supra note 2.
President Clinton answered by issuing Executive Order 12,953, "Actions Required of all Executive Agencies To Facilitate Payment of Child Support." The order is designed to make federal agencies “model employers” for child support enforcement.” To become a model employer, the order identified immediate actions required of all federal agencies.” The order also tasked the DOD, as well as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the HHS (hereinafter “other federal agencies”), to review, study, and provide recommendations on issues related to child support enforcement, which placed these agencies in a lead role for “enhancing the Federal Government’s commitment to ensuring parental support for all children.”

President Clinton included service of legal process as one of the issues for review by the DOD, and other federal agencies. While there


   It is outrageous that the federal government has allowed so many deadbeat parents to get away with such an immoral and irresponsible crime for so long . . . . Children who don’t receive their support payments are already being treated like second-class citizens by their own parents. It’s about time the government stop turning them into third-class citizens by facilitating deadbeats in avoiding their legal and moral obligation to support their children.

   Id.


10. Id. § 101.

   “Child Support Enforcement” means any administrative or judicial action by a court or administrative entity of a State necessary to establish paternity or establish a child support order, including a medical support order, and any actions necessary to enforce a child support or medical support order. Child support actions may be brought under the civil or criminal laws of a State and are not limited to actions brought on behalf of the State or individual by State agencies providing services under title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

   Id. § 203.

11. Id. §§ 301-305. See infra sec. III.B.2.a.

   “Federal agency’ means any authority as defined at 5 U.S.C. 105, including the Uniformed Services, as defined in section 202 of this order.” Id. § 201.

12. Id. § 401(a).

13. Id. § 402(a).

14. Id. §§ 401(b), 402(b).

15. Id.

16. For the remainder of this article, the term “service of legal process” will be shortened to “service of process.”
are several problems associated with child support enforcement, service of process to gain jurisdiction over the deadbeat parent is the first critical step in the entire process. Without proper service and notice to defendants, courts lack jurisdiction to issue support orders for child support.\(^1^9\) In the absence of a court order, many noncustodial parents refuse to pay financial support for their children.

Status as a member of the armed forces complicates the service of process issue and, in some cases, frustrates child support enforcement efforts. Within the United States, military policies on providing assistance vary depending on the type of federal jurisdiction, the location of an installation, and restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act.\(^2^1\) Furthermore, the individual military services have different policies on how much assistance they will give to parties seeking to serve process.\(^2^2\) Outside the United States, the internal laws of host nations or international treaties limit military assistance regarding service of process. These laws and policies increase costs and prolong the time necessary to resolve support obligations, thereby creating barriers to effective child support enforcement.

Prior to the President’s executive order, Congress examined child support enforcement issues and proposed legislation attacking obstacles to support, including service of process.\(^2^5\) Congress included in its proposals language requiring federal agencies to designate agents for receipt of service of process on employees or military members stationed overseas.\(^2^7\)

\(^{17}\) Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 401(a).

\(^{18}\) Id. § 402(a)(iv).

\(^{19}\) See Griffin v. Griffin, 328 U.S. 876 (1946).

\(^{20}\) For example, look at the difference in assistance provided in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction versus concurrent federal jurisdiction. See infra discussion sec. IV.B.1.


\(^{22}\) See infra discussion sec. IV.B.1. for an example of how the Air Force policy differs from other military services requiring assistance in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.

\(^{23}\) See infra discussion secs. V.B.2.c. and V.C.


This approach benefits plaintiffs by providing a central location within each federal agency for service of process. It also reduces the costs and delays associated with service overseas and eliminates requirements for serving process under the internal laws of foreign nations and international treaties. To date, Congress has not passed legislation mandating that federal agencies appoint designated agents for receipt of service of process in actions to establish child support or paternity.

The Executive branch also considered including language within Executive Order 12,953 to direct federal agencies to designate agents for receipt of service of process that would have the same effect and bind employees to the same extent as actual service on them.28 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), after consultation with the DOD about the propriety of designated agents,29 amended the draft of Executive Order 12,953 before the President signed it. The change removed the requirement for federal agencies to designate an agent for receipt of service of process.30 In its place, the OMB inserted language directing federal agencies to assist in the service of legal process in civil actions pursuant to orders of courts of States to establish paternity and establish or enforce a support obligation by making Federal employees and members of the Uniformed Services stationed outside the United States available for the service of process. Each agency shall designate an official who shall be responsible for facilitating a Federal employees’ or member’s availability for service of process, regardless of the location of the employee’s workplace or member’s duty station.

26. Within the DOD, it is more common to refer to members of the Armed Forces as “servicemembers.” However, because this article routinely uses the word “service” in conjunction with “of process,” I will instead refer to members of the Armed Forces as military members, unless a member is referred to by a common military service designation (e.g., “soldier” for Army; “sailor” for Navy; “airman” for Air Force; and “marine” for Marines).

27. See, e.g., H.R. 4570, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., § 201(a) (1996). This section provides that:

[T]he head of each Government agency shall . . . designate an agent for receipt of service of process, for any Federal employee or member of the Armed Forces serving in or under such agency, in connection with an action, brought in a court of competent jurisdiction within any state, territory, or possession of the United States, for obtaining a child support order or for establishing parentage.

28. The author reviewed proposed drafts containing language that would have required federal agencies to designate agents for receipt of service of process for child support enforcement purposes. See supra note 4.

29. The author coordinated the change with representatives of the Office of Management and Budget [hereinafter OMB]. See Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 302. Every Federal agency shall assist in the service of legal process in civil actions pursuant to orders of courts of States to establish paternity and establish or enforce a support obligation by making Federal employees and members of the Uniformed Services stationed outside the United States available for the service of process. Each agency shall designate an official who shall be responsible for facilitating a Federal employees’ or member’s availability for service of process, regardless of the location of the employee’s workplace or member’s duty station.

Id.

30. Id.
cies to appoint responsible officials to facilitate service of process.\footnote{Id.} Although the President adopted the amended language in the executive order, he directed further study of the designated agent approach.\footnote{Id. §§ 401(a), 402(a)(iv).}

The designated agent approach offers appealing benefits to child support enforcement agencies, their caseworkers, and custodial parents confronted with the hurdles of serving process on DOD employees and military members stationed overseas.\footnote{See infra discussion sec. VI.B.1.b.} However, for policy makers and lawyers, there is a genuine concern that the proposal will prejudice due process rights and unwittingly affect compliance with international law obligations.

It is time to get to the heart of the child support enforcement problem. The first step in correcting the problem is simplifying ways to effect service of process on deadbeat parents, especially those within the DOD. For the DOD to become the model employer envisioned by President Clinton, solutions must be devised to overcome the procedural hurdles associated with due process rights, judicial jurisdiction, and international law. The DOD cannot overcome these hurdles alone. The DOD and other federal agencies must work together to develop a unified approach to solve service of process issues. This article recommends such an approach. Specifically, this article examines current DOD policies related to service of process for child support enforcement, and makes recommendations to improve them. These recommendations are then embodied into a proposed unified approach for improving service of process on military members. The purpose of the unified approach is to enhance the DOD’s commitment to child support enforcement by placing the armed forces in the forefront of other federal agencies by becoming a model employer. This goal is consistent with the past proactive practices of the armed forces to promote child support enforcement.\footnote{The armed forces, specifically the Army, criminalized failure to provide child support years before the Congress enacted any similar type of legislation. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994) makes nonsupport a criminal offense in certain interstate types of cases.}
Part One of this article defines the scope of the child support enforcement problem, both nationally and within the DOD. It also explains why the public perceives that service of process is the main obstacle in the child support enforcement process when a service member is ignoring a child support obligation. Part Two discusses Executive Order 12,953 in detail, focusing on the tasks that federal agencies must perform to achieve model employer status. Part Three overviews military service policies on child support and identifies specific policies related to service of process. It addresses military assistance with service of process both within and outside the United States, including a discussion of how the Posse Comitatus Act limits military assistance. Part Four surveys other laws and procedures related to service of process. It encompasses a review of jurisdictional prerequisites necessary for valid service of process, as well as foreign laws and international agreements that affect service overseas. A fundamental understanding of these rules is critical before proceeding to the analysis of the DOD’s response to the executive order located in Part Five. Finally, Part Six proposes a unified approach to improving service of process for child support enforcement. It includes recommendations for federal agency actions and changes in law that would improve service of process in child support enforcement cases.

II. Part One: Scope of the Problem

A. Nationwide

During the 1970s, Congress found that nonpayment of child support contributed to childhood poverty and increased the number of families receiving government support. Based on these findings, Congress created a federal child support enforcement program. Congress designed the program to strengthen state and local efforts to obtain child support from noncustodial parents who failed to provide financial support. Congress later amended this program to apply to all families, not just those participating in federally funded programs. By extending this assistance, Congress intended to help those families not requiring federal or state aid to stay off the welfare rolls.

37. GAO Report, supra note 4, at 1 (“Nonpayment of child support contributes to childhood poverty, as well as to increases in the number of families receiving Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits.”).
38. Id. (“To help families avoid poverty and welfare dependency, the Congress created the CSE [Child Support Enforcement] program in 1975 as a federal-state partnership.”).
39. Id.
By 1994, there were fifteen million support cases nationwide and approximately $34 billion in unpaid child support. Only about twenty percent of children and families relying on government assistance programs receive full or partial child support from their noncustodial parent. In those cases where there is a child support enforcement order, the nationwide default rate is nearly fifty percent. This is an incredible statistic when one considers that the default rate on used car loans is three percent.

B. Within the DOD

In addition to the adverse press releases on the alleged number of deadbeat parents employed by the DOD, a formal study by the HHS found 42,000 military personnel in arrears on child support payments in 1989. Based on a sampling of military cases, the study estimated that states do not collect child support payments in more than half of the military cases sampled. Out of those cases, about twenty-five percent had court orders for support that military members had failed to honor. There were no court orders in the remaining seventy-five percent of cases. The three most common reasons cited in the report that contributed to the lack of a court order were: (1) failure to locate the member due to lack of a social security number; (2) failure by the child support enforcement caseworker

40. Id. at 2.
41. Id.
42. 141 CONG. REC. 5404-02, 5414 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (statement of Mr. Pryor introducing S. 687) [hereinafter Pryor Statement].
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 4.
44. See Pryor Statement, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. In light of the drawdown of military personnel that has reduced the active duty population in half, one would assume that this number should be substantially reduced.
48. Id. at 3 (51%).
49. Id.
50. Id.
to make appropriate contacts even though the member had been located; and (3) failure to collect based on the member’s assignment overseas or on a ship. The report projected that finding these parents and enforcing or establishing court orders would save the federal government more than $54.1 million annually.

C. Comparison of the National Problem with the Military Problem

The military default rate in cases involving support orders is one-half that of the nationwide default rate in similar cases. The military success in this area is probably due to the fact that military society is much more disciplined than the civilian community. There are rules governing a military member’s conduct including requirements to pay just debts or face criminal prosecution. These rules virtually guarantee that service members will comply with child support orders, unless they are willing to face adverse administrative or criminal actions. This unique combination of authority, that permits an employer (the military services) to take adverse administrative and criminal sanctions against its employees (military members), makes enforcement of child support orders far less problematic within the military community as compared to the civilian community.

51. Id. at 4. Without a social security number, it is often difficult to locate a military member unless the requesting party knows the member’s unit of assignment, current address, or other personal identifiers, such as date and place of birth. See generally id at 6.

52. Id. at 4. The report noted that child support enforcement (CSE) caseworkers have a difficult job in terms of keeping abreast on all appropriate contacts. Not only are they responsible for locating persons within their own area, but also in all other states and, perhaps, in foreign countries. One of the recommendations made in the report was better training of CSE caseworkers. See id. at 6-7.

53. Id.

54. Id. at 1.

55. See UCMJ art. 133 (1995) (making it a criminal offense for military officers to engage in conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman; article does not apply to enlisted personnel).

56. Id. art. 134 (making it a criminal offense for any military member to dishonorably fail to pay a just debt that has become due and payable provided the accused’s actions were to the prejudice of the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces).


58. See supra notes 55, 56.
Despite the military’s stronger record in child support enforcement, the public often perceives the opposite and believes that service of process is the problem.\textsuperscript{60} In large part, this is due to the great number of military members assigned overseas and on ships, or deployed for war or other national emergencies. Thus, it is the basic nature of military service that creates a tension between society’s need for improved child support enforcement and its need for national defense. The following scenario highlights this tension:

Assume a military member is the subject of a pending legal action for child support. Prior to service of process, the member is deployed for war. The member admitted to paternity, but has publicly proclaimed that he will not support the child because he told the destitute mother to have an abortion. The member spends two years in battle. During this time, the state child support enforcement agency is unable to serve process. Is it fair that the mother and child did not receive support for two years and that the state and taxpayers had to support the child?

Whether government policy should allow service of process under the above scenario is open to debate. One can argue that it is fair to serve process because the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (SSCRA)\textsuperscript{61} protects military members. The protections offered by the SSCRA include stays in court proceedings\textsuperscript{62} and reopening of default judgments.\textsuperscript{63} The contrary argument is that it is unfair to distract the service member and his or her unit from war-fighting to respond and comply with legal mandates. This latter argument generally reflects the current practice.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} When there is a problem with enforcement, it often stems from the fact that no one has requested the commander’s assistance and, therefore, the commander is not involved with crafting a solution. Those dealing with the military must recognize the importance of using command intervention when necessary.

\textsuperscript{60} See generally supra note 25 (listing proposed legislation).


\textsuperscript{62} Id. § 521 (“Stay of proceedings where military service affects conduct thereof” — the standard is whether the defendant has been materially affected by reason of his or her military service.).

\textsuperscript{63} Id. § 520 (“Default judgments” — to open a default judgment, the standard is whether the defendant has been prejudiced by military service and it appears that there is a meritorious legal defense.).

\textsuperscript{64} Unless there are process servers so bold as to apply their trade on the battlefield.
While the above scenario identifies competing interests, it also illustrates why the military services should accommodate child support enforcement efforts whenever military members are reasonably available for service of process. This accords with military service policies that prohibit members of the armed forces from using their military status to shield themselves from providing financial support to their dependents. If the DOD does not make changes that facilitate service of process on military members, child support enforcement agencies, practitioners, policy makers, and the American public will continue to focus their frustrations with child support enforcement on a military establishment which they perceive as having made service of process unduly difficult.

III. Part Two: President’s Executive Order

A. Background

In 1992, the Democratic Party Platform included a promise to create an effective nationwide system of child support enforcement. Following the election, which resulted in Democratic control of the Executive Branch and Congress, Congress proposed legislative initiatives designed to improve the nation’s welfare system and enhance child support enforcement procedures. Before passage of this legislation, however, another major political shift occurred with the election of both a Republican Senate and House of Representatives, thereby splitting political power between the President and the Congress. Democratic party initiatives came to a standstill as the new Republican majority promoted their “Contract with America.” Accordingly, the President was forced to use his authority to fulfill single-handedly his campaign promises regarding the creation of a more effective system for child support enforcement.

65. See infra discussion sec. IV.A.
67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
B. The Order

1. Findings

On 21 February 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,953 which found that “[c]hildren need and deserve the emotional and financial support of both their parents.” In the preamble to this order, the President stressed that the federal government, as “the Nation’s largest single employer . . . should set an example of leadership and encouragement in ensuring that all children are properly supported.”

2. Model Employer Status

Based on these findings, the President used the executive order to “[e]stablish the executive branch of the Federal Government, through its civilian employees and Uniformed Services members, as a model employer in promoting and facilitating the establishment and enforcement of child support.” Under the executive order, federal agencies must cooperate with efforts to establish paternity, obtain child support orders, and enforce collection of child support. It also commands federal agencies to provide information to their employees about actions that they should take and services that are available to ensure that their children receive the support to which they are legally entitled.

a. First Step: Immediate Actions

As a first step to achieving model employer status, the executive order required an array of immediate actions by federal agencies. For example,

70. Id. preamble.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
74. Id. (providing that “[a] support order establishes the legal obligation of the non-custodial parent to pay child support”).
75. Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 101(b).
76. Id. § 101(c).
77. Id. §§ 301-306.
the order mandated that federal agencies: (1) review and ensure compliance with wage withholding statutes related to child support;\(^78\) (2) assist with service of legal process overseas by making employees and members of the uniformed services\(^79\) available for service of process, and designate a responsible official for such assistance;\(^80\) (3) cooperate with the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS);\(^81\) (4) implement crossmatching of federal income tax refund offset records based on child support with federal agency payroll and personnel records to determine if there are federal employees with child support delinquencies;\(^82\) and (5) provide information to prospective and current employees on available child support enforcement services.\(^83\) The order assured responsive federal agency action by requiring agency activity reports within ninety days of issuance of the executive order.\(^84\)

b. Second Step: Agency Reviews and Reports

As a second step to ensuring model employer status for federal agencies, the order decreed additional agency action.\(^85\) The order commanded

\(78. \) Id. § 301.
\(79. \) Id. § 202. “Uniformed Services’ means the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and the Commissioned Corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Public Health Service.” Id.
\(80. \) Id. § 302.
\(81. \) Id. § 303.
\(82. \) Id. § 304.
\(83. \) Id. § 305 (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act is found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-66 (1994)).

In 1974, Congress established a mandatory program for the states for the enforcement of family support by the enactment of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and has amended it since that time, most notably in 1984 and 1988, to expand both the coverage of the program (to all families, not just those receiving welfare assistance) and the procedures the states are required to use. The federal program and the accompanying regulations require the states to enforce existing orders, to obtain support orders where necessary, to establish paternity, and to cooperate with the child support enforcement offices in other states. They must utilize interstate procedures when necessary to obtain support, including reciprocal arrangements with other countries . . . [As an aside.] In 1992 Congress also enacted a statute making failure to provide child support a federal crime in some inter-state cases. 18 U.S.C. § 226 (Supp. IV 1992).


\(84. \) Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 306.
\(85. \) Id. pt. 4.
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to chair a DOD task force for conducting a full review of policies and practices within the Uniformed Services. The executive order required the task force to ensure that uniformed services personnel provide their children with financial and medical support in the same manner and within the same time frames as mandated for all other children.86 At a minimum, the order required the task force to review issues related to: (1) withholding noncustodial parents’ wages; (2) service of legal process; (3) activities to locate parents and their income and assets; (4) release time to attend civil paternity and support proceedings; and (5) health insurance coverage under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.” The executive order88 also directed that the DOD task force review the SSCRA,89 the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act,90 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.91 The executive order did not require the DOD to take any action that would compromise the defense or national security interests of the United States.92

In addition to the DOD task force, the order established a second working group formed jointly by the OPM and the HHS.93 The order required that the OPM and HHS working group consider issues similar to those under review by the DOD task force.94 The order directed that the reviews by the DOD task force and the OPM/HHS working group culminate with recommendations to the OMB for “additional administrative, regulatory, and legislative improvements in the policies and procedures

86.  Id. § 401(a).
87.  Id. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services is more commonly known as CHAMPUS.
88.  Id.
92.  Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 503. Other caveats provided that this executive order is only intended to “require Federal agencies to adhere to the same standards as are applicable to all other employers in the Nation and shall not be interpreted as subjecting the Federal Government to any State law or requirement.” Id. § 502. The order also stated that it is internal to the management of the executive branch and does not create any right or benefit enforceable at law against the United States. Id § 501.
93.  Id. § 402(a).
94.  Id.

Sec. 402. Additional Federal Agency Actions. (a) OPM and the HHS shall jointly study and prepare recommendations concerning additional
administrative, regulatory, and legislative improvements in the policies and procedures of Federal agencies affecting child support enforcement. Other agencies shall be included in the development of recommendations for specific items as appropriate. The recommendations shall address, among other things:

(i) any changes that would be needed to ensure that Federal employees comply with child support orders that require them to provide health insurance coverage for their children;

(ii) changes needed to ensure that more accurate and up-to-date data about civilian and uniformed personnel who are being sought in conjunction with State paternity or child support actions can be obtained from Federal agencies and their payroll and personnel records, to improve efforts to locate noncustodial parents and their income and assets;

(iii) changes needed for selecting Federal agencies to test and evaluate new approaches to the establishment and enforcement of child support obligations;

(iv) proposals to improve service of process for civilian employees and members of the Uniformed Services stationed outside the United States, including the possibility of serving process by certified mail in establishment and enforcement cases or of designating an agent for service of process that would have the same effect and bind employees to the same extent as actual service upon the employees;

(v) strategies to facilitate compliance with Federal and State child support requirements by quasi-governmental agencies, advisory groups, and commissions; and

(vi) analysis of whether compliance with support orders should be a factor used in defining suitability for Federal employment.

Id. Compare with id. § 401(a):

Sec. 401. Additional Review for the Uniformed Services. (a). In addition to the requirements outlined above, the Secretary of the Department of Defense (DOD) will chair a task force, with participation by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Transportation, that shall conduct a full review of current policies and practices within the Uniformed Services to ensure that children of Uniformed Services personnel are provided financial and medical support in the same manner and within the same time frames as is mandated for all other children due such support. This review shall include, but not be limited to, issues related to withholding non-custodial parents’ wages, service of process, activities to locate parents and their income and assets, release time to attend civil paternity and support proceedings, and health insurance coverage under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). All relevant existing statutes, including the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, shall be reviewed and appropriate legislative modifications shall be identified.
of Federal agencies affecting child support enforcement.”

IV. Part Three: DOD Policies Regarding Child Support Enforcement

The military services have an interest in the welfare of both military members and their families. They recognize that military duty often requires military members and their families to reside outside their state of domicile, to include living overseas. In some cases, military members’ assignments may place that member beyond the judicial process of state courts. This section will focus on how the DOD addresses these concerns and explains military service policies on providing assistance with service of process.

A. General Policy

Department of Defense policy requires that military personnel provide adequate support to their children. However, the DOD did not provide any central guidance on how to ensure this support and instead left the mechanics to the individual military services.

Military service policies prohibit the use of a military member’s assignment to deny financial support to their family members or to evade court orders on financial support, paternity, and other related matters. These policies place primary responsibility on the service member for pro-

95. See Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, §§ 401(b), 402(b) (providing for submission of the recommendations to OMB within 180 days of issuance of the Executive Order).

96. See e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 608-99, Family Support, Child Custody, and Paternity, para. 1-5a(1)-(6)(5 Dec. 1994) [hereinafter AR 608-99] (referencing numerous programs established pursuant to laws that govern family housing; living and travel allowances; medical care; legal services; child care and youth development services; child and spouse abuse prevention services; and morale, welfare, and recreation services).

97. Id. para. 1-5b.

98. Id.


100. The DOD has provided central guidance in related areas concerning families. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir 6400.1, Family Advocacy Program (23 June 1992); U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir 6400.2, Child and Spouse Abuse Report (10 July 1987). However, the foregoing DOD guidance does not address cooperation with judicial actions to establish paternity or support.

101. AR 608-99, supra note 96, para. 1-5c.
viding adequate financial support to the family members. The policies carry the threat of adverse administrative action for noncompliance. Furthermore, one of the military services makes the failure to provide child support a criminal offense.

Military service policies proactively support compliance with family support obligations. However, they generally defer the underlying determination of support to civilian courts. For example, under Army policy, a minor child born out of wedlock is a family member of a male soldier if there is a court order identifying the soldier as the father and ordering the soldier to provide financial support. In the absence of such an order, Army policy does not place any legal obligation on the soldier to provide for the child, even if the soldier admits paternity.

102. See, e.g., Id., para. 1-5d. This paragraph provides that:

Soldiers are required to manage their personal affairs in a manner that does not bring discredit upon themselves or the United States Army. This responsibility includes—

(1) Maintaining reasonable contact with family members so that their financial needs and welfare do not become official matters of concern for the Army.

(2) Conducting themselves in an honorable manner with regard to parental commitments and responsibilities.

(3) Providing adequate financial support to their family members.

(4) Complying with all court orders.

103. For example, the adverse administrative action could include a memorandum of reprimand, bar to reenlistment, or an administrative separation. Without a detailed explanation, these actions can jeopardize or end a service member's military career.


105. AR 608-99, supra note 96, para. 2-5 (This Army regulation makes it a criminal offense for military members to fail to provide financial support pursuant to a court order, a written financial support agreement in the absence of a court order, or a regulatory financial support requirement in the absence of a court order or a financial support agreement.).

106. Id. glossary (defining family member).

107. Id. para. 2-2.
B. Policies Regarding Service of Process

Military service policies authorize the military to assist with service of process in civil matters in areas that are subject to military control. With limited exception, the rules facilitate service of process. Military assistance will vary depending on whether process is served within or outside the United States. Additionally, under certain circumstances military authorities will not permit service of process.

1. Within the United States

When a party wants to serve state court process in an area under military control, the amount of military assistance depends on the type of federal jurisdiction applicable to that area. In areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction that are not subject to the right to serve state process, military authorities determine whether the member will voluntarily accept service of process. Before making a decision, military authorities may give the member an opportunity to obtain legal advice. If the member refuses to accept service, the military authorities notify the party requesting service that the nature of exclusive federal jurisdiction precludes service. Air Force policy deviates from this process by allowing process servers on areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.

In areas of military control where the state has reserved the right to serve process, in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, or in areas where the United States has only a proprietary interest, the process is slightly different. If the individual declines to accept service of process, military authorities allow the requesting party to serve it pursuant to applicable state law. In such cases, military authorities may impose reasonable restrictions on the service to prevent interference with mission accomplishment and to preserve good order and discipline. Restrictions may include designating a location for the service of process. Military commanders can then order military members to the designated location; commanders do not have that authority over civilian employees.

108. For example, such areas may include installations, bases, posts, forts, or other area under military control.


110. Id.
Procedures differ slightly in cases where the forum court is not in the

111. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-21, LEGAL SERVICE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL LAW HANDBOOK, 16, 17 (15 Mar. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction” in this context refers to the authority to legislate within a geographically defined area. When the United States exercises federal jurisdiction over particular land, it can enact general, municipal legislation applying within that land. There are four types of jurisdiction:

1. **Exclusive legislative jurisdiction.** “Exclusive legislative jurisdiction” arises where the Government has received all the authority of the State to legislate with no reservation by the State of any authority except the right to serve civil and criminal process. As to any kind of land, the Supreme Court has held: “There is nothing incompatible with the exclusive sovereignty or jurisdiction of one state that it should permit another State to execute its process within its limits.” United States v. Cornell, 2 Mass. 60, cited in Fort Leavenworth Railroad v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 534 (1885) . . . .[1]t should be sought only when State or local laws interfere with military operations.

2. **Concurrent legislative jurisdiction.** “Concurrent legislative jurisdiction” arises where, in granting to the United States authority that would otherwise amount to exclusive legislative jurisdiction over an area, a State reserves the right to exercise authority concurrently with the United States. . . .[I]t may be justified for installations of great size, with a large population, in a remote location or, where, because of peculiar requirements stemming from Army use, the State or local Government does not have the resources to administer the area.

3. **Partial legislative jurisdiction.** “Partial legislative jurisdiction” arises where the Federal Government has been granted some legislative authority over an area by a State which reserves to itself the right to exercise, alone or concurrently with the United States, other authority constituting more than the right to serve civil or criminal process in the area. In other words, either the Federal Government, or the State, or both, have some legislative authority. An example would be where a State reserves only jurisdiction over criminal offenses, allowing the United States to exercise all other sovereign rights concurrently with the State, but denying it legislative jurisdiction over crimes.

4. **Proprietorial interests.** The term “proprietorial interest” describes situations where the Federal Government has acquired some degree of ownership of an area in a State but has not obtained any measure of the State’s legislative authority over that area.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

112. In this context, the term “military authorities” includes commanders or supervisors.

113. 32 C.F.R. §§ 516.10(d), 720.20(a) (1995).

114. For instance, Army policy clearly extends this right to soldiers. See id. § 516.10(d). Navy policy does not appear to extend this privilege. See id. § 720.20(a) (1995).

115. See id. § 516.10(d).


118. See id.
same state as the area under military control. In those cases: military policy does not require the member to accept process.\footnote{122} If the member declines to accept process, the military authorities generally notify the process server of the declination and provide no further assistance.\footnote{123}

2. \textit{Outside the United States}

The rules for overseas assistance are similar to those described under the voluntary acceptance procedures for areas of exclusive jurisdiction. They differ, however, because military authorities may act as physical conduit for service of process.\footnote{125} This only occurs when a military member voluntarily agrees to accept service of process.\footnote{126} When a member declines to accept, the military authority notifies the requesting party of the declination.\footnote{127} The military authority also advises the requesting party to follow procedures prescribed by the law of the foreign country concerned or applicable international agreements, such as the Hague Service Convention.\footnote{128}

\begin{enumerate}
\item 119. See id. § 720.20(a).
\item 120. See id.
\item 121. Id. If a civilian will not agree to report to a location for service of process, the process server may be escorted to the location of the civilian in order that process may be served. Normally, it is better for the civilian to go to the location designated by military authorities to prevent embarrassment in the workplace.
\item 122. Id.
\item 123. See id. The Air Force policy is more liberal. See DOD Report, supra note 104.
\item 124. See Air Force Opinion, supra note 109, at 242. The party requesting service of process actually sends it to the commander for delivery to the military member. The commander will physically deliver the document, but only if the member voluntarily agrees to accept the service of process. In such cases, the commander is not a process server but merely a conduit. Id.
\item 125. DOD Report, supra note 104, at 3, pt. III.A.2. See also 32 C.F.R. § 516.12(c) (1995), which implies that an official may actually serve the process ("If a DA official receives a request to serve process . . .") (emphasis added). Historically, the military services have not recognized process serving as a federal function or one of their official duties. See generally Lamont v. Haig, 539 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D. S.D. 1982); Air Force Opinion, supra note 109; 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a) (1995) ("[T]he commanding officer is not required to act as a process server.").
\item 126. 32 C.F.R. § 516.12(c) (1995).
\item 127. Id.
\item 128. Id.
\end{enumerate}
C. Impact of the Posse Comitatus Act

Posse Comitatus Act\(^{129}\) limitations help shape military policies regarding assistance with service of process. This act provides that:

> Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.\(^{130}\)

Over the past century, the military services have avoided directly serving process for state courts based on concerns that such help would violate the Posse Comitatus Act.\(^{131}\) In the absence of enabling legislation, the position of the military services is that service of process is a state responsibility and that military authorities cannot act as state court officials for the purpose of enforcing state law, which includes the service of state court process.\(^{132}\) The DOD policy extends application of the Posse Comitatus Act to the Navy.\(^{133}\)


\(^{130}\) Id. See also Air Force Opinion, supra note 109, at 242, which provides that:

> Our federal system of government was founded on the principle that United States military forces were established to defend against external threats and were not to be used to enforce internal domestic laws. Short of a formal declaration of martial law, Federal troops are to be used in a limited backup role where state police forces are in temporary need of assistance. Clearly, the protection of life and property and the maintenance of law and order within any state are the primary responsibilities of the State and local authorities. During the reconstruction period after the Civil War these constitutional distinctions were not strictly adhered to and, as a result, there were a number of abuses. In response, Congress in 1878 passed the so-called Posse Comitatus Act . . . to prevent the unauthorized use of Federal troops to execute the domestic laws of the United States. This act remains valid today and confirms the long-standing policy that federal forces are not to be used in a state police enforcement role unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.


\(^{132}\) Id.
V. Part Four: Other Laws and Procedures Related to Service of Process

This section explains jurisdiction and due process limitations stemming from the United States Constitution that require adequate notice, and, in some cases, “minimum contacts.”[134] This part also shows how process is served both within and outside the United States and how state, federal, and international laws and agreements can regulate and limit the service of process. Understanding these laws and procedures is necessary to assess recommendations for improving the service of process in child support enforcement actions.

A. Jurisdiction

1. Generally

Prior to serving process, a state must have the authority to subject a person to the process of its judicial or administrative tribunals.[135] This principle is commonly known as “judicial jurisdiction.”[136] United States legal practice divides judicial jurisdiction into three categories: (1) in personam (or personal) jurisdiction; (2) in rem[137] jurisdiction; and (3) quasi in rem[138] jurisdiction.[139] “Personal jurisdiction involves the power of a court to adjudicate a claim against the defendant’s person and to render a judg-

133. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, para. C, encl. 4 (15 Jan. 1986) [hereinafter Posse Comitatus Act Directive]. The “Posse Comitatus Act... is applicable to the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps as a matter of DOD policy, with such exception as may be provided by the Secretary of the Navy on a case-by-case basis.”). Approval by the Secretary of Defense is required when the use of military power would be regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory. Id.


136. Id. (citation omitted). Judicial jurisdiction is also called “jurisdiction to adjudicate.” It is distinguishable from “legislative” or “proscriptive” jurisdiction (the authority of a state to make laws) and “enforcement” jurisdiction (the authority of a state to compel compliance, or punish noncompliance, with its laws). Judicial jurisdiction operates between these two types of jurisdiction. Id.

137. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed. 1990) (“A technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in personam.” An in rem proceeding “encompass[es] any action brought against a person in which essential purpose of suit is to determine title to or to affect interests in specific property located within territory over which court has jurisdiction.”).
ment enforceable against the defendant and [the defendant’s] assets.”140 It is personal jurisdiction, not in rem or quasi in rem, that gives a court the power to establish a child support order or make a paternity determination.141 For the remainder of this part, the term “jurisdiction” will mean “personal jurisdiction.”

2. Due Process Limitations on Jurisdiction

There are two primary due process considerations related to service of process. The first is whether the defendant received proper notice of the legal proceeding against him or her.142 The second arises when the defendant resides outside the forum state. If located outside the forum state, the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to establish a constitutionally acceptable basis for its courts to exercise jurisdiction.143

a. Notice

Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”144 “The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information.”145 Furthermore, the method chosen to deliver the notice must comport with state law and constitutional parameters.146

138. Id. at 793-94.

Quasi in rem. A term applied to proceedings which are not strictly and purely in rem, but are brought against the defendant personally, though the real object is to deal with particular property or subject property to the discharge of claims asserted; . . . An action in which the basis of jurisdiction is the defendant’s interest in property, real or personal, which is within the court’s power, as distinguished from in rem jurisdiction in which the court exercises power over the property itself, not simply the defendant’s interest therein.

139. Born & Westin, supra note 135.

140. Id.

141. In rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction may, however, form the basis of a later child support enforcement action involving the property of a defendant and arrearage for nonsupport.


144. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306.

145. Id.
b. Minimum Contacts

An explanation of the historic underpinnings leading to the requirement for minimum contacts between a defendant and a forum state is critical to understanding the due process limitations on service of process. Over the past century, the due process limits on jurisdiction have changed dramatically.\(^{146}\) In 1870, the United States Supreme Court, in *Pennoyer v. Neff*,\(^{148}\) held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state courts from asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants not found within the territory of the state.\(^{149}\) The *Pennoyer* Court based its holding on two principles of international law that it found had application to interstate proceedings.\(^{150}\) In particular, the Court found that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory” and that “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons and property without its territory.”\(^{151}\)

As a result of the industrial era and the rapid progression of manufacturing and commerce that operated and organized without regard to interstate and international boundaries, states needed more flexible rules to regulate those activities.\(^{152}\) In 1945, the Supreme Court responded with its landmark decision, *International Shoe v. Washington*,\(^{153}\) that significantly modified the *Pennoyer* strict territorial view of judicial jurisdiction.\(^{154}\) The decision in *International Shoe* established the “minimum contacts” test.\(^{155}\) Under this test:

[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . . It is essential in

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147. *See generally supra* note 146.
148. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
149. *Born & Westin, supra* note 135, at 23.
150. *Id.*
155. *Id.*
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.156

Following International Shoe, the Supreme Court resorted to a twopart analysis of the “minimum contacts” test.157 Under the analysis, the Court determines whether the defendant has “purposefully availed” itself of the protections and benefits of the forum’s law.158 The Court asks whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would be “reasonable.”159 Applying these criteria, courts will find jurisdiction based on domicile,160 continuous activities within the forum,161 and even transitory presence of the defendant in the forum.162 “Although the courts have applied additional analysis in determining the minimum contacts test under International Shoe, it remains the seminal precedent for determining due process limitations on judicial jurisdiction.”163

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156. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
158. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 135, at 44 (footnote omitted) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
159. Id at 43 (footnote omitted).

The authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence with the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable from the various incidences of state citizenship . . . . One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him.

Id. at 163.
162. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,320 (1945) (holding that “[d]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’’)” (citation omitted).
163. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 135, at 24.
3. Statutory Authorizations for Establishing Jurisdiction

In addition to the foregoing constitutional considerations, there must be a statutory authorization for jurisdiction over defendants who are located outside the forum state.164 “Virtually all the states of the Union,”165 have passed long-arm statutes166 permitting them to serve process and establish jurisdiction on defendants physically located outside their territory. Such defendants must have specified “minimum contact” with the state before jurisdiction attaches.168 While state long-

164. Id. at 20.
166. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 302 (McKinney 1996) which provides long-arm jurisdiction for New York courts as follows:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he
   (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
   (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;
(b) Personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in matrimonial actions or family court proceedings. A court in any matrimonial action or family court proceeding involving a demand for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards or special relief in matrimonial actions may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no longer is a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or administrator, if the party seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time such demand is made, provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation, or the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state, or the claim for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards or special relief in matrimonial actions accrued under the laws of this state or under an agreement executed in this state.
arm statutes differ, each generally falls under one of three basic statutory approaches: (1) statutes that authorize service to the fullest extent permitted by the United States Constitution;\(^{169}\) (2) statutes that use brief, general formulae to define the circumstances in which personal jurisdiction may be asserted;\(^{170}\) and (3) statutes that exhaustively detail the circumstances under which states claim personal jurisdiction.\(^{171}\) State courts exercise primary responsibility for interpreting the reach of their state long-arm

\(^{167}\) See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (explaining the standards for such contacts).

\(^{168}\) Born & Westin, supra note 135, at 20-21 (the defendant may be located in other states or outside the country).

\(^{169}\) Id. “To the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution” generally means as limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An example is California’s long-arm statute that states that “[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or of the United States.” Id.

\(^{170}\) Id. For example, “the Texas long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction over any non-resident who ‘engages in business’ in the state.” Id.

\(^{171}\) Id. This is the most common type of long-arm statute. For example, the Illinois long-arm statute provides:

§ 2-209. Act submitting to jurisdiction — Process. (a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State at the time of contracting;
(5) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage, declaration of invalidity of marriage and legal separation, the maintenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at the time this cause of action arose or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to the cause of action;
(6) With respect to actions brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, as now or hereafter amended, the performance of an act of sexual intercourse within this State during the possible period of conception;
(7) The making or performance of any contract or promise substantially connected with this State;
(8) The performance of sexual intercourse within this State which is claimed to have resulted in the conception of a child who resided in this State;
(9) The failure to support a child, spouse or former spouse who has continued to reside in this State since the person either formerly resided with them in this State or directed them to reside in this State;
(10) The acquisition of ownership, possession or control of any asset or thing of value present within this State when ownership, possession or control was acquired;
(11) The breach of any fiduciary duty within this State;
(12) The performance of duties as a director or officer of a corporation organized under the laws of this State or having its principal place of business within this State;
(13) The ownership of an interest in any trust administered within this State; or
(14) The exercise of powers granted under the authority of this State as a fiduciary.

(b) A court may exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within or without this State against any person who:
(1) Is a natural person present within this State when served;
(2) Is a natural person domiciled or resident within this State when the cause of action arises, the action was commenced, or process was served;
(3) Is a corporation organized under the laws of this State; or
(4) Is a natural person or corporation doing business within this State.

(c) A court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.

statutes,\textsuperscript{172} except when their interpretation allegedly exceeds due process limitations under the United States Constitution.\textsuperscript{173} In these cases, federal courts must exercise their jurisdiction to determine the validity of a state’s long-arm statute.\textsuperscript{174}

B. Methods of Service

This section addresses methods of service of process both within and outside the United States. However, it does not include a discussion of service of process overseas pursuant to international agreements.\textsuperscript{175} That discussion is in the next section.

\textbf{1. Within the United States}

Within the United States, service of process is a fairly routine and mechanical exercise.\textsuperscript{176} Service of process consists of:

\textit{Hand} delivery to the defendant of the plaintiff’s complaint together with a “summons” directing the defendant to answer the complaint. In recent years, other methods of service, including service by registered mail, have become more common. Although process was historically served by an official of the forum court, service in the United States is now commonly effected by nongovernmental means. Service in domestic action is often made by private firms specializing in the service of process or by counsel for the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{177}

\textbf{2. Outside the United States}

By contrast to within the United States, service of process overseas can be a difficult and uncertain undertaking.\textsuperscript{178} Assuming that a state court
has jurisdiction over a defendant located abroad, there must be proper service of process on the defendant before the court can exercise jurisdiction. Generally:

[United States] law recognizes three basic mechanisms for serving United States process on persons located abroad: (1) Various federal or state statutes or rules of court provide for extraterritorial service of process by the plaintiff directly to the foreign defendant; (2) [United States] courts can issue letters rogatory requesting foreign courts to assist in serving United States process on persons located abroad and (3) the [United States] is a party to several international agreements that provide either mandatory or optional mechanisms for extraterritorial service of process.

In addition to these three methods, officers of the Foreign Service may serve process abroad, but only at the direction of the United States Department of State. Under current policy, the Department of State normally prohibits such service unless there is an exceptional case involving litigation affecting the United States government.

a. Federal or State Statutes Providing for Service Abroad

Under United States practice, federal and state rules provide the common method for extraterritorial service of process and do not require the affirmative cooperation of foreign authorities. There are different state rules on service of process. Many states have enacted rules similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Likewise, several states have adopted the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act which provides a condensed version of Rule 4. While some states have liberalized their service of process provisions to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution, others have not. Some cases, therefore, may require resorting to the time-consuming letters rogatory procedure.

b. Letters Rogatory

Letters Rogatory (also known as “letters of request”) provide another method for service of process abroad. A letter rogatory is a request for assistance (for example, with service of process) from the court of one country to the court of another country. Courts typically honor such

requests as a matter of comity.\textsuperscript{194} “The letter rogatory must be issued by the court in which the plaintiff’s action has been filed . . . \textbf{[and]} comply with U.S. \textbf{procedure,}\textsuperscript{195} as well as with the laws and customs of the receiving state.”\textsuperscript{196} Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1)(B) \textbf{and} some state statutes make specific provisions for the use of letters rogatory.\textsuperscript{197} Even

\begin{quote}
180. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides rules for service of process abroad; many states have modeled their long-arm statutes after it. The following is a brief synopsis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 as found in Leonard A. Leo, \textit{The Interplay Between Domestic Rules Permitting Service Abroad by Mail and the Hague Convention on Service: Proposing An Amendment to the Federal Rules & Civil Procedure}, 22 \textit{CORNELL INT’L L.J.} 335,338 (1989):

FRCP is a supplement that provides five alternative methods for serving foreign parties abroad. A party may serve a foreign defendant (1) in a manner provided by the foreign nation for service involving litigation within its own courts of general jurisdiction; (2) as directed by a foreign authority’s response to a letter rogatory, so long as the method is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; (3) by personal service to the party, an officer of a corporate party, or the party’s agent; (4) by forms of mail requiring a signed receipt; or (5) in a manner prescribed by an order of the district court.

a. Authority to Serve: FRCP 4(i) does not independently authorize service abroad. To invoke FRCP 4(i), federal or state law must authorize extraterritorial service; a party may only use the five alternative methods of service “when the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held.” Under FRCP 4(e), a party may serve an individual who is not an inhabitant of the forum state in which the district court sits whenever a state or federal statute permits such extraterritorial service. Therefore, before considering the alternatives set forth in subdivision (i), a party must determine whether any statutes permit service abroad.

b. Manner of Service: Once a party determines that it has the authority to serve abroad, it must then decide the method or manner of service. As a supplement, FRCP 4(i) is not the exclusive method of service abroad. For instance, FRCP 4(e) permits service in the manner prescribed either by statute or by the Federal Rules. Alternatively, a party may choose the flexibility provided under FRCP 4(i) to serve abroad. Among the alternatives from which to choose under FRCP 4(i), a party may serve a foreign defendant by mail.

c. State Service Provisions: State service provisions are important for two reasons. First, the state service rule is independently significant where an American plaintiff sues a foreign defendant in state court. Second, FRCP 4(e) permits a plaintiff in federal court to serve a foreign defendant in a manner prescribed by state law. The state provisions applicable in both contexts generally permit service abroad by mail without any observable limitations.

\textit{Id.} (footnotes omitted).
though letters rogatory are received and transmitted through judicial channels, American plaintiffs must ensure that the actual method used to serve process on the defendant is “reasonably calculated to give actual notice.”


183. 22 C.F.R. § 92.85 (1995). *See also* U.S. Dep’t of Justice Memo No. 386, *reprinted in* 16 *Int’l Legal Mat.* 1331 (1977). Note that 22 C.F.R. § 92.85 states that “[t]he service of process and legal papers is not normally a Foreign Service function. Except when directed by the Department of State, officers of the Foreign Service are prohibited from serving process or legal papers or appointing other persons to do so.”

184. Born & Westin, *supra* note 135, at 121. “Although the Department of State generally will not assist in the service of process, the Office of Citizens Consular Services of the Department of State provides useful information regarding service requirements in foreign countries. Overseas U.S. embassies are also helpful in providing information in some circumstances.” *Id.*


189. *Id.*

190. *Id.*


194. *See* Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), which defines comity as: “The recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”


196. Born & Westin, *supra* note 135, at 134. The formalities usually include the signature of a judge of the issuing court, an authenticated seal of the issuing court, and a translation of the request and all accompanying documents.

197. *Id.*
Letters rogatory are advantageous because they are unlikely to provoke foreign government objection, and, in some instances, are the only authorized means of service. Their disadvantages include their voluntary nature; the uncertainty of whether the service of process method chosen by the foreign court comports with American standards of due process; and the length of time that it takes to complete service of process, especially when parties to litigation use diplomatic channels. In sum, the letters rogatory procedure is “complex, costly, and time consuming.” Accordingly, this procedure should be a method of last resort for American litigants.

c. Noncompliance with Foreign Law

One factor that frequently arises in selecting a mechanism for extraterritorial service is the effect of noncompliance with foreign law. Department of Justice guidance provides that:

Absent a treaty, service abroad must be made (1) in accordance with domestic law regulating extraterritorial service, and (2) in a manner which will comport with the laws of the foreign country in which the document is to be served. A note of caution is in order here: service of judicial documents is regarded in civil law

198. Id. at 135. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1)(B) imposes this requirement, which is similar to the demands of the due process clause (citations omitted).

199. Id.


It is commonly necessary to proceed through diplomatic channels via letters rogatory, which means that the process has to be sent from the Clerk of Court to the state Secretary of State. The state Secretary of State authenticates the seal and signature of the Clerk of Court or judge and sends the document to the U.S. State Department. The U.S. Department of State authenticates the seal of the state Secretary of State and transmits it to the embassy of the country in which process is to be served. That embassy authenticates the seal of the Department of State and then transmits it down the hierarchical chain of that country’s institutions until it finally comes to the official who will serve it. That official’s return is then authenticated and transmitted back up to the embassy in Washington, and thence back down to the issuing court.


202. Id

countries as the performance of a judicial function, and the laws of some countries (e.g., Austria, Japan, Switzerland, Yugoslavia) make it an offense for foreign officials to perform, without express permission from the local government, judicial functions within their territories. In countries where service is deemed a judicial function, American documents should be served only by means of a letter of request or by mail (but note, Switzerland objects even to the latter mode of service).  

Despite the foregoing guidance, the majority view amongst American courts is that federal and state procedures are the “sole requirements that extraterritorial U.S. service must satisfy.” Therefore, service that is defective under foreign law usually will not invalidate service for purposes of United States law, at least under the majority view.

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205. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 135, at 128. Please note that: [although ALCO Standard represents the majority rule, there is a least one case in which a U.S. court relied upon foreign law to require service abroad through letters rogatory. After a series of incidents in the 1950s involving attempts to serve administrative subpoenas in Switzerland, the Swiss government lodged a formal protest with the United States Department of State. The Department of State responded in an aide-memoir apologizing for the “inadvertent violation of applicable Swiss law” and stating that the Department of State had “informed the competent United States authorities of the Swiss law referred to” and that such action “will avoid any future transmittals of such documents in a manner inconsistent with Swiss law . . . .” Thereafter, the Administrative Conference of the United States courts issued a directive requesting that any service to be effected on Swiss soil be done pursuant to letter rogatory, rather than the normal U.S. procedures for extraterritorial service. This led the court in R.M.B. Electrostat v, Lectra Trading A.G., No. 82-1844 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 1983), to require use of letters rogatory when serving a civil complaint and summons in Switzerland. The court apparently reasoned that drafters of Federal Rule 4 did not intend to authorize service abroad in circumstances that would violate foreign and international law.]

Id. at 128-29. Furthermore, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the district court found that:

Service of a subpoena was “compulsory process,” which unlike mere “notice” of the commencement of an action, constituted an assertion of U.S. enforcement jurisdiction. Moreover, the court concluded, unless the service of compulsory process was acceptable to the foreign state, it constituted an infringement of the foreign state’s sovereignty in violation of international law.

see also BORN & WESTIN, supra note 135, at 130.
While the judicial action may continue pursuant to the majority view, United States litigants should be aware of the risks they take when violating foreign restrictions on service of process. One possible consequence of service abroad in violation of foreign law is the imposition of criminal or civil sanctions against the process server. Many civil law nations view the service of process and the taking of evidence as public acts that require the participation or supervision of the local judiciary. Some of these civil law nations have imposed sanctions against United States process-servers for attempting to personally deliver United States complaints and summons to foreign defendants. Additionally, service in violation of another country’s laws can provoke vigorous foreign government protests that embarrass United States plaintiffs and affect the United States court’s overall view of the suit. Finally, service abroad in violation of foreign law can jeopardize the enforceability within the foreign nation of any United States judgment that the plaintiff obtains.

C. Service of Process Overseas Pursuant to International Agreement

Because overseas service of process is complex and risky, several nations have entered into agreements to help facilitate service of process.


208. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 135, at 127.

209. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Memo No. 386 at 20 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT’L LEGAL MAT. 1331, 1338 (1977) (United States government attorneys sued for trespass for serving a subpoena in the Bahamas; United States government attorney indicted for serving subpoena in France); FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (Practice Commentary) (urging compliance with foreign law “lest the return [of service] consist of a large envelope containing only the process server”).

210. Id

211. Id.

212. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 135, at 132.

213. Id. (citing as an example Germany’s Code of Civil Procedure, section 328, which provides that: “[a] judgment of a foreign court shall not be recognized . . . if a defendant who has not entered an appearance on the merits was not properly served”). This is not an inhibiting factor in child support enforcement involving American litigants and service members because there will be no need to enforce the judgment in a foreign jurisdiction (e.g., the member’s pay will be garnished through the Defense Finance and Accounting Office located in the United States).
The primary international agreement regarding service of process to which the United States is a signatory, is the Hague Service Convention.214

1. Development and Purpose

Following World War II, United States citizens and business firms substantially increased their overseas activities and investments.215 The United States government also instituted trade and aid programs of considerable magnitude that led to an interrelation of financial and commercial life in the United States and abroad to a degree unparalleled in history.216 However, a corresponding modernization of “international judicial procedure”217 did not accompany the expansion of business activities.218 The increased volume of international litigation magnified past problems with international judicial assistance.219

This whole problem of international judicial procedure has been complicated by the fact that courts in the United States operate under the general principles of the Anglo-American common-law system and other countries of Latin America and continental Europe operate under various modifications of the civil-law system. The civil-law system has as its basis the ancient system of Roman law and the Code Napoleon. Under the civil law, the fundamental concepts of procedure are very different from those of common-law systems. This particularly is true as to the various functions in litigation involving judges, lawyers, and litigants. The difference in fundamental concepts have served to compound the difficulties in that the lawyers and judicial officials operating within their respective systems misunderstand each other’s procedures and the problems.220

216. Id.
217. Id. (“International judicial procedure” has also been referred to as “international judicial assistance.”).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id at 5202 (emphasis added) (“In addition to countries operating under various modifications of the civil law systems, there are other countries which operate under Islamic law, and newly created countries such as Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Israel which have adopted procedural systems which are a combination of several different systems.”).

In addition to misunderstandings, international judicial assistance suffered from service of process procedures that failed to meet minimum standards of due process within the United States.\textsuperscript{221} For example, there were procedures that failed to ensure notice, or timely notice, thereby producing unfair default judgments.\textsuperscript{222}

Particularly controversial was a procedure, common among civil-law countries, called “notification au parquet,”\textsuperscript{223} which permitted delivery of process to a local official who was then ordinarily supposed to transmit the document abroad through diplomatic or other channels. Typically, service was deemed complete upon delivery of the document to the official whether or not the official succeeded in transmitting it to the defendant and whether or not the defendant otherwise received notice of the pending lawsuit.\textsuperscript{224}

American litigants desiring to serve process abroad were faced with the challenge of finding service methods that met both constitutional due process standards and were consistent with the local laws of the foreign state.\textsuperscript{225} American litigants also found service of process lengthy, cumber-

\textsuperscript{222} Id (Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
\textsuperscript{223} Id. at 709. The head of the United States delegation to the Convention described “notification au parquet” as follows:

This is a system which permits the entry of judgment in personam by default against a nonresident defendant without requiring adequate notice. There is also no real right to move to open default judgment or to appeal, because the time to move to open judgment or to appeal will generally have expired before the defendant finds out about the judgment. Under this system of service, the process-server simply delivers a copy of the wit to a public official’s office. The time for answer begins to run immediately. Some effort is supposed to be made through the Foreign Office and through diplomatic channels to give the defendant notice, but failure to do this has no effect on the validity of the service. There are no . . . limitations and protections [comparable to due process or personal jurisdiction] under the notification au parquet system. Here jurisdiction lies merely if the plaintiff is a local national; nothing more is needed.

\textsuperscript{224} Id.
\textsuperscript{225} Born & Westin, supra note 135, 131-33.
some, costly, and often insufficient. Unlike foreign countries, American litigants could not count on consular offices for service of process.

Hurdles facing foreigners were even more onerous due to the American federated system and the difficulty of finding an “official” in the United States willing to serve process. Under the federated system, foreign litigants had to deal with forty-nine separate procedural jurisdiction. Most foreign nations operated under civil law systems mandating “official” service through governmental channels. Because methods of service within the United States under the common law system usually entailed service by nongovernment officials (for example, a paid process server or an attorney), foreign nations believed that United States practices for serving process frustrated the ability of their nationals to effect “official” service.

In 1964, the United States Congress unilaterally acted to improve international service of process problems by enacting Public Law 88-619. This law expressly authorized United States district courts, based on a foreign letter rogatory, to order service of documents on persons within their district in connection with a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. It also permitted the Department of State to transmit foreign letters rogatory between foreign courts and American courts. This action improved the ability of foreign litigants to serve process within the United States but did not enhance the ability of American litigants to serve process abroad. Congress hoped that their unilateral action would induce foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures. This effort

226. See generally Commission Establishment, supra note 215, at 5202.
228. Id.
229. See Commission Establishment, supra note 215, at 5206 (The author describes 48 state court systems rather than 50 because neither Alaska nor Hawaii had yet received statehood).
230. Id.
231. See Downs, supra note 227.
232. Pub. L. No. 88-619, reprinted in 3 INT’L LEGAL MAT. 1081 (1964). This law amended sections of Title 18 of the United States Code dealing with international judicial procedure. The relevant sections of Title 18 that were amended were 1696 and 1781. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1696, 1781 (1982).
234. Id. § 1781.
occurred shortly before the Hague Conference and helped set the stage for United States participation.

At the October 1964 Hague Conference on Private International Law, delegates from the United States and twenty-two other nations developed the Hague Service Convention. The Convention revised earlier Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure. The revision was intended to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad. The United States’ delegation report commended the Convention for:

making substantial changes in the practices of many of the civil law countries, moving their practices in the direction of the U.S. approach to international judicial assistance and our concepts of


237. Id.


The Convention was adopted at the 10th session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (the “Conference”), an association of independent nations whose primary objective is the unification of conflict of laws rules. Located in the Netherlands, the Conference is staffed by a permanent bureau that operates under the supervision of a standing commission of the Netherlands government. The bureau and commission work together on the agenda for the quadrennial sessions and handle various administrative matters including the preparation of questionnaires to member nations on forthcoming topics. Special commissions made up of representatives of the member nations convene between sessions to prepare drafts of proposed conventions. These drafts are forwarded to all member nations for their observations. Responses to the drafts are then distributed at the sessions of the Conference. For each session, member nations send representatives from their countries including judges, legal scholars, legal advisers and experts on conflicts of laws.


241. Id.
due process in the service of process. The delegation’s chief negotiator emphasized that “the convention sets up the minimum standards of international judicial assistance which each country which ratifies the convention must offer to all others who ratify.” The repeated references to “due process” were not . . . intended to suggest that every contracting nation submitted itself to the intricacies of our constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, they were shorthand formulations of the requirement, common to both due process and the Convention, that process directed on a party abroad should be designed so that the documents “reach the addressee in due time.”

2. Service of process Under the Hague Service Convention

The Hague Service Convention provides transnational litigants with a variety of acceptable methods of service of process. “The primary innovation of the Convention” is the development of a Central Authority for service of process. Although the Hague Service Convention permits other methods of service, a plaintiff may always resort to use of the Central Authority method “if another method . . . should fail.” In effect, the Central Authority method acts as a “safety valve.”

a. The Central Authority

The Hague Service Convention requires each contracting state to establish a Central Authority to receive requests from other contracting states for service of documents. The authority or judicial officer competent under the law of the state in which the documents originate

242. Id. at 713-14 (citations omitted).
243. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, arts. 5, 8, 9-11, 19.
244 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 698.
247. Requests are submitted on a form USM-94. See State Dep’t Guide, Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters 3 (undated) [hereinafter DOS Guide]. Within the United States, the form is available at the office of any United States Marshal. Further information on the treaty may be obtained from the Supervisory Deputy for process at the nearest United States Marshal’s Office, or by contacting the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Marshal’s Service, (202) 307-9054. Id.
submits the request, along with the documents to be served. The authority or officer submitting the request must ensure compliance with the language requirements of the Hague Service Convention regarding the request and the documents to be served.

The Central Authority of the receiving state reviews the request for compliance with the Hague Service Convention. If the request does not comply, the Central Authority promptly notifies the requester and specifies

248. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, at art. 2; See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 698.

249. DOS GUIDE, supra note 247, at 3, 4. This guide provides that: Effective February 26, 1983, Public Law 97-462 amended Rule 4 of the FRCP regarding service of process. Pursuant to this change in Rule 4(c)(2)(A) the U.S. Marshal will no longer transmit Form USM-94 directly to the foreign central authority of a country party to the Hague Service Convention. Rather, the attorney representing the party seeking service should execute the portion of Form USM-94 marked “Identity and Address of the Applicant” and the “Name and Address of the Requesting Authority” portion of the Summary of the Document to be Served. A reference to the statutory authority to serve the document should appear prominently on the request, stating that “service is requested pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(A), U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” which authorizes any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age to serve a summons and complaint.

250. See Magnarini, supra note 245, at 670. “Under the laws of the various signatories, the range of persons authorized to forward service requests is very broad, through [sic] ‘private persons’ are specifically excluded from this right.” Id. (citing the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 3 (1983)).

251. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art 3 (requiring that the request conform to the model annexed to the Convention).

252. Id. Article 3 requires that the request and documents to be served must be submitted in duplicate. However, Article 20 provides that contracting states may agree amongst themselves to waive the requirement for duplicate copies of transmitted documents.

253. Id. art. 7. Article 3 provides that:

[T]he standard terms in the model annexed to the present Convention shall in all cases be written either in French or in English. They may also be written in the official language, or in one of the official languages, of the State in which the documents originate. The corresponding blanks shall be completed either in the language of the State addressed or in French or in English.

254. Id. art. 5 (stating that “the Central Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of the State addressed”).

255. Id art. 4.
its objection. If the request complies with the Hague Service Convention, the Central Authority serves the document, or arranges for service by an appropriate agency. The Central Authority may serve the documents by either a method prescribed by its internal law for domestic actions, or by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the Central Authority. If an applicant does not request a specific method of service, the Central Authority may serve process by delivery to an addressee who voluntarily accepts it. Known as “remise simple,” this method is by far the most broadly used approach in a substantial number of Contracting States.

After serving process, the Central Authority completes a certificate in the form of the model annexed to the Hague Service Convention and forwards it directly to the applicant. The certificate verifies service of the document and includes the method, the place and date of service, and the name of the person served. If service did not occur, the certificate sets out the reasons that prevented service.

256. Id.
257. Id art. 5.
258. Id. art. 12. Normally, the contracting state asked to serve the process may not seek payment or reimbursement of taxes or costs for the services rendered; however, the applicant shall pay or reimburse the costs occasioned by the employment of a judicial officer or of a person competent under the law of the State of destination, or for the use of a particular method of service.
259. Id.
260. Id.
262. DOS GUIDE, supra note 247, at 4. The person who delivers the document is often a police official. In most cases, the addressee accepts the document voluntarily or picks it up at the police station.
263. See id at 5. There is no specific time frame for service provided for in the Convention. However, the Hague Conference on Private International Law advises that most Convention central authorities generally accomplish service within two months.
264. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, at art. 6 (providing that any authority so designated by the Central Authority may complete the certificate).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
b. Methods of Service Other than the Central Authority

The Hague Service Convention permits other methods of service abroad in addition to the Central Authority. These methods include:

(1) service directly through diplomatic or consular agents, provided the receiving state does not object—although objections shall not apply to service upon a national of the state in which the documents originate; 268

(2) service through consular channels (or diplomatic channels in exceptional circumstances) by forwarding documents to those authorities of another contracting state designated by the latter for this purpose; 269

(3) service by postal channels, provided the receiving state does not object; 270

(4) the freedom of judicial officers, officials, other competent persons, or any person interested in the litigation to effect service of process through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the receiving state, provided the receiving state does not object; 271 and

(5) service by mutually acceptable means pursuant to agreement between the sending and receiving state. 272

c. Default Judgments

The Hague Service Convention also provides rules for default judgments. Under the Hague Service Convention, when a defendant has not appeared pursuant to a legal action, judgment shall not be given without proof that (1) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the receiving state; or (2) that the document was actually delivered to the defendant or his or her place of residence by a method authorized by the Hague Service Convention. 273

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268. Id. art. 8.
269. Id. art. 9.
210. Id. art. 10.
211. Id.
272. Id. art. 11.
273. Id. art. 16.
These provisions help to ensure timely notice by otherwise voiding a default judgment. However, they do not solve the problem of whether the method of service chosen under the internal law of the receiving state comports with American due process standards.

Notwithstanding the above rules on defaults, the Hague Service Convention authorizes a judgment in the absence of a certificate of service, under the following conditions:

the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this Convention, . . . a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document, [and] . . . no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through the competent authorities of the State addressed.

If a court grants a default judgment, the defendant may apply to have it reopened. This may occur after expiration of the time to appeal if the defendant, without fault, did not have knowledge of the document in sufficient time to defend or appeal. At the time of application, the defendant must demonstrate a prima facie defense to the action on the merits. At a minimum, a defendant may file such an application for up to one year after the date of the judgment.

3. United States Interpretation of the Hague Service Convention

Although “[r]eading and applying the provisions of the Convention may at first blush seem easy,” litigants have required courts within the
United States to interpret the Hague Service Convention on several occasions. The following highlights relevant areas of interpretation.

a. Status of the Hague Service Convention

Within the United States, the Hague Service Convention holds the status of a treaty. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, courts have found that the Hague Service Convention “shall apply in all cases, civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” As an exception, the “Convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the Hague Service Convention does not apply when there is service on a domestic agent that is valid and complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause.


282. *See Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,* 17 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 312-315-16 (1978) [hereinafter *U.S. Delegation Report*]. This report states that even the term “civil and commercial matters” lacks agreement. The United States interprets this term to include all matters, except criminal actions. The French and Swiss practice is to exclude fiscal and criminal matters. The Japanese practice excludes all administrative matters. The German practice is to exclude all criminal matters and those involving the enforcement of public law (as distinguished from private law). Finally, the Egyptian practice excludes family law. *Id.*

283. *See Permanent Bureau Report,* supra note 261, at 327-28. The following was written in the report:

> Extrajudicial documents differ from judicial documents in that they are not directly connected with lawsuits, and they are distinguished from purely private acts by the fact that they require the intervention of an “authority” or of a “judicial officer” under the terms of the Convention. Examples given were demands for payment, notices to quit in connection with leaseholds, and protests in connection with bills of exchange, but all on the condition that they emanate from an authority or from a process server.

*Id.*

Some countries permit the service of such documents by private persons rather than by an authority or judicial officer. As a result, the Special Commission encouraged the Central Authorities of signatory countries to serve documents that would otherwise require the intervention of an authority or judicial officer in their country. *Id.*


285. *See id.*
While the Hague Service Convention provides a means to serve process abroad,

[It] is not a long-arm device which provides independent authorization for service of process abroad . . . [T]he Convention, like Federal Rule 4, offers appropriate methods for serving process only when a state long-arm rule or other federal statute authorizes service abroad. A basis for jurisdiction over the foreign defendant must always be established independent of the Convention. The purpose of the Convention is to provide a mechanism to effectuate notice, not to regulate amenability.287

b. Service by Mail

American courts also have addressed whether the provisions of Article 10a of the Hague Service Convention permit service abroad by mail.288 The issue centers on the language contained in Article 10a stating that, in the absence of an objection by the receiving state,289 the sending state shall be free to “send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.”290 United States courts and legal commentators are split on whether this language permits actual service by mail or simply the forwarding of legal documents for informational purposes after successful service under other authorized provisions of the Hague Service Convention.291 The primary reason for this difference centers on the use of the

286. Id. at 707. The domestic agent was a subsidiary of the defendant in the United States.


289. See DOS GUIDE, supra note 247, at 1 (stating that at the current time, only China, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Luxembourg and Turkey have notified the Hague Conference on Private International Law on accession, ratification or subsequently that they object to service in accordance with Article 10a of the Convention, via postal channels).

290. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art. 10a.
word “send” in Article 10a rather than “effect service” as found in Articles 10b and 10c.292

Courts have employed divergent analytical frameworks for resolving this issue. Courts upholding service of process by mail look to the negotiating history and purpose of the Hague Service Convention for guidance. For instance, in Ackerman v. Levine,293 the district court looked to the history of the Hague Service Convention and found that the drafters carelessly chose the word “send” while intending to permit mail service.294 The district court also found that a literal interpretation of the Hague Service Convention would defeat its purpose of providing unifying rules permitting judicial assistance.295 Courts finding to the contrary have relied more heavily on methods of statutory construction.296 These courts have determined that it would be inconceivable for the drafters to have been so careless based on the deliberations normally attending treaty negotiation. Furthermore, permitting service by mail would circumvent the major innovation of the Hague Service Convention, the Central Authority, and make the vast bulk of the Hague Service Convention meaningless.298

291. See Ackennan, 788 F.2d at 830; Dainichi Kinzoku, 680 F. Supp. at 847; Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 456 (holding that the Hague Service Convention permits service by mail); but see Bankston, 889 F.2d at 172; Pochop, 111 F.R.D. at 464; Zisman, 106 F.R.D. at 194; Chrysler Corp., 589 F. Supp. at 1182 (holding that the Hague Service Convention does not permit service by mail). For analysis by legal commentators, see Born & Westin, supra note 135, at 155-60 (framing the issues and suggesting that the better practice for United States litigants is to consult the actual reservations of member states before using an alternative means rather than the Central Authority); Ristau, supra note 193 (considered one of the leading commentators on the Convention, he strongly contends that the draftsmen of the Convention intended the word “send” to encompass service of process rather than mere mailing of documents for informational purposes following an authorized method of service); Leo, supra note 239 (supporting an interpretation that article 10a permits service by mail provided the receiving state has not filed a formal objection to this provision of the Hague Convention); but see L. Andrew Cooper, International Service of Process by Mail Under the Hague Service Convention, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 698 (1992) (arguing that article 10a does not authorize service by mail); McCausland, supra note 238 (also arguing that article 10a does not authorize service by mail).

292. See, e.g., Born & Westin, supra note 135, at 159; Ristau, supra note 193, at 149 (or 4-28, n. 32); Leo, supra note 239, at 342; McCausland, supra note 238, at 197.


294. Id. (citation omitted).

295. Id.


297. Id.

298. Ackerman v. Levine, 889 F.2d 172, 190-91 (2d Cir. 1986).
Both arguments appear meritorious. However, neither argument considered the reports of the two Special Commissions\(^\text{299}\) that met to review the operation of the Hague Service Convention since its enactment.\(^\text{300}\) The First Special Commission, in that portion of their report commenting on service by postal channels, found that, “the States which object to the utilization of service by post sent from abroad are known thanks to the declarations made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^\text{301}\) and that “it was determined that most of the States made no objection to the service of judicial documents coming from abroad directly by mail in their territory.”\(^\text{302}\)

In responding to questions concerning interpretations of article 10a, the Second Special Commission stated that:

Article 10a in effect offered a reservation to Contracting States to consider that service by mail was an infringement of their sovereignty. Thus, theoretical doubts about the legal nature of the procedure were unjustified. Nonetheless, certain courts in the United States of America in opinions cited in the “Checklist” had concluded that service of process abroad by mail was not permitted under the Convention.\(^\text{303}\)

While the above statements are not dispositive, courts should consider them when interpreting article 10a. However, in the absence of clear judicial interpretation, American litigants should carefully assess the decisions of the jurisdiction that they are in prior to using service by mail in a foreign country which is a signatory to the Hague Service Convention.\(^\text{304}\) Also, the litigant must consider whether the foreign country has filed a formal objection to article 10a of the Hague Service Convention\(^\text{305}\) and


\(^{300}\). McCausland, supra note 238, at 197.

\(^{301}\). First Special Commission Report, supra note 299, at 329.

\(^{302}\). Id. at 326.

\(^{303}\). Second Special Commission Report, supra note 299, at 1561.

\(^{304}\). The litigant also needs to keep in mind whether or not the foreign country has objected to such service, and whether that country permits service by mail under its internal laws.
whether the internal laws of the receiving country permit service by

4. Independent State Agreements

The United States has not signed any international agreement on child support enforcement.\textsuperscript{307} Without such an agreement, states have entered into agreements with foreign nations on their own.\textsuperscript{308} States have been able to enter into these “Parallel Unilateral Policy Declarations”\textsuperscript{309} based on principles of comity\textsuperscript{310} and without violating the Compact Clause.\textsuperscript{311} These agreements generally provide for enforcement of child support obligations based on the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURES A).\textsuperscript{312}

\footnotesize
305. See Bankston v. Toyota, 123 F.R.D. 595, 599 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (prohibiting such service under these circumstances).

306. See Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that service of process was valid because Japanese law permitted it). The court did not consider the special nature of mail service in Japan. Japan, like other civil law countries, regards service of process as a sovereign act that requires service through government officials. See Robert W. Peterson, Jurisdiction and the Japanese Defendant, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV., 555, 577 (1985) (“The court clerk stamps the outside of the envelope with a notice of special service (‘tokubetsu sootatsu’). The mail-carrier acts as a special officer of the court by recording the proof of delivery on a special proof of service form and returning it to the court clerk.”). This may have impacted on the court’s decision. If Japan is unsatisfied with American judicial decisions, Japan is always free to exercise its right to formally object to service of process by mail under Article 10a (they have already done so regarding articles 10(b) and (c)). Id. See also Gloria Folger DeHart, Comity, Conventions, and the Constitution: State and Federal Initiatives in International Support Enforcement, 28 FAM. L. Q. 90, 105 (1994) (stating that service by mail is unknown in most of Latin America).


308. See generally supra note 307.

309. Id. (noting that this is the term of art given such agreements by the Department of State).

States have entered into such agreements with Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and several other foreign nations.313 Under these agreements:

311. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, 3. "The United States Constitution prohibits absolutely any state from entering ‘into any treaty, alliance, or confederation’ and requires the consent of Congress to ‘enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power.’” DeHart, supra note 306, at 91.

Congressional consent is not required for interstate agreements that fall outside the scope of the Compact Clause. Where an agreement is not "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States," it does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent.

Id. (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981)).

312. DeHart, supra note 306, at 90 (the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URES) is found at 9 B.U.L.A. 381 (1968)).

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URES) was first developed in 1950 . . . and was revised significantly in 1968 (RURES). In August 1992, an almost wholly new Act was completed to replace URESA/RURES and was renamed the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) [9 U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 1993)]. Because the application of the new Act to international cases remains the same, the arrangements made and discussed below under RURES are equally applicable to UIFSA. The procedures set out in URESA were developed by the states to solve the persistent and growing problems of obtaining support for children and spouses when the separated or divorced parents or spouses live in different states. The Act provides for a two-state lawsuit where an action is filed by the obligee in one state (the initiating state) and sent to the state where the obligor or his or her assets are located (the responding state). An appropriate court in the latter state establishes jurisdiction over the obligor, and may enter an order of support payable to the obligee in the initiating state. The Act establishes the requirements of the petition, the procedures to be followed, and the duties of both initiating and responding states. The cases are handled by a designated public agency which provides services to the petitioner. No costs or fees are charged, but the obligor may be ordered to pay fees, costs, and expenses. In addition to these procedures for establishing and enforcing an order, . . . the act sets out a procedure for registering an existing order which then becomes enforceable in the state where the obligor resides . . . . The 1968 RURES expanded the definition of responding state to include “any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is in effect.”

Id. at 92, 93 (citations omitted).

313. Id. at 94-97.
(1) the country will enforce the child support obligation, collect the money, and send it to the requesting state, whether or not there is an existing order; (2) the order will be enforced if recognizable under the laws and procedures of the country, and if it is not recognized or no order exists, an order or its equivalent will be obtained; (3) the system will deal with both in and out of wedlock children, and a determination of paternity will be made if possible in the circumstances; (4) each country will use its own laws and procedures; and (5) there will be no means test for legal services, and no charge for legal assistance or the services of government offices or personnel.314

While these agreements do not affect methods of service of process under the Hague Service Convention,315 they reflect the great interest that foreign nations and individual states within the United States have in child support enforcement matters. This cooperative effort between foreign nations and individual states demonstrates the feasibility of the Department of State developing mutually acceptable methods of service under the Hague Service Convention for improving service of process in child support enforcement matters.316 There should be de minimus concern by foreign nations over methods of service that do not involve their resources or citizens (for example, letting federal agencies serve process related to child support through employment channels on United States nationals employed by the agency overseas).

VI. Part V: The DOD Response—Executive Order 12,953

This part briefly overviews the DOD’s immediate reaction to the executive order. It then lists the seven service of process issues that the DOD Task Force, the OPM, and the HHS working group identified as having an adverse effect on the child support enforcement process. Following each of the seven issues is a summary of the recommendations made by the two working groups. After each summary, there is an author’s analysis of the recommendations made and, where appropriate, there are alternative considerations identified.

314. Id. at 99-100.
315. See generally Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,699 (1988) (holding that the Hague Service Convention, as a treaty, is the supreme law of the land and must be followed by state courts).
316. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art. 11 (permitting mutually acceptable methods of service of process).
A. DOD Reaction

The Department of Defense swiftly engaged in a serious effort to meet the mandates of the Executive Order. The DOD established inter-agency relationship and a Task Force commenced work immediately on the tasks required by the executive order. At its first meeting, the Task Force established four policy commitments as working guidance throughout the review process. These commitments provided for:

1. Streamlining policies and procedures by removing barriers hindering adequate and timely child support while remaining sensitive to the impact on the Agency;

2. Roughly equal treatment between uniformed members and federal civilian employees;

3. Ensuring due process protection for members of the uniformed services; and

4. Enabling the agency to become a model employer.

As part of the Task Force effort, each Service reviewed its policies on service of process. The Task Force considered these reviews prior to submission of the DOD 180-Day Report to OMB.

317. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE REPORT, SUMMARY OF DOD ACTIONS TO COMPLY WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,953 (5 June 1995).

318. See DOD REPORT, supra note 104, pt. II. The day following the Executive Order, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness met with the HHS Assistant Secretary for Children and Families to discuss child support enforcement and Executive Order 12,953.

319. Id.

320. DOD Task Force Meeting on Child Support Enforcement, Meetings at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Agenda]. The author attended the meeting that was chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Requirements and Resources, Ms. Jeanne B. Fites.

321. Id.

322. Id. Enclosure three to the Agenda provided a format for military service reports to the task force. Part 13 of this format asked for a review of compliance with court orders and service of process, including a discussion of methods of assistance and perceived problems with overseas assistance.

323. See infra sec. VI.B.
B. The 180-Day Reports

In accordance with the President’s executive order, DOD reported its findings and recommendations for improving child support enforcement to OMB. The OPM and the HHS also submitted their report to OMB (hereinafter OPM/HHS report). Both reports included findings and recommendations on service of process. Together, the reports identified seven service of process issues that adversely affect child support enforcement. Of seven issues identified in the reports, only the first three issues (appointment of designated agents for receipt of service of process; use of certified mail to serve process overseas; and lack of knowledge by practitioners) were common to each report.

1. Designated Agent

The executive order directed the study of a proposal requiring federal agencies to designate an agent for service of process that would have the same effect and bind employees to the same extent as actual service of process on the employees. Neither report favored this approach. Both reports expressed potential due process concerns regarding employees receiving actual or delayed notice as well as misgivings over agency liability. For example, the DOD Report questioned whether state courts could subject federal agencies to their judicial process when an employee or member failed to appear in court. The OPM/HHS report also stated that it is not clear if the designated agent would be an agent of the court in which litigation is pending, an agent of the federal government, or an agent

324. Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 401.
325. DOD REPORT, supra note 104.
327. DOD REPORT, supra note 104, at 4-7; OPWHHS report, supra note 326, at 9-11.
328. Id.
329. Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, at § 402(a)(iv).
330. DOD REPORT, supra note 104, at 5, 6 (stating, for example, that a member may never get actual notice if discharged before the service of process reaches him or her; or the notice may be delayed during time of war, national emergency, or other military exigencies).
331. Id. (showing, for example, that a member may never get actual notice if discharged before the service of process reaches him or her; or the notice may be delayed during time of war, national emergency, or other military exigencies).
332. Id.
333. Id.
of one or both parties to the litigation. The OPM/HHS report also expressed concern about whether state civil procedure statutes and court rules would need to be amended to obtain jurisdiction under the designated agent approach.335

a. Report Recommendations

Neither report recommended adopting the designated agent proposal. After coordination with the OPM and the HHS, the DOD Report concluded that the proposal appeared unworkable.336 The OPM/HHS report, while not advocating the use of a designated agent, recommended that any proposal mandating the use of designated agents should include provisions for protection of civilian employees (e.g., postponement rights, right to open a default judgment) similar to those afforded military members under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act,337 as well as protections for federal agencies from liability.338 Neither report provided any legal authority for its positions.

b. Author’s Analysis

The designated agent proposal would significantly simplify the procedures for service of process. Service on designated agents within the United States would negate requirements to comply with foreign law or international agreements.339 The proposal also reduces the required knowledge base for practitioners by creating fewer, more readily identifiable targets for service of process.340 The proposal would save child support enforcement (CSE) caseworkers and other practitioners (for example, lawyers and process servers) a tremendous amount of time, energy and

335. Id.
338. OPM/HHS report, supra note 326, at 10.
340. For example, whenever a child support enforcement action involved a military member, rather than having to find the member, the process server merely needs to serve process on the DOD designated agent. Thus, if someone needed to serve process on 100 different military members located overseas, they could send all 100 summons and complaints to the same DOD designated agent in one envelope. The address for the designated agent would likely be obtainable from the Federal Register or by making a telephone call to the DOD (while it may require a few telephone calls, it would be quicker and less expensive than finding all 100 members overseas).
expense associated with locating deadbeat parents and effectuating legally binding service of process on them in a foreign country.

In the absence of any cost studies, it is reasonable to assume that the savings to the nation resulting from more efficient child support enforcement would outweigh any expense caused to federal agencies by having to set up procedures for the designated agent to receive the process and ensure delivery to the intended recipient. This is especially true within the military services because many commanders already receive requests for service of process and act as conduits for that service when the member voluntarily agrees to accept it. Furthermore, regardless of whether the member agrees to accept it, the commander will have to take some action; either to arrange a location for service of process or to return the process to the requesting party.

Both reports identified legal concerns with due process, agency liability, and the need for states to amend their service of process rules. However, the reports did not contain supporting legal analysis. This article addresses the due process issue. The other two issues are not analyzed because they are matters of policy and procedure. For instance, legislative drafters could, as a matter of policy, craft legislation ensuring that federal agencies are immune from liability for their role as designated agents for service of process.

The fundamental question is whether service on the federal government, as an agent for an individual in a civil matter unrelated to official agency functions, comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Due process requires adequate notice to the defendant and the court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the pen-

341. The issue of states amending their jurisdictional statutes to take full advantage of their long-arm ability under the United States Constitution is a matter of state preference. However, the federal government may encourage states to change their rules by granting or denying federal benefits to states contingent on adopting specified rules.
343. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is implicated because appointment of a designated agent would most likely be pursuant to federal action by either congressional legislation or executive order. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution must also be considered because states would have to amend their state service of process codes to include service on a designated agent of the federal government as an acceptable means of service of process that gives the issuing court jurisdiction.
344. See supra sec. V.A.2.
dency of the action and afford an opportunity to present objections.\textsuperscript{345} This article assumes that the content of the notice, as found in the summons and complaint, are adequate. Also, there should be little concern about the ability of the federal government to pass the legal process in a timely fashion to its civilian employees or military members.\textsuperscript{346}

The jurisdictional prong of due process is more complicated as applied to the proposal for designated agents. \textit{International Shoe} and its progeny require minimum contacts with the forum state that do not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\textsuperscript{347} The proposal in Executive Order 12,953 raises concern about satisfying minimum contacts. It is unclear whether the approach permits service by any state, regardless of the state’s contacts with the defendant;\textsuperscript{348} or whether the approach is subject to the minimum contacts analysis for jurisdiction established in \textit{International Shoe}.\textsuperscript{349}

Because the President would not implement any proposal that violates the Due Process Clause, the proposal is suitable only for those cases where the forum state has the required minimum contacts necessary to establish jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{350} In those cases where a state served process on a designated agent without having sufficient minimum contacts, and the agent passed

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{345} Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank \& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
\item \textsuperscript{346} See generally 5 C.F.R. §§ 581.201, 201 (1995) (service of process for garnishment orders for child support and alimony).
\item \textsuperscript{348} See S. 689, 103th Cong., 1st Sess. (1994). Section 201 of this bill would have declared that Congress found that due process is satisfied if state courts exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who is a parent or presumed parent of a resident child in order to establish, enforce, or modify a child support order or to establish parentage—thereby confronting the Due Process Clause as interpreted by the courts.
\item \textsuperscript{349} \textit{International Shoe}, 326 U.S. at 310.
\item \textsuperscript{350} See Kulkoski v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In this case, the defendant and plaintiff were married in California on a brief layover to the defendant’s overseas military assignment. They eventually took up residence in New York for many years. Upon their divorce, the plaintiff moved to California. The defendant later consented to his daughter moving to California. The plaintiff brought suit in California for modified support and child support. The Supreme Court ultimately overturned the California award to the plaintiff, finding that the California courts lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the defendant so as to make it unfair for the defendant to appear before California courts over his objection.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the process on to the defendant, the defendant would be able to challenge the service and request that the court quash it on due process grounds.\textsuperscript{351}

An additional concern not raised by either report is whether the federal government may be a proper agent of the employee for service of process in a private civil matter. The basic rule is that the person to be served must actually authorize the appointment of the agent for receipt of service of process.\textsuperscript{352} The proposal contained in the order mandates appointment of the agent by the federal agency without requiring approval or authorization from the employee. The federal government is without authority to appoint an involuntary agent for service of process on one of its employees in a private litigation matter not involving the federal government.\textsuperscript{353} Therefore, in the absence of a specific authorization by the employee, the proposal violates the basic rule on appointment of an agent and should not be implemented.

c. Alternative Considerations

While both reports are correct in their conclusions that the designated agency approach is not legally sound, the reports should have addressed the underlying intent of the proposal and explored other options. The plain language of the proposal indicates that the drafters intended to preclude defendants from avoiding service of process by guaranteeing a recipient who is always available for service of process and cannot avoid it.

Another approach that meets the executive order’s intent is to make federal agencies responsible for appointing officials to assist with actual delivery of service of process. As an employer, the federal government is certainly capable of passing civil process in a timely manner to its employees. Furthermore, the federal government (for example, DOD) may be the only resource available to help serve process on military members while assigned on board a ship or deployed to a remote geographic location.

\textsuperscript{351} Id.

\textsuperscript{352} See Ackerman v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that not even service on defendants’ secretary at defendants’ place of business was effective when plaintiffs’ presented no evidence that defendants intended to appoint the secretary to receive service in their behalf); see also Lamont v. Haig, 539 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D. S.D. 1982); Davis-Wilson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 2 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 6 (E.D. La. 1985). Service has also been permitted on domestic subsidiary corporations deemed to be agents of their overseas parent corporation. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).

\textsuperscript{353} See generally supra note 352.
This approach is not, however, without legal concerns. First, it may not be usable in those foreign countries where internal laws prohibit such service, or in those countries that are signatories to the Hague Service Convention. Also, within the DOD, the prohibitions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act must be considered if the designated agent, or agents thereof, are members of the armed forces.

Fortunately, the foregoing legal concerns are not absolute barriers to authorizing full military assistance with delivery of service of process. Most rules regarding international service of process stem from concerns by individual nations about fair treatment of their own citizens by the courts of other countries. Common sense dictates that foreign nations lack interest in domestic United States litigation solely involving American plaintiffs and defendants. Foreign nations should not be unduly concerned by service of process within their borders if it is unobtrusive, performed completely within United States federal agency employment channels, and does not require the use of the resources or citizens of foreign nations.

Military policies currently permit military commanders to deliver the process to members in person in those cases where the military member agrees to voluntarily accept service of process. This practice is in accordance with military service policies that require members to pay their just debts and provide financial support for their family members. Additionally, the mechanics associated with providing such assistance already exist within the military services, to include designated “responsible officials” under Executive Order 12,953 who could oversee this function. Therefore, if legal barriers are removed, the DOD should be amenable to this alternative because it permits the military services to ensure that military members comply fully with military policies.

A modification to this alternative would be using Department of State consular channels to deliver process rather than federal agency officials.

354. See Born & Westin, supra note 135.
356. See supra sec. IV.C. (Posse Comitatus Act).
357. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art. 11 (allowing mutually acceptable methods of service of process).
Designation of consular channels would overcome legal concerns in those countries that are signatories to the Hague Service Convention. It is unfortunate for American litigants in child support enforcement actions that internal Department of State policy does not take advantage of its full authority under the Hague Service Convention. Finally, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibitions are not finite. Legislative amendments could authorize military authorities to deliver service of process in child support enforcement actions.

2. Certified Mail

The executive order also directed review of a proposal to improve service of process for civilian employees and members of the Uniformed Services outside the United States by using certified mail. The DOD Report rejected this proposal. The report found that setting up a separate mailing system for certified mail is potentially expensive and time consuming; ripe for abuse; an invasion of privacy; not available in many foreign countries; and improper in those countries that are signatories to the Hague Service Convention and have filed objections to service of process by mail.

The OPM/HHS report did not completely reject the possibility of improving service of process by using certified mail. This report determined that state CSE agencies involved in international cases should first attempt service on an individual through international registered mail where feasible. The Report concurred with the DOD comments that litigants cannot serve process by mail in those countries that are signatories to the Hague Service Convention and have filed appropriate objections. The Report also noted that state civil procedure codes and child support

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360. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art. 8 (permitting service through diplomatic and consular channels on one’s own nationals over the objection of the receiving state).


362. A legislative change is not required for the Navy and Marine Corps as they were not included in 18 U.S.C. § 1385. All that would be required is a change to U.S.DEPT OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, para. C, encl. 4 (15 Jan. 1986), which makes the Posse Comitatus Act applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps. However, arguably for morale reasons, it would not be wise for the DOD to unilaterally change the DOD policy in the absence of a legislative change applying to the Army and Air Force as well.


364. DOD REPORT, supra note 104, at 6.
statutory provisions might not permit accomplishing service of process by international mail.\textsuperscript{368}

\textit{a. Report Recommendations}

The OPM/HHS report recommended that the HHS Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) advocate changes in international conventions and other domestic and international laws to facilitate broader acceptance of service of process by mail in child support enforcement cases.\textsuperscript{369} The DOD Report did not provide any recommendations on this issue.

\textit{b. Author’s Analysis}

The ability to effectuate service of process by mail is a critical tool for a court within the United States to obtain jurisdiction over a party in a child support case.\textsuperscript{370} To erase the public perception that military status often enables some deadbeat parents to avoid a court’s jurisdiction in a child support enforcement action,\textsuperscript{371} DOD must advocate the use of the military

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{365} \textit{Id.} The report stated that:
\[\text{T}his\ process\ is\ not\ feasible\ because\ flagging\ or\ otherwise\ distinguishing\ mailing\ envelopes\ or\ setting\ up\ an\ alternative\ system\ for\ special\ certified\ mail\ return\ receipt\ cards\ for\ child\ support\ cases\ is\ a\ potentially\ expensive\ and\ time-consuming\ task.\ It\ is\ also\ one\ ripe\ for\ abuse\ and\ misuse\ and\ subject\ to\ attack\ as\ an\ invasion\ of\ privacy.\ For\ example,\ the\ sender\ using\ the\ special\ envelope\ or\ receipt\ card\ for\ child\ support\ matters\ could\ disguise\ non-child\ support\ actions\ to\ obtain\ service\ of\ process\ or\ the\ sender\ could\ use\ this\ system\ to\ embarrass\ the\ recipient\ in\ the\ work\ place.\ Furthermore,\ certified\ mail\ is\ a\ domestic\ product\ only.\ Restricted\ mail\ service\ is\ available\ to\ many\ foreign\ countries,\ but\ to\ be\ eligible\ for\ restricted\ delivery,\ the\ mail\ must\ first\ be\ registered.\ Moreover,\ American\ courts\ have\ consistently\ held\ that\ international\ mail\ service\ of\ civil\ summonses\ is\ not\ proper\ in\ the\ case\ of\ countries\ that\ have\ entered\ an\ appropriate\ reservation\ under\ Article\ 10\ (objections\ to\ service\ via\ postal\ channels)\ of\ the\ Hague\ Service\ Convention.\ For\ these\ reasons,\ certified\ mail\ is\ not\ a\ viable\ option\ for\ service\ of\ process\ for\ child\ support\ enforcement\ matters.\]
\item \textsuperscript{366} \textit{Id. at 9.}\ Secondar methods for obtaining service include consular and diplomatic channels, long-arm statutes, and the Hague Service Convention, which the United States and at least 40 other countries have signed.
\item \textsuperscript{367} \textit{OPM/HHS report, supra note 326, at 10.}
\item \textsuperscript{368} \textit{Id.}\ This is a state choice whether to permit such service as a basis for attaining jurisdiction.
\item \textsuperscript{369} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{370} \textit{See supra sec. VA.2 for a discussion on due process limits.}\
\end{itemize}
postal system overseas and lobby the State Department to enter into any international agreements necessary to permit such service. The DOD has not done this. Although citing numerous potential problems with service by mail, the DOD has failed to provide any authority to support its conclusions, which appear erroneous as applied to military members overseas. For instance, the United States postal system does not need new mail systems for serving process by certified mail overseas on military members. The current military postal system already authorizes such service in overseas countries where the majority of military members are assigned. Additionally, there appears to be no legitimate privacy concern regarding the marking of mail on the outside as a “Child Support Enforcement Matter.”

Unlike the DOD, the OPM/HHS report favors improving service of process by registered mail and advocating changes under existing conventions to permit such service. On this issue, the OPM and HHS approach offers more cooperation than the DOD position.

**c. Alternative Considerations**

In addition to supporting the OPM and the HHS recommendation, United States postal regulations could be amended to provide for the exter-
nal marking of mail\textsuperscript{375} as a “Child Support Enforcement Matter” or, in the sender block, “From a Child Support Enforcement Agency.” This would enable recipients to readily distinguish their mail and identify those mail items that relate to child support enforcement. Users of this type of marking should have to certify, under penalty of perjury, that the enclosed material solely relates to a child support enforcement matter.\textsuperscript{376} This certification would help protect recipients from accepting mail, under false pretenses, that they otherwise might wish to avoid.

In addition to these changes, all federal agencies could impose an affirmative obligation on their employees or uniformed members to arrange for acceptance of service of process in child support enforcement matters.\textsuperscript{377} Adopting these proposals would facilitate service of process overseas by enabling employees and uniformed members to recognize certified or registered mail actions that pertain to child support enforcement, and to fulfill their obligations to accept them.

These alternatives would require action by the Department of State prior to implementation. Specifically, the Department of State would have to work out understandings or agreements with foreign nations, including those that are signatories to the Hague Service Convention and who have objected to service by mail, that permit this type of mail service on our own nationals.\textsuperscript{378}

3. Lack of Knowledge

Both the DOD Report and the OPM/HHS report identified lack of knowledge as a contributor to problems with service of process. The DOD Report claimed that some of the frustration experienced by civilian practitioners (whether lawyers or CSE caseworkers) stems from their unfamiliarity with the military.\textsuperscript{379} Also, both reports found that practitioners dealing with international child support enforcement cases often lack the requisite knowledge to overcome efficiently the hurdles associated with service of process overseas.\textsuperscript{380}

\textsuperscript{375} Either certified, registered or other type of mail that the post office guarantees to deliver.


\textsuperscript{377} See infra sec. VI.B.4 (Department of State approach).

\textsuperscript{378} Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art. 11 (allowing mutually acceptable methods of service of process).

\textsuperscript{379} DOD REPORT, supra note 104, at 4-5.

\textsuperscript{380} id; OPM/HHS report, supra note 326, at 10.
a. Report Recommendations

The OPM and the HHS recommended that the OCSE develop a comprehensive training and technical assistance strategy for international child support enforcement cases. This would include special emphasis on educating officials in other nations on United States practices on case initiation, administration and judicial processes, and service methods. The DOD Report supports this recommendation.

In addition to increased training, the DOD recommended the establishment of a centralized federal office for child support enforcement. The envisioned office would provide a centralized point of contact within the federal government for state child support enforcement offices that need assistance in handling cases involving overseas noncustodial parent. The office would also have responsibility for coordinating service of process with appropriate federal agencies. The report claimed that the advantages of a consolidated, centralized office staffed with persons trained to handle service of process overseas would outweigh the funding requirements to establish a centralized office.

b. Author’s Analysis

The recommendation for increased education of United States practitioners is appropriate. However, the expenditure of funds to train foreign governments and practitioners is questionable in light of other methods available to improve service of process.

The DOD recommendation for a centralized office is premature in light of the designation of responsible officials within each agency for facilitating assistance with service of process. These agency points of

381. OPM/HHS report, supra note 326, at 10.
382. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Presumptively, had they been better, then neither the DOD nor the OPM and the HHS would have found lack of knowledge a problem.
389. For example, such other methods include the use of consular channels, agreements with other countries, direct federal agency assistance with service of process.
390. Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 302.
contact, depending on the commitment of each federal agency, will likely become valuable resources for guidance to those unfamiliar with the assistance provided by each agency. Further, as noted below, there are other agencies within the federal government that could simply take on an increased leadership role in this area.

c. Alternative Considerations

Enhance the role of the Department of State in service of process for child support enforcement matters, particularly for overseas issues. The State Department already has an office that provides general guidance on service of process overseas.391 “The [State Department] officials in Washington are invariably helpful, knowledgeable and dedicated despite overwhelming workloads and responsibilities.”392 It would be a worthwhile investment to increase their funding and staff to take a lead role in such matters.

Additionally, an increase in staff accords with the proposal to change Department of State policy regarding use of consular channels to serve process abroad.393 While the State Department is already involved in the submission of letters rogatory, this approach would permit it to take on a greater role with service of process in countries that are signatories to the Hague Service Convention. Centralization of this function within the Department of State would forego creating another separate centralized office, as the DOD suggests, that would overlap with the State Department because the proposed new office would not have authority to engage in the letters rogatory process. Finally, this alternative would dramatically reduce the need to educate state and foreign practitioners. Basically, all that state practitioners would have to know is to refer a matter involving overseas service of process to the State Department.

4. Different Agency Policies

The OPM/HHS report identified an issue with differences in federal agency policies.394 Some agencies are stricter in their policies regarding personnel who fail to provide required support.395 For instance, the

393. See infra sec. VII.B.2.
394. OPM/HHS report, supra note 326, at 10.
395. Id.
Department of State policy affirmatively requires employees to accept service of process for child support enforcement actions or face curtailment or adverse disciplinary action.\textsuperscript{396}

\textit{a. Report Recommendation}

The Report recommends that all federal agencies with workforce employees or members outside the United States clarify their personnel policies.\textsuperscript{397} Also, agencies must inform employees of their duty to comply with child support obligations and potential sanctions.\textsuperscript{398}

\textit{b. Author’s Analysis}

This is one of the most important steps that federal agencies can take to improve assistance with service of process procedures. The Department of State took the lead among the federal agencies by quickly establishing an aggressive policy that orders employees to arrange for an acceptable method of service of process in child support and paternity actions. If its employees do not make such arrangements, then the Department of State may take appropriate adverse action against them.\textsuperscript{399} Other agencies, including the DOD, have not yet adopted this approach. While there may be some legal issues with the Department of State approach,\textsuperscript{400} it clearly accords with the spirit and intent of the President’s executive order.\textsuperscript{401}

\textsuperscript{396} Id.

\textsuperscript{397} Id. at 11.

\textsuperscript{398} Id

\textsuperscript{399} U.S. Dep’t of State, Department Notice: Facilitating Payment of Child Support (May 15, 1995) [hereinafter DOS Notice].

The Department must make its employees stationed abroad available for service of process in State court civil cases concerning paternity and child support. That means employees may not use their diplomatic or consular status to avoid acceptance of service in such court actions. The Department will not accept papers or service of process on the employee’s behalf, but it will require the employee to arrange an acceptable method for acceptance of service. The Department will waive diplomatic immunity if necessary. An employee who refuses to accept service in violation of this order may be subject to immediate curtailment of tour and to disciplinary action, as appropriate.

\textsuperscript{400} If there is a collective bargaining agreement in place, an agency may have to negotiate this as a term and condition of employment with the union. 5 U.S.C. \S\S 7103,7114 (1994).

\textsuperscript{401} Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9. \S 101.
Within the armed forces, establishment of this type of policy would greatly facilitate service of process. However, the Posse Comitatus Act may prohibit using the military to serve process, or using military authority to order members to accept process.\textsuperscript{402} To avoid this legal prohibition, the Posse Comitatus Act should be amended to authorize the use of military authority.\textsuperscript{403} If amended, commanders could give lawful orders, carrying the threat of criminal prosecution,\textsuperscript{404} to service members who refuse to make themselves available for service of process. The days when commanders fruitlessly asked service members to accept service of process voluntarily, after seeing a legal assistance attorney, would disappear, and legal gamesmanship would give way to the practical needs of society.\textsuperscript{405} The establishment of responsible officials under the executive order will help monitor compliance with this type of approach.\textsuperscript{406}

5. Different Service Policies

Similar to the problem of differing agency policies, the DOD Report noted that the individual military services have varying policies on providing assistance with service of process.\textsuperscript{407} For instance, the DOD Report highlights the flexible Air Force policy that allows process servers on all Air Force installations, regardless of whether they are in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{408} Furthermore, the Air Force policy provides assistance overseas regardless of whether the host nation is a signatory to the Hague Service Convention or its internal laws would otherwise prohibit service of process in violation of the host nation’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{409}


\textsuperscript{403} See supra sec. IV.C., infra sec. VII.A.2 a.

\textsuperscript{404} UCMJ art. 92 (1995) (failure to obey an order or a regulation).

\textsuperscript{405} See e.g., US. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-3, THE ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (30 Sept. 1992). Military policies authorize legal assistance for military members. After receiving legal advice on the effect of accepting process, a member would often choose to decline it, thereby delaying or avoiding the pending court action. Without a court order establishing paternity or awarding support, commanders have no authority to force members to provide financial support or to take adverse action against them. Id.

\textsuperscript{406} Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, § 302. Responsible officials provide a check on the system when commanders or other military authorities don’t provide assistance either due to ignorance or lack of adherence to policies.

\textsuperscript{407} DOD REPORT, supra note 104, at 6.

\textsuperscript{408} Id.

\textsuperscript{409} Id.
a. Report Recommendation

The DOD recommended that the services establish uniform rules on the service of process for child support enforcement matters. These rules would allow process servers on all installations regardless of whether they were exclusive jurisdiction or not. The rules would also ensure the availability of service members for service of process within a reasonable amount of time (making provision for exceptions such as when the member is in a combat zone) based on uniform DOD guidance.

b. Author’s Analysis

The DOD is on point with its analysis. Uniform DOD rules on service of process would avoid variances in service policies. The public often views such variances negatively, not understanding why one service permits service of process and the other does not. However, the DOD should cautiously approach adopting uniform guidance that would permit service overseas in violation of host country law or the Hague Service Convention. While the Air Force may have avoided problems due to a lack of interest or knowledge of such practices by foreign nation authorities, it would be better to have official understandings and agreements entered into that permit the DOD to serve its own members overseas.

c. Alternative Considerations

The DOD should include, in its uniform guidance, rules requiring members to arrange for acceptance of service of process similar to those mandated by the Department of State for its employees. Also, the DOD should not wait for a response from OMB to begin drafting and implementing guidance. If model employer status is the goal, then the DOD must aggressively take the lead to make improvements on its own. This includes soliciting the Department of State to work out understandings and agreements with foreign nations.

6. Responsible Official

The OPM/HHS report identified an issue with appointing responsible officials under the executive order for facilitating service of process on
agency employees or members.\textsuperscript{414} This report commented that such designation does not guarantee actual service of process.\textsuperscript{415} The OPM/HHS report further stated that the issue of service of process overseas may not be that big a problem,\textsuperscript{416} noting that “a few highly publicized problems in overseas service of process cases may have made it appear that there are more problems than there really are.”\textsuperscript{417}

\textit{a. Report Recommendation}

The OPM/HHS report recommended that the OCSE form a working group of federal agency responsible officials. This group would determine the scope of the problem (for example, how may cases are problems due to lack of information) and recommend appropriate remedies.\textsuperscript{418}

\textit{b. Author’s Analysis}

The OPM and the HHS are correct that the appointment of responsible officials does not guarantee service of process. Even with responsible officials appointed, federal agencies have no greater authority to ensure actual service of process. The appointment also fails to overcome the expense, delay, and complexity associated with service overseas.

The OPM and HHS recommendation to form a working group of responsible officials is meritorious. However, it is questionable why the OPM and the HHS did not form a working group of responsible officials prior to submitting their 180-Day Report to OMB. Their charter in the executive order gave them the authority to convene that type of working group.\textsuperscript{419}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[413] Exec. Order No. 12,953, \textit{supra} note 9, § 302.
\item[414] OPM/HHS report, \textit{supra} note 326, at 9.
\item[415] \textit{Id}.
\item[416] \textit{Id}.
\item[417] \textit{Id}.
\item[418] \textit{Id}.
\item[419] Exec. Order No. 12,953, \textit{supra} note 9, § 402 (“Other agencies shall be included in the development of recommendations . . .”). Also, section 302 of the Executive Order required publication of the list of responsible officials in the \textit{Federal Register} by 1 July 1995. Accordingly, OMB had time to meet with them.
\end{footnotes}
c. Alternative Considerations

The executive order did not provide guidance on the duties of responsible officials other than to state that they should facilitate a member’s availability, regardless of location. The OPM should immediately promulgate uniform guidance on what “facilitation” means. Otherwise, some agencies may take a minimalist approach as compared to the aggressive stance taken by the Department of State in requiring their employees to arrange for acceptance of service of process.

7. Translation

The OPM/HHS report identified as a problem the requirement to translate documents when sent to a central authority under the Hague Service Convention. Translation is costly and time consuming.

a. Report Recommendation

The Report recommended that OCSE, in conjunction with state child support practitioners, explore simplified, low-cost methods to facilitate translations.

b. Author’s Analysis

While this recommendation makes sense, it is not new and has been the subject of international concern for many years. Also, the translation problem is only relevant when dealing with foreign defendants who do not understand the English language, or when serving process using the Central Authority method under the Hague Service Convention. Adoption of federal agency policies requiring employees and members to arrange for service would negate this concern for American defendants.

420. Exec. Order No. 12,953, supra note 9, at § 302.
421. See DOS Notice, supra note 399 (regarding Department of State policy making employees responsible for arranging for acceptance of service of process).
422. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art. 5.
423. OPM/HHS report, supra note 326, at 10.
424. Id.
425. See generally First Special Commission Report, supra note 299, at 323.
427. Hague Service Convention, supra note 24, art. 5.
who do not need the documents translated into another language. The same rationale applies if service is made through consular channels.

VII. Part Six: Unified Approach

Both the DOD report and the OPM/HHS report contain fragmented recommendations that do not operate together as part of a total solution. Furthermore, the recommendations found in both reports are not the only solutions for improving service of process. Allowing the DOD to fix its part of the service of process problem will not erase the overall problem. While it may result in additional service of process on military members, there will still be other persons protected from service of process by the state, federal and international issues that the DOD cannot fix on its own.

Service of process problems can only be fixed by a consolidated effort of the key federal agencies. The following synthesizes the recommendations and alternatives found in Part Five and recommends a unified approach for improving service of process. The DOD, in conjunction with other federal agencies, must implement this approach to solve the complex problems associated with service of process and to enhance child support enforcement.

A. DOD Specific Steps

1. Promulgating Uniform DOD Guidance

The DOD must promulgate the following minimum guidance for service of process:

a. Member Responsibility

Military members have an absolute legal and moral responsibility to provide for the financial and medical support of their children, whether legitimate or born out of wedlock. In accordance with their responsibility, members shall arrange for receipt of service of process in child support actions pending against them. When a military member knows that papers

428. Translation is only required when using the Central Authority. See id.
429. Although these do not relate to improving service of process, the DOD also should consider requiring the military services to develop uniform guidance on support amounts in the absence of a court order or mutually acceptable agreement, as well as requiring uniform criminal sanctions similar to those promulgated by the Army under AR 608-99, supra note 96, para. 2-5.
to be served on him or her, whether by personal service, mail, or other method prescribed by an international agreement, contain notice of a child support enforcement action, the member shall accept the service of process. After accepting the process, the member will have the opportunity to seek advice of a military attorney, or private attorney at no expense to the government, regarding the process. In the absence of military exigency, military commanders shall authorize military members reasonable time, including leave, and legal assistance necessary to respond to the action.

b. Military Department Responsibility

The military departments are responsible for ensuring, through command channels, that military members meet their child support responsibilities. This includes requiring members to provide for children pursuant to a court order, a mutually acceptable support agreement, or an interim support regulation. Also, military members shall provide support to children born out of wedlock as directed by a court order, or if the military member has acknowledged paternity on a paternity acknowledgment form developed by federal, state, or local authorities pursuant to a hospital-based paternity establishment program. Additionally, the military services shall ensure through command channels that child support enforcement agencies and process servers in child support enforcement actions receive prompt assistance with service of process. Military commanders shall permit process servers, regardless of the forum state, to serve process for a child support enforcement action at reasonable times and locations on installations or facilities under their control.

2. Advocating Legislative Changes

The DOD should advocate the following legislative changes.

a. Amendment to Posse Comitatus Act

Congress should amend the Posse Comitatus Act as follows:

Section 1385a—Service of Process by Military Authorities: The Secretary of Defense may promulgate rules permitting military authorities to deliver state court process for establishing paternity or a child support order to military members as an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. The act by military authorities of accepting and delivering judicial process in child support enforcement actions shall not subject military authorities or other federal government officials to the jurisdiction of state courts nor
make military authorities, other federal government officials, or the federal government liable for any cause of action.

\textit{b. Postal Rules}

The DOD should consult with the OPM, the HHS, and Postal Authorities to draft legislation that amends postal regulations to provide for external marking of mail (certified, registered, and other types of guaranteed mail) as “Child Support Enforcement Matter.” The amendment must require that users of this marking certify, under penalty of criminal prosecution, that the enclosed material solely relates to a child support enforcement matter.\textsuperscript{430} Postal delivery systems using this marking must be designed to ensure delivery to the recipient and return acknowledgment to the sender.

\textbf{B. Other Agency Actions}

\textit{1. Uniform Guidance}

The OMB needs to direct the OPM, in consultation with other federal agencies, including the DOD and the HHS, to publish uniform guidance on the duties of responsible officials and federal agency policies regarding an employee’s responsibility to provide financial support. The policy should follow the Department of State approach that authorizes adverse action against employees who fail to arrange for acceptance of service of process.

\textit{2. Increased Use of Consular Channels to Serve Process}

The Department of State needs to amend its internal policies to take advantage of the permissible limits of its authority to serve process through consular channels under the Hague Service Convention.

\textit{3. Coordination of Agreements or Understandings}

The Department of State must coordinate agreements and understandings with foreign nations, especially those that are signatories to the Hague Convention, to ensure the United States is authorized to serve process on its own nationals by methods that do not involve the foreign nations’ resources or citizens. For example, permitting military authorities to

\textsuperscript{430}. \textit{See supra} sec. VI.B.2.
deliver process on military members when stationed in the foreign country; allowing the use of certified mail through military postal systems.

4. Centralization of Service of Process

The OMB, in consultation with the Department of State and the HHS, should seek increased funding for the Department of State to expand its staff in order to establish a centralized office for service of process in child support enforcement actions overseas.

VIII. Conclusion

The public’s perception that service of process is the main obstacle to child support enforcement within the armed forces overshadows the relative success experienced by the armed forces in the child support arena. Unfortunately, the underlying nature of military service creates occasions where notice and service on a member are nearly impossible. In the absence of these circumstances, the barriers to timely service of process on United States employees or military members overseas are a creation of federal government bureaucracy. It is time to cut the red tape and implement measures throughout the federal government that comply with the President’s goal of creating an effective system of child support enforcement.

The agency reports submitted to OMB fail to propose adequate solutions for cutting through the quagmire of self-imposed government obstacles. The recommended unified approach provides an opportunity for the DOD to challenge the bureaucracy by implementing and promoting measures that improve service of process. The proposed unified approach places military members in the forefront of child support enforcement matters. This placement is appropriate in light of previously existing military service policies requiring parents to meet their support obligations and the overriding responsibility that parents have to support their children.

The unified approach is not resource intensive. The military services already have systems in place to handle actual delivery of service of process in child support enforcement matters. Furthermore, by increasing Department of State involvement and resources to create one central location that can provide complete assistance to the states—including the service of process—state child support enforcement agencies would save costs and improve collections. Their cost savings, combined with increased collections in child support that reduce expenditures in federal
programs, would likely compensate any expenditures required to increase the staff and resources of the Department of State.

In sum, the DOD must be proactive and move quickly to remove barriers to service of process. This will facilitate judicial determinations of paternity and child support obligations that, once established, the DOD can enforce better than other employers nationwide. By promoting the unified approach, the DOD will assume a responsible position of leadership among the federal agencies in child support enforcement and attain model employer status.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT¹

REVIEWED BY MAJOR JOHN B. JONES, JR.²

Defense and the environment is not an either/or proposition. To choose between them is impossible in this real world of serious defense threats and genuine concerns.³

—Defense Secretary Dick Cheney

Mr. Stephen Dycus explains the purpose behind National Defense and the Environment in his preface: “This book is intended to provide a thoroughgoing introduction to the relationship between defense and environmental issues. It is meant to inform and provoke further inquiry.”⁴ For the most part, the author delivers on his promise by providing a well-written introduction to the complex world of environmental law.

The book’s strength lies in informing the reader of the environmental concerns facing the nation, explaining the regulatory frameworks designed to address these concerns, and examining the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ability and effectiveness in complying with these environmental statutes. Mr. Dycus capably analyzes the myriad issues which are the result of environmental regulations interacting with defense realities. To assist the reader’s understanding of the often complex issues involved in this area, Mr. Dycus logically lays out the contents of the book. The first and last chapters focus on the author’s “thought-provoking themes”; he questions whether, in the struggle between national defense and the environment, we “can have it both ways.”⁵ The intervening chapters address the “nuts and bolts” of our national environmental concerns. In each of these chapters Mr. Dycus reveals the origin of the various regulatory schemes, explains how they operate, and then examines how they affect the DOD.⁶

2. Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Army. Written while assigned as a student, 45th Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
3. Dycus, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting Defense Secretary Dick Cheney).
4. Id. at xiv.
5. Id. at 1, 183.
In spite of addressing an area that many might consider dull—especially when describing the statutory frameworks—Mr. Dycus is able to make the material more meaningful through a series of “case studies.” After laying out the applicable statute, the author helps to make it more meaningful by examining actual incidents in which the DOD has had to cope with the legislation. Among the many case studies, the author relates how the United States Army has struggled with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) interface at Basin F at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado; he describes how the United States Air Force attempted to comply with the Clean Air Act (CAA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in performing its cleanup at Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire; and he examines the ongoing controversy concerning the destruction of chemical weapons at Tooele Army Depot, Utah, and Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. These case studies illustrate the complexities involved in complying with the wide range of environmental

6. Chapter Two, “Environmental Planning for National Defense,” explains how the environmental statutes apply to national security objectives and provides excellent summaries of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Chapter Three, “Environmental Regulation of the Defense Establishment,” examines those statutes designed to eliminate pollution at its source (such as the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)) and how they affect the DOD. Chapter Four, “Dangerous Legacy: Cleaning Up After the Cold War,” looks at the DOD’s efforts in complying with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and RCRA after World War Two in cleaning up America’s installations and focuses on the enormous costs involved. Chapter Five, “Military Base Closures and Reassignments,” addresses the variety of environmental issues facing commanders when installations shut down. Chapter Six, “Environmental Protection During Wartime,” examines the devastating effect that war can have on the environment and outlines the limitations that international agreements place on wartime destruction. Chapter Seven, “Environmental Protection in Courts,” examines court decisions in which the DOD and the environment collide; the decisions cover a broad spectrum, from allowing broad deference to the military in this arena to granting injunctive relief. Chapter Eight, “Liability for Environmental Damages,” acts as a refresher course for anyone who has served in the claims arena and provides a succinct history on federal sovereign immunity, the Tucker Act, the Federal Torts Claims Act and the Feres doctrine.

Evident from these chapters is the broad range of issues that the DOD must confront when dealing with national environmental law. This point becomes particularly salient for the military practitioners at the installation level who have to address these myriad complex problems.

7. Id. at 91-93.
8. Id. at 131-32.
9. Id. at 66-68.
concerns and hint at future problems that the military is likely to encounter.\textsuperscript{10}

The book also serves as an excellent resource, especially for those unfamiliar with, or just starting out in the area of environmental law (in other words, this book is ideal for many military practitioners). Mr. Dycus has taken the complex and often overlapping realm of environmental regulation and made it understandable. Before launching into the ramifications that a particular law may hold for the DOD, the author concisely explains the statute’s inner workings, defines terms, and explains concepts. Although they typically fail to shed additional light on the text, the endnotes are numerous and could serve as an outstanding starting point for further research. Mr. Dycus relies on a variety of sources, ranging from DOD directives to House Committee hearings to law review articles and legal journals. Of particular note to military practitioners is the number of military legal periodicals that the author relies on as authority; Mr. Dycus cites twenty-one \textit{Air Force Law Review} articles, nine \textit{Military Law Review} articles, three \textit{Naval Law Review} articles, and four articles from \textit{The Army Lawyer}.\textsuperscript{11}

The book contains three highly informative appendices. Appendix A\textsuperscript{12} lists the major federal environmental statutes (such as the NEPA, RCRA, CERCLA) and then provides a series of DOD cases under each identified statute. A short parenthetical describing the issue involved accompanies each citation. Appendix B lists the addresses of government

\textsuperscript{10} To further underscore the enormity of the environmental problem facing the nation, the author scatters chilling statistical evidence throughout the book. As of 1994, there were 19,694 contaminated sites at 1722 DOD facilities nationwide. \textit{Id} at 80. The cost of cleanup at all DOD sites is estimated at $42 billion and projected to take thirty years. \textit{Id}. Cleanup is costly in terms of both time and expense. For example, the production of ammunition between World War Two and the Vietnam War at the Army’s Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant (TCAP) in Minnesota resulted in trichloroethylene leaching into the drinking water of surrounding towns. In treating this problem, the Army:

- treated more than 3 billion gallons of groundwater to remove 320,000 pounds of volatile organic compounds, and it has excavated 1,100 cubic yards of soil containing PCBs. Yet of 19 contaminated sites at the base, only one has been completely cleaned up, and restoration of the entire facility is not expected before the year 2000, at a cost now estimated at $154 million.

\textit{Id}. at 94.

The Army describes TCAP as “one of its success stories.” \textit{Id}. The DOD is a big player in the environmental arena: the Pentagon directly controls some 25 million acres of land in the United States and more than 250 military installations in the United States operate public water systems regulated under the SDWA. \textit{Id} at 5, 7.
tal agencies associated with national defense and the environment, while Appendix C lists the addresses and phone numbers of public interest organizations.

The author also examines how environmental regulations apply to the Department of Energy (DOE). Concerning the current state of cleanup regarding nuclear material, Mr. Dycus paints a bleak picture: “We have more than 1.4 million drums of buried or stored waste . . . . If you just take the stored waste and start piling those drums on a football field, it literally would go six miles high. That’s just the stored waste we already have.”

In shifting its focus from weapons production to environmental restoration, the DOE faces formidable challenges. To begin with, the costs are staggering. Cleaning up the entire weapons complex is estimated at $200 billion. Unfortunately, “[t]he technology needed to clean up some of the most dangerous wastes has not even been invented. Critical cleanup standards do not yet exist to measure DOE’s progress.” Finally, attempting to dispose of hundreds of tons of radioactive material in light of the EPA regulations and the RCRA and CERCLA restrictions is especially difficult when “much of the nuclear waste was dumped into unlined ditches and pits, many containers holding waste are now leaking into the open environment, and much of the radioactive waste is ‘mixed’ with nonradioactive waste, creating problems in storage, treatment, and disposal.”

12. See Dycus, supra note 1, at 195-213.
13. Id. at 214-15. This listing includes the Environmental Protection Agency, the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, and the assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security/Cleanup.
14. Id. at 216-17. These organizations include the Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club, and Greenpeace.
15. Id. at 104.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 103.
18. Id. at 104.
19. Id.
Mr. Dycus approaches the DOD’s response to environmental issues evenhandedly and, for the most part, favorably. Although he criticizes the United States Air Force (as part of the coalition forces) in the Persian Gulf War for damaging the environment, Mr. Dycus cites numerous examples of how the DOD has aggressively pursued a policy of compliance with environmental regulations. As evidence of this “new environmental ethic,” “[the DOD is] working hard to come into compliance . . . [and] the Army reports that 96 percent of RCRA violations at its facilities can be cured by administrative or procedural corrections, and that such violations are being reduced by increased staffing and improved training.” Moreover,

Under its Army Environmental Training Master Plan, all soldier and civilian employees are to receive some environmental instruction at various stages in their military careers. The Navy and the Air Force have similar programs. All three service branches have created special environmental leadership courses for high-ranking officers, as well as programs aimed at particular compliance issues, such as the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments.

In facing the environmental challenge, Mr. Dycus senses a new attitude among the military, where base commanders “are becoming more sensitive to the environmental impacts of their maintenance and training activities” and “all military services are learning to centralize responsibility to environmental matters.”

*National Defense and the Environment* serves as an excellent reference tool for the military practitioner. Mr. Dycus explains how the broad range of federal environmental statutes impacts the military and capably describes the DOD’s response. Care of the environment continues to be a

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20. The coalition sorties contributed to the destruction of the atmosphere by purging their fuel tanks with halon, a fire retardant gas that destroys stratospheric ozone while the bombing of Iraqi oil fields contributed to the black smoke. *Id* at 139. Additionally, both Kuwait and Iraq remain strewn with tons of unexploded ordnance. *Id.*

21. *Id.* at 78.

22. *Id.* As part of their initial training at The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, newly appointed judge advocates receive five hours of environmental law instruction during their basic course. At the graduate level advanced course, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, provides more experienced judge advocates (captains and majors attending from all services) 19 hours of environmental law instruction.

23. *Id.* at 6.
top priority for the military and it will take a concerted effort by the military, Congress, state and local governments, and the general public for real improvement to occur. With this effort and understanding, perhaps one day we may realize the dual goal of “steady improvement with the regulatory laws, even as we maintain our military preparedness in a dangerous world.”

24. *Id.* An underlying theme to his work is that the United States can and should hold itself out as a world leader in the environmental arena, with the military as the vanguard. Specifically, Mr. Dycus maintains that our environmental laws should apply abroad and govern in times of war as well as in peace. The author recommends that the DOD consider a reduced form of environmental assessment in the planning stages of combat operations, especially when there is an opportunity for advanced planning. However, the United States Armed Forces does not conduct overseas operations in an environmental vacuum. Executive Order 12,114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, requires federal agencies, prior to undertaking actions that have significant effects on the environment outside the United States geographical borders, to prepare documents such as environmental impact statements or environmental assessments. *See* Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980), *reprinted in* 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). The Army receives further guidance in this area through U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 200-2, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS (23 Dec. 1988) and U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 6050.7, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS (31 Mar. 1979) (which essentially reproduce Executive Order 12,114).

25. *Dycus, supra* note 1, at 79.
Iron Soldiers: How America’s 1st Armored Division Crushed Iraq’s Elite Republican Guard

Reviewed by Major Scott F. Romans

Although many books have been written about the war in the Persian Gulf, few have been written from the perspective of the soldiers on the ground. Tom Carhart provides this perspective in his book *Iron Soldiers*. Based primarily on interviews with unit members, Carhart attempts to explain how the 1st Armored Division prepared for and fought its part of the Persian Gulf War. The division’s mission, as part of VII Corps, was to destroy Iraq’s Republican Guard. The division achieved a higher level of mission accomplishment than did the book. While the book is interesting and informative, it lacks the depth and objectivity to explore fully the interesting issues it raises about how the war was fought by this armored division.

The book begins as one battalion of the division, 1/37 Armor, prepares to engage the Iraqi Republican Guard for the first time. After the author introduces Major General Griffiths, the Division Commander, the division G3 and G2, and some of the men, 1/37 Armor rolls off to their first engagement. As the battalion rolls forward, Mr. Carhart takes the reader back to Germany, where the division was first notified that it was deploying to the desert. From that point, the book marches forward from preparation for deployment, through movement to Southwest Asia, preparation for combat, to the actual combat operation itself. Along the way, the author introduces and resolves several subplots which fall into two main categories: those that are operational in nature, and those of a human interest appeal.

The scene for these subplots is set as the division learns that it will deploy as part of VII Corps. First, Mr. Carhart discusses the reorganization of the division—how third brigade, 3d Infantry Division, under the command of...
mand of Colonel James Riley, went in place of 1st Armored Division’s first brigade, and how 616 Infantry moved from third brigade to second brigade. He then introduces the key players of the subplots.

The most interesting pre-deployment subplot involves Colonel Snowmont, the third brigade commander. According to General Griffiths, of all of his brigade commanders, Colonel Snowmont was the one “who looked like he may one day be the brightest star of all.” This assessment changed, however, as General Griffiths becomes concerned about third brigade’s apparent lack of enthusiasm (and readiness) as the deployment draws near. Finally, Colonel Snowmont takes himself out of command, indicating that he suffered from a longstanding medical problem that made him nondeployable.

It is this incident, as much as others in the book, that leave the reader frustrated and seeking a more definitive resolution of the issue presented. As the incident with Colonel Snowmont unfolds, the reader discovers that, according to the colonel, he suffered a head injury in a training accident in the late 1980’s that he managed to keep from limiting his career. Apparently, he had a CAT scan done prior to the deployment that showed no evidence of malfunction, and Brigadier General Hendrix, the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, believed Colonel Snowmont was trying to avoid his duty by feigning medical problems. General Griffiths accepted Colonel Snowmont’s relinquishment of command and put Colonel Zanini in his place. The book never offered a conclusion, nor any objective evidence, as to whether Colonel Snowmont suffered from a medical condition. We are also not told what happened to Colonel Snowmont after he gave up command of the brigade. Did he retire? Was he reassigned? In a strict sense, these matters are beyond the scope of the story of how the 1st Armored Division fought the war, and it may be impossible to come to any definite conclusion regarding what really happened. However, the story of a senior commander (indeed, the “brightest star”) who voluntarily gives up the opportunity to lead his unit into war, is so intriguing and unusual that some sort of further explanation or investigation would have been welcomed by the reader.

Another subplot of an operational nature involved the second brigade commander, Colonel Meigs, and one of his battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Mike McGee. Lieutenant Colonel McGee’s battalion, 616 Infantry, was originally part of third brigade. However, the battalion was

3. Carhart, supra note 1, at 49.
moved to second brigade to replace their infantry battalion that was not deploying. As the division deployed to Saudi Arabia and prepared for war, friction developed between Lieutenant Colonel McGee and Colonel Meigs. Eventually, it got to the point where Colonel Meigs issued an administrative letter of concern to Lieutenant Colonel McGee and the battalion commander became convinced that Colonel Meigs would soon relieve him of command.

Here again, however, Mr. Carhart leaves the reader with unanswered questions. Lieutenant Colonel McGee was not relieved, and in fact the 6/6 Infantry played an important part in the division’s war effort. Lieutenant Colonel McGee and Colonel Meigs resolved their differences at the conclusion of the battle of Medina Ridge. According to Mr. Carhart, as Lieutenant Colonel McGee traveled through the battlefield at the conclusion of the battle, he developed a new respect for Colonel Meigs based on the mass destruction leveled against the Republican Guard by the second brigade. According to Mr. Carhart, all differences were resolved in a radio transmission where both commanders profess admiration and gratitude for the other. As in the case of Colonel Snowmont, however, questions were left unanswered concerning the exact nature of the disagreements between the two men. Was Lieutenant Colonel McGee insubordinate? Did Colonel Meigs ride Lieutenant Colonel McGee too hard in his attempts to demonstrate second brigade standards? Again, these questions may never be definitively answered, but more information, or even an opinion offered by the writer, would be helpful to the reader.

The human interest subplots are both heartwarming and poignant. Mr. Carhart relates the story of two lieutenants, an armor platoon leader and a military police platoon leader, who fell in love just before they both deployed to Southwest Asia. Included in this subplot is a rather humorous account of how the officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the armor battalion arrange a meeting between the two in the desert. This is one subplot that Mr. Carhart resolves: included in the book are photos of the lieutenants’ wedding.

Mr. Carhart provides his greatest insight into the human dynamics of this war, however, in his coverage of the role and activities of the family members left behind in Germany. He provides a detailed account of how the spouses of officers and senior noncommissioned officers took on the important mission of keeping up the morale and spirits of family members during the deployment, including a detailed account (including photos) of an “unbirthday party” given on Valentine’s Day.
On a more poignant note, one of the author’s subplots involves a matter that certainly has occurred throughout history, yet has not received much attention until recently: mothers leaving their young children and going off to war. In the book, a young pregnant lieutenant in the aviation brigade asks her supervisor, the brigade S-1, to hold her slot for her until she returns from maternity leave from having her third child. However, after the baby is born, the lieutenant changes her mind and wishes not to deploy. In the book, the brigade S-1, also a woman, denies the young lieutenant’s request and requires her to return to duty (after her maternity leave had expired). The S-1’s order to the lieutenant highlights the conflicts that arise when members of the armed forces (male or female) are required to fulfill their obligations as parents and as soldiers:

Lieutenant Hill, I didn’t make you join the Army, I didn’t make you go to flight school, I didn’t make you get married, I didn’t make you have a baby and I did not make you fight to keep your slot open when the deployment was announced! I am now simply enforcing your voluntary agreement! The army’s sole purpose is to be prepared to fight and protect the interests of the United States! It is not a social welfare agency! Now listen to me! So long as you draw an army paycheck and are physically able to perform our duties, you must perform them!4

These subplots develop in the context of the division preparing for war. As the various stories unfold, the reader learns about how the division moved to the desert, trained for the war, and fought the war. Included are explanations of the functions of various staff officers and levels of command, as well as a primer on basic armor tactics. Mr. Carhart, a former officer who served in Vietnam, dedicated the book to the noncommissioned officer’s corps, so the book naturally highlights the important role played by the noncommissioned officers of the division. Mr. Carhart’s explanations are readable and understandable, yet not too basic for those readers who already have a working knowledge of the Army. To make his points clearly he provides basic maps of the division’s position. While those who served in Southwest Asia may find the maps too simplistic, they do place the division in the context of the theater of operations. Also included are photographs of many of the characters mentioned in the book.

4. Id at 95 (emphasis in original).
Although the book is full of useful, pertinent information, the usefulness, and indeed the credibility, of the information provided is diluted somewhat by the author’s cheerleading writing style. Perhaps the reason he fails to provide the information and opinions for the subplots previously discussed is simply because to do so would involve taking sides in some form or fashion. To take sides in such a manner would no doubt detract from one of the soldier’s image. Mr. Carhart appears too enamored of his subjects to conduct such an objective analysis.

This lack of objectivity and critical analysis is the most glaring in the discussion of a friendly fire incident during the war that killed one soldier and injured others. The author discusses the investigation of the incident in one sentence, and then concludes that the accident was “not terribly surprising: They [the victims of the friendly fire incident] were, after all, broken down in a war zone, and there were a lot of exhausted and heavily armed American soldiers moving across the Iraqi desert in the dead of night with blood in their eyes.” To take such a cavalier attitude to such a serious problem does a great disservice to the cause the author tries so desperately to promote. After the war, much attention and criticism was focused on the friendly fire incidents that occurred during the war. News media and Pentagon officials alike discussed how these incidents could have been avoided, and what technological or operational changes could deter such incidents in the future. To dismiss this tragedy as almost inevitable, without any discussion of the investigation into the incident or plans for improvement in the future, is to miss one of the most controversial and important issues to come out of the Persian Gulf War.

As part of Mr. Carhart’s style, he includes melodramatic prose that grows increasingly tiresome as the book progresses. Two examples of this style should be enough to make this point:

And now, there was an unmistakable sense in the air that this was for real, that they were going out with their fearsome weapon systems and kill Iraqis. The smell of cordite made their hearts pound, their blood churn, their mouths water, and the appetite for war grew stronger every day.

The wagon train of supplies edged forward single file, trying oh-so-carefully to keep their tires in the path cut by their point man’s

5. Id. at 283.
6. Id. at 116 (emphasis in original).
steel tracks. Flaming Iraqi T-72 steel torches lit their way, and bagpipes playing thunderous tunes of glory seemed about to burst from Sergeant Kennedy’s forehead as he led them in a slow parade across the burning battlefield.’

Even the soldiers involved, although excited about the opportunity to apply their training in live combat, would most likely agree that such prose overstates their emotions.

The soldiers and family members of the 1st Armored Division have much to be proud of for their efforts in support of Operation Desert Storm. Although lacking in detailed critical analysis, Mr. Carhart’s book captures the essence of these efforts. Despite its shortcomings, this book should be on the reading list of all students of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

7. *Id.* at 265.
THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION:
A COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE LEGENDARY FIGHTING FORCE

REVIEWED BY MAJOR JAMES S. EICHER

The French Foreign Legion! The mere name echoes like a rifle-shot, evoking stark images of leather-faced mercenaries, mysterious castaways from the humdrum of ordinary life, spurned lovers, disenfranchised sons, and yes, the occasional fugitive from justice. We have seen them in the movies, marching across endless desert sands and defending hopelessly remote outposts for which the names and locations have all but faded from memory. But what is the truth behind the French Foreign Legion?

I first heard of the Legion as a young boy. My Father and I have always shared a love of history, and I recall him once saying to me, “The Foreign Legion is probably the toughest, most disciplined outfit on earth.” So, while recently browsing through a local bookstore, something caught my eye: Douglas Porch’s 636 page The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force (hereinafter The Legion). The book’s length was somewhat imposing, but I was immediately taken in by its thirty-two pages of photographs and numerous campaign maps.

Professor Douglas Porch, of The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, brings impressive credentials to The Legion, having previously authored four other books relating to French military history. This background, combined with Porch’s obvious affection for his topic and “several summers [of] combing archives in France for undiscovered [Legion] documents, diaries and memoirs” (where Porch apparently often visited his parents-in-law), resulted in a truly extraordinary book.

2. Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Army Reserve. Written while assigned as a student at the 45th Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
4. See The Legion, supra note 1, at xii.
In his Preface to *The Legion*, Porch explains, “This study does not pretend to be an exhaustive history of the Legion—that would be quite impossible!” He continues, “I believe that there is room for a book on the Legion that links its combat performance to its recruitment, training, rituals, and special social environment.” *The Legion* is not just a dry recitation of battle dates and crusty campaigns; it is masterfully written history. It is also a psychological study and a social analysis, as well as a solid critique of Legion training techniques and battle strategies. This is quite an undertaking—one which Porch handles brilliantly.

While a seemingly distant concept today, foreigners fighting in other nations’ armies was not unusual in years’ past. Two well-known examples from our own Revolutionary War are the Hessians, who fought for the British, and Lafayette, who fought for the colonialists. Indeed, the entire military fabric of late medieval and renaissance Europe largely rested on the shoulders of mercenary (and often foreign) troops. To this day, Swiss mercenaries continue to guard the Pope. However, Article 13 of the post-revolutionary July 1789 French Charter decreed, “No foreign troop can be admitted into the service of the State, except under a [special] law.”

When the 1830 revolutionary movements began, many young men from other European countries flocked to France, hoping to find refuge in the spiritual home of egalitarian revolution. Unfortunately, the French were not particularly happy at receiving this rabble. The solution? Either turn them back at the border, which was often done, or toss them into the military. King Louis-Philippe’s 10 March 1831 “special law” creating the Foreign Legion provided the legal tool for accomplishing the latter. Quite simply, the Legion was to serve twin complementary aims: Sweep the French streets of its foreign male riffraff, while providing France with an expendable, no-risk military troop to be thrust into faraway colonial lands.

Enlistment in the Legion usually took place “in a dingy room of an official building in Paris, or in one of the French provincial towns, especially those near the German or Belgian frontiers.” The recruits were given a third-class ticket to Marseille and a small sum of money for food.

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5. *Id*
6. *Id*
7. *Id* at 3.
8. *Id* at 1.
9. *Id* at 5, 631.
10. *Id* at 172.
during the trip before a corporal marched them to the station . . . . The newly minted legionnaires traveled unescorted.”11

Their destination? Algeria! From the onset, Algeria “was to be at once [the Legion’s] spiritual home and the crucible that would forge its unique character.”12 It was there that the Legion earned its reputation as “Le Plus Beau Corps De France” (“The most handsome unit of France.”).13 German-American recruit Erwin Rosen, who enlisted in 1905, describes first seeing Oran, which “appeared quite suddenly between a narrow gap in the cliffs, ‘as if from a conjurer’s box . . . a maze of flat-roofed houses on hilly ground.’”14 A sergeant came on board, marched to the bow and shouted, “Legionnaires a moi!” (equivalent of “Attention, Legionnaires!”). Their lives would never be the same again.15

Porch omits no detail in his storied depiction of the Legion’s many Algerian adventures. When he describes the 1849 Battle of Zaatcha, one can imagine Gary Cooper charging through the palm trees, dashing out-fitted in his blue tunic and “kepi blanc” (the distinctive white legionnaire cap). His masterful prose places the reader in the thick of the battle grasping for more details.

Porch offers a fascinating recollection of the Third Republic’s little publicized 1895 disastrous campaign in Madagascar. It was here that General Duchesne ordered his troops to “march or die.”16 A more accurate description of General Duchesne’s command might have been “march and die!”

The French Foreign Legion has all too often earned its stripes through much needless suffering. In Madagascar, the French had not properly scouted out the terrain and “possibly [landed] on the wrong side of the island.”17 While waiting for a shipment of 2000 battle wagons designed to be pulled by mules over the hopelessly soggy terrain, General Duchesne allowed his troops to spend weeks in the tropical lowlands, where malaria

11. Id. at 173.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 171, 174.
15. Id. at 174.
16. Id. at 12, 269.
17. Id. at 269.
and dysentery decimated their fighting effectiveness.\textsuperscript{18} The Madagascar Campaign was won only at a terrible cost.

The traditional French refusal to “mount” the Legion (in the belief that horses and/or mules provided too convenient a vehicle for desertion) illustrates another poignant example of needless Legion suffering. The command’s stiff adherence to its “march or die” mentality often resulted in the Legion pathetically trudging after fleet-footed Arabian chargers across endless desert sands.

Who were these men? Porch digs deeply into Legion archives and diaries for the answer. Current Legion literature proclaims, “The legionnaire is seldom an angel but never a criminal.”\textsuperscript{19} This aura of mystery is due in no small part to the “anonymat,” the provision of the Legion enlistment contract which still exists today allowing a recruit to enlist under whatever name he chooses.

Certainly there have been “Beau Geste types [from the 1939 Paramount Picture starring Gary Cooper]\textsuperscript{20} in the Legion,” but Porch maintains, “they [have] made up a minuscule minority.”\textsuperscript{21} Leon Randin wrote in 1906, “Take 100 of these unhappy soldiers, and you have a maximum of 20 or 30 scatter-brains or ‘declasses’ and 70 or 80 victims that misery or hopelessness have thrown into the chasm of the Legion.”\textsuperscript{22}

The Legion’s most reliable source of recruitment has been a constant since the very beginning: the political upheaval of other countries. “Russians after 1917, Spaniards in the wake of the Civil War in 1936, Germans in 1945 and, most recently, refugees from the former Soviet bloc” have kept the Legion ranks filled.\textsuperscript{23} Others are “fleeing disastrous love affairs or scrapes with the law; [some] simply want a career or French citizenship. Most are looking for a new start.”\textsuperscript{24} Porch concludes, “It’s the belief that one can break with the past and begin again, that salvation is to be found in the quest for danger and suffering that brings men to the Legion.”\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Id. at 271,274.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} See The Legion, supra note 1, at 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} See generally id. at 17 (of photographs); see also, Tala Skari & Giorgia Florio, Through the Gates of Hell, LIFE, Mar. 1996, at 39 [hereinafter Gates of Hell].
  \item \textsuperscript{21} See The Legion, supra note 1, at 181.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} See Gates of Hell, supra note 20, at 41.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Id
\end{itemize}
Yet, “how [can] an elite unit come to be fashioned out of material regarded as unpromising?”26 This question seems the primary impetus for Porch writing *The Legion*. With very few exceptions, the French Foreign Legion has rightfully earned its badge of honor as one of the toughest fighting forces in history. How can refugees from the normal motivating factors of home, family, community, and country be molded into a crack military force? Is it love for France (or the liberty France traditionally has represented)? Hardly. Porch tells us that, almost to a man, recruits who came to the Legion with such idealistic motivations are routinely ostracized as “fools.”27 Neither is it the pay. While some legionnaires have of course enlisted for the “gamelle” (mess tin),28 legionnaire pay was traditionally too low to be much of a draw; even today, a legionnaire recruit starts out at only $300.00 per month.29

So, what accounts for the Legion’s tenacious fighting spirit? The selection process is part of the answer. Currently, the Legion receives far too many applicants for its 8500 strong ranks. Thus it is relatively easy to weed out the physically unfit and unstable recruit.30 To a certain extent, this has always been the case. “Avoid all intellectuals, argumentative people, persuasive speakers able to influence opinion . . . . Give preference to farm workers, day laborers and all other manual trades,” a legionnaire officer advised in 1943.31

In the end, it seems the very thing which causes men to come to the Legion in the first place accounts for their valor and discipline under fire. “To those who have forsaken their past, the Legion provides a new family—a polyglot brotherhood of grit and endurance.”32 Combine this with the legendary Legion discipline (as well as extremely tough training), and the result is a fraternal bond uncommon to even the most homogeneous of “national” armies. The official Legion motto, “Legio Patria Nostra” (The Legion, Our Father) says it all.33

Porch’s book is truly outstanding. Though it is too lengthy to read at a single sitting, *The Legion* moves right along and draws you in. Ulti- 

26. See *The Legion*, supra note 1, at xiii.
21. *Id.* at 342.
28. *Id.*
30. See generally *The Legion*, supra note 1, at 9.
31. See *Id.* at 621.
32. See *Gates of Hell*, supra note 20, at 39.
33. See generally *The Legion*, supra note 1, at 633, 10.
mately, it is Porch’s storytelling ability, combined with his meticulous attention to historical detail, which carries the day. Through *The Legion*, you can vicariously experience life in the French Foreign Legion. You can pull back the curtain on its shrouded mysteries, experience the legionnaire camaraderie, feel the desperation, hope, and hopelessness all in one. In the end, you join the legionnaires in their quest for belonging and spiritual renewal.
A historian who relies primarily on the words of his subjects to present the historical fact, without embellishing or spinning their words, may ultimately render the role of historian irrelevant. Thankfully, historian T.J. Stiles has embraced such peril in presenting a study of the American Civil War through the words of the men who commanded the forces that fought those epic battles. His masterful presentation enhances historical understanding and does not detract from his role as historian.

*In Their Own Words, Civil War Commanders*, is a collection of first-person accounts of many of the most significant battles fought during the Civil War. Written by the Union and Confederate commanders who commanded nearly three million men, these accounts provide an unembellished, though not necessarily unbiased, record of the events which defined this most critical juncture in American history. Stiles’ role in presenting this fine collection is more akin to the hunter and gatherer—who searches out and captures that which is available—rather than to the cook, who is chiefly concerned with preparing something palatable from the ingredients provided. With the few exceptions addressed later in this review, Stiles is content to allow the words of the participants to speak for themselves, ungarnished by comment or critique. This is not to say Stiles is a passive bystander. Indeed, the structural framework he provides and the deft economy of his gap bridging from one battle to the next are integral to the work’s success.

Stiles states the goal of this book in the opening sentence of its preface when he says it “aims to bring the drama of first-person accounts of American Civil War Commanders to life.”

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2. Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Army. Written while assigned as a Student, 45th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
3. In his introduction to the book, Professor Gary W. Gallagher notes that between 1861 and 1865, more than 2,100,000 men served in the Union armies and approximately 800,000 served in the Confederate armies.
ican history into the hands of today’s readers.” He continues by noting that “[t]he words of the actual historical actors, as they share their thoughts and observations, make historical events personal, immediate, and real.”

Stiles both achieves his goal and is on the mark with his assessment of the virtue of the first hand account. The judge advocate knows well that Stiles’ preference for a first-hand account is recognition of the value of direct evidence of a historical fact vis a vis reliance on hearsay. Judgments made, be they in a courtroom or classroom, are undeniably more reliable when based on direct evidence from the participants involved in the action, rather than from one who learned later of the events. Of course, this assertion presupposes that the credibility of the direct evidence participant can be verified. As will be discussed, Stiles alerts the reader to the portions of various accounts that should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism and which thus may not be entitled to the supposition of accuracy and reliability.

The author provides a structure for this work that greatly enhances critical analysis of Civil War battles. He uses a chronological progression

4. The Union commanders were:
   George B. McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac (1862);
   U.S. Grant, Commander of the Army of Tennessee and later Commander-in-Chief of the Union Armies;
   William T. Sherman, Commander of a Brigade at First Bull Run and later Commander-in-Chief in the West;
   Philip H. Sheridan, Commander of an Infantry Division and later Commander-in-Chief of the Cavalry of the Army of the Potomac;
   David D. Porter, Second-in-Command to Farragut at New Orleans;
   David G. Farragut, Commander of the Gulf blockade Squadron, and S. Dana Greene, Executive Officer on the U.S.S. Monitor.

The Confederate Commanders were:
   P.G.T. Beauregard, Commander of the Confederate Army at Manassas;
   Joseph E. Johnston, Commander-in-Chief in Northern Virginia, later Commander-in-Chief in the West during the Vicksburg Campaign, and Commander of the Army of Tennessee during the Atlanta Campaign;
   James Longstreet, Commander of a Division and later a Corps under Robert E. Lee in the Army of Northern Virginia;
   John B. Hod, Commander of the Army of Tennessee after Johnston;
   John S. Mosby, Commander of the Partisan Rangers in Virginia;
   John McCorkle, scout for William C. Quantrill and later squad leader under guerrilla George Todd in Missouri, and
   John McIntosh Kell, Executive Officer under Captain Raphael Semmes on the C.S.S. Alabama.

5. STILES, supra note 1, at xi,

6. Id.
of significant battles as his framework. Starting with The First Battle of Bull Run in 1861, the reader learns of a tremendous Confederate victory in tactical detail that only the Confederate commander General P.G.T. Beauregard could possibly relate. The war’s first real measure of soldiership and generalship is crystallized through the intimate knowledge that only Beauregard possesses. Similarly, an “After-Battle Report” written in the sobering days following the battle serves as the basis for observations by a Union brigade commander at Bull Run named William Tecumseh Sherman. General Sherman poignantly conveys a Union commander’s perspective upon his first encounter with “cannonballs striking men and ... a field strewn with dead men and horses ....”7 The juxtaposition of Beauregard’s and Sherman’s impressions of the first major battle of the war, without a single word of explication or critique from Stiles, establishes the structure for the remainder of the book. Stiles is content to set the stage for the battle—in three short pages he covers three months of social, political, and military events that take the reader from the ramparts of Fort Sumter to the rolling fields of Manassas—yet he leaves the detailed explanation of the battle to the men who commanded.

Although Stiles attempts evenhandedness in his selection of appropriate Confederate and Union commanders to tell the story of a given battle, he does not always succeed. Thus, while the reader enjoys the benefit of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s and Union General George B. McClellan’s views of the Peninsula Campaign in 1862, or the views of Confederate General John B. Hood and Union General William T. Sherman on the Atlanta Campaign of 1864, the reader will be disappointed at hearing only McClellan’s account of Antietam, or U.S. Grant’s account of Shiloh. Certainly, the biggest disappointment in this regard is Stiles’ decision to provide only Confederate General James Longstreet’s perspective on the quintessential battle of the war—Gettysburg. Although he provides twenty-seven detailed and fascinating pages of Longstreet’s perspective, Stiles nevertheless leaves the reader thirsting for the Union viewpoint. The words of Union Generals Meade, Sickles, Hancock or Sykes would contribute greatly to the symmetry of the Gettysburg perspective.

The omission of a Union perspective at Gettysburg, or a Confederate perspective at Antietam, Shiloh, The Wilderness, or Spotsylvania is symptomatic of the book’s major flaw. In fairness to Stiles, however, it is a weakness not entirely of his own making, nor is it one of which he is unaware from the start. Stiles acknowledges in his preface that “[t]o keep

7. Id. at 20.
the book from running on to thousands of pages, I have had to limit the number and scope of these selections . . . .”8 The reader must ask whether Stiles was too solicitous of his publisher’s guidance on length. The investment of a dozen more pages might provide the reader with insight into the thought processes and perspectives of the Union leadership as Pickett was preparing his charge on that fateful third day of the Gettysburg conflict.

Whereas he may be chided for excessive thoroughness in some instances, Stiles is not to blame for the most significant omission in the entire book. Who better could provide the Confederate perspective at Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, The Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Petersburg, and finally Appomattox than the legendary commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee? Why are his words not represented in this work? The answer is disappointingly simple: one can neither hunt nor gather that which does not exist. Stiles publishes nothing from Robert E. Lee because Robert E. Lee published nothing regarding his command during the war.9 Stiles should not be criticized for choosing not to answer McClellan’s Antietam with a perspective less informed than that of the Confederate commander at the battle, General Lee. The same can be said of his decision to forego a Confederate viewpoint at other battles which the great Confederate General could have, but chose not to, comment upon.

The occasional imbalance in command perspective has minimal impact on the overall analytical structure of the book. Believing that any first hand account is better than none, Stiles gives the reader ample opportunity to examine the war from the viewpoint of the commanders. The shoes which the reader is invited to wear are not only the warn and muddy boots of the Army commander; Stiles also invites analysis from the soggy shoes of the Navy commander. Therein lies one of the great treasures of this book. In a war renowned for the ferocity of its land battles, battles which forever immortalized the men who commanded the armies of both North and South, the exploits of the Union and Confederate naval forces often receive scant attention. Beyond the vague notion that the Civil War saw the first battle between ironclads, precious little about naval warfare is included in mainstream study of the war. Stiles is able to give the great

8. *Id.* at xi.
9. In his introduction, Professor Gallagher notes that Robert E. Lee is the most significant, though not the only, Civil War commander who wrote nothing of his experience after the war. Confederate commander of the Army of Tennessee, General Braxton Bragg, and Union General George Henry Thomas also eschewed a written account of their time as Civil War commanders.
naval commanders their due in a fashion wholly consistent with his analytical structure.

Stiles does indeed present the first clash of ironclads in the waters of Hampton Roads off the coast of Virginia in March of 1862. S. Dana Greene, executive officer on the U.S.S. Monitor, gives a firsthand account of the historic battle between his ship and the C.S.S. Merrimack. More important as a precursor to an epochal change from wooden ship to metal ship than as a decisive naval battle, the duel between the Monitor and Merrimack is nonetheless remarkable when seen from the shoes of a naval officer who is an actual participant in this signal event. The marvel of Stiles’ effort is that he demonstrates, through artful bridging of events, the significance of this battle in the overall Union strategy of gaining superiority in the waters off the Confederacy for the dual purpose of strangling rebel commerce and maintaining freedom of movement for Union soldiers and supplies. At still other chronologically appropriate places in this book, Stiles employs the writing of Union Admiral David S. Porter to describe the opening of the lower Mississippi and the Battle of New Orleans. Naval forces are given their due in the West for the part they played in the capture of Vicksburg. So too is the perspective of the Confederate naval commander presented in John McIntosh Kell’s account of the cruise of the C.S.S. Alabama, a ship that wreaked havoc upon the Union merchant fleet in the oceans of the world. Stiles’ final offering in the naval realm is an account from Union Admiral David G. Farragut, of “Damn the Torpedoes” fame, who recounts the Battle of Mobile Bay.

Rounding out Stiles’ presentation is an interesting and relevant detour into the world of the Confederate guerrilla. Through the account of Colonel John Mosby, Stiles gives the reader insight into the motivation of Confederate irregular forces and their impact on Union operations in Northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley. The reader is left with a real appreciation for the dash and daring of Colonel Mosby who recounts his foray behind Union lines to capture the sleeping Union General Stoughton. Mosby’s impertinence characterizes the prevailing mood of the Confederate Army during the first eighteen months of the war. It also highlighted the impotence of the Union Army during this same time frame. A second look at Confederate guerrillas is provided through the words of a Missouri Bushwacker named John McCorkle. Stiles’ inclusion of McCorkle’s accounts of the Lawrence Kansas and Centralia Missouri massacres reminds the reader that by late summer 1863, the tide had turned against the Confederacy everywhere. As part of William C. Quantrill’s Raiders, McCorkle was subordinate to a man Stiles’ characterizes as “a dark coun-
terpart to Mosby of Virginia.” Quantrill had an “evil genius [for] this sort of warfare” and he and his men took no prisoners. McCorkle’s account of the wholesale slaughter of Union soldiers ratifies this assessment. The almost sophomoric hijinx of Mosby kidnapping a General in his bed-clothes, when contrasted with the deadly serious business of Quantrill’s massacres, marks the limits of Confederate endeavor in the realm of guerrilla forces.

Throughout this book, Stiles remains steadfast in his approach of letting the commanders tell the story of the great Civil War battles while he remains content to provide context or gap fill as necessary to preserve the chronology. However, in his preface, Stiles does make the reader aware that a critical eye is required when measuring the commanders’ accounts of their actions. Self-interest is the enemy of rectitude and Stiles allows Professor Gallagher the task of setting the historical record straight. Gallagher does so three times in his introduction by commenting upon: (1) McClellan’s excuses as to why he did not exploit initial success at Antietam with a robust reserve standing at the ready; (2) General Philip Sheridan’s gross understating of his numerical advantage against Early’s Confederate force during the Valley Campaign of 1864; and (3) General Longstreet’s failure to assume responsibility for his tardiness in bringing his force into the fray on the second day at Gettysburg. Thus, the reader has ample warning as to the potential shortcomings of several commander accounts.

Stiles’ success is complete when measured against his stated goal found in the book’s preface. In Their Own Words, Civil War Commanders does provide the reader a fascinating appraisal of Civil War battles from the perspective of the men who commanded the blue and the gray. Reading these first-person accounts does make “personal, immediate, and real” the battles upon whose outcome hung the fate of our nation. The words of the various commanders, not the words of Stiles or Gallagher, tell the story of sacrifice, gallantry, fear, and respect. The outdated diction and the stilted language used by the commanders of the time reinforces for the reader the pleasure of knowing that he is learning about this epic struggle from the actual participants. Stiles, however, is not rendered irrelevant by his choice. Instead, Stiles provides valuable context and gap filling that wonderfully complements the words of Civil War veterans. He also serves the critical function of skeptic. Stiles knows that a soldier interested in

10. Stiles, supra note 1, at 184.
11. Id.
self-preservation may distort the truth. Thus, Stiles does not allow a commander to quibble without alerting the reader that self-interest may be skewing a particular account.

T.J. Stiles has compiled a tremendous collection of first-hand accounts of the great battles of the Civil War. Though not all inclusive, this collection is a valuable contribution to the study of our nation’s defining moment. The serious historian and the casual reader can both benefit from this book. For the historian, this book serves as a point of departure for more in-depth study of any of the fourteen commanders and the battles they fought. For the casual reader, this book’s value lies in it being very enjoyable. Wherever the judge advocate lies on the spectrum between historian and casual reader, this book is a “can’t miss” and one that should find its way onto a shelf in the living room bookcase.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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