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Articles

Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Why the New UCMJ’s Rape Law Missed the Mark, and How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put It Back on Target
Major Jennifer S. Knies

How Far Is Too Far? Helping the Commander to Keep Control Without Going over the Line; the Trial Practitioner’s Guide to Conditions on Liberty and Article 13 Credit
Major John M. McCabe

Note from the Field

Organization Days Versus “Organization Daze”: Official and Unofficial Unit Activities in USAREUR
Military and Civil Law Division
U.S. Army Europe

Book Reviews

CLE News

Current Materials of Interest
Articles

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U.S. Army Europe

Book Reviews

State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration
Reviewed by Major Danyele M. Jordan

Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different?
Reviewed by Major Kyle D. Murray

CLE News

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Individual Paid Subscriptions to The Army Lawyer
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Major Jennifer S. Knies

[T]he force used may vary depending on the relationship and familiarity, if any, between perpetrator and victim, but the essence of the offense remains the same -- sexual intercourse against the will of the victim.¹

I. Introduction

The 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)² answered the call for a much needed revision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)³ rape law. The media, military appellate courts, numerous study groups, and Congress itself voiced the need for reform of the military’s rape law, which had remained virtually unchanged since the inception of the UCMJ.⁴ The new statute, in many ways, takes a step forward in the military’s struggle against sexual assault, but at the very heart of the statute, Congress missed the mark. The new law approaches rape and sexual assault as a crime of violence, placing a requirement for force at the center of the offense. This article will demonstrate that the core of the crime of sexual assault is not violence, but the violation of “sexual autonomy.”⁵ In order to provide a clear standard, prevent miscommunication, and “assist in maintaining good order and discipline,”⁶ the military sexual assault statute should require affirmative consent from both parties before sexual penetration.

An examination of the legislative intent shows that the authors crafted the new statute in the belief that, “[r]ape is an act of violence, anger, and power, distinguished by its coercive and sometimes brutal nature. The essence of rape is the force or coercion used by the defendant, not the lack of consent of the victim.”⁷ This article will argue that the opposite is true. Violation of the sexual autonomy of the victim is the heart of the crime. Rape and sexual assault are criminal because the unwelcome penetration intrudes upon the sexual autonomy, trespasses against the “bodily integrity,”⁸ and violates the privacy rights of the victim. A statutory definition of sexual assault that does not center upon lack of freely given and affirmatively expressed consent misses the fundamental nature of the crime.

³ The Uniform Code of Military Justice is the military’s legal code.
⁵ STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998). Schulhofer’s book is considered by many to be one of the most important works on rape law. The terms “sexual autonomy” and “bodily integrity” are taken from Schulhofer and used throughout this article.
⁶ MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pts. I, ¶ 3 (2005) [hereinafter MCM] (“The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.”).
⁸ SCHULHOFER, supra note 5 (Schulhofer uses the term “bodily integrity” throughout his book.).
Military law should be based upon the understanding of rape and sexual assault as a violation of sexual autonomy and bodily integrity. The current legal approach to rape and sexual assault is unique among contemporary jurisprudence. Nowhere else in the law is the victim shouldered with the burden of proving they did not consent. In rape law is the victim expected to resist an attacker before the act becomes a crime. Lastly, rape is the only crime in which the victim’s silence is construed as consent. The stark contrast of rape law to other laws is not arbitrary. There are both historical and practical reasons for the special treatment of the crime of rape.

Anthropologists and sociologists have conducted extensive research into the cultural history of rape and rape laws. Feminist jurisprudence on the crime of rape is vast and compelling. Although this article will provide brief summaries of some of this research for background purposes, the article’s focus is on what is in the best interest of the U.S. Armed Forces and those who serve, rather than the sociological or feminist perspective. Indeed, the primary goal of the statute proposed by this article is to protect potential victims and potential offenders equally, and deter allegations and the occurrence of sexual assault in the military.

Aside from the historical reasons for the treatment of rape under current law, there are also legitimate practical explanations. Sexual interaction is, by its nature, a private and complex issue. Proof issues and fear of wrongful conviction have played a large role in forming the legal framework for the crimes of rape and sexual assault. Over time, case law has evolved to modernize the UCMJ rape statute, partially correcting inequities generated by these historical and practical obstacles. Military appellate courts have clarified the limits of the resistance requirement, developed the doctrine of constructive force, and attempted to clearly define “consent” and “force.” Lately, however, the courts have signaled that they have reached the extent of reform available to them, and have called for reform of the statute itself. The media and several study groups have also appealed to Congress for change.

10 See, e.g., United States v. Bonano-Torres, 31 M.J. 175, 178 (C.M.A. 1990) (“proof of resistance—or lack thereof—is highly significant in all rape cases where the victim has the capacity to resist.”).
11 In some circumstances, such as when an attacker is brandishing a weapon, silence is not viewed as consent. However, outside any extenuating circumstances, the default assumption is that silence equals consent. “If a victim in possession of his or her mental faculties fails to make lack of consent reasonably manifest by taking such measures of resistance as are called for by the circumstances, the inference may be drawn that the victim did consent.” MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, ¶ 45 c(1)(b).

Feminist jurisprudence is a philosophy of law based on the political, economic, and social equality of sexes. As a field of legal scholarship, feminist jurisprudence began in 1960s. It now holds a significant place in U.S. law and legal thought and influences many debates on sexual and domestic violence, inequality in the workplace, and gender based discrimination. Through various approaches, feminists have identified gendered components and gendered implications of seemingly neutral laws and practices. Laws affecting employment, divorce, reproductive rights, rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment have all benefited from the analysis and insight of feminist jurisprudence.

Id.
14 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 12; MACKINNON, supra note 12.
15 British Chief Justice Lord Hale is often quoted for his role in setting the tone of the law’s approach to rape claims. Rape “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.” SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 18 (citing United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
17 See United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (2005); United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 675 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993); infra Part II.G.2 (discussing these cases and the courts’ opinions that reform of the UCMJ rape statute is needed).
With the new statute,\textsuperscript{19} Congress attempted to answer the criticism of the current rape statute. However, the statute does not adequately address many of the significant issues facing the Armed Forces in their attempt to eliminate sexual assault in the military.\textsuperscript{20} A consent-based statute would better address these issues and concerns, but in the unique culture of the military services, a statute requiring affirmative consent would affect the greatest positive change and best serve the men and women of the armed forces.

This article proposes a military sexual assault statute that requires verbal affirmative consent before the act of sexual penetration, and argues that an affirmative consent standard will provide a clear standard, prevent miscommunication, and assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces. The complete statute proposed by this article is located in Appendix A. The background section will identify and discuss the prevalence of sexual assault and the ways in which it impacts the armed forces and degrades military readiness. Next, the article describes the growing trend among academia, legislatures, and courts toward viewing and defining rape in terms of sexual autonomy rather than force. Sections II.B and II.C describe the concept of affirmative consent and lay the foundation for the affirmative consent statute proposed by the author. Sections II.D and II.E provide an overview of the development of contemporary rape law in both the civilian sector and in the military. In doing so, they will highlight the historical tension between the true essence of rape as a violation of sexual autonomy, and the convenience of defining rape in terms of force. Sections II.F and II.G discuss the current military rape statute, as well as the criticism of the statute and other events that led Congress to reform the current military rape law. Section III of the article will review the new statute and its positive aspects, and then focus on where the new statute falls short. Specifically, this section discusses the significant drawbacks of defining sexual assault in terms of force, rather than sexual autonomy. Section IV explains the affirmative consent statute proposed by this article and compares it to the UCMJ offenses of assault, unlawful entry, and larceny. Section IV.B of the article then outlines the need for affirmative consent in the military and discusses the benefits of the proposed statute. Finally, Section IV.B addresses common criticisms of an affirmative consent statute. This section explains how the issues identified in the criticism are actually improved by the proposed statute as applied to the armed forces. The article concludes with the argument that the proposed affirmative consent statute will strengthen military readiness by producing a culture of respect for sexual autonomy.

II. Background

The new statutory scheme for criminal sexual misconduct in the 2006 NDAA represents the military’s first significant change of rape and sexual misconduct statutes in the history of the UCMJ.\textsuperscript{21} With the increasing numbers of women serving in the armed forces,\textsuperscript{22} and the recognition that males are also victims of these crimes,\textsuperscript{23} the issue of sexual assault has become increasingly important. In addition, several scandals involving sexual assault in the military have sharpened attention to the issue.\textsuperscript{24} These factors resulted in calls from many sectors for the military’s rape statute to be modernized to more adequately address the sex-related crimes most commonly encountered in the military today.\textsuperscript{25}

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\textsuperscript{20} See infra Part III.C.

\textsuperscript{21} See Sims, supra note 4; Johnson, supra note 4.


\textsuperscript{23} In 1970, women made up only 1.4 percent of active-duty personnel. With the establishment of the all-volunteer force in 1973, however, the military services began actively recruiting women to meet their overall numerical goals. The percentage of women has grown steadily since, reaching 11.8 percent of the active force in 1994 and 13.6 percent today [1997].

\textsuperscript{24} For the years 2002 and 2003, males constituted nine percent of the victims of sexual assault in the military services. \textit{CARE FOR VICTIMS}, supra note 18, at 20.


\textsuperscript{26} \textit{See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31; CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 57; United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (2005); United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 675 (C.C.M.R. 1993).}
A. Sexual Assault’s Impact on the Military

The Department of Defense (DOD) has embraced the fact that sexual assault in the military adversely impacts unit cohesion and negatively affects mission accomplishment. In April 2004, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld clearly demonstrated how significant he considered the impact of sexual assault on military readiness to be when he took the “unusual step of writing directly to [the combatant commanders] on the subject of sexual assault.” In his memo, Secretary Rumsfeld called sexual assault unacceptable behavior that threatens military readiness and must not be tolerated. He described it as an affront to the decency owed each human being.

The threat to military readiness that Secretary Rumsfeld references is significant. An allegation of sexual assault in a unit and the ensuing investigation and trial often cause the deterioration of unit morale and cohesion. The Army’s command policy regulation says that sexual assault “degrades mission readiness by devastating the Army’s ability to work effectively as a team.” In most cases, the mission of the unit is affected to some degree. The accused Soldier is usually not allowed to change duty stations, may not be able to deploy with the unit, and may spend large amounts of the duty day meeting with attorneys and investigators. The victim must also meet with investigators and attorneys while trying to cope with the trauma and stress of the assault. Witness lists may include dozens of unit members, each of whom must spend time in interviews and, possibly, in court. The commanders of the accused and victim must dedicate valuable time and resources to supporting their affected unit members.

Sexual assault’s impact often sweeps like a shock wave through the unit—consuming time and effort of the leadership and those involved, causing distrust and suspicion, and thereby destroying a formerly cohesive and effective team.

26 See, e.g., Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, to Combatant Commanders, subject: Confronting Sexual Assault (30 Apr. 2004) [hereinafter Combatant Commanders Memo] (on file with author); Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff et al., subject: Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (3 May 2005), available at http://www.sapr.mil/contents/references/OSD%2008248-05.pdf [hereinafter JCS Memo] (Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld characterized sexual assault as an affront to the institutional values of the armed forces, and said it harms individuals, undermines military readiness, and weakens communities.); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 8-2 (7 June 2006) [hereinafter AR 600-20-20).

27 Combatant Commanders Memo, supra note 26.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 See, e.g., AR 600-20, supra note 26, para. 8-2.

32 Id.

33 See SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ, supra note 7, at 2 (“Rape and sexual abuse have a devastating impact on victims. These offenses also negatively affect morale, good order and discipline and the unit cohesion and combat effectiveness of military personnel and units.”).

34 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-2, SUSPENSION OF FAVORABLE PERSONNEL ACTIONS (FLAGS) para. 1-12(a) (23 Dec. 2004) [hereinafter AR 600-8-2]. (A soldier under investigation or charged with a crime must be “flagged”, meaning no favorable personnel actions may be taken on the soldier. This includes prohibitions against: change of duty station or reassignment, promotion, awards, attendance at civil or military schooling, etc.).

35 Id.

36 “Pentagon health care experts identified military sexual trauma as a major deployment and readiness issue that must be dealt with. Rape victims often experience post-traumatic stress symptoms such as anxiety, depression, and intrusive thoughts, and are more likely to develop post-traumatic stress in other situations, according to military research.” SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ, supra note 7, at 117 (citing Sergeant First Class Kathleen T. Rhem, Services Move to Lower Instances of Rape in the Ranks, USA American Forces Press Service, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2001/n0405200120010405 4.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2004)); see also CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 67 (“research has suggested that 94% of all rape victims reporting a recent rape to authorities will meet criteria for PTSD two weeks after the rape”) (citing B.O. Rothbaum et al., A Prospective Evaluation of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Victims, 5 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 455 (1992)).

37 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAM PROCEDURES (23 June 2006) [hereinafter DODI 6495.02] (This instruction contains commander’s checklists for the numerous tasks the commander of a victim or accused service member must complete following an allegation of sexual assault. Many of the tasks are to be done immediately, taking priority over any other duties. The commander of a victim may need to issue a temporary restraining order, or reassign the victim (or accused) to a different unit. The victim’s commander often must attend the monthly case management meetings and meet with other agencies to ensure the victim is getting the care they require. The accused member’s commander must perform many of the same tasks for the alleged offender. The commander must try to keep rumors and reprisal from taking place in the unit, and remind all members that the accused is innocent until proven guilty. An allegation of sexual assault in a unit may necessitate extra refresher training, climate surveys, and other steps to try to minimize the impact on morale in the unit.).
Unfortunately, many commanders will face the challenge of dealing with a sexual assault allegation within their command, as sexual assault is not a rare occurrence in the armed forces. Studies indicate that men and women in the armed forces are victims of sexual assault at the same rate as, if not greater than, society at large. Section 577 of the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 required the military services to provide an annual summary to Congress with the number of sexual assaults reported in each of the services. In calendar year 2006, there were 2947 reported sexual assaults involving a military service member as either the victim or perpetrator. Between March 2002 and October 2003, the Veterans Administration (VA) screened almost three million veterans. Of those screened, 20.7% of females and 1.2% of males had a history of military “sexual trauma.”

Certain service members are at greater risk for sexual victimization. A Navy study surveyed recruits during basic training and followed them for two years. Of that group, 7.5% of females reported experiencing behavior that constituted rape within six months of entering the Navy. Of the males surveyed, 2.6% admitted to committing behaviors that constituted rape during their first six months in the Navy.

Many recruits entering the military services are already victims of sexual assault when they arrive for duty. Research shows that these previously-victimized service members are far more likely to be victimized again. Female Navy recruits who experienced childhood sexual abuse were five times more likely to experience adult rape prior to entering the military. Male recruits who had been victims of childhood physical and sexual abuse were four to six times more likely to report having committed rape prior to entering the military. The trend continues once the victims enter military service. Female veterans “who joined the military before the age of 20, who were of enlisted rank (regardless of age), or who experienced childhood physical or sexual violence” were at least twice as likely as other female service members to be raped during their military service.

In addition to the risk factors many young service members bring with them, the environment they encounter when they join the military often adds to their vulnerability. One study of active duty women found that “low sociocultural power (i.e. age, education, race/ethnicity, marital status) and low organizational power (i.e. pay grade and years of active duty service) were associated with an increased likelihood of . . . sexual assault.” Among female veterans surveyed, the likelihood of rape during military service also increased for those who “observed heterosexual activities of others in military sleeping quarters (three-fold increase for Vietnam era; four-fold increase for post Gulf War era).”

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28 Care for Victims, supra note 18, at 56-59 (The Task Force specifically rejected the feasibility of direct comparisons between sexual assault rates between military and civilian populations. They did, however, report the results of various reports and surveys, including FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) rates of sexual assault and the military services’ own reported statistics, which are derived from reports to law enforcement. These reports are relatively comparable because they are both collected by law enforcement agencies and define sexual assault similarly. The UCR rates for 2002 were thirty-three percent per 100,000 population, and the services reported rate in 2002 was 69.1 per 100,000 population. Again, these two statistics cannot be compared side by side, but they indicate a rough estimate of occurrence in each community).


40 Department of Defense Annual Report on Military Services Sexual Assault for CY 2006 2 (15 Mar. 2007) [hereinafter 2006 Annual Report] (These are only the sexual assaults that were reported to law enforcement. “Sexual assault is one of the most underreported crimes, with more than half still being left unreported.” Shanan M. Catalano, Criminal Victimization, 2005, National Crime Victimization Survey, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 2006). Of the reported assaults on military victims in 2002 and 2003, nine percent were male; Care for Victims, supra note 18, at 20).

41 Care for Victims, supra note 18, at 58 (citing unpublished VA data).

42 The VA classified any sexual harassment or sexual assault that occurred during military service as “sexual trauma.” Id.

43 Id. (stating that eighty percent of the perpetrators were active duty males).

44 Id.

45 Id. at 61 (citing L.L. Merrill, et al., Childhood Abuse and Sexual Revictimization in a Female Navy Recruit Sample, 12 J. Traumatic Stress 211 (1999)).

46 Id.

47 Id. (quoting A.G. Sadler et al., Factors Associated with Women’s Risk of Rape in the Military Environment, 43 Am. J. Indus. Med. 262 (2003)).

48 Id. at 62 (citing Sadler et al., supra note 48).

49 Id. at 61-62 (citing M.S. Harned, et al., Sexual Assault and Other Types of Sexual Harassment by Workplace Personnel: A Comparison of Antecedents and Consequences, 2 J. Occupational Psychol. 174 (2002)).

50 Id. at 62 (citing Sadler et al., supra note 48).
Sexual assault in the military has an injurious effect on the individuals involved in the assault, a demoralizing and destructive influence on the military community in which the assault occurs, and a direct negative impact on military readiness. The DOD’s stated policy is to “prevent and eliminate sexual assault within the Department by providing comprehensive procedures to better establish a culture of prevention, response, and accountability that enhances the safety and well-being of all DoD members.” The DOD recognizes that this is an issue that demands a direct and progressive approach.

The main focus of the DOD’s efforts to this point has been in the areas of training and response. Progress has been made in both areas, but none of the improvements are likely to have a real preventative effect on the occurrence of sexual assault. Because the new UCMJ statute remains focused on the use of force and fails to provide a clear standard, it is also unlikely to prevent the crime from occurring. A law that demands absolute respect for sexual autonomy and provides a clear and simple standard to which service members must adhere would be the strongest, most effective weapon in the military’s war against sexual assault.

B. Sexual Autonomy

The first and most important step is to recognize that sex should never be considered permissible unless there is genuine, freely given consent on both sides.

The DOD is not alone in its determination to conquer sexual assault. Civilian communities and courts struggle alongside the military in attempting to prevent and deal with sexual assaults. An important step taken by many jurisdictions in this struggle has been the attempt to accurately define the nature of rape, and re-draft statutes to reflect the essence of the crime. Recently, there is a growing consensus among academia and the courts that the traditional force-based statutes should be reformed into statutes centered upon consent and the notion of protecting sexual autonomy.

The theory of rape as a violation of sexual autonomy and bodily integrity has existed, to some extent, throughout history. The original English common law defined rape as a crime centered on consent. The drafters of the Model Penal Code acknowledged that the “central mission of rape law was to protect ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘meaningful consent.’” Over time, however, rape laws have evolved into statutes centered primarily on the force used to commit the rape, rather than the actual violation of the victim’s sexual autonomy. An increasing number of academics, courts, and legislatures are now identifying the focus on force as a central flaw in rape law, and advocating reform based on the definition of rape as sex without consent.

In his book, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law, Stephen Schulhofer provides what many consider to be the most persuasive and insightful discussion of this concept. Schulhofer argues, “Of all our rights and

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52 JCS Memo, supra note 26 (then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld characterized sexual assault as an affront to the institutional values of the armed forces, and said it harms individuals, undermines military readiness, and weakens communities).
53 DODI 6495.02, supra note 37, para. 4.
54 See 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 6-9 (describing increased training and response programs).
55 Although better and more frequent training will have some preventative effect, the most significant improvements resulting from the new programs are likely to be a better atmosphere for encouraging victims to report, and better response to those reports.
57 See infra Part II.B.
58 See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 322 (2000); SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 282.
61 Bryden, supra note 58, at 322 (“Virtually all modern scholars want to modify or abolish the force requirement as an element of rape.”).
62 SCHULHOFER, supra note 5.
63 Id. at 323 (“All rape-law scholars are indebted to the authors of two important books . . . Stephen Schulhofer’s recent Unwanted Sex . . . is a landmark in the history of rape-law scholarship.”).
liberties, few are as important as our right to choose freely whether and when we will become sexually intimate with another person. Yet, as far as the law is concerned, this right—the right to sexual autonomy—doesn’t exist.”

Schulhofer points to the comprehensive protection the criminal law provides for our property, privacy, right to vote, labor, and confidential information. The law “ensures that we retain these rights until we choose to give them to someone else; we can’t simply lose them by default. And the law doesn’t say . . . that people facing interference with these rights should just ‘take responsibility’—that they should scream, fight back physically, or ‘stop whining.’” In comparison, the protection provided to the important right of sexual autonomy is quite limited. As Schulhofer points out, although the law seeks to protect women from significant violence, it seems unconcerned with protecting the right to make a truly free choice about whether to participate in sexual activity.

Schulhofer recommends a law that protects sexual autonomy “directly and for its own sake, not with hesitation or apology, nor with irritation at victims who aren’t able to help themselves.” Others echo this opinion. In fact, Professor David Bryden, in Redefining Rape, boldly asserts, “Virtually all modern rape scholars want to modify or abolish the force requirement as an element of rape.” Although there seems to be consensus on that point, the implementation of the concept is less unanimous. Schulhofer would retain the crime of rape by force, but add an offense for sexual penetration without the freely-given consent of the other person. Other suggestions include changes in the mens rea for rape, either to make rape a strict liability crime or a crime of negligence. This trend toward consent-based statutes is more than an academic discussion. Many state legislatures have enacted sexual assault laws that, to differing degrees, move away from the element of force, and focus more on consent. As with the scholars, however, the legislative approaches are varied.

State rape and sexual assault statutes vary widely in their approach to what constitutes criminal behavior. At least twenty states have specific offenses for sexual penetration without consent that do not list force as an element. Mississippi’s offense of sexual battery reads, “A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with . . . [a]nother person without his or her consent.” The District of Columbia has the offense of misdemeanor sexual abuse for any sexual act (to include penetration) or sexual contact with another person without that person’s permission. These state statutes reflect a growing recognition that violations of sexual autonomy should be criminalized.

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64 SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 282.
65 Id. at 274.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 114.
69 Id. at 282.
70 Bryden, supra note 58, at 322.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 283.
74 See, e.g., John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It’s Time for “No” to Really Mean “No,” 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 3 (1993); Bryden, supra note 58, at 322.
75 ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31, N-14 (“As of 2004, 46 out of the 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia and Federal government, had enacted revised sexual assault and/or rape statutes . . . . Many statutes have crimes that make having intercourse without the consent of the other party a crime . . . .”).
77 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95.
78 D.C. CODE § 22-3006 (“Whoever engages in a sexual act or sexual contact with another person and who should have knowledge or reason to know that the act was committed without that other person’s permission, shall be imprisoned for not more than 180 days and, in addition, may be fined in an amount not to exceed $1000.”).
Unfortunately, some of these statutes then resort to defining consent in terms of force used, thereby defeating the positive step of recognizing sexual autonomy.\textsuperscript{79} Alabama’s criminal code, for example, has a misdemeanor crime of sexual misconduct for engaging in sexual intercourse without consent.\textsuperscript{80} The victim’s consent, however, is defined in terms of lack of consent, resulting from forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent.\textsuperscript{81} Even more disappointing, forcible compulsion is then defined in terms of force that “overcomes earnest resistance” of the victim.\textsuperscript{82} Nonetheless, the absence of force as an element in these offenses demonstrates the growing focus on consent-based rape and sexual assault statutes.

Despite the momentum of this movement, many jurisdictions have chosen to maintain force as an element of rape and sexual assault.\textsuperscript{83} One important reason for this may be the difficulty lawmakers and courts have defining consent.\textsuperscript{84} Even with a working definition of consent, however, lack of consent is hard to prove without invoking requirements for evidence of force or resistance by the victim.\textsuperscript{85} Thus, even once a jurisdiction progresses to a statute that recognizes sexual autonomy, they often still find themselves looking to evidence of force and resistance to prove lack of consent.\textsuperscript{86} A promising, although more controversial, solution gaining support in academic and legal circles is the requirement for affirmative consent before sexual penetration.\textsuperscript{87}

C. Affirmative Consent

A requirement for affirmative consent before sexual penetration has the promise of succeeding where other rape law reforms have failed.\textsuperscript{88} In their article \textit{The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform}, Ilene Seidman and Susan Vickers discuss the success and shortcomings of rape law reform over the past thirty years and make recommendations for future reform.\textsuperscript{89} In addressing the issue of consent, they echo Schulhofer’s call for the elimination of force as a statutory element of rape, noting that after thirty years of rape law reform, “society still expects rape to be a horrifiedly violent crime.”\textsuperscript{90} Seidman and Vickers argue that the most persistent issue in rape law is the distinction between seduction and assault.\textsuperscript{91} Affirmative consent is their remedy for this obstacle. They assert that consent should be verbal and affirmative, eliminating the notions of implied consent or that silence equals consent.\textsuperscript{92}

The law should not assume that women are or must be coy about sex. Women cannot be viewed as consenting merely by their conduct, appearance, reaction, or silence. Women must directly and explicitly express their sexual desire or agreement to have intercourse in a given situation, and men must respond accordingly. Instead of assuming a woman’s sexual ambivalence indicates consent, the law should assume that sexual ambivalence means no.\textsuperscript{93}

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\textsuperscript{79} See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70; ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 761; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318; TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011.

\textsuperscript{80} ALA. CODE § 13A-6-56.

\textsuperscript{81} Id. § 13A-6-70.

\textsuperscript{82} Id. § 13A-6-60.

\textsuperscript{83} See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22.

\textsuperscript{84} See sec. II.F.1 for a discussion of the difficulty military courts have in defining force and consent.

\textsuperscript{85} See Bryden, supra note 58, at 355-60.

\textsuperscript{86} See supra note 76 (listing the states with consent-based statutes that define consent in terms of force or resistance).


\textsuperscript{88} See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, \textit{Sex and Guilt}, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) (“Despite several decades of legislative reform designed to free rape law from these misogynistic antecedents, contemporary courts remain hostage to the traditional definitions, which require rape victims to surmount special legal obstacles that the victims of other crimes are spared.”).

\textsuperscript{89} Seidman & Vickers, supra note 87, at 484.

\textsuperscript{90} Id.

\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 485.

\textsuperscript{92} Id.

\textsuperscript{93} Id.
Seidman and Vickers recommend “making the direct verbal expression of desire or agreement to sex necessary to establish affirmative consent,” and “defining a lack of verbal expression of affirmative desire or agreement to sex as a dispositive lack of consent.” In Redefining Rape, David Bryden conducts a thorough and objective review of the most popular recommendations for redefining rape law. Bryden finds the affirmative consent rule promising in many ways, and cautiously identifies it symbolically and educationally as “an excellent rule.” Bryden points out, “what it requires of a man is simply that he behave with a civilized regard for his companion’s wishes. If she signifies assent . . . he may proceed . . . . If she equivocates, or gives no positive signal, he must wait.”

Bryden believes an affirmative consent rule would have the benefits of alternative rules, without their drawbacks. It serves the purpose of a bright line rule, and avoids the vagueness of other subjective standards. Perhaps most importantly, under affirmative consent “force would be decoupled from consent.” A violation of sexual autonomy could be punished without proving force, and violations involving force could be punished as a separate crime with more severe penalties. This treatment of consent would put rape law on even ground with consent standards in other areas of the law. Requiring affirmative verbal consent may take the standard a step beyond the consent required in other areas, but for the military, it is a necessary and promising step.

Currently, only New Jersey has an affirmative consent standard for sexual penetration. In 1992, the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that “any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration constitutes the offense of sexual assault.” In that case, M.T.S., a seventeen-year-old male, was living, along with his girlfriend, in a house with eight other people, including the fifteen-year-old victim and her mother. M.T.S. and the victim gave conflicting accounts of their relationship. The victim said that M.T.S. had tried to kiss her several times and once attempted to put his hands inside her pants, but she rejected his advances every time. On the night of the assault, the victim said she awoke with M.T.S. on top of her with his penis in her vagina. She slapped him and told him to get out, and he complied. According to M.T.S., he and the victim were good friends. Their relationship had led to kissing and hugging and they had discussed having sexual intercourse. M.T.S. said they were kissing and hugging in her bed and they had sexual intercourse. M.T.S. says after the fourth thrust, she pushed him off and said, “stop, get off,” which he did.

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94 Id.
95 Id.; see also Kasubhai, supra note 87, at 41 (“The sex act is a violation per se without consent.”).
96 Bryden, supra note 58.
97 Id. at 400.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 402.
102 See, e.g., Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992); Kasubhai, supra note 87, at 41 (“In order to properly align the consent doctrine in rape law with consent in other areas of the law, nonconsent must be presumed.”).
104 Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277.
105 Id. at 1267.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1268.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
The trial court concluded that the victim had consented to a session of kissing and petting with M.T.S. The court also found that the victim had not been sleeping, but that she had not consented to the actual penetration. They found M.T.S. guilty of second degree sexual assault. The appellate division reversed, holding that the New Jersey statute required a showing of force.

After an analysis of the legislative intent of the statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the finding of juvenile delinquency. In their opinion, the court held, “[r]easonable people do not engage in acts of penetration without permission, and it is unlawful to do so.” The court was specific about what evidence should be considered relevant in these cases. They said neither the victim’s subjective state of mind nor the reasonableness of the victim’s actions is relevant to the case. The victim may be questioned about what he or she said or did “only to determine if the accused was reasonable in believing that affirmative permission had been freely given.” The court explained that the affirmative consent may be verbal or demonstrated through physical actions.

New Jersey’s affirmative consent law is one of the most progressive sexual assault laws in the United States. The theory of requiring affirmative consent before sexual penetration requires a significant shift in the way the crime of rape, and consent within that crime, is traditionally viewed. Throughout much of the history of common law, consent in rape has been treated differently from other crimes. The rape victim, unlike other crime victims, has been shouldered with the burden of proving his or her non-consent. This difference may seem acceptable and necessary because it has been that way throughout modern history. The different treatment, however, is not needed, and is in fact unreasonably disparate from other laws. The tension between acknowledging the true essence of rape as a violation of sexual autonomy and the reliance upon the convenience of defining rape in terms of force is not new. An examination of the history of rape law shows that the concept that rape law should be consent-based and not focused on the use of force has been an undercurrent throughout modern legal history. Understanding this history helps explain why rape law is where it is today, and why it must continue to evolve.

D. Origins of Contemporary Rape Law

If there is one area of social behavior where sexism is entrenched in law—one realm where traditional male prerogatives are most protected, male power most jealously preserved, and female power most jealously limited—it is in the area of sex itself, even forced sex.

The historical origins of rape law explain, in part, the current form of force-centered laws against rape and sexual assault. The historic approach to rape as a crime against the father’s or husband’s property has shaped the theory of the law, and remnants of that legacy remain. Throughout modern history, however, there have been acknowledgements that the essence

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115 Id. at 1269.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. (The New Jersey statute defines sexual assault as sexual penetration with the use of “physical force or coercion.”) (citing NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1) (2006)).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1279.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1277.
125 See Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270-74; SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 18-29.
126 Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1274.
128 Kasubhai, supra note 87, at 51.
of the crime of rape is sex without consent rather than force. Nonetheless, for both historical and practical reasons, force-centered statutes have prevailed over time and are the law to this day in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions.

The crime of rape has been punished throughout history, but it was traditionally a crime against the legal interests of fathers and husbands. For example, Mosaic law codified the rights of a father over his daughter as property. The rape of a daughter, especially a virgin daughter, was viewed as theft from the father because it lowered her monetary value for marriage. Because Biblical law demanded adulterers be stoned to death, a claim of rape by a married woman was frequently viewed as an excuse to avoid execution for adultery.

Remnants of this view toward the crime of rape linger. Claims of rape in the military are often viewed as excuses to avoid punishment for adultery or other crimes. These suspicions partially account for the special burden historically placed on a rape victim to prove not only that she resisted enough, but that enough force was used to convince her skeptics that she is telling the truth.

Interestingly, English common law originally defined rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman against her will,” with no requirement for force. It appears the early crafters of common law understood that the essence of rape was the lack of consent, rather than the use of force. In the seventeenth century, however, British Chief Justice Mathew Hale infamously pronounced that rape “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.” Courts worried that a woman might falsely accuse a man of rape to avoid embarrassment over having consented to intercourse or to explain a pregnancy. They were also concerned that scorned women would use accusations of rape for revenge or blackmail. By the eighteenth century, Blackstone had defined rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.” During this time, American jurisdictions adopted the requirement for force, apparently to prove that the carnal knowledge was against the victim’s will.

By the early twentieth century, American courts were adamant that a victim resist “to the utmost” to prove her unwillingness. Additional rape-specific rules requiring independent corroborating evidence, prompt complaint, and

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129 English common law originally defined rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman against her will,” with no requirement for force. Wicktom, supra note 59, at 401; Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270. (The American Law Institute reformers who wrote the Model Penal Code specifically identified that the primary goal of rape law is protecting “freedom of choice” and “meaningful consent”). MPC COMMENTARIES, supra note 60, pt. II, cmt. to § 213, at 301; SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 22.

130 At least twenty-eight states and the federal government have force-centered sexual assault statutes. See supra note 76 (listing states with consent-based statutes).

131 See Kasubhai, supra note 87, at 51.

132 Id.

133 Id. at 52 (citing BROWN MILLER, supra note 12).

134 See Deuteronomy 22:22 (“If a man be found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall both of them die, both the man that lay with the woman, and the woman...”); id. 22:23-24 (“If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto a husband, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die; the damsel, because she cried not, being in the city; and the man, because he hath humbled his neighbor’s wife: so thou shalt put away evil from among you.”); Kasubhai, supra note 87, at 51.

135 See ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 34; CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 40-42.

136 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 17-20.


139 Wicktom, supra note 59, at 403; Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1271; SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 18.

140 SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 18; Wicktom, supra note 59, at 403; Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1271.

141 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 (University of Chicago Press, 1979) (1765); SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 18.

142 Wicktom, supra note 59, at 402 (citing ROLLIN PERKINS & RONALD BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 211 (1982)); Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270.

143 Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1271; SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 19.

144 SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 19. See also Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1271.

145 See, e.g., UNITED STATES v. WILEY, 492 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1974); SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 20.
special instructions by the judge were also firmly entrenched in the law. In the 1950s, at the same time the UCMJ was created, a group of respected judges, lawyers, and scholars from the American Law Institute began an in-depth study of American criminal law. When the reformers began their examination of rape, they were shocked by the low rate of conviction. After studying the cases, the group of men identified three contributing flaws in the law: “the resistance requirement, the undue preoccupation with victim consent, and the inclusion of too many diverse kinds of misbehavior within a single felony that carried extremely severe punishments.” This 1950 group of experts identified flaws in the rape law that are strikingly similar to many of the problems the current study groups, task forces, and courts have repeatedly identified. The reformers specifically identified that the primary goal of rape law is protecting “freedom of choice” and “meaningful consent.”

Despite the prescient and progressive view of the American Law Institute reformers, in the end, the Model Penal Code they crafted avoided the issue of consent and fell back onto the convenience of a rape statute defined by force. The group’s work was very influential, and many jurisdictions throughout the United States adopted versions of the Code. Once again, despite the acknowledgement that the essence of rape is the violation of sexual autonomy, statutes centered on force, and thereby the insistence that rape requires force, were further ingrained into American law and public understanding.

Throughout history and the development of contemporary rape law, the requirement for force has served as a useful evidentiary tool. Proof issues and fear of wrongful conviction have played a large role in forming the legal framework for the crimes of rape and sexual assault, and physical violence used in perpetrating a sexual assault provides the fact finder with tangible evidence. Physical injury is usually a clear signal that whatever occurred between the victim and defendant was not consensual. The demand for some physical evidence of resistance on the part of the victim provides a convenient bright line rule. Unfortunately, centering the law on force rather than sexual autonomy suppresses the true nature of the crime, and tends to send the message that anything short of physical brutality is an acceptable method of obtaining sexual activity.

The original crafters of English common law defined rape as it should be: sex without consent—a crime because it violates the bodily integrity of the victim. Over the course of history, for reasons of distrust and suspicion, as well as the legitimate practical need to have a clear standard, the law became about force. The central issue of sexual autonomy was lost in the requirements for proof of adequate resistance and force. Even though influential reformers in the 1950s correctly identified the problems with a force-centered statute and viewed the essence of rape as a violation of bodily integrity and free choice, they ended up solidifying the reliance on force to define the crime. The law continued to move away from the true nature of rape, and rely more heavily on requirements for force.

This analysis suggests that over time, lawmakers and courts decided that the true essence of rape as a violation of bodily integrity and free choice could be sacrificed in the interest of providing a convenient evidentiary tool. Modern courts and legislatures, however, are increasingly rejecting this historical trade-off and searching for ways to draft contemporary rape laws that protect sexual autonomy.

147 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 19.
148 Id. at 20.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31; CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 57; United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (2005); United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 675 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993).
152 MPC COMMENTARIES, supra note 60, at 301; SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 22.
153 MPC COMMENTARIES, supra note 60, at 301 (The choice to focus on force rather than consent relied on the reformer’s inability or unwillingness to define consent; their assumptions that women were often ambivalent about sex, and might say “no” when they meant “yes”; and a belief that focusing on force would keep the factfinder away from the sticky issue of consent.); SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 23.
154 SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 23.
155 See id. at 18.
156 See, e.g., Ex rel. M.T.S. 609 A.2d 1266, 1271 (N.J. 1992) (“Evidence of resistance was viewed as a solution to the credibility problem; it was the ‘outward manifestation of nonconsent, [a] device for determining whether a woman actually gave consent.’” Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680, 689 (1966)).
157 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER supra note 5, at 99-103.
Military rape law has followed a similar path in its development, and like civilian rape law, the UCMJ retains the focus on force rather than sexual autonomy. Also like civilian courts, however, modern military courts have gradually reformed military law with respect to its treatment of force and consent. In some ways, military case law increasingly indicates an acknowledgement of the concept that sex without consent should be punished, whether or not force was an issue.

Like its civilian counterparts, military law also has its origin in British law. The first American military code was the Massachusetts Articles of War, which was an adoption, with slight changes, of the British Articles of War of 1774. The later 1775 Articles of War, rather than listing rape as a specific offense, required a commander to turn over any military members accused of rape, or any other civilian capital crime, to the local civil magistrate for prosecution. This requirement continued until the American Civil War.

The National Forces Act of 1863 gave the military exclusive jurisdiction over service members accused of rape or other violent crimes in time of war. This resulted in commanders having the responsibility for referring military members accused of rape to courts-martial. Because the Act did not define rape, the military adopted the common law definition of rape at that time, which had already incorporated the requirement for force.

The 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice went into effect on 31 May 1951, beginning the modern era of military law. The 1950 UCMJ represented the most significant change in military law in the history of the United States, and established, for the first time, one criminal code that applied to all of the military services in times of both war and peace. Article 120 of the UCMJ retained the common law definition of rape as a male engaging in “an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, by force and without her consent.” The 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) retained many of the “special rules” required specifically for rape cases, including the requirement for corroboration, the fresh complaint requirement, and rules specifically allowing inquiry into a victim’s sexual history. These special evidentiary rules remained in the MCM for the next thirty years.

In 1980 the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE) replaced all of the prior military evidentiary rules. The MRE eliminated the corroboration and fresh complaint rules, and established MRE 412, the rape shield provision.

158 Both the current Article 120, UCMJ and the new Article 120 that will become law on 1 October 2007, define rape based on the force used. In fact, the new statute relies solely on force. See discussion infra Parts II.F, III.A.


161 American Articles of War (1776), reprinted in William Winthrop, Military Law & Precedents 964 (2d ed. 1920 reprint); Johnson, supra note 4, at 23.

162 Winthrop, supra note 161, at 972; Johnson, supra note 4, at 22-30.

163 12 Stat. 736 (1863).

164 Winthrop, supra note 161, at 667; Johnson, supra note 4, at 24.

165 Winthrop, supra note 161, at 677; Johnson, supra note 4, at 22-30.


168 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. XXVII, ¶ 199(a) (1951) (hereinafter 1951 MCM); Johnson, supra note 4, at 27.

169 “A conviction cannot be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of an alleged victim in a trial for a sexual offense . . . if such testimony is self-contradictory, uncertain, or improbable.” Johnson, supra note 4, at 27 (quoting 1951 MCM, supra note 168, pt. XXVII, ¶ 153(a)).

170 “In prosecutions for sexual offenses . . . evidence that the alleged victim of such an offense made complaint thereof within a short time thereafter is admissible.” Id. (quoting 1951 MCM, supra note 168, pt. XXVII, ¶ 142(c)).

171 “For the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the alleged victim, evidence the victim has an unchaste character is admissible.” Id. (quoting 1951 MCM, supra note 168, pt. XXVII, ¶ 153(b)).


173 Id.
NDAA\textsuperscript{174} modified Article 120(a) to make the rape offense gender neutral and remove the spousal exemption, which had precluded men from being charged with rape if the victim was their wife.\textsuperscript{175}

The 1993 changes were the last modifications to Article 120 until the 2006 NDAA reform. The current Article 120(a) reads: “Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”\textsuperscript{176} This definition of rape is virtually identical to the common law definitions used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{177} An understanding of the current military rape statute and the case law that military courts have developed will be helpful in analyzing the new 2006 NDAA statute and the changes proposed by this thesis.

F. Current Rape Statute

Although the statutory definition of rape has not changed dramatically since the inception of the UCMJ,\textsuperscript{178} the military courts have affected significant changes through case law. The courts have worked toward limiting the resistance requirement,\textsuperscript{179} and have developed the doctrine of constructive force to account for cases in which the force used is not physical.\textsuperscript{180} In some ways, it is as if military courts have been waging their own battle to slowly and methodically eliminate the requirement for force, arriving at a consent-based statute.\textsuperscript{181} This evolution is limited, though, by the undeniable presence of the distinct element of “force” in the current statute.\textsuperscript{182}

\begin{quote}
Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.\textsuperscript{183}
\end{quote}

The UCMJ’s simply stated rape statute belies the challenge and complexity of prosecuting the offense.\textsuperscript{184} The MCM lists only two elements: “1) That the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse; and 2) That the act of sexual intercourse was done by force and without consent.”\textsuperscript{185} Of the two elements, the second is responsible for the debate, dispute, and confusion in the majority of cases. The bulk of litigation surrounds the meaning of “force” and “consent,” and how they are related.

The second element actually consists of two separate and distinct elements: force and lack of consent.\textsuperscript{186} The MCM discusses force and lack of consent,\textsuperscript{187} but does not offer a clear definition of either one. In fact, the MCM discusses them together, adding to the challenge of distinguishing one from the other. Because of the complexity of trying to define each


\textsuperscript{175} Johnson, \textit{supra} note 4, at 29-30.

\textsuperscript{176} UCMJ art. 120(a) (2005).

\textsuperscript{177} By the eighteenth century, Blackstone had defined rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.” 4 BLACKSTONE, \textit{supra} note 141, at 210.

\textsuperscript{178} Aside from the 1993 change making the statute gender neutral and eliminating the spousal exemption, the definition of rape has not changed.

\textsuperscript{179} The requirement is still alive in current military rape law. \textit{See} United States v. Bonano-Torres, 31 M.J. 175, 178 (C.M.A. 1990) (“proof of resistance-or lack thereof—is highly significant in all rape cases where the victim has the capacity to resist”).


\textsuperscript{181} See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 683 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993) (Bridgman, J., concurring) (“arguably, ‘constructive force’ is applied where there has been, in fact, no actual force, but the acts are felt to be reprehensible”) (Baum, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (voicing frustration with the loose interpretations of the rape statute, noting that both force and lack of consent are necessary to the crime. [T]he “statutory elements have not been modified. Societal changes and case decisions may have prompted differing views on how these elements are manifested, but they still must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{182} See Simpson, 58 M.J. at 377 (“Force and lack of consent are separate elements.”); United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 245 (2005) (“Although listed within the same element, the discussion and case law make it clear that force and lack of consent are distinct, although related, elements of the offense.”).

\textsuperscript{183} UCMJ art. 120 (2005).


\textsuperscript{185} MCM, \textit{supra} note 6, pt. IV, ¶ 45(b)(1).

\textsuperscript{186} See Simpson, 58 M.J. at 377 (“Force and lack of consent are separate elements.”); Leak, 61 M.J. at 245 (“Although listed within the same element, the discussion and case law make it clear that force and lack of consent are distinct, although related, elements of the offense.”).

\textsuperscript{187} MCM, \textit{supra} note 6, pt. IV, ¶ 45 c(1)(b).
element, and the way in which they are often intertwined and usually depend on the same facts for proof. Military courts have developed a significant body of case law. In many respects, this body of case law is the result of the courts trying to apply the dated UCMJ definition of rape to the modern context of rape and sexual assault involving minimal levels of force or violence.

I. By Force and Without Consent

Over time, military courts have struggled to define the elements of force and consent, and have outlined two distinct kinds of force in rape cases: actual force and constructive force. An examination of what constitutes force inevitably turns to consent and the resistance requirement. Current military law retains the resistance requirement in cases of actual force, demanding actual physical and/or verbal resistance by the victim against an aggressor to prove her lack of consent. In cases involving constructive force, “the incidental force involved in penetration” is sometimes enough to satisfy the force requirement.

The MCM dedicates a large amount of attention to the explanation of force and lack of consent. The majority of the 200-word explanation, however, is actually a description of the hurdles a victim must overcome in order to prove her lack of consent, and the circumstances in which the proof is not required. If the victim does not resist enough, consent is presumed. Nowhere in this lengthy explanation of force and lack of consent is force defined or explained. The MCM discusses the lack of consent required as “more than a mere lack of acquiescence.” A significant burden is placed upon the victim to “make her lack of consent reasonably manifest by taking such measures of resistance as are called for by the circumstances.” Further, if the victim fails to take “reasonable measures” to resist, the manual states, “the inference may be drawn that the victim did consent.” This language serves to make the determination of the victim’s consent subjective. The reasonableness of her reaction in the midst of what is likely a surprising and traumatic event is to be determined by the judge or panel. This interpretation of silence as consent is in opposition to any other formulation of consent under the UCMJ.

The courts have recognized the inequity of this “inflexible rule establishing resistance as a necessary element.” Despite their rejection of an “inflexible” resistance requirement, the court in United States v. Bonano-Torres held that “where there is no constructive force and the alleged victim is fully capable of resisting or manifesting her non-consent, more than the incidental force involved in penetration is required for conviction.” This is a reasonable conclusion to draw, given the

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189 See, e.g., Leak, 61 M.J. at 246 (“[T]hese elements are included within the same statutory element, suggesting an intentional substantive link. They also are often closely allied with regard to proof. The same evidence offered on the issue of force, may also serve to prove lack of consent. In this manner for example, evidence of measure(s) of resistance might prove both the elements of force and lack of consent.”).
190 See United States v. Bonano-Torres, 31 M.J. 175, 178 (C.M.A. 1990) (“proof of resistance-or lack thereof-is highly significant in all rape cases where the victim has the capacity to resist”).
191 Id. at 179.
192 See generally Simpson, 58 M.J. at 368; see also Palmer, 33 M.J. at 9-10 (“Consent induced by fear, fright, or coercion is equivalent to physical force.”).
193 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, ¶ 45 c(1)(b).
194 Id. (“If a victim in possession of his or her mental faculties fails to make lack of consent reasonably manifest by taking such measures of resistance as are called for by the circumstances, the inference may be drawn that the victim did consent.”).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 683 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993) (Bridgman, J., concurring) (voicing frustration that “as Article 120(a), UCMJ is currently applied, the offense of rape in the military justice system is guided, not by law, but by individual perceptions of the offense . . . consent is sometimes treated as a state of mind and sometimes related to the physical manifestations of the victim conveying a lack of consent. Again, to an unfortunate extent, rape is in the mind of the beholder.”).
200 See infra Part III (comparing consent in rape to consent in other areas of the UCMJ).
202 Id.
wording of the statute and ensuing case law, but it leaves the responsibility for preventing the rape squarely on the shoulders of the victim. The court goes on to lament the fact the MCM “stops short of explaining what is sufficient force in the non-constructive force cases.”203 It is this inability to define force that results in forming the definition in terms of what type of resistance the victim must offer.

2. Constructive Force

The concept of constructive force does not exist in the language of the UCMJ, nor is it found anywhere in the MCM. Constructive force is an alternative theory of force that military appellate courts have developed in addressing instances of clearly non-consensual sexual acts where there was no use of overt physical force. In these cases, force is found in abuse of authority, fear, or coercion.204 As in cases of actual force, however, the doctrine of constructive force still requires some level of force.205

It is in this area of law that the courts have ventured farthest away from the actual language of the statute, which plainly requires both lack of consent and force in every case. The courts have stopped short of interpreting the law to allow for a crime of sex without consent, but involving no force at all.206 The direction in which the military appellate courts have taken rape law under the UCMJ, however, indicates a growing attitude that military rape law should protect sexual autonomy, rather than merely protecting against the use of force to obtain sex.207 The military courts have taken the outdated rape statute as far along into the future as they can, but leading up to the 2006 NDAA reform, they have signaled that they cannot do more without a reformation of the statute itself.208

G. The Call for Change

Several incidents in the past twenty years focused attention on the issue of sexual assault in the military. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have each had large public sexual assault scandals. In 1991, eighty-three women and seven men were sexually assaulted at the Navy’s Tailhook convention in Las Vegas.209 The Navy’s investigation was viewed by many as a cover-up of the events that took place, and the DOD Inspector General subsequently investigated and substantiated most of the reported assaults.210 In 1997, Army drill sergeant Staff Sergeant Delmar Simpson was convicted of eighteen counts of raping female trainees under his control.211 In response to the allegations of sexual assault at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Army established a hotline for reports of sexual assault and received thousands of phone calls and hundreds of allegations.212 In 2003, at least twenty-two female Air Force Academy cadets reported that they had been sexually assaulted, and that the Academy’s administration had failed to investigate the reported crimes.213 Most recently, congressional alarm over reports of sexual assaults in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the appointment of the Task Force on Care for Victims of Sexual Assault.214 The resulting investigations and study groups have called for reform of the military’s sexual assault policies and rape law.215

203 Id.

204 See United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7, 9 (C.M.A. 1991) (“Where intimidation or threats of death or physical injury make resistance futile, it is said that ‘constructive force’ has been applied”); United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 377 (2003).

205 See Bonano-Torres, 31 M.J. at 179.

206 See id.

207 See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 683 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993) (Bridgman, J., concurring) (“arguably, ‘constructive force’ is applied where there has been, in fact, no actual force, but the acts are felt to be reprehensible”); United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (2005) (“the essence of the offense remains the same – sexual intercourse against the will of the victim”).

208 See, e.g., Webster, 37 M.J. at 675; Leak, 61 M.J. at 246; see see. II.G for more discussion of specific calls by the courts for reformation of the statute.

209 Tailhook 91, ”supra note 24.

210 Id.

211 See PBS Online NewsHour Transcript, supra note 24.

212 See id.

213 See Booth-Thomas, supra note 24.

214 CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18.

215 See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31; CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 57.
While some maintained that the UCMJ rape and sexual misconduct statutes did not need to be revised, others argued that the statute was outdated and due for an update. The requests that the statute be updated came from many different directions. Military appellate courts pointed to the antiquated statutes and stated the need for reform. Most importantly, in the 2005 NDAA, Congress demanded feedback from the DOD on modernizing sex crimes in the UCMJ. In the 2006 NDAA, Congress responded to the DOD feedback by updating the military sexual misconduct statute for the first time in the history of the UCMJ.

The most common criticism of the current UCMJ rape offense is that it does not adequately address the full range of contemporary sexual misconduct. Military appellate courts, commissions, and task forces have identified the need for a shift to a statute centered on consent rather than force. Additionally, the current statute does not draw clear lines identifying criminal conduct for situations involving voluntary intoxication, abuse of authority, and coercion. Critics also recommended that the reformed statute have better definitions of concepts such as consent, force, and incapacity. The recommendations from each group were consistent that change is necessary and Congress must update the statute. A review of these groups’ recommendations demonstrates that virtually all of the critics envisioned military rape law moving toward a more consent-based sexual assault statute.

1. Studies and Reports

In May 2001, the National Institute of Military Justice issued a report entitled Report of the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the so-called “Cox Commission.” The commission recommended repealing the rape and sodomy provisions of the UCMJ, as well as the offenses specified under Article 134 that concern criminal sexual misconduct, and replacing them with “a comprehensive Criminal Sexual Conduct Article, such as is found in the Model Penal Code or Title 18 of the United States Code.” The commission reasoned:

Because it is crucial that service members are both made aware of and held accountable for sexual activities that interfere with military missions, undermine morale and trust within military units, or exploit the hierarchy of the military rank structure, the Commission recommends that a new statute be drafted to replace the current provisions. Many issues presented in the modern context simply do not fit the current statutes.

The commission echoed the opinion from others in the past, and those that followed, that the military statute failed to keep pace with the times. Though they did not specifically recommend a consent-based standard, the Cox Commission recognized that a progressive military sexual assault law has the power to both educate and deter “sexual activities that interfere with military missions [and] undermine morale and trust within military units.”

216 See infra note 260.
218 See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31; CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 57.
220 See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31; Leak, 61 M.J. at 246; Webster, 37 M.J. at 675.
221 See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31; Leak, 61 M.J. at 246; Webster, 37 M.J. at 675.
222 See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31.
223 See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31.
224 COX COMMISSION, supra note 18.
225 See discussion supra note 18.
226 COX COMMISSION, supra note 18.
227 Id.
228 Id. (“The Commission urges that the new statute recognize that military rank and organization may produce an atmosphere where sexual conduct, although apparently consensual on its face, should be proscribed as coercive sexual misconduct.”).
In February 2004, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld responded to growing publicity and congressional concern about the treatment of victims of sexual assault in the military by appointing the Task Force on Care for Victims of Sexual Assault.\(^{229}\) Secretary Rumsfeld directed the task force to study the handling of alleged victims of sexual assault throughout the DOD.\(^{230}\) This task force found that confusion existed over the definitions and terms used in the military to refer to sexual assault, rape, and sexual harassment.\(^{231}\) The Task Force recommended “that DoD bring greater transparency to the UCMJ, improve definitions of sexual assault, and resolve confusion over terms, behaviors, and legal definitions.”\(^{232}\)

In the aftermath of the Air Force Academy’s sexual assault scandal in June 2005,\(^{233}\) Congress mandated the formation of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies.\(^{234}\) Secretary Rumsfeld appointed a task force comprised of senior military leaders and experts in sexual assault from the civilian sector. After a full year of studying the prevention of and response to sexual harassment and assault at the United States Military and Naval Academies, the task force recommended that Congress “revise the current sexual misconduct statutes to more clearly and comprehensively address contemporary sexual misconduct.”\(^{235}\) The report specified that the revised statute should have varying degrees of sexual misconduct, including a specific provision for the criminal act of sexual penetration or assault where no force is involved.\(^{236}\) The report concludes, “[i]f a person has intercourse or other sexual contact with someone when they know or should know that there is no consent, the person should be held criminally accountable.”\(^{237}\) Like contemporary scholars and lawmakers, the task force recognized the need to protect sexual autonomy, regardless of any attending force. This need was echoed by military courts.

2. Military Courts

The military appellate courts also voiced frustration with the inability of the rape statute to adequately address many of the sexual assault crimes they encounter, and recommended statutes based on consent.\(^{238}\) In 1993, the U.S. Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed a rape conviction in the case of United States v. Webster.\(^{239}\) In Webster, the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a female petty officer after she told him “no” repeatedly.\(^{240}\) The defendant agreed that she told him “no” repeatedly, but contends that she consented based upon her physical participation.\(^{241}\) The victim said she continued to say “no” the entire time and did not participate in any way.\(^{242}\) She admitted, however, that she never tried to hit the defendant or run away, and she was not afraid of him.\(^{243}\) Though the court looked at the totality of the circumstances and found that the sexual intercourse “was done by force and without consent”\(^{244}\) they made a direct and unequivocal plea for reform of Article 120 of the UCMJ:

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\(^{229}\) CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18.

\(^{230}\) Id. at 1.

\(^{231}\) Id. at 20-21.


\(^{233}\) In 2002 and 2003 a number of current and former Air Force Academy cadets went public with allegations that their reports of sexual assault at the Academy had been severely mishandled. Several study groups and commissions were formed to assess the problem at the Air Force Academy. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PANEL TO REVIEW SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY (22 Sept. 2003); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT ON THE SERVICE ACADEMY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND LEADERSHIP SURVEY (4 Mar. 2005).

\(^{234}\) ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18.

\(^{235}\) Id. at 31.

\(^{236}\) Id.

\(^{237}\) Id.


\(^{239}\) Webster, 37 M.J. at 670.

\(^{240}\) Id. at 672.

\(^{241}\) Id.

\(^{242}\) Id.

\(^{243}\) Id.

\(^{244}\) Id. at 675 (quoting MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, ¶ 45b(1)(c)).
In the absence of a reform of Article 120, UCMJ, we are left to the unguided ad hoc application of the trial court’s classification of “degrees” of rape, as reflected in the sentence adjudged. . . . [w]e are attempting to apply a 1950’s law to the post—“sexual revolution” morality [or lack of it] of the 1990’s. Acknowledgement of this problem calls for a change in the law.\(^{245}\)

The court specifically recommended the military adopt a consent-based statute:

Although we have found sufficient evidence of force and lack of consent, using the “totality of the circumstances” test, a better alternative would be explicit recognition of the trend toward defining rape as a sexual assault requiring only the lack of consent of the victim and establishing degrees of seriousness of the offense commensurate with the extent of force involved or other aggravating circumstances.\(^{246}\)

Not only did the court endorse a consent-based approach to reform of the UCMJ, they identified New Jersey’s affirmative consent standard as an “example of a better approach.”\(^{247}\) The endorsement of an affirmative consent standard by a military appellate court is a significant signal that military courts, as well as civilian courts and legal scholars, see the need for laws that recognize sexual autonomy.

As recently as 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) acknowledged in United States v. Leak\(^{248}\) that the essence of rape is, and always has been, “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim.”\(^{249}\) The court echoed the opinion that “Article 120 is antiquated in its approach to sexual offenses,”\(^{250}\) and noted:

Article 120 is dated, its elements may not easily fit the range of circumstances now generally recognized as “rape,” including date rape, acquaintance rape, statutory rape, as well as stranger-on-stranger rape. As a result, the traditional military rape elements have been applied in contexts for which the elements were not initially contemplated.\(^{251}\)

The court went on to say that case law evolved to address these discrepancies (primarily in the form of constructive force doctrine), but acknowledged that the application of this case law is “complex because the elements of consent and force are often intertwined.”\(^{252}\) Therefore, courts assessing the totality of the circumstances may confuse actual and constructive force concepts.\(^{253}\)

An affirmative consent standard would eliminate the persistent confusion described by the court in Leak by dispensing with the need for force and signs of resistance to indicate lack of consent. The court in Webster endorsed the concept of affirmative consent, and both courts, in their own words, recognized on the record that the “essence of the offense”\(^{254}\) of rape is the violation of sexual autonomy.\(^{255}\)

\(^{245}\) Id. at 675 n.8.

\(^{246}\) Id.

\(^{247}\) Id.


\(^{249}\) Id. at 246.

\(^{250}\) Id.

\(^{251}\) Id.

\(^{252}\) Id.

\(^{253}\) Id.

\(^{254}\) Id.

\(^{255}\) See id. at 239 (“the force used may vary depending on the relationship and familiarity, if any, between the perpetrator and victim, but the essence of the offense remains the same—sexual intercourse against the will of the victim”); United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 675 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993) (recommending that the statute be based solely on consent, and identifying an affirmative consent statute as a model clearly indicates their view that the crime of rape is, at its core, a violation of sexual autonomy).
3. Congress

Members of Congress had wanted to reform the sexual misconduct statutes in the UCMJ for years.\textsuperscript{256} In November 2004, Representative Louise Slaughter introduced a bill entitled \textit{Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence in the Military Act}.\textsuperscript{257} The bill sought to change the UCMJ by incorporating the federal sexual assault statutes into the Code.\textsuperscript{258} Although this bill did not clear the House of Representatives, it served as a shot across the bow to the DOD that Congress was serious about updating the military’s sexual misconduct statutes.

The official signal that reform of the UCMJ was inevitable came in the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005. In it, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to review the UCMJ and the \textit{MCM} with the objective of determining what changes are required to improve the ability of the military justice system to address issues relating to sexual assault and to conform the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial more closely to other Federal laws and regulations that address such issues.\textsuperscript{259}

The responsibility fell to the Joint Service Committee (JSC) on Military Justice,\textsuperscript{260} which created a sub-committee to review federal and state sexual assault statutes and propose changes in compliance with the mandate from Congress.

In February 2005, the sub-committee, comprised of Judge Advocate representatives from each of the military services and the Coast Guard, produced an extensive report entitled \textit{Sex Crimes and the UCMJ: A Report for the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice}.\textsuperscript{261} The report provided various options for amending the UCMJ rape statute, but concluded that a change was not necessary.\textsuperscript{262} Members of Congress, and specifically the House Armed Services Committee, had wanted to revise the UCMJ rape and sexual misconduct statutes for a couple of years and were not satisfied with leaving the statute as it was.\textsuperscript{263} They used what is referred to as “Option 5”\textsuperscript{264} from the JSC’s report as the basis for the new UCMJ Article 120.\textsuperscript{265} This was the preferred option of the JSC among the options to change the UCMJ.\textsuperscript{266}

III. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back—The New Statute

In the 2006 NDAA, Congress implemented the most significant change to the UCMJ rape statute in the UCMJ’s history.\textsuperscript{267} The new Article 120 is nearly identical to Option 5 from the JSC’s recommendation. It replaces rape and carnal

\textsuperscript{256} Interview with Mark Epley, General Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, and Colonel (Ret.) Jeanette James, HASC Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Epley Interview].
\textsuperscript{258} Id.
\textsuperscript{260} The JSC on Military Justice is comprised of Judge Advocate representatives from each of the military services, and meets to review and propose changes to the \textit{MCM}.
\textsuperscript{261} \textit{SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ}, supra note 7.
\textsuperscript{262} The JSC presents a thorough summary of the most common arguments against reforming the UCMJ sexual misconduct statutes. The report lists five reasons the committee recommended against change:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item all offenses that the military desires to prosecute can be prosecuted now;
  \item the military can rapidly promulgate regulations to prohibit sexual misconduct;
  \item military jurisprudence is advanced, flexible and sophisticated—this vast body of caselaw can be lost by statutory changes;
  \item change requires training of attorneys and investigators; and
  \item change may result in more cases being reversed.
\end{enumerate}

\textit{Id.} The report cites concerns about the confusion and disruption that a change would cause, but concedes that if “higher authorities direct a UCMJ change to substantially conform to Title 18, Option 5 is the alternative that best takes into account unique military requirements.”
\textsuperscript{263} Epley Interview, \textit{ supra} note 256.
\textsuperscript{264} \textit{SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ}, \textit{ supra} note 7 (Option 5, also known as Option E, is the fifth of six options put forth by the JSC in their report.).
\textsuperscript{265} Epley Interview, \textit{ supra} note 256.
\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Id.}
knowledge, and addresses many of the sexual misconduct offenses currently found in Article 134.\textsuperscript{268} Though the new statute reflects some of the changes recommended by critics of the current statute, Congress failed to truly reform the statute in the way the studies and military appellate courts recommended.\textsuperscript{269} Rather than focusing the crime on the issue of consent, as an increasing number of legal scholars and legislatures are doing, and as they were encouraged to do by military courts and studies, Congress further entrenched the requirement for force.

A. The New Statute

The new sexual assault statute differs from the current statute in two significant ways. First, the new statute contains fourteen different sexual offenses against adults and children.\textsuperscript{270} These offenses replace the offenses of rape and carnal knowledge, prohibit other sexual misconduct currently covered by various Article 134 offenses, and consolidate them all within one article, “Rape, Sexual Assault, and Other Sexual Misconduct.”\textsuperscript{271} Second, lack of consent is no longer an element of the crime.\textsuperscript{272} The crimes are based upon the force used against the victim to engage in sexual acts or contact with them.\textsuperscript{273} Consent now becomes an affirmative defense to the crimes of rape and sexual assault.\textsuperscript{274}

1. Offenses

The new statute lists fourteen separate sexual offenses,\textsuperscript{275} starting with the most violent and forceful rape and progressing down with decreasing levels of force and less invasive forms of contact. Included among the fourteen are several variations of crimes against children, as well as several other types of sexual misconduct. These offenses are not relevant to this topic, and are not discussed in this article.\textsuperscript{276} The new sexual offenses against adults are: 120(a) rape; 120(c) aggravated sexual assault; 120(e) aggravated sexual contact; 120(h) abusive sexual contact; and 120(m) wrongful sexual contact. Rape and aggravated sexual assault are essentially the current Article 120 rape offense, broken into two offenses based on differing levels of force.\textsuperscript{277} These offenses criminalize forced acts of sexual penetration. The last three offenses, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, and wrongful sexual contact are analogous to the current offense of indecent assault, and are also broken down into decreasing levels of force.\textsuperscript{278} These are the acts of improper sexual touching that do not rise to the level of sexual penetration. Each offense requires some level of force, with the exception of 120(m), wrongful sexual contact, which merely requires lack of permission.\textsuperscript{279}

\textsuperscript{268} § 552.
\textsuperscript{269} See, e.g., COX COMMISSION, supra note 18; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 31; United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (2005); United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 675 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993).
\textsuperscript{270} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006) (The new offenses are: 120(a) (Rape); 120(b) (Rape of a child); 120(c) (Aggravated sexual assault); 120(d) (Aggravated sexual assault of a child); 120(e) (Aggravated sexual contact); 120(f) (Aggravated sexual abuse of a child); 120(g) (Aggravated sexual contact with a child); 120(h) (Abusive sexual contact); 120(i) (Abusive sexual contact with a child); and 120(j) (Indecent liberty with a child); 120(k) (Indecent act); 120(l) (Forcible pandering); 120(m) (Wrongful sexual contact); and 120(n) (Indecent exposure).).
\textsuperscript{271} Id.
\textsuperscript{272} Id.
\textsuperscript{273} Id.
\textsuperscript{274} Id.
\textsuperscript{275} Id.
\textsuperscript{276} Id. (The crimes against children are: 120(b) (Rape of a child); 120(d) (Aggravated sexual assault of a child); 120(f) (Aggravated sexual abuse of a child); 120(g) (Aggravated sexual contact with a child); 120(i) (Abusive sexual contact with a child); and 120(j) (Indecent liberty with a child). The other sexual misconduct offenses are: 120(k) (Indecent act); 120(l) (Forcible pandering); and 120(n) (Indecent exposure).).
\textsuperscript{277} Id.
\textsuperscript{278} Id.
\textsuperscript{279} Id.
a. Article 120(a) Rape

The offense of rape under the new statute is reserved for the most forceful and violent forms of forced intercourse. The text of the offense is:

Any person subject to this chapter who causes another person of any age to engage in a sexual act by—(1) using force against that other person; (2) causing grievous bodily harm to any person; (3) threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subject to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping; (4) rendering another person unconscious; or (5) administering to another person by force of threat of force, or without the knowledge or permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby substantially impairs the ability of that other person to appraise or control conduct; is guilty of rape and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.280

This offense, combined with the new statute’s definition of “sexual act,” broadens the scope of behavior that may be punished under the title of “rape.”281 The new statute defines a sexual act as “contact between the penis and the vulva”282 or “the penetration, however slight, of the genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”283 Therefore, rape now constitutes far more than penetration of a vulva by a penis. Rape can also include penetration by other objects. Under this portion of the offense, however, the object must penetrate the genital opening, as opposed to just the vulva. While not stated explicitly in the language, this definition of sexual act functions to limit the offense of rape to a crime against women.284 A crime of sexual penetration against a male (as well as anal penetration of a female) would still be charged as Article 125, forcible sodomy.285

Whereas the current statute defines rape only as sexual intercourse by force and without consent, the new statute enumerates specific behaviors and applications of force that constitute rape. The first of these is “rape by force,” with force defined as:

action to compel submission of another or to overcome or prevent another’s resistance by—(a) the use or display of a dangerous weapon or object; (b) the suggestion of possession of a dangerous weapon or object that is used in a manner to cause another to believe it is a dangerous weapon or object; or (c) physical violence, strength, power, or restraint applied to another person, sufficient that the other person could not avoid or escape the sexual conduct.286

Rape may also be accomplished by causing grievous bodily harm or threatening death, grievous bodily harm, or the kidnapping of any person.287 The sexual act would also be considered rape if it were accomplished by rendering the person unconscious or administering drugs, alcohol, or other substances to substantially impair the ability of the person to appraise or control her conduct.288 This administration of intoxicating substances must be done by force, by threat of force, or without the knowledge or permission of the person.289

Although the offense of rape is broader in some ways, in other ways the new statute narrows activity that can be considered rape. The new definition of force restricts the definition of force developed by case law under the current statute.

280 Id.
281 Id. (defining sexual act as “contact between the penis and vulva . . . or the penetration, however slight, of the genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”).
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
287 Id. (Grievous bodily harm is defined as serious bodily injury, including fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs, and other severe bodily injury. It does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or bloody nose.).
288 Id.
289 Id.
The behaviors prohibited by the current doctrine of constructive force, as well as sex with a person who is asleep, unconscious, or highly intoxicated (voluntarily) are now included in the offense of aggravated sexual assault.290

b. Article 120(c) Aggravated Sexual Assault

The offense of aggravated sexual assault covers the same sexual acts as rape, but with a lower required level of force by the perpetrator. The offense may be committed by threat or placing the other person in fear, amounting to less than the threat of death, kidnapping or grievous bodily harm.291 For this offense, threat or placing a person in fear is defined as “a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the victim or another being subjected to a lesser degree of harm than death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping.”292 This definition includes physical damage to a person or property, as well as threats to accuse a person of a crime, expose a secret, or publicize an asserted fact that would subject someone to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.293 It also specifically includes the use or abuse of military position, rank, or authority to affect or threaten to affect the military career of a person.294 Finally, the offense includes engaging in a sexual act by causing bodily harm or engaging in a sexual act with a person who is incapacitated or incapable of appraising the nature of, declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act.295

Aggravated sexual assault specifically codifies many of the behaviors that have been included as rape through the development of case law under the current statute.296 Because the behaviors currently prohibited by constructive force case law are directly addressed by this offense, the majority of that case law will likely not apply under the new statute. Similarly, because force is specifically defined by the new statute, some of the movement military appellate courts had made away from force requirements and toward consent-focused law will be lost under the new law.297 The new statute takes military rape law away from the consent-based law that has been embraced by military appellate courts and civilian jurisdictions, and recommended by studies and legal scholars.

c. Article 120(e) Aggravated Sexual Contact

Aggravated sexual contact covers behavior that would have been rape under 120(a) had the contact constituted a sexual act. It includes much of the behavior that would be considered indecent assault under the current statute. Sexual contact is defined as:

The intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of another person, or intentionally causing another person to touch, either directly or through the clothing, the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.298

The forms of force used to accomplish the sexual contact for this offense correspond to those required in the offense of rape as discussed above.

290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
295 Id.
297 For example, under the facts in Webster, where the victim resisted verbally, but the accused ignored her and penetrated her, the accused would not have violated the new statute. It would be possible to charge him with wrongful sexual contact (sexual contact without permission), but the act of penetration is not covered by the definition of sexual contact, so the penetration itself could not be specifically punished. United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, (C.G.C.M.R. 1993)
d. Article 120(h) Abusive Sexual Contact

In the same way that the forms of force in aggravated sexual contact correspond to those in rape, the force used for the offense of abusive sexual contact is the same type that is used in aggravated sexual assault. The difference is that the acts are sexual contact rather than sexual acts. This offense is roughly analogous to the current crime of indecent assault where lesser forms of force are used.\(^{299}\) For example, if a person comes across someone who is asleep or unconscious and fondles that person’s breasts, the offense is abusive sexual contact. If, however, the perpetrator is the one who rendered the other person unconscious by placing an intoxicant in the other’s drink without that person knowing it, the fondling would then be an aggravated sexual contact. If the person in the first scenario actually made penis to vulva contact or penetrated the genital opening of the person with any object, he or she would be guilty of aggravated sexual contact. In the second scenario, where the perpetrator rendered the victim unconscious, these acts would be rape.

e. Article 120(m) Wrongful Sexual Contact

This offense is particularly interesting, because it is similar to the statute proposed by this article. Wrongful sexual contact requires no force at all, only a wrongful sexual contact without permission.\(^{300}\) The statute reads, “Any person subject to this chapter who, without legal justification or lawful authorization, engages in sexual contact with another person without that other person’s permission is guilty of wrongful sexual contact . . . .\(^{301}\) This is not very different from the current indecent assault offense. It is simply a cleaner, more straightforward version because it does not require proof that the touching was indecent, with that term’s lengthy definition. In addition, wrongful sexual contact does not have the marital exemption or the prejudice to good order and discipline requirement that indecent assault does.\(^{302}\) Lack of permission is an element of the crime and, therefore, the Government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.\(^{303}\)

This new offense captures the concept of sexual autonomy and bodily integrity that is missing from the rest of the new (and current) statute. It makes sexual contact with another, without the permission of that person, a crime. Strangely though, the new statute punishes mere sexual contact without permission, but leaves unpunished the more egregious offense of sexual acts without permission. This result is representative of the illogical approach current laws take toward the crimes of rape and sexual assault. Because of the deeply-entrenched notion that force and resistance from the victim are required to make non-consensual sex criminal, even this thoroughly modern statute cannot quite make the final logical step—the criminalization of sex without consent.

2. Affirmative Consent Defense

Under the new statute, consent is no longer an element; it is an affirmative defense.\(^{304}\) The Government will have to prove the elements of the offense: sexual act or contact and the attending use of force.\(^{305}\) If the defense asserts that the act or contact was consensual, they must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence.\(^{306}\) If the defense is successful in meeting their burden, the Government must then prove the acts or contact were not consensual beyond a reasonable doubt.\(^{307}\) Part of the reasoning for this construct was to take the focus off of the behavior of the victim and focus attention on the criminal behavior of the accused.\(^{308}\) This notion is one of the main arguments for framing rape law around a force element and removing consent as an element.\(^{309}\) Whether this construct will have the intended effect remains to be seen.

\(^{299}\) UCMJ art. 134 (2005).


\(^{301}\) Id.

\(^{302}\) UCMJ art. 134.


\(^{304}\) Consent is not an affirmative defense to 120(m) wrongful sexual contact, since lack of consent is an element of the crime and must be proven by the government.


\(^{306}\) Id.

\(^{307}\) Id.

\(^{308}\) Id.

\(^{309}\) Id.

SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ, supra note 7, at 103.
B. Benefits of the New Statute

1. Differing Levels of Offenses with Appropriate Corresponding Maximum Punishments

Many of the advocates for changing the military’s rape law cited the need for varying levels of offenses and corresponding maximum punishments. Few rape allegations in the military involve a significant amount of force or violence. Most of the cases fit into the category of “date rape” or “acquaintance rape.” Despite the infrequency of the traditional “stranger rape” in current society, panels and judges expect to see a violent act by a stranger when they see the charge of rape. Instead of a masked attacker, they are presented with a young Soldier who looks just like every other hard-working young person in their unit. Instead of a victim with bruises and cuts, they are presented with a victim with no apparent injury. This unrealistic expectation of how a victim and accused should appear makes most people hesitant to stigmatize a Soldier with the label of a “rapist.” The knowledge that rape is a capital crime adds to the reluctance many feel to convict anyone for this crime, especially when the victim has no outward injury. Different levels of offenses with corresponding maximum punishments will provide prosecutors differing levels of offenses under which to charge sexual misconduct. The facts alleged in a sexual assault will more closely resemble the behavior prohibited by the offense, and the maximum punishment will seem more appropriate to the crime.

2. Improved Definitions of Consent and Force

The definitions of force and consent in the new statute are important improvements. Although military courts had developed significant case law attempting to define these crucial terms, the exact meaning of each element remained elusive. Vague standards “leave contested issues to be settled in an unforeseeable, ad hoc manner by whichever police officers, prosecutors, or jurors decide whether to file charges or impose sanctions in a particular case.” As a result, in situations where standards and definitions are unclear, the law resolves these issues (as it should) in the favor of the accused. This is especially true with the crime of rape, where resolving tough issues in favor of the accused undoubtedly contributes significantly to the low conviction rates for this particular crime.
C. Criticism of the New Statute

1. Force—“The Essence of Rape”

The dilemma over whether to acknowledge rape as a violation of sexual autonomy or rely on force-centered definitions to facilitate evidentiary proof at trial has historically resulted in statutes demanding proof of force and resistance. Recently, however, civilian jurisdictions and scholars, as well as military courts, have focused reform on correcting this anomaly of the law. When military appellate courts called for a new statute, they indicated that a new rape law should center on consent. The support for consent-based rape law is echoed by legal scholars, and statutes based on consent have been enacted in numerous states.

Despite this background, Congress enacted a new rape law that centers solely on force. The law’s focus on the force used to commit a sexual assault as opposed to the violation of sexual autonomy has significant negative effects. Schulhofer criticizes the force-centered laws for “making almost no effort to control abuses that are not physically violent.” The language of the new statute itself is what the average service member will know. The sole focus on force will likely cause people to look for clear signs of violence and dismiss allegations involving no glaring use of force. This language delivers an inference of social permission to use any method short of physical violence to achieve sexual conquest. “It leaves women unprotected against forms of pressure that any society should consider morally improper and legally intolerable.” Even worse, Schulhofer argues, this approach “distorts social conceptions of legitimate behavior and raises the threshold for the kind of physical violence that the law is willing to recognize as ‘abnormal’ force.” Regardless of how the MCM defines force, it is inevitable that the message sent will continue to be, “as long as you don’t use overt physical violence, you can get away with forcing sex on an unwilling partner.”

The debate over whether to eliminate either force or consent when reforming rape statutes is not a new one. As discussed earlier, when the American Law Institute tackled the reform of the entire American criminal code in the 1950s, they struggled with the issue of whether to focus the crime of rape on lack of consent or violence. Though the reformers acknowledged that “the central mission of rape law was to protect ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘meaningful consent,’” they chose instead to focus the model statute on force rather than consent. Their intention, in part, was to move away from focusing on the acts of the victim and refocus attention on acts of the perpetrator. In doing this, the reformers also avoided the difficult task of defining consent.

The JSC’s report indicates that they employed some of the same reasoning in defining rape as a crime of force. Nonetheless, the committee stated the opinion that “the essence of rape is the force or coercion used by the defendant, not the

321 SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ, supra note 7, at 103 (quoting Tchen, supra note 7, at 1529).
322 See supra sec. II.B.
323 Id.
325 See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 58; SCHULHOFER, supra note 5; Kasubhai, supra note 87; Seidman & Vickers, supra note 87; Little, supra note 313.
326 See supra note 76.
327 SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 15.
328 Training usually focuses on the language of the statute rather than the case law.
329 SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 15.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 20.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ, supra note 7, at 103.
lack of consent of the victim.” Whatever the reason for choosing force over lack of consent in the new statute, it is likely that consent will remain the central contested issue in most cases of sexual assault. The committee attempted to address this issue by making consent an affirmative defense, requiring the accused to raise the defense and prove the victim’s consent by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is successful, the prosecution would then have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent. This will be the likely route most cases follow, and once again, the focus will return to the victim, looking for evidence of force and resistance.

IV. Back on Course—An Affirmative Consent Statute

The U.S. military has an at-risk population living in a high risk environment. Congress must recognize the gravity of this situation and act in a forward thinking and aggressive manner to protect service members and preserve good order and discipline, unit cohesion, and morale. Sexual assault can disrupt each of these and negatively impact mission accomplishment. The military requires a rape statute that provides a clear standard, prevents miscommunication, and assists in maintaining good order and discipline. An affirmative consent standard will best accomplish these goals.

A. Proposed Statute

The statute proposed by this article confronts the core issue of sexual assault head-on by centering the offense upon the premise that each person has a right to sexual autonomy and bodily integrity. Any person who infringes upon another person’s autonomy or integrity is guilty of a crime. Rather than placing the responsibility for communication solely on the shoulders of the would-be victim, this proposed statute forces both parties to share responsibility for respectful sexual activity equally. The proposed statute’s core offense is the offense of wrongful sexual penetration—a crime requiring no force, and prohibiting penetration without affirmative verbal consent. Any use of force elevates the crime to a more serious offense with a correspondingly greater maximum punishment. This proposed statute would provide service members with clear and simple guidance: “Before you engage in sexual intercourse, you must first get verbal consent from the other person. If you fail to get the other person’s verbal consent, you are guilty of wrongful sexual penetration and will be subject to punishment under the UCMJ.”

The proposed statute draws from the recommendations and examples of military courts, other UCMJ offenses, well respected legal scholars, and progressive state sexual assault statutes, as well as the new Article 120 statute passed by Congress in the 2006 NDAA. The proposed statute is similar to the new Article 120, but the offenses are listed in the opposite order. Rather than starting with the most serious crime and working down to lesser crimes, the proposed statute starts with the crime of wrongful penetration. This offense is the heart of the proposed statute. It states clearly, and up front, that a violation of sexual autonomy is a crime punishable by court-martial.

1. Wrongful Sexual Penetration

Wrongful sexual penetration is the foundation of the proposed statute. It is the only proposed offense that differs dramatically from the new statute enacted by Congress. Under the proposed statute, the offense of wrongful sexual penetration states: “Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse with another person without

338 Id. (quoting Tchen, supra note 7, at 1529).
340 Id.
341 See supra Part II.A (discussing statistics on victims and offenders entering military and the increased risk levels associated with military service).
342 See id. (discussing sexual assault’s impact on military readiness).
343 See infra app. A (Proposed Statute).
344 See infra app. A (“Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse with another person without first obtaining the affirmative verbal consent of that other person is guilty of wrongful sexual intercourse and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”).
345 Id.
346 This format is parallel to the UCMJ crimes of unlawful entry, assault, and larceny. The core violation of property, bodily integrity, or privacy is the core crime, and the use of force elevates the crime to a different offense.
first obtaining the affirmative verbal consent of that other person is guilty of wrongful sexual penetration and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.\textsuperscript{347} The offense has two elements: an act of sexual penetration, and that the act was committed without affirmative verbal consent. Any force used in conjunction with the wrongful sexual penetration would elevate the crime to a different offense with greater maximum punishment.\textsuperscript{348}

2. Maximum Punishment

The maximum punishment for the proposed offense of wrongful sexual penetration is five years imprisonment\textsuperscript{349} This punishment strikes the right balance between recognizing the violation of sexual autonomy as a serious breach, and at the same time, acknowledging the lack of force or other aggravating circumstances. The maximum punishments for the remaining crimes are equivalent to the maximum penalties in the new Article 120 for corresponding offenses. Therefore, the penalty for the proposed offense of wrongful sexual penetration falls between the new Article 120 crimes of wrongful sexual contact (maximum of one year imprisonment) and abusive sexual contact (maximum of seven years imprisonment) in terms of maximum punishment.\textsuperscript{350}

Wrongful sexual penetration’s position between these two crimes for punishment is appropriate because a non-violent violation of sexual autonomy falls somewhere between non-violent sexual touching and violent sexual touching. This determination is, admittedly, somewhat arbitrary, but in general, a physically violent sexual touching is potentially more traumatic than sexual penetration where the initiator failed to obtain verbal consent. Perhaps more important, the mal-intent of the accused is arguably greater when force is used.

3. Definition of Affirmative Verbal Consent

The definition of affirmative verbal consent under the proposed statute conveys the same message found in Ex rel. M.T.S., Schulhofer’s proposed statute, and most importantly the new Article 120.\textsuperscript{351} The definition of consent in the new Article 120 is “words or overt acts indicating a freely given agreement to the sexual conduct at issue . . . “\textsuperscript{352} This definition of consent clearly captures the concept of sexual autonomy that the proposed statute would actually implement. In the proposed statute, affirmative verbal consent is defined as “actual verbal consent prior to sexual penetration, clearly indicating that the other person is freely willing or desiring to engage in the penetration.”\textsuperscript{353} The court in Ex rel. M.T.S. prohibited penetration “without the affirmative and freely-given permission . . . to the specific act of penetration.”\textsuperscript{354} Schulhofer’s proposed statute finds an actor guilty when “he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person, when he knows that he does not have the consent of the other person.”\textsuperscript{355} All of these definitions correctly focus on the violation of sexual autonomy as the key issue in sexual assault. The requirement for verbal consent is superior, however, because it is cleaner and less ambiguous. It provides a bright-line rule where the others do not. As discussed in section V(B)(1)(b) below, a bright line rule is particularly important to military service members.

\textsuperscript{347} See infra app. A (Proposed Statute).
\textsuperscript{348} Id. (abusive sexual penetration or rape).
\textsuperscript{349} Id.
\textsuperscript{350} Id.
\textsuperscript{353} See infra app. A (Proposed Statute).
\textsuperscript{354} Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277.
\textsuperscript{355} SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 283.
4. Mens Rea and Defenses

The offense of wrongful sexual penetration under the proposed statute is a general intent crime, as is the crime of rape in the current statute. The accused need only have the intent to commit the act of sexual penetration. The intent to commit the acts without consent, or acquiring the requisite affirmative consent, is not required. Ignorance of the requirement for affirmative consent is not a defense under the proposed statute, however, mistake of fact remains a defense to the crime.

If an accused mistakenly believed that the victim gave affirmative verbal consent, and that belief was reasonable under the circumstances, a mistake of fact defense would apply. A mistake of fact defense under an affirmative consent standard will not require scrutiny of the victim’s actions and state of mind. Instead, the fact-finder must determine whether the defendant’s belief that the victim gave him verbal affirmative consent was reasonable.

Additionally, it is a defense to the crime of wrongful penetration that the two were married or cohabitating and the sexual penetration was with the permission of the other person. It would be unreasonable for a married or cohabitating couple with an established sexual relationship to be expected to obtain verbal consent every time they were intimate. Most would likely agree to disregard the requirement in practice anyway.

Of course, it is always a defense that the victim did, in fact, provide freely given verbal consent prior to the sexual penetration. With this, the inevitability of “he said-she said” conflicting accounts remains. The occurrence of miscommunication, operating in the gray area and “regret sex” will certainly be minimized, however, by a clear standard requiring verbal consent before penetration.

5. Other Offenses

The remainder of the proposed statute is similar to the new Article 120 that will take effect on 1 October 2007, with some exceptions. First, the proposed statute is gender neutral, including penetration of the anus in all of the applicable offenses. Also, the proposed statute includes penetration of a victim using any force at all, and penetration of an

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356 In the current statute, rape is a general intent crime. The elements require only that “the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse” and that “the act of sexual intercourse was done by force and without consent” UCMJ art. 120 (2005).

357 Because every service member must receive mandatory training on sexual assault and the law, both upon entering service and annually, ignorance of the law is not a defense.

358 MCM, supra note 6, R.C.M. 916(j)(1).

359 Id. (“If . . . mistake of fact goes to any other element requiring only general intent or knowledge, the . . . mistake of fact must have existed in the mind of the accused and must have been reasonable under the circumstances.”).

360 See Ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1279.

361 See id.; Bryden, supra note 58, at 405-06.


363 For example, an initiator may know his partner is either unwilling, or unsure, but engages in sexual penetration anyway, because the partner does not resist.

364 “Regret sex” is an unofficial pejorative term some use to indicate the belief that an alleged victim acquiesced to, or even willingly participated in sexual penetration, but then regretted the decision, and alleged the penetration was not consensual.

365 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing why these scenarios will be minimized by an affirmative consent standard).

366 The violation of sexual autonomy is not gender dependent. Statistics show that up to ten percent of military victims of sexual assault are male. See Report from David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to Senate and House Armed Services Committees on Reported Cases of Sexual Assault in the Military for 2005 (on file with author). The new statute defines rape only as [penetration of the female sex organ], explicitly excluding forced sexual penetration of a male from the crime of rape. Male victims of sexual assault experience the same types of trauma, humiliation, and shame that female victims endure. See, e.g., GILLIAN C. MEZEY & MICHAEL B. KING, MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Cindy Struckman-Johnson, Male Victims of Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE:  THE HIDDEN CRIME 192 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Becherhofer eds., 1991). For a male victim in the military, the reluctance to report and humiliation are likely even more significant. The laws against sexual assault in the military must acknowledge that male victims are no less affected than female victims. The goal of this proposal is to ensure members of our armed forces, male and female, are free and safe from intrusion upon their bodily integrity and violation of their sexual autonomy. Admittedly, this proposal is not the focus of this article, and is not debated further. Nonetheless, it remains an important drawback of the new statute and should be addressed as part of refining the new Article 120.
unconscious or sleeping victim in the offense of rape. These areas in which the new Article 120 actually took steps back, rather than forward, from the current statute.

Under the proposed statute, the offense of wrongful sexual contact is retained from the new Article 120, with the two additional offenses of abusive sexual contact and aggravated sexual contact for varying levels of force. Wrongful sexual contact in the new Article 120 correctly captures the criminality of the conduct: sexual contact without permission, a violation of sexual autonomy. This offense is framed in terms of permission rather than affirmative verbal consent because of the difficulty of trying to decide where and when affirmative consent would be required (i.e. before hugging, kissing, fondling—at each step?). Affirmative verbal consent is required only at the time of the actual act of penetration.

Before sexual penetration, you must have the freely-given verbal consent of your partner. This simple requirement is all that service members would need to know. There is no question where the line is drawn. The possibility of miscommunication is significantly diminished, and the underlying message about what is acceptable in sexual interaction is morally appropriate. The new rape law sends the message that as long as you do not use physical violence or unlawful coercion, all other means are acceptable. The proposed statute’s message is that you must respect each person’s sexual autonomy.

6. Comparison to Other UCMJ Offenses

Though affirmative consent may seem radical, the format of the proposed statute and its treatment of consent are comparable to the theory of other UCMJ offenses such as assault, unlawful entry, and larceny. Military law in these crimes is focused on the protection of the bodily integrity, privacy, and property of individuals. The law does not assume consent in these offenses, and force used in committing the crimes is treated as a higher offense or simply aggravation. The purpose of these laws is “to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.” The proposed statute would accomplish this purpose by providing a clear standard, preventing miscommunication, and encouraging a culture of respect for sexual autonomy.

The violations of bodily integrity, privacy, and property in these crimes parallel the breach of sexual autonomy inherent in a sexual assault, as reflected in the proposed statute. An important distinction between these other UCMJ offenses and sexual assault is the resulting harm to the victim—not only physical, but derived from the violation of the person’s autonomy or bodily integrity. “Sexual behavior . . . puts at risk a much more sensitive, physically and psychologically precious interest—our bodily independence and our right to control our own exposure to sexual intimacy.” Victims of sexual assault experience traumatic consequences such as post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at a higher rate than many other

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367 Notice of Proposed Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 71 Fed. Reg. 47489-47490, at 9 (Aug. 17, 2006) (The new statute included a sleeping or unconscious person (unless rendered so by the accused) in the lesser crime of aggravated sexual assault. Also included in that lesser crime are sexual acts committed by causing bodily harm. Under the current statute, these acts are rape. UCMJ art. 120 (2005)).
368 Id.
370 Id.
371 See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 87, at 489-90 (“In 1996, Antioch College issued a sexual offense prevention policy that attempted to define nonconsensual sexual conduct. Consent to sex is defined as ‘the act of willingly and verbally agreeing to engage in specific sexual behavior.’ . . . [T]he policy states that such requests for and assent to intimacy must be renewed at every stage as intimacy increases. . . . We propose, instead, that to be consensual, affirmative verbal consent must be obtained immediately prior to an act of penetration, which eliminates the most maligned part of Antioch’s policy as well as the possibility that one party is acting on prior given consent that has since been withdrawn.”).
372 UCMJ art. 128 (2005).
373 Id. art. 121.
374 Id. art. 134.
375 See, e.g., id. arts. 128, 121, 134.
376 MCM, supra note 6, pt. I, ¶ 3.
377 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 67.
378 Id.
crimes, particularly when the victim knows the offender. An individual’s exposure to this level of harm should be more directly and zealously protected, not less. This recognition is reflected in the heightened level of caution required by the proposed statute.

a. Assault

The UCMJ offense of assault is constructed in a manner that protects individuals from another person touching, or even offering to touch, them in an offensive manner without the individual’s lawful consent. The MCM defines assault as “an attempt or offer with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated.” The attempt or offer “must be done without legal justification or excuse and without the lawful consent of the person affected.” Although the language of Article 128 requires the threat of force or violence, the MCM explains that ‘bodily harm’ is to be construed broadly to mean “any offensive touching of another, however slight,” clearly indicating that the prohibited behavior is the non-consensual offensive touching.

The basic offense is simple assault or assault consummated by a battery. Any increase in the level of applied force in consummating an offer or battery raises the offense to assault consummated by a battery, aggravated assault, and other forms of assault warranting increased punishment. This is the basic construct of the proposed sexual assault statute; a violation of sexual autonomy, with additional levels of offenses for increasing use of force or infliction of bodily harm. The purpose in both the assault and the proposed sexual assault laws is safeguarding the bodily integrity of the victim and punishing a breach of that integrity, thereby increasing the military readiness of the armed forces.

b. Unlawful Entry

The offense of unlawful entry protects the individual’s property from intrusion by others without the individual’s consent, as well as the privacy of the individual. The MCM defines an unlawful entry as an entry onto “the real property of another or certain personal property of another . . . made without the consent of any person authorized to consent to entry or without other lawful authority.” If the unlawful entry is perpetrated with the intent to commit a crime, the offense rises to house breaking and the maximum punishment increases as well.

Of all the UCMJ crimes, unlawful entry may be the crime that most closely parallels the proposed base crime of wrongful sexual penetration. The proposed statute prohibits sexual penetration of another without that person’s affirmative verbal consent. Both unlawful entry and unlawful sexual penetration seek to protect the individual’s right to privacy and freedom from unlawful intrusion by requiring affirmative permission or consent to enter a person’s property or body. The violation of privacy upon a person’s property and his body are analogous, with the significant distinction that intrusion upon a person’s bodily integrity and autonomy is more personal and potentially devastating than intrusion onto his property. The

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379 See, e.g., CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 67 (Rape is widely believed to perhaps be the most traumatic violent crime for the victim (excluding murder)); D.G. Kilpatrick, Victims of Rape and Sexual Harassment: Why Don’t They Report and What Support Do They Need? (paper presented to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, Tampa, Florida, Oct. 31, 1997) (In a national survey, roughly one third of rape victims reported they had contemplated suicide or experienced PTSD); Rothbaum et al., supra note 36, at 455 (stating that research has suggested that 94% of rape victims reporting a recent rape to authorities will meet the criteria for PTSD within two weeks of the rape).

380 UCMJ art. 128.

381 Id.

382 Id.

383 Id.

384 Id.

385 Id. art. 134. The elements of unlawful entry are:

1) That the accused entered the real property of another or certain personal property of another which amounts to a structure usually used for habitation or storage; 2) That such entry was unlawful; and 3) That under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Id. (The MCM defines an entry as “unlawful” if it is made “without the consent of any person authorized to consent to entry or without other lawful authority.”).

386 Id.
law safeguarding a person’s sexual autonomy should be at least as protective, if not more, than the law defending his property. The proposed statute codifies this basic principle.

c. Larceny

In addition to guarding property rights and bodily integrity through prohibitions against unlawful entry and assault, the UCMJ provides protection for individuals’ property by prohibiting larceny. Under the UCMJ, “any person . . . who wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds, by any means, from the possession of the owner or of any other person any money, personal property, or article of value of any kind” is guilty of either larceny or wrongful appropriation. As with unlawful entry, the wrongfulness of the taking in this offense is based upon lack of consent. “As a general rule, a taking or withholding of property from the possession of another is wrongful if done without the consent of the other” or by false pretense. Force or fear of immediate injury used to commit the crime makes the offense a robbery, and warrants increased punishment.

In the same way that the UCMJ guards a person’s right to privacy and bodily integrity, the military code also protects the individual’s property. Before taking another person’s property, the law requires that you have her consent. This prohibition against taking property without the consent of the owner is similar to the concept that violating a person’s sexual autonomy without consent should be specifically prohibited. If the law requires you to obtain consent before taking a friend’s DVD player to watch a movie, shouldn’t it require a greater degree of consent before an act as personal and serious as sexual penetration? The proposed affirmative consent statute acknowledges that the resulting harm to the victim, and often the entire military unit, is much greater with a violation of sexual autonomy than a violation of property rights, and demands an appropriately increased level of care.

The UCMJ protects individuals’ privacy, bodily integrity, and property by requiring consent before another person may impose upon these protected areas. Sexual autonomy is in many ways more private and important than these other areas. The harm to a victim of sexual assault is generally much greater than the harm caused to victims of other crimes, such as assault, unlawful entry, or larceny. Correspondingly, the detrimental effect on morale and unit cohesion is likely to be heightened with a sexual assault. When the protection of sexual autonomy is viewed in light of military law’s defense of other personal interests, the shift to an affirmative consent standard for sexual assault seems less dramatic and more reasonable.

B. The Need for Affirmative Consent in the Military

A military statute requiring actual verbal affirmative consent would be truly ground-breaking. In some important respects, the military is the most appropriate jurisdiction to take this bold approach to sexual assault. First, as discussed, sexual assault has a direct negative impact on unit readiness, mission accomplishment, and morale. Additionally, the

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387 Id. art. 121.
388 Id. Wrongfully taking with the intent to permanently deprive the person is larceny. Wrongfully taking with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of use is wrongful appropriation.
389 Id.
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 Id. art. 122.
393 Id. art. 121.
394 Id.
395 See Little, supra note 313, at 1352.
396 UCMJ arts. 128 (assault), 134 (unlawful entry), 121 (larceny).
397 See supra sec. II.A (discussing sexual assault’s detrimental effect on military readiness).
398 See supra pt. II.A.
unique culture of the military requires a heightened sense of respect and strict adherence to standards of service members. \(^{399}\) Lastly, the military is in the unique position of being able to educate each individual subject to the UCMJ, to ensure that everyone understands the requirement to obtain affirmative consent and the consequences for failing to do so. \(^{400}\) The military has both the motivation and the means to approach the issue of sexual assault in a truly progressive and effective manner.

Not only is the requirement for affirmative consent before sexual penetration a promising way to address sexual assault’s effect on military readiness, it is also the most effective way to establish a culture of respectful and responsible sexual interaction among members of the armed forces. The need for sexual autonomy and privacy is critical in the unique military culture, where service members often live and work closely together with little or no physical separation. \(^{401}\) In this environment, it is essential to establish firm boundaries regarding bodily integrity. The UCMJ and military regulations already recognize this in many ways. \(^{402}\) Service members knowingly submit to these higher standards and higher levels of regulation in their lives. These laws and regulations make living and working in such close proximity more comfortable and safe by establishing and protecting boundaries. The result is an efficient and effective military establishment, \(^{403}\) ready to accomplish the mission.

1. Benefits of Requiring Affirmative Consent
   a. Preventing Miscommunication

One of the concerns about leaving out the force requirement and relying solely on consent to define rape is that sexual interaction is not clear cut. \(^{404}\) Men and women communicate differently and have differing understandings of what actually constitutes consent in a given situation. \(^{405}\) People are understandably reluctant to convict a person of a serious crime, when the incident may have been a miscommunication or misunderstanding. \(^{406}\) They have good reason to be cautious. A survey conducted in 1992 found that twenty-two percent of women felt they had been forced to have sex, yet only three percent of men said they had ever forced a woman to have sex. \(^{407}\) Within that gap of misunderstanding and miscommunication there will inevitably be both perceived and actual rapes and sexual assaults. Within that same gap, there are likely allegations against men who had no intention of committing a crime. Much of the pain caused by this lack of communication would be avoided by an affirmative consent statute.

Our culture traditionally expects the man to be the assertive, and sometimes even aggressive, partner in sexual situations. \(^{408}\) Television, movies, and other media perpetuate this expectation, and increasingly, take it to the extreme. \(^{409}\) It is not necessarily unreasonable for a young man who has grown up watching music television shows and popular movies to think that some degree of force is acceptable, if not expected. The media bombards these men (and women) with images of a

\(^{399}\) See, e.g., *SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ*, supra note 7, at 117 (“The military is a unique society and should develop criminal laws designed to carry out its policy objectives.”).

\(^{400}\) DODI 6495.02, supra note 37, para. E3.2 (requiring periodic, mandatory education and training in Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, during pre-commissioning and initial-entry training programs, and throughout the professional military education systems; annual sexual assault awareness training; and pre-deployment sexual assault training).

\(^{401}\) See, e.g., *SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ*, supra note 7, at 117 (“The deterrence of sexual offenses in the military is especially critical because of the unique military environment that requires large numbers of young men and women to work together in close quarters that are often highly isolated.”); Michelle Tsai, *Do Female Soldiers Get Any Privacy?*, SLATE, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/216464 (discussing close living conditions of Soldiers in Iraq and Kuwait).

\(^{402}\) Many of the crimes found in Article 134 of the UCMJ are based on activity that would not be criminal in civilian jurisdictions (adultery, self-injury). These activities are more strictly regulated in the military because of their effect on good order and discipline.

\(^{403}\) MCM, supra note 6, pt. 1 ¶ 3.

\(^{404}\) See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 87, at 485; SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 62.

\(^{405}\) Id.

\(^{406}\) See ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 32.

\(^{407}\) SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 62 (quoting ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., *SEX IN AMERICA* 221 (1994)).

\(^{408}\) Id. at 61.

\(^{409}\) See, e.g., *THE FORTY YEAR OLD VIRGIN* (Universal Pictures 2005) (containing a scene in which one of the lead characters helps his friend get a woman extremely drunk so that she will have sex with him); *GONE WITH THE WIND* (Warner Brothers 1939) (containing a famous scene in which the hero carries the screaming and protesting heroine up to the bedroom, and next shows the heroine the following morning, clearly happy and satisfied).
man forcefully and coercively overcoming the woman’s reluctance to engage in sex.\textsuperscript{410} Both men and women can come to see this as part of the dating ritual.

To further confuse matters, some studies have shown that a percentage of women report sometimes saying “no” when they actually mean “yes.”\textsuperscript{411} These studies not only reveal the complex nature of consent in sexual relations, they also perpetuate the belief that all women who say “no” really mean “yes.” Generations of young people who have grown up in the culture described above cannot be left to sort out for themselves who actually means “no” when they say it. Requiring clear and unequivocal consent from both parties before penetration will encourage service members to assign real meaning to their words and prevent the potentially devastating results of this type of miscommunication.\textsuperscript{412}

Affirmative consent not only protects potential victims, but also those who may potentially be accused of sexual assault. Anyone concerned with protecting service members from false or questionable accusations of rape has reason to embrace an affirmative consent requirement. A person who genuinely desires to have consensual intercourse should welcome clear communication of that consent from their partner. As Nicholas Little points out, most “men in dating situations do not want to be rapists by forcing their dates into unwanted sexual intercourse.”\textsuperscript{413} Presumably, a person who has specifically expressed their desire or consent to engage in intercourse will be less likely to feel that they were taken advantage of, or forced against their will into sexual activity. The possibility of miscommunication is significantly reduced when the law requires an affirmation of consent from participants in sexual activity.

b. Need for a Bright Line Rule

In a society where there is an increasingly liberal and unclear sexual culture,\textsuperscript{414} the military owes its young service members a bright line rule. The proposed statute would provide a clear moral and legal standard to which they can adhere—for their own protection, and for good order and discipline within the unit. The requirement that consent be affirmatively conveyed would benefit both male and female service members. It would protect not only potential victims, but potential perpetrators as well.

The concept of sexual autonomy—that you must have affirmative permission to engage in sexual activity with someone—is more easily understood than the current definition of “by force and without consent.”\textsuperscript{415} In the area of sexual activity, it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between seduction and assault.\textsuperscript{416} In the current and new statutes, the line is drawn at the use of force. When service members walk away from their mandatory training on the new sexual assault law, they will still not know exactly where the line is in sexual interaction. The message many will take away is that any means of obtaining sex short of violence is acceptable. In contrast, if the law requires freely given verbal consent, the take-away message is simple: \textit{Ask first}. Everyone will know and understand where to draw the line.

c. Educational and Deterrent Effect

An affirmative consent statute would fulfill the purpose of military law by promoting justice and assisting in the maintenance of good order and discipline.\textsuperscript{417} The military has its own, separate code of justice because it is a unique society, requiring criminal laws designed specifically to implement its policy objectives.\textsuperscript{418} With regard to sexual assault, the military

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{410}“A study published in Ms. Magazine in 1990 found that one out of eight Hollywood movies depict a rape theme.” Little, \textit{supra} note 313, at 1352 (citing\textbf{BERNARD LEFKOWITZ, OUR GUYS: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND SECRET LIFE OF THE PERFECT SUBURB} 248 (Michael Kimmel ed. 1997)).
\item \textsuperscript{411}\textbf{SCHULHOFER, supra} note 5, at 64 (citing Charlene Muehlenhard & Lisa Hollabaugh, \textit{Do Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean Yes?}, 54 \textit{F. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.} \textbf{872} (1998)).
\item \textsuperscript{412}See Little, \textit{supra} note 313, at 1352.
\item \textsuperscript{413}\textit{Id.} at 1351.
\item \textsuperscript{414}See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 37 M.J. 670, 675 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993) (“In my view, we are attempting to apply a 1950’s law to the post-’sexual revolution’ morality [or lack of it] of the 1990’s.”).
\item \textsuperscript{415}UCMJ art. 120 (2005).
\item \textsuperscript{416}\textbf{SCHULHOFER, supra} note 5, at 62.
\item \textsuperscript{417}\textbf{MCM, supra} note 6, pt. I, ¶ 3.
\item \textsuperscript{418}\textbf{SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ, supra} note 7, at 117.
\end{thebibliography}
has three major policy objectives: deterrence, readiness, and good order and discipline. The proposed statute best achieves each of these objectives.

Education is a powerful tool for the military. Article 137 of the UCMJ requires the military to educate service members on relevant portions of the UCMJ, including the punitive articles. Personnel must receive the education within six days of entering active duty, again after six months of service, and upon reenlistment. The DOD requires additional training specifically addressing sexual assault. This mandatory education has an important effect on service members’ understanding of military law. Currently, every service member has been taught, in their training on the military definition of rape, that rape requires force. This, along with the messages service members receive from the media and popular culture, has undoubtedly shaped their understanding about what kind of sexual behavior is prohibited, and what is acceptable.

The military must send a stronger and louder message than the media and civilian society. Unfortunately, the message sent by the current and new force-centered laws is virtually inaudible. The proposed statute would send a clear message that sexual autonomy is a right the military demands for its members. Envision an entire generation of service members that has entered and risen through the ranks of a military that tells them, “If you have sex without first obtaining verbal consent, you are violating the UCMJ.” It is not unrealistic to think that a future military generation with this clear guidance will have far fewer instances of sexual assault.

The proposed statute would deter sexual assault not only through the threat of punishment; its clear guidance and simple, yet unequivocal message would educate service members about the specific behavior required of them. By providing an easily understood message with a clear standard, and by preventing miscommunication, the proposed statute would deter sexual assault in ways that the current and new statutes cannot.

d. Alcohol

Alcohol is a crucial element to solving the problem of sexual assault in the military. Alcohol is involved in the majority of rape cases reported in the military. There are no clear guidelines on how much alcohol or what level of intoxication negates a person’s capacity to consent. An affirmative consent requirement would help provide a bright line rule in these scenarios. If a person is not sober enough to clearly voice her desire or consent to engage in sexual activity, she has not consented.

When alcohol is involved, the victim may be unable, or less likely, to clearly and forcefully voice his opposition to an act, which is problematic when the current law “equate[s] passivity with consent.” A recent study commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council in the United Kingdom found that intoxication of the victim often serves to nullify the requirement for consent in the minds of jurors. The study noted that jurors viewed silence as a reasonable indication of consent. A law that does not default to consent, but requires a verbal manifestation of willingness will help to correct the skewed vision of consent many have in rape cases.

419 Id.
420 UCMJ art. 137.
421 Id.
422 See supra note 400 (describing DOD mandatory sexual assault training).
423 See supra note 411 (describing DOD mandatory sexual assault training).
424 See supra note 411-12.
425 See CARE FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 60; ACADEMIES TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 24.
427 Bryden, supra note 58, at 401.
429 Id.
Affirmative consent is not a “silver bullet” that will end sexual assault or result in guilty findings for all rapists. Requiring service members to communicate in a straightforward manner before sexual intercourse will not prevent military courts from having to decipher the facts of ‘he said, she said’ cases. What can be expected of the proposed statute is fewer instances of miscommunication, less gray area for those looking to push the limits (or simply unsure where the limit is), and eventually, a military culture of respect for every individual’s bodily integrity and sexual autonomy, resulting in enhanced military readiness.

2. Arguments Against Affirmative Consent

Requiring affirmative verbal consent is a controversial proposition. Critics worry it will spell the end of romance and turn sex into a contractual relationship. They are concerned about innocent, well-meaning men being caught up in an overly broad offense. Some even worry that certain women may be unable to affirmatively voice their consent. In each of these criticisms, however, affirmative consent arguably turns out to have a positive net effect. Romance and intimacy may actually be heightened by more effective communication. A clearly stated affirmative consent requirement will be easily understood and prevent miscommunication, thereby protecting the well-intended initiator. Lastly, both parties will be encouraged to say what they really mean, resulting in more responsible sexual behavior.

Nonetheless, the requirement for actual verbal consent would be extremely progressive. In fact, many of the scholars advocating consent-based statutes dismiss the idea of requiring actual verbal affirmation of consent as a bridge too far. Currently, New Jersey is the only state that has adopted an affirmative consent standard, and the court in Ex rel. M.T.S. specified that the affirmative consent need not be verbal. Schulhofer worries that the change is too radical and may be ignored by intimate partners, and even juries. In the end, he acknowledges that the “verbal-yes rule may be worth the costs,” but thinks the idea is too many steps beyond what contemporary courts would be willing to consider.

a. Loss of Romance and Spontaneity

Some critics fear that requiring affirmative consent would produce a bizarre world where romance could no longer exist because partners must ask permission before any sexual activity. They view sexual intimacy as “a runaway train that can be stopped for nothing as rational as a yes.” Schulhofer is also uncomfortable with the loss of spontaneity that may result, but he acknowledges that the requirement for verbal consent would lessen ambiguity and reduce the risk of misunderstanding. Ilene Seidman and Susan Vickers point to the “highly visible and largely successful public health campaign to promote condom use as a result of the AIDS epidemic.” The idea of getting people to stop and discuss safe sex before engaging in intercourse was once seen as impossible. Seidman and Vickers argue that getting an affirmative consent before engaging in intercourse was once seen as impossible.

430 Little, supra note 313, at 1345.
432 See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 58, at 406-07 (discussing the need for adequate notice).
433 Interview with LTC Timothy MacDonnell (former Trial Counsel Assistance Program (TCAP) attorney) and MAJ Jacqueline Emanuel (former trial defense attorney), TJAGLCS, in Charlottesville, Virginia (Feb. 20, 2007) [hereinafter MacDonnell Interview].
434 See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Allgeier & Betty J. Turner Royster, New Approaches to Dating and Sexuality, in SEXUAL COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 133 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds., 1991) (“Sexual interaction, particularly intercourse, is never utterly spontaneous in our culture. A couple needs to find a private location, get their clothes off, and so forth, and these activities involve two people to make decisions. . . . As far as romance is concerned, it is deepened . . . by sharing the kind of personal information with one another that is needed for true informed consent.”).
435 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 272; Bryden, supra note 58, at 406-07.
437 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 272.
438 Id. (noting that these courts are often “still willing to infer consent from passivity and silence, without any affirmative sign of consent”).
439 See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 431, at 48, 53.
440 Seidman & Vickers, supra note 87, at 489.
441 SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 272.
442 Seidman & Vickers, supra note 87, at 489.
443 Id.
“yes” before intercourse is “no more an imposition on sexual expression than condom use.” Another proponent of affirmative consent points out the oddity “that a requirement to ask permission before borrowing a roommate’s car needs no further justification, yet asking permission from one’s date to ensure that she too is willing to engage in sex is an imposition.”

The military already imposes certain restrictions on personal interaction and requires heightened precautions in normal social contact. Adultery and consensual sodomy are punishable under the UCMJ. An HIV-positive service member must disclose his medical condition to a potential sexual partner or face UCMJ punishment. Even common daily interaction is safeguarded. Consensual dating relationships between Soldiers of different ranks (for example, an officer and an enlisted member) are often prohibited, even if the two do not work together. The same regulation prohibits Soldiers of different ranks from conducting business together. The imposition upon individual service members to communicate clearly with a potential sex partner is a small price to pay for a new standard of respect for sexual autonomy. This culture of respect will eventually result in better communication, clearer standards, and in the end, improved military readiness.

b. Adequate Notice

One of the most often cited, and perhaps most legitimate concerns about affirmative consent is ensuring adequate notice. Though Bryden acknowledges the theoretical superiority of verbal consent, he worries that such a sweeping change to the law would result in innocent violations of the new law by the uninformed. Providing adequate notice of a significant change in law is important. In this respect, the military is in a uniquely fortunate position. Military members are routinely educated on the UCMJ, and the new law can be incorporated into sexual assault and values training as well. This type of training is already mandatory for all new entrants to active duty, and annually throughout their careers. The easily-understood concept of ensuring you have your partner’s permission before engaging in intercourse with them could be taught and reinforced in many ways. Because of the simplicity of the concept, the proposed statute would provide clearer notice of what constitutes a crime than either the current or new statute.

c. But What If Her “No” Means “Yes”?

Some critics of an affirmative consent standard seek to protect the shrinking violet’s right to have sex. They are concerned that a woman who does not want to seem forward or easy may not want or be able to frankly state her desire to engage in sexual intercourse. What if she says “no” but really means “yes”? The answer is simple: she doesn’t have sex that night. If she truly wants to engage in intercourse, she will find a way to communicate this to her partner. Currently, the shrinking violet faces the opposite problem. If a woman is not self-assured enough to tell her partner that she is not comfortable with intercourse, or to speak up more forcefully when he disregards her objections, the result is violation of her sexual autonomy. This outcome is far more harmful than the shy woman who is denied sexual activity because she was too embarrassed to say “yes.”

The relatively minor discomfort of having to ask if the partner consents may actually be lessened by the fact that the conversation is required by law. The requirement will likely make the question (and answer) seem less inappropriate or

444 Id.
445 Little, supra note 313, at 1352.
446 UCMJ art. 125 (2005) (sodomy); id. art. 134 (adultery).
448 AR 600-20, supra note 26, para. 14-4(c)(2).
449 Id. para. 14-4(c)(1).
450 Bryden, supra note 58, at 406-07.
451 Id.
452 See supra note 400 (describing DOD mandatory sexual assault training).
453 MacDonnell Interview, supra note 433.
454 Little, supra note 313, at 1353.
unnatural, and the stigma associated with it will diminish with time. Discomfort and some awkwardness seem a small price to pay for ensuring that your actions are wanted and will not unintentionally cause the other person pain or trauma.

d. Too Progressive

Schulhofer and Bryden are both concerned that requiring verbal consent is too progressive. The underlying theme of their criticisms, however, seems to be that in theory, verbal affirmative consent is likely to be the best solution. In civilian jurisdictions, the notice problem and risk of nullification may very well outweigh the potential benefit of requiring verbal consent. The real problem then, is that societal norms have not yet evolved to the point where verbal consent is a workable solution. The military is not society at large, and affirmative verbal consent is a workable solution for the armed forces. The military services have the unique ability to ensure adequate notice to every individual service member. Military personnel are accustomed to differing standards in the name of good order and discipline and military readiness. It may be that this relatively small imposition on individual service members results in a truly transformational impact on the culture, personal responsibility, and readiness of the armed forces.

V. Conclusion

The requirement that service members obtain affirmative consent from their partners before sex has the potential to be “the tipping point” in the military’s struggle against sexual assault. The DOD has invested substantial resources into solving this problem. An official endorsement of the concept of sexual autonomy as a right deserving the full protection of the UCMJ could very well bring about “the moment of critical mass” that pushes DOD’s battle over the edge to success. The result would be a military culture in which bodily integrity and sexual autonomy are accepted social norms, and the thought of engaging in sexual intercourse without the verbal consent of one’s partner is as taboo as drinking and driving.

The proposed statute is an aggressive, proactive step toward DOD’s goal of eliminating sexual assault from the military. Sexual assault is an issue that warrants a ground-breaking military law. The purpose of military law is “to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.” Arguably, there is no other internal issue facing the U.S. military that poses a greater threat to justice and good order and discipline than sexual assault.

The statute proposed by this thesis has the potential to be this catalyst for change because it would unequivocally proclaim that the military’s standard is absolute respect for sexual autonomy. This message would have meaning because it is backed by the authority of the UCMJ. Service members would easily understand exactly what is expected of them, and what the consequences are for failing to abide by the standard.

In addition, requiring affirmative consent would guard against miscommunication in the current culture of sexual freedom and require responsible sexual interaction on the part of both parties. A statute that clearly defines what is required and what is criminal with regard to sexual behavior will demand that service members live by the high standards the military expects of them. The end result will be a culture of respect for sexual autonomy with fewer sexual assaults, producing correspondingly high unit cohesion, morale, and military readiness.

455 Id.
456 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 272; Bryden, supra note 58, at 406-07.
457 Id.
458 See id.
459 MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2002). Gladwell argues that there is a “magic moment when an idea, trend, or social behavior crosses a threshold, tips, and spreads like wildfire.”
460 While there are not specific numbers, the DOD has created a new office (Sexual Assault Prevention and Response), an entire new program with training for every military member, and financed numerous Task Forces and study groups in their attempt to address the problem of sexual assault.
461 GLADWELL, supra note 459, at 12.
462 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at iii.
463 MCM, supra note 6, pt. I, ¶ 3.
Appendix A

Proposed Statute

Article 120. Rape, Wrongful Penetration, and other Sexual Misconduct

(a) Wrongful sexual penetration. Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual penetration with another person without first obtaining the affirmative verbal consent of that other person is guilty of wrongful sexual penetration and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) Wrongful sexual contact. Any person subject to this chapter who, without legal justification or lawful authorization, engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person without that other person’s permission is guilty of wrongful sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(c) Abusive sexual penetration. Any person subject to this chapter who commits the offense of wrongful sexual penetration upon another person—

(1) by threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping); or

(2) if that person is substantially incapable of appraising the nature of the sexual penetration or voicing that person’s freely given consent

is guilty of abusive sexual penetration and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(d) Abusive sexual contact. Any person subject to this chapter who engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (c) (abusive sexual penetration) had the sexual contact been a sexual penetration, is guilty of abusive sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(e) Rape. Any person subject to this chapter who commits the offense of wrongful sexual penetration upon another person—

(1) by using force against that other person;

(2) by causing bodily harm to any person;

(3) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subject to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping;

(4) by administering to another person by force or threat of force, or without the knowledge or permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby substantially impairs the ability of that person to appraise or control conduct; or

(5) who is sleeping or unconscious;

is guilty of rape and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(f) Aggravated sexual contact. Any person subject to this chapter who engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (e) (rape) had the sexual contact been a sexual penetration, is guilty of aggravated sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(g) In a prosecution under subsection (a),

A. It is a defense that the accused was married to, or cohabitating with the other person.

B. It is an affirmative defense that the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an incorrect belief that the other person affirmatively consented to the sexual penetration. The ignorance or mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused and must have been reasonable under all the circumstances.

(h) Definitions.

(1) Sexual penetration. The term “sexual penetration” means—

(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or anus, and for the purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight; or

(B) the penetration, however slight, of the genital opening or anus of another by hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

(2) Sexual contact. The term “sexual contact” means the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

(3) Affirmative consent. Affirmative consent is actual verbal consent prior to sexual penetration, clearly indicating that the other person is freely willing or desiring to engage in the penetration.

(i) Maximum Punishments

1. Wrongful Sexual Contact DD, BCD 1 yr Total Forfeitures
2. Wrongful Sexual Penetration DD, BCD 5 yrs Total Forfeitures
3. Abusive Sexual Contact DD, BCD 7 yrs Total Forfeitures
4. Aggravated Sexual Contact DD, BCD 20 yrs Total Forfeitures

644 SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 283 (using Schulhofer’s language “commits an act of sexual penetration”).
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Appendix B

The New Statute

Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552


SEC. 552. RAPE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND OTHER SEXUAL MISCONDUCT UNDER UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.
(a) Revision to UCMJ-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 920 of title 10, United States Code (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 920. Art. 120. Rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct
(a) Rape- Any person subject to this chapter who causes another person of any age to engage in a sexual act by—

(1) using force against that other person;
(2) causing grievous bodily harm to any person;
(3) threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping;
(4) rendering another person unconscious; or
(5) administering to another person by force or threat of force, or without the knowledge or permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby substantially impairs the ability of that other person to appraise or control conduct;

is guilty of rape and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(b) Rape of a Child- Any person subject to this chapter who--
(1) engages in a sexual act with a child who has not attained the age of 12 years; or
(2) engages in a sexual act under the circumstances described in subsection (a) with a child who has attained the age of 12 years;

is guilty of rape of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(c) Aggravated Sexual Assault- Any person subject to this chapter who--

(1) causes another person of any age to engage in a sexual act by--

(A) threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping); or
(B) causing bodily harm; or

(2) engages in a sexual act with another person of any age if that other person is substantially incapacitated or substantially incapable of--

(A) appraising the nature of the sexual act;
(B) declining participation in the sexual act; or
(C) communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act;

is guilty of aggravated sexual assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(d) Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in a sexual act with a child who has attained the age of 12 years is guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(e) Aggravated Sexual Contact- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (a) (rape) had the sexual contact been a sexual act, is guilty of aggravated sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(f) Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in a lewd act with a child is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(g) Aggravated Sexual Contact With a Child- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (b) (rape of a child) had the sexual contact been a sexual act, is guilty of aggravated sexual contact with a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(h) Abusive Sexual Contact- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault) had the sexual contact been a sexual act, is guilty of abusive sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(i) Abusive Sexual Contact With a Child- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (d) (aggravated sexual assault of a child) had the sexual contact been a sexual act, is guilty of abusive sexual contact with a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(j) Indecent Liberty With a Child- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in indecent liberty in the physical presence of a child--
   (1) with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or
   (2) with the intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person;
   is guilty of indecent liberty with a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(k) Indecent Act- Any person subject to this chapter who engages in indecent conduct is guilty of an indecent act and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(l) Forcible Pandering- Any person subject to this chapter who compels another person to engage in an act of prostitution with another person to be directed to said person is guilty of forcible pandering and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(m) Wrongful Sexual Contact- Any person subject to this chapter, without legal justification or lawful authorization, engages in sexual contact with another person without that other person’s permission is guilty of wrongful sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(n) Indecent Exposure- Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally exposes, in an indecent manner, in any place where the conduct involved may reasonably be expected to be viewed by people other than members of the actor’s family or household, the genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple is guilty of indecent exposure and shall by punished as a court-martial may direct.
(o) Age of Child-
   (1) TWELVE YEARS- In a prosecution under subsection (b) (rape of a child), subsection (g) (aggravated sexual contact with a child), or subsection (j) (indecent liberty with a child), it need not be proven that the accused knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act, contact, or liberty had not attained the age of 12 years. It is not an affirmative defense that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 12 years.
   (2) SIXTEEN YEARS- In a prosecution under subsection (d) (aggravated sexual assault of a child), subsection (f) (aggravated sexual abuse of a child), subsection (i) (abusive sexual contact with a child), or subsection (j) (indecent liberty with a child), it need not be proven that the accused knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act, contact, or liberty had not attained the age of 16 years. Unlike in paragraph (1), however, it is an affirmative defense that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 16 years.
(p) Proof of Threat- In a prosecution under this section, in proving that the accused made a threat, it need not be proven that the accused actually intended to carry out the threat.
(q) Marriage-
   (1) IN GENERAL- In a prosecution under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault), or under subsection (d) (aggravated sexual assault of a child), subsection (f) (aggravated sexual abuse of a child), subsection (j) (indecent liberty with a child), subsection (m) (wrongful sexual contact), or subsection (n) (indecent exposure), it is an affirmative defense that the accused and the other person when they engaged in the sexual act, sexual contact, or sexual conduct are married to each other.
   (2) DEFINITION- For purposes of this subsection, a marriage is a relationship, recognized by the laws of a competent State or foreign jurisdiction, between the accused and the other person as spouses. A marriage exists until it is dissolved in accordance with the laws of a competent State or foreign jurisdiction.
   (3) EXCEPTION- Paragraph (1) shall not apply if the accused’s intent at the time of the sexual conduct is to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person.
(r) Consent and Mistake of Fact as to Consent- Lack of permission is an element of the offense in subsection (m) (wrongful sexual contact). Consent and mistake of fact as to consent are not an issue, or an affirmative defense, in a prosecution under any other subsection, except they are an affirmative defense for the sexual conduct in issue in a prosecution under subsection (a) (rape), subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault), subsection (e) (aggravated sexual contact), and subsection (h) (abusive sexual contact).
(s) Other Affirmative Defenses not Precluded- The enumeration in this section of some affirmative defenses shall not be construed as excluding the existence of others.
(t) Definitions- In this section:
   (1) SEXUAL ACT- The term ‘sexual act’ means--
      (A) contact between the penis and the vulva, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight; or
      (B) the penetration, however slight, of the genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
   (2) SEXUAL CONTACT- The term ‘sexual contact’ means the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of another person, or intentionally causing another person to touch, either directly or through the clothing, the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
   (3) GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM- The term ‘grievous bodily harm’ means serious bodily injury. It includes fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs, and other severe bodily
injuries. It does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or a bloody nose. It is the same level of injury as in section 928 (article 128) of this chapter, and a lesser degree of injury than in section 2246(4) of title 18.

4) DANGEROUS WEAPON OR OBJECT- The term 'dangerous weapon or object' means--
   (A) any firearm, loaded or not, and whether operable or not;
   (B) any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that in the manner it is used, or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or grievous bodily harm; or
   (C) any object fashioned or utilized in such a manner as to lead the victim under the circumstances to reasonably believe it to be capable of producing death or grievous bodily harm.

5) FORCE- The term 'force' means action to compel submission of another or to overcome or prevent another's resistance by--
   (A) the use or display of a dangerous weapon or object;
   (B) the suggestion of possession of a dangerous weapon or object that is used in a manner to cause another to believe it is a dangerous weapon or object; or
   (C) physical violence, strength, power, or restraint applied to another person, sufficient that the other person could not avoid or escape the sexual conduct.

6) THREATENING OR PLACING THAT OTHER PERSON IN FEAR- The term 'threatening or placing that other person in fear' under paragraph (3) of subsection (a) (rape), or under subsection (e) (aggravated sexual contact), means a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the victim or another person being subjected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping.

7) THREATENING OR PLACING THAT OTHER PERSON IN FEAR-
   (A) IN GENERAL- The term 'threatening or placing that other person in fear' under paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault), or under subsection (h) (abusive sexual contact), means a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the victim or another being subjected to a lesser degree of harm than death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping.
   (B) INCLUSIONS- Such lesser degree of harm includes--
      (i) physical injury to another person or to another person's property; or
      (ii) a threat--
         (I) to accuse any person of a crime;
         (II) to expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or
         (III) through the use or abuse of military position, rank, or authority, to affect or threaten to affect, either positively or negatively, the military career of some person.

8) BODILY HARM- The term ‘bodily harm’ means any offensive touching of another, however slight.

9) CHILD- The term ‘child’ means any person who has not attained the age of 16 years.

10) LEWD ACT- The term ‘lewd act’ means--
    (A) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or
    (B) intentionally causing another person to touch, not through the clothing, the genitalia of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

11) INDECENT LIBERTY- The term ‘indecent liberty’ means indecent conduct, but physical contact is not required. It includes one who with the requisite intent exposes one’s genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple to a child. An indecent liberty may consist of communication of indecent language as long as the communication is made in the physical presence of the child. If words designed to excite sexual desire are spoken to a child, or a child is exposed to or involved in sexual conduct, it is an indecent liberty; the child’s consent is not relevant.

12) INDECENT CONDUCT- The term ‘indecent conduct’ means that form of immorality relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual relations. Indecent conduct includes observing, or making a videotape, photograph, motion picture, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, electronically, or chemically reproduced visual material, without another person’s consent, and contrary to that other person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, of--
    (A) that other person’s genitalia, anus, or buttocks, or (if that other person is female) that person’s areola or nipple; or
    (B) that other person while that other person is engaged in a sexual act, sodomy (under section 925 (article 125)), or sexual contact.

13) ACT OF PROSTITUTION- The term ‘act of prostitution’ means a sexual act, sexual contact, or lewd act for the purpose of receiving money or other compensation.

14) CONSENT- The term ‘consent’ means words or overt acts indicating a freely given agreement to the sexual conduct at issue by a competent person. An expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission resulting from the accused’s use of force, threat of force, or placing another person in fear does not constitute consent. A current or previous dating relationship by itself or the manner of
dress of the person involved with the accused in the sexual conduct at issue shall not constitute consent. A person cannot consent to sexual activity if--

(A) under 16 years of age; or
(B) substantially incapable of--
(i) appraising the nature of the sexual conduct at issue due to--
   (I) mental impairment or unconsciousness resulting from consumption of alcohol, drugs, a similar substance, or otherwise; or
   (II) mental disease or defect which renders the person unable to understand the nature of the sexual conduct at issue;
(ii) physically declining participation in the sexual conduct at issue; or
(iii) physically communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual conduct at issue.

(15) MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO CONSENT- The term 'mistake of fact as to consent' means the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an incorrect belief that the other person engaging in the sexual conduct consented. The ignorance or mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused and must have been reasonable under all the circumstances. To be reasonable the ignorance or mistake must have been based on information, or lack of it, which would indicate to a reasonable person that the other person consented. Additionally, the ignorance or mistake cannot be based on the negligent failure to discover the true facts. Negligence is the absence of due care. Due care is what a reasonably careful person would do under the same or similar circumstances. The accused’s state of intoxication, if any, at the time of the offense is not relevant to mistake of fact. A mistaken belief that the other person consented must be that which a reasonably careful, ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have had under the circumstances at the time of the offense.

(16) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE- The term ‘affirmative defense’ means any special defense which, although not denying that the accused committed the objective acts constituting the offense charged, denies, wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility for those acts. The accused has the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of evidence. After the defense meets this burden, the prosecution shall have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the affirmative defense did not exist.’.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The item relating to section 920 (article 120) in the table of sections at the beginning of subchapter X of chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended to read as follows:

920. 120. Rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct.’.

(b) Interim Maximum Punishments- Until the President otherwise provides pursuant to section 856 of title 10, United States Code (article 56 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the punishment which a court-martial may direct for an offense under section 920 of such title (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), as amended by subsection (a), may not exceed the following limits:

(1) SUBSECTIONS (a) AND (b)- For an offense under subsection (a) (rape) or subsection (b) (rape of a child), death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
(2) SUBSECTION (c)- For an offense under subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault), dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 30 years.
(3) SUBSECTIONS (d) AND (e)- For an offense under subsection (d) (aggravated sexual assault of a child) or subsection (e) (aggravated sexual contact), dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 20 years.
(4) SUBSECTIONS (f) AND (g)- For an offense under subsection (f) (aggravated sexual abuse of a child) or subsection (g) (aggravated sexual contact with a child), dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 15 years.
(5) SUBSECTIONS (h) THROUGH (j)- For an offense under subsection (h) (abusive sexual contact), subsection (i) (abusive sexual contact with a child), or subsection (j) (indecent liberty with a child), dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 7 years.
(6) SUBSECTIONS (k) AND (l)- For an offense under subsection (k) (indecent act) or subsection (l) (forcible pandering), dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.
(7) SUBSECTIONS (m) AND (n)- For an offense under subsection (m) (wrongful sexual contact) or subsection (n) (indecent exposure), dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for one year.

(c) Applicability- Section 920 of title 10, United States Code (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), as amended by subsection (a), shall apply with respect to offenses committed on or after the effective date specified in subsection (f).

(d) Aggravating Factors for Offense of Murder- Section 918 of title 10, United States Code (article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended in paragraph (4) by striking ‘rape,’ and inserting ‘rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual contact with a child,’.
(e) Statute of Limitations- Section 843(a) of title 10, United States Code (article 843(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), as amended by section 553(a), is amended by striking ‘or rape,’ and inserting, ‘rape, or rape of a child,’.

(f) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on October 1, 2007.
How Far Is Too Far? Helping the Commander to Keep Control Without Going over the Line; the Trial Practitioner’s Guide to Conditions on Liberty and Article 13 Credit

Major John M. McCabe∗

The name given to the type of restraint imposed is not suasive, because nomina mutabilia sunt, res autem immobiles.¹

I. Introduction

The trial counsel diligently works at his desk. The phone rings. The company commander, Captain Smith, has just found out that Private Snuffy has returned from his six-month absence without leave (AWOL). Captain Smith asks, “What can we do with this guy? Can I put him in jail? Can I lock him in the day room? Can I put him on restriction? What can I do so this guy doesn’t flee again?” He wants an answer quickly.

A quick answer may be helpful, but quality advice will protect everyone’s interests. The trial counsel’s first priority should be to advise the command of the proper action to take. If the defense counsel files a motion claiming that illegal pretrial punishment or unduly harsh circumstances of confinement have occurred, the actions taken are what will later be judged to determine if the accused will be entitled to credit. Good intentions, although a factor, will not always suffice before the judge. The commander’s actions will carry the day when arguing a motion in the area of pretrial restraint. However, one should also advise commanders on maintaining the proper terminology under the Rules of Court Martial (RCM), such as “conditions on liberty” and “pretrial restraint.”

This primer discusses the proper actions for pretrial restraint and conditions on liberty. This article will assist the practicing trial counsel in making the right decisions in advising the commander on appropriate pretrial restraints and conditions on liberty. Furthermore, this primer will assist defense counsel in recognizing when the command has gone too far on appropriate pretrial restraint and conditions on liberty. When the command does go too far, this primer will assist the defense counsel in filing an appropriate Article 13 motion.²

II. The Basics

A. Pretrial Restraint (RCM 304) or Pretrial Confinement (RCM 305)

Rule for Courts-Martial 304 provides that “pretrial restraint is moral or physical restraint on a person’s liberty which is imposed before and during disposition of offenses. Pretrial restraint may consist of conditions on liberty,³ restriction in lieu of arrest,⁴ arrest,⁵ or confinement.”⁶


¹ United States v. Gregory, 21 M.J. 952, 959 (A.C.M.R. 1986) (quoting the court on the effect of pretrial restraint and not what label is put on the restraint). “Loosely translated, this phrase means: ‘A name may be true or false, or may change, but the thing itself always maintains an identity.’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 946 (5th ed. 1979)). Id. at n.1.

² UCMJ art. 13 (2005).

³ MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 304(a)(1) (2005) [hereinafter MCM] (“Conditions on liberty are imposed by orders directing a person to do or refrain from doing specified acts. Such conditions may be imposed in conjunction with other forms of restraint or separately.”).

⁴ Id. R.C.M. 304(a)(2) (“Restriction in lieu of arrest is the restraint of a person by oral or written orders directing the person to remain within specified limits; a restricted person shall, unless otherwise directed, perform full military duties while restricted.”).
The trial counsel and defense counsel must understand the proper use of conditions on liberty. “Conditions on liberty include orders to report periodically to a specified official, orders not to go to a certain place (such as the scene of an alleged offense), and orders not to associate with specified persons (such as the alleged victim or potential witnesses).” These types of conditions on liberty often include limits to the company area, place of duty, the dining facility, and place of religious worship. For example, conditions that limit off post access or limit on-post access to certain places have been deemed proper conditions on liberty.8

“Conditions on liberty must not hinder pretrial preparation, however. Thus, when such conditions are imposed, they must [be] sufficiently flexible to permit pretrial preparation.”9 Commanders should ensure that the accused Soldier has adequate access to his defense counsel. Adequate access to defense counsel requires commanders to allow for adequate time during the duty day, if necessary, and for adequate consultation and preparation with defense counsel.

A proper condition on liberty will not equate to any credit for pretrial confinement or restraint. Proper conditions on liberty will also not start the 120-day speedy trial clock.10

Although not always dispositive for judges ruling on actions by the command, trial counsel should reinforce proper terminology to commanders. Proper terminology will assist trial counsel in teaching commanders the reasons behind conditions on liberty. A condition on liberty is not a term used to carry out punishment. On the other hand, the term “restriction” connotes punishment. For example, commanders often want to restrict the Soldier to post or to the barracks. Restriction is generally a term for post-Article 15 punishment.11 Use of proper terminology is a tool for counsel to ensure that conditions put on the Soldiers are for control purposes rather than a means for punishment. Commanders should continuously be trained on the underlying reasoning behind their actions. The commander’s reasons and actions must include a focus on control, not punishment. Despite terminology, however, when conditions on liberty become punishment or become too onerous, credit may be granted. In general, the courts have determined that credit shall be granted under RCM 30512 in situations where conditions on liberty or pretrial restraint are so onerous that it equates to “restriction tantamount to confinement.”13

B. Pretrial Restraint, Restriction Tantamount to Confinement or Physical Restraint

One critical reason why the trial counsel must give good advice on pretrial restraint or conditions on liberty is judicially-based credit. If the command sets conditions that are too harsh or too restrictive, these conditions may later be judged as

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5 Id. R.C.M. 304(a)(3). Rule for Courts-Martial 304(a)(3) states:

Arrest is the restraint of a person by oral or written order not imposed as punishment, directing the person to remain within specified limits; a person in the status of arrest may not be required to perform full military duties such as commanding or supervising personnel, serving as guard, or bearing arms. The status of arrest automatically ends when the person is placed, by the authority who ordered the arrest or a superior authority, on duty inconsistent with the status of arrest, but this shall not prevent requiring the person arrested to do ordinary cleaning or policing, or to take part in routine training and duties.

Id.

6 Id. R.C.M. 304(a)(4) (“Pretrial confinement is physical restraint, imposed by order of competent authority, depriving a person of freedom pending disposition of offenses. See R.C.M. 305.”).

7 Id. R.C.M. 304(a) discussion.


9 See MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 304(a) discussion.

10 See id. R.C.M. 707(a).


12 See id. R.C.M. 305(a) (“Pretrial confinement is physical restraint, imposed by order of competent authority, depriving a person of freedom pending disposition of charges.”).

13 See United States v. Gregory, 21 M.J. 952 (A.C.M.R. 1986). See also United States v. Smith, 20 M.J. 528 (A.C.M.R. 1985); Wiggins v. Greenwald, 20 M.J. 823 (A.C.M.R 1985); Washington v. Greenwald, 20 M.J. 699 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (determining whether the restraint imposed was lawful and so onerous as to find that it was tantamount to confinement).
“tantamount to confinement” that rises to physical restraint. The defense counsel will want to evaluate all conditions on liberty to determine if a motion for credit is appropriate. Defense counsel need to assess all orders that are close to or appear to be actual “physical restraint.”

The military court-martial may provide credit for pretrial confinement or pretrial punishment. “The issue of credit for pretrial confinement and/or punishment has a long history in military law.” Generally, Article 13 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) forbids “pretrial punishment as well as arrest or confinement more rigorous than necessary to assure the accused’s presence at trial.” Rule for Courts-Martial 304(f) expressly forbids pretrial restraint as punishment and any use of pretrial restraint as punishment. When pretrial punishment or conditions more rigorous than required to insure the accused’s presence at trial is ordered, an accused may be entitled to relief under Article 13 of the UCMJ.

A court must decide “whether . . . pretrial confinement conditions constitute illegal pretrial punishment or constitute legally permissible restraint.” The court will determine whether the conditions are “for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not make punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation.”

There are three distinct categories of credit that can be granted to an accused. First, legal pretrial confinement is credited day for day. For example, an accused allegedly commits murder and after a pretrial confinement review, a magistrate upholds the commander’s decision for pretrial confinement. Second, the courts allow day for day credit for conditions on liberty that rise to the level of pretrial confinement or physical restraint. A common example is the command that locks an accused Soldier in his barracks room, feeds him his meals in the room and keeps a guard at the door for the weekend until trial counsel can be notified. Finally, the military judge may grant more than day for day credit for illegal pretrial confinement that equates to pretrial punishment.

These examples are varied and can be achieved after legal pretrial confinement or circumstances amount to harsh or restrictive conditions on liberty. Other examples include the following: placing a Soldier in solitary confinement for no legitimate purpose or parading a shackled Soldier in front of the unit to make an example of drug users to illustrate what happens to such criminals in the unit. The types of credit available are formally outlined in the next section.

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14 See generally United States v. Rendon, 58 M.J. 221 (2003) (discussing that RCM 305 applies to restriction tantamount to confinement only when that restriction rises to the level of “physical restraint”).


16 Id. See also UCMJ art. 13. Article 13 states:

No person, while being held for trial, may be subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances required to insure his presence, but he may be subjected to minor punishment during that period for infractions of discipline.

Id.

17 See MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 304(f). Rule for Courts-Martial 304(f) states:

Punishment prohibited. Pretrial restraint is not punishment and shall not be used as such. No person who is restrained pending trial may be subjected to punishment or penalty for the offense which is the basis for that restraint. Prisoners being held for trial shall not be required to undergo punitive duty hours or training, perform punitive labor, or wear special uniforms prescribed only for post-trial prisoners. This rule does not prohibit minor punishment during pretrial confinement for infractions of the rules of the place of confinement. Prisoners shall be afforded facilities and treatment under regulations of the Secretary concerned.

Id.

18 See UCMJ art. 13.


C. Types of Credit

In 1984, the Court of Military Appeals allowed Allen credit for legal pretrial confinement although such confinement was not considered punishment. Allen credit is computed as day for day credit when the accused was legally placed in pretrial confinement. The court in Allen took guidance from a Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) in order to maintain consistency with current federal law that allows day for day credit for legal pretrial confinement.

In addition to Allen credit, two additional pretrial credits exist: Mason and Suzuki credits. Mason credit, which is mutually exclusive from Allen credit, is day for day credit allowed for pretrial restriction that is equivalent to confinement. Suzuki credit allows for more than day for day credit for illegal pretrial confinement amounting to punishment. Unlike Allen and Mason credit which come from case law, RCM 305(k) explicitly recognizes Suzuki credit.

As an aside, for completeness, Pierce credit (also from case law)—an issue outside the scope of this primer—is given when an accused already received punishment from non-judicial punishment, but is court-martialed for the same charges. Based on Pierce credit, when an accused is court-martialed for the same charges as a previous Article 15, the accused is entitled to complete credit for any and all non-judicial punishment adjudged. Pierce allows the accused credit day for day, dollar for dollar and stripe for stripe.

D. Case Law—Pretrial Restraint Tantamount to Confinement

The court in United States v. Smith looked at the totality of the conditions to determine if the pretrial restraint was in fact “tantamount to confinement.” The court considered some relevant factors in its determination:

The nature of the restraint (physical or moral), the area or scope of the restraint (confined to post, barracks, room, etc.), the types of duties, if any performed during the restraint (routine military duties, fatigue duties, etc.), and the degree of privacy enjoyed within the area of restraint.

The court also considered additional conditions which could significantly affect the four factors above. These conditions were:

[W]hether the accused was required to sign in periodically with some supervising authority; whether a charge of quarters or other authority periodically checked to ensure the accused’s presence; whether the accused was required to be under armed or unarmed escort; whether and to what degree accused was allowed visitation and telephone privileges; what religious, medical, recreational, educational, or other support facilities were available for the accused’s use; the location of the accused’s sleeping

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24 See id. (referencing DODI 1325.4). Department of Defense Instruction 1325.4 has been replaced by DODI 1325.7 which provides “[p]risoners shall be given credit for time served toward a sentence to confinement until the term of the confinement is served . . . . No credit for time served shall be given during periods in which the term of confinement is interrupted by unauthorized absence.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE, ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND CLEMENCY AND PAROLE AUTHORITY para. 6.3.1.2 (17 July 2001).
27 See Rock, 52 M.J. at 156.
29 See id.
31 Id. at 531.
accommodations; and whether the accused was allowed to retain and use his personal property (including his civilian clothing).32

Despite previous courts defining restriction tantamount to confinement as the trigger for applying credit under RCM 305, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) further clarified that restriction tantamount to confinement “does not, per se, trigger, justify or require application of R.C.M. 305.”33 There has often been confusion about how commanders and advising Judge Advocates can know what pretrial restraints are acceptable. The court in Gregory concluded that “most severe forms of pretrial restraint will not be tantamount to confinement and thus, RCM 305 will not be applicable.”34 The Gregory court went on to advise: “Judge Advocates should become familiar with the distinction between Smith and the Wiggins/Washington cases and advise commanders accordingly.”35

E. Case Law—Physical Restraint

The court in Rendon attempted to clarify that “the conditions or terms of the restriction must constitute physical restraint depriving an accused of his or her freedom. Anything less is outside the scope of R.C. M. 305.”36

The Rendon court provided the following analysis:

On its face, R.C.M. 305 applies to “pretrial confinement.” R.C.M. 305(b) directs that an accused may only be “confined if the requirements of this rule are met.” Conspicuously absent from R.C.M. 305(b), or anywhere else in R.C.M. 305 is any reference to applying the procedural or credit provisions of the rule to any other form of pretrial restraint. R.C.M. 305(k), the credit provision upon which appellee relies, is limited by unambiguous language to “confined served” after noncompliance with R.C.M. 305(f), (h), (i), or (j). There is no support in R.C.M. 305 for applying R.C.M. 305(k) to any lesser form of restraint.

Further, the nature of pretrial confinement or “confined served” encompassed by the R.C.M. 305 is clear: “pretrial confinement is physical restraint . . . depriving a person of freedom pending disposition of offenses.” . . . We find no evidence that the President intended the procedural protections or credit provided in R.C.M. 305 to apply to anything other than the physical restraint attendant to pretrial confinement.37

In United States v. Rendon, the appellee sought administrative credit for pretrial constraint that consisted of a written order of restriction.38 The conditions rising to the level of restriction tantamount to confinement were:

1. Appellee was restricted to Training Center Yorktown.
2. Appellee was permitted to eat at the Coast Guard Dining Facility during regular meal hours.
3. Appellee was prohibited from wearing civilian clothing other than gym attire while at the gym. His civilian clothing was temporarily taken from him.
4. Appellee was required to move from his room to a restriction room where he enjoyed less privacy. Appellee was not, however, physically limited to only the barracks or the “restriction room.”
5. Appellee was permitted visitors only with prior approval.
6. Appellee could not consume alcohol.
7. Appellee had reporting requirements after duty hours and on weekends.
8. After 2200 hours, Appellee could not leave his room unless there was an emergency.

32 Id. at 531, 532.
35 Id. See also Wiggins v. Greenwald 20 M.J. 823, 824 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (Wiggins received no credit as it was deemed that his conditions were lawful and that “the conditions of restraint, though substantial, were less onerous than those which were found tantamount to confinement . . . .”); Smith, 20 M.J. 528 (Smith’s conditions, on the other hand, rose to “restriction tantamount to confinement” and Smith received fifty-six days credit for the period of restriction served prior to trial. Smith’s restrictions, however, were also deemed legal.).
36 Rendon, 58 M.J. at 224.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 222.
9. Appellee was required to get permission to go to sick call.
10. Appellee could not utilize the Mariner’s Mart, Liberty Lounge, or the Cyber Cafe.
11. Personal property that Appellee brought to the “restriction room” was inspected, including his purchases from the Exchange.
12. Appellee’s telephone and pager were taken from him and he was specifically prohibited from using them.
13. Appellee was told he could not use Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facilities.
14. Appellee was not required to be accompanied by an escort when he left the barracks.39

The trial judge found that, although a close call, the restriction was tantamount to confinement and awarded Mason credit.40 On appeal, the Coast Guard Court of Appeals found that “the military judge erred when he declined to award Appellee additional credit for a violation of R.C.M. 305.”41 For the reasons discussed above, the CAAF set aside the Coast Guard’s court decision because the appellee was not physically restrained, only geographically limited.42 These conditions on liberty only limited the accused to certain geographical limits and did not rise to the level of physical restraint. Therefore, the accused was not entitled to credit for these particular limitations.

F. Case Law—Two-Part Test

The military courts have generally applied a two-part test in determining whether pretrial restraint amounts to pretrial punishment, or whether the actions are legally permissible restraint.43 First, the court must determine “whether appellant’s pretrial confinement conditions constitute illegal pretrial punishment or constitute legally permissible restraint.”44 In deciding this issue, the court will attempt to determine the intent of the command.45 The court will determine if the “conditions are imposed ‘for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.’”46 Second, the court must determine whether the arrest or confinement imposed is more rigorous than circumstances require to ensure the presence of the accused.47 The Recent Developments/Case Law section in this article examines specific cases to help clarify this two-part test.

G. Other Consequences of Pretrial Confinement (RCM 305)

1. Speedy Trial Clock

Another result beyond credit for pretrial confinement is the start of the speedy trial clock.48 Rule for Courts-Martial 707(a) requires that the accused be brought to trial within 120 days of preferral of charges or imposition of restraint for restriction in lieu of restraint, arrest or confinement as defined in RCM 304(a)(2)–(4).49 Conditions on liberty do not invoke the speedy trial clock. Rule for Courts-Martial 707(a)(2) does not list RCM 304(a)(1) (conditions on liberty) as an imposition of restraint. In fact, conditions on liberty is expressly absent, therefore, conditions on liberty do not invoke the speedy trial clock.

39 Id. at 223.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 224.
42 See id. at 226.
44 Gilchrist, 61 M.J. at 796.
45 See id.
46 Id. (citing Palmiter, 20 M.J. at 99) (Everett, C.J., concurring in result) (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538)).
47 See id.; see also UCMJ art. 13.
48 See MCM, supra note 3, R.C.M. 304(a) discussion.
49 Id. R.C.M. 707(a)(1)(2).
2. **Requirements to Continue Pretrial Confinement (RCM 305)**

Rule for Courts-Martial 305(h)(B) requires the commander to release the accused from pretrial confinement unless the commander believes upon probable cause that:

1. an offense triable by court-martial has been committed;
2. the prisoner committed it; and
3. confinement is necessary because it is foreseeable that (a) the prisoner will not appear at trial, pretrial hearing or investigation, or (b) the prisoner will engage in serious criminal misconduct; and (c) less severe restraints are inadequate.\(^{50}\)

A forty-eight hour probable cause determination by a neutral and detached officer is required after pretrial confinement is ordered.\(^{51}\) Further, a seven day review of pretrial confinement is required by a neutral and detached officer appointed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the secretary concerned.\(^{52}\) The seven day review shall determine if probable cause exists for pretrial confinement and the necessity of continued pretrial confinement.\(^{53}\) In accordance with the Army’s Part Time Military Magistrate (PTMM) Program, the forty-eight hour probable cause determination is not required if the PTMM holds a pre-trial confinement review within forty-eight hours of an individual’s confinement.\(^{54}\) Past Army practice has encouraged trial counsel to schedule the magistrate review within forty-eight hours of confinement to avoid the neutral and detached officer requirement.

3. **Factors to Consider for Pretrial Confinement**

   “A person should not be confined as a mere matter of convenience or expedience.”\(^{55}\)

Some factors to be considered are:

1. The nature and circumstances of the offenses charged or suspected, including extenuating circumstances;
2. The weight of the evidence against the accused;
3. The accused’s ties to the locale, including family, off-duty employment, financial resources, and the length of residence;
4. The accused’s character and mental condition;
5. The accused’s service record, including any record of previous misconduct;
6. The accused’s record of appearance at or flight from other pretrial investigations, trials, and similar proceedings; and
7. The likelihood that the accused can and will commit further serious criminal misconduct if allowed to remain at liberty.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{50}\) *Id.* R.C.M. 305(h)(B).

\(^{51}\) *Id.* R.C.M. 305(i)(1).

\(^{52}\) *Id.* R.C.M. 305(i)(2).

\(^{53}\) *Id.*

\(^{54}\) U.S. ARMY CHIEF TRIAL JUDICIARY, STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR MILITARY MAGISTRATES 10 (15 Oct. 2006).

\(^{55}\) See MCM, *supra* note 3, R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B) discussion.

\(^{56}\) *Id.*
III. Recent Developments/Case Law for Legal and Illegal Pretrial Restraint/Confinement

A. Shackled to a Cot\textsuperscript{57}

A general court-martial convicted Private First Class Gilchrist, pursuant to his guilty pleas, of going from his appointed place of duty, disrespect toward a superior noncommissioned officer, failure to obey a lawful order (three specifications), wrongful use of marijuana, Xanax and cocaine (one specification each), wrongful distribution of Xanax (two specifications), and larceny of other than military property (two specifications).\textsuperscript{58} The military judge also convicted Gilchrist of failure to obey a lawful order, contrary to his plea on that specification.\textsuperscript{59}

The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) considered whether Gilchrist should have received Article 13 credit for being shackled to a cot for eight hours in a utility room known as the “ice house.”\textsuperscript{60} The court adopted the following facts found by the military judge:

On or about 16 January 2002, the accused was transported back to Fort Bliss from Fort Knox for the Article 32 investigation relating to additional charges in this case. Because the Provost Marshal [detention] cell was full, the accused was placed in a utility room on the first floor of the barracks. The room was called the Ice House because an ice-making machine was housed inside the room. It was well known to those in the unit. The room also contained a metal cot, several tables, as well as barracks maintenance equipment. There is no latrine in the room. The [charge of quarters (CQ)] desk was located 10–20 feet away from the door to the room. The duty drill sergeant’s office was located another 10 feet from the CQ desk.

The military judge also found that appellant arrived between 2200 and 2300, was “secured with leg irons to one of the legs of the cot,” and that SFC Wyatt “had to wake [appellant] in the morning at approximately 0630.”\textsuperscript{61}

For unrelated reasons, “the military judge granted five days credit for [a] name calling and ‘public denunciation’ in violation of Article 13, UCMJ, but [granted] no credit for having been shackled to the cot.”\textsuperscript{62}

The ACCA concluded that they would evaluate a two-part test to determine if credit was required for shackling a Soldier to a cot. First, they would decide “whether appellant’s pretrial confinement conditions constitute illegal pretrial punishment or constitute legally permissible restraint.”\textsuperscript{63} Second, they would “determine if appellant’s shackling to a barracks room cot was ‘more rigorous’ confinement ‘than . . . required to insure’ appellant’s presence.”\textsuperscript{64}

In looking at the first point, ACCA had to determine whether the conditions were imposed “for the purpose of punishment or whether [they were] but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.”\textsuperscript{65} The ACCA found that the pre-trial confinement conditions of being shackled to the cot in the ice house did not constitute illegal pretrial confinement.\textsuperscript{66} They agreed with the military judge that the conditions were not made with the intent to punish or

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{57} United States v. Gilchrist, 61 M.J. 785 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Id. at 786.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Id. at 787.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Id. at 795.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} See id. at 796.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Id. at 797.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} See id. at 796 (quoting United States v. Palmiter, 20 M.J. 90, 99 (C.M.A. 1985) (Everett, C.J., concurring in the result)).
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Gilchrist, 61 M.J. at 798.
\end{itemize}
The testimony revealed that the main reason he was kept in the room was because the detention cell was full. Gilchrist was shackled because a previous detainee, who was not shackled, had escaped from the window in the room.

As to the second part of the test, the ACCA concluded that the restraint was more rigorous than necessary. The record contained “no evidence indicating appellant was a flight risk or posed a risk to others.” The court determined that at least four other Soldiers were available in the barracks that night and other lesser restraints were available.

In summary, the court awarded “ten days of confinement credit for the unusually harsh circumstances of appellant’s pretrial confinement while awaiting his Article 32, UCMJ, investigative hearing.” The ACCA found that shackling a pretrial prisoner to a cot was not per se unduly harsh, but they were not persuaded that shackling was required in this situation. Therefore, this case emphasizes the importance of the underlying reasons for the commander’s actions in determining whether credit is appropriate.

B. End of Service Obligation While in Pretrial Confinement

In United States v. Fischer, a Soldier was in pretrial confinement when his service obligation expired. The case explored whether appellant was subjected to illegal pretrial punishment when his pay stopped because of the end of his service obligation. The CAAF affirmed the lower court’s decision stating that there was a legitimate non-punitive reason behind the Defense Department Finance Regulation which required the government to stop a servicemember’s pay when he reached his end of service date. The court determined that there was no distinction between a servicemember in pretrial confinement or any other status upon expiration of their service obligation. The court stated that “[a]ll service members lose their entitlement to pay and allowances upon expiration of their enlistment contract.”

There are two exceptions to the policy but the appellant did not qualify for either. One exception is if the servicemember remains in service and performs productive work. The court found that standard confinement duties did not qualify as performing productive work. The second exception requires that, upon acquittal, the service member be retroactively paid. Fischer did not qualify for this exception as he was convicted.
The court also considered if the regulation was excessive.\textsuperscript{84} Excessiveness is determined by evaluating whether the action is “more rigorous than necessary” under the circumstances. The CAAF disagreed, citing that even in a civilian context, confinees will lose jobs and income and the policy to reimburse those acquitted was more generous than its civilian counterpart and, therefore, was not excessive.\textsuperscript{85}

The dissent in \textit{Fischer} (a close, 3-2 decision) stated that “the regulation requiring the determination of pay [in these] circumstances is punitive in effect and its application constitutes illegal pretrial punishment.”\textsuperscript{86} The dissent could not concur in the view that the “[g]overnment can, solely for its own purposes, imprison a presumptively innocent individual, unilaterally continue military status with all its obligations and duties and at the same time take away one of the basic rights associated with active duty military status—the right to pay.”\textsuperscript{87} The dissent believed that the majority relied too heavily on the fiscal and historical perspective and did not properly interpret Article 13.\textsuperscript{88}

Once again, the underlying reasons behind the action control the appropriateness of awarding credit. In this case, the legitimate, non-punitive reasons for the action determined that no credit was justified.

C. Soldier in Solitary Pretrial Confinement Isolated from Other Prisoners

The CAAF granted review in \textit{United States v. King} to determine if Deandrea J. King, Jr., U.S Air Force, was improperly denied credit from a military judge because his status as a “maximum security” prisoner was illegal pretrial punishment.\textsuperscript{89} The court used the two part test which prohibits the intent to punish and the imposition of unduly rigorous circumstances.\textsuperscript{90}

After an initial evaluation, the confinement facility designated King as a maximum security prisoner and confined him in a double occupancy cell with certain maximum security restrictions.\textsuperscript{91} These restrictions included:

1. Remaining in the cell with the exception of appointments and emergencies;
2. Eating all meals in the cell (meals were delivered to the cell);
3. No library or gym privileges (books and gym equipment were delivered to the cell);
4. No sleeping during duty hours;
5. A requirement to wear a yellow jumpsuit and shackles when released for appointments; and
6. Two escorts, one of whom was armed, whenever King was moved to appointments.\textsuperscript{92}

King asserted that “he was unlawfully punished by being commingled with a sentenced prisoner and later when he had to endure two weeks of solitary confinement after [his] request for a waiver of the prohibition against commingling pre- and post trial prisoners was denied.”

The CAAF was reluctant to second guess the security determinations of the confinement officials and found no intent to punish and no excessive punishment as to the commingled conditions.\textsuperscript{94} Commingling is a factor to consider, but not per se a

\textsuperscript{84}Id. at 421 (Erdmann, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{85}Id.
\textsuperscript{86}Id. at 422.
\textsuperscript{87}Id. at 423.
\textsuperscript{88}Id. at 422.
\textsuperscript{89}61 M.J. 225 (2005).
\textsuperscript{90}Id.
\textsuperscript{91}Id.
\textsuperscript{92}Id. at 226.
\textsuperscript{93}Id. at 227.
\textsuperscript{94}Id. at 228.
violation of Article 13. However, the CAAF did find that the period King was segregated without explanation was so excessive as to be punishment. Under RCM 305(k), the court provided three days of credit for each day he was confined in solitary.

The *King* case again illustrates the importance of focusing commanders on the reasons for designating actions against an accused. Preparing a commander to articulate her reasons for the actions she takes against an accused is vitally important when Article 13 issues are raised.

In the recently-decided case, *United States v. Adcock*, the CAAF granted two for one credit for an Air Force officer who was placed in civilian pretrial confinement in violation of several provisions of the Department of Air Force, Instruction 31-205. In a ruling opposite to that found in the *King* case, where excessive punishment was found, the military judge ruled that there was a legitimate non-punitive governmental objective and there was no intent to punish. Referring to *King*, the CAAF conceded that "confined in violation of service regulations does not create a per se right to sentencing credit under the UCMJ." The CAAF found that knowingly and deliberately violating confinement service regulations allows a military judge to consider credit for these violations under RCM 305(k). Accordingly, counsel should be aware of their particular service regulations and instructions for confinement.

IV. Deployment Issues

Trial counsel will have to make some unique decisions while prosecuting cases in a deployed environment. This section explores some unique challenges that may arise. The following topics come from issues in the Abu Ghraib cases after preferral of charges. Private Charles Graner, after his conviction, raised three Article 13 issues (among others). These three main issues raised were: (1) having his weapon removed in a combat environment; (2) denial of leave; and (3) being ordered to work outside of his primary and secondary military occupation specialty (MOS).

A. Taking a Weapon from an Accused after Preferral of Charges in a Combat Environment

Upon preferral of charges, the company commander ordered the removal of then-Specialist (SPC) Charles Graner’s personal M16 weapon and all ammunition. The company commander explained that based on the pictures, the evidence, and the charges, he determined that these behaviors showed a lack of self-discipline, a lack of self-control, and no concern for human life. In addition, the commander explained that he had a major concern for the safety of other Soldiers, witnesses, and the prosecution who all lived at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq, with SPC Graner.

By local regulation, Camp Victory dining facilities required Soldiers to carry a weapon to gain entry to eat. Soldiers without weapons were required to carry and present a memorandum from the company commander to the dining facility

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95 Id.
96 Id.
98 Id. at 21.
99 Id. at 23.
100 Id. at 23-24.
102 Transcript of Record at 2360, United States v. Graner, Headquarters, III Corps (2004 (on file with author).
103 Id. at 2282, 2321.
104 Id. at 2321.
105 Id.
The memorandum stated that the bearer was authorized to eat without the weapon. It did not indicate why the Soldier did not possess a weapon. The military judge in this case ordered ten days sentencing credit for taking away the weapon for approximately eight months. In his decision, the military judge articulated the following reasons:

Concerning the weapons issue, where the weapons were taken—the accused’s personal weapon was taken away from him on or about the 20th of March, 2004, until he left the unit at the end of November, 2004, the court finds that soldiers on Victory Base in uniform were basically required to have a weapon with them 24/7, and that, when they go to the mess hall, they have to have a weapon with them. There’s a sign there to the effect that you can’t eat without one. The court finds that the command addressed this issue with a permission slip and, although the court doesn’t—the court also finds that not having a personal weapon in no way, shape, or form placed the accused at an appreciable risk while on Victory Base, as there are only indirect fire issues on Victory Base and having an M-16, an M-4, or a 9mm is going to do zero good to an RPG landing on your head. The court finds that there is no evidence that not having a weapon necessarily put the accused in a position of not being able to defend himself. However, the court does recognize the reality of the situation in Victory Base of not having a weapon. Not having a weapon does carry a certain stigma. The command says that he didn’t have a weapon because he looked like an undisciplined soldier in those pictures. This, quite frankly, is a close call because, on the one hand, the court finds that there is no evidence that there was an intent to punish by this, but, on the other hand, the effect on the accused is to be one of the few soldiers without a weapon on Victory Base, and that amounts to a continual embarrassing situation. Because of that, the court will award some credit for the weapon on that basis only. Again, this is not strictly as a violation of Article 13, because the court finds that it wasn’t taken away to punish the accused but the effect of a soldier not having a weapon on that base simply, quite frankly in this case, appears to be because he was pending charges. The court finds the effect on the accused is that he’s subject to public embarrassment in various public places, not just the mess hall.

Trial practitioners faced with removing a weapon from an accused in a combat zone must attempt to continue to advise commanders to articulate their reasons beyond punishment and minimize, to the best of their ability, any embarrassment caused by removal of a weapon.

B. Denial of Leave

Specialist Graner was also denied leave while serving at Camp Victory. Although the Abu Ghraib cases were unique and high profile, taking longer than the average court-martial, it was still important to articulate reasons for a denial of leave. The company commander articulated a safety concern for SPC Graner due to the high profile case and the fact that the commander had been notified that SPC Graner had received threatening e-mails. Specialist Graner had also been reported drunk and disorderly on a temporary duty trip to Germany for a hearing. The company commander denied SPC Graner’s leave request because motions and depositions concerning the case were pending.

The military judge found:

106 Id. at 2290.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2367–68.
109 Id. at 2362–63.
110 Id. at 2322.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 2323.
113 Id.
Concerning the defense motion for appropriate relief with respect to Article 13, the court makes the following findings: That, during his time in Iraq, the accused was never permitted to go on leave—excuse me, during the time that the accused was assigned to the 16th MP Brigade, from approximately March 2004 to December 2004, they never permitted him to go on leave. The command’s articulated reason for denial of leave, the court finds, was death threats to the accused—against the accused and safety concern, particularly once the media interest in the case increased. The court finds that this occurred approximately in the May time-frame, which was before any requests for leave came in. The court finds that the initial denial for leave was based on an articulated objective rationale and had no intent to punish. In that, quite frankly, the court finds that, for the denial of leave during the entire time-frame, there was no evidence that it was intended to punish the accused, but rather that they made a judgment call, particularly in a high-visibility case, as to the safety of the accused. Subsequent requests were also impacted on the need for the accused to be around for the depositions and interviews of General Officers. Quite frankly, by having him around, it expedited—it facilitated his ability to prepare for this case.114

Although leave appears to be a privilege and not a right, the command must still articulate solid reasons for denial of leave. The command should not just deny leave because a Soldier is charged with a crime.

C. Working Outside of One’s MOS

Specialist Graner was removed from his place of duty at Abu Ghraib prison and relieved of all military police duties.115 He mainly worked Soldier-type work details.116 At one point, for a five day period, Graner worked along side a Soldier performing punishment for an Article 15.117 As to working outside the MOS, the judge provided no credit, but two days for every one day (for five days, a total of ten days credit) for working with a Soldier being punished under Article 15. The judge found:

The court finds that the accused was not permitted to continue to work as a military policeman. Contrary to the defense contention, the court finds this extremely reasonable, given the types of charges that the accused was facing. Having him doing any military police duties, quite frankly, the court would be very surprised. But, at the end of the day, not having him perform military police duties is certainly not an intent to punish and was a reasonable reaction given the nature of the charges. As far as the duties that the accused did perform, the court finds that he performed a lot of details, filling sandbags, sweeping, and other details around the installation. The court also finds that the accused was given ample opportunity to work with his counsel and performed other duties other than the ones he articulated, in the sense that he was also permitted to perform construction duties and other things like that. The fact that he worked side-by-side on certain occasions with third-country nationals and/or Iraqi contractors, the court sees no evidence that this was done to humiliate him because there was no evidence that such was humiliating. There’s no evidence before the court that working with the Iraqi people in any way, shape, or form was somehow humiliating or embarrassing. Now, it may be that, in various circumstances, one would feel that way, but there’s no evidence before the court. The court does find that, at least on five separate occasions and unrebutted, the accused worked half-a-day with a soldier serving Article 15 punishment. For that, the accused will receive some credit.118

V. Factors—Pretrial Restraint versus Pretrial Punishment

A practical way to determine whether a command has crossed the line from pretrial restraint to pretrial punishment is various factors used by the military courts. These factors are:

114 Id. at 2360–61.
115 Id. at 2277, 2282.
116 Id. at 2282.
117 Id. at 2284, 2364.
118 Id. at 2364–65.
1. What similarities, if any, in daily routine, work assignments, clothing attire, and other restraints and control conditions exist between sentenced persons and those awaiting disciplinary disposition?
2. If such similarities exist, what relevance to customary and traditional military command and control measures can be established by the government for such measures?
3. If such similarities exist, are the requirements and procedures primarily related to command and control needs, or do they reflect a primary purpose of stigmatizing persons awaiting disciplinary disposition?
4. If so, was there an “intent to punish or stigmatize a person waiting disciplinary disposition”?

Although these factors are not the only considerations, they provide excellent guidelines and a good starting place when evaluating a command’s rationale and technique for handling accused Soldiers. Both trial counsel and defense counsel should constantly evaluate the measures taken, the intent of the command, the purpose behind the action and the action itself to see if it goes over the line of acceptable conditions on liberty, pretrial restraint, or pretrial confinement.

VI. Conclusion

Despite the labels we put on conditions on liberty or pretrial restraint, the trial counsel must understand the limits a commander may put on the accused. Defense counsel, on the other hand, must disregard the labels as well, and analyze the actions taken against their clients. Black and white answers as to the worth of Article 13 credit are not always available. However, if you follow the words of the RCM, the principles of the case law, and the examples outlined in this article, you should be able to make sound decisions in the area of pretrial restraint and confinement. Actions speak louder than words and the commander’s intent, the purpose behind the action, and the action itself will speak volumes in determining proper conditions on liberty and appropriate Article 13 credit.

Note from the Field

Organization Days Versus “Organization Daze”:
Official and Unofficial Unit Activities in USAREUR

Military and Civil Law Division
U.S. Army Europe

Introduction

Nearly daily, we are asked to render an opinion on whether an event is “official” from an ethical standpoint. To reduce personal costs and reward employees, event organizers sometimes proclaim their organization days as “official events.” Theorizing that an organization day is necessary for good office morale, falsely believing their judgment alone will justify the expenditure of U.S. taxpayer dollars, these organizers overlook fiscal, administrative, and personnel law issues in such events that require consistent legal advice to avoid questionable stewardship of government resources. Organization days generally range from on-post, organized team-building events to off-post, tourist-style events. The U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Office of the Judge Advocate has observed everything from cruises of the Neckar River to backyard barbecues publicized as official organization day events. Both official and unofficial organization days are permissible, assuming the rules that relate to each are followed. Commanders, and indeed Judge Advocates, may get into trouble if they blur the distinctions and the funds involved, creating instead an “organization daze.” While there is room for judgment in this area, a good rule of thumb is that the more closely organization days resemble unit parties/picnics or other social outings, the less official they are, and the less authority there is for preparing or participating in them during the duty day or for funding them with appropriated funds (APF). This note synopsizes how some common, recurring legal issues and pitfalls have been dealt with in USAREUR to help avoid “organization daze.”

Appropriated Fund Support

In addition to Army major command (MACOM)-wide morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) events, smaller level military organizations typically may conduct official organization days as unit-level activities under Army Regulation (AR) 215-1. As official organization days, these activities may qualify for certain APF support if, for example, they include such measures as: (1) a schedule of activities that maintains mission readiness, improves unit teamwork and creates esprit de corps (e.g., team athletic or competitive events between sections); (2) periodic personnel accountability (e.g., roll calls to...
ensure safety and attendance);\(^9\) (3) a location on or near post (preferably with the participants reporting to their duty station and proceeding to the activity site together to reduce costs, enhance force protection and ensure the timely start of official events);\(^10\) (4) Soldiers in a “uniform of the day” and civilian employees in appropriate attire;\(^11\) and (5) food purchased by the participants.\(^12\) Note that the use of reasonable, on-hand resources, such as facilities and athletic equipment, will help reduce the APF costs of such events.\(^13\)

This office has generally concluded that hails and farewells, dining ins/outs, military balls, holiday office parties, and social events at private or government quarters are not official organization events or functions.\(^14\) Government resources may be used for official purposes only. Official purposes clearly include ones that are specifically provided for by law or are essential for successful completion of a DOD function, action or operation. The underlying ethics principle is that employees shall protect and conserve federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized activities.\(^15\) Units cannot create an official event by simply inviting or designating a speaker to discuss command issues or by declaring an otherwise unofficial event to be a “training event” or official place of duty.\(^16\) Consequently, units may use very limited government resources for unofficial events.\(^17\) This does not include appropriated funds, non-tactical vehicles (NTVs), or government personnel.\(^18\) Thus, without an ethics counselor’s prior legal review, government resources should not be used in support of the above listed functions.

Funding of Events

Use of APFs

The use of APFs may be authorized for official organization days that “include unit activities that maintain mission readiness, improve unit teamwork, and create espirit de corps. Esprit de corps may include such activities as welcome home celebrations.”\(^19\)

Use of Nonappropriated Funds (NAFs)

The use of NAFs may also be authorized for official organization days when “such use is not otherwise prohibited and it has been certified in writing that APF support is not available.”\(^20\)

\(^9\) See generally id. Roll calls can keep timekeeping records for the event valid. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REG. 7000.14-R, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION vol. 8, ch. 2 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter DOD REG. 7000.14-R].

\(^10\) See, e.g., discussion infra, Miscellaneous Issues.


\(^12\) See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 30-22, THE ARMY FOOD PROGRAM para. 3-441 (10 May 2005) (explaining dining facility support of organization day activities). Appropriated funds may not be used to purchase food or refreshments for military or civilian employees who are not in a temporary duty status. Use of Appropriated Funds to Purchase Light Refreshments at Conferences, B-288266, 2003 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS (Jan. 27, 2003) (finding GSA exceeded its authority when it authorized agencies to pay for light refreshments for attendees not in a travel status). Unit funds may not be used to pay for food or refreshments for official organization days. See AR 215-1, supra note 6, para. 5-13k. Unit funds, however, may sell food during official organization days as part of an approved fundraiser. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 210-22, PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS ON DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INSTALLATIONS para. 15b (22 Oct. 2001). In addition, units may use funds previously raised by properly constituted informal funds to purchase food or refreshments for official organization days. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 4-21 (7 June 2006).

\(^13\) See AR 215-1, supra note 6, tbl. D-1. Participants in official mission-sustaining activities normally should not need to rent MWR equipment or grounds since it is MWR’s APF-supported mission to support these activities. Id. para. 3-7. This point, however, may be esoteric to cash strapped MWR managers. Nevertheless, “Programs will be delivered in the recreation center, community activity center, and other facilities . . . not limited to . . . special events such as exhibits, lectures, tours . . . [and] organization days . . .” Id. para. 8-16c.

\(^14\) Information Paper, The Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Official vs. Unofficial Functions (25 Jan. 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Official vs. Unofficial Information Paper]. See generally AR 215-1, supra note 6, para. 5-13k; see also AR 58-1, supra note 5, para. 2-3 (providing guidance for determining whether certain events have an official purpose, when authorizing non-tactical vehicle (NTV) use).


\(^16\) Certain events are clearly unofficial and disingenuous attempts to convert their nature can be a subterfuge of regulatory guidance. Official vs. Unofficial Information Paper, supra note 14; see, e.g., AR 58-1, supra note 5, para. 2-3.

\(^17\) JER, supra note 2, paras. 2-301h, 2-311.

\(^18\) See AR 215-1, supra note 6, para. 5-13k; AR 58-1, supra note 5, para. 2-3

\(^19\) AR 215-1, supra note 6, para. 8-29.
Unit Funds

Unit funds were principally designed to offset the costs of social events such as unit parties and picnics. Unit funds may only be used for events held “for the collective benefit of all unit members for off-duty recreational purposes. . . . All unit members must have the opportunity to participate in the activity . . . . Activities must relate to the MWR of the unit members. Family members (and guests) may participate at the discretion of the unit members.” Therefore, unit funds may not be used for official organization days, but may be used for unofficial organization days, when APF support is not authorized.

Army Civilian Employees

Soldier attendance at official and unofficial organization days is largely the difference between being in a duty or pass status. Yet, the Army requires a diverse workforce—especially overseas—whose differing employment conditions and different rules occasionally require different results even in similar situations. Non-Soldier attendance at organization days requires special consideration. Just as with Soldiers, civilian employees may participate in MWR activities, and their duty status during organization days similarly depends on the official nature of the events. The similarity ends with the discretion to grant “passes” (in other words, to not charge the employee leave).

The basic work week for federal employees is forty hours. Army civilian employees must be in some type of duty status during this workweek. Their time and attendance categories include normal duty and other statuses such as temporary duty (TDY), annual leave, sick leave, military leave, family/medical leave, leave without pay (LWOP), excused absence (a.k.a. administrative leave), absence without official leave, and others. Army civilian employees participating in official activities during duty hours naturally require no special status because they are considered to be on duty; however, those participating in unofficial or social activities must be in a proper absence status, other than TDY.

Army civilian employees may be ordered to attend official team-building/training events, but compelled attendance does not necessarily equate to compelled participation in events. For example, civilian participation in physical training depends on mission, medical, and other liability factors and should be left voluntary. Official organization days also require careful planning because they present a potential for workers compensation claims, and because such employee activities may require union coordination. Additionally, to avoid disparate treatment, a unit’s organization day should be open to the entire government work force of an organization, not just a particular group.

20 Id.
22 AR 215-1, supra note 6, para. 6-1(c) (emphasis added).
23 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-10, LEAVES AND PASSES (15 Feb. 2006) [hereinafter AR 600-8-10].
24 AR 215-1, supra note 6, paras. 1-8, 5-13q.
25 See, e.g., DOD REG. 7000.14-R, supra note 9, vol. 8, ch. 2.
27 See 5 C.F.R. § 630.101; see also DOD REG. 7000.14-R, supra note 9, vol. 8, ch. 2, para. 020206A (observing: “Generally, a full-time employee’s basic work requirement is 80 hours in a pay period. . . . Attendance and absence must be recorded consistent with the status in which employed.”). Hence, Army civilians choosing not to participate in official organization day events must either report for work or take appropriate leave.
29 See, e.g., Cecil Green, His Best Is All Hearts (July 1993) (on file with author) (describing teambuilding benefits of the former Army HEARTS program which essentially had participants running a team obstacle course, “Like climbing a 30-foot tree cut to look like a telephone pole. Or inching along a steel cable suspended 30 feet above the ground.”). The article, formerly on a U.S. Army Operations Support Command web site, quoted a disabled Red River Army Depot participant in the program as saying: “I’ve got a lot more trust in my co-workers now, and you can see and feel a difference in the shop . . . . We’re concerned about each other and working as a team. . . .”
31 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-63, ARMY HEALTH PROMOTION para. 5-2c (7 May 2007) [hereinafter AR 600-63] (encouraging but not requiring participation in Army total fitness programs).
33 See, e.g., AR 600-63, supra note 31, para. 1-19c.
In contrast to official organization days, there is no authority for Army civilian employees to use official duty time to attend unofficial or social activities. Therefore, Army civilian employees must use annual leave, properly approved and acquired compensatory time, or LWOP to participate in such activities. Generally, legal or regulatory authority is needed for an absence from duty to be excused without charge to leave.

Excused absences may not be appropriate for unofficial unit activities—the use of taxpayer dollars, APF, for unofficial purposes is not condoned by statute or regulation. Comptroller General decisions and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidelines limit grants of administrative leave to brief absences for certain situations. Agency regulations and collective bargaining agreements can further restrict the situations for which it is appropriate. For APF employees, “[p]eriods of excused absence are considered part of an employee’s basic workday even though the employee does not perform his or her regular duties . . . . Consequently the authority . . . must be used sparingly.” Thus, their release from normal duties must qualify for excused absence treatment, which generally is limited to reasons consistent with the public interest (e.g., blood donation, funerals, etc.). Similarly, administrative dismissals for groups of employees “should be rare and authorized only when conditions are severe or normal operations would be significantly disrupted . . . . [rather than] to create the effect of a holiday (to include activity downdays and training days).” For NAF employees, managers arguably enjoy greater flexibility but they still must apply principles of sound stewardship of resources, and uniform and impartial administration.

Time-off awards (TOA) are not intended to facilitate such off-duty activities. For APF employees, current guidance discourages the use of TOAs for substantial portions of the workforce on a single occasion, and the use of TOAs to this extent has no precedent in Comptroller General/OPM decisions. For NAF employees, TOAs may be used to recognize individuals or groups for performance or suggestions; however, the contribution of each group member must be consistent with the intent of the Army’s awards policies.

24 These categories avoid taxpayer compensation for the performance of unofficial duties, and thus are appropriate. See discussion infra, Use of APFs.

25 See, e.g., supra note 27 (quoting DOD Reg. 7000.14-R).


29 DOD MAN. 1400.25-M, supra note 28, SC 630.7; see, e.g., supra note 3 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Defense Commissary Agency, Eastern Region Headquarters and the National Association of Government Employees art. 16 (Dec. 1999)).

30 DOD MAN. 1400.25-M, supra note 28, SC 630.7.1.

31 See id. SC 630.7.4.

32 Id. SC 610.3.3.1.

33 5 C.F.R. § 2635.705 (2007); see also JER, supra note 2, para. 2-301b.


35 Similar to the appropriate use of administrative leave:

Time-off awards shall not be granted to create the effect of a holiday or treated as administrative excusals or leave; i.e. they shall not be granted in conjunction with a military “down” or “training” day or the like, which would grant the entire civilian employee population, or a majority of the civilian population, a time-off award to be used on a specified day.

Id.

36 See also U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE, SUPP. 1 TO U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 672-20, INCENTIVE AWARDS para. 4-5 (27 May 2005) (“Supervisors will not direct the use of TOAs for any specific time or day, whether for an individual or a group of employees.”).

37 See AR 215-3, supra note 36, paras. 5-45b, 9-1a, 9-8d, 9-1d.
Local National (LN) Employees

In overseas locations such as Europe, LNs may participate in official unit activities; however, unofficial unit activities during duty hours may present complications. Employment conditions for LN employees are usually found in Status of Forces Agreements, treaties, other agreements, or contracts with local unions. Thus, one should consult those documents and any corresponding local regulations for applicable provisions in a particular country.

In USAREUR, for example, German LNs enjoy one outing per year under their labor rules. For these LNs, this activity is covered by administrative leave. The specific rules provide the following:

It is customary in GE that once a year, or at longer intervals, an employer and his or her employees, or management and employees of a firm, government agency, or other enterprise, have a joint outing at worktime (Betriebsausflug). These outings normally take the place of company parties . . . .

Activity commanders or chiefs may authorize outings for a period not to exceed 1 workday in a calendar year . . . .

The time of the outing that coincides with regular work hours will be considered administrative leave. Employees who do not join the outing are required to work unless they are on annual leave or other authorized absence.

Outings constitute a welfare and morale program (AR 58-1). Supervisors may furnish bus transportation as authorized in AR 58-1, paragraph 2-5c. Transportation will be furnished only on a cost-reimbursable basis . . . .

Joint LN/US civilian participation in unofficial unit activities during LN duty hours is, of course, possible (assuming U.S. personnel are in appropriate duty status (e.g., pass or leave)). The restrictions above, however, limit administrative absence authority for LN outings since supervisors may not grant LNs official time off for both an LN outing and a comparable unofficial unit activity in the same year.

Contractor Employees

The Army Materiel Command (AMC) General Counsel has opined, regarding organization days and picnics:

While it is recommended that we do not formally invite support contractor employees, they may attend if they make arrangements with their employer, i.e., they are in some kind of leave or non-pay status. Even under these circumstances we should never create any expectation that contractor employees attend the event.
Thus, units should not invite contractor employees to participate in either official or unofficial unit activities, or imply that such participation is expected, and contractor employees should not be used to set up for, or to conduct fundraising for, such events.66

Family Members

Family members often attend official and unofficial unit activities.57 They generally enjoy access to military facilities, and their participation in MWR programs or at public affairs events (similar to an open house or family day at work) is envisioned by regulation.58 Adequate medical resources (and liability release forms) should be on-hand for official events.59

Miscellaneous Issues

Events may be held at sites other than the permanent duty station, but this raises TDY and NTV issues.60 Unofficial activities will not qualify for TDY.61 For DOD civilians, “TDY assignments may be authorized/approved only when necessary in connection with official DOD activities or Government business.”62 For military personnel, “[e]ach Service shall . . . authorize only travel necessary to accomplish the mission . . . and . . . ensure that only travel essential to the needs of the Government is authorized.”63 Military and civilian personnel may not use NTVs to travel to unofficial or social events.64

The decision to characterize an event as official for TDY purposes involves more than a judgment call. The more an employee’s activities will diverge from mission requirements, the greater the likelihood the activity is not official and, without specific authority, does not qualify for APF support, including the duty time of attendees.65 For instance, attendance at otherwise unofficial events such as private organization meetings is permissible when such “attendance may be beneficial in the normal performance of official duties but is not required to accomplish the approving authority’s mission.”66 Nonetheless, such attendance generally is only considered to be quasi-official and qualifies only for permissive TDY at no cost to the government (or excused absence for civilian employees if permitted).67

Personnel who volunteer to attend an official organization day, in essence, volunteer for an official duty (i.e. training). Consequently, they remain entitled to reimbursement for certain expenses under federal statute and the Joint Federal Travel Regulation (JFTR). Supervisors authorizing such official duties at locations outside the permanent duty station, and for periods beyond the duty day, can therefore incur costs for personnel travel, NTV support, and per diem to include lodging

60 Id.
61 See, e.g., AR 215-5, supra note 5, para. 6-1c(3) (permitting discretionary family member participation when unit funds are used).
62 See generally id.; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF ARMY, REG. 360-1, THE ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM (15 Sept. 2000) [hereinafter AR 360-1].
63 See, e.g., AR 215-5, supra note 5, para. 6-1c(3) (permitting discretionary family member participation when unit funds are used).
64 Id. tbl. 1 n.4.
65 For analogy only, in order to authorize paid TDY at meetings of private organizations, individual attendance was required to be of direct and substantial benefit to the approving authority and to the Department of Defense provided Government funds were available. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 1-211, ATTENDANCE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AT PRIVATE ORGANIZATION MEETINGS tbl. 1-1, R. 1 (1 Dec. 83) (rescinded).
66 Id. tbl. 1 n.2 (defining a quasi-official meeting). The regulation also considers the cost of regular salary and the loss of time that would have been spent by employees on accomplishing specific program assignments. Id. tbl. 1 n.4.
and meals. These entitlements are not waived simply by having personnel “volunteer” to pay their way. Indeed, having people fund portions of an “official event” would be augmenting congressional appropriations—a violation of federal law.68

Many other appropriate tools exist for commanders to lawfully achieve their intended objectives for organization days. Getting to know one’s employees can be accomplished at office calls, counseling sessions, or even voluntary social events. Forming a team or enhancing cohesion may be accomplished through regulation-prescribed events. If managers find such regimented events unappealing, this is an indication that they should be looking at off-duty activities without APF support. A close relative of official organization days, also qualifying for APF support if done correctly, is the staff ride.69 Staff rides are training events done in a less formal, off-site setting, but typically include an agenda of substantive military educational presentations and activities.70 But mixing the travel of a staff ride with the leisure of an unofficial organization day and the APF support of unit-level activities is a recipe for disgruntled employee grievances, questionable workers’ compensation claims, and audits of finances and time and attendance records that can affect a military manager’s career, and detrimentally affect participants.71

Conclusion

Although this note addresses just some of the myriad issues related to organization days, it will help offices avoid the most chronic legal issues. Since misuse of resources can result in criminal violations, units should consult servicing legal offices for assistance in resolving organization day issues. Perhaps the best way to ensure your office reviews these issues is to send a proactive note to commanders advising them that it is in everyone’s best interest to ask for permission, rather than forgiveness, in this area.


69 The staff ride program in USAREUR is managed through a centralized APF contract administered by the U.S. Army Contracting Command, Europe. See U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE, REG. 350-1, TRAINING IN THE ARMY IN EUROPE fig. 2-1 (Feb. 15, 2007) (ascribing staff ride program as a USAREUR function).

70 See U.S. Army Center of Military History, Staff Rides, available at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/StaffRide/index.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (listing suggested staff rides); see also U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Staff Rides, available at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/arl/resources/ssi/csi/ssi_staff (last visited Apr. 6, 2007) (“Staff rides and battlefield tours provide important insights into military operations, concepts of leadership, and conditions at the time of battle, as well as vignettes and topics of discussion.”); Memorandum, Commanding General USAREUR and Seventh Army, to subordinate commanders and staff, subject: Army in Europe Command Policy Letter 21, Counseling, Coaching, and Mentoring (18 Apr. 2006) (“Commanders are responsible for preparing our next generation of leaders . . . . Create, plan, and conduct well-organized events such as staff rides, structured off-sites, after-action reviews, and seminars that teach how to lead in combat.”).

71 The “Stars & Stripes” test may be applied here. If managers (and their legal advisors) are not satisfied that their activity would read well to taxpayers on the front page of the Stars & Stripes newspaper, they might wish to reconsider its nature. Participants may face unexpected leave charges on disallowed APF events. See generally AR 600-8-10, supra note 23.
Book Reviews

STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

REVIEWED BY MAJOR DANYELE M. JORDAN

There is a secret history of the CIA and the Bush Administration both before and especially after 9/11. It is a cautionary tale, one that shows how the most covert tools of American national security policy have been misused. It involves domestic spying, abuse of power, and outrageous operations. It is a tale that can only now begin to be told.

On September 11, 2001, suicide terrorists killed thousands of unsuspecting American citizens by hijacking and crashing airplanes into prominent American buildings. The President of the United States, George W. Bush immediately responded by launching a worldwide manhunt for those responsible. He declared that he would take every precaution to protect American citizens from further attacks at home and abroad. President Bush further stated that he would unleash the “full resources of the intelligence and law enforcement communities” to find those responsible, “making no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and those who harbor them.” It is against this backdrop that State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration unfolds.

In State of War, author James Risen chronicles the leadership failures in the wake of the September 11th attacks. He then unveils the power struggles that developed during the Bush Administration’s quest to rid the world of terror. Risen also describes the hasty and questionable policy decisions, failed intelligence efforts, and unbelievable operations that were the inevitable result. At its conclusion, State of War accomplishes the author’s main goals of exposing the neoconservative base that captured the administration’s foreign policy, while also explaining the demise of the once powerful Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

State of War begins with a description of the “complicated” relationship between President Bush and CIA Director George Tenet. This description includes a synopsis of how Tenet secured his position as Director in the new Bush Administration. While developing the complex connection between President Bush and George Tenet, Risen identifies the

2 U.S. Army. Written while assigned as a student, 55th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
3 RISEN, supra note 1, at 10.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Also called “9/11” throughout the book.
9 Such failures are described throughout the book. However, early on, Risen points to the absence of effective leadership as the defining characteristic of the Bush Administration. RISEN, supra note 1, at 3. Risen also spends a great deal of time chronicling the CIA’s intelligence failures, which not surprisingly, are also blamed on the Bush Administration. Id. at 109 (naming pressure from the Bush Administration as the reason the CIA suppressed or ignored strong evidence that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapons program).
10 Id. at 63–70. Risen states that “the dominant power relationship” in the Bush Administration was between Rumsfeld and Cheney. Id. at 64. Together, they “reorganized” the intelligence bureaucracy with Rumsfeld placing himself at the head. Id. at 67.
11 See id. at 65 (charging that post 9/11, the President and his staff made important decisions “on the fly”); id. at 120 (blaming the CIA’s inability to recruit spies in Iraq for their lack of intelligence there); id. at 81 (discussing the CIA’s plans to engage in sabotage activities to undermine the Iraqi regime).
12 See id. at 1 (accusing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and “[his] cadre of neoconservative ideologues” of exerting “broad influence over foreign policy”).
13 See id. at 220–21 (concluding that the CIA lost its dominance in the U.S. intelligence community due to the Bush Administration’s politicization of the agency, and due to the influence of the neoconservatives).
14 Id. at 11.
15 Id. at 11–18.
other main players in this saga: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and former Secretary of State Colin Powell. Risen later demonstrates that their personalities and personal ambitions were directly linked to the abuses and failures that plagued both the Bush Administration and the CIA.

Even though the specific personalities and agendas of the senior officials are important to State of War, the heart of the book centers on their abuses. Risen grabs the reader with tales of domestic spying, assassination squads, risky covert operations, harsh interrogation tactics, secret transfers of prisoners, illegal drugs, Afghan warlords, fabricated evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and dangerous ties between the U.S. allies and al Qaeda. These are the stories that make State of War such a controversial and insightful book. However, as interesting as these tales may be, they lack detailed analysis.

One example of an underdeveloped story is the situation in Iraq. Risen’s main theory on Iraq is that Iraq posed no threat to the United States. He argues that the President, in building a case for an invasion of Iraq, falsely accused Saddam Hussein of having “terrorist connections” and WMDs. According to the author, the administration used the WMDs as a pretext because “Iraq had been on the Bush agenda from the very beginning.” The remainder of his analysis centers on the Bush Administration’s efforts to convince the CIA to support its agenda and the CIA’s responses thereto. Risen does not explore any other reasons for a U.S. attack (like Iraq’s continued violation of United Nations Resolutions 678 and 687). Risen also gives little attention to the role of Congress in providing a possible justification for the attack. When one considers the variety of approaches Risen could have taken on the issue, his focus on the most controversial reason seems biased, or at least one-dimensional.

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16 Id. at 13–15.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 18. Condoleezza Rice, despite gracing the cover of the book and holding key positions in the Bush administration, received limited coverage in Risen’s book and was generally portrayed as weak and ineffective. See id. at 63, 161, 217.
19 Id. at 13–14. Like Condoleezza Rice, Risen depicted Colin Powell as irrelevant, being outmaneuvered and marginalized by neoconservatives on too many important issues. Id. at 149-50. However, unlike Rice, Risen respected Powell as one of the few moderates in the administration. Id. at 1, 149–50, 160–62. Risen even described him as “a giant of a man who deserved better,” and “a sad yet still regal figure who seemed to personify an era of great Republican statesmanship...” Id. at 149.
20 Risen describes Tenet as “extremely adaptable” and too political to be the CIA director. Id. at 12. As such, with Tenet at the helm, the CIA was bullied by the neoconservatives, leading to taking shortcuts and accepting “shoddy intelligence” in order to appease the Bush Administration. Id. at 71–72, 113. Risen portrays Donald Rumsfeld as “the ultimate turf warrior” and the “real power in the Bush Administration.” Id. at 19, 220. Rumsfeld’s conservative ideology and strong influence led to the militarization of the intelligence community, flawed policy of ignoring the drug problems in Afghanistan, and shift of the Pentagon’s role as a developer of foreign policy. Id. at 67–70, 160, 221. Risen described Dick Cheney as the de facto national security advisor who, as an enthusiastic supporter of Rumsfeld and other neoconservatives at the Pentagon, enabled them to push their agendas on important issues. Id. at 64, 66, 71, 150. Despite enjoying a close relationship with the President, Risen depicted Rice as ineffective on foreign policy issues thereby unable to influence the policies that developed. Id. at 3, 64; see supra note 18.
21 See RISEN, supra note 1, at 43–47 (accusing the Bush administration of purposely failing to get congressional approval for the National Security Agency’s domestic eavesdropping or spying operation), 70 (stating that Donald Rumsfeld created his own private spy service “buried deep within the Pentagon’s vast black budget, with little or no accountability”), and 24-27 (arguing that Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales purposefully did not inform the President of the torture or harsh interrogation tactics used by the CIA giving him deniability and allowing the practice to continue without proper vetting and legal authorization).
22 Id. at 24 (harsh interrogation tactics), 34 (secret prison transfers), 43 (domestic spying), 86 (WMD fabrications), 138 (covert operations), 152 (illegal drugs), and 179 (U.S. allies and al Qaeda).
23 Id. at 80, 86.
24 Id. at 86.
25 Id. at 77.
26 Id. at 76–84.
27 See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 175 (Jan. 2004) (“Under Resolutions 678 and 687, both still in effect, the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.” (quoting Address to the Nation on Iraq, Mar. 17, 2003, 39 WKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 338, 339 (Mar. 24, 2003))).
30 Many authors have written on President Bush’s authority to invade Iraq. These include: James P. Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?, 34 PRES. STUD. Q. 4 (Mar. 2004) (analyzing the statements made by President Bush and his administration and comparing them to the link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and his nuclear weapons capabilities, and then making a conclusion based upon his extensive
Another example of Risen’s superficial development of an important issue is the domestic spying program. Risen again identifies the problem—governmental encroachment on civil liberties. He even provides shocking revelations that Congress and the judiciary knew of the program. Yet, compared to other works on the subject, Risen did not weigh all sides of the issue.

On the other hand, one highlight of the book is the transparency that it brings to the political process. Risen’s numerous contacts provide the reader with details normally hidden from average citizens. Risen reveals so much insider information that even the most politically savvy reader can benefit. Yet, Risen’s access to high-level bureaucrats does not always translate into supportable accusations.

State of War accuses the Bush Administration of wrongdoing even when there is no evidence to back it up. For instance, Risen blames the administration for harsh interrogation tactics used against captured terrorist suspects. Risen makes this finding based upon an alleged conversation between President Bush and George Tenet. Risen states that President Bush asked Tenet: “Who authorized putting him [Abu Zubaydah] on pain medication?” Risen then interprets this question as President Bush directing the intelligence community to be harder on the captured suspects. Despite admitting that top CIA officials never heard of the statement being made, and did not believe that the conversation took place, Risen concludes that President Bush did make the statement because it “fits into that broader, get-tough message that the president and the White House were sending to the CIA in the months after 9/11.”

Another criticism of State of War is Risen’s heavy reliance on anonymous sources. Anonymous sources appear so frequently that one wonders if the stories are true or simply a figment of the author’s imagination. At least one other reviewer of State of War shares this opinion and describes Risen as “enamored with anonymous sources from the intelligence examination); John C. Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L’ L. 3, 563 (2003); Murphy, supra note 27; JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., WMD IN IRAQ: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS (Carnegie Endowment Report 2004), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Iraq3FullText.pdf.

See generally Memorandum, Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, subject: Presidential Authority to Conduct Wireless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (5 Jan. 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf (prepared by the Congressional Research Service) (analyzing the constitutional and statutory issues raised by the NSA electronic surveillance activity, outlining the legal framework regulating electronic surveillance by the government, exploring ambiguities in those statutes, and addressing the congressional or President’s inherent authority to order the operations).

Another example of Risen’s access to hard-to-get information can be seen in the following quote:

One outside expert on communications privacy who previously worked at the NSA said that the United States government has recently been quietly encouraging the telecommunications industry to increase the amount of international communications traffic that is routed through American-based switches. It appears that at least one motive for doing so may be to bring more international calls under NSA scrutiny.

Risen, supra note 1, at 44–49, 55–57.

There are several examples of unsupported assertions. See id. at 59 (asserting that the creation of the new Northern Command is an example of the broader policies and procedures put in place by the Bush Administration which may erode civil liberties in the United States, however, failing to show how this command, whom he admits is supposed to protect the U.S. homeland, will erode any civil liberties.). See also id. at 77, 106, 121 (blaming the Bush Administration for pressuring the CIA to develop intelligence on Iraq and fabricating that Iraq had WMDs. Then the author admitted that the CIA chose to hide important information from the administration on its own regarding Saddam Hussein’s abandoned efforts to create WMDs and the CIA’s doubts about the quality if intelligence they gathered on Iraq.).
community . . . ."\(^{42}\) This reviewer further notes, “There is also some intriguing material on Iran and Saudi Arabia, the veracity of which is hard to determine,” (presumably due to the lack of named sources or footnotes).\(^{43}\)

In defense of Risen’s extensive use of anonymous sources, he does mix them with some high-powered named sources which add needed credibility to the allegations. Perhaps his extensive investigative reporting background also lends reliability to his assertions.\(^{44}\) It also helps that many of Risen’s accusations against the Bush Administration are verifiable by other means, including other reports and news stories, and admissions by those involved.\(^{45}\) Another book reviewer agrees when he writes, “Yet though this is a ‘faith-based’ account to an extent, it bears the ring of authenticity in that it at times simply adds detail to what we already know.”\(^{46}\)

A further criticism of Risen’s book is his presentation of the information. State of War presents its accounts through a series of short takes that read like front page news stories.\(^{47}\) Some accounts take up only a single paragraph.\(^{48}\) They are often unrelated and simply inserted at a random point in another narrative. This style of writing makes the book difficult to follow and detracts from the overall presentation. Conversely, there are two notable departures from the choppy writing style seen throughout State of War. One is the story of Doctor Swansan Alhaddad who traveled to Baghdad in order to gather information about Iraq’s nuclear program from her brother.\(^{49}\) The other is that of the Russian scientist who traveled to Vienna to deliver nuclear bomb blueprints to Iranian scholars.\(^{50}\) These stories are written from the perspective of the actual participants. They are intriguing and full of suspense, adding flow to an otherwise disconnected book.

Finally, a word of caution to conservative readers: Risen wrote State of War with a definite bias towards more moderate influences. He laments that “the presidency of George W. Bush has marked a radical departure from the centrist traditions of U.S. foreign policy, embodied by his father.”\(^{51}\) He even longs for the days of the slow bureaucratic process with checks and balances that resulted in safe, more conventional decisions.\(^{52}\) As such, the book never acknowledges that the world as we know it changed after September 11th. Its author has not come to grips with the America that emerged from the rubble of the World Trade Center. He seems unable to even contemplate that those former policies may be the reason why September 11th was possible in the first place.

However, in all fairness to Risen, he does briefly acknowledge the limited success of the administration’s policies when he writes:

In a sense, this new pattern represents a triumph for the American-led counterterrorist efforts. Al Qaeda now seems to lack the power to conduct another 9/11, although bin Laden still yearns to launch another

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\(^{43}\) Id.


\(^{48}\) See RISEN, supra note 1, at 35 (operation “Box Top”), 140 (Iraqi cleric killed), 166 (hunt for Osama bin Laden).

\(^{49}\) Id. at 85–88, 102–06.

\(^{50}\) Id. at 194–95.

\(^{51}\) Id. at 2.

\(^{52}\) Id. at 65.
“spectacular.” Al Qaeda has been forced to resort to more conventional forms of terrorism—car bombs and small explosives left on buses and trains.53

Risen was correct in this respect. The year is now 2007 and despite his criticisms of the Bush Administration’s failed policies and CIA intelligence missteps, there has not been a major attack in the United States in six years. Risen’s book gives little attention to that fact. He also fails to consider that the very policies that he complains about may have already saved thousands of lives. David Ignatius addresses the complexity of these issues when he quotes a question asked by a former CIA official: “Would it have made sense to ‘render’ [Mohammed] Atta to a place where he could have been interrogated in a way that might have prevented Sept[ember] 11? That is not a simple question for me to answer, even as I share the conviction that torture is always and everywhere wrong.”54 Risen never tackles these tough questions. Considering that Risen’s goal was to expose and accuse, any analysis of complex issues may be beyond the scope of this book.

State of War is a short book that is easy to read. It adequately presents the allegations against the Bush Administration in a believable, if not convincing manner. The lack of detailed analysis and the one-sided view, however, limit its usefulness for the more politically astute. But for the novice who is unfamiliar with politics, the Bush Administration, or the issues facing the government today, State of War is a great place to start.

53 Id. at 172.
54 Ignatius, supra note 45.
REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT¹

REVIEWED BY MAJOR KYLE D. MURRAY²

The United States was founded on a set of beliefs and not, as were other nations, on common ethnicity, language, or religion. Since we are not a nation in any traditional sense of the term, in order to establish our nationhood, we have to reaffirm and reinforce periodically the values of the men who declared independence from Great Britain and framed the Constitution. As long as the Republic endures, in other words, Americans are destined to look back at its founding.³

“Traditionally, Americans are regarded as worshippers of their Constitution. . . . Traditionally, also, Americans are credited or charged, as the case may be, with veneration of ‘The Founding Fathers’ whose words and deeds, like the beads of a rosary, keep believers in touch with their faith.”⁴ However, “[w]hat we need is not more praise of the founders but more understanding of them and their circumstances. We need to find out why the revolutionary generation was able to combine ideas and politics so effectively and why subsequent generations in America could not do so.”⁵ In Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different, Professor Gordon S. Wood attempts to reveal the answers to those questions by placing a “proper historical perspective on the last quarter of the eighteenth century.”⁶ Upon assembling a collection of eight essays on eight individual founders, Professor Wood comes to the conclusion that these extraordinary men distinguished themselves because of their character.⁷ The founders’ character-driven leadership enabled the creation of a governmental system that ultimately “destroyed the sources of their own greatness.”⁸ This destruction further leads Professor Wood to conclude that the founders could never be replicated.⁹ However, despite his excellent factual accounts of these eight extraordinary men, I disagree with the author’s analysis of the character of the founders, his interpretation of the founders’ contribution to their own demise, and his conclusion regarding the inability to recreate such great leaders.

Prior to examining these three points of contention, it is necessary to comment on the way Professor Wood assembled this book. From a structural perspective, the book fails to flow smoothly throughout. Revolutionary Characters consists of eight individual essays, slightly modified, yet previously published elsewhere, pieced together to form one body of work.¹⁰ Professor Wood presents essays on George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Adams, Thomas Paine, and Aaron Burr, accompanied by an introduction and an epilogue. Each essay begins with a minor transitional sentence referring to the previous essay that barely ties the two together and somewhat trivializes the previous chapter. Additionally, a reading of the essays independent of the introduction and epilogue would fail to reveal the author’s overall themes, while a reading of only those two sections would lead to a significant understanding of Professor Wood’s points.

First, according to the author, examination of the character of each of the selected founders serves an important role in understanding their accomplishments.¹¹ He cautions the reader to view character as it was defined at the end of the eighteenth century and not as it is defined today.¹² “[T]heir idea of character was the outer life, the public person trying to show the world that he was living up to the values and duties that the best of culture imposed on him.”¹³ Professor Wood

² U.S. Marine Corps. Written while assigned as a student, 55th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
³ WOOD, supra note 1, at 4.
⁵ WOOD, supra note 1, at 10.
⁶ Id.
⁷ See id. at 23.
⁸ Id. at 11.
⁹ See id. at 28.
¹⁰ See id. at 276–301.
¹¹ See id. at 10.
¹² See id. at 23.
¹³ Id.
focuses on “disinterestedness” in examining their characters. “Disinterestedness was the most common term the founders used as a synonym for the classical conception of virtue or self sacrifice; it better conveyed the threats from interests that virtue seemed increasingly to face in the rapidly commercializing eighteenth century.” This description points more to the modern definition of character than it does the eighteenth century definition, and the author actually supports his points with examples of both types of character.

As the author cautioned, character in the eighteenth century is different from the modern view. It is difficult to examine the founders’ character in the modern sense because “[l]ife was theater, and impressions one made on spectators were what counted. Public leaders had to become actors or characters, masters of masquerade.” These masks force us to look to their writings and the writings of others to determine their inner character. Unfortunately, “[i]t is often difficult to distinguish between the private correspondence and the public writings of the revolutionaries, so alike are they.” An examination of the essay on George Washington provides a perfect example.

George Washington’s disinterestedness, although it preserved a fledgling nation, served to further his personal interest in protecting his fame. The author refers to the “greatness of George Washington,” and rightfully so. Professor Wood considers him to be the most important of the founders. George Washington held the nation together because he was able to effectively control hostilities between the two political parties and “use his immense prestige and good judgment to restrain fears, limit intrigues, and stymie opposition that otherwise might have escalated into serious violence.” Although, the author supports his position with descriptions of Washington’s disinterested acts, his descriptions lead the reader to surmise that Washington’s disinterestedness may have actually been self-interest.

Convinced that Washington did not act out of self-interest, Professor Wood calls George Washington “the only truly classical hero we have ever had.” The author states “Washington’s genius, Washington’s greatness, lay in his character.” But here, Professor Wood describes what more resembles the modern view of character. In describing Washington, Wood writes “He had character and was truly a man of virtue.” “It was his moral character that set him off from other men.” He considers Washington’s greatest act to be his resignation in 1783 from his position as the Commander-in-Chief of the American forces. The irony lies in the fact that this disinterested act established Washington as a great man and brought him greater power and fame. “[Washington] was well aware of his reputation and his fame earned as the commander in chief of the American revolutionary forces. That awareness of his heroic stature was crucial to Washington. It affected nearly everything he did for the rest of his life.” This awareness of his famed status, coupled with his concern for preserving it, makes the reader question the true disinterestedness of his actions. Professor Wood lends support to this theory by acknowledging “Washington was not naive. He was well aware of the effect his resignation would have.” The recognition that one would become known as a “modern Cincinnatus” clashes with the idea of being driven by altruistic motives.

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14 See id. at 16.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 23.
17 Id. at 24.
18 Id. at 250.
19 See id. at 32–33.
20 Id. at 29.
21 Revolutionary Characters (Book TV on C-SPAN 2 television broadcast Aug. 26, 2006). This episode was recorded on 30 May 2006, at the Politics and Prose Bookstore in Washington, D.C. where Professor Wood gave a speech followed by a question and answer period. Id.
22 WOOD, supra note 1, at 56.
23 Id. at 32.
24 Id. at 34.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See id. at 41.
28 Id. at 32–33.
29 Id. at 42.
30 Id.
Finally, the author lends further commentary to the nature of his disinterestedness and character by stating “[d]espite his outward modesty, Washington realized he was an extraordinary man, and he was not ashamed of it.” 31  “He spent the rest of his life guarding and protecting his reputation and worrying about it.” 32

The essay on Aaron Burr also raises issues regarding these two types of character: outward character (eighteenth century view) and inner character (modern view). 33  Aaron Burr’s character and disinterestedness, in the modern senses, led to his fame and ultimately his demise. 34  Professor Wood starts his essay on Burr stating, “[b]y examining Burr’s eccentric and extraordinary career, we can begin to understand better the character of the major founders.” 35  Which type of character is the author seeking to understand? For Burr, it was his inner character that caused him problems with the other founders. 36  Wood then describes Burr as a man of little character and full of self-interest. 37  “Beyond what politics could do for his friends, his family, and him personally, it had little emotional significance for him. Politics, as he once put it, was ‘fun and honor & profit.’” 38  Professor Wood goes on to state “no political leader of his prominence in the period ever spent so much time and energy so blatantly scheming for his own personal and political advantage.” 39  Yet, this lack of inner character did not prevent Aaron Burr from achieving political success, and nearly achieving the presidency. 40  However, Professor Wood describes Burr’s self-interested politics as the cause of his downfall. 41  “There was ‘no doubt’ in Hamilton’s mind that ‘upon every virtuous and prudent calculation’ Jefferson was to be preferred to Burr. It was a matter of character, he said: Burr had none, and Jefferson at least had ‘pretensions of character.’” 42  Thus, despite the author suggesting that the reader should look to the external character to examine the founders, the support for the difference between Burr and the other founders is based solely on a comparison of his inner character with the inner character of the others.

The founders had flaws which they shielded from the nation by hiding behind their characters. 43  They were common men with common flaws who were perfect for the government they created: a “government of the people.” 44  Their creation did not just protect them from the common people, but also protected the government from themselves: the so-called elite. The importance does not lie within the founders’ external character as the author states, but within these men’s understanding of their own internal character flaws. James Madison understood this and discussed the need to take precautions against a self-governing body. 45  “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the people. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.” 46  Madison continued with his point regarding the need to take precautions against the character of man. “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.” 47  The truly disinterested acts took place when these men created a form of government that accounted for their own character flaws.
Secondly, Professor Wood stresses the point that the founders contributed to their own demise.48 “They helped create the changes that led eventually to their own undoing, to the breakup of the kind of political and intellectual coherence they represented. Without intending to, they willingly destroyed the sources of their own greatness.”49 However, the founders did not destroy the sources of their greatness; their actions actually created and preserved their greatness. The system of government they created remains in place today, and the founders’ fame remains. Professor Wood’s individual essays repeatedly suggest that the desire for fame for the generations was a driving factor behind many of their actions.50 The founders were tasked with creating a new system of government to deal with their current situation, and in accomplishing this task they (with the exception of Burr) were overly concerned with their reputations and how they would be remembered.51 George Washington weighed every action very carefully to preserve his fame.52 Thomas Jefferson understood the public audience for his correspondence and took great care in preparing his writings.53 James Madison valued the publication of his personal notes enough to include the following requirement in his will:

> Considering the peculiarity and magnitude of the occasion which produced the convention at Philadelphia in 1787, the Characters who composed it, the Constitution which resulted from their deliberation, it’s effects during a trial of so many years on the prosperity of the people living under it, and the interest it has inspired among the friends of free Government, it is not an unreasonable inference that a careful and extended report of the proceedings and discussions of that body, which were closed doors, by a member who was constant in his attendance, will be particularly gratifying to the people of the United States, and to all who take an interest in the progress of political science and the cause of true liberty.54

These men did not meet their demise at the hands of their own creation because the goal was much greater than the author concludes. These men achieved lasting fame.

Finally, Professor Wood states these great leaders cannot be recreated.55 The leadership of the founders created an enduring system that has not required the need for revolutionaries, but leaders of equal or greater capacity will always be recreated. Leaders respond to the situations they face. The founders possessed a desire to prosper independently of the King and they responded to that situation. The leaders understood that the “critical point was self rule.”56 The founders did not all share the same views. “Jefferson’s belief in the common man led him to believe in weak government, unenergetic legislatures, low taxes, no debt, and government as close to the people as possible.”57 In contrast, “Hamilton’s lack of faith in the common man led him to believe in a strong national government, a social and economic aristocracy, an industrial state, taxes, debt, and, of course, judicial review.”58 George Washington’s leadership held both sides together.59 The founders were men of vision and intelligence, but they were also flawed.60 “[T]he Revolution ‘failed to free the slaves, failed to offer full political equality to women, . . . failed to grant citizenship to Indians, [and] failed to create an economic world in which all could compete on equal terms.’”61 They were not perfect but their achievements were incredible. Similar men have always existed and will continue to exist. The author states “[t]he founders had succeeded only too well in promoting democracy and equality among ordinary people; indeed, they succeeded in preventing any duplication of themselves.”62

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48 See WOOD, supra note 1, at 11.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 43, 228, 230.
51 See id. at 228.
52 See id. at 43.
53 See id. at 230.
54 MADISON, supra note 4, at ix.
55 See WOOD, supra note 1, at 28.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See WOOD, supra note 1, at 49–50.
60 See id. at 9.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 28.
conclusion goes too far. Their character is perfectly capable of duplication and improvement; the system of government they created has prevented the need to duplicate their caliber of revolutionaries in the United States.

In conclusion, Professor Wood’s individual essays on the eight founders provide excellent insight into their characters, but not in the manner in which the author intended. The author unwittingly provides support for the theory that men of ordinary character accomplished the extraordinary and preserved the ability of the common man to self-govern within the United States. Regardless, the book conveys a positive message. Readers should be proud of the accomplishments of these Revolutionary Characters, and marvel that common men can establish and maintain an effective system of self-government, despite their faults.
1. Resident Course Quotas

a. Attendance at resident continuing legal education (CLE) courses at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army (TJAGLCS), is restricted to students who have confirmed reservations. Reservations for TJAGSA CLE courses are managed by the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), the Army-wide automated training system. If you do not have a confirmed reservation in ATRRS, attendance is prohibited.

b. Active duty service members and civilian employees must obtain reservations through their directorates training office. Reservists or ARNG must obtain reservations through their unit training offices or, if they are non-unit reservists, through the U.S. Army Personnel Center (ARPERCOM), ATTN: ARPC-OPB, 1 Reserve Way, St. Louis, MO 63132-5200.

c. Questions regarding courses should be directed first through the local ATRRS Quota Manager or the ATRRS School Manager, Academic Department at 1 (800) 552-3978, extension 3307.

d. The ATRRS Individual Student Record is available on-line. To verify a confirmed reservation, log into your individual AKO account and follow these instructions:

Go to Self Service, My Education. Scroll to Globe Icon (not the AARTS Transcript Services).
Go to ATRRS On-line, Student Menu, Individual Training Record. The training record with reservations and completions will be visible.

If you do not see a particular entry for a course that you are registered for or have completed, see your local ATRRS Quota Manager or Training Coordinator for an update or correction.

e. The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, is an approved sponsor of CLE courses in all states that require mandatory continuing legal education. These states include: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI, and WY.


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### NCO ACADEMY COURSES

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<td>512-27D30</td>
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### WARRANT OFFICER COURSES

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<td>9th JA Warrant Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>7 Jul – 1 Aug 08</td>
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<td>7A-270A0</td>
<td>15th JA Warrant Officer Basic Course</td>
<td>27 May – 20 Jun 08</td>
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<td>7A-270A1</td>
<td>19th Legal Administrators Course</td>
<td>16 – 20 Jun 08</td>
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<td>7A270A3</td>
<td>2008 Senior Warrant Officer Symposium</td>
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### ENLISTED COURSES

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<td>512-27DC5</td>
<td>25th Court Reporter Course</td>
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### ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL LAW

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<td>5F-F28</td>
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<td>5F-F29</td>
<td>26th Federal Litigation Course</td>
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**CONTRACT AND FISCAL LAW**

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<td>3 – 11 Mar 08</td>
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<td>160th Contract Attorneys Course</td>
<td>23 Jul – 1 Aug 08</td>
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<td>5F-F101</td>
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<td>5F-F103</td>
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<td>5F-F13</td>
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**CRIMINAL LAW**

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**INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW**

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<td>5F-F42</td>
<td>89th Law of War Course</td>
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<td>5F-F42</td>
<td>90th Law of War Course</td>
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### 3. Naval Justice School and FY 2008 Course Schedule

Please contact Jerry Gallant, Registrar, Naval Justice School, 360 Elliot Street, Newport, RI 02841 at (401) 841-3807, extension 131, for information about the courses.

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<td>786R</td>
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<td>24 – 28 Mar 08 (San Diego)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Advanced SJA/Ethics (020)</td>
<td>14 – 18 Apr (Norfolk)</td>
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<tr>
<td>850V</td>
<td>Law of Military Operations (010)</td>
<td>16 – 27 Jun 08</td>
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<td>4044</td>
<td>Joint Operational Law Training (010)</td>
<td>21 – 24 Jul 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>0258</td>
<td>Senior Officer (020)</td>
<td>10 – 14 Mar 08 (Newport)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senior Officer (030)</td>
<td>5 – 9 May 08 (Newport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Officer (040)</td>
<td>9 – 13 Jun 08 (Newport)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Officer (050)</td>
<td>21 – 25 Jul 08 (Newport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Officer (060)</td>
<td>18 – 22 Aug 08 (Newport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Officer (070)</td>
<td>22 – 26 Sep 08 (Newport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4048</td>
<td>Estate Planning (010)</td>
<td>21 – 25 Jul 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>961M</td>
<td>Effective Courtroom Communications (020)</td>
<td>28 Jan – 1 Feb 08 (Bremerton)</td>
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<tr>
<td>748A</td>
<td>Law of Naval Operations (010)</td>
<td>3 – 7 Mar 08</td>
</tr>
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<td>Law of Naval Operations (020)</td>
<td>15 – 19 Sep 08</td>
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<td>Dates/Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>7485</td>
<td>Litigating National Security (010)</td>
<td>29 Apr – 1 May 08 (Andrews AFB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>748K</td>
<td>USMC Trial Advocacy Training (020)</td>
<td>12 – 16 May 08 (Okinawa)</td>
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<td>USMC Trial Advocacy Training (030)</td>
<td>19 – 23 May 08 (Pearl Harbor)</td>
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<td>USMC Trial Advocacy Training (040)</td>
<td>15 – 19 Sep 08 (San Diego)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2205</td>
<td>Defense Trial Enhancement (010)</td>
<td>12 – 16 May 08</td>
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<td>3938</td>
<td>Computer Crimes (010)</td>
<td>19 – 23 May 08 (Newport)</td>
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<td>961D</td>
<td>Military Law Update Workshop (Officer) (010)</td>
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<td>Military Law Update Workshop (Officer) (020)</td>
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<td>961J</td>
<td>Defending Complex Cases (010)</td>
<td>18 – 22 Aug 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>525N</td>
<td>Prosecuting Complex Cases (010)</td>
<td>11 – 15 Aug 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>2622</td>
<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (020)</td>
<td>14 – 18 Jan 08 (Pensacola)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (030)</td>
<td>14 Jan – 18 Feb 08 (Bahrain)</td>
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<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (040)</td>
<td>3 – 7 Mar 08 (Pensacola)</td>
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<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (050)</td>
<td>14 – 18 Apr 08 (Pensacola)</td>
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<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (060)</td>
<td>28 Apr – 2 May 08 (Naples, Italy)</td>
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<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (070)</td>
<td>9 – 13 Jun 08 (Pensacola)</td>
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<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (080)</td>
<td>16 – 20 Jun 08 (Quantico)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (090)</td>
<td>23 – 27 Jun 08 (Camp Lejeune)</td>
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<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (100)</td>
<td>14 – 18 Jul 08 (Pensacola)</td>
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<td>Senior Officer (Fleet) (110)</td>
<td>11 – 15 Aug 08 (Pensacola)</td>
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<tr>
<td>961A</td>
<td>Continuing Legal Education (010)</td>
<td>4 – 5 Feb 08 (Yokosuka)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Continuing Legal Education (020)</td>
<td>1 – 2 May 08 (Naples)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7878</td>
<td>Legal Assistance Paralegal Course (010)</td>
<td>31 Mar – 5 Apr 08</td>
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<td>03RF</td>
<td>Legalman Accession Course (010)</td>
<td>1 Oct – 14 Dec 07</td>
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<td>Legalman Accession Course (020)</td>
<td>22 Jan – 4 Apr 08</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Legalman Accession Course (030)</td>
<td>9 Jun – 22 Aug 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>846L</td>
<td>Senior Legalman Leadership Course (010)</td>
<td>18 – 22 Aug 08</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senior Legalman Leadership Course (010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>049N</td>
<td>Reserve Legalman Course (Phase I) (010)</td>
<td>21 Apr – 2 May 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>056L</td>
<td>Reserve Legalman Course (Phase II) (010)</td>
<td>5 – 16 May 08</td>
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<td>Reserve Legalman Course (Phase III) (010)</td>
<td>19 – 30 May 08</td>
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<td>5764</td>
<td>LN/Legal Specialist Mid-Career Course (020)</td>
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<td>961G</td>
<td>Military Law Update Workshop (Enlisted) (010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Military Law Update Workshop (Enlisted) (020)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4040</td>
<td>Paralegal Research &amp; Writing (010)</td>
<td>21 Apr – 2 May 08</td>
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<td>Paralegal Research &amp; Writing (020)</td>
<td>16 – 27 Jun 08 (Norfolk)</td>
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<td>Paralegal Research &amp; Writing (030)</td>
<td>14 – 25 Jul 08 (San Diego)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4046</td>
<td>SJA Legalman (010)</td>
<td>25 Feb – 7 Mar 08 (San Diego)</td>
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<td>SJA Legalman (020)</td>
<td>12 – 23 May 08 (Norfolk)</td>
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### Pending Prosecution Trial Enhancement (010)  
- 4 – 8 Feb 08

### 7487 Family Law/Consumer Law (010)  
- 31 Mar – 4 Apr 08

### Senior Enlisted Leadership Course (Fleet)  
- 627S
  - 6 – 8 Nov 08 (San Diego)
  - 7 – 9 Jan 08 (Jacksonville)
  - 14 – 16 Jan 08 (Bahrain)
  - 4 – 6 Feb 08 (Yokosuka)
  - 11 – 13 Feb 08 (Okinawa)
  - 20 – 22 Feb 08 (Norfolk)
  - 18 – 20 Mar 08 (San Diego)
  - 31 Mar – 2 Apr 08 (Norfolk)
  - 14 – 16 Apr 08 (Bremerton)
  - 22 – 24 Apr 08 (San Diego)
  - 28 – 30 Apr 08 (Naples)
  - 19 – 21 May 08 (Norfolk)
  - 8 – 10 Jul 08 (San Diego)
  - 4 – 6 Aug 08 (Millington)
  - 25 – 27 Aug 08 (Pendleton)
  - 2 – 4 Sep 08 (Norfolk)

### Legal Officer Course (020)  
- 3676
- 26 Nov – 14 Dec 07
- 7 – 25 Jan 08
- 25 Feb – 14 Mar 08
- 5 – 23 May 08
- 9 – 27 Jun 08

### Legal Clerk Course (020)  
- 3679
- 26 Nov – 7 Dec 07
- 4 – 15 Feb 08
- 10 – 21 Mar 08
- 21 Apr – 2 May 08
- 7 – 18 Jul 08
- 8 – 19 Sep 08

### Senior Officer Course (020)  
- 3760
- 7 – 11 Jan 08 (Jacksonville)
- 25 – 29 Feb 08
- 7 – 11 Apr 08
- 23 – 27 Jun 08
- 4 – 8 Aug 08 (Millington)
- 25 – 29 Aug 08

### Military Justice Course for SJA/Convening Authority/Shipboard Legalman (020)  
- 4046
- 16 – 27 Jun 08

### Naval Justice School Detachment  
#### Norfolk, VA

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<tr>
<th>Course Code</th>
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<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>3676</td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (020)</td>
<td>26 Nov – 14 Dec 07</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (040)</td>
<td>10 – 28 Mar 08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (050)</td>
<td>28 Apr – 16 May 08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (060)</td>
<td>2 – 20 Jun 08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (070)</td>
<td>7 – 25 Jul 08</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Legal Officer Course (080)</td>
<td>8 – 26 Sep 08</td>
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<thead>
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<th>Course Code</th>
<th>Course Title</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<td>3679</td>
<td>Legal Clerk Course (020)</td>
<td>26 Nov – 7 Dec 07</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legal Clerk Course (030)</td>
<td>4 – 15 Feb 08</td>
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<td>Legal Clerk Course (040)</td>
<td>10 – 21 Mar 08</td>
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<td>Legal Clerk Course (050)</td>
<td>21 Apr – 2 May 08</td>
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<td>Legal Clerk Course (060)</td>
<td>7 – 18 Jul 08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Clerk Course (070)</td>
<td>8 – 19 Sep 08</td>
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### Naval Justice School Detachment  
#### San Diego, CA

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<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>947H</td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (020)</td>
<td>26 Nov – 14 Dec 07</td>
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<td>Legal Officer Course (030)</td>
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<td>Legal Officer Course (040)</td>
<td>25 Feb – 14 Mar 08</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (050)</td>
<td>5 – 23 May 08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Officer Course (060)</td>
<td>9 – 27 Jun 08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Air Force Judge Advocate General School Fiscal Year 2008 Course Schedule

Please contact Jim Whitaker, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, 150 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5712, commercial telephone (334) 953-2802, DSN 493-2802, fax (334) 953-4445, for information about attending the listed courses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Title</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>9 Oct – 13 Dec 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 08-01</td>
<td>10 Oct – 30 Nov 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal Craftsman Course, Class 08-01</td>
<td>24 Oct – 7 Dec 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Environmental Law Course, Class 08-A (Off-Site Wash DC Location)</td>
<td>29 – 30 Oct 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed Fiscal Law &amp; Contingency Contracting Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>27 – 30 Nov 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Employee Labor Law Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>10 – 14 Dec 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 08-02</td>
<td>3 Jan – 22 Feb 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trial &amp; Defense Advocacy Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>7 – 18 Jan 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard Annual Survey of the Law, Class 08-A &amp; B (Off-Site)</td>
<td>25 – 26 Jan 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve Annual Survey of the Law, Class 08-A &amp; B (Off-Site)</td>
<td>25 – 26 Jan 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Justice Administration Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>28 Jan – 1 Feb 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal &amp; Administrative Investigations Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>4 – 8 Feb 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Air Force Operations Law Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>8 – 10 Feb 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Course Name</td>
<td>Dates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Aspects of Information Operations Law Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>14 – 15 Feb 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course, Class 08-B</td>
<td>19 Feb – 18 Apr 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 08-03</td>
<td>25 Feb – 11 Apr 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paralegal Craftsman Course, Class 08-02</td>
<td>3 Mar – 11 Apr 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Trial Advocacy Course, Class 08-A (Off-site, Yokota AB, Japan)</td>
<td>10 – 14 Mar 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Defense Counsel Course , Class 08-A</td>
<td>14 – 18 Apr 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS Trial Advocacy Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>7 – 11 Apr 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 08-04</td>
<td>15 Apr – 3 Jun 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve Forces Judge Advocate Course, Class 08-B</td>
<td>19 – 20 Apr 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Defense Counsel Orientation Course, Class 08-B</td>
<td>21 – 25 Apr 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Law Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>28 Apr – 2 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Paralegal Orientation Course, Class 08-B</td>
<td>21 – 25 Apr 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Trial Advocacy Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>29 Apr – 2 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Labor &amp; Employment Law Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>5 – 9 May 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations Law Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>12 – 22 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation and Appropriate Dispute Resolution Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>19 – 23 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Law Update Course (DL), Class 08-A</td>
<td>28 – 30 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Forces Paralegal Course, Class 08-B</td>
<td>2 – 13 Jun 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 08-05</td>
<td>4 Jun – 23 Jul 2008</td>
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<td>Senior Reserve Forces Paralegal Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>9 – 13 Jun 2008</td>
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<td>Staff Judge Advocate Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>16 – 27 Jun 2008</td>
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<td>Law Office Management Course, Class 08-A</td>
<td>16 – 27 Jun 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course, Class 08-C</td>
<td>14 Jul – 12 Sep 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paralegal Apprentice Course, Class 08-06</td>
<td>29 Jul – 16 Sep 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trial &amp; Defense Advocacy Course, Class 08-B</td>
<td>15 – 26 Sep 2008</td>
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5. Civilian-Sponsored CLE Courses

For addresses and detailed information, see the March 2007 issue of *The Army Lawyer*. 

84 AUGUST 2007 • THE ARMY LAWYER • DA PAM 27-50-411
6. Phase I (Correspondence Phase), Deadline for RC-JAOAC 2008

The suspense for submission of all RC-JAOAC Phase I (Correspondence Phase) materials is NLT 2400, 1 November 2007, for those judge advocates who desire to attend Phase II (Resident Phase) at TJAGLCS in January 2008. This requirement includes submission of all JA 151, Fundamentals of Military Writing, exercises.

This requirement is particularly critical for some officers. The 2008 JAOAC will be held in January 2008 and is a prerequisite for most judge advocate captains to be promoted to major.

A judge advocate who is required to retake any subcourse examinations or “re-do” any writing exercises must submit the examination or writing exercise to the Non-Resident Instruction Branch, TJAGLCS, for grading by the same deadline (1 November 2007). If the student receives notice of the need to re-do any examination or exercise after 1 October 2007, the notice will contain a suspense date for completion of the work.

Judge advocates who fail to complete Phase I correspondence courses and writing exercises by 1 November 2007 will not be cleared to attend the 2008 JAOAC. If you have not received written notification of completion of Phase I of JAOAC, you are not eligible to attend the resident phase.

If you have any additional questions regarding attendance at Phase II (Residence Phase) or completion of Phase I writing exercises, contact LTC Jeff Sexton, commercial telephone (434) 971-3357, or e-mail jeffrey.sexton@hqda.army.mil.

For system or help desk issues regarding JAOAC or any on-line or correspondence course material, please contact the Distance Learning Department at jagc.training@hqda.army.mil or commercial telephone (434) 971-3153.

7. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Jurisdiction and Reporting Dates

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Reporting Month</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama**</td>
<td>31 December annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>15 September annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>30 June annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California*</td>
<td>1 February annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Anytime within three-year period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Period ends 31 December; confirmation required by 1 February if compliance required; if attorney is admitted in even-numbered year, period ends in even-numbered year, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida**</td>
<td>Assigned month every three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>31 January annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>31 December, every third year, depending on year of admission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>31 December annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>1 March annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Thirty days after program, hours must be completed in compliance period 1 July to June 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>10 August; completion required by 30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana**</td>
<td>31 January annually; credits must be earned by 31 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine**</td>
<td>31 July annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Reporting Requirement</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>30 August annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi**</td>
<td>15 August annually; 1 August to 31 July reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>31 July annually; reporting year from 1 July to 30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>1 April annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>1 March annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire**</td>
<td>1 August annually; 1 July to 30 June reporting year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>30 April annually; 1 January to 31 December reporting year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York*</td>
<td>Every two years within thirty days after the attorney’s birthday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina**</td>
<td>28 February annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>31 July annually for year ending 30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio*</td>
<td>31 January biennialally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma**</td>
<td>15 February annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Period end 31 December; due 31 January</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania**</td>
<td>Group 1: 30 April</td>
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<td>Group 2: 31 August</td>
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<td>Group 3: 31 December</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>30 June annually</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Carolina**</td>
<td>1 January annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee*</td>
<td>1 March annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Minimum credits must be completed and reported by last day of birth month each year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>31 January annually</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>2 July annually</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>31 October Completion Deadline; 15 December reporting deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>31 January triennialally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>31 July biennially; reporting period ends 30 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin*</td>
<td>1 February biennially; period ends 31 December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>30 January annually</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Military exempt (exemption must be declared with state).
**Must declare exemption.
**Current Materials of Interest**


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit/Location</th>
<th>ATTRS Course Number</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>POC</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>17-18 Nov 2007</td>
<td>77th RRC New York City, NY</td>
<td>001</td>
<td>Administrative &amp; Civil Law, Criminal Law</td>
<td>LTC John Petosa, (718) 352-5079, <a href="mailto:John.Petosa@us.army.mil">John.Petosa@us.army.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18 Nov 2007</td>
<td>12th LSO, 174th LSO, 213th LSO, &amp; 139th LSO Columbia, SC</td>
<td>002</td>
<td>Administrative &amp; Civil Law, International &amp; Operational Law</td>
<td>MAJ Lake Summers (803) 254-5322 <a href="mailto:summers@mtsolawfirm.com">summers@mtsolawfirm.com</a> LTC Jim Hardin <a href="mailto:James.E.Hardin@nccourts.org">James.E.Hardin@nccourts.org</a> 919 219-3860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Mar 2008</td>
<td>75th LSO Burlingame (San Francisco, CA)</td>
<td>005</td>
<td>Lessons Learned International &amp; Operational Law</td>
<td>CPT Steven Wang 916-642-2102 <a href="mailto:steven.wang1@us.army.mil">steven.wang1@us.army.mil</a> COL Roger Matzkind <a href="mailto:Roger.Matzkind@us.army.mil">Roger.Matzkind@us.army.mil</a> LTC Ronald Rallis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-30 Mar 2008</td>
<td>WIA&amp;ARNG Ft. McCoy, WI</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Air Force JAG School</td>
<td>Lt Col Julio R. Barron 608-242-3077 / DSN 724-3077 <a href="mailto:julio.barron2@us.army.mil">julio.barron2@us.army.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20 Apr 2008</td>
<td>1st LSO/90th RRC Oklahoma City, OK</td>
<td>008</td>
<td>International &amp; Operational Law, Contract &amp; Fiscal Law</td>
<td>LTC Randy Fluke, 409-981-7950; <a href="mailto:randall.fluke@us.army.mil">randall.fluke@us.army.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27 Apr 2008</td>
<td>91st LSO/9th LSO Oak Brook, IL</td>
<td>009</td>
<td>Administrative &amp; Civil Law, Contract &amp; Fiscal Law</td>
<td>SFC Eric Dahl 847.266.2523 <a href="mailto:eric.dahl@usr.army.mil">eric.dahl@usr.army.mil</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>25-27 Apr 2008</td>
<td>8th LSO/89th RRC Kansas City</td>
<td>010</td>
<td>Administrative &amp; Civil Law, Contract &amp; Fiscal Law</td>
<td>LTC Tracy Diel &amp; SFC Larry Barker <a href="mailto:tracy.t.diel@us.army.mil">tracy.t.diel@us.army.mil</a> SFC Larry Barker <a href="mailto:Larry.R.Barker@us.army.mil">Larry.R.Barker@us.army.mil</a> 816-836-0005 ext 2155/2156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27 Apr 2008</td>
<td>Indiana ARNG Indianapolis, IN</td>
<td>011</td>
<td>Administrative &amp; Civil Law, International &amp; Operational Law</td>
<td>1LT Kevin Leslie, (317) 247-3491, <a href="mailto:kevin.leslie@us.army.mil">kevin.leslie@us.army.mil</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each year, TJAGSA publishes deskbooks and materials to support resident course instruction. Much of this material is useful to judge advocates and government civilian attorneys who are unable to attend courses in their practice areas, and TJAGSA receives many requests each year for these materials. Because the distribution of these materials is not in its mission, TJAGSA does not have the resources to provide these publications.

To provide another avenue of availability, some of this material is available through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). An office may obtain this material through the installation library. Most libraries are DTIC users and would be happy to identify and order requested material. If the library is not registered with the DTIC, the requesting person’s office/organization may register for the DTIC’s services.

If only unclassified information is required, simply call the DTIC Registration Branch and register over the phone at (703) 767-8273, DSN 427-8273. If access to classified information is needed, then a registration form must be obtained, completed, and sent to the Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218; telephone (commercial) (703) 767-8273, (DSN) 427-8273, toll-free 1-800-225-DTIC, menu selection 2, option 1; fax (commercial) (703) 767-8228; fax (DSN) 426-8228; or e-mail to reghelp@dtic.mil.

If there is a recurring need for information on a particular subject, the requesting person may want to subscribe to the Current Awareness Bibliography (CAB) Service. The CAB is a profile-based product, which will alert the requestor, on a biweekly basis, to the documents that have been entered into the Technical Reports Database which meet his profile parameters. This bibliography is available electronically via e-mail at no cost or in hard copy at an annual cost of $25 per profile. Contact DTIC at www.dtic.mil/dtic/current.html.

Prices for the reports fall into one of the following four categories, depending on the number of pages: $7, $12, $42, and $122. The DTIC also supplies reports in electronic formats. Prices may be subject to change at any time. Lawyers, however, who need specific documents for a case may obtain them at no cost.

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There is also a DTIC Home Page at http://www.dtic.mil to browse through the listing of citations to unclassified/unlimited documents that have been entered into the Technical Reports Database within the last twenty-five years to get a better idea of the type of information that is available. The complete collection includes limited and classified documents as well, but those are not available on the web.

Those who wish to receive more information about the DTIC or have any questions should call the Product and Services Branch at (703)767-8267, (DSN) 427-8267, or toll-free 1-800-225-DTIC, menu selection 6, option 1; or send an e-mail to bcoorders@dtic.mil.

**Contract Law**

- AD A265777 Fiscal Law Course Deskbook, JA-506-93.

**Legal Assistance**

- AD A360700 Tax Information Series, JA 269 (2002).
3. The Legal Automation Army-Wide Systems XXI—JAGCNet

a. The Legal Automation Army-Wide Systems XXI (LAAWS XXI) operates a knowledge management and information service called JAGCNet primarily dedicated to servicing the Army legal community, but also provides for Department of Defense (DOD) access in some cases. Whether you have Army access or DOD-wide access, all users will be able to download TJAGSA publications that are available through the JAGCNet.

b. Access to the JAGCNet:

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c. How to log on to JAGCNet:

(1) Using a Web browser (Internet Explorer 6 or higher recommended) go to the following site:
(2) Follow the link that reads “Enter JAGCNet.”

(3) If you already have a JAGCNet account, and know your user name and password, select “Enter” from the next menu, then enter your “User Name” and “Password” in the appropriate fields.

(4) If you have a JAGCNet account, but do not know your user name and/or Internet password, contact the LAAWS XXI HelpDesk at LAAWSXXXI@jagc-smtp.army.mil.

(5) If you do not have a JAGCNet account, select “Register” from the JAGCNet Intranet menu.

(6) Follow the link “Request a New Account” at the bottom of the page, and fill out the registration form completely. Allow seventy-two hours for your request to process. Once your request is processed, you will receive an e-mail telling you that your request has been approved or denied.

(7) Once granted access to JAGCNet, follow step (c), above.

4. TJAGSA Publications Available Through the LAAWS XXI JAGCNet

For detailed information of TJAGLCS Publications available through the LAAWS XXI JAGCNet, see the March 2007, issue of The Army Lawyer.

5. TJAGLCS Legal Technology Management Office (LTMO)

The TJAGLCS, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia continues to improve capabilities for faculty and staff. We have installed new computers throughout TJAGLCS, all of which are compatible with Microsoft Windows XP Professional and Microsoft Office 2003 Professional.

The TJAGLCS faculty and staff are available through the Internet. Addresses for TJAGLCS personnel are available by e-mail at jagsch@hqda.army.mil or by accessing the JAGC directory via JAGCNET. If you have any problems, please contact LTMO at (434) 971-3257. Phone numbers and e-mail addresses for TJAGLCS personnel are available on TJAGLCS Web page at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/tjagsa. Click on “directory” for the listings.

For students who wish to access their office e-mail while attending TJAGLCS classes, please ensure that your office e-mail is available via the web. Please bring the address with you when attending classes at TJAGLCS. If your office does not have web accessible e-mail, forward your office e-mail to your AKO account. It is mandatory that you have an AKO account. You can sign up for an account at the Army Portal, http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/tjagsa. Click on “directory” for the listings.

Personnel desiring to call TJAGLCS can dial via DSN 521-7115 or, provided the telephone call is for official business only, use the toll free number, (800) 552-3978; the receptionist will connect you with the appropriate department or directorate. For additional information, please contact the LTMO at (434) 971-3264 or DSN 521-3264.

6. The Army Law Library Service

Per Army Regulation 27-1, paragraph 12-11, the Army Law Library Service (ALLS) must be notified before any redistribution of ALLS-purchased law library materials. Posting such a notification in the ALLS FORUM of JAGCNet satisfies this regulatory requirement as well as alerting other librarians that excess materials are available.

Point of contact is Mrs. Dottie Evans, The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, ATTN: CTR-MO, 600 Massie Road, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1781. Telephone DSN: 521-3278, commercial: (434) 971-3278, or e-mail at Dottie.Evans@hqda.army.mil.
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