Sudan
a country study
On the cover: A group of pyramids at Meroë, north of Khartoum


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This volume is the last in a series of books prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program, formerly sponsored by the Department of the Army and temporarily revived in FY 2004 with congressionally mandated funding under the sponsorship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5).

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official U.S. government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.

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The editor and authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of the coauthors of the 1992 edition of *Sudan: A Country Study*, edited by Helen Chapin Metz. Their information provided general background for the present volume.

Several members of the staff of the Federal Research Division greatly assisted in the preparation of this book. Sandra Meditz reviewed all parts of the book and served as the overall editor and manager of production. Catherine Schwartzstein edited the manuscript, made many useful suggestions, and helped clarify obscure points. She also conducted the final prepublication editorial review and compiled the index. Janie L. Gilchrist performed word processing and formatting of text.

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Christopher Robinson prepared the book’s graphics and also performed the photocomposition and preparation of the final digital manuscript.

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Finally, the editors wish to acknowledge the patience and support of each of the authors for what has been an extended editorial process with regard to producing this volume.
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This edition of *Sudan: A Country Study* is a revised and updated version that replaces the 1992 edition edited by Helen Chapin Metz. As with other volumes in the Country Studies series, it attempts to cover in a concise fashion the history, society, environment, economy, government, and security sector of a contemporary nation, in this case, the Republic of the Sudan. The text is based on a variety of sources including books, scholarly journals, foreign and domestic newspapers, official reports of governments and international organizations, and numerous periodicals and Web sites on Sudan, Africa, and the Middle East. At the end of each chapter is a bibliographic essay in which the author discusses the main sources used in the chapter. Complete citations for all chapters are included in the comprehensive bibliography at the end of the volume.

While this study was in production, the 10 Southern states of Sudan voted overwhelmingly to break away, and in mid-July 2011 they formed an independent nation, the Republic of South Sudan. In view of this development, the five chapters of the volume cover events in the whole of Sudan up to early 2011 and hence do not deal with South Sudan as an independent country. Events in Sudan and South Sudan since their separation are included in the Introduction and in the Country Profile, both current as of early August 2014.

Every effort has been made to include the most accurate and recent information throughout the volume. However, locating current information on both Sudan and South Sudan is often a difficult task. Information that is available may be fragmentary or not up to date. This problem is especially the case with respect to statistical data on such topics as the economy or the education and health sectors. Demographic information has fared better because the latest national census was conducted in 2008. In general, current information on security forces is scarce if not lacking altogether.

The spelling of contemporary place-names conforms in most cases to the system approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. However, in cases where the Board's version might prove confusing, we have retained spellings in English that are in common use, for example, Al-Obeid instead of Al-Ubayyid. With regard to personal names and terms in Arabic, we have followed the transliteration system of the Library of Congress–American Library Association, with modifications. In instances where names are commonly rendered in English, we have used the familiar
form rather than one that might not be recognizable to the reader, and no
diacritics are used except for apostrophes (‘) and hyphens (-).

Unfamiliar terms are defined in the text; more extended definitions are
found in the Glossary at the end of the volume. As an aid to the reader,
abbreviations and acronyms that appear in the text are listed with their
expanded form in Table A, and a chronology of significant events from
antiquity to 2014 appears in Table B. Metric measurements are used
throughout the text. Table 1 in the Appendix contains a conversion chart
to assist those readers unfamiliar with metric measurements. Because the
boundaries and names of Sudan’s administrative divisions have changed
since the early 1990s, the administrative divisions map for Sudan in 1991
given in chapter one serves for reference there and in succeeding chapters.
An administrative divisions map of Sudan in 2011 appears in the front of
the book. Current maps of both Sudan and South Sudan are in the Intro-
duction.
### Table A. Selected Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFESD</td>
<td>Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/d</td>
<td>barrels per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (under the CPA, <em>q.v.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Darfur Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>Equatoria Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Eastern Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNPOC</td>
<td>Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSM</td>
<td>Global System for Mobile Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>heavily indebted poor country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICF</td>
<td>Islamic Charter Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>internally displaced people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIUs</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LJM</td>
<td>Liberation and Justice Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<td>NCF</td>
<td>National Consensus Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NCRC</td>
<td>National Constitutional Review Commission</td>
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<td>NCSC</td>
<td>National Civil Service Commission</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electricity Corporation</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>NISS</td>
<td>National Intelligence and Security Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Press Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Security Organization (later the NISS, <em>q.v.</em> )</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSRCC</td>
<td>National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Service</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONGC</td>
<td>Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (Indian company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIC</td>
<td>Popular Arab and Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Popular Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Popular Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PETRONAS</td>
<td>Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Malaysian company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Popular Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC–NS</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SANU</td>
<td>Sudan African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Sudan Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Sudan Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sudanese pound (old)</td>
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<td>SDD</td>
<td>Sudanese dinar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Sudan Defence Force</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sudanese pound (new)</td>
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<td>SHRO</td>
<td>Sudan Human Rights Organization</td>
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<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>Sudan Mining Corporation</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Sudanese National Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Sudan Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA-N</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army–North</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM–IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–In Opposition</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Sudan Railways Corporation</td>
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<td>SRF</td>
<td>Sudan Revolutionary Front</td>
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<td>SSCC</td>
<td>Southern States Coordination Council</td>
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<td>SSCM</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCSC</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Civil Service Commission</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSIM</td>
<td>South Sudan Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSLA</td>
<td>South Sudan Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSLF</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSLM/A</td>
<td>South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPS</td>
<td>South Sudan Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Sudan Socialist Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSUDA</td>
<td>South Sudan United Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSUM</td>
<td>South Sudan Unity Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudapet</td>
<td>Sudan National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SudaTel</td>
<td>Sudan Telecommunications Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWTUF</td>
<td>Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMC</td>
<td>Transitional Military Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDSF</td>
<td>United Democratic Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A. Selected Abbreviations and Acronyms (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPF</td>
<td>United Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URRP</td>
<td>Umma Reform and Renewal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAP</td>
<td>Union of Sudan African Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Table B. Chronology of Important Events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ca. 70,000 years ago</td>
<td>Human habitation along the Nile in the Paleolithic Era.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000–7,000 B.C.</td>
<td>Neolithic communities are established in settled communities along the Nile in northern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 2650–2150 B.C.</td>
<td>Increasing contact between Nubia and Old Kingdom Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 2500 B.C.–1500 B.C.</td>
<td>Era of the Kerma culture in Nubia, known to the ancient Egyptians as Kush.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth century B.C.</td>
<td>Reemergence of the Kingdom of Kush with its capital at Napata.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>590 B.C.</td>
<td>Egyptian Army sacks Napata; the Kushite court relocates to Meroë.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. A.D. 350</td>
<td>Axumite army destroys Meroë.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth century</td>
<td>Three kingdoms (Nobatia, Muqurra, and Alwa) emerge in Nubia and facilitate the spread of Christianity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>640</td>
<td>Arab conquest of Egypt and beginning of Muslim contacts with northern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>642 and 652</td>
<td>First Arab-Egyptian campaigns into Nubia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1276</td>
<td>Mamluks of Egypt attack Nubia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1316</td>
<td>Last Christian Nubian king is deated, and the first Muslim king, a Nubian, accedes to the throne of Dongola, capital of Muqurra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1504</td>
<td>Establishment of the Islamic Funj Sultanate at Sinnar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820–21</td>
<td>Egyptian Ottomans conquer much of northern Sudan, abolish the Funj Sultanate, and establish Turco-Egyptian control over Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Muhammad Ahmed claims to be the “expected Mahdi” and revolts against the Turco-Egyptian administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>General Charles Gordon departs Cairo for Khartoum to become governor-general for a second time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885–98</td>
<td>Era of the Mahdist State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Anglo-Egyptian Condominium established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Adoption of policy to separate northern and southern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Juba Conference results in southern leaders accepting unification of northern and southern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Equatoria Corps mutinies at Torit on August 18, marking the beginning of civil war in the South.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Anglo-Egyptian Condominium comes to an end on January 1, and Sudan becomes an independent country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>General Ibrahim Abbud seizes power on November 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Anya Nya forms and renewes armed rebellion in Southern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Ja'far al-Numayri, with the support of the communists, seizes power on May 25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Addis Ababa Accords, signed on February 27, restore peace in Southern Sudan and grant the region autonomy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Oil discovered in Southern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), led by John Garang, launches a new civil war in Southern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir seizes power on June 30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The Asmara Declaration of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) acknowledges Southern Sudan’s right to self-determination and calls for separation of religion and state and for armed struggle to overthrow the National Islamic Front regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>The United States launches a cruise-missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in August, alleging that it was making materials for chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Sudan begins to export oil in August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>In July Sudan and the SPLA sign the Machakos Protocol in Kenya, the first of several agreements that in 2005 are incorporated into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army. The protocol envisions a vote in the South for union with or secession from Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Two new rebel groups, the Front for the Liberation of Darfur (later the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) and the Justice and Equality Movement, launch attacks in February throughout Darfur. In October Hassan al-Turabi is released after three years in prison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>On May 26, Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) sign the Protocol on Power Sharing. On September 9, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that genocide has occurred in Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>On January 9, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending 22 years of civil war in Sudan. The agreement incorporates several previously negotiated accords. On March 24, the UN votes to send 10,700 peacekeepers to South Sudan to facilitate the redeployment of government troops to the North and to work with the African Union to foster peace in Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>On January 1, the UN takes over peacekeeping in Darfur from African Union troops. The fifth population and housing census in Sudan is conducted April 22–May 6 in preparation for the referendum on South Sudan’s future, as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>On March 4, al-Bashir is indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Darfur. In September the National Consensus Forces form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>In national elections held April 11–15, al-Bashir is reelected president of Sudan with 68.24 percent of the vote, and Salva Kiir is elected president of South Sudan with 92.99 percent of the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2011 | South Sudanese vote January 9–15 in a referendum at the end of the six-year transition period, as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. Of more than 3.8 million votes, 98.8 percent vote to secede from the North.  
On January 30, students begin protests against regime policies in Khartoum.  
In May 19–21, armed clashes begin in Abyei as the Sudan Army moves to occupy the region. In late July, the first of more than 1,500 Ethiopian police and troops arrive to separate the armed forces of North and South in the contested area.  
On June 5, fighting breaks out in the mountains of South Kordofan as Khartoum seeks to stamp out discontent among the Nuba, who sided with the South during the civil war.  
On July 9, South Sudan is officially declared independent of Sudan and is known henceforth as the Republic of South Sudan.  
On July 14, the Republic of South Sudan is admitted to the United Nations; the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur is signed in Doha, Qatar.  
On September 1, fighting begins in Blue Nile State when Khartoum sends its army to consolidate control of the region and to drive out the Northern branch of the SPLM. Thousands flee into Ethiopia.  
On November 11, the Sudan Revolutionary Front forms. |
| 2012 | On January 20, South Sudan announces a shutdown of its oil production in a dispute with Sudan over oil-transit fees.  
In April fighting breaks out in Abyei between Northern and Southern armed forces.  
On September 27, Sudan and South Sudan sign an agreement covering nine outstanding issues between the two nations, including oil-transit fees and demarcation of their common border, but it excludes the status of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. |
| 2013 | On January 5, the National Consensus Forces and the Sudan Revolutionary Front sign the New Dawn Charter.  
On April 6, South Sudan resumes pumping oil for export through Northern pipelines.  
In September violent protests erupt in Sudan over cuts to fuel subsidies; protesters also call for political reform and a new government.  
On December 15, fighting breaks out between Dinka and Nuer soldiers in Juba after President Salva Kiir charges Vice President Riek Machar with attempting a coup; beginning of civil war in South Sudan. |
| 2014 | On January 27, al-Bashir issues a formal call for a “national dialogue” to discuss the major issues before Sudan, including peace and political reform.  
On June 10, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar agree to a cease-fire and a transitional government within 60 days; neither goal is achieved. |
Country Profile

Country

**Formal Name:** Republic of the Sudan / Republic of South Sudan

**Short Form:** Sudan / South Sudan

**Term for Citizen(s):** Sudanese / South Sudanese

**Capital:** Khartoum / Juba

**Other Principal Urban Centers:** Sudan: Omdurman, Khartoum North, Port Sudan, Kassala, Al-Obeid, Nyala; South Sudan: Aweil, Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, Rumbek, Wau
Date of Independence: January 1, 1956 / July 9, 2011

Historical Background

Since antiquity, Sudan’s history has centered around a succession of states along the northern Nile and around cultural, military, and political relations with the Egyptians to the north. The ancient Egyptians at times controlled the northern Sudanese lands of Nubia and Cush and fostered an Egyptianized population that ruled Egypt in the early first millennium B.C. A few centuries later, the commercial state of Meroë dominated the central Nile. In the mid-fourth century A.D., Meroë succumbed to invasion and was succeeded by three states with cultural ties with Egypt, including Orthodox Christianity.

During the fourteenth century, Islam was introduced from Egypt. Together with migrations from the north, Islam gradually changed the nature of Sudanese society. Islam facilitated the division of the country into northern and southern halves, one Arab and Muslim, the other African and animist, a division that persists today. The Funj kingdom centered at Sinnar on the Blue Nile and the sultanate of Darfur in the west flourished in and after the sixteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, the Egyptians once more asserted control over much of Sudan. They divided the country into provinces and brought the Southern peoples into their administrative system based at Khartoum. Slavery and the slave trade intensified during the nineteenth century and instilled in Southerners fear and hatred of the Northern Arabs. In the early 1880s, an Islamic cleric declared himself the long-awaited Mahdi. He led his followers, the Ansar, in a revolt that drove out the Egyptians and their Ottoman Turk and British overlords and established his dominion over much of northern and central Sudan.

This Mahdist state lasted until 1898, when the Egyptians and British returned, defeated the Ansar, and established a joint administration, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, which made Sudan in effect a British colony. British colonial officials fostered a system of administration from the central Nile region which entailed the neglect of peripheral areas, and separated the Southern provinces of Upper Nile, Equatoria, and Bahr al-Ghazal from the North. The latter were largely left to their own devices, economic and political development being concentrated along the central Nile.

Sudan gained its independence from Britain in 1956. Since then, it has alternated between civilian and military government, the latest of which is the present regime of Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. The attempt to
impose Islam and sharia on the South aroused Southerners to rebel against the central government, first in 1963 and then a second time in 1983. After a huge loss of life and displacement among Southerners, this second rebellion ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which provided for a Government of National Unity with separate administrations for the North and the South. It also provided that after a six-year interval, Southerners would decide upon continued unity with Northern Sudan or independence. On January 9, 2011, Southerners chose independence, which became effective the following July 9. The two countries then began to deal with the issues involved in their separation, including boundaries, citizenship, debt, and oil revenues. In 2003 another rebellion broke out in Darfur in protest of economic and political marginalization. After a large loss of life and displacement of civilians and despite efforts at peace-making, the Darfur war remained unresolved. In 2014 Sudan was engaged in a debate about a new constitution and political order and was faced with rebellions in Darfur and in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. In December 2013, civil war broke out in South Sudan between its two largest ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer, and continued into 2014.

**Geography**

**Size:** Sudan’s total area equals 2,505,813 square kilometers; land area 2,376,000 square kilometers; coastline 835 kilometers. Until 2011, it was, geographically, the largest country in Africa. The total area of Sudan is now 1,861,484 square kilometers. The total area of South Sudan is 644,329 square kilometers.

**Topography:** Sudan is a land of plateaus and plains. Low mountains are found behind the Red Sea coast, in the far south, and in the far west. The only interior highlands of consequence are the Nuba Mountains west of the White Nile. All significant streams flow into the White Nile or Blue Nile, which join at Khartoum to form the River Nile. Extensive swamps are found in the south, especially along the Bahr al-Ghazal and the Bahr al-Jabal, the principal southernmost tributaries of the White Nile.

**Climate:** Rainfall ranges from rare and occasional in the far northern desert to relatively abundant and frequent (rainy seasons of six to nine months) in the southern third of the country. In most years, central Sudan has enough rain for agriculture, but a lack of rain the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s caused severe drought. Dust storms, often accompanying the arrival of the annual southwesterly rains in May–July, are common in central and parts of northern Sudan, reducing visibility and causing much discomfort. Mean temperatures and daily maximums are
generally high; desert temperatures can be quite cool at night. Desertification, deforestation, and land degradation are among severe environmental problems.

**Society**

**Population:** Sudan: 37.9 million; South Sudan: 11.3 million (both 2013 World Bank estimates). According to Sudan’s most recent census of April 2008, total population was 39.2 million, 30.9 million in Northern Sudan and 8.3 million in Southern Sudan; just over 47 percent were aged 16 years or younger. Population growth peaked in the 1980s at 3.3 percent a year but declined thereafter; in 2008 the annual growth rate was estimated at 2.1 percent. Roughly two-thirds of the population lives within 300–500 kilometers of Khartoum, with concentration in the Khartoum area. In 2012 life expectancy was 62 years in the North, 55 years in the South (World Bank estimates).

**Languages:** Sudan is one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse nations in the world. Its people speak more than 400 languages and dialects. Until the early 2000s, Arabic was the official language, but English was also widely spoken, particularly in the South. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 established Arabic and English as equal working languages of government and society, but today Arabic is again the official language in the North, and English continues in wide use in the South. Other major languages are Bedawiye, a Cushitic tongue spoken by the Beja nomads of the East, and the Nilotic languages of the Nuer (Naadh) and Dinka (Jieng) spoken in the South.

**Ethnic Groups:** Sudan’s population consists of some 600 ethnic groups, broadly divided into Muslims and non-Muslims. Among Muslims, about 40 percent identify themselves as “Arabs” by culture and language and reside largely in Northern Sudan. Other Northern but non-Arab groups are the Nubians along the northern Nile and in the Kassala area, the Beja in the East, and the Fur in the West. Major Southern non-Muslim groups are the Dinka (Jieng), Nuer (Naadh), and Shilluk (Collo). The Nuba, a separate group culturally and linguistically, reside in the mountains of South Kordofan.

**Religion:** Islam, Christianity, and traditional African religions are all found in Sudan. Perhaps three-fourths of Sudan’s population is Muslim. Sudanese are uniformly Sunni, although many are adherents of Sudan’s Sufi brotherhoods—Ansar, Khatmiyyah, and Qadiriyyah. Most live in the North, East, West, and Center, where they constitute more than 90 percent of the population. Estimates of the Christian population range from 4 to 10...
percent. Denominations include Orthodox Christians, Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, and Evangelicals. About 20 percent of the population are followers of indigenous African religions who live largely in the South. Common precepts are belief in a high spirit or divinity, spirits as forces in nature, and veneration of ancestors. Islamic Law (sharia) applies in the North but not in the South.

**Education:** In the early 1990s, the al-Bashir regime significantly reorganized primary and secondary education. The education ladder thereafter consisted of two years of preschool, eight years of basic (primary) education, and three years of secondary instruction. The curriculum became strongly Islamist, and Arabic became the primary language of instruction. This system was modified by the 2005 peace agreement to allow separate education systems in North and South. Today Arabic continues as the language of instruction in the North; in the South, English and indigenous languages are used. In 2009–10, 6.3 million pupils were enrolled in basic education and 761,200 in secondary; 513,000 students were attending public and private universities. As in the past, Northerners continued to have greater access to education than Southerners. In 2009 adult literacy was estimated at 69 percent for the country as a whole; as of 2011, the Southern government reported that 27 percent of its citizens were literate.

**Health:** In the early 2000s, available health care was far below what was needed. There was a great disparity in health care between urban areas and the countryside and between North and South. In the North, the best care was available in Khartoum, with at best adequate facilities in other urban areas, and little or none in rural regions. Facilities in the South were mostly destroyed during the civil war and were being rebuilt in the post-2005 era. Not surprisingly, access to health care was far more restricted in the South than even in the North. Malnutrition was widespread, and rates of infant and maternal mortality were among the highest in the world, especially in the South. Diseases include malaria, perhaps the major scourge, tuberculosis, typhoid, measles, schistosomiasis, and, additionally in the South, river blindness, cholera, guinea worm, and sleeping sickness. The UN estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence among adults in 2013 at 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent in Sudan, 2.2 percent in South Sudan.

**Economy**

**Salient Features:** Information on Sudan’s economy is spotty or nonexistent and often lags by years. Sudan has natural and human resources, but even so, it remains a poor country. The economy is based on agriculture, although the export of oil since 1999 has led to a large increase in national income. A limited transport network, a lack of foreign investment, and
long wars in the South and in Darfur are among important constraints on economic performance. Dependence on imports of capital equipment, low export earnings, and imports of petroleum before 1999 led to high foreign debt, a continuing problem. Since the early 1990s, the government has promoted privatization of state-owned enterprises as one way to stimulate the economy, with mixed results. Foreign investment has risen in parallel with privatization but was hampered by International Monetary Fund (IMF) restrictions in the 1990s and by ongoing U.S. sanctions. Since 1997 Sudan has implemented a structural adjustment program in cooperation with the IMF. The program has helped stabilize the economy and promote economic expansion, aided by exports of oil. South Sudan receives virtually all of its revenue from the export of its oil. The informal sector constitutes a large part of the overall economy in Sudan and South Sudan.

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP):** In 2013 the World Bank reported Sudan’s GDP as US$66.55 billion, and South Sudan’s GDP as US$13.80 billion. Sudan's GDP grew at a rate of at least 6 percent a year beginning in the late 1990s, rising to more than 11 percent in 2006 but declining to 4.21 percent in 2009, when GDP totaled an estimated US$54.2 billion. Its main components were agricultural products, mining and petroleum, and services.

**Agriculture:** Agriculture and livestock raising were the main sources of livelihood for an estimated 80 percent of Sudan’s population in the early 2000s. Agricultural products accounted for upwards of 95 percent of exports until oil exports came on line in 1999. Of an estimated 84 million hectares of arable land, the area under permanent cultivation was estimated at 16 to 17 million hectares as of 2002. Agriculture consists of a modern market-oriented sector of irrigated and mechanized rain-fed farming concentrated in the central part of the country and a traditional sector engaged in subsistence activities elsewhere, where water resources permit cultivation. Principal modern-sector crops are cotton, peanuts, sesame, sorghum, sugarcane, and wheat; subsistence cultivators produce mostly sorghum and millet, and also peanuts and sesame. Livestock provides a large part of the livelihood of nearly half of the population, and among pastoralists and nomads, cattle and camels are the measure of status and wealth. Sales of livestock—cattle, sheep, goats, and camels—have become the fastest growing export sector after oil. The area of forest in Sudan has declined sharply since 1990 because of overgrazing, mechanized farming, and desertification. South Sudan has potential for a forest-products industry.

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Manufacturing: Large-scale manufacturing is dominated by publicly owned enterprises. Sugar and textiles were the main products before expansion of the oil sector. Petroleum exports in the late 1990s provided funds for investment and import of equipment. Telecommunications and the growing and processing of sugar greatly benefited from this investment, but textile production has remained far below capacity. The GIAD industrial city, established in 2000, consists mostly of armaments and automotive industries. Elsewhere, small-scale enterprises produce pharmaceuticals, cement, electrical goods, paints, and textiles. South Sudan has little if any manufacturing capacity.

Minerals: Significant minerals that are being mined include gold, extracted in the Red Sea Hills and Nubia since Pharaonic times and since 2012 in North Darfur; gypsum, also in the Red Sea Hills; and chrome in the Ingessana Hills. Asbestos, limestone, marble, manganese, mica, iron ore, and uranium ores are among other minerals present in the country.

Petroleum: Oil was first discovered in the late 1970s. Most extraction and reserves are in the South, but exploration is currently underway in the North. Further exploration and drilling were hampered and/or suspended by civil war and by lack of infrastructure to transport and process petroleum. Production resumed in the late 1990s and was followed by construction of two export pipelines and terminals on the Red Sea. Consortia formed by foreign oil companies played a large role in these developments. Proven reserves are 5 billion barrels of oil and 3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Oil extraction in 2009 averaged ca. 490,000 barrels/day; in the first half of 2014, production averaged 260,000 barrels per day, 150,000 from South Sudan and 110,000 from Sudan. Gas production is foreseen in the future. Major refineries are Al-Jayli near Khartoum and another at Port Sudan with a joint capacity of ca. 170,000 barrels/day. Under the 2005 peace agreement, oil revenues were split between North and South. A dispute over transit fees in 2012 contributed to a decline in production.

Energy: In the early 2000s, Sudan’s chief sources of energy were wood, charcoal, hydroelectric power, and oil. Expanded use of charcoal and wood for fuel as the population has grown has contributed to deforestation and desertification. Sudan depends heavily on hydropower from dams on the Nile and its tributaries for electricity production; in 2006, hydropower supplied 41 percent of the country’s needs. Steady expansion since then, especially of the 300-megawatt Kajbar Dam and the 1,250-megawatt Merowe Dam, both on the northern Nile, has led to a doubling of generating capacity. There are no hydropower dams in South Sudan.
**Imports:** In 2013 Sudan’s imports amounted to US$9.9 billion. In 2008 Sudan’s import bill came to US$8.9 billion, largely machinery, transport equipment, and capital goods. The largest suppliers were China, Saudi Arabia, India, and Egypt.

**Exports:** In 2013 Sudan’s exports were US$7.0 billion. In 2008 exports amounted to US$12.4 billion, US$11.6 billion of it crude oil or petroleum-based products destined for China and Japan. Since 2000 such products have contributed 80 to 90 percent or more of export revenue, far surpassing the value of agricultural exports that formerly constituted the whole of Sudan’s exports.

**External Debt:** Sudan’s foreign debt stood at US$42 billion in June 2012 according to the government. South Sudan’s debt reportedly stood at SSP7.8 billion (US$2.5 billion) in July 2014. Sudan has carried a large foreign debt for decades. At the time of separation in July 2011, total foreign debt was about US$38 billion; North and South have not yet negotiated the portion allotted to each.

**Budget:** Sudan’s 2014 budget was projected at approximately SDG51.1 billion (US$9.0 billion). In 2014, South Sudan’s government budget was ca. US$5.6 billion, much of it devoted to salaries and security.

**Currency and Exchange Rate:** Sudan’s unit of currency is the Sudanese pound, SDG, divided into 100 piasters. This (new) pound, introduced in January 2007, replaced the Sudanese dinar and the old Sudanese pound. On September 1, 2014, the exchange rate was about SDG5.68=US$1.00. South Sudan’s currency is the South Sudanese pound, SSP. On June 1, 2014, the exchange rate was SSP3.1=US$1.00

**Transportation**

**Roads:** Estimates of the road network in the early 2000s ranged upwards of 50,000 kilometers, of which 3,600 kilometers were paved. Gravel roads accounted for ca. 3,700 kilometers, and there were an estimated 45,000 kilometers of mainly seasonal earth road and sand tracks.

**Railroads:** The government-owned Sudan Railways Corporation operates 4,578 kilometers of 1.07-gauge single track connecting most of the country’s production and consumption centers. The main line runs from Wadi Halfa and Port Sudan in the north via Khartoum to Al-Obeid and Nyala in the center and west and to Wau in the southwest, with short extensions to Sinnar and Kuraymah. An eastern segment connects Kassala and Al-Damazin with Sinnir, and a spur runs from Sinnar to al-Gadaref.
716-kilometer light rail system serves the Gezira agricultural area southeast of Khartoum. Rehabilitation was underway on the lines to Wadi Halfa and Port Sudan. Service on the Wau line has been restored after closure during the civil war.

**Inland Waterways:** Sudan has 4,068 kilometers of navigable rivers, but only 1,723 kilometers are open throughout the year. The backbone of the system is formed by the White Nile, Blue Nile, and Nile River. Cataracts, shallows, a growing number of dams, and seasonal variation in water levels limit river traffic. River transport, which dwindled after the mid-1980s when navigation south of Kosti became impossible because of attacks by the SPLA, has not recovered.

**Pipelines:** Sudan has two major pipelines that carry oil from the Southern oil fields to the Red Sea for export. A 1,610-kilometer line runs from the Bashayir terminal near Port Sudan to the Bentiu fields in Unity State via Khartoum and the Al-Jayli refinery. The second line is 1,500 kilometers long and runs from Port Sudan to the Melut Basin in Upper Nile State. Extensions connect outlying fields to the major lines. Capacity exceeds 1 million barrels per day, but refining capacity and other factors have constrained this potential.

**Civil Aviation:** Sudan Airways provides domestic service from Khartoum to 15 domestic airports and international service from three airports to the Middle East and Africa. Juba international airport has flights to Khartoum and to capitals of neighboring countries.

**Marine Ports and Shipping:** Port Sudan and Sawakin on the Red Sea are the major commercial ports; the port of Bashayir handles most oil exports. The national merchant marine had 19 vessels in the early 2000s that sailed mainly between the Red Sea ports in the Mediterranean and Europe.

**Telecommunications:** Sudan’s telecommunications network has greatly expanded in recent years, albeit from a very low base. In 2008 there were only 356,000 landlines, fewer than five lines per 1,000 residents, and 11.2 million mobile-phone subscriptions, but large parts of the country were not covered by mobile-phone networks. Internet users numbered 4.2 million; cyber cafés in larger towns and cities provided most Internet service.
Government and Politics

Political System: Since independence in 1956, Sudan has gravitated between civilian and military government. The latest turnover came in 1989, when Lieutenant Colonel Umar al-Bashir led a coup that overthrew the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. Since then, Sudan, although officially a republic with a constitution and governing authority divided among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, has functioned as a highly centralized political system with real power and authority exercised by the office of the presidency under al-Bashir. The government is dominated by the National Congress Party (NCP) headed by al-Bashir. Sudan has traditionally been governed by Arabs of the central Nile who neglected peripheral regions, giving rise in the post-independence era to separatist movements in the South, East, and West (Darfur). Corruption in government at all levels is an ongoing problem.

From 2005 to 2011, Sudan was governed according to provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, which ended more than two decades of civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan. The CPA created the Government of National Unity in Khartoum and an autonomous government for Southern Sudan in Juba with its own executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. Southerners took up seats in the cabinet and the national legislature. The CPA also provided that after six years Southern Sudanese would vote to remain part of Sudan or opt for independence. In a referendum in January 2011, 98.8 percent of Southerners who voted chose independence from the North. The separation became official on July 9, 2011. Since then, Sudan and South Sudan have been governed by interim constitutions.

Executive Branch: In Sudan, the executive consists of a president who is head of state and head of government. He wields wide-ranging powers over domestic and foreign policies and is commander in chief of the Sudan Armed Forces. He is directly elected by the people of Sudan to a five-year term. Al-Bashir has held this office continuously since 1993, including during the CPA era. He was last elected in 2010. There are also two vice presidents and a council of ministers appointed by the president.

In South Sudan, the executive consists of a president, a vice president, and a council of ministers. The president is head of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). His position and powers mirror those of Sudan’s presidency. He selects the vice president but must appoint the council of ministers with the consent of the national legislature. Since
2005 Salva Kiir Mayardit has been South Sudan's president, having been last elected to a five-year term in 2010. He was first vice president during the CPA-era Government of National Unity in Khartoum.

**Legislative Branch:** Sudan has a bicameral legislature consisting of the National Assembly and the Council of States. South Sudan's legislature also has a National Assembly and a Council of States. At present, each legislature consists of members elected to five-year terms plus those nominated to fill vacancies after the National Unity Government dissolved in 2011. The 2010 elections gave the NCP a majority in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) a majority in Juba.

**Judicial Branch:** The CPA's Interim National Constitution established a system of national courts, which Sudan has essentially preserved. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the land. It consists of 70 judges and has jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. A Constitutional Court of nine judges handles issues relating to constitutional law as well as cases of human rights. Courts of appeal hear cases from lower courts involving customary law, among other matters. The 2011 transitional constitution in the South also established a Supreme Court and courts of appeal. Because of a lack of trained personnel, customary courts adjudicated most legal proceedings. For much of Sudan's independence era, executive interference in judicial proceedings has been common, particularly by military governments; it is also common in South Sudan.

**Administrative Divisions:** Sudan is divided into 15 states, South Sudan into 10. Each state has a governor and a council of ministers as well as its own legislative and judicial organs. Each is subdivided into smaller administrative units; those in the South include payams (districts) and bomas (villages). Governors, formerly appointed, were all elected in the 2010 elections. The administration of the oil-rich and contested area of Abyei on the border between North and South was still being negotiated as of 2014.

**Legal System:** Sudan’s judiciary was based on British laws and courts during the colonial period. Beginning in the 1980s, Islamic law (sharia) was implemented to one degree or another by successive governments, giving rise to much controversy among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. After 1991 sharia was in force in Sudan in keeping with the Islamist agenda of the National Islamic Front, which became the NCP. The 1998 constitution established sharia as one of several bases of Sudanese law. The legal system today is a mixture of sharia and English law. In the
South, customary law applies below the state level, and most litigation occurs in customary courts. Religious freedom is generally respected.

**Electoral System:** National elections were held in 1996 and 2000. In both cases, al-Bashir was elected president in elections that major opposition parties boycotted. National elections were next held in April 2010 under provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Al-Bashir was again elected after his two main opponents withdrew at the last minute, and Salva Kiir was overwhelmingly elected to the presidency of South Sudan, both to five-year terms. The voting age in Sudan is 17 years and older; it is 18 years and older in South Sudan.

**Political Parties:** All political parties were banned after the 1989 coup until 1999. Sudan has a large number of parties or political groups, which are regulated by the Political Parties Act of 2007. Major parties are: the National Congress Party with al-Bashir at its head; the National Umma Party led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, a descendant of the nineteenth-century Mahdi; the Democratic Unionist Party led by Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, based on the Khatmiyyah religious order; the Popular Congress Party founded in 2000 by Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi; the Sudanese Communist Party led by Muhammad Mukhtar Al-Khatib; and the Reform Now Party, led by Ghazi Salah al-Din Atabani. Other important political groups are the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, both Darfuri groups; the Beja Congress and the Free Lions who are joined in the Eastern Front; the SPLM-N (North), the Northern remnant of the southern SPLM; the National Consensus Forces; and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front. In South Sudan, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is the dominant political party, with Salva Kiir at its head. There are a number of smaller regionally based political parties or groups.

**Foreign Relations:** Sudan considers itself part of the African and Arab worlds. It has a special interest in all of its nine neighbors, particularly in Egypt, where relations date to antiquity, but also in Ethiopia and Uganda, headwaters of the Nile and its tributaries. Sudan’s Islamist agenda largely determined the nature (friendly or otherwise) of relations with Arab and neighboring states during the 1990s. These relations generally improved with the decline of Sudan’s Islamist militancy in the 2000s. Sudan and Egypt have drawn much closer since the later 1990s, adopting a common position in discussions with their African neighbors about sharing the Nile's water even as they remain divided over administration of the Hala’ib Triangle on their border. Relations with Chad also warmed after long years when both countries sponsored insurgent movements in each other's territory.
Sudan’s perceived support for international terrorism has affected its relations with Western countries since the 1990s, especially the United States, although the conflicts in the South and in Darfur have also loomed large. The United States accused Sudan of playing a role in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, acts that led the United States to bomb the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum. Although Sudan has since cooperated with the United States on international terrorism, the country remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; Sudan is also subject to U.S. economic sanctions because of wars in Darfur and the South.

South Sudan belongs to the United Nations, the African Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It has especially close relations with Uganda and the United States, the United States having nurtured its independence movement and provided large amounts of economic aid since 2011.

**National Security**

**Armed Forces Overview:** In 2013 the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) consisted of a large army, a small air force with modern fighter and transport aircraft, a small navy, and paramilitary forces. The armed forces have faced problems of morale and poorly maintained equipment in the past, but since the late 1990s oil revenues have enabled Sudan to finance imports of modern weaponry, much of it from China, Egypt, Iran, and Russia. Beginning in the late 1990s, Sudan began to manufacture military equipment of its own, including light tanks, light and heavy artillery, machine guns, and armored personnel carriers. Security concerns are unresolved border issues with South Sudan and ongoing insurgencies in Darfur and in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States.

In the South, the government faced the task of molding the armed groups and militias that compose the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into a conventional army. The fighting that began in late 2013 between Dinka and Nuer components of the SPLA showed the difficulty of this task. The SPLA is composed overwhelmingly of infantry, the South having only a few light aircraft and no navy. The South's security concerns are the North and insurgencies in the East and West.

**Sudan: SAF Military Units:** The Sudanese army was estimated at 240,000 in 2013. It is largely a light infantry force of more than 20 divisions supported by specialized units; among these are armored, engineering, and mechanized divisions, special-forces companies, and a border-security brigade. Its equipment includes several hundred heavy and light
tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, heavy artillery, armored personnel carriers, and air-defense guns and missiles, the latter of uncertain serviceability. The navy, with an estimated 1,300 personnel, had barely a dozen serviceable craft to patrol coastal and river traffic. Naval commands were located at Port Sudan and Khartoum. The 3,000-member air force was based mainly in the Khartoum area. It had more than 60 combat aircraft, including MiG-29SE and MiG-29UB Fulcrums, A-5 Fantans, and Su-25 Frogfoots. Among other craft were helicopters (Mi-24/35 Hinds and Mi-171s) and C-130H Hercules transports. The missiles of the air-defense system were most likely obsolete. The air force, like the army, has in the past suffered from lack of maintenance of its equipment.

**South Sudan: SPLA Military Units:** In 2013 SPLA ground forces numbered an estimated 210,000, divided into nine infantry divisions. Main equipment included more than 100 tanks, T-55s and T-72s; support artillery, consisting of self-propelled guns, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars; and air-defense guns. The SPLA had no air force per se, no fighter aircraft, and only a small number of helicopters and transport craft.

**Defense Budget:** Sudan’s defense expenditures in 2013 were estimated at US$1.52 billion. In 2013 South Sudan’s defense budget was about US$714 million.

**Military Service:** In Sudan, men and women aged 18–30 are subject to compulsory military service for a period of two years. In South Sudan, males 18 years and older are eligible to join the SPLA, although the age requirement appears not to be strictly enforced. Women are also eligible to serve in the South Sudanese military.

**Paramilitary Forces:** Since the early 1990s, Sudan has had both paramilitaries and irregular fighters organized into militias. The People’s Defense Force, the major government-sponsored paramilitary, was created in 1989 to fight against the SPLA. In 2013 it consisted of an estimated 20,000 active-duty personnel and 85,000 reservists. The *janjaweed* are the most famous and notorious of the militias. They were originally Arab cattle-herders armed by the government to fight against rebels in Darfur beginning in 2003. Other Arab militias armed by the government, variously called *murahalin*, have fought in Darfur and South Kordofan. During the civil war, the government armed several militias in Southern Sudan to fight against the SPLA. South Sudan was not reported to have paramilitary forces similar to those in the North, although ethnically based militias operate in several states.
Police: Sudan's police functions are divided among several organizations. The United Police Forces number about 30,000 and are responsible for a wide range of duties, including civil defense, criminal investigations, immigration and customs, and traffic control. The Popular Police Forces, with an estimated 35,000 members, operate as a politicized militia that enforces religious strictures among the Muslim population. The Popular Defense Forces consist of auxiliaries who ostensibly relieve the Sudan Armed Forces of local defense duties. A Border Intelligence Guard provides intelligence to the armed forces.

The South Sudan Police Service was created following the signing of the CPA in 2005. Since then it has been undergoing restructuring and training by UN agencies, including the UN Mission in South Sudan.

Human Rights: The Sudanese government in general has a poor human-rights record. International human-rights organizations regularly reported restrictions on free speech, assembly, and the press; arbitrary arrest and detention; denial of due process in the courts; beating, rape, torture, and extrajudicial killing by security forces; and cruel and inhumane treatment or punishment. Prison conditions are harsh, especially with regard to food and health. Sudanese government armed forces committed massive human-rights violations in Darfur after 2003 and in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States beginning in 2011, but rebel forces in those states also engaged in human-rights abuses. In South Sudan, international organizations have reported human-rights violations by the SPLM, SPLA, and militias similar to those in the North. Most recently, government and anti-government armed forces committed large-scale ethnically based massacres and displacement of civilians in the civil war that began in mid-December 2013.
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Sudan, 2011
IN MID-2011 THE MAJOR QUESTION about the unified nation-state of Sudan was: Whither the “Two Sudans?” Before the January 2011 referendum in the South of Sudan, in which Southerners voted for independence, the question had been whether Sudan would continue as one unitary state or would divide into two independent, separate entities. This earlier question had preoccupied Sudan for six years, following the cease-fire between the North and the South and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, which ended more than two decades of civil war.

From its outset, the CPA foresaw two possible outcomes for the future of Sudan: continued unity or separation and independence for the South. To allow for each of these possibilities, the CPA provided inter alia for a unitary national government composed of officials from both the North and the South and the sharing of revenues from export of the country’s oil, located almost entirely in the South. It did not, however, provide for immediate merging of the military forces, nor did it provide for economic development of the South beyond the sharing of the income from oil. Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of the CPA, and there were both, the course of events during the period of the CPA—2005 to 2011—reinforced the long-term alienation of Southern Sudanese from their Northern counterparts to the extent that the option of unity lost whatever traction in may ever have had, leaving the option of separation as the only viable alternative. As a consequence, the question of the continued unity of the Sudanese state was answered in January 2011, when more than 98 percent of voters in the referendum opted for independence from Sudan. Henceforth, two states appeared on the African map where heretofore there had been only one: the Republic of Sudan (the North), and the Republic of South Sudan (the South).

To long-term observers of Sudan, the outcome of the referendum was hardly a surprise. They had long identified several major problems that plagued the Sudanese state and that hindered its unity, among them governance, the diversity of Sudan’s peoples, and the concentration of decision-making in Khartoum at the expense of outlying peoples and regions.

As a unitary state, Sudan contained a wide diversity of peoples spread across the enormous expanse of its 2.5 million square kilometers. These peoples have different cultures, religions, and physical features. Numbering more than 40 million in 2014, they are divided into some 600 ethnic groups or tribes and speak more than 400 languages. Broadly speaking,
they are divided between the Muslim Arabs of the North and the Christian and animist Africans of the South. Governing such diversity would pose a major task under the best of circumstances—a state of being that Sudan can hardly be said to have enjoyed in recent decades, if ever. Since independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan has witnessed alternating periods of civilian and military rule, accompanied by incipient or full-scale civil war except for the years 1972–83. The latest phase in this cycle began in 1989 with the arrival of an Islamist government with strong military backing under President Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP).

The northern part of the country has a long tradition of human settlement that stretches back at least into the Late Stone Age. Later, the ancient kingdoms of Kush (early second millennium B.C.) and Meroë (sixth century B.C.) flourished on the northern Nile. Beginning by the eighth century A.D., Arabs arrived from Egypt, and with them in due course came Islam, which slowly spread in succeeding centuries. The nineteenth century brought the presence of Turks and Egyptians, the Mahdist state, and finally, at its end, British colonialists. The colonial period lasted until 1956 and brought, at least to some parts of the country, a transport infrastructure, minor development, education, and a respected civil service and judiciary. In terms of the economy, geography, and government, it saw the creation of the modern nation-state of Sudan, combining the Arab-Islamic North with the Nilotic Africans of the South, the Beja groups of the East, and the Darfuris of the West.

The Nilotic peoples of the South have been in place for centuries and perhaps much longer. They practice agriculture and pastoralism and live for the most part in stateless societies, although there are exceptions, such as the Shilluk. Their relations with Northerners in the more recent past can best be described as troubled, arising largely from experience with Arab slavers who preyed on them, especially in the nineteenth century. This experience left a legacy of fear, suspicion, and general ill will among Southerners with regard to their Northern neighbors that persisted through the colonial period and the years of independence to the present. It is the legacy of slaving, along with perceptions of domination and neglect, which largely explains the Southerners’ preference for independence in the voting in 2011 and the course of relations between North and South since then.

Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the Arabs of the mid-northern Nile have been at the center of government, formulating economic, military, political, and social policies for the entire country but at the same time denying any representation for peoples other than themselves in the governing process. It is this uninterrupted concentration of political authority and power at the center among a select group of riverine Northerners that has caused so many of Sudan’s problems since independence, first among
Southerners and later among Darfuris, Beja, Nubians, the Nuba, and others. This pattern of governance has persisted under President al-Bashir and his NCP since 1989. Al-Bashir and the NCP have championed an Islamist agenda, including the imposition of Islamic law, the sharia, on the country, an agenda that has alienated many Sudanese, regardless of religion. To repeat, it is this concentration of resources in the center that has led to the desire for secession among peripheral peoples, of whom the first to secede now inhabit the independent state of South Sudan.

Aside from these major factors, a number of new, more immediate issues came to the fore at the time of separation in July 2011, resulting from the need to divide the assets and liabilities of the former unified state. Among these were and in most cases still are the questions of citizenship, debt-sharing, division of oil revenues, the demarcation of the border, and the status of provinces along the common border (see fig. 2; fig. 3).

As separation neared, some of the inhabitants on each side of the new border faced the question of their status. Northerners in the South tended to be traders and government officials, whereas upwards of some 3 million or more Southerners resided in the North, many of them long-term residents with little or no connection or identity with the South. It was assumed that many of these Southerners would return to their families and lands in the South, and, indeed, many began the arduous journey to do just that, a process hastened by the declaration of the al-Bashir regime that the North would become a full-fledged Islamist state governed by the sharia. They returned to a land many of them did not know and where they faced an uncertain future with regard to employment and access to land. The status of Southerners in the North remained unsettled, despite discussions between Northern and Southern leaders.

The question of how to divide Sudan’s external debt, some US$38 billion in 2011, was another issue that remained unsettled despite attempts at negotiation by both sides. A closely related and highly contentious issue concerned oil and how to share oil revenues. Almost all oil was found in the South, whereas refineries and the pipelines that carried the oil to Red Sea ports were located in the North. Moreover, the economies of both successor states were highly dependent on the income from oil exports. An agreement about how to share oil income and its transportation was obviously imperative—but disagreements over pipeline fees that the South would pay to transport its oil and Southern charges that the North was short-changing the South in terms of export income led to a total shut-down of oil production by the South in January 2012. The standoff between the two sides continued for months, even as their state budgets deteriorated alarmingly.

One of the most contentious issues concerned the status of three border regions—Abyei with its oil fields, the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan State, and Blue Nile State. The CPA had provided for what were termed
“popular consultations,” presumably plebiscites, to determine whether the inhabitants of each region wished to join the North or the South after July 2011. The consultations were either postponed repeatedly or, in the case of Blue Nile, barely begun, however, and as the CPA era came to an end, the final status of these regions was unsettled. As predicted, all three became flashpoints between the North and the South.

Beyond these three territories loomed the much longer-running conflict in Darfur that began in 2003 over charges of economic and political neglect. The region was well known for violence and mayhem involving insurgents on the one hand and government forces and allied militias on the other, some of the latter the infamous janjaweed (see Glossary), or armed raiders. A peacekeeping mission, the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur, was in place by 2008, but unfortunately there was little peace to keep. According to a 2013 UN estimate, 2.3 million people had been displaced by a decade of conflict and insecurity, driven...
into camps or exile. After 2009 the level of violence declined, but it rose in 2013 as the *janjaweed* militias, by now virtually independent of government control, and the rebels engaged in renewed raiding and at times killing of civilians. A new element was clashes among Arab militias in North Darfur over control of gold mines. In August 2013, the al-Bashir government created a new militia, the Rapid Support Forces, to help the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in its campaigns against rebels in Darfur and South Kordofan. This new militia fought with success, but it earned a reputation for brutality against civilians in Darfur.

Several ethnic-based insurgent groups are involved in the conflict in Darfur, the major ones being the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), now broken into two factions, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). There have been attempts at peace agreements, notably in Abuja (2006) and Tripoli (2007). The most recent effort is the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, signed in Doha, Qatar, on July 14, 2011, by a third group, the Liberation and Justice Movement, joined in April 2013 by a
JEM splinter. These accords have been signed by one or another rebel group but none has been accepted by all. The Doha Document is a framework agreement that addresses a number of issues in the Darfur conflict, among them a regional governing authority, wealth sharing, and representation in the national executive and legislature. Although backed by the UN and the African Union, the SLM and JEM have refused to sign on, demanding more autonomy within the region and a democratic and secular national government, among other objections. Negotiations under the Doha framework were underway in 2014, even as conflict continued in Darfur.

**South Sudan**

At independence on July 9, 2011, the people and government of the new Republic of South Sudan faced the task of constructing a new nation almost literally from the ground up. It was composed of a congeries of major and minor ethnic groups, the largest being the Dinka and the Nuer, with little intergroup cohesion. Its political system was mostly undeveloped. Its economy was largely informal and lacking in almost every aspect of development in terms of transportation, telecommunications, and industrial infrastructure. It had some of the lowest rates of literacy and health-care delivery in the world, all the result of the near-total neglect of Southern Sudan over the last century or more. The CPA era had seen some improvement in all of these areas, notably in the creation of some centralized state institutions and with the inflow of oil revenue from the National Unity Government in Khartoum. Still, the task that lay before the people of South Sudan was immense.

The South inherited embryonic state institutions from the CPA era, consisting of a presidency, a parliament, and the beginnings of executive- and judicial-branch agencies. Two of the major tasks were the writing of a constitution, a process still underway in 2014, and the creation of a national army out of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and smaller regionally based militias, some of which had fought against the SPLA during the civil war. Among major problems were charges of corruption and nepotism in the central government, and a feeling of exclusion from participation in affairs of the new state among various ethnic groups, for example, in the writing of the new constitution and in access to state employment.

The security situation in the South was also precarious. The present 10 states of the South witnessed much of the warfare during the second civil war from 1983 to 2005, some of it involving rivalries and fighting among different groups of Southerners. The legacy of this fighting, and the arms associated with it, continued after independence in the form of intercommunal violence as well as of skirmishing along the border with Sudan in the north and west. The most violent state was Jonglei, where fighting
Southern Sudanese celebrate their country’s independence on July 9, 2011, in Juba.
Copyright Getty Images
was ongoing between the Lou Nuer and the Murle groups in the months preceding independence. Between January 2011 and September 2012, the UN recorded at least 302 attacks in the province, resulting in 2,500 deaths. Some of the worst violence occurred in Pibor County, the Murle heartland, where the Lou Nuer and the Murle engaged in long-standing tit-for-tat cattle rustling that sometimes turned deadly, as it did in January 2011 and in early January 2012. There were charges that local and national officials were involved in fomenting the violence.

In response to the violence, the South Sudan government initiated a disarmament campaign in Jonglei in March 2012, but the Murle charged that in the process SPLA soldiers engaged in beatings, murder, rape, and torture. Such charges played into the hands of a local rebel leader, David Yau Yau, whose rebellion was the result of long-standing Murle grievances against the SPLA and of Yau Yau's disappointment over a lost election. Despite Yau Yau's rebellion, militia activity in South Sudan declined after 2011. In April 2013, President Salva Kiir Mayardit extended an offer of amnesty to six rebel leaders, including Yau Yau, who reconciled with the government in January 2014. Meanwhile, the cattle-raiding in Jonglei continued, with a report of upwards of 11,000 Nuer involved in a raid on the Murle in July.

The violence in Jonglei and elsewhere in the South tested the capabilities of the SPLA, given that it was itself composed of militiamen from the very ethnic groups often involved in the violence. It was also beyond the capabilities of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), the remnant of the UN supervisory force for the whole of Sudan before separation. In an effort to deal with intercommunal violence across South Sudan, President Kiir appointed a national reconciliation committee in April 2013 and handed its leadership to prominent clerics. Clerical mediation enabled David Yau Yau to end his rebellion.

Another problem requiring immediate attention was settling returnees from the North. Numbering some 2 million since the signing of the CPA in 2005, they flooded back into a homeland many, if not most, had never known. On the one hand, they were unprepared for the dire straits of the South; on the other hand, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) government faced the problem of resettling them and of providing employment. To the returnees were added more than 350,000 internally displaced persons resulting from intercommunal conflict, and a quarter million refugees fleeing conflict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States in the North. In and after 2011, international aid agencies were active in dealing with all three groups.

Aid agencies were also active in the fields of education and health, as was the government in Juba, the capital. UN statistics showed that primary-school enrollments had doubled since the signing of the CPA in
2005, but completion rates were still quite low. Adult literacy was also low, a major factor accounting for the lack of skilled manpower. The South was plagued by major curable diseases such as yellow fever, malaria, and sleeping sickness; rates of maternal and child mortality were high; and malnutrition was common. Nearly one-third of Southerners had no access to primary health care in 2011 according to the UN, a consequence of the scarcity of trained medical personnel to serve a population estimated at about 10 million. A wide range of other issues facing the new government included ensuring a steady flow of income from oil, questions about press freedom, substandard prison conditions, and continued integration of former rebel fighters into a unified SPLA.

A final problem facing the Southern leadership was perhaps the most difficult and yet the most important to solve—the creation of a national identity and a sense of unity among Southerners. Before separation in 2011, Southerners had been unified in their opposition to the North, but following independence, a new sense that they belonged together in their own separate nation was called for if South Sudan were to develop into a mature nation-state. Events in and after mid-2013, however, showed how far Southerners were from a unified whole.

There had been dissension within the SPLM/A since its creation, but in mid-2013 these divisions burst into the open in a new and dangerous form along both personality and ethnic lines. At issue was the need for responsible leadership and good governance. One of the basic divisions within the SPLM/A was that between the Dinka and the Nuer, with the latter alleging domination of the movement by the Dinka under first John Garang and then Salva Kiir, both Dinkas. In the post-independence interim government, Salva Kiir served as president, and Riek Machar Teny, a Nuer, as vice president. Machar had long sought to lead the SPLM; his ambition made him a rival with a large constituency within the SPLM/A.

Tension between the two leaders grew to the point that on July 23, Kiir dismissed Machar from office along with several members of the cabinet. Aside from rivalry between the two leaders, the dismissals reflected discontent within the SPLM and other Southern groups over the lack of transparency and participation in the government. There were in addition allegations of corruption and of high-handedness in governing on the part of Kiir and the top tier of SPLM officials. Following his dismissal, Machar announced that he would challenge Kiir for the chairmanship of the SPLM with the intent of becoming the SPLM candidate for the presidency in the upcoming 2015 elections. Machar and his followers became known as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM–IO).

In mid-December, fighting broke out in Juba between Dinka and Nuer units of the presidential guard following what the government termed an attempted coup, which it blamed on Machar, a charge he denied. The
fighting spread beyond the capital to Jonglei State and then into Upper Nile and Unity States in early 2014, leading to attacks and massacres by one group and its allies on the other, with bloody incidents in Bor, Bentiu, and elsewhere. Cease-fire agreements of January 23 and May 9 arranged in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD—see Glossary), a northeast Africa regional organization, failed, as both sides continued to fight, seeking advantage through control of territory and resources, especially oil installations and income, before engaging in serious negotiations. After demands from IGAD and the international community, a third cease-fire agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on June 10. It called for immediate negotiations on substantive issues, inclusion of all stakeholders in the peace talks, access for humanitarian relief efforts, and a transitional government of national unity to be in place within 60 days.

The June agreement held forth the prospect of peace and a new government in South Sudan in the near future. After a delay over differences regarding representation in the stakeholder organizations, both sides began talks in early August, but they failed to establish a transitional government in Juba by the August 10 deadline. By then, the toll of half a year of fighting was evident: thousands killed, 1 million internally displaced, destruction of infrastructure, and the specter of devastating famine. Clearly, the viability of South Sudan was in question in mid-2014, given the deep-seated hostility between the SPLM/A and SPLM/A-IO and their allied groups. It was also clear that a common identity and sense of unity among all Southerners remained distant goals.

Northern Sudan

The situation facing the North, the Republic of Sudan, in 2011 was almost as dire for, as in the South, the al-Bashir regime faced major challenges on the economic, military, political, and regional fronts. The economy had long suffered from mismanagement, but the separation of the South dealt a major blow to the Northern economy by nullifying the shared income from oil exports that had flowed during the period of the CPA. Then, a dispute with the South over pipeline and port fees led the South in January 2012 to shut down all oil production and, therefore, all exports through Northern pipelines, an act with grave consequences for both Northern and Southern finances. Deprived of oil income, the NCP government resorted to austerity measures as a way to confront a shrinking economy, rising prices, and inflation. There was also the looming external debt.

On the political side, the NCP continued its monopolized control of the national government and the military. It faced only weak opposition from long-established political parties such as the Umma Party and the Demo-
ocratic Unionist Party (DUP), but now it confronted a new protest movement among urban youth. Inspired in part by the “Arab Spring” across North Africa, young educated Sudanese engaged in street demonstrations in major cities, protesting austerity measures and the lack of employment and calling for a more open and democratic political system, one in which they sought a voice. The regime responded with repression, a policy that gradually succeeded in squelching the demonstrations but that failed to address the demands of the young protesters.

Aside from the young, the regime faced more serious and organized opposition from both the political and military fronts. Beginning in late 2008, the major elements of the political opposition joined together to form the National Consensus Forces (NCF). The membership includes the Umma led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Popular Congress Party of Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, the Democratic Unionist Party of Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, and various smaller political groups, plus women’s and youth organizations. The NCF program as issued in July 2012 favors a transitional government of national unity, a new national constitution, and settlement of disputes in Darfur, Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains by dialogue, not war. On the military side, conflict broke out in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan even before South Sudan declared its independence, and then subsequently in Blue Nile State. In both areas, local forces had joined with the SPLA against Khartoum during the civil war. Now, in 2011, they sought a degree of autonomy and political reform within the North. When the “popular consultations” called for by the CPA stalled in both regions and these remnants of the SPLA consequently refused to disarm, the SAF invaded South Kordofan on June 5 and Blue Nile on September 1. The SPLA remnants in the Nuba Mountains succeeded in repulsing the SAF, but in Blue Nile they were driven to the borderlands with Ethiopia and South Sudan, the fighting in each area eventually settling mostly into a stalemate. These Northern insurgents renamed themselves the SPLM/A-N (North) and on November 11 announced formation of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). They were joined by the major Darfuri opposition forces—the Justice and Equality Movement/Army and the two factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement—and in April 2012, by the Beja Congress in the East. The SRF stood for the overthrow of the al-Bashir regime by force and its replacement with a more inclusive political system.

On January 5, 2013, representatives of the SRF and the NCF signed an agreement in Kampala, Uganda, that essentially combined their programs. Known as the New Dawn Charter, the document called for the replacement of the NCP government by peaceful, constitutional means if possible, otherwise by force; a democratic and federal system of government; and the separation of religion and state, among other provisions. The charter, being a repudiation of NCP rule under al-Bashir, provoked a swift response. The
regime vehemently denounced it, labeled its signatories traitors, and promptly arrested some of the signers upon their return to the country.

Perhaps most significantly, continued governance from the center to the exclusion of Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the East, meant that the cycle of violence associated with peripheral peoples and regions would perpetuate itself and continue to take its toll on the energies and resources of all sides. Indeed, the issue of governance and exclusion from the functions and offices of state lay at the heart of the rebellions among the peoples of Sudan’s borderlands. Until the aspirations of these peoples were addressed, Sudan was unlikely to find peace. There was even the prospect of the emergence of a “New South,” a region stretching from Darfur in the west through Abyei and South Kordofan to Blue Nile State in the east that would supplant the SPLM/A-dominated South as a region in permanent rebellion against the governing elite in Khartoum.

While the NCP continued to hold the reins of power and to forcefully repress protest movements and rebellions, the party even before 2011 was hardly a unified whole. Corruption and nepotism have long characterized NCP rule, factors that produced discontent and resentment. Now, in the post-referendum and post-separation era, added to the range of issues facing the party and regime was the charge of having “lost” the South. Against this background, divisions over state policy and the future of the NCP surfaced among the party’s rank and file, broadly divided into two camps. On the one hand were those who favored some type of reform of the party to ensure its survival; on the other hand were those who saw no need to make changes or concessions of any kind, despite the challenges that confronted the party and regime. Nonetheless, members of both camps remained committed Islamists and appeared to accept al-Bashir’s vision of Sudan as a state that would be “Arab” in culture, Islamist in religious conviction, and governed by the sharia—this despite Muslim Sudanese who were not Islamists and the wide variety of Sudanese who were neither Muslim nor “Arab.”

Discontent within the NCP as well as in the armed forces became evident in November 2012, when the regime announced the arrest of one or more senior party leaders and more than a dozen senior army officers, heretofore considered loyal Islamists, whom it accused of planning a coup. Among those detained was Salah Gosh, the former head of national intelligence and later a presidential adviser for security. The next month, the regime announced the arrest of several more military leaders on charges of plotting a coup, a step that raised questions about the extent of the disaffection with NCP policies. Even as the government foiled these attempts at regime change, whether actual or alleged, they appeared to be clear evidence of peer rivalries within the NCP and of significant discontent in the army. An alternative—and peaceful—avenue of change might lie in
national elections, scheduled for April 2015, in which al-Bashir announced that he would not be a candidate.

The general discontent within the party, the armed forces, and the country at large commanded the attention of the regime in and after mid-2013. In an effort to further reduce the budget deficit resulting from the loss of oil revenue in 2011, the regime once again cut fuel subsidies on September 23, 2013. The reduction led to 10 days of violent demonstrations as the urban and rural poor, students, and now the middle class, united by economic grievances related to subsidies, inflation, and unemployment, took to the streets. There were calls not only to restore the fuel subsidy but also to bring down the regime. The protests were the most serious the al-Bashir government had ever faced. More than 200 protesters were killed as the security forces restored order, according to Amnesty International; the regime put the figure at less than half of that.

In April, al-Bashir had made a proposal for a broad political dialogue about the future of the country. In late January 2014, clearly in response to the September outburst, he repeated his proposal in a formal presentation before supporters and opponents of the government. He called for an economic and political “renaissance” for Sudan that would address four issues: peace on all fronts, political freedom, poverty reduction, and Sudanese national identity, of which peace was first and foremost. Major opposition leaders such as al-Turabi and Sadiq al-Mahdi reacted skeptically to the proposal but subsequently proved more receptive. The NCF, SRF, and other critics, however, demanded that the government first create an environment conducive to dialogue, before they would participate, by taking such steps as declaring a cease-fire on all fronts, ensuring humanitarian access to all war zones, and agreeing to a national coalition government to administer the dialogue process. Finally, there were calls to postpone the national elections scheduled for 2015 in view of the unsettled state of affairs throughout the country.

The government rejected these demands. It did, however, permit political parties to function more freely in early 2014, although arrests of opposition figures, including Sadiq al-Mahdi in May when he alleged atrocities by Rapid Support Forces in Darfur, and press censorship continued. At mid-year, the regime and opposition groups such as the NCF and SRF continued to spar over the parameters of a national dialogue, even as fighting was ongoing in Darfur and as government forces attacked SPLA–N positions in South Kordofan. On July 24, a national dialogue committee, composed of representatives of the government and government-approved opposition parties, announced that the national dialogue would begin in early August with a meeting of a national conference, which all political parties and rebels were invited to attend. The opposition parties and rebels, however, declined to participate until their demands, including a general
cease-fire and a national-unity government, had been met. Whether any of
the proposed discussions would lead to a meaningful national dialogue and
eventual political reforms in Sudan was an open question in mid-2014.

The Two Sudans in 2013–14

At the time of separation in mid-2011, several major issues were out­
standing between the two Sudans, among them a demarcated border, citi­
zension, and international debt. None, however, was more contentious
than oil. The CPA provided for shared revenues, and the income from oil
exports became crucial to government budgets in both countries, espe­
cially the South, where it composed some 98 percent of government reve­
nue. Almost all of the oil lay in the South except for oil fields in or close to
Abyei, claimed by both North and South. Refineries and the pipelines that
carried the oil to Port Sudan, however, lay in the North. Almost immedi­
ately a dispute arose over pipeline transit fees, with Khartoum demanding
much higher rates than the South was prepared to pay. When Khartoum
diverted some oil as compensation for what it considered unpaid fees, and
given the poor state of relations between North and South, the Southern
government shut down oil production in January 2012.

The impact on state budgets was devastating, and it was uncertain how
long the loss of income from oil could be sustained. Both states enacted
austerity measures, which set off inflation and were partly responsible for
anti-regime protests in Northern cities. In early April, fighting broke out in
Abyei over control of the enclave and its oil resources, and there were
fears that the clashes could widen into full-scale war between North and
South. Abyei was one of a range of outstanding issues discussed during
subsequent meetings between Khartoum and Juba, but the two govern­
ments could not agree on their respective representation in an interim leg­
sislature, on the scheduling of a referendum on the future of the region as
called for in the CPA, or on who would be eligible to vote in it. In 2011 the
UN created the Interim Security Force for Abyei and repeatedly extended
its mandate. In June 2014, the force numbered 4,109 uniformed person­
nel, nearly all of them Ethiopian peacekeepers.

Under pressure from the African Union and Western nations, Khartoum
and Juba agreed on a formula for oil transit fees in August 2012, which
became one of nine parts of an agreement on outstanding issues concluded
on September 27. Transit fees for Southern oil were set at an average of
US$10 per barrel. In addition, the South agreed to pay US$3.03 billion to the
North during the next three and one-half years as compensation for revenue
lost during the shutdown. Other agreements provided for nationals of each
country to freely reside in, work, and own property in the other country; for
withdrawal of all forces to their own side of the border; for establishment of
a 14-mile (22.5-kilometer) wide demilitarized border zone to be supervised
by a joint border verification and monitoring mission; for opening of 10 border-crossing corridors to facilitate trade; for the immediate joint demarcation of the border between North and South on the basis of the January 1, 1956, border line; and for joint efforts to obtain debt relief for Sudan’s international debt as at the time of separation, or, failing that, to apportion the debt between the two nations.

Despite pledges of good will, the two sides still found it difficult to work together. Among contentious issues, the September agreement did not settle the status of Abyei or other disputed border lands, and each side continued to accuse the other of supporting rebels in its territory. Nonetheless, the two sides negotiated a follow-on accord in mid-March 2013 that set a two to three-week timetable for implementation of the provisions of the September agreement. Both sides began to withdraw their forces from the demilitarized zone along their de facto border, and on April 6, South Sudan resumed pumping oil destined for Northern pipelines. Even so, issues such as border demarcation and charges of support for each side’s rebels continued to hinder full implementation of the September agreement. Negotiations about these as well as other outstanding issues between North and South were ongoing as of mid-2014.

The restoration of the oil-sharing regime and the consequent budgetary support it would provide to North and South, together with the remaining provisions of the September 2012 agreement, held forth the prospect of cooperation and peace between the two countries. But domestic developments within each in 2013 and 2014 eclipsed efforts to reach any such accommodation. The North, shaken by violent protests, was in the midst of a debate about political reform and of negotiations with rebels of the “New South.” The South was embroiled in a virtual civil war that threatened the very existence of the country. In mid-2014, it was difficult to predict what the future might hold for either country, given the state of affairs within each and the long history of troubled relations between them.

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Updated information on Sudan and South Sudan can be obtained from reports issued by the International Crisis Group, Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), Sudd Institute, United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), United States Institute of Peace, and Woodrow Wilson Center. Other good sources on current developments in Sudan and South Sudan include Africa Confidential (London), Economist Intelligence Unit (London), Gulf News (Bahrain), New York Times, and Sudan Tribune (Paris).

September 1, 2014

LaVerle Berry
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Tomb of the Mahdi in Omdurman
SUDAN IS DIVIDED BETWEEN its Arab heritage, identified with
the North, and its African heritage in the South. The two groups are
divided along linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines, and the
cleavage has generated ethnic tensions, clashes, and civil war. More­
over, the South’s geographical isolation has hindered that region’s polit­
ical, economic, and social development. Imperial Britain acknowledged
the North–South division by establishing separate administrations for
the two regions. Independent Sudan further reinforced this cleavage by
treating African Southerners as a minority group.

Another factor that has affected Sudan’s evolution is the country’s
relationship with Egypt. Contact between the peoples of Sudan and
Egypt dates to at least the eighth millennium B.C. and has been virtually
continuous ever since. Modern relations between the two countries began
in 1820, when an Egyptian army invaded Sudan. Egypt eventually con­
trolled Sudan’s Red Sea coast and extended its influence toward Ethiopia
and East Africa’s Great Lakes region. Egyptian rule ended in 1885 but
left a mark on Sudan’s political and economic systems. The emergence
of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1899 reinforced the Cairo–
Khartoum links. After Sudan gained independence in 1956, Egypt con­
tinued to exert influence over developments in Sudan.

Similarly, the period of British control (1899–1955) has had a last­
ing impact on Sudan. In addition to pacifying and uniting the country,
Britain modernized Sudan by facilitating economic development and
by establishing democratic institutions of national government. Even
in the early 2000s, many of Sudan’s political and economic institu­
tions owed their existence to British models.

Lastly, the civil war in the South has shaped Sudan’s postindepen­
dence history. This conflict has retarded the country’s social and eco­
nomic development, encouraged political instability, and led to an
endless cycle of weak and ineffective military and civilian govern­
ments. The conflict continued to affect Sudan’s people and institutions
into the early twenty-first century.

Early History

Archaeological excavations along the Nile River south of Aswan,
Egypt, have confirmed human habitation in the Nile valley during the
Paleolithic Era that spanned more than 60,000 years of Sudanese his­
tory. By the eighth millennium B.C., people of a Neolithic culture had
settled into a sedentary way of life along the river, living in fortified
mud-brick villages, where they supplemented hunting and fishing on the Nile with grain gathering and cattle herding. Contact with Egypt probably occurred early in the culture’s development because of the steady movement of people along the Nile. Skeletal remains suggest a blending of African and Mediterranean populations during the Neolithic period (eighth to third millennia B.C.) that has remained relatively stable until the present, despite gradual infiltration by other peoples.

Kush

Since the time of the Roman Empire, the region of northern Sudan from roughly the second cataract on the Nile as far as the fourth cataract, or even farther south, has been known as Nubia. The ancient Egyptians, however, called the land south of the second cataract Kush (also seen as Cush) and referred to its inhabitants as “the wretched Kush.” For more than 2,000 years after the Old Kingdom (ca. 2650–2150 B.C.), Egyptian economic and political activities greatly influenced the course of the central Nile region’s history. Even during periods when Egyptian political power in Kush waned, the Egyptians exerted profound cultural and religious influence on the indigenous people.

Trade developed naturally among the peoples of the Nile valley. Egyptian caravans carried grain to northern Sudan and returned with gold, ivory, incense, hides, and carnelian (a stone prized both in jewelry and for arrowheads). Egyptian traders especially valued gold as well as slaves, who became servants, concubines, or soldiers. The Egyptians sent military expeditions into Kush during the Old Kingdom, yet no attempt was made to establish a permanent footing in the area until the Middle Kingdom (ca. 2040–1640 B.C.), when the Egyptians built forts along the Nile as far as Semna, south of the second cataract, to protect gold mines in the area.

Asian nomads known as the Hyksos invaded Egypt and brought the Middle Kingdom to an end around 1640 B.C. Egyptian links with northern Sudan were severed, and the Nile River forts were abandoned. By then a distinct indigenous Bronze-Age culture, centered on the city of Kerma, had developed and had evolved into the kingdom of Kush in the region around the third cataract, near present-day Dongola (see fig. 4). The kingdom of Kush was almost certainly one of the earliest kingdoms in sub-Saharan Africa. It eventually dominated some 700 kilometers along the Nile, and its power made it a major rival of Egypt. Kerma’s culture and traditions of power influenced northern Sudan for a millennium and enjoyed a revival during the first millennium B.C. at Napata, near present-day Kuraymah. About 1500 B.C., after the Egyptians revived during the New Kingdom (ca. 1540–1075
Historical Setting

B.C.), the pharaohs defeated Kush and made it an Egyptian province. Egyptian administrative control extended as far south as the fourth cataract; tributary districts extended east to the Red Sea and south nearly to the confluence of the Nile and the Atbarah Rivers. Egypt exacted tribute in gold and slaves from local chiefs and ensured their loyalty by drafting their children to serve as pages at the pharaoh’s court.

Once Egypt had established control over Kush, officials and priests joined military personnel, merchants, and artisans and settled in the region. The ancient Egyptian language became widely used in everyday activities. The Kushite elite adopted Egyptian gods and built temples like the one dedicated to the sun god Amun at Napata. The temples remained centers of official religious worship until the coming of Christianity to the region in the sixth century A.D.

By the eleventh century B.C., the New Kingdom’s authority had diminished, giving way to divided rule in Egypt and ending Egyptian control of Kush. In the eighth century B.C., Kush reemerged as an independent kingdom ruled from Napata by monarchs who gradually extended their influence into Egypt. Long after Egyptian influence declined as Egyptians themselves succumbed to foreign domination, the Kushite elite continued to regard themselves as champions of genuine Egyptian cultural and religious values. About 750 B.C., a Kushite king called Kashta conquered Upper Egypt and became ruler of Thebes. His successor, Piankhy, subdued the delta, reunited Egypt under the Twenty-fifth Dynasty, and founded a line of kings who ruled Kush and Thebes for nearly a century. The dynasty’s intervention in the area of modern Syria caused a confrontation between Egypt and Assyria. When the Assyrians in retaliation invaded Egypt, Taharqa (688–663 B.C.), the last Kushite pharaoh, withdrew to Napata, where Kushite kings not only continued to rule but extended their dominions to the south and east.

Meroë

An Egyptian army sacked Napata in 590 B.C., compelling the Kushite court to move south to a more secure location at Meroë, just south of the Atbarah–Nile confluence. For several centuries, the Meroitic kingdom developed independently of Egypt, which passed successively under Persian, Greek, and Roman domination. During the height of Meroë’s power in the second and third centuries B.C., the kingdom extended over a region from the third cataract in the north to Soba, near present-day Khartoum, in the south.

The pharaonic tradition persisted among rulers at Meroë, who raised stelae to record the achievements of their reigns and erected pyramids to contain their tombs. These objects and the ruins of palaces, temples, and baths at Meroë attest to a centralized political system that commanded
Figure 4. Ancient and Medieval Sudan
the labor of a large workforce, including skilled artisans. A well-managed irrigation system supported a higher population density than was possible during later periods. By the first century B.C., the use of hieroglyphs had given way to a Meroitic script, which adapted the Egyptian writing system to the indigenous language that is related to the present-day Nubian spoken in this region. Meroë’s succession system was not necessarily hereditary. The matriarchal royal family member deemed most worthy often became ruler, the queen mother’s role in the selection process being crucial to a smooth succession. The crown appears to have passed from brother to brother (or sister), and only when no siblings remained from father to son.

Although Napata remained Meroë’s religious center, northern Kush fell into disorder as it came under pressure from the Blemmyes, predatory nomads from east of the Nile who were probably ancestors of the present-day Beja. However, the Nile continued to give the region access to the Mediterranean world. Additionally, Meroë maintained contact with Arab and Indian traders along the Red Sea coast and incorporated Hellenistic and Hindu cultural influences into its daily life. Metallurgical technology, especially ironworking, developed at Meroë, knowledge of which may have been transmitted westward across the savanna belt to West Africa from Meroë’s iron smelteries.

Meroë’s relations with its northern neighbors were not always peaceful. In 23 B.C. a Roman army razed Napata in response to Meroitic incursions into Upper Egypt. The Roman commander quickly abandoned the area, however, judging it too poor to warrant colonization.

By the beginning of the Christian era, a people known as the Noba or Nuba had occupied northern Kush. (The term Nubia, by which much of northern Sudan is known today, derives from the name of this people.) The Noba are believed to have been one of several well-armed bands of warriors who sold protection to the Meroitic population; eventually they intermarried and established themselves among the Meroitic people as a military aristocracy. Until nearly the fifth century, Rome subsidized the Noba and used Meroë as a buffer between Egypt and the Blemmyes. The cause of Meroë’s decline, including the role of invading peoples, is still subject to debate, but it has traditionally been associated with the expansion of Aksum, a trading state in modern Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east of Sudan. About A.D. 350, an Aksumite army captured and destroyed Meroë city, ending the kingdom’s independent existence.

**Christian Nubia**

By the sixth century, three states had emerged as heirs to the Meroitic kingdom, all subject to Byzantine influence. Nobadia in the
north had its capital at Faras, in what is now Egypt; to its south, the
country of Muqurra was centered at (Old) Dongola, a city on the Nile
about 100 kilometers south of modern Dongola; and Alwa, in the heart­
land of old Meroë farther south, had its capital at Soba. In all three
kingdoms, warrior aristocracies ruled over local Nubian populations.

Tradition holds that about 540, a Christian missionary arrived in
Nobadia and began to preach the gospel, but it is possible that conver­
sions began earlier under the aegis of Coptic missionaries from Egypt.
The Nubian kings accepted the Monophysite Christianity practiced in
Egypt and acknowledged the spiritual authority of Alexandria’s Cop­
tic patriarch over the Nubian church. Bishops named by the Coptic
patriarch and consecrated in Egypt directed the church’s activities and
wielded considerable secular power. The church sanctioned sacerdotal
kingship, confirming the royal line’s legitimacy; in return, the mon­
archs protected the church’s interests. The queen mother’s role in the
succession process paralleled that of Meroë’s matriarchal tradition.
Because women transmitted the right to succession, a renowned war­
rrior not of royal birth might be nominated to become king through
marriage to a woman in the line of succession.

The spread of Christianity opened channels to Mediterranean civili­
zation and renewed Nubia’s cultural and religious ties with Egypt. The
church encouraged literacy in Nubia through its Egyptian-trained
clergy and schools, but the use of Greek in the liturgy eventually gave
way to the Nubian language, written in an indigenous script that comb­
ined elements of old Meroitic and Coptic. Coptic, however, often
appeared in ecclesiastical and secular circles, and Nubians apparently
used colloquial Greek as late as the twelfth century. After the seventh
century, Arabic gained importance in the Nubian kingdoms, especially
as a medium for commerce.

The Christian Nubian kingdoms achieved their peak of prosperity
and military power in the ninth and tenth centuries. However, Muslim
Arab invaders, who conquered Egypt in 640, posed a threat to them; it
may have been this threat that compelled Nobadia and Muqurra to
merge into the kingdom of Dongola some time before 700. Although
the Arabs soon abandoned attempts to overcome Nubia by force, Mus­
lim domination of Egypt made it difficult to communicate with the
Coptic patriarch or to obtain Egyptian-trained clergy. As a result, the
Nubian church became isolated from the rest of the Christian world.

**The Coming of Islam**

Islam eventually changed the nature of Sudanese society and contrib­
uted to the country’s division into North and South. Islam also fostered
political unity, economic growth, and educational development among
Royal tombs at Meroë, circa 300–200 B.C.
A temple at Naqa, southwest of Meroë, circa first century A.D.
Courtesy Robert O. Collins
its adherents. However, these benefits did not extend beyond urban and commercial centers. Muslims maintain that Islam (literally, submission) unites the individual believer, the state, and society under God’s will (see Islam: Tenets and Practice, ch. 2). Islamic rulers, therefore, exercise temporal and religious authority. Islamic law (sharia) derived primarily from the Quran, encompasses all aspects of the lives of believers, called Muslims (“those who submit” to God’s will).

Within a decade of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632, Arab armies had carried Islam into North Africa and had begun to impose political control over conquered territories. The Arabs invaded Nubia in 642 and again in 652, when they laid siege to Dongola. The Nubians put up a stout defense, however, and forced the Arabs to accept an armistice and to withdraw their forces.

**The Arabs**

Contact between Nubians and Arabs long predated the coming of Islam, but the Arabization of the Nile valley was a gradual process that took nearly 1,000 years. Arab nomads continually wandered into the region in search of fresh pasturage, and Arab seafarers and merchants traded in Red Sea ports for spices and slaves. After a successful expedition as far as Dongola in 652, Egypt’s Arab commander, Abdallah ibn Sa’ad, concluded the first in a series of regularly renewed treaties with the Nubians that governed relations between the two peoples for more than 600 years. So long as Arabs ruled Egypt, there was peace on the Nubian frontier; however, when non-Arabs acquired control of the Nile delta, Egyptian–Nubian relations became troubled.

The Arabs realized the commercial advantages of peaceful relations with the Nubians and used the treaties to ensure that travel and trade proceeded unhindered across the frontier. The treaties also contained security provisions whereby both parties agreed that neither was obliged to come to the defense of the other in the event of an attack by a third party. Both parties agreed to an exchange of annual tribute as a gesture of good will, the Nubians in slaves and the Arabs in grain. This formality was only a token of the trade that developed between the two, not only in these commodities but also in the horses and manufactured goods that the Arabs brought to Nubia and in the ivory, gold, gems, gum arabic (from *Acacia senegal*), and cattle they carried back to Egypt or shipped to Arabia.

Traditional genealogies trace the ancestry of most of the Nile valley’s mixed population to Arab tribes that slowly migrated into the region beginning in about the ninth century. Even many non-Arabic-speaking groups claim descent from Arab forebears. According to Sudanese tradition, the two most important Arabic-speaking groups to
emerge in Nubia were the Ja’aliyyin and the Juhayna (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Both showed physiological continuity with the indigenous pre-Islamic population. In this historical but overly generalized view, the Ja’aliyyin have been seen as sedentary farmers and herders or as townspeople settled along the Nile and in Al-Gezira (also seen as Al-Jazirah, the land between the White Nile and the Blue Nile). The Juhayna, by contrast, have been seen as nomads, composed of a family of tribes that include the Kababish, Baqqara, and Shukriyyah. Both Ja’aliyyin and Juhayna formed a series of tribal sheikhdoms that succeeded the crumbling Christian Nubian kingdoms and that were in frequent conflict with one another and with neighboring non-Arabs. In some instances, as among the Beja, the indigenous people absorbed Arab migrants who settled among them. Acceptance of Islam facilitated the long-term Arabizing process, as did intermarriage and contact with Arab merchants and settlers. Exemption from taxation in regions under Muslim rule also proved a powerful incentive to cultural and religious conversion.

The Decline of Christian Nubia

The Nubian kingdoms maintained their political independence and their commitment to Christianity until the thirteenth century. In the early eighth century and again in the tenth century, Nubian kings attacked Egypt to force the release of the imprisoned Coptic patriarch and to relieve fellow Christians suffering persecution under Muslim rulers. In 1276, however, Egyptian Mamluks, an elite caste of often-unruly soldier-administrators, intervened in a dynastic dispute, ousted Dongola’s monarch, and delivered the crown and silver cross that symbolized Nubian kingship to a rival claimant. Thereafter, the Mamluks intervened repeatedly in Dongola’s affairs.

Because of frequent intermarriage between Nubian nobles and the kin of Arab sheikhs, the lineages of the two elites merged, and the Muslim heirs took their places in the royal line of succession. In 1315 a Muslim prince of Nubian royal blood became king of Dongola. A “dark age” enveloped Nubia in the fifteenth century, during which political authority fragmented and slave raiding intensified. Meanwhile, Arab tribes were gradually migrating south from Egypt along the Nile, bringing Islam with them. Communities in the river valley and savannah, fearful for their safety, formed tribal organizations and adopted Arab protectors. The Nubian Christian population slowly dwindled; even so, Muslims probably did not constitute a majority in the old Nubian areas until the fifteenth or sixteenth century.
The Rule of the Kashif

For several centuries, Arab caliphs in Cairo governed Egypt through a warrior caste called the Mamluks. In the thirteenth century, the Mamluks seized control of the state and created a sultanate that ruled Egypt until the early sixteenth century. Repeated military expeditions weakened Dongola, but the Mamluks failed to establish direct rule over Nubia. In 1517 the Turks conquered Egypt and incorporated the country into the Ottoman Empire as a province.

Ottoman forces pursued fleeing Mamluks into Nubia, which the Mamluks had claimed as a dependency. Although the Ottomans established administrative structures in ports on the Red Sea coast, they exerted little authority over the interior. Instead, they relied on military kashif (leaders), many of whom were Mamluks who had made peace with the Ottomans and who controlled their virtually autonomous fiefs as agents of the Turkish pasha in Cairo. The rule of the kashif lasted 300 years. Concerned with little more than tax collecting and slave trading, the kashif terrorized the population and fought among themselves for title to territory.

The Funj

At the same time that the Ottomans brought northern Nubia into their orbit, a new power, the Funj, arose farther south and supplanted the Christian kingdom of Alwa. In 1504 a Funj leader, Amara Dunqas, founded the Black Sultanate at Sinnar (also seen as Sennar and Sannar) that eventually became the keystone of the Funj Empire. By the mid-sixteenth century, Sinnar controlled Al-Gezira and commanded the allegiance of vassal states and tribal districts north to the third cataract and south to the swampy grasslands along the Nile.

The Funj state consisted of a loose confederation of sultanates and dependent tribal chiefdoms drawn together under the suzerainty of Sinnar’s sultan, who received tribute, levied taxes, and expected his vassals to supply troops in time of war. He also settled local disorders and resolved internal disputes in the vassal states. The Funj stabilized the region and interposed a military bloc separating the Arabs in the north, the Ethiopians in the east, and the non-Muslim Africans in the south.

The sultanate’s economy depended on the slave trade, farming, and herding. Sinnar apportioned tributary areas into tribal homelands, each one termed a dar, in which the sultan granted the local population the right to use arable land. The diverse groups that inhabited each dar eventually regarded themselves as units of tribes; movement from one dar to another entailed a change in tribal identification. Tribal distinctions in these areas in modern Sudan can be traced to
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this period. An appointed chieftain governed each *dar* according to customary law, paid tribute to the Sinnar sultan, and collected taxes.

In the mid-seventeenth century and at the height of its power, Sinnar repulsed the northward advance of the Nilotic Shilluk people up the White Nile and compelled many of them to submit to Funj authority. After this victory, Sultan Badi II Abu Duqn (1642–81) sought to centralize the government of the confederacy at Sinnar by creating an army of slaves that would free Sinnar from dependence on vassal sultans for military assistance and that would provide a means to enforce the Sinnar sultan’s will. The move alienated the Funj warrior aristocracy, who in 1718 deposed the reigning sultan and placed one of their own ranks on the throne. The eighteenth century witnessed another brief period of expansion, but civil war and the demands of defending the sultanate had overextended the warrior society’s resources and sapped its strength. In 1761 a court vizier, Muhammad Abu al-Kaylak, who had led the Funj army in wars, staged a palace coup and relegated the sultan to a figurehead role. Sinnar’s hold over its vassals diminished, and by the early nineteenth century, more remote areas ceased to recognize even the nominal authority of the sultan.

The Fur

Darfur was the Fur homeland. Renowned as cavalrymen, Fur clans frequently aided, and as frequently opposed, their kin, the Kanuri of Borno, in modern Nigeria. After a period of disorder in the sixteenth century, Sulayman Solong (1596–1637) became Darfur’s first sultan. He decreed Islam to be the official religion; however, large-scale religious conversions did not occur until the reign of Ahmad Bakr (1682–1722), who imported teachers, built mosques, and compelled his subjects to become Muslims. In the eighteenth century, several sultans consolidated the dynasty’s hold on Darfur, established a capital at Al-Fashir, and challenged the Funj for control of Kordofan (also seen as Kurdufan).

The sultans operated the slave trade as a monopoly. They levied taxes on traders and export duties on slaves sent to Egypt and took a share of the slaves brought into Darfur. Some household slaves advanced to prominent positions in the courts of sultans. The power exercised by these slaves provoked a violent reaction among the traditional class of Fur officeholders in the late eighteenth century. The rivalry between the slave and traditional elites caused recurrent unrest throughout the nineteenth century.
Southern Groups

There is little documentation on southern Sudan before the early nineteenth century and the subsequent extension of slave raiding into the South. Information about the peoples of this region before that time is based largely on oral history. According to these traditions, the Nilotic peoples—the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and others—entered southern Sudan some time before the tenth century. During the period from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth century, tribal migrations, largely from the area of Bahr al-Ghazal, brought these peoples to their present locations. Some, such as the Shilluk, developed a centralized monarchical tradition that enabled them to preserve their tribal integrity in the face of external pressures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Others, including the Dinka and Nuer, were stateless groups organized around local chieftaincies. The non-Nilotic Azande, who entered southwestern Sudan in the sixteenth century, established the region’s largest state. In the eighteenth century, the militaristic Avungara entered Sudan and quickly imposed their authority over the poorly organized and militarily weaker Azande. Avungara power remained largely unchallenged until the arrival of the British at the end of the nineteenth century.

Geographic barriers protected the Southerners from Islam’s advance, enabling them to retain their cultural and social heritage and their political and religious institutions. During the nineteenth century, the slave trade brought Southerners into closer contact with Sudanese Arabs and resulted in a deep hatred for the Northerners.

The Turkiyyah, 1821–85

As part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517, Egypt was divided into several provinces, each of which was placed under a Mamluk governor responsible to the pasha in Cairo, who answered to the Ottoman government. During about 280 years of Ottoman rule, some 100 pashas succeeded each other. In the eighteenth century, their authority became tenuous as rival Mamluk governors became the real power in the land. Struggles among the governors continued until 1798, when the French invasion of Egypt altered the situation. Combined British and Turkish military operations forced the withdrawal of French forces in 1801. In 1805 the Ottomans appointed Muhammad Ali as Egypt’s pasha to restore order.

Muhammad Ali used 10,000 Albanian troops provided by the Ottomans to purge Egypt of the Mamluks. Some fled south and, in 1811, established a state at Dongola as a base for their slave raiding. In 1820 the sultan of Sinnar informed Muhammad Ali that he was unable to
expel the Mamluks. The pasha therefore deployed 4,000 troops to Sudan, cleared it of Mamluks, accepted Sinnar’s surrender from the last Funj sultan, Badi IV, and reclaimed the territory for Egypt.

The Egyptian occupation of Sudan was initially disastrous. Under the new government established in 1821, known as the Turkiyyah or Turkish regime, soldiers lived off the land and levied high taxes on the population. They also destroyed many ancient Meroitic pyramids searching for gold. Furthermore, slave trading increased in the Funj heartland, causing many inhabitants to flee to escape the traders. Within a year of the pasha’s victory, 30,000 Sudanese slaves were taken to Egypt for induction into the army. However, so many perished from disease and the unfamiliar climate that the remaining slaves could be used only in garrisons in Sudan.

The new regime became less harsh as the military occupation became more secure. The Egyptians saddled the country with a parasitic bureaucracy, however, and expected the population to be self-supporting. Nonetheless, farmers and herders gradually returned to Al-Gezira. The Turkiyyah won the allegiance of some tribal and religious leaders by granting them a tax exemption. Egyptian soldiers, Sudanese slave soldiers, and mercenaries from various Ottoman domains manned garrisons in Khartoum, Kassala, Al-Obeid (also seen as Al-Ubayyid), and at several smaller outposts. The Egyptians divided Sudan into provinces, which were subdivided into smaller administrative units that usually corresponded to tribal territories. In 1835 Khartoum became the seat of the governor-general; many garrison towns also developed into administrative centers in their respective regions. At the local level, sheikhs and traditional tribal chieftains assumed administrative responsibilities.

The pasha’s government introduced new commercial and criminal codes in Egypt and Sudan in the 1850s, which were administered in secular courts. The change reduced the prestige of the qadis, Islamic judges whose sharia courts were confined to dealing with matters of personal status. The Turkiyyah also encouraged a religious orthodoxy favored in the Ottoman Empire. The government built mosques and staffed religious schools and courts with teachers and judges trained at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University. The government favored the Khatmiyyah (see Glossary), a traditional religious order, because its leaders cooperated with the regime. But Sudanese Muslims condemned the official orthodoxy as decadent because it had rejected popular beliefs and practices.

The Egyptians encouraged economic development in Sudan through state monopolies that exported slaves, ivory, and gum arabic. In some areas, tribal land, which had been held in common, became the private property of the sheikhs, who sometimes sold it to buyers
outside the tribe. But the slave trade was the most profitable business in Sudan and was the focus of Egyptian interests in the country until its gradual suppression in the 1860s.

Slavery had been an institution of Sudanese life throughout history, but Southern Sudan, where slavery particularly flourished, was long considered an area beyond Cairo’s control. Because Sudan was close to Middle Eastern slave markets, it was a natural supplier of captives. Consequently, the slave trade in the South intensified in the nineteenth century and continued after the British had suppressed slaving in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Annual raids resulted in the capture of countless thousands of Southern Sudanese and the destruction of the region’s economy and stability. The horrors associated with the slave trade generated European interest in Sudan.

Until 1843 Muhammad Ali maintained a state monopoly on slave trading. Thereafter, authorities sold licenses to private traders who competed with government slave raids. In 1854 Cairo ended state participation in the slave trade and in 1860, in response to European pressure, prohibited the slave trade altogether. However, the Egyptian army failed to enforce the prohibition against the private armies of the slave traders. The introduction of steamboats and firearms enabled slave traders to overwhelm local resistance and prompted the creation of southern “bush empires” by Baqqara Arabs.

Muhammad Ali’s successors, Abbas I (1849–54) and Said (1854–63), lacked leadership qualities and paid little attention to Sudan, but Isma’il (1863–79) revitalized Egyptian interest in the country. In 1865 the Ottoman Empire ceded the Red Sea coast and its ports to Egypt; two years later, the Ottoman sultan granted Isma’il the title of khedive (sovereign prince). Egypt organized and garrisoned the new provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Equatoria and, in 1874, conquered and annexed Darfur. Isma’il named Europeans to provincial governorships and appointed Sudanese to more responsible government positions. Responding to British pressure, Isma’il took steps to eliminate the slave trade in Northern Sudan. Attempts to build an army on the European model that would no longer depend on slaves for manpower, however, caused unrest. Army units mutinied, and many Sudanese resented the quartering of troops among the civilian population and the use of Sudanese forced labor on public projects. Efforts to suppress the slave trade also angered the urban merchant class and the Baqqara Arabs, who had grown prosperous by selling slaves.

Isma’il modernized the Sudanese military and proposed to extend Egyptian rule into the southern region. In 1869 British explorer Sir Samuel Baker received a commission as governor of Equatoria Province with orders to annex all territory in the White Nile’s basin and to
suppress the slave trade. In 1874 Charles George Gordon, a British officer, succeeded Baker, disarmed many slave traders, and hanged those who defied him. By the time he became governor-general in 1877, Gordon had weakened the slave trade in much of the South.

Unfortunately, Isma’il’s Southern policy lacked consistency. In 1871 he had named a notorious Arab slave trader, Rahma Mansur al-Zubayr, as governor of the newly created province of Bahr al-Ghazal. Al-Zubayr used his army to pacify the province and to eliminate his competition in the slave trade. In 1874 he invaded Darfur and then offered the region as a province to the khedive. Later that year, al-Zubayr defied Cairo when the khedive attempted to relieve him of his post and defeated an Egyptian force sent to oust him. Gordon, after he became Sudan’s governor-general, ended al-Zubayr’s slave trading, disbanded his army, and sent him back to Cairo.

The Mahdiyyah, 1885–98

Sudanese developments during this period cannot be understood without reference to the British position in Egypt. In 1869 the Suez Canal opened and became Britain’s economic lifeline to India and the Far East. To defend this waterway and ensure its profitability, the British government sought a greater role in Egyptian affairs, in 1873 supporting a program whereby an Anglo-French debt commission assumed responsibility for managing Egypt’s fiscal affairs. This commission eventually forced Khedive Isma’il to abdicate in favor of his more politically acceptable son, Tawfiq (in power, 1879–92).
After Isma’il’s removal in 1879, Gordon, who had been appointed by him, resigned as governor-general of Sudan in 1880. Gordon’s successors lacked direction from Cairo and feared the political turmoil that had engulfed Egypt; consequently, they failed to continue the policies he had put into place. The illegal slave trade revived, although not sufficiently to satisfy the merchants whom Gordon had put out of business. The Sudanese army suffered from a lack of resources, and unemployed soldiers from disbanded units troubled garrison towns. Tax collectors arbitrarily increased taxation.

Into this troubled atmosphere stepped Muhammad Ahmad ibn al-Sayyid Abdallah, a faqir or holy man who combined personal magnetism with religious zealotry and who was determined to expel the Turks and restore Islam to its early purity. The son of a Dongola boatbuilder, Muhammad Ahmad joined the Sammaniyyah order. Later, as a sheikh of the order, he spent several years in seclusion and gained a reputation as a mystic and teacher. In 1880 he became a Sammaniyyah leader.

Muhammad Ahmad’s sermons attracted an increasing number of followers. Among them was Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, a Baqqara from southern Darfur, whose planning capabilities were to prove of great value. Muhammad Ahmad revealed himself as al-Mahdi al-Muntazar (“the awaited guide in the right path,” usually seen as the Mahdi—see Glossary), sent from God to redeem the faithful and prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet ‘Isa (Jesus). The Mahdist movement that he founded demanded a return to the simplicity of early Islam, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, and the strict seclusion of women.

In May 1881, the Mahdi proclaimed a jihad against the Turkiyyah while he was at Aba Island, a Mahdist base on the White Nile south of Khartoum. At the time, Sudanese authorities dismissed him as a religious fanatic. After denouncing tax collectors, the Mahdi and his followers, known as the Ansar, fled to Kordofan to avoid arrest. Once there, he gained a large number of recruits, especially among the Baqqara, and the support or neutrality of all religious orders except the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah. Merchants and Arab tribes who had depended on the slave trade, along with the Hadendowa Beja, rallied to the Mahdi’s cause.

Early in 1882, the Ansar, armed with spears and swords, overwhelmed a 7,000-man Egyptian force near Al-Obeid and seized their rifles and ammunition. The Mahdi then laid siege to Al-Obeid and starred it into submission. The 30,000-man Ansar army then defeated an 8,000-man Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. Next, the Mahdi captured Darfur and imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian in the khalifa’s service, who later became the first Egyptian-appointed governor of Darfur Province.
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The Ansar advance and the Beja rising in the east imperiled communications with Egypt and threatened to cut off garrisons at Khartoum, Kassala, Sinnar, and Sawakin (also seen as Suakin) and in the South. To avoid being drawn into a costly intervention, the British government ordered an Egyptian withdrawal from Sudan. Gordon, who had been reappointed governor-general, arranged to supervise the evacuation of Egyptian troops and officials and all foreigners from Sudan. However, after reaching Khartoum in February 1884, Gordon realized that he could not extricate the garrisons. As a result, he called for reinforcements from Egypt to relieve Khartoum and recommended that al-Zubayr, an old enemy whom he recognized as an excellent military commander, succeed him so disaffected Sudanese could have a leader other than the Mahdi to whom they could rally. London rejected this plan, but Gordon argued that Sudan was essential to Egypt’s security and that allowing an Ansar victory would invite the movement to spread elsewhere.

British popular support for Gordon eventually forced Prime Minister William Gladstone to deploy a relief force under Lord Garnet Joseph Wolseley’s command. A “flying column” sent from Wadi Halfa on the Egyptian frontier bogged down at Abu Tulayh (commonly called Abu Klea), where the Hadendowa Beja broke the British line. An advance unit sent by river arrived at Khartoum on January 28, 1885, only to learn that two days earlier the Ansar had slaughtered the garrison, killed Gordon, and delivered his head to the Mahdi’s tent. Kassala and Sinnar fell soon after, and by late 1885 the Ansar had moved into the southern region. In all Sudan, only Sawakin, reinforced by Indian army troops, and Wadi Halfa remained in Anglo-Egyptian hands (see fig. 5).

The Mahdiyyah (Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Islamic laws. Sudan’s new ruler also authorized the burning of lists of pedigrees and books on law and theology because of their links to the old order. The Mahdiyyah is known as the first genuine Sudanese nationalist government. The Mahdi maintained that his movement was not a religious order that could be accepted or rejected at will but rather a universal regime that challenged man to join or to be destroyed. The Mahdi also convinced his followers that loyalty to him was essential to true Islamic belief. Moreover, service in the jihad replaced the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, as a duty incumbent on the faithful. Almsgiving became the tax paid to the state. The Mahdi justified his policies by claiming he had received instructions from God in visions.
The Khalifa

Six months after Khartoum’s capture, the Mahdi died of typhus. The task of establishing and maintaining a government fell to three of his deputies. Rivalry among these caliphs continued until 1891, when Abdallahi Ibn Muhammad, with the help primarily of the Baqqara Arabs, emerged as leader of the Mahdiyyah. Abdallahi—called the Khalifa (successor)—purged the Mahdiyyah of members of the Mahdi’s family and many of his religious disciples. Originally, the Mahdiyyah
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was a jihadist state, run like a military camp. Sharia courts enforced Islamic law and the Mahdi’s precepts, which had the force of law. After consolidating his power, the Khalifa created an administration and appointed Ansar (who were usually Baqqara Arabs) as amirs over each of the several provinces. The Khalifa also ruled over rich Al-Gezira. Although he failed to restore this region’s commercial well-being, he organized workshops to manufacture ammunition and to maintain river steamboats.

Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the Mahdiyyah period, largely because of the Khalifa’s commitment to jihad as the means to extend his version of Islam throughout the world. For example, the Khalifa rejected an offer of an alliance against the Europeans by Ethiopia’s Yohannes IV, a Christian monarch. In 1888 a 60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia and penetrated as far as Gondar, capturing prisoners and booty. The Khalifa’s refusal to conclude peace prompted an Ethiopian attack on Qallabat in March 1889; however, after Yohannes IV fell in battle, the Ethiopians withdrew. The same year, the Khalifa’s best general invaded Egypt, but British-led Egyptian troops defeated him at Tushki, a victory that ended the Ansar’s reputation of invincibility. The Belgians prevented the Mahdi’s men from conquering Equatoria, and in 1893 the Italians repulsed an Ansar attack at Akordat in present-day Eritrea, forcing the Ansar to withdraw from Ethiopia.

The Reconquest of Sudan

Herbert Kitchener (later Lord Kitchener) assumed command of the Egyptian army in 1892 and began preparations for the reconquest of Sudan. The British decision to occupy Sudan resulted in part from international considerations. By the 1890s, British, French, and Belgian territorial claims had converged at the Nile’s headwaters. Britain feared that other colonial powers would take advantage of Sudan’s instability to acquire Sudanese territory previously annexed to Egypt. Britain also wished to secure control of the Nile’s waters, upon which Egypt depended, and to safeguard a planned irrigation dam at Aswan.

The British government authorized Kitchener to launch a campaign in 1895. The Anglo-Egyptian Nile Expeditionary Force included 25,800 men, 8,600 of whom were British; the remainder belonged to Egyptian units that included six battalions recruited in Southern Sudan. An armed river flotilla escorted the force, which also had artillery support. The British established their headquarters at Wadi Halfa and extended their defenses around Sawakin. Kitchener launched the campaign in March 1896. In September he captured Dongola. The British then built a railroad from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamad, and a southward extension parallel
to the Nile as far as Barbar, to transport military forces. Anglo-Egyptian units fought a sharp action at Abu Hamad, but there was little other significant resistance until Kitchener reached Atbarah and defeated the Ansar. Thereafter, Kitchener’s soldiers marched and sailed to Omdurman, where the Khalifa made his last stand.

On September 2, 1898, the Khalifa committed his 52,000-man army to a frontal assault against the Anglo-Egyptian force massed on the plain outside Omdurman. The outcome was never in doubt. During the five-hour battle, about 11,000 Mahdists died, whereas Anglo-Egyptian losses amounted to 48 dead and fewer than 400 wounded. Mopping-up operations required several years, but organized resistance ended when the Khalifa died in fighting at Umm Diwaykarat, in Kordofan, in November 1899. Many Sudanese welcomed his demise, as Sudan’s economy had been all but destroyed during his reign and the population had declined by approximately one-half because of famine, disease, persecution, and warfare. Moreover, none of the country’s traditional institutions or loyalties remained intact. Mahdism had divided tribes, religious brotherhoods had been weakened, and orthodox religious leaders had vanished.

In the meantime, a major colonial incident had occurred in Southern Sudan. The French, in a race with the British to claim territory in Central Africa, sent an expeditionary force across Southern Sudan, arriving on the Nile at Fashoda, just north of modern Malakal, in July 1898 and claiming the Upper Nile region for France. Following defeat of the Mahdi’s army, Kitchener and his Anglo-Egyptian force marched south along the Nile and confronted the French, provoking a major diplomatic and military crisis. In the negotiations that followed, the French decided that considerations in Europe outweighed those in Sudan and withdrew westward, leaving Britain in control of the Upper Nile basin.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899–1955

In January 1899, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement restored Egyptian rule in Sudan but as part of the Condominium, or joint authority, exercised by Britain and Egypt. The agreement designated the territory south of the twenty-second parallel as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. However, it failed to clarify the juridical relationship between the two Condominium powers or to provide a legal basis for continued British presence in the South. Britain assumed responsibility for governing the territory on behalf of the khedive.

Article 2 of the agreement specified that “the supreme military and civil command in Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the Governor-General of Sudan. He shall be appointed by Khedival Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government and shall be removed only by Khedival Decree with the consent of Her Britan-
nic Majesty’s Government.” The British governor-general reported to the Foreign Office through its resident agent in Cairo. In practice, however, he exercised extraordinary powers and directed the Condominium government from Khartoum as if it were a colonial administration. Sir Reginald Wingate succeeded Kitchener as governor-general in 1899. In each province, two inspectors and several district commissioners aided the governor. Initially, most administrative personnel were British army officers seconded to the Egyptian army. Starting in 1901, however, British civilian administrators formed the nucleus of the Sudan Political Service. Egyptians filled middle-level posts, while Sudanese gradually acquired lower-level positions.

Initially, the governor-general and provincial governors exercised great latitude in governing Sudan. After 1910, an executive council, whose approval was required for all legislation and budgetary matters, assisted the governor-general. This council included the inspector-general; the civil, legal, and financial secretaries; and two to four other appointed British officials. The executive council retained legislative authority until 1948.

After restoring authority, the British dedicated themselves to the creation of a modern government. Jurists adopted penal and criminal procedural codes similar to those in force in British India. Commissions established land-tenure rules and adjusted claims in dispute because of grants made by successive governments. Land taxes remained the basic
form of taxation, and, for the first time in Sudan’s history, the rate of taxation was fixed. The 1902 Code of Civil Procedure continued the Ottoman separation of civil law and sharia, but it also created guidelines for the operation of sharia courts as an autonomous judicial division under a chief qadi appointed by the governor-general. Religious judges and other sharia court officials were invariably Egyptian.

There was little resistance to the Condominium, but there were cases of intertribal warfare, banditry, or revolts of short duration. For example, Mahdist uprisings occurred in February 1900, 1902–3, 1904, and 1908. In 1916 Abdallah al-Suhayni, who claimed to be the Prophet Isa, launched an unsuccessful jihad.

The problem of the Condominium’s undefined borders was a greater concern. A 1902 treaty with Ethiopia fixed the southeastern boundary with Sudan. Seven years later, an Anglo-Belgian treaty determined the status of the Lado Enclave in the South, establishing a border with the Belgian Congo (present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo). The western boundary proved more difficult to resolve. The status of Darfur, formerly under Egyptian control, was the issue. When the Mahdiyyah disintegrated, Sultan Ali Dinar reclaimed Darfur’s throne, which had been lost to the Egyptians in 1874; with British approval, he continued to hold the throne under Ottoman suzerainty on condition that he pay annual tribute to the khedive. When World War I broke out, Ali Dinar proclaimed his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and responded to its call for a jihad against the Allies. Britain deployed a force against Ali Dinar, who died in subsequent fighting. In 1916 the British annexed Darfur to Sudan and terminated the Fur sultanate.

During the Condominium period, economic development occurred only in the Nile valley’s settled areas. Among other things, the British extended telegraph and rail lines to link key points in Northern Sudan but not to more remote areas. Port Sudan opened in 1906, replacing Sawakin as the country’s principal port. In 1911 the government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate launched the Gezira Scheme to provide high-quality cotton for Britain’s textile industry (see Agriculture, ch. 3). An irrigation dam near Sinnar, completed in 1925, brought a much larger area in Al-Gezira under cultivation. Planters sent cotton by rail from Sinnar to Port Sudan for shipment abroad. The Gezira Scheme made cotton the mainstay of the country’s economy and turned the region into Sudan’s most densely populated area. It also brought the issue of the Nile’s waters to the fore. In 1929 Egypt and Sudan, under British auspices, concluded the Nile Waters Agreement, which recognized Egypt’s historical rights to the Nile’s water, allocated the annual flow between the two countries, and gave Egyptians the right to review future irrigation or power projects on the Nile or its tributaries in Sudan.
In 1922 Britain approved Egypt’s declaration of independence. However, the 1923 Egyptian constitution made no claim to Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Subsequent Anglo-Egyptian negotiations foundered on the Sudan question. Nationalists rioted in Egypt and Sudan, where some supported union with Egypt. In November 1924, Sir Lee Stack, governor-general of Sudan and sirdar (commander in chief, Anglo-Egyptian army), was assassinated in Cairo. Britain ordered all Egyptian troops, civil servants, and public employees withdrawn from Sudan. In 1925 the authorities formed the 4,500-man Sudan Defence Force (SDF) under Sudanese officers to replace Egyptian units.

Sudan was relatively quiet in the late 1920s and 1930s. During this period, the colonial government favored indirect rule, that is, administration through indigenous leaders, as a governing system. Traditional leaders were the sheikhs of villages, tribes, and districts in the North and tribal chiefs in the South. The number of Sudanese recognizing them and the degree of authority they held varied. The British first delegated judicial powers to sheikhs to enable them to settle local disputes and then allowed them to administer local governments under the supervision of British district commissioners.

Mainstream political development, however, occurred among local leaders and Khartoum’s educated elite. In their view, indirect rule
prevented the country’s unification, exacerbated tribalism in the North, and served to insulate the less-advanced South against Arab influence. Indirect rule also implied government decentralization, which alarmed the educated elite who had careers in the central administration and envisioned an eventual transfer of power from British colonial authorities to their class. Although nationalists and the Khatmiyyah opposed indirect rule, the Ansar, many of whom enjoyed positions of local authority, supported the concept.

**Britain’s Southern Policy**

From the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the British sought to modernize Sudan by applying European technology to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its authoritarian institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions. However, Southern Sudan’s remote and undeveloped provinces—Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile—received little attention until after World War I, except for efforts to suppress tribal warfare and the slave trade. The British justified this policy by claiming that the South was not ready for exposure to the modern world. To allow the South to develop along indigenous lines, the British, therefore, closed the region to outsiders, thus keeping it isolated and backward. A few Arab merchants controlled the region’s limited commercial activities, while Arab bureaucrats administered whatever laws existed. Christian missionaries, who operated schools and medical clinics, provided limited social services.

The earliest Christian missionaries were the Verona Fathers, a Roman Catholic religious order that had established Southern missions before the Mahdiyyah. Other missionary groups included Presbyterians from the United States and the Anglican Church Missionary Society. The government eventually subsidized mission schools because mission graduates usually gained posts in the provincial civil service. Many Northerners regarded missions as tools of British imperialism. Some Southerners attended schools in British East Africa (present-day Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) rather than in Khartoum, thereby exacerbating the North–South division.

British authorities treated the three provinces in the South as a separate region. The colonial administration, as it consolidated its position in the 1920s, detached the South from the rest of Sudan for all practical purposes. The period’s Closed Districts Ordinance barred Northern Sudanese from entering or working in the South and reinforced the separate-development policy. Moreover, the British gradually replaced Arab administrators and expelled Arab merchants, thereby severing the South’s last economic contacts with the North. The colonial adminis-
tration discouraged Islam and Arab customs and dress but attempted to revitalize African customs and tribal life that the slave trade had disrupted. Finally, a 1930 directive stated that blacks in the Southern provinces were to be considered as a people distinct from Northern Muslims and that the region eventually should be integrated into Britain’s East Africa colonies.

The economy suffered in the South because of the region’s isolation. Moreover, there was a continual struggle between British officials in the North and their counterparts in the South, as those in the former category opposed recommendations that Northern resources be diverted to spur Southern economic development. Personality clashes between officials in the two branches in the Sudan Political Service also impeded the South’s growth. Those individuals who served in the Southern provinces tended to be military officers with previous Africa experience who were on secondment to the colonial service. They usually were distrustful of Arab influence and were committed to keeping the South under British control. By contrast, Northern officials tended to be Arabists often drawn from the diplomatic and consular service. Whereas Northern provincial governors conferred regularly with the governor-general in Khartoum, their three Southern colleagues met to coordinate activities with the governors of the British East African colonies.

**The Rise of Sudanese Nationalism**

Sudanese nationalism as it developed after World War I was an Arab and Muslim phenomenon based in the Northern provinces. Nationalists opposed indirect rule and advocated a centralized national government in Khartoum responsible for both regions. Nationalists also believed Britain’s Southern policy divided Sudan and prevented its unification under an Arabized and Islamic ruling class. Ironically, however, a non-Arab led Sudan’s first modern nationalist movement. In 1921 Ali Abd al-Latif, a Muslim Dinka and former army officer, founded the United Tribes Society that called for an independent Sudan based on power sharing between tribal and religious leaders. Three years later, Ali Abd al-Latif’s movement, reconstituted as the White Flag League, sponsored demonstrations in Khartoum. His arrest and subsequent exile in Egypt sparked a Sudanese army battalion mutiny, the suppression of which temporarily crippled the nationalist movement.

In the 1930s, nationalism reemerged as educated Sudanese sought to restrict the governor-general’s power and to obtain Sudanese participation in the executive council’s deliberations. However, Britain and Egypt refused to modify the Condominium agreement. Moreover, the British saw themselves as the protector of the Sudanese from Egyptian
domination. The nationalists feared that friction between the Condominium powers might eventually result in the attachment of Northern Sudan to Egypt and of Southern Sudan to Uganda and Kenya. Although they settled most of their differences in the 1937 Treaty of Alliance, which set a timetable for the end of British military occupation, Britain and Egypt failed to agree on Sudan’s future status.

Nationalists and religious leaders disagreed about whether Sudan should seek independence or union with Egypt. The Mahdi’s son, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, supported independence, whereas Ali al-Mirghani, the Khatmiyyah leader, favored union with Egypt. Coalitions supported by each of these leaders formed rival wings of the nationalist movement. Radical nationalists and the Khatmiyyah later created the Ashigga Party, subsequently renamed the National Unionist Party (NUP), to advance the cause of Sudanese–Egyptian unification. The moderates favored Sudanese independence in cooperation with Britain and, together with the Ansar, established the Umma Party.

The Road to Independence

As World War II proceeded, Italian forces invaded Sudan in mid-1940 from Italian East Africa (present-day Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia) and captured Kassala, but the SDF prevented an advance on Port Sudan. In January 1941, the SDF, expanded to 20,000 troops, recaptured Kassala and joined the British offensive that routed the Italians in Eritrea and liberated Ethiopia. Some Sudanese units later contributed to the British Eighth Army’s victory in North Africa.

In the postwar years, the Condominium government made several changes. In 1942 the Graduates’ General Conference, a quasi-nationalist movement composed of educated Sudanese, demanded a pledge of self-determination after the war, abolition of the Closed Districts Ordinance, an end to the separate curriculum in schools in the South, and more Sudanese in the civil service. The governor-general rejected these demands but agreed to a government-supervised transformation of indirect rule into a modernized system of local government. Sir Douglas Newbold, the executive council’s civil secretary, helped establish a parliamentary government and the administrative unification of North and South. In 1948, over Egyptian objections, Britain authorized the partially elected Legislative Assembly, representing both regions, to supersede the advisory executive council.

Because the pro-Egyptian NUP boycotted the 1948 Legislative Assembly elections, pro-independence groups dominated the assembly. In 1952 leaders of the Umma-dominated legislature negotiated the Self-Determination Agreement with Britain. The legislators adopted a constitution that provided for a prime minister and council of ministers
relevant to a bicameral parliament. The new government would assume responsibility in all areas except military and foreign affairs, which remained in the British governor-general's hands. The Egyptians, demanding recognition of their sovereignty over Sudan, repudiated the Condominium agreement and declared their reigning monarch, Faruq, king of Sudan (see fig. 6).

After seizing power in Egypt and overthrowing the Faruq monarchy in late 1952, Colonel Muhammad Naguib resolved the problem of Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Cairo previously had linked discussions on Sudan's status to an agreement on the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal. Naguib separated the two issues and accepted Sudanese self-determination. In February 1953, London and Cairo signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, which allowed for a three-year transition period from Condominium rule to self-government. During the transition phase, British and Egyptian troops would withdraw from Sudan. The Sudanese then would decide their future status in a plebiscite. Naguib's concession seemed justified when parliamentary elections in late 1952 gave a majority to the pro-Egyptian NUP, which had called for an eventual union with Egypt. In January 1954, a new government emerged under NUP leader Isma'il al-Azhari.

The South and the Unity of Sudan

During World War II, some British colonial officers questioned the viability of the separation of the Southern provinces from Northern Sudan. British officials also had become more sensitive to Arab criticism of the policy in the South. In 1946 the Sudan Administrative Conference determined that Sudan should be administered as one country. Conference delegates also agreed to readmit Northern administrators to posts in the South, abolish the trade restrictions imposed under the Closed Districts Ordinances, and allow Southerners to work in the North. Additionally, Khartoum nullified the prohibition against Muslim proselytizing in the South and introduced Arabic in the South as the official administration language.

Some British officials in the South accused Northerners of unduly influencing the conference and of refusing to examine reasons for retaining the separate-development policy. These officers argued that Northern domination of the South would result in a Southern rebellion. Khartoum convened a conference at Juba to resolve these issues and to assure Southerners that a postindependence government would safeguard Southern political and cultural rights.

Despite these promises, many Southerners expressed concern that Northerners would overwhelm them. In particular, they resented the imposition of Arabic as the official language of administration, which
shut most English-speaking Southerners out of the civil service, and the replacement of trusted British district commissioners with unsympathetic Northerners. After the government replaced several hundred colonial officials with Sudanese, only four of whom were Southerners, the Southern elite abandoned hope of a peaceful, unified, independent Sudan.


Figure 6. Anglo–Egyptian Sudan, circa 1950
Southern hostility toward the Northern Arab majority surfaced violently in August 1955 when Southern army units mutinied to protest their transfer to garrisons under Northern officers. The rebellious troops killed several hundred Northerners, including government officials, army officers, and merchants. Khartoum quickly suppressed the revolt and executed 70 Southerners for sedition. But this harsh reaction failed to pacify the South, as some mutineers escaped to remote areas and organized resistance to the Arab-dominated government.

**Independent Sudan**

The al-Azhari government, hoping to promote unity with Egypt, set aside the agenda for self-determination proposed by the Condominium powers. After realizing that popular opinion had shifted against unification with Egypt, however, al-Azhari reversed the NUP’s stand and supported Sudanese independence. In August 1955, he called for the speedy withdrawal of foreign troops and requested that the Condominium powers sponsor a plebiscite in advance of the scheduled date. Independence was achieved, however, by a simple declaration adopted unanimously by the Sudanese parliament on December 19, 1955. On January 1, 1956, Sudan became an independent republic.

**The Politics of Independence**

Sudan gained independence without a permanent constitution. Instead, the Constituent Assembly adopted a document known as the Transitional Constitution that replaced the governor-general as head of state with a five-member Supreme Commission elected by a parliament composed of an indirectly elected Senate and a popularly elected House of Representatives. The Transitional Constitution also allocated executive power to the prime minister, who was nominated by the House of Representatives and confirmed in office by the Supreme Commission.

Although it achieved independence without conflict, Sudan inherited many problems from the Condominium. One of the most important was the status of the civil service. The government placed Sudanese in the administration and provided compensation and pensions for British officers of the Sudan Political Service who left the country; it retained those who could not be replaced, mostly technicians and teachers. Southerners resented the replacement of British administrators in the South with Sudanese from the North. Many Southern leaders, opposed to violence, hoped to win constitutional concessions as a bulwark against what they perceived as Arab imperialism. Most Southerners supported provincial autonomy and warned that failure to win legal concessions would drive the South to rebellion.
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The parliamentary regime introduced plans to expand the country’s education, economic, and transportation sectors. To achieve these goals, Khartoum needed foreign economic and technical assistance, to which the United States made an early commitment. Talks between the two governments began in 1957, and in July 1958 the parliament ratified a U.S. aid agreement. Washington hoped this agreement would reduce Sudan’s reliance on a one-crop (cotton) economy and facilitate the development of the transportation and communications sectors.

Prime Minister al-Azhari formed a coalition government in February 1956, but he alienated the Khatmiyyah by supporting secular government policies. In June some Khatmiyyah members who had defected from the NUP established the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) under al-Mirghani’s leadership. The Umma and the PDP cooperated to bring down the al-Azhari government. With support from the two parties and backing from the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, Abdallah Khalil put together a coalition government.

Major issues confronting Khalil’s government included agreeing on a permanent constitution, stabilizing the South, encouraging economic development, and improving relations with Egypt. Strains within the Umma–PDP coalition hampered the government’s ability to accomplish these goals. The Umma, for example, wanted the constitution to institute a presidential government on the assumption that Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi would be elected the first president. Consensus was lacking about the country’s economic future. A poor cotton harvest followed the 1957 bumper cotton crop, which Sudan had been unable to sell at a good price in a glutted market. This downturn depleted Sudan’s reserves and caused unrest over government-imposed economic restrictions. The Umma called for reliance on increased foreign aid to overcome these problems and finance future development projects. The PDP, however, opposed this strategy because it promoted unacceptable foreign influence in Sudan. Despite these differences, the Umma–PDP coalition lasted for the remaining year of the parliament’s tenure. Moreover, after the parliament adjourned, the two parties promised to maintain a common front for the 1958 elections.

The electorate gave a plurality in both houses to the Umma and an overall majority to the Umma–PDP coalition. The NUP, however, won nearly one-quarter of the seats. In the South, the vote brought a rejection of the men who had cooperated with the government and a victory for advocates of autonomy within a federal system.

After the new parliament convened, Khalil again formed an Umma–PDP coalition government. Unfortunately, factionalism, corruption, and vote fraud dominated parliamentary deliberations at a time when the country needed decisive action on the proposed constitution and the
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South’s future. Another issue that divided the parliament concerned Sudanese–U.S. relations. In 1958 Khalil signed a technical assistance agreement with the United States. The parliament approved the agreement despite opposition from many PDP delegates.

Factionalism and bribery in parliament, coupled with the government’s inability to resolve Sudan’s many social, political, and economic problems, increased popular disillusion with democratic governance. Specific complaints included Khartoum’s decision to sell cotton at a price above world market prices that resulted in low sales. Import restrictions imposed to take pressure off depleted foreign-exchange reserves caused consternation among town dwellers accustomed to buying foreign goods. Moreover, an Egyptian embargo on imports of cattle, camels, and dates caused suffering among rural Northerners. Egypt also criticized Khalil and suggested that it might support a coup. Meanwhile, reports circulated in Khartoum that the Umma and the NUP were near agreement on a new coalition that would exclude the PDP and Khalil.

On November 17, 1958, the day parliament was to convene, Khalil staged a coup. The takeover was planned in conjunction with leading Umma members and the army’s two senior generals, Ibrahim Abbud and Ahmad Abd al-Wahab, who became leaders of the military regime. Abbud pledged to resolve all disputes with Egypt, including the long-standing problem of the status of the Nile. He abandoned previous unrealistic policies regarding the sale of cotton and appointed a constitutional commission to draft a permanent constitution. Abbud maintained, however, that political parties only served as vehicles for personal ambitions and that they would not be reestablished when civilian rule was restored.

The Abbud Military Government, 1958–64

The coup removed political decision making from the control of civilian politicians. To rule the country, Abbud created the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which included officers affiliated with the Ansar, such as Abd al-Wahab, and the Khatmiyyah, such as Abbud. Even so, under the military regime, the influence of the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah lessened. The strongest religious leader, a posthumous son of the Mahdi and leader of the Ansar, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, died in 1959. His son and successor, the elder Sadiq al-Mahdi, failed to enjoy the respect accorded his father. When Sadiq died two years later, Ansar religious and political leadership divided between his brother, Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, and his son, the younger Sadiq al-Mahdi.

The regime benefited during its first year in office from successful marketing of the cotton crop and the settlement of a dispute with Egypt over sharing the Nile’s waters. But despite early successes, opposition
elements remained powerful. In 1959 dissident military officers made three attempts to replace the regime with a “popular government.” Although the coup leaders were sentenced to prison, discontent within the military continued to plague the government. The Sudan Communist Party (SCP), which had supported the coup attempts, gained a reputation as antigovernment. To compound its problems, the Abbud regime lacked dynamism and the ability to stabilize the country. Its failure to place capable civilian advisers in senior positions, launch a credible economic and social development program, and gain the army’s support encouraged political turbulence.

Abbud’s Southern policy proved to be his undoing. The government suppressed expressions of religious and cultural differences and bolstered attempts to Arabize society. For example, in February 1964, Abbud expelled foreign missionaries from the South and then closed parliament to cut off outlets for Southern complaints. Southern leaders had renewed in 1963 the armed struggle against the government that had continued sporadically since 1955. The rebellion was then spearheaded by guerrilla forces known as the Anya Nya (snake venom).

Return to Civilian Rule, 1964–69

Abbud’s inability to quell growing Southern discontent or to improve the economic and education sectors led to protests by University of Khartoum students and faculty, civil servants, and trade unionists. Attempts to silence these protests resulted in the so-called October Revolution of 1964, which centered on a general strike that spread throughout the country. After several days of rioting that brought many deaths, Abbud dissolved the government and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Strike leaders, former politicians, and army commanders who planned the transition from military to civilian rule selected a nonpolitical senior civil servant, Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa, as prime minister to head a transitional government.

The new civilian regime, which operated under the 1956 Transitional Constitution, tried to end political factionalism by establishing a coalition government. Although the new government allowed all political parties to operate, only five of 15 posts in al-Khatim’s cabinet went to party politicians. The prime minister gave two positions to nonparty Southerners and the remaining eight to members of the National Front for Professionals, the party of the strike leaders; the eight included several communists.

Eventually two political parties represented the South. The Sudan African National Union (SANU), founded in 1963 and led by William Deng and Satunino Lohure, a Roman Catholic priest, operated among refugee groups and guerrilla forces. Deng’s wing of SANU
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(known locally as SANU–William) and the second party, the Southern Front, coalesced in 1965 and agreed to participate in upcoming parliamentary elections. During the next four years, SANU became a voice in parliament for Southern regional autonomy within a unified state. Exiled SANU leaders balked at Deng’s moderate approach and formed the Azania Liberation Front based in Uganda.

Anya Nya leaders remained aloof from political movements. The guerrillas were fragmented by ethnic and religious differences. Additionally, conflicts surfaced within Anya Nya between older leaders and younger, better-educated men such as Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese army captain, who eventually became a guerrilla leader, largely because of his ability to obtain arms from Israel.

The government scheduled national elections for March 1965 and announced that the new parliament’s task would be to prepare a constitution. The deteriorating security situation in the South precluded elections in that region, a situation that caused disagreements between political parties about whether to hold elections in the North or to postpone them until the whole country could vote. The PDP and SCP, both fearful of losing votes, wanted to postpone the elections as did Southern elements loyal to Khartoum. Their opposition forced the government to resign. The president of the reinstated Supreme Commission, who had replaced Abbud as chief of state, announced that the elections would be held wherever possible. The PDP rejected this decision and boycotted the elections.

The 1965 election results were inconclusive and led in June to a coalition cabinet headed by Umma leader Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub; al-Azhami, the NUP leader, became the Supreme Commission’s permanent president and head of state. The Mahjub government had two goals: progress toward solving the Southern problem and removal of communists from positions of power. The army launched a major offensive to crush the Southern rebellion, in the process augmenting its reputation for brutality. Southerners reported atrocities against civilians, especially at Juba and Wau. Sudanese army troops also burned churches and huts, closed schools, and destroyed crops and cattle. As for his second objective, Mahjub secured parliamentary approval of a decree that abolished the SCP and deprived 11 communists of their seats.

In October 1965, the Umma–NUP coalition collapsed because of a disagreement over whether Mahjub, as prime minister, or al-Azhami, as president, should conduct Sudan’s foreign relations. Mahjub remained in office until his resignation in July 1966 after a parliamentary vote of censure, an act that produced a split in Umma. The traditional wing led by Mahjub, under the spiritual leadership of Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, opposed the party’s majority. The latter group professed loyalty to the
imam’s nephew, the younger Sadiq al-Mahdi, a great-grandson of the Mahdi and the official Umma leader, who rejected religious sectarianism. Support from the majority Umma and NUP allies ensured that Sadiq became prime minister.

Sadiq wanted to foster economic development and to make peace with the Southern insurgents. He also wanted to replace the Supreme Commission with a president and a Southern vice president and proposed autonomy for the South. But neither Sadiq nor Mahjub, who returned to power in May 1967, was able to implement meaningful policies to deal with Sudan’s overriding problems because of continual political opposition and maneuvering in parliament. Sadiq survived a coup attempt in December 1966 by communists and a small army unit. Another notable development came in December 1967, when the PDP and NUP formed the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) under al-Azhari’s leadership.

**The al-Numayri Era, 1969–85**

On May 25, 1969, the Free Officers’ Movement seized power. At the conspiracy’s core were nine officers led by Colonel Ja’far al-Numayri, who had been implicated in plots against the Abbud regime. Al-Numayri’s coup preempted plots by other groups, most of which involved armed factions supported by the SCP, Arab nationalists, or conservative religious groups. He justified the coup on the grounds that civilian politicians had paralyzed the decision-making process and had failed to resolve the country’s economic and regional problems and to devise a permanent constitution.

**The Revolutionary Command Council**

The coup leaders constituted themselves as the 10-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which possessed collective executive authority under al-Numayri’s chairmanship. The RCC established a “democratic republic” dedicated to advancing “Sudanese socialism.” The RCC also suspended the Transitional Constitution, abolished all government institutions, banned political parties, and nationalized many industries, businesses, and banks. Furthermore, al-Numayri arrested 63 civilian politicians and forcibly retired senior army officers.

Babikir Awadallah, the former chief justice who had been privy to the coup, was appointed prime minister and presided over a 21-member cabinet that included only three RCC officers, among them its chairman, al-Numayri, who also served as defense minister. The cabinet’s other military members held the portfolios for internal security and communications. Nine members of the Awadallah regime were allegedly communists, including one of the two Southerners in the
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cabinet, John Garang de Mabior, minister of supply and later minister for Southern affairs. Others identified themselves as Marxists. Since the RCC lacked political and administrative experience, the communists played a significant role in shaping its policies and programs. In November al-Numayri replaced Awadallah as prime minister. However, Awadallah remained RCC deputy chairman and foreign minister and an important link with leftist elements.

Conservative forces, led by the Ansar, posed the greatest threat to the RCC. Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi had withdrawn to the Aba Island Mahdist stronghold in the Nile, near Kosti, in the belief that the government had decided to strike at the Ansar movement. The imam had demanded a democratic government, the exclusion of communists from power, and an end to RCC rule. In March 1970, hostile Ansar crowds prevented al-Numayri from visiting the imam. Fighting subsequently erupted between government forces and as many as 30,000 Ansar. When the Ansar ignored an ultimatum to surrender, army units attacked Aba Island, killing some 3,000 people. The imam escaped only to be killed while attempting to cross the border into Ethiopia. The government exiled Sadiq al-Mahdi to Egypt to prevent him from succeeding his uncle as head of the Ansar.

After neutralizing the conservative opposition, the RCC consolidated its position with the intent of phasing out communist participation in the government. The SCP’s orthodox wing, led by party secretary-general Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub, demanded a popular-front government with communists participating as equal partners. By contrast, the National Communist wing supported cooperation with the government. Soon after the Aba Island incident, al-Numayri deported Mahjub; when he returned illegally, al-Numayri arrested him. In March 1971, al-Numayri placed communist-influenced trade unions under government control and banned communist-affiliated student, women’s, and professional organizations. Additionally, he announced plans to form a national political movement to be called the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), which would control all political parties, including the SCP. After this speech, the RCC arrested the members of the SCP’s central committee and other leading communists.

The SCP, however, retained a covert organization that launched a coup against al-Numayri on July 19, 1971, led by Major Hisham al-Atta. Three days later, loyal army units rescued al-Numayri and arrested al-Atta and his confederates. Al-Numayri blamed the SCP for the coup and arrested hundreds of communists and dissident military officers. The government subsequently executed some of these individuals and imprisoned many others. Having survived the SCP-inspired coup, al-Numayri then reaffirmed his commitment to establishing a socialist
state. A provisional constitution, published in August 1971, described Sudan as a “socialist democracy” and provided for a presidential form of government to replace the RCC. A plebiscite the following month elected al-Numayri to a six-year term as president.

The Southern Problem

The origins of the civil war in the South date to the 1950s. On August 18, 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit composed of Southerners, mutinied at Torit. Rather than surrender to Sudanese authorities, many mutineers disappeared into hiding with their weapons, marking the beginning of the first war in the South. By the late 1960s, the war had resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people. Several hundred thousand more Southerners hid in the forests or escaped to refugee camps in neighboring countries.

By 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain weapons and supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya recruits and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and international arms dealers with monies collected in the South and from among Southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment, and supplies from government troops. Militarily, the 5,000–10,000-man Anya Nya controlled much of the countryside in the South and operated from remote camps, while government forces occupied the region’s major towns. However, rebel units were too small and scattered to be highly effective in any single area.

Government operations against the rebels declined after the 1969 coup. However, when negotiations failed to result in a settlement, Khartoum increased troop strength in the South to about 12,000 in 1969 and intensified military activity. Although the Soviet Union and Sudan concluded an arms agreement worth between US$100 million and US$150 million in August 1968, by May 1969 there had been no deliveries of T–55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, or aircraft. However, Sudan obtained some Soviet-manufactured weapons from Egypt. By late 1969, the Soviet Union had shipped unknown quantities of 85mm antiaircraft guns, 16 MiG–21s, and five Antonov–24 transport aircraft. During the next two years, the Soviet Union delivered an impressive array of equipment, including T–54, T–55, T–56, and T–59 tanks; and BTR–40 and BTR–152 light armored vehicles (see Foreign Military Assistance, ch. 5).

In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become leader of Southern forces, proclaimed the creation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Anya Nya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled
Southern politicians supported the SSLM. Although the SSLM created a governing infrastructure in many areas, real power remained with Anya Nya, with Lagu at its head. Al-Numayri hoped to end the war in the South by granting regional self-government and undertaking economic development there. The two sides held talks in Addis Ababa, and on March 27, 1972, Khartoum and the SSLM signed the Addis Ababa Agreement. This agreement guaranteed autonomy for a Southern region composed of three provinces, Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile, under a regional president appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly. The High Executive Council, or cabinet, named by the regional president was responsible for governing the region, except that the national government retained authority over such areas as defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, and economic and social planning. Southerners, including Anya Nya veterans, would be incorporated into a 12,000-man Southern command of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) under equal numbers of Northern and Southern officers. The accords also recognized Arabic as Sudan’s official language and English as the South’s principal language.

Although many SSLM leaders opposed the settlement, Lagu approved its terms and agreed to a cease-fire. Khartoum issued a decree legalizing the agreement and creating an international commission to ensure the well-being of refugees returning to the South; Khartoum also announced an amnesty, retroactive to 1955. March 27 was thereafter celebrated as National Unity Day.

Political Developments

After the settlement in the South, al-Numayri attempted to mend fences with Muslim religious groups in the North through such measures as administrative decentralization, popular with the Ansar, who favored rural over urban areas; reaffirmation of Islam’s special position in the country; recognition of sharia as the source of all legislation; and the freeing of some members of religious orders. However, reconciliation with conservative groups eluded al-Numayri. They organized outside Sudan under Sadiq al-Mahdi’s leadership and in 1974 coalesced into a new movement called the National Front. Among their members were the NUP and the Islamic Charter Front, then the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (see Glossary), an Islamic activist movement.

Al-Numayri formed a Constituent Assembly in August 1972, in order to draft a permanent constitution, which it had done by the following May. The document provided for a continuation of presidential government, recognized the SSU as the only authorized political organization, and supported regional autonomy for the South. Although it cited Islam
as Sudan’s official religion, Christianity was recognized as the faith of a large number of Sudanese citizens (see Christianity, ch. 2). In May 1974, a People’s Assembly of 250 representatives was seated on the basis of the new constitution.

There was discontent with al-Numayri’s policies and increased military influence in government despite these measures. The tension escalated as a result of food shortages and the settlement in the South, which many Muslim conservatives regarded as a surrender. Unsuccessful coup attempts occurred in 1973 and 1974 and again in July 1976, the latter Ansar-inspired and supported by the conservative opposition in the National Front. Government soldiers killed more than 700 rebels in Khartoum in response and arrested scores of dissidents, including many prominent religious leaders. This unrest notwithstanding, in 1977 Sudanese voters reelected al-Numayri for a second six-year term as president.

National Reconciliation

Al-Numayri and his opponents adopted more conciliatory policies following the 1976 coup attempt. In early 1977, al-Numayri and Sadiq al-Mahdi met in Port Sudan and signed an eight-point agreement that readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the National Front’s dissolution. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan’s nonaligned foreign policy, and promised to reform local government. In keeping with this “national reconciliation,” the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq, who renounced multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime’s one-party system. The SSU then admitted former National Front supporters into its ranks.

Returning exiles from the old Umma Party, DUP, and Muslim Brotherhood were permitted to stand as independent candidates in national elections held in February 1978, winning 140 of 304 seats in the People’s Assembly. Their success led to disillusion and weakened discipline among SSU deputies. The end of the SSU’s political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption at all government levels, undermined al-Numayri’s ability to govern Sudan. Al-Numayri adopted a more dictatorial leadership style to preserve his regime. He ordered the State Security Organisation to imprison thousands of opponents and dissidents without trial and dismissed or transferred independent-minded ministers and senior military officers, selecting replacements on the basis of loyalty rather than competence (see Internal Security Agencies, ch. 5). In June 1983, al-Numayri sought to counter the South’s growing political power by redividing it into its former constituent provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile; he had
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suspended the Southern Regional Assembly almost two years earlier. The Southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which emerged in mid-1983, unsuccessfully opposed this redivision and called for the creation of a new united Sudan.

Al-Numayri proclaimed sharia as the basis of the Sudanese legal system in September 1983. His decrees, known as the September Laws, were bitterly resented by secularized Muslims and the non-Muslim Southerners. The SPLM denounced sharia and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. Meanwhile, the security situation in the South had deteriorated so much that by the end of 1983 virtual civil war had resumed. In Khartoum, a general strike in early 1985 over rising food, gasoline, and transport costs paralyzed the country.

Economic Developments since Independence

The 30 years since independence had witnessed several notable economic developments by the mid-1980s. In November 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (Nile Waters Treaty). The treaty increased Sudan’s share of the Nile’s flow over that allocated in the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement (4 billion cubic meters/year—bcm/yr) to 18.5 bcm/yr, and increased Egypt’s allotment from 48 bcm/yr to 55.5 bcm/yr. It cleared the way for construction of a new dam at Aswan and provided for Egyptian compensation to Sudan for flooding in Nubia caused by the Aswan High Dam and for the relocation of the affected population. Negotiated without the participation of other riparian states, the treaty has led to years of cooperative activities and discussions among all Nile basin states over the equitable sharing of the Nile’s waters since it was signed.

In the Al-Gezira area, more land had been brought under cultivation during the 1950s and early 1960s, aided by the new agreement between Egypt and Sudan that increased Sudan’s allotment of the Nile’s waters. During the same period, new irrigation projects relying on pumped water were established, mostly on the Blue Nile. Beginning in the early 1960s, Nubians displaced by construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt were resettled west of Kassala on land watered by a new dam on the Atbarah, where they cultivated cotton, peanuts, and sugarcane. In 1966 a large dam was constructed at Roseires on the Blue Nile, initially for irrigation and later for electricity generation. In the mid-1970s, two large-scale projects for growing and processing sugar were developed on the White Nile close to Kosti. One, the Kananah Sugar Project, was among the largest such operations in the world. Another large-scale undertaking was the Jonglei Canal (see Glossary), designed to increase
the northward flow of the White Nile by diverting part of the Nile’s water around the Al-Sudd swamp.

Exploration for petroleum deposits began in 1959 along the Red Sea littoral. No oil was found, but a refinery operating on imported petroleum was built at Port Sudan in 1964. Exploration resumed in the mid-1970s and met with greater success in what are today the states of Upper Nile and West Kordofan. By the early 1980s, the region was producing more than 12,000 barrels per day, and there were proposals for a pipeline and a second refinery at Kosti. All exploration and production ceased in 1984, however, after attacks by Southern guerrillas on the oil installations. Similar attacks brought construction of the Jonglei Canal to a halt as well.

The Transitional Military Council

The combination of the South’s redivision, the introduction of sharia throughout the country, the renewed civil war, and growing economic problems—the same issues that would bedevil successive governments—all contributed to al-Numayri’s downfall. On April 6, 1985, a group of military officers led by Lieutenant General Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab overthrew al-Numayri, who took refuge in Egypt. Three days later, al-Dhahab authorized formation of a 15-man Transitional Military Council (TMC) to rule Sudan. The TMC suspended the constitution; dissolved the SSU, secret police, parliament, and regional assemblies; dismissed regional governors and their ministers; and released hundreds of political detainees. Al-Dhahab also promised to negotiate an end to the civil war and to relinquish power to a civilian government within 12 months. Although the general populace welcomed and supported the new regime, it soon became evident that al-Dhahab lacked the skills to resolve Sudan’s economic problems, restore peace to the South, and establish national unity.

Sudan’s economy was in shambles by the time al-Dhahab seized power, and its international debt totaled some US$9 billion. Agricultural and industrial projects funded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank remained in the planning stages. Most factories operated at less than 50 percent of capacity, while agricultural output had dropped by 50 percent since 1960. Moreover, famine threatened Southern and Western Sudan.

The TMC failed to resolve these problems. The al-Dhahab government refused to accept IMF economic austerity measures, resulting in an IMF declaration of Sudan’s bankruptcy. The TMC also failed to secure alternative international investment, to control a soaring rate of inflation, or to obtain international food aid to prevent an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 deaths. Although al-Dhahab attempted concilia-
tion with the South, his refusal to repeal sharia negated his overtures and convinced SPLM leader John Garang that the central government still sought to subjugate the South. Even so, the two sides signed the Koka Dam Declaration in Ethiopia in March 1986, which called for a Sudan “free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism, and all causes of discrimination and disparity,” repeal of sharia, and a constitutional conference. Despite general acceptance of the declaration, al-Dhahab deferred its implementation because of opposition from Muslim conservatives over repeal of sharia. Meanwhile, fighting between the SPLA and government forces continued in the South.

The TMC proved similarly unable to foster a national political consensus. In April 1985, negotiations between the TMC and the Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions resulted in the establishment of a civilian cabinet. Although it contained three Southerners who belonged to the Southern Sudanese Political Association, the cabinet failed to win the loyalty of most Southerners, who believed the TMC was only continuing the failed policies of the deposed al-Numayri. The multiplicity of political parties added to the difficulties. In the aftermath of al-Numayri’s overthrow, approximately 40 parties registered with the TMC and announced their intention to participate in national politics. They ranged from those committed to revolutionary socialism to those that supported Islamism. Of the latter, the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, had succeeded the Islamic Charter Front as the main vehicle for the Muslim Brotherhood’s political aspirations. Policy disagreements over sharia, the civil war, and the country’s future direction made for a confused political scene.

In this troubled atmosphere, al-Dhahab sanctioned the promised April 1986 general election, which the authorities spread over a 12-day period and postponed in 37 constituencies in the South because of the civil war. Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma Party won 99 seats, while the DUP, led now by Khatmiyyah leader Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, gained 64 seats, and al-Turabi’s NIF obtained 51 seats. Regional political parties from the South, the Nuba Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills won lesser numbers of seats. The SCP and other radical parties failed to score any significant victories.

**Sadiq al-Mahdi and Coalition Governments**

Sadiq al-Mahdi formed a coalition government in June 1986, with the Umma, DUP, NIF, and four parties from the South. Unfortunately, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and incapable of governing Sudan. Party factionalism, corruption, personal rivalries, scandals, and political instability characterized his government. After less than a year in office, Sadiq dismissed the government because it had failed to draft a
new penal code to replace sharia, reach an agreement with the IMF, end the civil war in the South, or attract remittances from Sudanese expatriates.

To retain the support of the DUP and the Southern political parties, Sadiq formed another in a series of ineffective coalition governments, all of which suffered from the same overriding weaknesses as the first. Al-Mirghani of the DUP and al-Turabi of the NIF were deeply involved in the political maneuverings surrounding these governments. As a prime example, in November 1988 al-Mirghani and the SPLM leadership on their own signed an agreement in Addis Ababa that included provisions for a cease-fire in the South, freezing of sharia, lifting the state of emergency, and abolition of all foreign political and military pacts. The parties to the agreement also proposed to convene a constitutional conference to decide Sudan’s political future. The NIF opposed this agreement because of its stand on sharia. When the government opposed the agreement, the DUP withdrew from the coalition. Senior military officers then presented Sadiq with an ultimatum demanding that he make the coalition government more representative and that he announce terms for ending the civil war.

Responding to this pressure, Sadiq dissolved the government on March 11, 1989, and created a new coalition that included Umma, the DUP, and representatives of Southern parties and trade unions. The NIF refused to join the government because it was not committed to enforcing sharia. Sadiq claimed that his new government was committed to ending the civil war through implementation of the November 1988 DUP–SPLM agreement. He also promised to provide food relief to famine areas, reduce the government’s international debt, and build a national political consensus. His inability to deliver on these promises eventually caused his downfall.

Umar al-Bashir and the Islamist Revolution

On June 30, 1989, a group of 15 military officers, including Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, overthrew the Sadiq government and established the National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council (NSRCC) to rule Sudan. The NSRCC banned all political parties; abolished the constitution, national assembly, and trade unions; and arrested government leaders and more than 100 military officers. Al-Bashir’s long-term agenda included fomenting an Islamist revolution, distancing Sudan from its traditional Western allies and enhancing relations with Arab countries, ending the war against the SPLA, and improving the country’s economy by developing the oil sector. Several Arab countries, including Chad, Egypt, Libya, the
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People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, immediately recognized the new government.

Al-Bashir moved quickly and decisively against real and imagined opponents. Among other actions, he purged the armed forces, police, judiciary, and civil service and dismissed from government posts supporters of Umma and the DUP, both of which opposed the government’s Islamist policies. He also detained many opposition politicians, including Sadiq al-Mahdi. In March 1990, security forces arrested 57 people, including army officers and civilians, for attempting a coup d’etat. On April 23, al-Bashir ordered the execution of 28 army officers for plotting a coup; in April 1991, another 20 military officers were executed for similar reasons. The government also authorized the police to arrest suspected subversives without a warrant and to hold them in security buildings known as “ghost houses,” without filing criminal charges against them. The use of torture was commonplace.

Such tactics, however, failed to extinguish popular dissent. In November 1990, trade unions and students staged antigovernment demonstrations in Khartoum, Wad Madani, Atbarah, and Al-Obeid. In mid-1993, because of their opposition to al-Bashir, the authorities arrested 21 Umma activists, including three former ministers, preachers at Ansari mosques, and the Ansar Affairs Organization’s director of guidance. In October 1993, there were three days of rioting in Omdurman, Wad Madani, and Al-Obeid because of food shortages and price rises. The following month, University of Khartoum students protested over alleged vote rigging that resulted in supporters of the NIF winning all 40 seats in the students’ union. Nonetheless, despite this unrest and growing international criticism of its human-rights record, the government refused to moderate its policies.

In early 1992, the NSRCC announced its intention to disband. To govern the country until national elections could be held, it created two temporary bodies, a Transitional National Council (TNC) and a 300-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA). Both were dominated by personalities and policies of the National Congress Party (NCP), successor to the NIF as of 1991. On October 16, 1993, the NSRCC officially dissolved itself amidst much fanfare about its intention to make reforms aimed at preparing the country for presidential, legislative, and local elections to be organized on the basis of the nine states into which the NSRCC had divided the country in 1991 (see fig. 7). Al-Bashir, who had been NSRCC chairman, became Sudan’s president, while his deputy, Major General Zubayr Muhammad Salih, became vice president. The new government announced that its policies would continue to be based on the “Islamic cultural scheme” and that “commitment” to Islam was obligatory. This institutional arrangement continued until March
1996, when national elections transformed the TNA into a 400-member National Assembly and al-Bashir was elected to a five-year term as president.

The regime took its first major step toward Islamization on December 31, 1990, when it imposed a version of sharia on Northern Sudan that was more stringent and more rigorously enforced than that decreed by President al-Numayri in September 1983. Islamic courts, composed largely of NIF members, administered and enforced sharia laws. A new penal code introduced in 1991 explicitly mandated the death penalty for
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anyone who advocated apostasy. The government also restricted the rights of women in public life and employment. During 1989–91, for example, newly enacted laws prohibited women from selling food or tea after 5 p.m. and from working in coffeehouses and cafeterias. Women also were required to sit in the rear of buses to avoid sitting in front of men. The Popular Police Force Act (1992) gave organizations such as the Public Order Police, Popular Police Forces, Popular Committees, and the Guardians of Morality civic group authority to punish women for such offenses as “scandalous conduct” or “immodest dress.” The following year, Khartoum issued Decree 155, which authorized execution of anyone who operated a group of two or more persons for the procurement of prostitutes.

The government also discriminated against non-Muslims by excluding them from senior-level positions in the civil service, judiciary, and military. Clerics subjected non-Muslim Sudanese to traditional hudud (see Glossary) criminal punishments. Protests by the Sudan Council of Churches and the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference against these and other discriminatory practices fell on deaf ears. In late 1991, two bishops and two diocesan administrators issued a pastoral letter that encouraged Christian resistance to Islamization. The following January, Sudanese authorities, claiming that the letter posed a threat to national security and could cause civil strife, confiscated all copies of the letter and subjected several bishops, including Archbishop of Khartoum Gabriel Wako, to harsh interrogations. Khartoum also impeded humanitarian relief deliveries to some non-Muslim populations and expelled all Christian missionaries from southern Kordofan.

There was a significant deterioration in Sudan’s human-rights record throughout the mid- and late 1990s, a development that prompted a series of reports from the United Nations (UN), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and African Rights. However, some allegations against Khartoum, concerning the use of chemical weapons and widespread slave raids, proved to be false or greatly misrepresented in the Western media. Ironically, there was little criticism of the SPLA and other rebels groups that also committed widespread human-rights violations, such as the execution of government troops who had surrendered and the abduction or enslavement of young boys to serve as porters for the SPLA.

In October 1994, Gaspar Biró, the UN representative for Sudan, issued a report that accused Khartoum of bombing civilian targets in the South, recruiting child soldiers, and interfering with food-relief shipments. The regime rejected the report as “outrageous, repetitive, untruthful and politicized.” In December the UN adopted a resolution that censured Khartoum for its many abuses. In January 1995, Amnesty International launched a
six-month campaign against Sudan’s poor human-rights record. Among other things, Khartoum was accused of purging its opponents in the civil service, trade unions, judiciary, and educational institutions. Amnesty International also accused rebel groups in the South, including the SPLA, of committing human-rights violations. Al-Bashir rejected an Amnesty International recommendation to establish an international civilian monitoring group.

In mid-1995, the London-based African Rights organization reported that the SAF, frequently supported by the Popular Defense Forces, the military wing of the NIF, repeatedly attacked civilians and moved many of them into protected villages (critics claimed they were concentration camps) to isolate them from the SPLA. African Rights also drew attention to the fact that government forces destroyed food stocks and animals; raped women; and kidnapped, tortured, or killed anyone suspected of disloyalty. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2000 annual report on human rights, the SPLM/A also had a record of committing extrajudicial killings, beatings, rape, arbitrary detention, and forced conscription. The report alleged that SPLM/A officials were guilty of, or complicit in, theft of property of nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies operating in the South.

The most controversial aspect of Khartoum’s human-rights record concerned reports of its involvement in slave raids as an extension of its war policy in the South. By the 1990s, there were widespread accounts of armed men identified as government forces raiding and kidnapping Southerners, especially women and children, who were marched north and absorbed into Arab households or sold to traders. Such reports brought international condemnation and calls for action. In October 1999, Zurich-based Christian Solidarity International (CSI) announced that since 1995 it had bought the freedom of 15,447 “slaves” from Arab middlemen for US$50 per fugitive. CSI’s activities and those of similar organizations elicited criticism from several sources. Others alleged that CSI was merely rewarding kidnappers for their illicit activities, while a Canadian report in February 2000 maintained that CSI allowed the SPLA to use fraudulent slave redemptions to raise money for buying arms and ammunition. The al-Bashir government characterized the alleged “slaving” as merely intertribal scuffling and refused to cooperate with calls for international inquiries.

There was no indication by the turn of the century that the regime, the SPLA, or other rebel groups were prepared to take steps to cease their abuse of the population in the South. Human-rights issues in Sudan also remained a highly contentious and politicized subject for most Western countries.

Umma, the DUP, trade unions, and the secular professional elite remained active in the capital despite the regime’s harsh tactics. Outside
Khartoum, the Christian peoples of the Nuba Mountains constituted the strongest opposition. Nonetheless, divisions and endless squabbling among these groups ensured that none of them posed a serious threat to the government. Some 11 political parties, 51 professional unions, and 51 trade unions signed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) charter on October 21, 1989. Throughout the mid-1990s, the NDA tried unsuccessfully to persuade its members to put aside their differences, adopt a common strategy to overthrow al-Bashir, and establish a democratic government. On December 5, 1994, Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with Sudan because of Khartoum’s support of Eritrean Islamic Jihad, an opposition group, and subsequently invited the NDA to move its headquarters into the former Sudanese embassy in Asmara. Despite Eritrean training, the NDA failed to improve its military capabilities, even though the SPLA had joined the alliance.

Al-Bashir continued in the late 1990s to rely on divide-and-rule tactics against the opposition, especially the SPLA. On April 21, 1997, for example, Khartoum signed a peace agreement with six Southern factions opposed to the SPLA and its leader, John Garang (the South Sudan Independence Movement, SPLA–Bahr al-Ghazal Group, Equatoria Defense Force, Independence of Bor Group, Independence Movement for Southern Sudan, and Union of Sudan African Parties). On September 20, 1997, Lam Akol, leader of the SPLA–United faction, also signed a peace accord with Khartoum.

Al-Bashir attended to the moribund petroleum sector, enlisting foreign assistance for its revival. In 1995 he concluded agreements with the People’s Republic of China and with Qatar for further development of Sudan’s oil fields, and proposals were floated to upgrade the refinery at Port Sudan and to build a pipeline from the Southern oil fields to that facility, despite continuing insecurity in the South. Both projects were underway by the late 1990s, as was a new refinery at Al-Jayli, north of Khartoum, which was being constructed by the China National Petroleum Company (see Petroleum, ch. 3). The pipeline, more than 1,600 kilometers long, was completed in August 1999, largely with financing from Argentine, British, Canadian, Chinese, and Malaysian companies. Petroleum exports via the new pipeline began in late 2000. Improvements such as these drew protests from international human-rights groups, which alleged that increased oil revenues would help finance the civil war in the South. In an effort to promote trade, particularly with Sudan’s Arab neighbors, a free-trade zone was established in 2000 along part of the Red Sea coast (see Manufacturing, ch. 3).

As he neared the end of a decade in power, al-Bashir remained head of state and in command of the armed forces, but the ideological underpinnings of the regime and the driving force of the Islamist movement clearly lay with al-Turabi, the speaker of the National Assembly, and
his sympathizers. The relationship between the two leaders gradually evolved into rivalry for control of the state and its institutions (see The Al-Bashir Era, ch. 4). On March 28, 1998, the National Assembly ratified a draft constitution stating that sharia law and custom constituted the basis of the country’s legal system and declaring Sudan a 25-state federation. Then on May 8, some 96 percent of Sudanese who voted endorsed the constitution, which al-Bashir signed into law on June 30, exactly nine years after his coup d’état. The SPLM rejected the document because of its “religious nature” and because it defined Sudan as a federation rather than a confederation.

Elections for the National Assembly and the presidency were scheduled for December 1999, and in late 1998 al-Bashir signed the Political Association Act, which allegedly restored multiparty politics. Umma and the DUP dismissed the legislation as a sham and called for the establishment of a transitional government of national unity. Even so, in early 1999 the registration of political parties began, and eventually Umma, the DUP, and a host of other organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Socialist Popular Party, Islamic Movement, and Sudanese National Party, signed up.

Al-Bashir declared a three-month state of emergency on December 13, 1999, in response to a proposed constitutional amendment allowing the National Assembly to remove the president, a proposal sponsored by al-Turabi and his legislative allies. Al-Bashir saw the amendment as intended to ensure al-Turabi’s complete ascendance—an initiative he preempted with the emergency decree. It enabled al-Bashir to dissolve the National Assembly, thereby eliminating al-Turabi from any role in the government, although he retained much influence throughout the country, and to postpone the national elections. In response to unrest among al-Turabi’s followers, al-Bashir extended the state of emergency through 2000 in a successful effort to consolidate his standing as the unquestioned master of Sudan.

Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamization of Sudan

Hassan al-Turabi, a British- and French-educated Islamic scholar, was the driving force behind the NIF and the chief architect of the Islamization of Sudan’s government and society. He was also tolerant toward international terrorism. Throughout the 1989–99 period, his relationship with al-Bashir vacillated between confrontation and cooperation. Shortly after seizing power, al-Bashir jailed al-Turabi, who had been active in the Muslim Brotherhood, for six months and then placed him under house arrest. In mid-1991, al-Turabi regained his freedom after declaring his willingness to work with the al-Bashir regime.
Al-Khabir Mosque and an open-air market in central Khartoum, undated photograph
Copyright Getty Images
Al-Turabi spent much time between 1992 and 1994 promoting his Islamist ideas in several countries, including Afghanistan, Britain, Eritrea, Italy, Qatar, and the United States. His speeches and interviews generated considerable interest in the Arab world but inflamed passions in Western countries that opposed his support of radical Islamist doctrines. Critics frequently abused al-Turabi, verbally and otherwise, for his views. On May 25, 1992, for example, a Sudanese Muslim named Hashim Badr al-Din, who was a karate expert, attacked al-Turabi at Canada’s Ottawa Airport. He spent several weeks recovering from his injuries in a Canadian hospital and a clinic in Switzerland. For the next six months, al-Turabi was rarely seen in public. However, in November 1993, he traveled to Afghanistan to mediate conflicts between Afghan warlords.

Al-Turabi established the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) in Khartoum in April 1991 and became its secretary-general. Some 300 delegates from 45 nations attended the inaugural conference and urged all Muslims to oppose U.S. involvement in the 1990–91 Gulf War and attempts to isolate Sudan, to facilitate the Islamic revolution, and to coordinate anti-imperialist activities. The al-Bashir government called PAIC’s formation “the most significant event since the collapse of the Caliphate” and an alternative to the endless bickering between the League of Arab States (Arab League) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). PAIC held its second conference in Khartoum, during December 2–4, 1993, with about 450 delegates from 60 countries in attendance. Among other things, they discussed ways to contend with “American hegemony” and to marginalize the OIC. Approximately 300 delegates from 80 countries attended PAIC’s third meeting in Khartoum, which ran from March 30 to April 2, 1995. Al-Turabi caused a controversy by claiming that the “typical ascetic religious clergy is no longer viable in modern times.” He also accused Amnesty International of being in the pay of British intelligence and recommended the creation of an Islamic human-rights organization and the adoption of an Islamic human-rights charter. The three PAIC meetings represented the apex of al-Turabi’s efforts to unify and radicalize the Islamic world. By the late 1990s, however, PAIC had become moribund, and al-Turabi’s influence throughout the Arab world had waned.

At the same time, the al-Turabi–al-Bashir relationship became increasingly strained as the two sought to marginalize one another. An unexpected tragedy occurred on February 12, 1998, when an aircraft crashed on landing near Nasir in Upper Nile and killed First Vice President Zubayr Muhammad Salih and seven other senior government officials. This accident prompted the largest cabinet reshuffle since al-Bashir had seized power. As a result, al-Turabi became even more of a political
force in the government as NIF loyalists gained 16 out of 24 ministerial portfolios. He tried to use this influence to reduce the power of the presidency by urging moribund parties such as the DUP and Umma, both of which opposed al-Bashir, to rejoin the political process. Throughout 1999 al-Turabi succeeded in maintaining control over the ruling party and continued his efforts to marginalize al-Bashir. The political maneuvering between the two men reached its climax in December when al-Turabi arranged for an assembly vote that would have amended the constitution to allow al-Bashir’s removal by a two-thirds vote. On December 12, al-Bashir, who still enjoyed the support of the SAF and the security forces, ended this scheming by dismissing al-Turabi from his post as speaker, dissolving the assembly, and declaring a state of emergency.

**Sudan and International Terrorism**

The most controversial aspect of Sudan’s Islamization experiment concerned its links to international terrorism. Even before al-Bashir seized power, there were terrorist incidents in Sudan, two of which involved U.S. government employees. On March 1, 1973, the Black September Palestinian terrorist group murdered U.S. ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., U.S. deputy chief of mission George Curtis Moore, and Belgian chargé d’affaires Guy Eid. Sudanese authorities arrested the terrorists and tried them on murder charges, but, in June 1974, released them to the custody of the Egyptian government. On April 16, 1986, gunmen from the Libyan Embassy in Khartoum shot and wounded a U.S. Embassy employee. Two years later, the Abu Nidal organization bombed Khartoum’s Acropole Hotel and Sudan Club. No Americans were injured.

Sudan’s links with international terrorism expanded significantly after al-Bashir and the NIF came to power in 1989. Al-Turabi cultivated relations with the Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden in hopes of securing funding for his scheme to spread political Islam throughout the world. In 1991 bin Laden, his family, and scores of fighters from Afghanistan arrived in Khartoum. Among his other activities, bin Laden established several companies in the agricultural, financial, road construction, and tanning sectors. None were successful because bin Laden used them primarily as conduits to move cash to finance terrorist activities.

Sudanese authorities arrested Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, a Venezuelan terrorist known as “Carlos the Jackal,” in August 1994 and turned him over to French security officials. Khartoum maintained that the Carlos incident proved that it had no links to international terrorism, an assertion disputed by the United States. Meanwhile, Sudan and France denied the turnover involved any trade-offs. However, relations between
the two countries improved dramatically, especially with regard to eco-
nomic and military cooperation. Examples of the changed climate came
when Paris financed the purchase of four Airbus planes for Sudan Air-
ways and interceded on Sudan’s behalf to improve its relations with the
IMF and the UN. France also provided military aid to Sudan for use
against the SPLA. In October 1994, Sudan established a council on eco-
nomic affairs in Paris. In late 1995 and early 1996, several French com-
panies signed mining and telecommunications contracts with Sudan.

The next manifestation of Sudan’s links with international terrorism
occurred on June 26, 1995, when Islamist gunmen tried to assassinate
President Husni Mubarak of Egypt as he arrived in Addis Ababa to
attend the opening of an Organization of African Unity (OAU; now
African Union) summit. Although the assassins fired a dozen rounds at
Mubarak’s limousine, he was unharmed in the attack and immediately
returned to Cairo, but the fracas claimed the lives of two Ethiopian
police officers and two assailants, while several people sustained inju-
ries. Three days later, the Ethiopian police identified the chief suspect as
Seraj Mohammed Husayn, a Sudanese. They speculated that the other
assassins were Egyptian Islamic militants, who were subsequently
arrested or killed in Addis Ababa or who escaped to Sudan. Mubarak
angrily accused Khartoum generally and al-Turabi specifically of hav-
ing masterminded the assassination plot, but he doubted that there had
been direct Sudanese government involvement. Al-Bashir expressed
regret for the incident, but both he and al-Turabi denied any Sudanese
involvement in the attack.

Sudanese–Egyptian relations quickly deteriorated as a result of the
incident. On June 27, there were clashes between Sudanese and Egyp-
tian forces in the disputed Hala’ib Triangle that claimed the lives of two
Sudanese (see Egypt, ch. 4). The following day, Mubarak expelled 70
Sudanese police from jointly guarded posts in the Hala’ib Triangle. On
June 29, he warned that there could be reprisals against the “band of
criminals” in power in Sudan, a threat that brought warnings to prepare
for war in Khartoum. On July 1, nonetheless, a senior Egyptian foreign
ministry official announced that Egypt would not attack Sudan but
would punish the country by nonmilitary means should investigators
find a link between Khartoum and the failed attack in Addis Ababa.

The international community also took action against the al-Bashir
regime for its involvement in the incident. On September 11, 1995, the
OAU passed a resolution demanding that Sudan turn over three sus-
spects implicated in the attempted assassination. When Khartoum
refused to comply with the resolution, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution on January 31, 1996, that encouraged Sudan to
implement the OAU resolution within 60 days. In April the Security
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Council responded to Khartoum’s continued refusal to honor these resolutions by adopting another resolution that directed Sudan to extradite the three suspects and to sever its links with international terrorism. Additionally, the UN asked member and nonmember states to reduce staff levels at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and to restrict the movement of Sudanese government personnel in their countries. Other penalties included restricting the entry into or transit through their territories of Sudanese government and military officials, and calling on all international and regional organizations to refrain from holding conferences in Sudan. In July the Security Council authorized the imposition of an air embargo to compel Khartoum to hand over the three suspects, but this proposal was eventually scuttled on humanitarian grounds. Meanwhile, Sudanese–Ethiopian relations remained strained until November 1999, when the two countries agreed to reactivate their joint commission of ministers.

A proliferation of U.S. intelligence reports in 1990–96 indicated that Khartoum planned to attack U.S. targets in Sudan and elsewhere. As a result, in 1993 the United States placed Sudan on its list of sponsors of terrorism and evacuated dependents of U.S. embassy personnel from Khartoum. In 1996 U.S. intelligence reported that Sudan wanted to kill Anthony Lake, then adviser for national-security affairs to President William J. Clinton. Eventually in 1998, the New York Times reported that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had withdrawn more than 100 of its reports that had linked Sudan with the Lake assassination plot and international terrorism because its source had fabricated the information.

Operatives of the international terrorist organization al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998. Two days later, Sudan’s foreign minister, Mustafa Uthman Isma’i’l, announced that his government had approved U.S. requests to use its airspace to evacuate American diplomats and citizens from Kenya and to provide emergency aid to survivors of the bombings. However, despite this aid and the absence of any credible evidence linking Sudan to the attacks, Washington accused Khartoum of being involved in the bombings.

On August 20, the United States launched a cruise-missile strike against Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries in Khartoum North. President Clinton and other senior U.S. officials justified the action by claiming that the factory had been producing Empta, a precursor to the VX nerve gas; that Osama bin Laden either owned or had invested in the plant; that Al-Shifa did not produce any medicine or drugs; that the factory was a high-security facility guarded by the Sudan Armed Forces; and that Iraq had shipped weapons of mass destruction to Sudan. The international
press was highly skeptical of these assertions. The Observer (London) reported that the allegations were “a catalogue of U.S. misinformation, glaring omissions and intelligence errors about the function of the plant.” The Washington Post, New York Times, and Times (London) expressed similar doubts. In October, a survey team, headed by Thomas Tullius, chairman of Boston University’s chemistry department, reported that it had found no traces of chemical weapons compounds at the plant.

Salah Idris, the owner of Al-Shifa, sued the U.S. government in American courts in 1999. He demanded an apology for the attack, release of US$24 million of his assets frozen in U.S. banks, and US$30 million in compensation for his destroyed factory. Idris also hired Kroll Associates, an international security company, to investigate U.S. allegations that the plant produced chemical weapons and had links to Iraq. The company was unable to substantiate either accusation. In May the United States unfroze his assets but refused to admit it had made a mistake in bombing his plant. By late 1999, the terrorism issue and the war in Southern Sudan, ensured that relations between Khartoum and Washington remained cool.

**The Peace Process in Southern Sudan**

Al-Bashir had promised, when he seized power, to initiate peace talks to end the civil war in the South because many senior SAF officers had come to believe that a decisive military victory over the SPLA was impossible. Within days, Khartoum announced a one-month cease-fire, offered amnesty to all rebels, and invited SPLA commander John Garang to join the peace process. Al-Bashir also said he had no objection to the separation of the South provided it would accept a federal system of government, although Khartoum later denied that he had made this statement. In August 1989, Garang unveiled a peace initiative that called for the formation of a broad-based government of national unity and an army composed of SPLA and SAF personnel. He also wanted to convene a national constitutional conference to resolve the country’s “fundamental problems” and to draft a new constitution in preparation for “free general elections.”

Al-Bashir failed to respond to Garang’s statement but instead announced that there would be a national peace conference in Khartoum. However, the SPLA refused to attend because al-Bashir advocated a federal solution to the North–South problem. Despite these setbacks, there were two peace initiatives by early 1990. Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter sponsored discussions in Nairobi, while Egypt promised that it would help Sudan achieve peace. Both plans failed because, in Carter’s view, “neither side [was] prepared to take the difficult steps necessary for peace.”
Nigeria sponsored the next major peace initiative in Abuja. During the first round of talks (May 26–June 4, 1992), the two sides recognized that Sudan was a multiethnic, multilingual, multireligious, and multicultural country. Apart from this acknowledgment, nothing else was accomplished. In the second round of negotiations (April 26–May 17, 1993), the attendees discussed several constitutional, political, security, and social issues. Specific topics included power-sharing between Khartoum and the federated states, the powers of the central government, the use of a referendum to determine whether Southerners wanted to remain part of Sudan or become independent, and the resettlement and rehabilitation of Southerners affected by the war.

In September 1993, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which became in 1996 the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD—see Glossary), under the chairmanship of Kenya’s president, Daniel arap Moi, launched an initiative to end the civil war. In May 1994, IGADD adopted a declaration of principles that acknowledged the diversity of Sudan’s various ethnic groups and suggested several prerequisites to enhance the country’s unity. The latter included a secular constitution, administrative decentralization, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and equitable distribution of Sudan’s wealth and resources. Should these principles be ignored, South Sudan could exercise the right of self-determination or declare its independence.

Over the next few years, there were several IGADD-sponsored meetings, but the warring parties failed to reach a compromise on these issues. In mid-1995 the international community sought to invigorate the peace process by establishing the Friends of IGADD (Britain, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the United States). This informal grouping persuaded both sides to declare a cease-fire. In 1996 IGAD expanded its mandate to include regional economic cooperation and the coordination of social and economic policies. The following year, Khartoum accepted the 1994 declaration of principles as a basis for future negotiations; however, subsequent IGAD-sponsored talks (in October 1997, May 1998, and August 1998) failed to make any significant progress. The al-Bashir government and the SPLA agreed to meet on April 20, 1999, but Khartoum refused to attend and suspended all contacts with the rebels through IGAD because three government officials and a Sudanese aid worker had died while supposedly in SPLA custody. By late 1999, the IGAD peace process remained moribund and, as a result, Sudan began looking for an alternative mediator.

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Interested readers may consult a variety of books for a more comprehensive account of Sudan’s history. Useful surveys include P. M.
Holt and M. W. Daly’s, *A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*; Peter Woodward’s, *Sudan, 1898–1989*; and Kenneth David Druitt Henderson’s *Sudan Republic*. The *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan* edited by Richard A. Lobban, Jr., Robert S. Kramer, and Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban also contains a wealth of information about the country’s history. Richard Hill’s *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820–1881* assesses Egypt’s nineteenth-century conquest and occupation of Sudan. An excellent analysis of the British period is given in M. W. Daly’s *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934* and *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934–56*. The postindependence period is discussed in Mansour Khalid’s *The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan’s Political Evolution*; his *War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries* is a useful survey of the country’s history after 1898. Gabriel Warburg’s *Islam, Nationalism, and Communism in a Traditional Society* is a standard source. Apart from these books, the journal *Sudan Notes and Records* is essential for studying Sudan’s historical development.

The past few years have seen an increase in the literature about Southern Sudan. Many of Robert O. Collins’s studies are particularly useful, including *Land Beyond the Rivers: The Southern Sudan, 1898–1918*; *Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918–1956*; and *The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Junglei Canal, 1900–1988*. J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins also have produced many essential volumes, the most important of which are *Requiem for the Sudan: War, Drought, and Disaster Relief on the Nile* and *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000*. Two sympathetic assessments of Southern Sudan’s relationship to Khartoum are Dunstan M. Wai’s, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* and Abel Alier’s, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*. For an Arab viewpoint, Mohamed Omer Beshir’s *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* and *The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace* are pertinent. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Al-Nilayn Mosque at the confluence of the Blue Nile and White Nile in Khartoum
TO UNDERSTAND SUDAN—either the country in general or any specific issue, such as the turmoil in Darfur, endemic economic problems, political instability since independence in 1956, and many others—requires first of all an appreciation of Sudan’s physical vastness and its ethnic and demographic diversity, which exceed those of all but a very small number of nations on earth. The country encompasses virtually every geographical feature, from the vast harsh deserts of the North to the substantial rain forests rising on its southern borders.

Like most African countries, Sudan is defined by boundaries that European powers determined at the end of the nineteenth century. The Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration in Sudan, established in 1899, emphasized indirect rule by tribal sheikhs and chiefs, although tribalism had been considerably weakened as an administrative institution during the Mahdist period (1885–98). This loosening of loyalties exacerbated problems in governmental structure and administration and in the people’s identification as Sudanese. To this day, loyalty remains divided among family, clan, ethnic group, and religion, and it is difficult to forge national unity because the immensity of the land permits many of Sudan’s ethnic and tribal groups to live in relative isolation from each other and beyond the reach of the central government.

The Nile is the link that runs through Sudan and influences the lives of Sudan’s people, even though many of them farm and herd far from the Nile or its three main tributaries, the Blue Nile, the White Nile, and the Bahr al-Ghazal. Not only do nomads come to the river to water their herds and cultivators to drain off its waters for their fields, but the Nile facilitates some trade, administration, and urbanization. Consequently, the confluence of the Blue Nile and White Nile became the administrative center of a vast hinterland because the area commanded the river, its commerce, and its urban society. This location enabled the urban elites to exercise a limited degree of control of the scattered and often isolated population of the interior while enjoying limited access to the peoples of the outside world.

Although linked by at least some dependence on the Nile, Sudan’s population is divided by ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. Many Sudanese in the North claim Arab descent and speak versions of Arabic, but Sudanese “Arabs” are highly differentiated. Over many generations, they have intermingled in varying degrees with the indigenous peoples and are more accurately described as “Afro-Arab.” By now, Arabic is Sudan’s official language (with Arabic and English the predominant languages in the South), but beyond Khartoum and its two
neighboring cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North, a variety of languages are spoken.

A more unifying factor has been Islam, which has spread widely among the peoples of northern Sudan. Because Muslims are required to use Quranic Arabic for ritual prayer, knowledge of some Arabic has tended to follow the spread of Islam as it did in the rest of North Africa. Only in the middle of the twentieth century did the Arabic language become a defining factor for Arab identity and Arab nationalism across the region. This development almost coincided in Sudan with the post-World War II struggle for independence.

Whereas all Muslims of Northern Sudan are Sunni (see Glossary), they form no monolithic bloc. Some, especially in the urban centers, are strictly orthodox Muslims, whereas others, mostly in the rural areas but also on the periphery of the capital region, are more attracted to Sufism (see Glossary) or other forms of mystical worship. Within this branch and tendency of Islam are a host of religious sects with their own Islamic rituals and syncretistic adaptations.

The Sudanese of the South are of purely African origin. Islam has made only modest inroads among these followers of traditional religions, as has Christianity, which spread in the twentieth century mostly through the activities of European missionaries. Arabic has not replaced the diverse languages of the South, but a pidgin form has become more widely spoken than English used to be, especially in the far South.

The differences between North and South have often engendered hostility, a clash of cultures that in the last 150 years has led to frequent violence. The strong regional and cultural differences have inhibited nation building and contributed to the civil war in the South that has raged almost continuously since independence, except for a period of peace between 1972 and 1983 and in the early 2000s. The distrust between Sudanese of the North and those of the South—whether elite or peasants—has been a constant during the long years of hostilities. And the cost of war has drained valuable national resources at the expense of health, education, and welfare in both regions.

**Physical Setting**

Unitary Sudan is Africa’s largest country, embracing 2,505,813 square kilometers of northeast and central Africa. It consists of a huge plain bordered on three sides by mountains: to the east the Red Sea Hills, to the west Jabal Marrah, and on the southern frontier the Didinga Hills and the Dongotona and Imatong Mountains. Jutting up abruptly in the south-central region of this vast plain are the isolated Nuba Mountains and, to their east, the Ingessana Hills; far to the southeast is the lone Boma Plateau near the Ethiopian border. Spanning 18 degrees of
latitude, the plain of Sudan includes from north to south significant regions with distinctive characteristics: northern Sudan, western Sudan, the central clay plains, the Jabal Hadid, or Ironstone Plateau, and the southern hill masses (see fig. 8).

Geographic Regions

Northern Sudan, lying between the Egyptian border and Khartoum, has two distinct parts, the desert and the Nile valley. To the east of the Nile lies the Nubian Desert and to the west is the Libyan Desert. They are similar: stony, with sandy dunes drifting over the landscape. There is virtually no rainfall in these deserts, and in the Nubian Desert there are no oases. In the west, there are a few small watering holes, such as Bir en Natrun. Here the water table reaches the surface to form wells that provide water for nomads, caravans, and administrative patrols, although insufficient to support an oasis and inadequate to provide for a settled population. Running through the desert is the Nile valley, with its alluvial strip of habitable land no more than two kilometers wide and productivity dependent on the annual flood.

Western Sudan is a generic term describing the regions known as Darfur and Kordofan (also seen as Kurdufan), which together comprise 850,000 square kilometers. From Khartoum’s perspective, this area has been traditionally regarded as a single regional unit despite the physical differences. The dominant feature throughout this immense area is the absence of perennial streams; thus, people and animals must remain within reach of permanent wells. Consequently, the population is sparse and unevenly distributed. Western Darfur is an undulating plain dominated by the volcanic massif of Jabal Marrah towering 900 meters above the Sudanic plain; the drainage from Jabal Marrah onto the plain can support a settled population. Western Darfur stands in stark contrast to northern and eastern Darfur, which are semidesert with little water either from the intermittent streams known as wadis or from wells that normally go dry during the winter months. Northwest of Darfur and continuing into Chad lies the unusual region called the jizzu, where sporadic winter rains generated from the Mediterranean frequently provide excellent grazing into January or even February.

The southern region of western Sudan (including South Darfur and South Kordofan States) is known as the qoz, a land of sand dunes that in the rainy season is characterized by a rolling mantle of grass that has more reliable sources of water with its boreholes and man-made reservoirs than does the northern region. A unique feature of central Sudan is the Nuba Mountain range of South Kordofan, a conglomerate of isolated dome-shaped, sugarloaf hills that ascend steeply and abruptly from the great Sudanic plain. Many hills are isolated and
extend only a few square kilometers, but several large hill masses with internal valleys cut through the mountains high above the plain.

Sudan’s third distinct region is the central clay plains that stretch eastward from the Nuba Mountains to the Ethiopian frontier, broken only by the Ingessana Hills, and from Khartoum in the north to the far reaches of southern Sudan. Between the Dindar and Rahad Rivers, a low ridge slopes down from the Ethiopian highlands to break the end-
less skyline of the plains, and the occasional hill stands out in stark relief. The central clay plains provide the backbone of Sudan’s economy because they are a productive region in which settlements cluster around available water. Furthermore, in the heartland of the central clay plains lies Al-Gezira (also seen as Al-Jazirah, literally, “peninsula” in Arabic), the land between the Blue Nile and the White Nile north of an imaginary line linking Kosti and Sinnar (also seen as Sennar and Sannar) where the great Gezira Scheme was developed (see Agriculture, ch. 3). The project grows cotton for export and traditionally produced more than half of Sudan’s revenue and export earnings.

Northeast of the central clay plains lies eastern Sudan, which is divided between desert and semidesert and includes Al-Butanah, the Qash Delta, the Red Sea Hills, and the coastal plain. Al-Butanah is an undulating land between Khartoum and Kassala that provides adequate grazing for cattle, sheep, and goats. East of Al-Butanah is a peculiar geological formation known as the Qash Delta. Originally a depression, it has been filled with sand and silt brought down by the flash floods of the Qash River, creating a delta above the surrounding plain. Extending 100 kilometers north of Kassala, the whole area watered by the Qash is a rich grassland with bountiful cultivation long after the river has spent its waters on the surface of its delta. Trees and bushes provide grazing for the camels from the north, and the rich, moist soil provides an abundance of food crops and cotton.

North of the Qash lie the more formidable Red Sea Hills. Dry, bleak, and cooler than the surrounding land, particularly in the heat of the Sudan summer, they stretch northward into Egypt, a jumbled mass of hills where life is hard and unpredictable for the hardy Beja inhabitants. Below the hills sprawls the coastal plain of the Red Sea, varying in width from about 56 kilometers in the south near Tawkar to about 24 kilometers near the Egyptian border. The coastal plain is dry and barren. It consists of rocks, and the seaward side is thick with coral reefs.

The southern clay plains, which can be regarded as an extension of the northern clay plains, extend all the way from northern Sudan to the mountains of the Sudan–Uganda border, and in the west from the borders of the Central African Republic eastward to the Ethiopian highlands. This great Nilotic plain is broken by several distinctive features. First, the White Nile bisects the plain and provides large permanent expanses of water such as lakes Fajarial, No, and Shambe. Second, Al-Sudd, the world’s largest swamp, provides a formidable expanse of lakes, lagoons, and aquatic plants, an area that in high floodwaters exceeds 30,000 square kilometers, approximately the area of Belgium. So intractable was this sudd (see Glossary), or barrier, as an obstacle to
navigation that a passage was not discovered until the mid-nineteenth century. Then as now, Al-Sudd, with its extreme rate of evaporation, absorbs on average more than half the waters that flow down the White Nile from the equatorial lakes of Central Africa. These waters also create an annual flood plain known as the toich, which provides grazing when the floodwaters retreat to the permanent swamp and sluggish river, the Bahr al-Jabal, as the White Nile is called here.

The land rising to the south and west of the southern clay plains is referred to as the Ironstone Plateau (Jabal Hadid), a name derived from its laterite soil and increasing elevation. The plateau rises from the west bank of the Nile, sloping gradually upward to the Congo–Nile watershed. The land is well watered, providing rich cultivation, but the streams and rivers that come down from the watershed divide and erode the land before they flow onto the Nilotic plain and into Al-Sudd. Along the streams of the watershed are the gallery forests, the beginnings of the tropical rain forests that extend far into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To the east of the Jabal Hadid and the Bahr al-Jabal rise the foothills of the mountain ranges along the Sudan–Uganda border—the Imatong, Dongotona, and Didinga—which rise to more than 3,000 meters. These mountains form a stark contrast to the great plains to the north that dominate Sudan’s geography.

Soils

The country’s soils can be divided geographically into three categories: the sandy soils of the northern and west-central areas, the clay soils of the central region, and the laterite soils of the south. Less extensive and widely separated, but of major economic importance, is a fourth group consisting of alluvial soils found along the lower reaches of the White Nile and Blue Nile Rivers, along the main Nile to Lake Nubia, in the delta of the Qash River in the Kassala area, and in the Barakah Delta in the area of Tawkar near the Red Sea.

Agriculturally, the most important soils are the clays in central Sudan that extend from west of Kassala into southern Kordofan. Known as cracking soils because of the practice of allowing them to dry out and crack during the dry months to restore their permeability, they are the basis in parts of Al-Gezira and Khashm al-Qirbah for irrigated cultivation. East of the Blue Nile, large areas are used to grow rainfed crops by farmers who have mechanized equipment. West of the White Nile, these soils allow traditional cultivators to grow sorghum, sesame, peanuts, and (in the area around the Nuba Mountains) cotton. The southern part of the clay-soil zone lies in the broad floodplain of the upper reaches of the White Nile and its tributaries, covering most of Upper Nile, Jonglei, North Bahr al-Ghazal, and Warab States. Sub-
ject to heavy rainfall during the rainy season, the floodplain proper is inundated for four to six months each year. The large swampy area, Al-Sudd, is permanently flooded, and adjacent areas are flooded for one or two months. In general, this area is poorly suited to crop production, but the grasses it supports during dry periods are used for grazing.

The sandy soils in the semiarid areas south of the desert in North Kordofan and North Darfur States support vegetation used for grazing. In the southern part of these states and the western part of southern Darfur are the so-called qoz sands. Livestock raising is this area’s major activity, but a significant amount of crop cultivation, mainly of millet, also occurs. Peanuts and sesame are grown as cash crops. The qoz sands are the principal area from which gum arabic is obtained through tapping of *Acacia senegal* (known locally as hashab). This tree grows readily in the region, and cultivators occasionally plant hashab when land is returned to fallow. Sudan produces about 60 percent of the world’s gum arabic.

The laterite soils of the south cover most of West Equatoria and West Bahr al-Ghazal States. They underlie the extensive moist woodlands found in these provinces. Crop production is scattered, and the soils, where cultivated, lose fertility relatively quickly; even the richer soils are usually returned to bush fallow within five years.

**Hydrology**

Except for a small area in northeastern Sudan, where wadis discharge the sporadic runoff into the Red Sea or rivers from Eritrea flow into shallow evaporating ponds west of the Red Sea Hills, the entire country is drained by the Nile and its two main tributaries, the Blue Nile and the White Nile. The longest river in the world, the Nile flows for 6,737 kilometers from its farthest headwaters in central Africa to the Mediterranean. The importance of the Nile has been recognized since biblical times; for centuries the river has been a lifeline for Sudan.

The Blue Nile flows out of the Ethiopian highlands to meet the White Nile at Khartoum. The Blue Nile is the smaller of the two rivers; its flow usually accounts for only one-sixth of the total. In August, however, the rains in the Ethiopian highlands swell the Blue Nile until it accounts for 90 percent of the Nile’s total flow. Sudan has constructed several dams to regulate the river’s flow: the Roseires Dam, about 100 kilometers from the Ethiopian border; the Meina al-Mak Dam at Sinjah; and the largest, the 40-meter-high Sinnar Dam constructed in 1925 at Sinnar. The Blue Nile’s two main tributaries, the Dindar and the Rahad, have headwaters in the Ethiopian highlands and discharge water into the Blue Nile only during the summer high-water
season. For the remainder of the year, their flow is reduced to pools in sandy riverbeds.

The White Nile flows north from central Africa, draining Lake Victoria and highland regions of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. North of Uganda, the Nile is known as Bahr al-Jabal until the point at Lake No, where the Bahr al-Ghazal flows into it. At Bor, the southern edge of the great swamp of the Nile, Al-Sudd, begins. The river has no well-defined channel here; the water flows slowly through a labyrinth of small spillways and lakes choked with papyrus and reeds. Much water is lost to evaporation. To provide for water transportation through this region and to speed the river’s flow so that less water evaporates, Sudan, with French help, began building the Jonglei Canal (see Glossary; also seen as Junqali Canal) from Bor to a point just upstream from Malakal. However, construction was suspended in 1984 because of security problems caused by the civil war in the region.

South of Khartoum, the British built the Jabal al-Awliya Dam in 1937 to store the water of the White Nile and then release it in the fall when the flow from the Blue Nile slackens. Much water from the reservoir has been diverted for irrigation projects in central Sudan, however, and much of the remainder evaporates. By now, silt deposits have curtailed the overall flow.

The White Nile has several substantial tributaries that drain southern Sudan. In the southwest, the Bahr al-Ghazal and its major tributary, the Bahr al-Arab, which meet at Al-Sudd, drain a basin larger in area than France. Although the drainage area is extensive, evaporation takes most of the water from the slow-moving streams in this region, and the discharge of the Bahr al-Ghazal into the White Nile is minimal. In southeast Sudan, the Sobat River drains an area of western Ethiopia and the hills north of the Sudan–Uganda border. The Sobat’s discharge is considerable; at its confluence with the White Nile just south of Malakal, the Sobat accounts for half the White Nile’s water.

North of Khartoum, the Nile flows through the desert in a large S-shaped pattern to empty into Lake Nasser behind the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. The river flows slowly beyond Khartoum, dropping little in elevation, although five cataracts hinder river transport at times of low water. The Atbarah River, flowing out of Ethiopia, is the only tributary north of Khartoum, and its waters reach the Nile for only the six months between July and December. During the rest of the year, the Atbarah’s bed is dry, except for a few pools and ponds.

Sudan faces some severe environmental problems, most related either to the availability of water or its disposal. Among them are desertification, land degradation, and deforestation. Desertification, the southward shift of the boundary between desert and semidesert, has
occurred at an estimated rate of 50 to 200 kilometers since records of rainfall and vegetation began in the 1930s. Its impact has been most notable in North Darfur and North Kordofan. Desertification is likely to continue its southward progression because of declining precipitation and will lead to continued loss of productive land. Agriculture, particularly poorly planned and managed mechanized agriculture, has led to land degradation, water pollution, and related problems. Land degradation has also resulted from an explosive growth in the size of livestock herds since the 1960s that has overtaxed grazing areas. Deforestation has occurred at an alarming rate. Sudan as a whole might have lost nearly 12 percent of its forest cover between 1990 and 2005, or about 8.8 million hectares (see Glossary), a loss driven primarily by land clearance and energy needs. Northern, eastern, and central Sudan have been gravely affected; southern Sudan is estimated to have lost some 40 percent of its forest cover since independence.

Compounding Sudan’s environmental problems are long years of warfare and the resultant camps for large numbers of internally displaced people, who scour the surrounding land for water, fuel, and food. United Nations (UN) experts predict that riverbank erosion and loss of fertilizing silt will occur from Sudan’s current ambitious program of dam construction on the Nile and its tributaries. In urban areas, rapid and uncontrolled population influx into Khartoum and other cities and towns
and the general lack of facilities to manage solid waste and sewage are among major environmental concerns.

**Climate**

Although Sudan lies within the tropics, the climate ranges from arid in the north to tropical wet-and-dry in the far southwest. Temperatures do not vary greatly with the season at any location; the most significant climatic variables are rainfall and the length of the dry season. Variations in the length of the dry season depend on which of two air flows predominates: dry northern winds from the Sahara and the Arabian Peninsula or moist southwesterly winds from the Congo River basin and southeasterly winds from the Indian Ocean.

From January to March, the country is under the influence of dry northeasterlies. There is minimal rainfall countrywide, except for a small area in northwestern Sudan where the winds have passed over the Mediterranean and bring occasional light rains. By early April, the moist southwesterlies have reached southern Sudan, bringing heavy rains and thunderstorms. By July the moist air has reached Khartoum, and in August it extends to its usual northern limits around Abu Hamad, although in some years the humid air may even reach the Egyptian border. The flow becomes weaker as it spreads north. In September, the dry northeasterlies begin to strengthen and to push south, and by the end of December they cover the entire country. Yambio, close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has a nine-month rainy season (April–December) and receives an average of 1,142 millimeters of rain each year; Khartoum has a three-month rainy season (July–September) with an annual average rainfall of 161 millimeters; Atbarah receives showers in August that produce an annual average of only 74 millimeters.

In some years, the arrival of the southwesterlies and their rain in central Sudan can be delayed, or they may not come at all. If that happens, drought and famine follow. The decades of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s saw the southwesterlies frequently fail, with disastrous results for the Sudanese people and economy.

Temperatures are the highest at the end of the dry season, when cloudless skies and dry air allow them to soar. The far south, however, with only a short dry season, has uniformly high temperatures throughout the year. In Khartoum, the hottest months are May and June, when average highs are 41°C, and temperatures can reach 48°C. Northern Sudan, with its short rainy season, has hot daytime temperatures year-round, except for winter months in the northwest, where there is some precipitation in January and February. Conditions in highland areas are generally cooler, and the hot daytime temperatures during the dry season throughout cen-
Central and northern Sudan fall rapidly after sunset. Lows in Khartoum average 15º C in January and have dropped as low as 6º C after the passing of a cool front in winter.

The haboob, a violent dust storm, can occur in central Sudan when the moist southwesterly flow first arrives (May through July). The moist, unstable air forms thunderstorms in the heat of the afternoon. The initial downflow of air from an approaching storm produces a huge yellow/red wall of sand and clay that can temporarily reduce visibility to zero; traffic comes to a standstill, and fine sand particles penetrate the most unlikely places.

Population

Sudan’s vast territory, coupled with its history of near-constant civil conflict, has made gathering precise demographic data a daunting task. The Sudanese government conducted national censuses in 1955–56, 1973, 1983, and 1993. Each had serious flaws. The first census was inadequately prepared and executed. The second was not officially recognized by the government, and its findings were never released. The third census was of better quality, but some of the data have never been analyzed because of inadequate resources. The 1993 census was plagued by irregularities and data gaps, most notably data from Southern Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005 called for a countrywide national census as the basis for an equitable allocation of resources, infrastructure, and power (see Recent Constitutional Developments, ch. 4). This fifth national census was mandated to occur not later than mid-2007, but it was not carried out until April 22–30, 2008. Preliminary results were available in late 2010 in time for the Southern Sudan independence referendum in January 2011.

The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that Sudan had a population of 8 million in 1950 and nearly 14 million in 1970. Sudan’s own census of 1983 showed the total population to be 21.6 million, reflecting an annual growth rate between 1956 and 1983 of 2.8 percent. The next official census, conducted in 1993, placed Sudan’s population at 24.9 million, but it omitted the South because of continuing civil war. According to the 2008 census, Sudan’s population totaled 39.2 million, of whom 30.9 million lived in the North and 8.3 million in the South. Of the total population, males slightly outnumbered females (at 20.1 million versus 19.1 million); those aged 16 years and younger constituted 47.2 percent of the total, of whom 46.7 percent were in the North and 49.0 percent in the South (see fig. 9). The U.S. Census Bureau’s estimate of Sudan’s mid-year 2008 population was 40.2 million, with a birthrate of 34 births per 1,000, a death rate of 14 per 1,000, and a rate of growth about 2.1 percent. As long as Sudan continues to grow at or near its current pace, it
will rank among the world’s fastest-growing countries. While population models vary, the U.S. Census Bureau projected a population of 49.8 million in 2015 and 63.1 million in 2025.

Despite these projections, the country’s population growth rate has been steadily declining and will likely continue to do so. The U.S. Census Bureau and the World Bank estimated that population growth peaked in the 1970s and 1980s at 3.2 and 3.3 percent, respectively, and that it has gradually fallen since that time. From 1990 to 2000, the population grew by 2.8 percent; by the early 2000s, the rate had declined to about 2.6 percent or lower. Sudan’s estimate of its annual population growth from 1983 to 2008 was 2.8 percent. Experts predict that the population growth rate will fall below 2 percent sometime around 2020.

Sudan had a population density in mid-2008 of only 16 persons per square kilometer, but this figure is misleading because much of Sudan is uninhabitable, and its people are unevenly distributed throughout the country. Roughly two-thirds of Sudan’s population resides within 300–500 kilometers of Khartoum and is concentrated around Khartoum and
in Al-Gezira. Government estimates for 2007 showed that the country’s most densely populated states were Khartoum (16.7 percent), Al-Gezira (11.1 percent), and South Darfur (9.4 percent), a population distribution seemingly confirmed by the 2008 census. In the South, the 2008 census showed that the most populous states were Jonglei (1.4 million), Central Equatoria (ca. 1.2 million), and Warab (ca. 1.0 million). The census also showed that for Sudan as a whole, the urban–rural ratio was 29.5 and 70.5 (42.0 and 58.1 in the North, and 17.01 and 83.0 in the South), less than average rates of urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa and much less than in North Africa. The population of the Three Towns (see Glossary) of the Khartoum metropolitan area is uncertain because of fluctuations in the number of refugees, but estimates of 5 million may be realistic. In general, Sudan remains an overwhelmingly rural nation.

In 2009 the United Nations reported that life expectancy at birth for Sudanese citizens averaged 58 years, 57 years for males and 59 for females, an increase from 46 years in 1970 and 53 years in 1990. This average compares positively with that of other African nations (52 years) and is comparable to other nations at a similar stage of economic development (58 years). Life expectancy is expected to continue to increase in coming decades; for example, the U.S. Census Bureau predicts that average life expectancy in Sudan will reach 66 years by 2025. In 2009 the annual number of births totaled 1.3 million. The rate of infant mortality (under one year) was 69 deaths per 1,000 live births, and the total fertility rate (lifetime births per female) was 4.1. Both rates showed substantial declines since the 1980s.

In the South, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that as of the mid-2000s, life expectancy was 42 years, significantly less than for the country in general. A household health survey conducted by the Southern government in 2006 found that the infant mortality rate was 102 deaths per 1,000 live births; the under-five mortality rate, 135 per 1,000; and the maternal mortality rate, 2,054 deaths per 100,000 live births, all among the highest rates in the world. Average nationwide statistics for 1993–99 for these same categories—65 per 1,000, 125 per 100,000, and 506 per 100,000, respectively—were well below those of the South as of 2006 (see Health, this ch.). Contraceptive use remains very low in Sudan. For the most part, only urban elites have knowledge of basic family-planning practices. Sudan does not have a national family-planning program.

**Migration and Refugees**

The era since independence has seen a notable increase in internal migration. In the early postindependence years, most migrants left their homes in search of employment in large agricultural projects or
in large urban centers, particularly the Three Towns, which attracted some 50 percent of all internal migrants. Their numbers escalated greatly in the late 1980s because of drought and famine, the civil war in the South, and Chadian incursions into the West. As in the past, migrants left their homelands for economic, social, and psychological reasons, but now with the added factor of personal survival.

Internal migration created problems of employment, housing, and services, and it also had an enormous impact on ethnicity. Although migrants tended to cluster with their kinfolk in their new environments, the daily interaction with Sudanese from many other ethnic groups rapidly eroded traditional values learned in the villages. In the best of circumstances, this erosion might lead to a new sense of national identity as Sudanese, but the new communities often lacked effective absorptive mechanisms and were weak economically. Ethnic divisions were thus reinforced, and at the same time social anomie was perpetuated. Refugees from other countries, like internal migrants, were a factor that further complicated ethnic patterns.

By the early 2000s, continued conflict in the South and the outbreak of warfare in Darfur had led to a dramatic increase in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs). In 1991 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that approximately 1.8 million IDPs, many of them Southerners, resided in the North, of whom an estimated 750,000 were in what was then Al-Khartoum State, 30,000 each in Kordofan and Al-Awsat States, 300,000 each in Darfur and Ash Sharqi States, and 150,000 in Ash Shamali State. In January 2009, the UNHCR estimated that there were more than 4 million IDPs in Sudan excluding the South, including 2.5 million IDPs in the Darfur region and 1.7 million in Khartoum State, most of them Southerners. In addition, some 30,000 refugees from neighboring countries also resided in Khartoum. As for the South, international organizations estimated that 4 million people there had been displaced, more than 2 million deaths had occurred, and 600,000 were forced into exile between the resumption of the civil war in 1983 and its end in 2005. Figures for total displaced populations within Sudan varied according to the source. For example, the Norwegian Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that as of early 2009, about 4.9 million remained internally displaced, half of them in the Darfur region.

Aside from Sudanese who have relocated within their own country, almost 700,000 had left Sudan altogether as of 2005, including the estimated 600,000 from the South. Uganda hosted more than 200,000 of them; tens of thousands more had fled to Kenya. UN officials reported in March 2006 that an average of 100–125 Sudanese migrants arrived at one of their 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad each day. By January
2009, the number of Sudanese refugees in Chad had risen to almost 250,000, whereas the numbers in Kenya had declined to about 23,000. In late 2008, the UNHCR estimated that nearly 130,000 Sudanese refugees still resided in Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Aside from Egypt, a relatively small number of Sudanese have sought refuge in the Arab world in Lebanon and Syria.

Refugees not only have flowed out of Sudan, but they also have streamed in. As of late 2008, the UNHCR reported roughly 230,000 refugees from other countries in Sudan. Some 147,000 were housed in camps along the border with Eritrea. Almost all were Eritreans except for perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 Ethiopians. Many of these refugees had lived in eastern Sudan for more than 40 years as a result of conflict and famine in their homelands. Since July 2007, this region had seen a continuing influx of newcomers from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Some 45,000 Chadians and 3,000 refugees from the Central African Republic had crossed into Darfur as a result of raiding and fighting along Sudan’s western border, some of it dating to the 1990s. An estimated 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers resided in Khartoum, most of them Eritreans and Ethiopians; a few Ethiopian refugees were found in the South.

Large numbers of IDPs and refugees abroad had begun to return to their homes as a result of peace efforts between the North and the South. As of early 2009, more than 2 million of the estimated 4 million from the South who had fled their homeland for the North were thought to have returned home. Many had done so with encouragement from the new Government of South Sudan, whose policy was to encourage Southerners to return to the South, apparently in view of the upcoming national census. Nonetheless, large numbers had chosen to remain in their places of refuge, including the estimated 1.7 million in and around Khartoum, because they preferred the amenities and alternative livelihoods associated with urban life, because they lacked the means to move on their own, or because they were discouraged by the lack of infrastructure, services, and security in their homelands. By remaining in the North, however, the displaced faced generally squalid conditions in refugee camps and, in Khartoum, forced relocation as the government cleared land for urban development. At the same time, tensions associated with peace efforts were responsible for large numbers of IDPs in three regions along the border between North and South, namely, Abyei, Blue Nile State, and South Kordofan.
Ethnicity and Languages

Ethnicity

Sudan’s ethnic and linguistic diversity is among the most complex in the world. Its nearly 600 ethnic groups speak more than 400 languages and dialects, many of them intelligible to only a small number of individuals. In recent decades, some of these small groups have been absorbed by larger groups, and migration often causes individuals reared in one tongue to converse only in the dominant language of the new area. Some linguistic groups have been absorbed by accommodation, others by conflict. In the case of migrants to the Three Towns, Arabic is the lingua franca even for Southerners, while the use of English continues to decline in quantity and quality.

The definition and boundaries of ethnic groups depend on how people perceive themselves and others. Language, cultural characteristics, and common ancestry may be used as markers of ethnic identity or difference, but they do not always define groups of people. Thus, the people called Atuot and the much larger group called Nuer speak essentially the same language, share many cultural characteristics, and acknowledge a common ancestry, but each group defines itself and the other as different. Moreover, ethnic group names commonly used in Sudan and by foreign analysts are not always used by the people themselves. This fact is particularly true for non-Arab groups known by names coined by Arabs or by the British, who based the names on terms used by Arabs or others, not by the group itself. Thus, the Dinka and the Nuer, the largest groups in the South, call themselves, respectively, Jieng and Naadh, and not Dinka or Nuer.

The distinction between Sudan’s Muslim and non-Muslim people has been of considerable importance in the country’s modern history and provides a preliminary ordering of ethnic groups. It does not, however, correspond in any simple way to distinctions based on linguistic, cultural, or racial criteria, nor to social or political solidarity. Choice of language has played a political role in the ethnic and religious cleavage between the peoples of the North and of the South. English traditionally was associated with being non-Muslim, as Arabic was associated with Islam. Yet, recent migration from the South to destinations throughout northern towns even as far north as Dongola (also seen as Dunqulah), plus aggressive government policies of Arabization in the school system during the 1990s, make this distinction less applicable in the early 2000s.
Languages

Most languages spoken in Africa fall into four language super-stocks. Three of them—Afro-Asiatic, Niger-Kordofanian, and Nilo-Saharan—are represented in Sudan. Each is divided into groups that are in turn subdivided into sets of closely related languages. Two or more major groups of each of the three superstocks are present in Sudan, historically both a north–south and an east–west migration crossroads.

The most widely spoken language in Sudan is Arabic, a member of the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family. Cushitic, another major branch of Afro-Asiatic, is represented by Bedawiye (with several dialects), spoken by the largely nomadic Beja. Chadic, a third branch, is represented by its most important single language, Hausa, a West African tongue used in Nigeria by the Hausa themselves and employed by many other West Africans in Sudan as a lingua franca.

Niger-Kordofanian is first divided into Niger-Congo and Kordofanian. The widespread Niger-Congo language group includes many divisions and subdivisions of languages. Represented in Sudan are Azande and several other tongues of the Adamawa-Eastern language division, and Fulani of the West Atlantic division. The Kordofanian stock comprises only 30 to 40 languages spoken in a limited area of Sudan—the Nuba Mountains and their environs.

The designation of a Nilo-Saharan superstock has not been fully accepted by linguists, and its constituent groups and subgroups are not firmly fixed, in part because many of the languages have not been well studied. Assuming the validity of this language family and its internal divisions, then 10 of its 12 major divisions and many of their subdivisions are well represented in Sudan, where roughly 75 languages, well over half of those named in the 1955–56 census, could be identified as Nilo-Saharan. Many of these languages are only used by small groups of people. Only six or seven of them were spoken by 1 percent or more of Sudan’s 1956 population. Perhaps another dozen were the home languages of 0.5 to 1 percent. Included among Nilo-Saharan languages are Masalit in North Darfur; various Nubian dialects of Northern Sudan; and Jieng (Dinka) and Naadh (Nuer) in Southern Sudan.

Many other languages are spoken by a few thousand or even a few hundred people. Several lingua francas have emerged, and many peoples have become genuinely multilingual, fluent in a native language spoken at home, a lingua franca, and perhaps other languages. Arabic, however, has several different forms, and not all who master one are able to use another. Among the varieties noted by scholars are classical Arabic, the language of the Quran, not a widespread spoken language.
and mostly used in Islamic rites and poetry. Although some Muslims might become acquainted with classical Arabic in the course of rudimentary religious schooling, very few except the most educated know it by rote. Modern Standard Arabic, derived from classical Arabic, is used by the educated in travel outside the country. Then there are at least two kinds of colloquial Arabic in Sudan—that spoken in roughly the eastern half of the country and known as Sudanese or Omdurmani colloquial Arabic, and that spoken in western Sudan, closely akin to the colloquial Arabic spoken in Chad. There are other colloquial forms. A pidgin called Juba Arabic is peculiar to Southern Sudan.

Modern Standard Arabic is in principle the same everywhere in the Arab world and generally permits communication among educated persons whose mother tongue is one or another form of colloquial Arabic. Despite its international character, however, Modern Standard Arabic varies from country to country. Nevertheless, it has been the language used in Sudan’s central government, the press, Sudan television, and Radio Omdurman. The latter also broadcast in classical Arabic. One observer, writing in the early 1970s, noted that Arabic speakers (and others who had acquired the language informally) in western Sudan found it easier to understand the Chadian colloquial Arabic used by Chad Radio than the Modern Standard Arabic used by Radio Omdurman. This may also be the case elsewhere in rural Sudan, where villagers and nomads speak a local dialect of Arabic.

Juba (or pidgin) Arabic, developed and learned informally, has been used in Southern towns, particularly in the far South, for some time and has spread slowly but steadily throughout the South, but not always at the expense of English. The Juba Arabic used in the marketplace and even by political figures addressing ethnically mixed urban audiences cannot be understood easily by Sudanese from the North.

Despite Arabic’s status as the official national language, English was acknowledged as the principal language in the South into the 1990s. It was also the chief language at the University of Khartoum and was the language of secondary schools even in the North before 1969. In the early 1970s in the South, the first two years of primary school were taught in the local language. Thereafter, through secondary school, either Arabic or English could be the medium of instruction (English and Arabic were regarded as of equal importance); the language not used as a medium was taught as a subject. At the time when this option was established, roughly half the general secondary schools (equivalent to grades seven through nine) were conducted in Arabic and half in English in what were then Bahr al-Ghazal and Al-Istiwai States.
The new policy for higher education announced by the Sudanese government in 1990, however, dictated that Arabic would be the language of instruction in all institutions of higher learning (see Education, this ch.). This policy was reversed by provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 that were incorporated into Sudan’s Interim National Constitution. These provisions established both Arabic and English as official working languages of the national government and as the languages of instruction in higher education. The constitution declared further that “all indigenous languages of the Sudan are national languages and shall be respected, developed, and promoted,” and it allowed any legislative body below the national level to adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working language(s) within that body’s jurisdiction. These changes began working their way into public life and into secondary and higher education.

**Ethnic Groups**

**Muslim Peoples**

An often-made distinction among Sudan’s peoples is that between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. While the distinction may be valid in terms of religion, both Muslim and non-Muslim groups are enormously diverse ethnically, linguistically, and geographically. The distinction, nonetheless, remains a useful method of classifying Sudan’s variegated ethnic landscape (see fig. 10).

**Arabs and Nubians**

The term *Arab* is confusing to most people because it does not correspond to an ethnic or religious identity. For example, there are at least 10 million Arab Christians, mostly in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, a small number of whom reside in Sudan as descendants of Orthodox Copts who arrived during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Similarly, “Arabs” span the racial spectrum from very light to quite dark in pigmentation, and there are no unifying physiological characteristics. In fact, the League of Arab States debated the issue of Arab identity for years after its establishment in 1945 and eventually decided that an Arab was anyone whose mother tongue was Arabic and who “identified with Arab culture and destiny.” By this definition, approximately 40 percent of Sudan’s population is ethnically Arab, but most Sudanese intellectuals and informed foreign observers agree that the more accurate description is Afro-Arab.

Further complicating the terminology have been consistent efforts by non-Arab politicians, especially those in the South and some in the West, to describe the ruling elite as Arab in order to appeal to presumed
sympathies of Western observers, when in fact the indigenous elite in the North is a mixture of Arabs, Afro-Arabs, and non-Arabs. Actually, Northerners are more divided than united along tribal, racial, religious, and socioeconomic lines, a fact that accounts partially for the failures of successive governments to assert control over outlying areas or to move the country forward economically and socially. A much more useful distinction is, in fact, a term that originated in the nineteenth century distinguishing the *awlad al-bahr* (children of the river) from the *awlad ar-rif* (children of the countryside), a distinction reflecting the
fact that all central governments since the 1820s have exercised a reach of perhaps no more than a 300-kilometer radius from Khartoum.

Besides the major distinction dividing Arabs into sedentary and nomadic individuals, there was an old tradition that assigned them to tribes, each said to have a common ancestor. Earlier reference works distinguished three supra-tribal categories—the Juhayna, Ja’aliyyin, and Kawahlia. Yet this listing is limited and its inferences debatable. The Juhayna category consisted of tribes considered nomadic, although many had become fully settled. The Ja’aliyyin encompassed the riverine, sedentary peoples from around Atbarah to just north of Khartoum, but some of these peoples had moved elsewhere. Some of the groups had become sedentary only in the twentieth century. Sudanese saw the Ja’aliyyin as primarily indigenous peoples who were gradually Arabized. Sudanese thought the Juhayna were more homogeneous, although some Juhayna groups had become more diverse by absorbing indigenous peoples. The Baqqara, for example, who moved south and west and encountered the peoples of those areas, became scarcely distinguishable from them.

A third supra-tribal division of some importance was the Kawahlia, consisting of 13 tribes of varying size. Eight of these tribes and segments of the other five were found north and west of Khartoum. These people were more heavily dependent on pastoralism than were the segments of the other five tribes, who lived on either side of the White Nile from south of Khartoum to north of Kosti. This cluster of five groups (for practical purposes, independent tribes) exhibited a considerable degree of self-awareness and cohesion in some circumstances, although that had not precluded intertribal competition for local power and status.

Membership in tribal and subtribal units is generally by birth, but individuals and groups may also join these units by adoption, clientage, or a decision to live and behave a certain way. For example, when a sedentary Fur (“African”) becomes a cattle nomad, he is perceived as a Baqqara (“Arab”). Eventually, the descendants of such newcomers are regarded as belonging to the group by birth.

Tribal and subtribal units divide the Arab ethnic category vertically, but other distinctions, such as social status and power, cut across Arab society and its tribal and subtribal components horizontally. Still another division is that of religious associations.

A glance at both Sudan’s modern history and its governing elites reveals the major tribal groupings in riverine Muslim Sudan to be Nubians, Shayqiyyah, Ja’aliyyin, and Shukriyyah. Many smaller groups that are politically noteworthy, e.g., the Hashmab and the Mahha, are interspersed among them.
Besides actual size, tribal influence can be traced to educational opportunity. For example, “modern,” i.e., public education as distinct from religious (khalwa or kuttab) education, traveled southward from Egypt and initially reached Wadi Halfa in the far north of Nubia. It is no coincidence that the majority of the top administrators and university educators in postindependence Sudan have been Halfawiyin, commonly known as Nubians. They are descendants of the ancient Kerman and Napatan populations and predate the arrival of the Arabs.

Following the flooding of Wadi Halfa and the forced relocation of 40,000 or so citizens to Khashm al-Qirbah near Kassala in the mid-1960s, plus internal migration to the capital area, the center of Nubian settlement and culture has been Dongola; indeed, many “southern” Nubians have long been referred to as Dongolawi. The aforementioned Mahha are their fellow Nubian neighbors. Other much smaller groups speaking a related language and claiming a link with the Nile Nubians have been given local names; some near Dongola have been largely Arabized and are referred to as Danaqla. Even before the resettlement, many had left the valley for varying lengths of time to work in towns, although most sought to maintain a link with their traditional homeland. In the 1955–56 census, more Nile Nubians were counted in Al-Khartoum Province than in the Nubian country to the north. A similar pattern of work in towns was apparently followed by those resettled at Khashm al-Qirbah. Many Nubians there retained their ancestral tenancies and had kin oversee their land and the hiring of non-Nubians to work it. The Nubians, often with their families, worked in Khartoum, the town of Kassala, and Port Sudan in jobs ranging from domestic service and semiskilled labor to teaching and civil service, which required literacy. Despite their knowledge of Arabic and devotion to Islam, Nubians retained considerable group consciousness and tended to maintain tightly knit communities in towns. In the mid-1990s, they numbered close to 300,000.

Their next significant neighbors up the Nile are the Shayqiyyah living in and around Kuraymah, Merowe, and Kurti (also seen as Korti). They have been prominent in the military officer corps and police but also in senior positions in government. Like the Dongolawis to the northwest, these awlad al-bahr derive their livelihood from limited horticulture and date palm groves and are culturally somewhat akin to residents of Upper Egypt. Such is not the case with the Ja’aliyyin of the Nile region north and south of the capital area. Traditionally primarily involved in agriculture, these settled cultivators used to dominate central Sudan’s core socially, economically, and, to some extent, politically.

East of the Blue Nile, just south of the capital region, is the land of the Shukriyyah, another significant ethnic group controlling both
agriculture along the fertile Blue Nile and grazing land in and toward the Al-Butanah area east of the Nile. Farther east along the border with Eritrea and Ethiopia are the Rashaida, a relatively “pure” Arab people who arrived from Saudi Arabia in the nineteenth century and are related to the Juhayna grouping. The Rashaida are nomads who migrate with their camels, sheep, and goats between Al-Gedaref and Kassala or farther north in rhythm with the seasons.

Another large “Arab” tribal federation is the Kababish, mostly in Kordofan. From their home area around Bara, young adult men have been camel drivers who deliver large flocks via a track through northwest Sudan to Upper Egypt near Asyout and on to Cairo’s Imbaba camel market. This activity has become legendary as the Darb al-Arba’ (the Forty Days Road), providing meat to hungry Egypt and economic prosperity to the Kababish and others in Kordofan. Farther west is the Hamar confederation, whose lifestyles and activities closely parallel those of the Kababish.

To the southwest are the Misiriyah and Rizayqat tribal federations, also seminomadic and also famous mostly for raising camels and sheep. Both straddle the border between South Kordofan and South Darfur. Of these, the Misiriyah may be the more significant because of their numbers—they are subdivided into two distinct federations with a distinct difference in skin pigmentation—and also because of their grazing locations near the northernmost Dinka grouping, the Abyei Dinka, whose territory is a “Southern” enclave in “Northern” Sudan. Throughout the twentieth century, reports of Misiriyah encroachment on traditional Rizayqat or Abyei Dinka land, particularly during periods of drought, led to intercommunal fighting and loss of life and livestock. More recently, the Misiriyah and Rizayqat have been mentioned in connection with the infamous janjaweed (see Glossary), ethnic militias armed by the central government to subdue the Darfuri rebels (see The War in Darfur, 2003–11, ch. 5). It is too early to conclude whether there is direct involvement of these groups or if these allegations reflect long-time animosities.

**Beja**

The Beja probably have lived in the Red Sea Hills since ancient times. Arab influence was not significant until a millennium or so ago, but it has since led the Beja to adopt Islam and genealogies that link them to Arab ancestors, to Arabize their names, and to include many Arabic terms in their language. Although some Arabs figure in the ancestry of the Beja, the group is mostly descended from an indigenous population, and they have not become Arabized. Their language, Bedawiye, links them to other Cushitic-speaking peoples farther south.
Most Beja belong to one of four groups—the Bisharin, the Amarar, the Hadendowa, and the Bani Amir. The largest group is the Hadendowa, but the Bisharin have the most territory, living as settled tribes on the Atbarah River in the far south of the Beja range and as nomads in the north. A good number of the Hadendowa are also settled and engaged in agriculture, particularly in the coastal region near Tawkar, but many remain nomads. The Amarar, living in the central part of the Beja range, seem to be largely nomadic, as are the second largest group, the Bani Amir, who live along the border with Eritrea. The precise proportion of nomads in the Beja population in the early 2000s was not known, but it was far greater than the nomadic component of the Arab population.

The Beja are characterized as conservative, proud, and aloof even toward other Beja and quite reticent in relations with strangers. They were long reluctant to accept the authority of central governments and have been organized, off-and-on, in the Beja Congress as a movement to advance their regional agenda (see Eastern Sudan, ch. 4). Estimates of their number in the early 2000s ranged upward of 2 million. In recent years, and in response to a declining rural economy and to warfare, many Beja have settled in urban areas such as Port Sudan, Sawakin (also seen as Suakin), and Kassala, some as refugees, and others as laborers in the oil-export sector.

**Fur**

The Fur, ruled from the seventeenth century until 1916 by an independent sultanate that controlled east–west trade and oriented politically and culturally to peoples in Chad, are a sedentary group long settled on and around the Jabal Marrah, where they cultivate millet, sorghum, and peanuts. Although the ruling dynasty and the peoples of the area have long been Muslims, they have not been Arabized; their integration into larger Sudanese society has been incomplete and troubled. Livestock have played a small part in the subsistence of most Fur. Those who acquired a substantial herd of cattle could maintain it only by living like the neighboring Baqqara Arabs, and those who persisted in this pattern eventually came to be thought of as Baqqara. In the late 1980s (the latest available estimate), the Fur numbered about 500,000.

Although the Fur are the largest indigenous “nation” in Darfur—the province was named after them—they have felt marginalized since before independence. Some of their leaders have organized local movements calling for more autonomy or better services from Khartoum. These movements, such as the Suny Liberation Front of the 1960s and 1970s (named after the town of Suny, near Jabal Marrah), sporadically took up arms against the central government. Gaining in
strength in the late 1980s, adherents of these movements, organized as the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), struck with a vengeance in February 2003 against government positions in the provincial capital, Al-Fashir. A so-called *Black Book* detailed the perceived marginalization of the Darfuri peoples.

**Zaghawa**

Living on the desert plateau north of the Fur are the seminomadic people calling themselves Beri but known to the Arabs as Zaghawa or Bideyat. Large numbers of the group also live in Chad. Altogether, they numbered an estimated 122,000 in the late 1980s (latest available figure).

Herders of cattle, camels, sheep, and goats, the Zaghawa also gain a major part of their subsistence by gathering wild grains and tubers. Zaghawa are settled in villages as cultivators of millet and vegetables; some are merchants who exchange animals for foodstuffs and manufactures. Adequate rainfall and access to water sources are perennial concerns. The long-lasting civil war in Chad, the years of drought from the 1980s onward, plus increasing desertification all led to communal infighting among neighboring tribes, both Arab and non-Arab throughout the mid-1990s.

Converted to Islam from the seventeenth century and traditionally Ansar (see Glossary), the Zaghawa were among those groups who were targeted by emissaries identified with a branch of Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (see Islamic Movements and Religious Orders, this ch.; The Al-Bashir Era, ch. 4). A rebel group, heavily Zaghawa and calling itself the Justice and Equality Movement, joined the Sudan Liberation Army organized by the Fur in attacks on government forces in 2004. The Zaghawa are cognizant of their cultural identity and determined to preserve their well-being and political independence.

**Masalit, Berti, and Daju**

There are other peoples living in Darfur in the early 2000s who speak Nilo-Saharan languages and are at least nominally Muslim, the most important being the Masalit, Berti, and Daju. All are primarily cultivators living in permanent villages, but they also practice animal husbandry in varying degrees. The Masalit, living on both sides of the Sudan–Chad border, are the largest group, numbering 240,000 in the early 2000s. Small groups are found as far east as Al-Gedaref as a result of labor migration. Historically under a minor sultanate, they were positioned between the two dominant sultanates of the area, Darfur and Wadai (in Chad) and have long fiercely guarded their independence.
They grow millet, sorghum, peanuts, and vegetables, some of which they trade with Arab nomads and townspeople. In recent decades, the Masalit, like their neighbors, have been adversely affected by drought and desertification.

A part of the territory they occupy was controlled formerly by the Fur, but the Masalit gradually encroached on it in the first half of the twentieth century in a series of local skirmishes carried out by villagers on both sides rather than by the sultanates. In 1990–96 much of Darfur was in a state of anarchy; there were many instances in which Masalit militias attacked Fur and other villages. In 2003 the Masalit were among the early victims of raids by the government-allied janjaweed.

The Berti consist of two groups. One lives northeast of Al-Fashir; the other migrated to eastern Darfur and western Kordofan in the eighteenth century. Small groups are scattered across northern Sudan. Members of the western group, in addition to cultivating subsistence crops and practicing animal husbandry, gather gum arabic for sale in local markets. They are more relaxed in their Islamic observances than some of their neighbors. The Berti tongue has given way to Arabic as a home language.

The term Daju applies to three groups of sedentary agriculturalists situated in southern Kordofan, southwestern Darfur, and eastern Chad. These groups call themselves by different names and exhibit no sense of common identity. In the early 2000s, they totaled 143,000. Converted to Islam in the fifteenth century or earlier, they are not strict in their religious observances. The Daju are renowned as warriors and have long quarreled with their neighbors.

**West Africans**

A large number of people of West African origin also live in Sudan. In the mid-1970s, West Africans were estimated at more than 10 percent of the population of the northern states. Some were descendants of persons who arrived at least five generations earlier; others were recent immigrants. Some had come in self-imposed exile to escape European colonial rule in their homeland. Others were once pilgrims to Mecca, settling either en route or on their return. Many came over decades in the course of the great dispersion of the nomadic Fulani; others arrived, particularly after World War II, as rural and urban laborers or to take up land as peasant cultivators.

A large percentage of people included in the West African category are said to be of Nigerian origin (locally called Borno, after the Nigerian emirate that was their homeland). Given Hausa dominance in northern Nigeria, the widespread use of their language there and elsewhere, and the propensity of the Hausa to go on the hajj, many West
Africans in Sudan are identified as Hausa, when in fact many are probably ethnically Fulani. The Hausa themselves, particularly those long in Sudan, prefer to be called Takari. In the early 2000s, they were thought to number almost 500,000. The Fulani, even more widely dispersed throughout West Africa, may have originated in states other than Nigeria. Typically, the term applied to the Fulani in Sudan is Fallata, but Sudanese also use that term for other West Africans. In the early 1980s, they numbered 90,000.

Fulani nomads are found in many parts of central Sudan from Darfur to the Blue Nile, and they occasionally compete with indigenous populations for pasturage. In Darfur, groups of Fulani origin have adapted in various ways to the presence of the Baqqara tribes. Some have retained all aspects of their culture and language. A few have become much like Baqqara in language and in other respects, although they tend to retain their own breeds of cattle and ways of handling them. Some of the Fulani groups in the eastern states are sedentary, descendants of settled Fulani of the ruling group in northern Nigeria. Many recognize a “sultan” as their leader, who is accorded privileges by the central government of Sudan.

Non-Muslim Peoples

There are a few expatriates temporarily residing in Sudan; otherwise all non-Muslims are Christians or animists. In earlier times, these terms were employed by virtually all Sudanese, and they referred essentially to the peoples of the South. By 2011 this was no longer the case. The term *animist* is disputed; some scholars prefer *indigenous* or *traditional* religions. However, such nomenclature can be confusing as well because many Muslims consider that these terms also apply to them. Indeed, Muslims prefer to view religious identity as “People of the Book” (*ahl al-kitab*), meaning essentially Jews, Christians, and Muslims, as opposed to all others.

Moreover, given recent migrations and displacements, it is now estimated that as many Southerners live in the North as in the traditional South and that a number have been there long enough to have become acculturated within the Muslim-dominated areas of the North. Furthermore, speculation continues among all parties as to how many Southern migrants in the North will return to their ancestral homelands given the impending independence of the South. The majority opinion is that only those Southerners with assets in the South—land, houses, animals, and relatives—will go back; a substantial number who found employment in cities in the North are likely to remain there.

Primordial identities, such as family, clan, and tribe, tend to dominate here as in most developing countries. Migrants tend to cluster around
their own kind, and, consequently, ethnic identity remains strong. In that sense, the major identities of the old non-Muslim groups remain observable, regardless of assimilation and religious “conversion.” From that perspective, the remaining categories of ethnic groupings to be listed are the dominant Nilotes of the central South, smaller tribes in the southernmost and southwestern South, and some small groups residing in the hilly areas south of the Blue Nile on or near the border with Ethiopia. Another cluster of peoples commonly called the Nuba, but socially and culturally diverse, live in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan State. Their region became pivotal in the negotiations leading to the peace agreement of January 2005.

Nilotes

“Nilote” is a common name for many of the peoples living on or near the Nile and its tributaries in the southern third of Sudan. The term refers to people speaking languages of one section of the Nilotic subbranch of the Eastern Sudanic branch of Nilo-Saharan and sharing a myth of common origin. They are marked by physical similarity and many common cultural features. Many have a long tradition of keeping cattle, including some for whom cattle are no longer of practical importance. Because of their adaptation to different climates and their encounters, peaceful and otherwise, with other peoples, there is also some diversity among the Nilotes.

The Nilotes still constitute more than three-fifths of the population of the South in the early 2000s despite civil war and famine. One group, the Dinka, or Jieng, numbering perhaps 2.5 million to 3 million, make up roughly two-thirds of the total category and about 10 percent of Sudan’s population. The Dinka are the single largest “nation” in Sudan and are widely distributed over the northern portion of Southern Sudan, particularly in North Bahr al-Ghazal and West Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes, and Jonglei States. The next largest group, only one-third to one-quarter the size of the Dinka, are the Nuer, or Naadh, concentrated in Upper Nile State. The Shilluk, or Collo, the third largest group, have only about one-fourth as many people as the Nuer, numbering about 185,000 in the late 1980s. The remaining Nilotic groups are much smaller.

The larger and more dispersed the group, however, the more internally varied it has become. The Dinka and Nuer, for example, did not develop a centralized government encompassing all or any large part of their groups. The Dinka are considered to have as many as 25 sub-tribal groups, each autonomous within a well-defined region. The Nuer have nine or 10 separately named groups.

Armed conflict between and within Southern ethnic groups is long-standing and continued into the twenty-first century in the context of the North–South struggle. Sections of the Dinka have fought
sections of the Nuer and each other. Other Southern groups have also expanded and contracted in the search for cattle and pasturage. The Nuer have absorbed some of the Dinka to the extent that some present-day sections of the Nuer have significant Dinka components.

Relations among various Southern groups were affected in the nineteenth century by the intrusion of Ottomans, Arabs, and eventually the British. Some ethnic groups made their accommodation with the intruders and others did not, in effect pitting one Southern ethnic group against another in the context of foreign rule. For example, some sections of the Dinka were more accommodating to British rule than were the Nuer. These Dinka treated the resisting Nuer as hostile, and hostility developed between the two groups as a result of their differing relationships to the British. The achievement of Sudanese independence in 1956 and the adoption of certain aspects of Islamic law, or sharia, by the central government in September 1983 greatly influenced the nature of relations among these groups in modern times. The second Southern civil war, launched in April 1983 by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), was perceived by many as Dinka-centered because its primary leader, John Garang de Mabior, and most of its foot soldiers were, in fact, Dinka (see Second Southern Civil War, 1983–2005, ch. 5).
The next largest group of Nilotes, the Shilluk (who refer to themselves as Collo), are not dispersed like the Dinka and the Nuer, but rather settled mainly in a limited, uninterrupted area along the west bank of the White Nile, just north of Malakal. Some also live on the eastern bank. With easy access to fairly good land along the Nile, they rely much more heavily on cultivation and fishing than the Dinka and the Nuer do, and they have fewer cattle. The Shilluk have truly permanent settlements and do not move regularly between cultivating and cattle camps.

Unlike the larger groups, the Shilluk along the Upper Nile were traditionally ruled by a single politico-religious head (reth), believed to become at the time of his investiture as king the representative, if not the reincarnation, of the mythical hero Nyiking, putative founder of the Shilluk. The administrative and political powers of the reth have been the subject of some debate, but his ritual status was clear enough: his health was believed to be closely related to the material and spiritual welfare of the Shilluk. It is likely that the territorial unity of the Shilluk and the permanence of their settlements contributed to the centralization of their political and ritual structures. In the late 1980s, activities against the SPLA by armed militias supported by the government seriously alienated the Shilluk in Malakal, and the pattern of intra-Southern fighting has continued off-and-on into the present century.

**Bari, Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari**

Several peoples living mainly to the south and east of the Nilotes speak languages of another section of the Nilotic subbranch of Eastern Sudanic. Primary among them are the Bari and the closely related Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari (Mundari), who speak dialects of Bari. The Bari and Mandari, who live along the Nile around Juba and hence close to Nilotes, have been influenced by them and have sometimes been in conflict with them. The more southerly Kuku live in highlands along the Uganda border, and the Kakwa inhabit the rain forest around Yei. All of these groups engage in subsistence agriculture, sorghum, maize, and peanuts being standard crops. The Kuku and Mandari also keep cattle. All have been severely affected by years of strife and have fled into towns or into Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or even farther afield.

**Murle, Didinga, and Others**

Two other tribes, the Murle and the Didinga, speak Eastern Sudanic languages of sub-branches other than Nilotic. The Murle dwelled in southern Ethiopia in the nineteenth century, and some are still there. Others moved west and drove out the local Nilotes, whom they report-
edy regarded with contempt, in the process acquiring a reputation as warriors. The Murle are predominantly pastoral. Their social and cultural life revolves around cattle, and they are renowned among their neighbors for cattle raiding. They are also skilled hunters. Their loyalties were divided between Northerners and Southerners during the civil war.

The Didinga inhabit hill country on the border with Kenya. Primarily agriculturalists, they grow maize, beans, millet, and tobacco. They also pan for alluvial gold. The relative isolation of the Didinga Hills has helped them preserve their cultural traditions, although they joined the SPLM/A in opposition to the forces of the national government.

Along the mountainous border with Ethiopia in Blue Nile and S Innar States live several small heterogeneous groups. Some, such as the Uduk, speak languages of the Koman division of Nilo-Saharan and are believed to have been in the area since antiquity. Others, including the Ingessana, were refugees driven into the hills by the expansion of other groups. In the past, most of these peoples straddling the Sudan—Ethiopia border experienced strife with later-arriving neighbors and slave raids by the Arabs. All adapted by learning the language of more dominant groups.

Azande

In West Equatoria and West Bahr al-Ghazal States live a number of small, sometimes fragmented groups who speak languages of the Adamawa-Ubangi branch of the Niger-Congo language family. The largest of these groups are the Azande, who constitute perhaps 7 to 8 percent of the population of the South and are the dominant group in West Equatoria.

The Azande emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when groups of hunters, divided into aristocrats and commoners, entered the northeastern part of present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo, and later southwestern Sudan and southeastern Central African Republic, and conquered peoples already there. Although the aristocrats provided ruling kings and nobles, they did not establish an inclusive, centralized state. The means of succession to kingship, however, encouraged Azande expansion. A man succeeded to his father’s throne only when he had vanquished those of his brothers who chose to compete for it. The brothers—princes without land or people but with followers looking for the fruits of conquest—would find and rule hitherto unconquered groups. Such expansion brought them into conflict with their neighbors, in particular, the Dinka, whom they failed to subdue. In this manner, the Azande became a heterogeneous people. The Azande traditionally lived in scattered homesteads and engaged in subsistence
farming. Their crops included maize, cassava, yams, coffee, and a variety of fruit. Oracles and witchcraft played important roles in their social relations.

Their earlier military and political successes notwithstanding, the Azande in the twentieth century were poor, largely dependent on cultivation (hunting was no longer a feasible source of food), and afflicted by sleeping sickness. In an attempt to mitigate these problems, British colonial authorities instituted a development project known as the Azande Scheme, involving cotton growing and resettlement. The program failed, however, for a variety of reasons, including an inadequate understanding of Azande society, economy, and values on the part of the colonial planners. Partly in an effort to escape sleeping sickness, many Azande moved into villages, away from kin and former social networks. Some became Christians and Muslims. At the same time, they experienced a declining birthrate. Azande support of the Anya Nya guerrilla groups, as well as conflicts with the Dinka, also served to worsen the plight of the Azande. In the late 1980s, those in Sudan were thought to number about 350,000. As a result of warfare in the South in the 1980s and 1990s, many Azande fled into neighboring countries, further disrupting their former cultural practices.

Bviri, Ndogo, and Others

Several other groups of cultivators in southwestern Sudan speak languages closely akin to that of the Azande but lack a dominant group. The most important seem to be the Bviri. They and a smaller group called Ndogo speak a language named after the latter; other smaller communities speak dialects of that tongue. These communities do not share a sense of common ethnic identity, however.

The other groups in southwestern Sudan speak languages of the central branch of Nilo-Saharan and are scattered from West Bahr al-Ghazal (the Kreish) to Central Equatoria (the Moru and the Avukaya) to East Equatoria (the Madi). In between, in Central Equatoria, are such peoples as the Bongo and the Baka. The languages of Moru and Madi are so close, as are aspects of their cultures, that they are sometimes considered as one. The same is true of the Bongo and the Baka, but there is no indication that either pair constitutes a self-conscious ethnic group.

Nuba

Living in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan are perhaps three dozen or more small groups collectively called the Nuba. They vary considerably in their culture and social organization and are anything but a unitary ethnic group. For example, some are patrilineally organized, others adhere to matrilineal patterns, and a very few—the
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Southeastern Nuba—have both patrilineal and matrilineal groupings in the same community. The large number of Kordofanian languages these people speak are not generally mutually intelligible, except by some adjacent communities. Judging partly from this linguistic diversity, it would appear that a number of disparate peoples now known as the Nuba moved into the hill country of South Kordofan over the centuries in search of security. Even so, the Nuba were subjected to raids by Arab slavers, and, more recently, to encroachment by neighbors who coveted their fertile land.

Despite the Arabization of the people around them, only small numbers of Nuba have adopted Arabic as a home language, and even fewer have converted to Islam. Some have become Christian, but most retain either traditional or dual religious identities. Quite a few Nuba, however, serve in the armed forces and police. Most remain cultivators; animal husbandry plays only a small part in their economy.

When the George W. Bush administration came into office in the United States in early 2001, it made peace in Sudan a high priority. That September, a special envoy, former Senator John Danforth of Missouri, was charged with developing a comprehensive peace plan. Senator Danforth’s team decided to focus on the Nuba Mountains region as a test case because of its central location and its demographically mixed population. The Nuba were seen as a potential bridge between North and South, having been claimed by both. The contesting military units of the government and SPLA withdrew from this area, and international observers were brought in to monitor adherence to military and political agreements. These steps led to confidence-building measures that eventually were extended to regional and national power sharing, including administration and division of resources. The process, heavily supported by the Bush administration, culminated in the peace agreement of 2005 (see Institutions of Government, ch. 4). In an indirect sense, the formerly marginalized Nuba may have contributed in a major way to national reconciliation.

Regionalism and Ethnicity

There were in the early 2000s, at a minimum, five distinct regional identities in Sudan, which in a country of such enormous size was not surprising. The South, West, East, and North all considered themselves to have been marginalized by the Center, and in that order of disaffection. To the outside observer, these claims seemed valid, but they were frequently overstated by politicians who dramatized the situation in order to curry local favor. Whereas politicians from the South, for example, spoke of discrimination, officials in the North denied it. The Western reader might think of regionalism in Canada, Spain, Italy, or
Britain, with the difference that these countries have vastly greater resources and infrastructures to address such complaints. The phrase *benign neglect* would seem to be more appropriate in Sudan, because the leadership in the central region was completely preoccupied with local infighting and maneuvering and had little energy left over to address legitimate concerns of the more distant regions, especially considering the meager resources available to Sudanese governments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The few educated leaders from the South, West (Darfur), and East have parlayed these issues into regional movements, both political and military, while some of their colleagues adopted the Northern (region) strategy of moving to the Center and cooperating with or being co-opted by the national leadership. Indeed, every Sudanese government since independence contained representatives from all these regions, albeit often as tokens in relatively minor ministerial portfolios.

An additional complicating factor was the tendency of Sudan’s national army to recruit heavily from impoverished areas, as happens in many other countries. Early on, Beja and Nuba joined in such large numbers that they are said to provide the majority of foot soldiers in recent years. Consequently, when rebel movements attacked government positions in 1983 in the South and later across the Ethiopian border and in Darfur in 2003, many if not most of the government soldiers came from those very areas. Senior officials apparently questioned whether these troops could be counted upon to fire “on their own relatives,” and several leaders in Khartoum decided to confront these rebellions instead by arming traditional enemies of the insurgents as militias. The result was Southern tribes (non-Dinka) versus Southern insurgents (the Dinka-heavy SPLA), Darfuri militias (non-Fur) against the Fur-heavy SLA, and non-Zaghawa against the Zaghawa-dominated Justice and Equality Movement (JEM; see Regional Dynamics and Conflict, ch. 4).

The result of all these developments was further fragmentation of regional identity, but increased tribal loyalty. In the 2000s, it was no longer accurate to describe the confrontations as Arab Northerners versus African Southerners, but rather as infighting among Northern factions over control of the Center, whereas some Southern tribes have aligned with the government in Khartoum against their Southern neighbors. The same is true in Darfur, where some groups have attacked government positions, and Khartoum responded by arming other Darfuri with a history of either traditional or recent (1990s skirmishes) enmity toward the SLA and JEM. What may have been common Darfuri grievances due to marginalization by Khartoum have been superseded by life and death struggles pitting Darfuris against each other.
All this is not to deny the continuance of some ancient preconceptions, because North–South hostilities predate the colonial era. In the nineteenth century and earlier, many Arabs saw the South as a source for slaves and considered its peoples inferior by virtue of their paganism if not their color. Organized slave raiding ended in the late nineteenth century, but the residue of bitterness remained among Southerners, and the Arab view of Southerners as pagans persisted.

During British rule, whatever limited accommodation there may have been between Arabs and Africans was neither widespread nor deep enough to counteract a longer history of conflict between these peoples. At the same time, for their own reasons, the colonial authorities encouraged segregation of the ethnically different North and South (see Britain’s Southern Policy, ch. 1).

However, neither Arab attitudes of superiority nor British dominance in the South led to loss of self-esteem among peoples there. A number of observers remarked that most Southern peoples, particularly Nilotes, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk, were fiercely proud and refused to consider their religious orientations and lifestyles to be inferior to those of the country’s dominant elite.

Other tensions within Northern Sudan originated not from traditional antipathies but from competition for scarce resources. For example, there has been a conflict between the Rufaa al-Haj, a group of Arab pastoralists living in the area between the Blue Nile and the White Nile, and Fallata (Fulani) herders. The movements of the Fallata intersected with the seasonal migrations of the Rufaa al-Haj. Here ethnic differences aggravated but did not cause competition.

The general reluctance of groups in the South to accept Muslim Arab domination likewise did not imply Southern solidarity. The opportunities for power and wealth in the new politics and bureaucracy in South Sudan were limited in the early 2000s; some groups felt deprived of their shares by the preeminent Southern group, the Dinka. Since at least the early 1970s, one of the main sources of ethnic conflict in the South was the extent to which the Dinka dominated politics there and controlled the allocation of rewards, whether of government posts or of other opportunities. In the 1955–56 census, the Dinka constituted a little more than 40 percent of the total population of the three provinces that at that time constituted the South: Bahr al-Ghazal, Aali an-Nil, and Al-Istiwai. Because no other group approached their numbers as Southern independence was imminent, the Dinka were expected to play a large part in the new political life of South Sudan.

Some of the leading figures in the South, such as Abel Alier, head of the South’s regional government from 1972 until 1981, are Dinka, as was the late SPLA leader John Garang (although the SPLA made an
effort to shed its Dinka image by cultivating supporters in other
groups). It is not known whether the 25 Dinka tribal groups are equally
represented in the alleged Dinka predominance. During the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium, the colonial power deprived other groups,
such as the Nuer, a comparable Nilotic people and traditional rivals of
the Dinka, of leadership opportunities because they were considered
intractable, were then not numerous, and lived in inaccessible areas.
By the 1990s, however, the Nuer had begun to offer themselves as
determined rivals to the Dinka. It is these kinds of ethnic divisions and
tensions within and among different peoples in Sudan that helped fos-
ter civil strife and that hindered national unity and peace.

Religious Life

Religion in Sudan, as in many developing countries, is not only a
matter of spirituality and rituals, but also a major form of social iden-
tity. In the 2000s, about 75 percent of Sudan’s population is Muslim.
Most live in the North of the country, where they constitute more than
90 percent of the population. Data on Christians are less reliable; esti-
mates range from 4 to 10 percent of the population.

Perhaps 20 percent of the Sudanese are still attached to the indige-
nous religions of their forebears. Most Christian Sudanese and adher-
cents of local religious systems originated in the South but by the early
2000s were spread throughout all regions. Islam has made inroads into
the Southern states and the Nuba Mountains; many estimates hold that
its adherents are roughly equal to the number of Christians but are less
visible because mission-educated Christians have superior education
and many have become leaders in government and political movements.

Islam: Tenets and Practice

Sudanese Muslims are adherents of the Sunni branch of Islam, some-
times called orthodox, by far the larger of the two major branches, the
other being Shi’a (see Glossary), which is not represented in Sudan.
Sunni Islam in Sudan is not marked by a uniform body of belief or prac-
tice, however. Some Muslims oppose aspects of Sunni orthodoxy, and
rites having a non-Islamic origin are widespread, accepted as if they
were integral to Islam, or sometimes recognized as separate. Moreover,
Sunni Islam in Sudan (as in much of Africa) has been characterized by
the formation of religious orders or brotherhoods, each of which makes
special demands on its adherents.

Islam requires of the faithful five fundamental obligations that con-
stitute the Five Pillars of Islam. The first pillar, the shahada or profes-
sion of faith, is the affirmation “There is no god but God (Allah) and
Muhammad is his prophet.” It is the first step in becoming a Muslim and a significant part of prayer. The second obligation is prayer at five specified times of the day. The third enjoins almsgiving. The fourth requires fasting during daylight hours in the month of Ramadan. The fifth requires a pilgrimage to Mecca for those able to perform it, to participate in the special rites that occur during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar.

Most Sudanese Muslims who are born to the faith meet the first requirement. Conformity to the second requirement is more variable. Many males in the cities and larger towns manage to pray five times a day—at dawn, noon, midafternoon, sundown, and evening. Only one or two of these prayer times occurs during the usual working day of an urban dweller. A cultivator or pastoralist may be less vigorous in meeting these requirements. Regular prayer is considered the mark of a true Muslim; it is usually accomplished individually or in small groups. Congregational prayer takes place at the mosque on Friday when Muslims (usually men, but occasionally women separately located) gather, not only for the noon prayer, but also to hear readings and a sermon by the local imam. Muslims fast during the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, Ramadan, the time during which the first revelations to Muhammad occurred. It is a period during which most Muslims must abstain from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual activity during the daylight hours. The well-to-do perform little work during this period, and many businesses operate on reduced schedules. Because the months of the lunar calendar revolve through the solar year, Ramadan occurs during the various seasons over a period of about 33 years. Observance appears to be widespread, especially in urban areas and among sedentary Sudanese Muslims.

Historically, in the Muslim world almsgiving meant both a special tax for the benefit of the poor and voluntary giving to the needy, but its voluntary aspect alone survives. Alms may be given at any time, but there are specific occasions in the Islamic year or in the life of the donor when they are more commonly dispensed. Gifts, whether of money or food, may be made on such occasions as the feasts that end Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca, or in penance for some misdeed. These offerings and others are typically distributed to poor kin and neighbors.

Because of geographic proximity, the pilgrimage to Mecca, the hajj, is less costly and arduous for the Sudanese than it is for many Muslims. Nevertheless, it takes time (or money if travel is by air), and the ordinary Sudanese Muslim has generally found it difficult to accomplish, rarely undertaking it before middle age. Some have joined pilgrimage societies into which members pay a small amount monthly and choose one of their number when sufficient funds have accumulated to send
someone on the pilgrimage. A returned pilgrim is entitled to use the honorific title al-hajj for a man, or al-hajjah for a woman.

Another ceremony commonly observed is the great feast Id al-Adha (also known as Id al-Kabir), representing the sacrifice made during the last days of the pilgrimage. The centerpiece of the day is the slaughter of a sheep, which is distributed to the poor, kin, neighbors, and friends, as well as the immediate family.

Islam imposes a standard of encouraging generosity, fairness, and honesty. Sudanese Arabs, especially those who are wealthy, are expected by their coreligionists to be generous.

In accordance with Islamic law, most Sudanese Muslims do not eat pork or shellfish. Conformity to the prohibitions on gambling and alcohol is less widespread. Usury is forbidden by Islamic law, but Islamic banks have developed other ways of making money available to the public (see Islamic Banking, ch. 3).

Historically, Islam insists on observance of sharia, which governs not only religious activity narrowly conceived but also daily personal and social relationships. In principle, sharia stems not from legislative enactment or judicial decision but from the Quran and the hadith—the accepted sayings of Muhammad. That principle has given rise to the conventional understanding, advocated by Islamists, that there is no distinction between the religious and the secular in a truly Islamic society. Until 1983 modern criminal and civil, including commercial, law generally prevailed in Sudan. In the North, however, sharia was expected to govern what is usually called family and personal law, i.e., matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In the towns and in some sedentary communities, sharia was accepted, but in other sedentary communities and among nomads, local custom was likely to prevail—particularly with respect to inheritance (see The Legal System, ch. 4).

In September 1983, then-President Ja’far al-Numayri (in power 1969–85) imposed sharia throughout the land, eliminating the civil and penal codes by which the country had been governed in the twentieth century. His government brought in traditional Islamic punishments for theft, adultery, homicide, and other crimes. To demonstrate its “Islamic commitment” vis-à-vis the large number of Northern Muslim skeptics, the al-Numayri regime went out of its way to implement the infamous hudud (see Glossary) laws, traditional punishments that had not been employed during the entire previous century and that earned the regime much criticism in the foreign media. The zealfulness with which these punishments were carried out contributed to the fall of al-Numayri. Nevertheless, no successor government, including that of Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, has shown an inclination to abandon sharia, although its application is now limited to majority-Muslim states.
Islam is monotheistic, and Sunnis insist that there can be no intercessors between an individual and God. Nevertheless, folk Islam in Sudan includes a belief in spirits as sources of illness or other afflictions and in magical ways of dealing with them. The imam of a mosque is a prayer leader and preacher of sermons. He may also be a teacher and in smaller communities combines both functions. In the latter role, he is called a faqih (pl., fuqaha), although a faqih need not be an imam. In addition to teaching in the local Quranic school (khalwa), the faqih is expected to write texts from the Quran or magical verses to be used as amulets and cures. His blessing may be asked at births, marriages, deaths, and other important occasions, and he may be asked to participate in wholly non-Islamic harvest rites in some remote places. All of these functions and capacities make the faqih the most important figure in popular Islam; but he is not a priest. His religious authority is based on his putative knowledge of the Quran, sharia, and techniques for dealing with occult threats to health and well-being. The notion that the words of the Quran will protect against the actions of evil spirits or the evil eye is deeply embedded in popular Islam, and the amulets prepared by the faqih are intended to protect their wearers against these dangers.

In Sudan as in much of African Islam, the cult of the saint is of considerable importance, although some Muslims would reject it. The development of the cult is closely related to the presence of the religious orders; many who came to be considered saints after their deaths were founders or leaders of religious orders who in their lifetimes were thought to have baraka, a state of blessedness implying an inner spiritual power inherent in the religious office. Baraka intensifies after death as the deceased becomes a wali (literally custodial guardian, but in this context translated as saint). The tomb and other places associated with the saintly being become the loci of the person’s baraka, and in some views he or she becomes the guardian spirit of the locality. The intercession of the wali is sought on a variety of occasions, particularly by those seeking cures or by barren women desiring children. A saint’s annual holy day is the occasion of a local festival, which may attract a large gathering.

Better-educated Muslims in Sudan often disapprove of such practices; some may participate in prayer at the saint’s tomb but argue that prayer is directed only to God. Many others, however, see the saint not merely as an intercessor with, and an agent of, God, but also as a nearly autonomous source of blessing and power, thereby approaching popular as opposed to orthodox Islam.
Islamic Movements and Religious Orders

Islam made its deepest and longest-lasting impact in Sudan through the activity of the Islamic religious brotherhoods or orders. These orders emerged in the Middle East in the twelfth century in connection with the development of Sufism, a mystical current reacting to the strongly legalistic orientation of orthodox Islam. The orders first came to Sudan in the sixteenth century and became significant in the eighteenth. Sufism seeks for its adherents a closer personal relationship with God through special spiritual disciplines. The exercises (dhikr) include reciting prayers and passages of the Quran and repeating the names, or attributes, of God while performing physical movements according to the formula established by the founder of the particular order. Singing and dancing may be introduced. The outcome of an exercise, which lasts much longer than the usual daily prayer, is often a state of ecstatic abandon.

A mystical or devotional way (sing., tariqa; pl., turuq) is the basis for the formation of particular orders, each of which is also called a tariqa. The specialists in religious law and learning initially looked askance at Sufism and the Sufi orders, but the leaders of the orders in Sudan have won acceptance by acknowledging the significance of the sharia and not claiming that Sufism replaces it.

The principal turuq vary considerably in their practice and internal organization. Some orders are tightly organized in hierarchical fashion; others have allowed their local branches considerable autonomy. There may be as many as a dozen turuq in Sudan. Some are restricted to that country; others are widespread in Africa or the Middle East. Several turuq, for all practical purposes independent, are offshoots of older orders and were established by men who altered in major or minor ways the tariqa of the orders to which they had formerly been attached.

The oldest and most widespread of the turuq is the Qadiriyyah founded by Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani in Baghdad in the twelfth century and introduced into Sudan in the sixteenth. The Qadiriyyah’s principal rival and the largest tariqa in the western part of the country is the Tijaniyyah, a sect begun by Ahmad al-Tijani in Morocco, which eventually penetrated Sudan in about 1810 via the western Sahel (see Glossary). Many Tijani became influential in Darfur, and other adherents settled in northern Kordofan. A class of Tijani merchants arose later on as markets grew in towns and trade expanded, making them less concerned with providing religious leadership. Of greater importance to Sudan was the tariqa established by followers of Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris, known as al-Fasi, who died in 1837. Although he lived in Arabia and never visited Sudan, his students spread into the Nile valley, estab-
Members of the Qadiriyyah order at a dhikr, a religious rite, in Khartoum, 2002. Here men twirl in a dance in the manner of the famed “whirling dervishes” of Sudan, reaching a state of ecstasy. Copyright Lillian Craig Harris

lishing indigenous Sudanese orders, the Majdhubiyyah, the Idrisiyyah, and the Khatmiyyah.

Much different in organization from the other brotherhoods is the Khatmiyyah (or Mirghaniyyah after the name of the order’s founder). Established in the early nineteenth century by Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, it became the best organized and most politically oriented and powerful of the turuq in eastern Sudan (see The Turkiyya, 1821–85, ch. 1). Al-Mirghani had been a student of Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris and had joined several important orders, calling his own order the Khattim at-Turuq (hence Khatmiyyah, meaning the seal of the paths). The salient features of the Khatmiyyah are the extraordinary status of the al-Mirghani family, whose members alone may head the order; loyalty to the order, which guarantees paradise; and the centralized control of the order’s branches.

The Khatmiyyah is centered in Kassala and Al-Gedaref States, and its greatest following is in eastern Sudan and in portions of the riverine area. The al-Mirghani family was able to turn the Khatmiyyah into a political power base, despite its broad geographical distribution, because of the tight control they exercise over their followers. Moreover, gifts from followers over the years have given the family and the order the wealth to organize politically and eventually led to the formation of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which competed in the first free elections for parliament. In the 1960s, the PDP helped form the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which some 50 years later remained the second largest party or movement in the country (see Democratic Unionist Party, ch. 4). Khatmiyyah members tend to vote
overwhelmingly for the DUP, much as Ansar tend to vote over­whelm­ingly for the Umma Party.

Khatmiyyah influence does not equal, however, that of the al-Mir­ghani principal rival, known as Ansar, or followers of the Madhi (see Glossary). Their present-day leader is Sadiq al-Mahdi, the great-grand­son of the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad ibn al-Sayyid Abdallah, whose uprising in the 1880s drove the Egyptian–Ottoman Turk administration from Sudan in 1885. Most other orders are either smaller or less well organized than the Khatmiyyah. Moreover, unlike many other African Muslims, Sudanese Muslims in urban areas are less inclined to identify with one or another tariqa. Instead they prefer more openly political movements that seek to change Islamic society and governance to con­form to their own visions of the true nature of Islam.

Mahdism was a late nineteenth-century movement in origin. It has been linked to a religious order, but it is not a tariqa in the traditional sense. Mahdism and its adherents, the Ansar, seek the regeneration of Islam, and in general, are critical of the turuq. Muhammad Ahmad ibn al-Sayyid Abdallah, a faqih, proclaimed himself to be Al-Mahdi al­Muntazar (“the awaited guide in the right path,” usually seen as the Mahdi), the messenger of God and representative of the Prophet Muhammad, not simply a charismatic and learned teacher, an assertion that became an article of faith among the Ansar. He was sent, he said, to prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet ‘Isa (Jesus) and the impending end of the world. In anticipation of Judgment Day, it was essential that the people return to a simple and rigorous, even puritanical, Islam (see The Mahdiyyah, 1885–98, ch. 1).

The idea of the coming of a Mahdi has its roots in Sunni and Shi’a Islamic traditions. The issue for Sudanese and other Muslims was whether Muhammad Ahmad was in fact the Mahdi. Indisputably, however, Muhammad Ahmad managed to unify the majority of Sudan’s tribes in an uprising against misrule by Egyptians administering the Turkiyyah. His movement succeeded in ridding the country of foreign rule in 1885, and in that respect it had parallels in other North and West African sectarian movements.

In the century since the Mahdist uprising and into the 2000s, the neo-Mahdist movement and the Ansar, supporters of Mahdism from western Sudan, have persisted as a political force in Sudan. Many groups, from the Baqqara cattle nomads to the largely sedentary tribes on the White Nile, support this movement. The Ansar are hierarchi­cally organized under the control of Muhammad Ahmad’s successors, who all belonged to the al-Mahdi family (members of the ashraf). The ambitions and varying political perspectives of different members of the family have led to internal conflicts, and it appears that Sadiq al­
Mahdi, president of the Umma Party since 1964 and putative leader of the Ansar since the early 1970s, does not enjoy the unanimous support of all Mahdist. Mahdist family political goals and ambitions seem to have taken precedence over the movement’s original religious mission. The modern-day Ansar are thus loyal more to the political descendants of the Mahdi than to the religious message of Mahdism.

By the 1950s, a substantial number of well-educated middle-class urban Muslims began to feel uncomfortable with the tradition-bound and rural-based *turuq*. Some opted for the Nile Unity Party (NUP) as an alternative political organization, which gained some success in the early elections and produced the country’s first prime minister, Isma’il al-Azhari. Others considered the NUP, the Umma, and other parties to be too factionalized and based only on sectarian and regional support rather than on national interests. These champions of a “New Sudan” were drawn from the urban intelligentsia and divided fairly evenly in the 1960s between the far left—two communist parties—and the far right—the Muslim Brotherhood (see Glossary). One of the Brotherhood’s co-founders, Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, continued to play a national role in the early 2000s.

**Christianity**

Christianity in Sudan can be divided into three categories: the numerically small, but historically oldest, Orthodox churches; the numerically large “establishment” churches; and the numerically small, but fervently supported, foreign-based evangelical churches.

Christianity traveled southward up the Nile in the fourth century from the Holy See of Alexandria, and its Coptic Orthodox adherents can be found in small numbers in the urban areas of Sudan (and in much greater numbers in neighboring Egypt). The Greek Orthodox community is equally small and consists of Greek and Syrian merchant families who established businesses in the Ottoman period. Both Orthodox communities have thriving schools and social clubs in Khartoum as well as modern church buildings in the capital. Ethiopian Orthodoxy is found among Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in Khartoum and in the border region near Kassala.

Christians in a second category attend what British colonialists deemed mainstream churches, e.g., Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Roman Catholics. Under the colonial system known as indirect administration, British missionaries were allocated what was then Upper Nile region, and the Belgian “White Fathers” Order, Equatoria Province, now Central Equatoria, East Equatoria, and West Equatoria. Church buildings had to be accompanied by a school and small health facility. In this fashion, Christian missionaries functioned as local “extension services” for the district.
commissioners and were seen as such. These missions continued to operate intermittently if they survived the ravages of two civil wars; in the early 2000s, their adherents are reasonably well assimilated. Most clergy in these areas are now indigenous. As a result of the theological division of territory, Catholics are found along the borders with Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the highest concentration being clustered around Juba and Torit. Thought to be the largest Christian denomination, they numbered 4.6 million in 2005 and were led by an indigenous Dinka, Cardinal Gabriel Zubayr.

The Christians in a third category are members of charismatic churches, whose founders originally had been allocated the geographically more difficult central–south region, meaning former Bahr al-Ghazal State. They depend overwhelmingly on foreign-based missionary organizations, particularly American evangelicals, who have backed them financially and whose supporters in Washington, DC, have been among the most adamant critics of Khartoum regimes. Their churches and communities have been the most exposed to the fighting that has raged in the South.

The Nilotic peoples were originally indifferent to Christianity, because most identified it with the conquering colonial powers, perceiving it as the “white man’s religion.” In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, many persons in the educated elite embraced its tenets, at least superficially, as Christianity and English became symbols of opposition to Khartoum and/or Muslim domination.

The treatment of Christians in Sudan after the introduction of sharia law in September 1983 was quite controversial. Most observers agree that then-President Ja’far al-Numayri instituted these laws to shore up his faltering regime in the face of ever-spreading disaffection among Muslim Northerners and at a time—April 1983—when the previously more-quiescent Southerners were partly engaged in a new rebellion. His increasingly insecure regime tried to prove its Islamist credentials by harsh application of the new hudud laws in the capital region, especially regarding alcohol consumption and petty thievery.

This step coincided with the arrival of large numbers of bewildered refugees from the South, who had fled to the capital area with the recent outbreak of war. They were unfamiliar not only with their new residential surroundings but also with the new laws. This resulted in hudud applications falling disproportionately on unsuspecting Southern refugees or unskilled workers, many of whom had been used to the easy availability of alcoholic drink on their day off on Sunday. Not surprisingly, news of Southerners being victimized at the hands of the “Islamic” and “Arab” government spread internally as well as interna-
tionally and exacerbated existing tensions. These reports were subsequently cited as alleged evidence of discrimination against non-Muslims, and they were later combined with further allegations of deliberate government policies to “Islamize” Christians from the South.

In reality, Christians of many denominations practice their religion freely in Sudan. As of 2011, they were found not only in the South, but also more than 2 million were spread throughout the cities of the North. They have access to churches ranging from small and primitive buildings to large and majestic cathedrals, such as those in Khartoum and Wau, although churches are not necessarily within easy commuting distance. Christian activities include small Pentecostal churches on the edge of urban areas, established seminaries in Khartoum North, and open-air services attended by thousands of worshipers in downtown Khartoum.

Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox denominations are all members of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), a countrywide organization for the protection and promotion of their common interests. A subgroup, the New Sudan Council of Churches, was established when war made it logistically difficult for Southerners to participate in SCC affairs. A larger umbrella group, the Sudan Inter-Religious Council, is an outgrowth of the peace accords of 2005. Intended to foster dialogue
and reconciliation between Christian and Muslim communities, the
council sponsored a conference on the role of religious leaders in
peacemaking in July 2005, among other initiatives.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005 decreed
that each state determines the nature of its laws by majority vote, a
reaffirmation of de facto national policy since at least the mid-1990s.
Sharia remains in force in the 15 provinces of the North, but non-
Muslims in Khartoum are exempt from punishments prescribed by
sharia and enjoy other religious protections. Christians and tradition­
alists in the 10 states of the South enjoy unrestricted religious free­
dom without regard for Islamic laws and regulations.

**Indigenous African Religions**

Among Southerners, each indigenous religion is unique to a spe­
cific ethnic group, although several groups may share elements of
belief and ritual because of common ancestry or mutual influence.
The group serves as the congregation, and an individual usually
belongs to that faith by virtue of membership in the group. Believing
and acting in a religious mode is part of daily life and is linked to the
social, political, and economic actions and relationships of the
group. The beliefs and practices of indigenous African religions in
Sudan are not systematized, in that people do not generally attempt
to put together in coherent fashion the doctrines they hold and the
rituals they practice.

The concept of a high spirit or divinity, usually seen as a creator
and sometimes ultimately responsible for the actions of lesser spirits,
is common to most groups in the South. Often the higher divinity is
remote, and believers treat the other spirits as autonomous, orienting
their rituals to these spirits rather than to the high god. Such spirits
may be perceived as forces of nature or as manifestations of ances­
tors. Spirits may intervene in people’s lives, either because individu­
als or groups have transgressed the norms of the society or have
failed to pay adequate attention to the ritual that should be generally
addressed to the spirits.

The Nilotes generally acknowledge an active supreme deity, who
is therefore the object of ritual, but the belief and rituals differ from
group to group. The Nuer, for example, have no word corresponding
solely and exclusively to God. The word sometimes so translated
refers not only to the universal governing spirit but also to ancestors
and forces of nature whose spirits are considered aspects of God. It is
possible to pray to one spirit as distinct from another but not as dis­
tinct from God. Often the highest manifestation of spirit, God, is
prayed to directly. God is particularly associated with the winds, the
sky, and birds, but these are not worshipped. The Dinka attribute any remarkable occurrence to the direct influence of God and will sometimes mark the occasion with an appropriate ritual. Aspects of God (the universal spirit) are distinguished, chief of which is *deng* (rain). For the Nuer, the Dinka, and other Nilotes, human beings are as ants to God, whose actions are not to be questioned and who is regarded as the judge of all human behavior.

Cattle play a significant role in Nilotic rituals. Cattle are sacrificed to God as expiatory substitutes for their owners. The function is consistent with the significance of cattle in all aspects of Nilotic life. Among the Nuer, for example, and with some variations among the Dinka, cattle are the foundation of family and community life, essential to subsistence, marriage payments, and personal pride. The cattle shed is a shrine and meeting place, the center of the household; a man of substance, head of the family, and a leading figure in the community is called a “bull.” Every man and the spirits themselves have ox names that denote their characteristic qualities. These beliefs and institutions give meaning to the symbolism of rubbing ashes on a sacrificial cow’s back in order to transfer the burden of the owner’s sins to the animal.

The universal god of the Shilluk is more remote than that of the Nuer and Dinka and is addressed through the founder of the Shilluk royal clan. Nyiking, considered both man and god, is not clearly distinguished from the supreme deity in ritual, although the Shilluk may make the distinction in discussing their beliefs. The king (*reth*) of the Shilluk is regarded as divine, an idea that has never been accepted by the Nuer and Dinka.

All of the Nilotes, and other peoples as well, pay attention to ancestral spirits, the nature of the cult varying considerably as to the kinds of ancestors who are thought to have power in the lives of their descendants. Sometimes, it may be the founding ancestors of the group whose spirits are potent. In many cases, it is the recently deceased ancestors who are active and must be placated.

There is a wide range of natural forces thought to be activated by spirits, of which perhaps the most common is rain. Although Southern Sudan does not suffer as acutely as the North from lack of rain, there has sometimes been a shortage, particularly from the 1970s to 1990; this shortage has created or exacerbated hardship, famine, and the travail of civil war. For this reason, rituals connected with rain have become important in many ethnic groups, and ritual specialists concerned with rain or thought to incarnate the spirit of rain are important figures.
The distinction between the natural and the supernatural that has emerged in the Western world is not relevant to traditional religions. Spirits may have much greater power than human beings, but their powers are perceived not as altering the way the world commonly works but rather as explaining occurrences in nature or in the social world.

Some men and women are also thought to have extraordinary powers. How these powers are believed to have been acquired and exercised varies from group to group. In general, however, some people are thought to have inherited the capacity to harm others and to have a disposition to do so. Typically, they are accused of inflicting illness on specific individuals, frequently their neighbors or kin. In some groups, it is thought that men and women who have no inherent power to harm may nevertheless do damage to others by manipulating images of the victim or items closely associated with that person.

An individual may occasionally be thought of as a sorcerer. When illness or some other affliction strikes in a form that is generally attributed to a sorcerer, there are ways (typically some form of divination) of confirming that witchcraft was used and of identifying the sorcerer.

The notions of sorcery are not limited to the South but are found in varying forms among peoples, including nomads and other Arabs, who consider themselves Muslims. A specific belief widespread among Arabs and other Muslim peoples is the notion of the evil eye. Although a physiological peculiarity of the eye (walleye or cross-eye) may be considered indicative of the evil eye, any persons expressing undue interest in the private concerns of another may be suspected of inflicting deliberate harm by a glance. Unlike most witchcraft, where the perpetrator is known by and often close to the victim, the evil eye is usually attributed to strangers. Children are thought to be the most vulnerable.

Ways exist to protect oneself against sorcery or the evil eye. Many magico-religious specialists—diviners and sorcerers—deal with these matters in Sudanese societies. The diviner is able to determine whether witchcraft or sorcery is responsible for the affliction and to discover the source. He also protects and cures by providing amulets and other protective devices for a fee or by helping a victim punish (in occult fashion) the sorcerer in order to be cured of the affliction. If it is thought that an evil spirit has possessed a person, an exorcist may be called in. In some groups, these tasks may be accomplished by one person; in others, the degree of specialization may be greater. In the North, among Muslim peoples, the faqih may spend more of his time as diviner, dispenser of amulets, healer, and exorcist than as Quranic teacher, imam of a mosque, or mystic.
The Society and Its Environment

Social Order

The social order in Sudan was very much in flux in the 2000s. Various factors, including rural to urban migration; the large numbers of displaced persons—foreign and native—in so many parts of the country, many of whom were starting to return to their homes after the end of the civil war; economic pressures forcing more and more women into the labor force; plus the increased availability of modern technology (e.g., cellular telephones, television stations, and the growing availability of the Internet to at least professional elites in urban settings), have all combined to create new social patterns that were still evolving.

The “old” Sudan, where religious, tribal, and village notables held sway in an unchallenged fashion, so prevalent for most of the twentieth century and before, still existed but no longer dominated the country’s social order. Parallel to it were fragmented societies in large urban settings, smaller kinship communities in the poorer outskirts ringing the large centers, and the extensive dwelling areas of displaced persons who were at least temporarily cut off from their traditional leaders. Young men and women more often than not had to fend for themselves, whether they were, for example, Northern Muslim university graduates or Southern migrant women selling beer, or perhaps themselves, in order to make ends meet. In addition, it was alleged—although such a factor was probably exaggerated—that most Sudanese had relatives living abroad who sent not only some financial support but also accompanying ideas about other ways of living, worshipping, and identifying. While such influences were common for North Africans who lived close to Europe, or Lebanese and Palestinians working in Gulf countries or overseas, they were relatively new to Sudan.

Many outside observers have noted over the years how strongly anchored Sudanese customs and values have been. Historically, poor Sudanese found economic and personal support with their kinfolk, and it was not uncommon for a man fallen on hard times to stay at a relative’s home for months at a time, certain in the knowledge that he would be cared for and not asked for anything in return. In the new century, this pattern has become the exception rather than the rule. If there is no future at home, the preferred option is to join relatives abroad, for those who can devise the means to do so.

How, then, can one present the “new” social order in the early 2000s? At least five separate lifestyles can be observed: that found in the core of the major cities, that of the ex-urbs surrounding them, settled village folk in the rural areas, seminomads, and genuine pastoralists. The last two categories are distinguished by the fact that seminomads have a defined home base inhabited year-round by the
old, the very young, and the infirm, but from which the rest of the tribe moves out for six to nine months at a time and then returns. Genuine pastoralists, who are very few in number, have no fixed specific address but roam in generalized areas that are commonly recognized by friend and foe.

**Northern Society**

The paramount chief remains a venerated figure for tribally organized Sudanese, one who still dispenses judgments regarding personal conduct, answers local administrative questions, and sometimes even comments on marriage. Among Arabs and Arabized Northerners, he is known as the nazir. Below him is the subtribal chief usually referred to as sheikh (although that term has multiple meanings). Most people in the South also recognize paramount chiefs for large tribes, but their honorific names vary locally.

In rural villages and even in some near the edges of large cities, the administrative head is referred to as omda. His role as village headman parallels in many ways that of the patriarch of an extended family and, in large villages, that of the sheikh heading the hara, or quarter. Omada rule by consensus, rather than by dictate, take responsibility for knowing every person living in their area, and are always approachable by one and all. They, not the police, adjudicate disputes. They mediate between families, and they offer advice on education, work opportunities, and marriage issues. Their source of authority is always customary law, although some central governments validate their positions officially, as did the British-led colonial administration and the early postindependence regimes, which preferred to administer local government through such traditional leaders. They should not, however, be seen as autocrats, because their position depends on acceptance by the community and they are required to consult regularly with all parties, most especially with local “wise men” with whom they are likely to be in daily contact.

Parallel to these territorial communities are the religious associations (see Religious Life, this ch.). In settled rural areas, the faqih might have similar authority to the omda or sheikh, except that his domain is typically limited to spiritual and mystical areas; he would not be consulted on matters of local government.

The closer one approaches to the cities through the more rural outskirts—and in the case of the capital region through impoverished refugee camps—the central and widely accepted authority figure is absent. There are, of course, some local leaders, but their authority does not compare with that of the sheikh or nazir. If local disputes arise and they cannot be resolved quickly by government authorities,
who in any case would have less legitimacy than the traditional leaders in the eyes of the local populace, the dispute might simply fester for long periods, or the offended party might move away to another ex-urban location. Newcomers to urban centers have shallow roots by definition and feel less pressured to conform to local norms, to which they have no allegiance in this extremely heterogeneous society.

Aside from the presence of government buildings, core urban areas tend to be more stable because of their location and longevity. Established neighborhoods used to be “overseen” by a sheikh, but in recent years the civil servants, businessmen, educators, laborers, entertainers, and other professional people are consumed by the typical urban preoccupations of seemingly never-ending rush-hour traffic, shopping, and visiting relatives in typically large extended families no longer living side-by-side as in rural areas or days of yore. The introduction of minibuses, cellular phones, extended Sudanese television transmission, plus the availability for the middle and upper classes of satellite TV and the Internet, has visibly shifted the focus of daily activities from extended to nuclear families. For sure, in times of stress, relatives come together in solidarity vis-à-vis the world, but on a day-to-day basis, life in the large cities of Sudan resembles more and more that of midsize cities in the West. Consequently, the “big men” so easily identifiable in rural areas are not found in large cities. If anything, they are being replaced by well-known singers, famous poets, and the occasional entertainer. Businessmen and top professionals in medicine, law, and information technology are all concentrated in the capital region and, together with senior officials in the national government, have formed a new class in which everyone seems to know almost everyone else. Together they form what some refer to as the “political state” or the “ruling class.”

Southern Communities

South Sudan, by contrast, evolved somewhat differently, in part because of its different demography, but also because the colonial administration had created a Closed Districts Ordinance to protect the region from both commercial and cultural influences from the North. In preindependence Sudan, most communities in the South were small, except for the large conglomerate of Nilotes, Dinka, and Nuer who dominated what were then Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile Provinces and the Azande people of former Equatoria Province. During the Condominium, the colonial administration imposed stronger local authority on communities in the South. It made local leaders into chiefs or headmen and gave them executive and judicial powers—tempered by local councils, usually elders—to administer their people, under the scrutiny of a British district commissioner. As in the
North, the relatively fluid relationships and boundaries among Southerners became better defined and more stabilized.

There is scant systematic evidence of how independence, civil war, and famine affected the social order of the peoples of the South. The gradual incorporation of Southerners into the national system—if only as migrant laborers and as local craftsmen—and increased opportunities for education did, however, affect social arrangements, ideas of status, and political views.

An educated elite emerged in the South after independence, and by the early 2000s, some members of this elite were important politicians and administrators at the regional and national levels. Other members, however, had emigrated to escape Northern discrimination. How the newer elite was linked to the older traditional one was not clear. Secular chieftainships had been mostly gifts of the colonial authorities, but the sons of chiefs took advantage of their positions to get a Western education and to create family ties among local and regional elites.

South Sudan’s development of an elite class based on education and government position came about in part because of the absence of an indigenous trading and entrepreneurial class, which might have challenged the educated elite. Merchants there were mostly Arabs or others originating elsewhere, especially Greeks. In addition, the South lacked the equivalent of the Muslim leaders of religious orders in the North, who also might have claimed a share of influence. Instead of several elites owing their status and power to varied sources and constituencies, the South developed an elite that looked for its support to persons of the same ethnic background and to those who identified with the South’s African heritage.

Clans were of two kinds in traditional Nilotic society. One kind, a minority but a large one, consisted of clans whose members had religious functions and furnished the priests of subtribes and sometimes of tribes. These priests have been called chiefs or masters of the fishing spear, a reference to the ritual importance of that instrument. Clans of the other kind were warrior groupings. The difference was one of function rather than rank. A spear master prayed for his people when they went to war, or in other difficult situations, and mediated between quarreling groups. He could function as a leader, but his powers lay in persuasion, not coercion. A spear master with a considerable reputation for spiritual power was deferred to on many issues. In rare cases—the most important being that of the Shilluk—one of the ritual offices gained influence over an entire people, and its holder was assigned the attributes of a divine king.

A special religious figure—commonly called a prophet—has arisen among some of the Nilotic peoples from time to time. Such prophets,
thought to be possessed by a sky spirit, often had much wider influence than the ritual officeholders, who were confined to specific territorial clan or lineage segments. They gained substantial reputations as healers and used those reputations to rally their peoples against other ethnic groups and sometimes against “the Arabs” and the Europeans. The Condominium authorities considered prophets subversive, even when their message did not apparently oppose authority, and hence suppressed them.

Another social pattern common to the Nilotes was the age-set system. Traditionally, males were periodically initiated into sets according to age; with the set, they moved through a series of stages, assuming and shedding rights and responsibilities as the group advanced in age. The system was closely linked to warfare and raiding, which diminished during the Condominium. In postindependence times, civil war and famine further undermined the system, and its remnants seemed likely to fade as formal education becomes more accessible.

The Dinka were the most populous Nilotic people historically, so numerous that social and political patterns varied from one tribal group to another. Among the Dinka, the tribal group was composed of a set of independent tribes that settled in a continuous area. The tribe, which ranged in size from 1,000 to 25,000 persons, traditionally had only two political functions. First, it controlled and defended the dry-season pastures of its constituent subtribes; second, if a member of the tribe killed another member, the issue would be resolved peacefully. Homicide committed by someone outside the tribe was avenged, but not by the tribe as a whole. The colonial administration, seeking equitable access to adequate pasturage for all tribes, introduced a different system and thus eliminated one of the tribe’s two responsibilities. In postindependence Sudan, the handling of homicide as a crime against the state made the tribe’s second function also irrelevant. The utilization and politicization of ethnic groups as units of local government have supported the continuation of tribal structures into the present; however, tribal chiefs in the early 2000s did not fulfill any traditional functions except as sage advisers to their people in personal and family matters.

Some attempts were made to transform these ethnic tribal structures in order to produce a national, or at least a greater subnational, identity. For instance, in the early formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), one of the main ideological goals was to produce a new non-Northern, riverine-area solidarity based on the mobilization of diverse ethnic groups in deprived areas (see Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, ch. 4; Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, ch. 5). To achieve this new sense of solidarity, it attempted to recruit not just
peoples in the South but also the Fur, Funj, Nuba, and Beja communities. Its success was limited by the persistent perception that the SPLM was essentially Dinka-based. Further, non-Dinka Southerners were suspicious of the leadership’s motives, even though many, like the above-mentioned four communities based in the North, agreed on the principle of resisting perceived Arab domination. Examples of splits within the rebel movement in the South were the establishment of the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM), which resulted from other tribal and clan identities following a proposed peace agreement in 1997.

The subtribes were the largest significant political segments historically, and they were converted into subchiefdoms by the colonial government. Although the subchiefs were stripped of most of their administrative authority during the al-Numayri regime (1969–85) and replaced by loyal members of the Sudan Socialist Union, the advice of subchiefs continued to be sought on local matters. Thus, a threeteried system was created: the traditional authorities, the Sudanese civil service, and the political bureaucrats from Khartoum. During the 1980s, this confused system of administration dissolved into virtual anarchy as a result of the replacement of one regime by another, civil war, and famine. In the South, however, during the next two decades, the SPLM created new local administrative structures in areas under its control. Even so, in general the traditional structure of Nilotic society, although severely damaged, remained relatively unchanged. Loyalties to one’s rural ethnic community were deeply rooted and were not forgotten, even by those who fled for refuge or employment to urban centers in the North.

**Urban and National Elites**

Sudan in the early 2000s did not yet have an urban national elite comparable to those of Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, or Syria in the Arab world, or to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria in Africa. Small provincial elites were found in regional capitals in the sense that government, business, and tribal and religious leaders were recognized as being “above the rest,” but they did not constitute a distinct social class. Their roots were frequently in the countryside, and they maintained dual rural–urban identities as such. These subregional mini-elites also seemed not to share significant elements of a common value system, and economic ties among them were tenuous. If a national society and elites were emerging, it was in the Three Towns constituting the national capital area. It was in Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman that the national politicians, high-level bureaucrats, senior military, educated professionals, and wealthy merchants
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and entrepreneurs lived, worked, and socialized. Even those who had residences elsewhere also maintained second family homes, especially in Omdurman.

These elites long recognized the usefulness of maintaining a presence in the capital area, traditionally living in Omdurman, a much more Arab city than Khartoum. The other truly urban elites also used to live in Omdurman until around 2000, but the concentration of the North’s varied elites in one city did not necessarily engender a common social life. As in many Arab and African cities, much of Omdurman’s population lived in separate if not wholly isolated quarters.

By the early 2000s, the capital region had become truly urbanized for the first time in Sudanese history, complete with high-rise buildings, overcrowding, and monumental traffic jams. The old and so-familiar former pattern of life, in which most educated Sudanese knew each other or knew at least someone in the other’s family, was no longer possible. If there were an in-country elite, it consisted of senior military, senior civil servants, and senior academic figures alongside the new and rising business elite and those from the (also new) worlds of satellite TV and entertainment. Compared to Western societies, the Sudanese elite knew more about each others’ families and lifestyles but did not interact very closely.

One part of the elite structure was not predominantly urban, however, although the family headquarters were located in the capital area. These were the heads of important religious groups, whose constituencies and sources of power and wealth were largely rural. Leaders of large tribes were based in their regions but maintained family homes in the capital, to which they commuted frequently and where some members of their usually very large families settled.

Most of the educated elite children whose families originated in outlying regions considered themselves to be “from Khartoum,” and the most educated, when asked about their identity, answered “Sudanese” first and foremost. This phenomenon was quite new, and it reflected disillusion with the politics and economics of the “old Sudan” in which regional, tribal, and sectarian affiliations mattered greatly, yet those political and social identities failed to deliver peace and prosperity and increasingly were blamed for the failures. To the extent that the Northern elites were Muslim and Arab—most being both—they shared an overall religion and language but were otherwise marked by differences in interest and outlook.

Still more divergent were the elite Southerners, most of whom were non-Muslims, few spoke Arabic fluently, and they were regarded—and saw themselves—not primarily as a professional or bureaucratic elite, but as a regional one. Many appeared to prefer a career in the
South to a post in Khartoum; indeed, after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 took effect, they moved to Rumbek, Wau, or Juba. These elites exercised political power directly or gave significant support to those who did. But so diverse and sometimes conflicting were their interests and outlooks that they did not constitute a cohesive class.

Sudanese society did not develop a consensus, in terms of overarching values, as to what kinds of work, talents, possessions, and background were more worthy than others and therefore conferred higher status. For generations there were merchants, entrepreneurs, and religious leaders in Sudan. The latter enjoyed a special status through the 1980s but have declined visibly ever since. For example, the prestige of both the al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani families fell considerably as a result of failures of their political leaders in the last two to three decades. This was strikingly apparent in the strife-ridden region of Darfur, where all residents—victims and victimizers—not only were Muslims but also belonged to the same sect (Ansar), yet their leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, had virtually no influence over these feuding factions. Indeed, his automobile was stoned by an enraged mob during a visit in 2004; such an event would have been unthinkable in the 1980s. In the Sudan of the early 2000s, wealth and the influence and power it generated came to carry greater status than traditional religious position.

The educated, secular elite was a newer phenomenon, and some deference was given its members by other elites. In the Muslim North, the educated ranged from devotees of Islamic activism to Islamic reformers and a few avowed secularists. Despite the respect generally given the educated, however, those at either extreme were likely to make members of other elites uncomfortable.

The younger, larger generation of the educated elite did not consist entirely of offspring of the older, smaller, educated elite. Many were sons (and sometimes daughters) of businessmen, wealthy landowners, and the tribal elite. A peculiar feature of the educated Sudanese was that large numbers lived outside Sudan for years at a time, working in Middle Eastern oil-producing states, Europe, or North America. Some of their earnings came back to Sudan, but it was not clear that they had much to do with the formation or characteristics of a specifically Sudanese elite.

Tribal and ethnic elites carried weight in specific localities and might be significant if the states were to achieve substantial autonomy; however, their importance on the national scene was questionable. That they were significant was apparent from what followed in the wake of an internal political realignment in the country’s top leadership in 1999–2000, when some exiled politicians returned, as did
some academics and well-established professionals from the oil-producing countries, Europe, North America, and even from Egypt, Kenya, and Uganda. The quid pro quo for their return was political amnesty in exchange for an understanding to refrain from attacking the government of al-Bashir and the National Congress Party.

Socializing and intermarriage among members of the different elites could be significant in establishing a cohesive upper class, but that had not happened by the early 2000s, except among a few at places such as the University of Khartoum. It was still easier for a male Sudanese intellectual to marry a non-Muslim Westerner than a Muslim from a different tribe and sect, although family acceptance of such a personal decision was on the increase.

After independence, the old elite regarded itself as the arbiter of social acceptance into the company of those riverine “Arab” families who had long lived in the Omdurman–Khartoum area, had substantial income from landholding, and had participated in the higher reaches of government during the Condominium or engaged in professions of medicine, law, and the university. Men from these families were well educated. Few engaged in business, which tended to be in the hands of families of Lebanese, Syrian, Greek, and at least partial Egyptian ancestry.

Beginning in the late 1960s, in the North Muslims of non-Mediterranean background began to acquire substantial wealth as businessmen, often as importers and exporters. These men were relatively young when they began their entrepreneurial activity, and unlike members of the older elite families, they were not well educated. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, many of these businessmen had started sending their children to Britain or the United States for advanced degrees. Reflecting trends in other societies, whereas the sons of the older elite had been educated mainly for government careers, in and after the 1980s, business education was increasingly emphasized. In contrast to the more secular elites in the professions, the civil service, and the military, however, many members of these newer economic elites gravitated toward religion and the Muslim Brotherhood. By the early 2000s, almost the entire leadership of the Sudanese Islamists had graduate degrees, usually in applied sciences, and most often from Western universities.

The older elite typically used to intermarry and exclude those whose backgrounds they did not know, even if the families were wealthy and successful in business, religion, or education. Gradually, after independence, Arabic speakers of other sedentary families acquired higher education, entered the bureaucracy or founded lucrative businesses, and began to participate to a limited degree in the social circle of the older
families. The emphasis on “good family” persisted, however, in most marriages. Sedentary “Arabs” were acceptable, as were some persons of an older mixture of “Arab” and Nile Nubian ancestry, for example, the people around Dongola. But people from the South and the West—even if Muslims—and members of nomadic groups (particularly the darker Baqqara Arabs) were not. A man from the South might be esteemed for his achievements and other qualities, but he was not considered an eligible husband for a woman of a sedentary Arab family. There are some exceptions in current times, as there were decades ago, but they are generally perceived as such.

Women and the Family

The extended family continued to provide social services in post-2000 Sudan. Traditionally, the family was responsible for everyone, including the old, the sick, and the mentally ill, although many of these responsibilities were eroded by urbanization. Whether in rural or urban society, however, the burden of these social services fell heavily upon women.

Except for the small number of liberated, educated young women from families of the elite, in the North women remained within the household and were segregated at all festivities, usually eating after the men. This was particularly the case with Muslim households. Men entertained in their own quarters, and males of an extended family ate together. In a small family, the husband ate alone or, more frequently, took his bowl to join his male neighbors.

A young university couple might live much as in the West, in an apartment or in a small house without relatives, and might live, eat, and entertain together. Nevertheless, traditional patterns were deeply rooted, and the husband might often be away visiting his male friends in their homes, in the market, or in cafés. At home a servant helped with the children. Although the educated young married or unmarried woman had greater mobility because of her job, she was not exempt from the traditional obligations and the public supremacy of the Muslim husband. She was aware that her education and job were not a license to trespass upon male-dominated social norms.

The uneducated woman had greater freedoms in some respects, as long as she was with her peers; for even among well-to-do families, a young woman was restricted to her household and female friends until transferred to similar seclusion in the house of her husband. Paradoxically, this segregation could cause a spirit of independence, particularly among educated women, for there were a host of aunts, cousins, and grandmothers to look after children and allow mothers to work outside the home. Nevertheless, social traditions governed the
way of life of Sudanese women. The segregation and subordination of women in Sudanese society should not obscure female domination of the household, just as their men commanded public life. The home and the rearing of children were their domains—so long as they upheld male-oriented social norms.

Two traditional customs among women in the North had an enormous impact on their private and social relationships—the zar cult and female “circumcision.” Zar was the name given to the ceremony conducted only by women practitioners that was required to pacify evil spirits and to cleanse women of afflictions caused by demons or jinn. Zar cults were numerous throughout Muslim Africa. Illnesses, including depression, infertility, and other organic and psychological disorders, were attributed to possession by hostile spirits. Although zar ceremonies varied widely, they not only freed the one possessed but also were great social occasions where women could communicate together as men did within male circles.

Female genital mutilation, or infibulation (excising the external genitalia and sewing the vagina shut), was widely practiced throughout Muslim and Christian Africa, and especially among Sudan’s Northern Arab population. Enormous pressure was put on girls aged 12 or younger, as well as on older women and their families, to observe these traditions.
The issue of female genital mutilation was controversial, however, because of the physical and psychological problems it caused women. The practice was opposed by Sudanese governments from the Mahdi in the nineteenth century to the current regime and by international organizations, such as the UN. Midwives performed the operation, which often led to shock, hemorrhage, and septicemia. It created innumerable obstetrical problems before and after childbirth and throughout life. Despite international conferences, legislation, and efforts to eradicate the practice, however, it appeared to be on the increase in the early 2000s, not only in Sudan but in Africa generally. At the same time, the adoption of Western medicine by the growing educated class increasingly promoted awareness of the harmful effects of infibulation. Legislation banning female genital mutilation in Sudan was in place since before independence, with severe penalties for the male head of household where it took place; even so the practice continued unabated.

In the South, the role of women differed dramatically from that in the North. Although women were subordinate to men, they enjoyed much greater freedom within their societies. Female genital mutilation was not practiced and no zar cult existed, although spirits were regularly consulted about public and private affairs through practitioners. Women had greater freedom of movement and, indeed, participated to a limited degree in the councils of lineage. Husbands consulted their wives on matters pertaining to public affairs. Many women also played important roles in the mediation of disputes, and, as of 2007, one prominent woman, Rebecca Garang, had assumed a responsible position in the Government of South Sudan. On the downside, as human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) began to spread, many in the North associated it with “African licentiousness” rather than with “freedom” for women. As one more cultural fault line along the North–South divide, the trade-off for “freedom” was seen as not worth the price of sexually transmitted diseases.

**Education**

The education sector saw steady improvement in Sudan over the 1990s and early 2000s. Even with constant unrest and unrelenting poverty, the number of children attending school rose, as did literacy rates. Still, Sudan lagged behind most of its African counterparts in terms of educating its youth. It also fell significantly below the education standards of the Arab world. Sudan’s widely dispersed rural population made mass education a difficult task. Additionally, long years of civil war interrupted schooling and displaced many families.
The Society and Its Environment

Young men and boys who would otherwise have been enrolled in secondary schools instead enlisted in the fighting. For the most part, male students had to serve in the army or Popular Defense Forces (a paramilitary body allied with the National Islamic Front) before they could enroll in one of the country’s universities. And if these challenges were not enough, poverty, especially in the South, made attending school an impossible luxury for many children.

Development of the Education System

The public and private education systems inherited by the country after independence were designed more to provide civil servants and professionals to serve the colonial administration than to educate Sudanese. Moreover, the distribution of facilities, staff, and enrollment was biased in favor of the needs of the administration and a Western curriculum. Schools tended to be clustered in the vicinity of Khartoum and to a lesser extent in other urban areas, although the population was predominantly rural. This concentration, found at all levels, was most acute in education beyond the four-year primary level. The North suffered from shortages of teachers and buildings, but education in the South, largely in the hands of missionaries, was even more inadequate. Civil strife and the ejection of all foreign missionaries in February 1964 further diminished educational opportunities in the South.

The demand for education exceeded Sudan’s educational resources. At independence in 1956, education accounted for only 15.5 percent of the Sudanese budget: this to support 1,778 primary schools (enrollment 208,688), 108 intermediate schools (enrollment 14,632), and 49 government secondary schools (enrollment 5,423). Higher education was limited to the University of Khartoum. The adult literacy rate was 23 percent. For the first decade and a half after independence, the philosophy and curriculum beyond primary school followed the British education tradition. Although all students learned Arabic and English in intermediate and secondary schools, the language of instruction at the University of Khartoum was English. Sudanese schools, in many cases unable to keep pace with the demand, relied heavily on foreign teachers to fill the necessary teaching slots.

When the al-Numayri-led government took power in 1969, it considered the education system inadequate for the needs of social and economic development. Its governing philosophy, “Arab Socialism,” was heavily influenced by the Egyptian model under Gamal Abdel Nasser. Accordingly, an extensive reorganization was proposed, which would eventually make the new six-year elementary program compulsory and would pay much attention to technical and vocational education at all
levels. Previously, primary and intermediate school had been preludes to secondary training, and secondary school prepared students for the university. The system produced some well-trained university graduates, but the great bulk of students who did not go as far as the university, or even secondary school, received little training to prepare them for technical work or skilled labor.

The government education system had been largely reorganized by the late 1970s. There were some preprimary schools, mainly in urban areas. The basic system consisted of a six-year curriculum in primary schools and a three-year curriculum in junior secondary (middle or general) schools. From there, qualified students could go on to the three-year upper-secondary level, which prepared students for higher education; commercial and agricultural technical schools; and teacher-training secondary schools designed to prepare primary-school teachers. Postsecondary education included universities, higher technical schools, and teacher-training colleges to train junior- and upper-secondary school teachers. Of the more than 5,400 primary schools in 1980, fewer than 14 percent were located in the South, home to about 25 percent of the country’s population. Many of the schools there were established during the Southern Regional Administration (1972–81). The renewal of the civil war in mid-1983 destroyed many schools, although the SPLA operated schools in areas under its control. Nevertheless, many teachers and students were among the refugees who fled the ravages of the war in the South.

In the early 1980s, the number of junior-secondary schools was a little more than one-fifth the number of primary schools; only about 6.5 percent of them were in the South. There were just 190 upper-secondary schools in the public system in 1980, but it was at this level that private schools of varying quality proliferated, particularly in the three cities of the capital area. Despite the emphasis on technical education, there were only 35 technical schools in Sudan, less than one-fifth the number of academic upper-secondary schools. In 1976–77 eight times as many students entered the academic stream as entered the technical schools; moreover, prospective employers often found technical-school graduates inadequately trained, a consequence of sometimes irrelevant curricula, low teacher morale, and lack of equipment. The technical schools were meant to include institutions for training skilled workers in agriculture, but few of the schools were directed to that end, most of them turning out workers more useful in the urban areas.

The hope for universal and compulsory education had not been realized by the early 1980s, but as a goal it nonetheless led to a more equitable distribution of facilities and teachers in rural areas and in the South. During the 1980s, the government established more schools at
The revolutionary government of Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir announced sweeping reforms in Sudanese education in September 1990. In consultation with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist teachers and administrators, who were the strongest supporters of his regime, al-Bashir proclaimed a new philosophy of education in which instruction was to be cast along Islamist lines. He decreed that the number of university students be doubled and that Arabic replace English as the language of instruction in universities. The government strictly controlled curricula and dismissed instructors who opposed the reforms. To implement these changes, al-Bashir pledged substantially increased financing. From 1992 to 2004, the central government allocated 8 percent of its overall budget to education, eight times the figure for health but some 28 percent of that for defense.

Primary and Secondary Education

A series of decrees and laws issued during the 1990s established the parameters of Sudan’s new education system. In 1992 a comprehensive reform of primary and secondary education was undertaken that provides for 11 years of schooling in three stages—preschool, basic, and secondary. Long-term goals included not only universal primary education but also an increase in vocational training and in female enrollment. In 1995 the government established the Federal Ministry of Education and charged it with administration, curriculum, and teacher preparation. In 1998 a so-called Compulsion Law mandated that all children aged six to 13 be enrolled in school, a law that was little enforced.

Education officials implemented the new three-stage education ladder and curriculum between 2002 and 2004. Following a two-year preschool program, the ladder was composed of basic and secondary instruction, a concept that differed from the elementary, intermediate, and secondary levels of former years. The basic level began at age six and encompassed the next eight years of instruction, followed by three years of secondary study, for a total of 11 years. Longer school years compensated for the former twelfth year of study and allowed students earlier entrance into the national workforce.
The basic school curriculum was structured around the themes of religion, language, mathematics, man and the universe, expressional arts, and applied arts. This stage was divided into three cycles, the last of which were the seventh and eighth grades. Completion of the basic level terminated the formal education of about half of all pupils. The abolition of the distinction between academic and technical instruction was a goal at the secondary level. Hence, students studied a variety of subjects drawn from both curricula, although language (Arabic and English), religion, mathematics, and science were core subjects common to all three secondary grades. Instruction in schools in the North was in Arabic. Ministry officials hoped that instruction in both academic and technical subjects would better prepare students for gainful employment once they completed their secondary education.

Parallel with this formal education system was a less formal program of primary instruction. It consisted of four years of enrollment in a compressed basic-level curriculum designed to meet the needs of out-of-school students aged nine to 14. After completing this course of study, students were expected to be eligible to enroll in mainstream secondary schools.

The 2004 and 2005 peace accords between the national government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army foresaw change in national education. The accords called for creation of educational opportunities for those affected by war, for parallel systems of education to run in the North and the South during the six-year interim period, and for free education in Southern states. Both Arabic and English were recognized as official working languages of the national government and as languages of instruction in higher education.

The Ministry of Education reported that for the academic year 2009–10, there were 6.3 million primary students enrolled in nearly 20,000 schools, of which more than 18,000 were government schools and some 1,600 were nongovernment schools. Comparable enrollment in 1997–98 was 3 million. At the secondary level, the ministry counted 761,200 students and nearly 3,000 schools, including 163 technical schools and 15 Islamic studies institutions. These figures compared with 486,000 students in 2001–2 and 461,000 in 1997–98. UN figures for 2008 showed a national adult literacy rate (ages 15 and older who could read and write) of 69 percent as compared with 61 percent in 2004, when the literacy rate for women was only 52 percent compared with 71 percent for men. Statistics for 2009 from the Southern Sudan Ministry of Education showed that of the population 15 years of age and older, 27 percent were literate (40 percent for males, 16 percent for females).
The early 2,000s saw a steady increase in the number of children enrolled in preschool education despite warfare and large-scale internal displacement; as of 2000, about one-quarter of the population had access to such programs. Between 1990 and 1998, the number of children attending preschool increased annually by 3.9 percent, with even higher rates of growth for girls. Enrollment rates in basic and secondary education have also shown steady growth, more so in the North and in urban areas. Education officials also reported progress toward achievement of gender equality at all levels of schooling, particularly in the North.

Sudan held a national symposium on education in 2001, which established a number of education targets for both 2005 and 2015. The targets focused primarily on increasing the percentage of children in school and decreasing the gender disparity. The government concluded that to fund education and improve facilities, local communities should pay 50 percent of the annual expense to educate their children, a minimum of US$26 per student. Many communities, however, could not raise such funds. Thus, while improvements were planned, some would be difficult to realize.

**Educational Opportunity**

The government provided free primary education for children aged six to 14, at least in theory. Attendance rates were always low, and school closings resulted from civil conflict. Still, some encouraging trends emerged. In 1996, for example, only 44 percent of the age-relevant population attended school in Sudan. More boys (47 percent) than girls (40 percent) attended school at this point. The World Bank estimated the primary-school enrollment rate at 60 percent in 2004, with a 49-percent completion rate; comparable figures for 2000 were 51 percent enrollment and 39 percent completion. Secondary enrollment in 2004 was 33 percent compared with 26 percent in 2000. However, data from a 2006 household health survey in North and South Sudan showed that only 53.7 percent of children were attending primary school, although this figure probably did not fully reflect increasing enrollments in the South. Unfortunately, many students came to school or not as their situations allowed, and perhaps half or more were unable to complete the education program mandated by the national government.

Far greater access to education existed in the states in the North than in those in the South. According to the Sudanese government, in 1980–81 there were 903 primary and intermediate schools in the South with a total enrollment of 166,000 pupils. A 1998 to 2001 UN survey in the three main regions of the South and part of the Nuba Mountains counted 1,096 schools with an enrollment of about 228,000 pupils; a
parallel assessment by the SPLM reported 1,500 schools with 508,000 pupils out of an estimated 1 million children aged seven to 14. Both studies clearly showed only a minority of eligible school children were enrolled in Southern schools in the early 2000s. Further, of those enrolled, most—60 percent—were in the first two grades; only 12 percent of pupils reached the upper grades, with fewer than 1 percent in eighth-grade classes. For the same years, the UN reported that 80 percent of eligible children in the North attended elementary school.

Several factors accounted for low enrollment in the South, among them a strong bias against educating girls. Of the approximately 228,000 primary enrollees in the 1998–2001 UN survey, only 26 percent were female, and they were concentrated in the lowest grades. It should be no surprise that illiteracy rates for women in the South were among the highest in the world. Young women were often deterred from education by demands for labor at home and by early marriage. Although boys enjoyed preferential opportunities, they, too, helped with farming and herding, and before 2005 young men often left home to fight against the central government.

Regardless of gender, the infrastructure for education in the South paled compared with even the modest educational assets of the North. Many children who did attend school never saw the inside of an actual classroom. According to the UN, as of 2003, some 43 percent of classes taught in the South took place outdoors, often with only the shade of a tree for shelter. Only 12 percent of classes in the South took place in a permanent classroom compared with 60 percent in the North. School buildings, if they once existed, had been destroyed by decades of warfare or needed substantial repair, and most teachers did not have access to essential educational tools such as books and state-prepared curricula.

The South also suffered from a lack of qualified teachers. In 2006 the Government of Southern Sudan reported that half of its teachers had only a primary education and no further training for their duties. Many taught voluntarily. At some schools, parents had to pay a registration fee to enroll their children; this fee provided remuneration for teachers. In other instances, teachers received only food or other barter items as forms of pay.

The peace agreements signed in 2004 and 2005 paved the way for a better-balanced, national education system. The 2004 protocol, in particular, called for creation of educational opportunities for those affected by war, for parallel systems of education to run in the North and the South during the six-year interim period, and for adequate and free education to be provided across the Southern states. Practical realities, especially as regards funding, would make improvement in
Southern education a long and slow process, one that would undoubtedly require substantial assistance from foreign donors.

In response to the need, international agencies such as the World Food Programme and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were funding construction of classrooms across the South as of 2005. A year later, the UN had undertaken to construct up to 250 new schools and to provide school supplies. Southerners and other long-neglected peoples in Darfur and Eastern Sudan could also expect to benefit from expanding educational facilities and from less-formal education programs.

Other initiatives aimed specifically at expanding educational opportunity were part of Sudan’s planning. First, the government started to respond to the education needs that stemmed from internal displacement. With the help of international organizations, displaced students began to receive education in their temporary communities. A second program was designed to address the problem of education among nomadic groups, at least 80 of which still existed in Sudan. Many resided in North Kordofan State, where most primary schools, supported with UN funds, went only through fourth grade. In 2009 Sudanese education officials began a shift from mobile schools to stationary schools, including boarding schools, for the estimated 500,000 nomadic children of primary age in the North. They hoped to increase enrollment from 32 percent to 70 percent by 2011, improve the relevance of the curriculum, and provide more trained teachers. A third initiative, also launched in 2009, aimed at increasing the enrollment of girls in primary schools in the North by more than 1 million by 2011.

Female Education

Girls’ education was traditionally of the most rudimentary kind, frequently provided in Muslim areas by a khalwa, or religious school, in which Quranic studies were taught. Such basic schools did not prepare girls for the secular learning mainstream, from which they were virtually excluded. By 1920 the government had provided five elementary schools for girls. Expansion was slow, however, and female education remained restricted to the elementary level until 1940, when the first intermediate school for girls, the Omdurman Girls’ Intermediate School, opened. By 1955 there were 10 such schools. In 1956 the Omdurman Secondary School for Girls, with about 265 students, was the only girls’ secondary school operated by the government. By 1960 there were only two upper-secondary schools for girls and no vocational schools except for the Nurses’ Training College with just 11 students, nursing not being regarded by many Sudanese as a suitable vocation for women.
This slow development of girls’ education was the product of tradition. Parents of Sudanese girls tended to look upon girls’ schools with suspicion, if not fear, that they would corrupt the morals of their daughters. Moreover, preference was given to sons, who, if educated, could advance themselves in society to the pride and profit of the family, something girls could not do. Their value was enhanced not at school but at home in preparation for marriage and the dowry that accompanied the ceremony. Finally, the lack of schools discouraged even those who desired elementary education for their daughters.

Female education claimed approximately one-third of all available educational resources by 1970, when there were 1,086 primary schools, 268 intermediate schools, and 52 vocational schools for girls. Among notable successes with female education was Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman. Originally founded in 1907 as a primary school for girls, in the early 2000s it was the oldest and largest private university in Sudan, having evolved into the premier women’s university with an enrollment approaching 5,000 in 2006. It offered a mixture of academic and practical programs, such as those that educated women to teach in rural areas. The newly wealthy elites considered Ahfad as the first choice for their daughters, and its graduates often went on to advanced studies abroad. Stipends were also available to women students of modest means, a step toward improving access by females to education at all levels.

**Higher Education**

Sudan in 2005 was home to 27 public universities and at least 46 private universities and colleges, the vast majority of them in the North. These institutions enrolled 447,000 students, 69,000 of whom completed their studies. Comparable figures for 1997–98 were 152,000 students and 26,000 graduates (public institutions only). In 2007–8, more than 50,000 students graduated from public universities. The Ministry of Higher Education reported that in 2009–10, about 513,000 students were attending public and private universities. Before 2005, instruction was solely in Arabic with few exceptions, among which was the University of Juba; teaching in English there recommenced as stipulated in the peace agreement of 2005. Admission was open to students with the highest scores on the Sudan School Certificate examination, which was administered at the conclusion of secondary school. Males usually had to serve in the military before they could enter the university. These requirements, along with the country’s overall poverty, constrained university enrollment.

Sudan’s first university, the University of Khartoum, opened in 1902. It began as Gordon Memorial College, a secondary school, and
A primary school at Rumbek, southern Sudan, 2004
A khalwa (Quranic school) northeast of Khartoum, 2004
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then became affiliated with the University of London in 1937, offering bachelor’s degrees. In 1956, at independence, it became a fully independent degree-granting institution. The University of Khartoum, with four campuses, remained the country’s flagship university, but even it was not immune to the pressures of politics and war. About 70 faculty who opposed al-Bashir’s Islamist reforms were dismissed in the early 1990s, and in January 1997, the university closed temporarily to allow students to join the armed forces.

Most observers agreed that by the early 2000s, this once-elite institution in Africa had become a mere shadow of its former self. Successive purges of the faculty following the 1964, 1969, and 1989 “revolutions” had deprived the campus of some of its best talent. Lowered standards in secondary schools as a result of the “socialist” experiment in the 1970s, combined with the disappearance of English as the language of instruction in secondary and university systems after 1990, continued to reduce the quality of incoming students. These developments at the nation’s premier university were replicated throughout the higher education establishment.

Higher education was primarily the domain of Northern Sudanese after independence, particularly those living in the capital region. In the mid-1970s, there were four universities, 11 colleges, and 23 institutes in Sudan. The universities were in the capital area, and all institutions of higher learning were in the North. Colleges in Sudan were specialized degree-granting entities; institutes granted diplomas and certificates for periods of study shorter than those commonly demanded at universities and colleges. These postsecondary institutions and universities had provided Sudan with a substantial number of well-educated persons in some fields but left it short of technical personnel and specialists in sciences relevant to the country’s largely rural character. By 1980 two new universities had opened, one at Wad Madani (University of Gezira) and the other in Juba. By 1990 some institutes had been upgraded to colleges, and many had become part of an autonomous body called the Khartoum Institute of Technical Colleges (also referred to as Khartoum Polytechnic). Some of its affiliates were outside the capital area, for example, the College of Mechanical Engineering at Atbarah, northeast of Khartoum, and Al-Gezira College of Agriculture and Natural Resources at Abu Naamah in Al-Awsat.

The 1990s saw a major expansion of higher education in regions outside the traditional Northern hub. A number of new universities were established, among them Kordofan, Darfur, Blue Nile (at Al-Damazin), Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Al-Imam Al-Mahdi (at Kosti). In a parallel development, a number of provincial colleges were upgraded to university status, including those at Nyala, Dongola, Port Sudan, Kas-
sala, and Al-Gedaref. In 1993 Al-Neelain University was created when the Sudanese government took over the former Khartoum branch of Cairo University, originally founded in 1955. In August 2006, however, ground was broken in Khartoum for a new campus of Cairo University, and plans existed for a branch of Egypt’s Alexandria University to open in Juba.

Various institutions were designed for specific training. The Islamic University of Omdurman, founded in 1921, existed primarily to train Muslim religious judges and scholars. The Al-Gezira College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, set in Sudan’s most fertile agricultural region, focused on protecting and utilizing Sudan’s environmental resources. Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman was the premier women’s education institution in Sudan. Of particular interest is the case of Omdurman Ahlia University. Academics, professionals, and businessmen founded it in 1982 to meet the ever-growing demand for higher education and practical training. Support came mainly from private donations and foreign foundations as well as from the government. Its curriculum, taught in English and oriented to job training pertinent to the needs of Sudan, proved popular.

The expansion of higher education in the 1990s was not accompanied by an increase in funding; hence, the share of funds allocated to each institution was less than what was needed for full operation. Consequently, buildings, laboratories, libraries, and other facilities deteriorated seriously, especially at older institutions, along with the qualifications of the student body. The impact of Arabization and Islamization of the universities’ curricula produced a preoccupation among students with the passing of examinations rather than with the development of skills of analysis and critical thinking. The economic surge resulting from petroleum exports gave hope that these trends might be reversed. In addition, after the signing of the CPA in 2005, there was some improvement in the relationship between the government and the faculty and students in the universities.

In the South, the University of Juba, opened in 1977, began as an institution to provide training for economic development and for the civil service in the region. After the outbreak of hostilities in 1983, the school moved to Khartoum for security reasons. Following the signing of the peace agreement in 2005, preparations began for the return to Juba, although as of early 2011, most faculty and administration remained in Khartoum. Two other Khartoum-based Southern universities, Bahr al-Ghazal in Wau, and Upper Nile in Malakal, both founded in 1991, also prepared to relocate to the South. A fourth university, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, was established in 2011 in Aweil. Several other campuses were either established or planned in Southern Sudan as of early 2011.
Health

Sudan’s health-care system languished for many years before 2005, because of constant warfare in the country. Aside from the country’s sheer size and the general lack of communication and transportation systems, the destruction of health facilities combined with the scattering of communities made establishing a modern, effective health-care system nearly impossible. Most of the country’s huge number of displaced persons received only irregular health-care treatment, if they received any at all. International organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and other aid-dispensing agencies were instrumental in caring for the vast displaced population. Serious but controllable diseases, such as malaria and dysentery, remained constant threats, as did malnutrition. The continual movement of peoples fleeing war made containing such diseases even more difficult than in other developing countries.

Regional Disparities

It is difficult to generalize about health care in Sudan because of the great disparity between the major urban areas and the rest of the country. Indeed, the availability of health care in urban settings is one cause of rural to urban migration. In terms of access to health care, Sudan can be subdivided into three categories: distinctly rural, rural near urban areas, and the capital region. In rural areas, especially outlying provinces, standard health care is completely absent. For the most part, there are neither doctors nor clinics in these regions. When illness occurs, home remedies and rest are often the only potential “treatments” available, along with a visit to a faqih or to a sorcerer, depending on region and location. Rural areas near cities or with access to bus or rail lines are slightly more fortunate. Small primary-care units staffed by knowledgeable, if not fully certified, health workers dispense rudimentary care and advice and also issue referrals to proper clinics in urban areas. Provincial capitals have doctors and hospitals but in insufficient numbers and of insufficient quality to meet rising demand.

The Three Towns of the capital region boast the best medical facilities and doctors in the country, although many of these would still be considered substandard in other parts of the world. Here, health care is available in three types of facilities: the overcrowded, poorly maintained, and underequipped government hospitals; private clinics with adequate facilities and equipment, often operated by foreign-educated doctors and charging prices affordable only by the middle and upper classes; and public clinics run by Islamist da’wa (religiously based charities) or by Christian missionaries, where adequate health care is
available for a nominal fee. Not surprisingly, many patients flock to the third category where it is available.

The civil war in the South destroyed virtually all the region’s medical facilities except those that the SPLA rebuilt to treat their own wounded and hospitals located in the three major towns—Malakal, Wau, and Juba—controlled by regional government forces. Even these facilities receive little use because they lack the most basic medical supplies. International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and faith-based groups are the main providers of care, in an uncoordinated manner, and estimates indicate that less than one-third of the population has access to adequate health services. Few highly trained health professionals remain in the region regardless of facilities. In 1981 there had been about 60 physicians in the South for a population of roughly 5 million, or one for approximately 83,000 persons. By WHO’s count in 2004, only 30 fully qualified doctors served the region’s population. An additional 806 medical assistants and nurses provided skilled care, while 721 laboratory technicians and 2,603 primary health care workers provided more basic health services—a total of 4,160 personnel to serve a population estimated to be in excess of 8 million. In the late 2000s, WHO reported that malnutrition was widespread there (45 percent among the general population, compared to 40 percent nationwide in the early 2000s), children suffered from a wide variety of maladies, and vaccination rates were low (17 percent were fully immunized in 2006 according to a Southern health survey that year).

WHO responded to the emergency situation in the South in 1989, and since then the organization has continued to provide humanitarian assistance in the region. In 2004 WHO expanded its efforts into control of major communicable diseases and general rehabilitation of healthcare facilities and services. In early 2006, the World Bank granted the new Government of South Sudan US$225 million to improve the administrative capacity of its Ministry of Health, rehabilitate existing facilities and build new ones, and improve health-care delivery to the two-thirds or more of the population beyond reach of such services.

WHO maintained offices in the capitals of each of Darfur’s three states in 2005 and oversaw the effort to provide health services there. More than 13,000 national and international personnel were involved in providing food, clean water, sanitation, primary health care, and medical drugs to the region’s refugees. In 2006, some 2.5 million Darfur were in need of assistance, and an estimated 22 percent of children suffered from acute malnutrition, the same percentage as in the South. Reliable information on Eastern Sudan was scarce, but overall health conditions could be gauged from under-five child mortality rates per 1,000 live births. In 2005 WHO reported that these ranged from 117 in Al-Gedaref
Health Care

Efforts to bolster health care in the country waxed and waned with the vicissitudes of war. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government undertook programs to deal with specific diseases in limited areas, with help from WHO and other humanitarian organizations. The Sudanese government also initiated more general approaches to the problems of health maintenance in rural areas, particularly in the South, including the construction of health-care facilities and provision of advice about nutrition and disease control. These efforts began against a background of inadequate and unequal distribution of medical personnel and facilities. As of 1982, there were nearly 2,200 physicians in Sudan, or roughly one for 8,870 persons. Most physicians were concentrated in urban areas in the North, as were the major hospitals, including those specializing in the treatment of tuberculosis, eye disorders, and mental illness. In 1976 there were 2,500 medical assistants working in Sudan, who helped ease the shortage of certified physicians. As of 1982, there were 12,800 nurses and 7,000 midwives working in the country, concentrated mostly in the North.

These numbers had improved significantly by the early 2000s. The Ministry of Health’s estimate was that 8,800 physicians served Sudan in 2006, almost doubling the number of 4,500 in 1998. The ratio of physicians per 100,000 people was 28.6, compared with 27 per 100,000 in Nigeria and 222 per 100,000 in Egypt (as of 2004). Ministry of Health statistics also revealed that women made up more than half of the country’s doctors and that the ratio of doctors working in urban areas versus those in rural areas was more than two to one.

According to the federal Ministry of Health’s latest figures, in 2008 Sudan had 395 hospitals with a total of more than 28,000 beds, up from 285 hospitals with 23,000 beds in 1998, roughly one hospital and 73 beds per 100,000 people. Health centers numbered 1,400 and primary health-care units, 2,000. Excluding the South, there were more than 8,600 physicians, 460 dentists, and 800 pharmacists. Private health facilities were in addition to these state facilities. All professional medical personnel were prone to leave the country once their training was complete. The Sudanese government had not released figures on health expenditures in recent years, but while statistics varied, WHO cited a figure of 3.6 percent of gross domestic product for 2008, or US$18 per capita; for 2006, WHO statistics gave the Ministry of Health budget as 6.3 percent of the government budget.
Considering the state of health care throughout the country, Sudan has a surprisingly well-developed medical education system. The nation has produced many of its own health-care workers. Sudan’s first medical school opened in 1918. There were 25 medical schools training doctors in Sudan in 2005. More than 40 other schools educated students in health-related fields. These schools graduated 1,400 doctors annually and many more health professionals. Retention of well-qualified doctors, however, was predictably difficult. The Sudanese Medical Council reported in 2005 that of the 21,000 doctors registered with their organization, nearly 60 percent practiced outside the country and that on average some 800 doctors left the country each year for Saudi Arabia, Britain, and other destinations.

Overall, the health infrastructure and number of doctors serving the Sudanese population in the early 2000s remained far below even minimal accepted standards. Improvements since the 1980s were stunted, mainly by war. Even in the North, where hospitals and doctors were concentrated, up to a third of all facilities did not meet accepted standards of medical practice. According to WHO, almost all public finance for health care went toward hospitals in urban areas. Thus, in most rural areas of the country, particularly in the South, residents often had to travel significant distances to reach the nearest health facility. Even with
the efforts of international NGOs in the South, the WHO estimated that only 25 percent of Southerners had access to health care, a lower estimate than some others.

**Diseases**

Sudan has a high incidence of debilitating and sometimes fatal diseases, the persistence of which reflects difficult ecological conditions, high levels of malnutrition, an inadequate health-care system, and conflict and violence. Malaria is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Sudan, and the entire population is at risk. This plague, controlled throughout much of the rest of the world, commands an inordinate amount of Sudan’s limited medical expertise. In 2003 hospitals reported 3 million cases; malaria victims accounted for up to 40 percent of outpatient consultations and 30 percent of all hospital admissions. In Darfur alone in 2005, doctors reported 227,550 cases; doctors, however, did report greater success in saving patients than in past years.

Poor sanitation and inadequate health care explain the presence of many other communicable diseases. Acute respiratory infections, hepatitis E, measles, meningitis, typhoid, and tuberculosis are all major causes of illness and mortality. More restricted geographically but affecting substantial portions of the population in the areas of occurrence are schistosomiasis (snail fever), found in the White Nile and Blue Nile areas and in irrigated zones between the two Niles, and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), which was originally limited to the Southern borderlands but began spreading rapidly in the 1980s in the forested regions of South Sudan. A number of tropical diseases formerly under control have resurfaced in the South because of the breakdown of the health-care system, including leprosy, elephantiasis, river blindness, cholera, and guinea worm.

A lack of safe water means that nearly 45 percent of children suffer from diarrhea, which leads to poor health and weak immune systems. Vaccination campaigns have largely eradicated polio from the country; in 2005 alone, more than 6 million children under the age of five were vaccinated. Although in 2004 a small outbreak led to 126 confirmed cases, the following year the number dropped to 18.

The years of conflict and difficulties in collecting data make it difficult to summarize Sudan’s experience of HIV/AIDS. Nonetheless, according to the United Nations, in 2009 an estimated 260,000 Sudanese were living with HIV, and 12,000 had died. The HIV prevalence rate among adults aged 15–49 was estimated at 1.1 percent, a relatively low rate compared with neighboring countries. UN officials suspected that South Sudan had a significant HIV problem because in 2010 more than 1 percent of pregnant women using antenatal services were living
with HIV. Sudanese officials in 2007 estimated prevalence rates in the South at 3.1 percent, or 155,000 adults, as a result of civil war, conflict in the East along the border with Ethiopia and Eritrea, and traffic along trucking routes serving major port areas. Prevalence was also thought to be higher than the overall estimates for the North in Khartoum, where hundreds of thousands of people had migrated to escape civil war. The use of unsterile syringes and untested blood by health workers has contributed to the spread of the disease among displaced peoples.

As recently as 1998, the Sudanese government denied that HIV/AIDS posed any significant health threat to its citizenry. Only in 2004 did the government reverse its policy and officially begin planning to address the problem. As of 2007, both Northern and Southern governments were developing policies to curb future cases and to treat those already infected. The minister of health in the North noted problems with the use of condoms as a preventive measure, and religious leaders were reluctant to discuss prevention methods beyond abstinence and monogamous marriage. Not surprisingly, knowledge about HIV/AIDS is limited, particularly in the South.

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Aside from general studies, a significant number of books and articles focus on the lengthy conflict between Southern groups and the central (and Northern-dominated) government. The following works contain a great deal of useful information about geography and ethnography, albeit mostly of the Southern region and often from a pro-Southern perspective. Leading references would be Abel Alier’s *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*; Mohammad Omar Beshir’s *The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace*; Francis Deng’s classic, *Dynamics of Identification: A Basis for National Integration in the Sudan* and his more recent *Sudan’s Civil War: The Peace Process Before and Since Machakos*; Bona Malwal’s *The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood*; Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins’s *Requiem for the Sudan: War, Drought and Disaster Relief on the Nile*; Douglas Johnson’s *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*; Mansour Khalid’s *War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries*; Ann Mosely Lesch’s, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*; Jay Spaulding and Stephanie Beswick’s *White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala*; and former U.S. Ambassador Donald Petterson’s memoir, *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe*.

As a description of the physical geography of Sudan, K. M. Barbour’s *The Republic of the Sudan: A Regional Geography* remains the standard work, supplemented by J. M. G. Lebon’s *Land Use in the Sudan*. Because the Nile is crucial to Sudan, it has been extensively studied, producing such standards as Robert O. Collins’s *The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal, 1900–1988*, as well as John Waterbury’s *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley* and his more recent *The Nile Basin: National Determinants of Collective Action*.

Outstanding works that focus on specific ethnic groups or regions include Gerard Prunier’s *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*; Alex de Waal’s *Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan*; and S. F. Nadel’s *The Nuba*:
An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes of Kordofan. The Dinka are well chronicled in the works of Francis M. Deng, especially *Tradition and Modernization: A Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan*. The best works on the Nuer are Douglas Johnson’s *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile* and Sharon Hutchinson’s *Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State*. Sources on languages include Lionel M. Bender’s *The Nilo-Saharan Languages: A Comparative Essay* and Raymond G. Gordon, Jr.’s chapter in *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*.

All studies of Islam in Sudan owe a debt to John Spencer Trimingham’s seminal work of that name. Gabriel Warburg’s *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyyah* traces the connection to politics, as do the more specialized *Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan* by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Abdelwahhab El-Affendi’s *Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, to be read in conjunction with Mahmoud Mohammed Taha’s *The Second Message of Islam*. Information on religion in the South is in Oliver Albino’s *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint*; Joseph Oduhu and William Deng’s *The Problem of the Southern Sudan*; Dunstan Wai’s, *The African–Arab Conflict in the Sudan*; and Muddathir Abdel-Rahim’s *The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan, 1899–1947*.

Current, if abbreviated, data on population, demography, health, and education as well as economic conditions can be found in *Sudan in Figures*, published by Sudan’s Central Bureau of Statistics. For more complete coverage as well as comparative data, the country data sheets and specialized studies of the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and World Bank are essential. These organizations are also at present the best sources on conditions in South Sudan and Darfur. Other reliable sources in their respective fields include the U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 3. The Economy
A cattle camp in Bahr al-Ghazal
THE ECONOMY OF SUDAN was at a turning point in the early decades of the twenty-first century. In January 2005, the signing of a peace treaty between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) brought to an end more than 20 years of conflict. The country had been torn apart by a costly civil war, economic mismanagement, an influx of refugees from neighboring countries as well as internal migration, and recurrent drought, especially in the West and South, with the concomitant failure of staple food and cash crops. With the prospect of peace, the country anticipated the possibility of reinvigorating its economy based on the development of its wealth of human and natural resources.

In the 1970s, economic growth had been stimulated by a large influx of capital from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, invested with the expectation that Sudan would become the breadbasket of the Arab world, by large increments of foreign aid from the United States and the European Economic Community, by loans from the World Bank, and by generous contributions from other countries. Sudan’s greatest economic resource was its agriculture, to be developed in the vast arable land that either received sufficient rainfall or could be irrigated from the Nile River. Its economic future became much brighter with the discovery of oil.

In the 1980s, however, Sudan underwent severe political and economic upheavals. The civil war in the South resumed in 1983. There was a dearth of rainfall in the usually productive regions of the Sahel (see Glossary) and southern Sudan. Refugees flowed into the country from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad, and internal migration as a result of the civil war further strained the Sudanese budget. In 1989 Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir led a military coup that overthrew the government. Under al-Bashir’s administration, Sudan became economically, if not politically, isolated from the world community. Britain cut its economic aid in 1991. The United States ended economic aid, although not humanitarian aid, in 1994, suspended its diplomatic presence in 1996, and applied sanctions for sponsorship of terrorism and human-rights abuses in 1997.

Sudan accrued an increasing debt burden over the years. By the early 1990s, it was unable to service its debt. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted a “Declaration of Non-Cooperation,” and the World Bank closed its Khartoum office. In 1997, however, Sudan developed an economic reform plan to reestablish long-term growth and initiated debt-service payments. By 1999, as Sudan began to export petroleum and petroleum products, economic growth had reached 6.6 percent. The IMF removed its Declaration of Non-Cooperation, and the World Bank reopened its office.
In January 2005, the SPLA and the Sudanese government signed a peace agreement that allowed the country to consider the economic dividend that peace might provide. Various countries and international organizations pledged to help Sudan recover from the civil war, although continued conflict and genocide in the Darfur region have so far prevented the recovery and restricted the type of foreign aid provided. The results of the referendum in January 2011, which led to independence for South Sudan, will, needless to say, have a significant impact on the economies of both North and South.

**Historical Development**

**The Colonial Period**

The colonial government was not interested in balanced economic growth. Instead, it concentrated its development efforts on irrigated agriculture and the railroad system throughout the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1955). Incidental government investment went mainly into ad hoc projects, such as the construction of cotton gins and oilseed-pressing mills, as adjuncts of the irrigation program. A limited amount of rain-fed mechanized farming was also initiated during World War II. After the war, two development programs—actually lists of proposed investments—were drawn up for the periods 1946–50 and 1951–55. These plans appear to have been a belated effort to broaden the country’s economic base in preparation for eventual Sudanese independence. Both programs were seriously hampered by a lack of experienced personnel and materials and had little real impact. Independently, the private sector expanded irrigated agriculture, and some small manufacturing operations were started, but only three larger industrial enterprises (a meat-processing plant, a cement plant, and a brewery) were constructed, all between 1949 and 1952. The newly independent Sudan’s principal development inheritance in 1956 thus was the vast irrigated Gezira Scheme and Sudan Railways.

**The Postcolonial Period**

The new government did not attempt to prepare a national development plan until 1960. A Ten-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development for the fiscal years (FY—see Glossary) 1961–70 was drawn up for SDP565 million (for value of the Sudanese pound—see Glossary), at the time equivalent to more than US$1.6 billion. The private sector was expected to provide 40 percent of the amount. Unfortunately, the government had few experienced planners, and goals were overly ambitious. The plan as prepared was not adhered to. Implementation was by investment programs that were drawn up annually, and projects
not in the original plan were frequently included. Investment was at a high rate in the first years, so that a number of major undertakings were completed by midplan, including the Khashm al-Qirbah and Manaqil irrigation projects and the Roseires Dam.

As the 1960s progressed, a lack of funds threatened the continuation of development activities. Government current expenditure had increased much faster than receipts, in part because of the intensification of the civil war in the South. At the same time, there was a shortfall in foreign investment capital. The substantial foreign reserves held at the beginning of the plan period were depleted, and the government resorted to deficit financing and foreign borrowing. By 1967, the Ten-Year Plan had been abandoned.

Late in the 1960s, the government prepared a new plan covering FY 1968 to FY 1972. That plan was discarded after the military coup led by Colonel Ja’far al-Numayri (in power, 1969–85) in May 1969. Instead, the government adopted the Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1970–74). That plan, which was prepared with the assistance of Soviet planning personnel, emphasized socialist development. After the end of the first civil war in the South, in 1973 the government established the Interim Action Program, which extended the original plan period through FY 1976. New objectives included the removal of transportation bottlenecks, attainment of self-sufficiency in the production of several agricultural and industrial consumer items, and an increase in agricultural exports. Investment during the first five years was considerably above the original plan projection; however, the plan failed to achieve its goal of a 7.6 percent annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), so it was extended to 1977. During the years of the Interim Action Program, the government initiated several irrigation projects, established factories on the Nile northeast of Khartoum and on the White Nile south of Khartoum, paved the roads between Khartoum and Port Sudan, and began excavation in the South for the Jonglei Canal (see Glossary), also seen as Junqali Canal.

In early 1977, the government published the Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977–82. The plan goals and projections also appeared optimistic because of the worsening domestic economic situation, marked by growing inflation. The inflation stemmed in large part from deficit development financing (printing money), increasing development costs because of worldwide price rises, and rising costs for external capital. During the plan's second year, FY 1978, there was no economic growth, external debt pressures increased, and Sudan failed to meet its scheduled payments. The result was an abandonment of Six-Year Plan projections, a restriction of expenditures generally to the completion of projects under way, elimination of transport constraints, and a series of short-term “rolling” programs that emphasized exports.
In October 1983, the government announced a three-year public investment program, but efforts to Islamize the economy in 1984 impeded its implementation. Between 1978 and 1985, agricultural and industrial production declined in per-capita terms, and imports during much of the 1980s were three times the level of exports. After the al-Numayri government was overthrown in April 1985, the investment program was suspended.

An economic recovery program began in August 1987. This program was followed, beginning in October 1988, by a three-year recovery program to reform trade policy and regulate the exchange rate, reduce subsidies and the budget deficit, and encourage exports and privatization. The military government of Colonel Umar al-Bashir that took office on June 30, 1989, offered little possibility for early economic recovery. Foreign business interests viewed the government’s policies to Islamize the banking system as a disincentive to do business in Sudan because no interest would be paid on new loans. Finally, the government did not satisfy the IMF or other major creditors that it had reduced subsidies on basic commodities enough to reduce its budget deficit. By 1991 the value of the Sudanese pound against the U.S. dollar had sunk to less than 10 percent of its 1978 value, and the country’s external debt had risen to US$13 billion, the interest on which could be paid only by raising new loans.

Two reasons for the decline in production were the droughts and accompanying famine occurring in 1980–91, and the influx of more than 1 million refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, and Uganda, in addition to the persons displaced by the warfare in the South, which had resumed in 1983, who were estimated to number between 1.5 million and 3.5 million. Nevertheless, the decline in Sudan’s agricultural and industrial production had begun before these calamities. Few development projects were completed on time, and those that were completed failed to achieve projected production. Sudan found itself in a cycle of increasing debt and declining production.

Sudan borrowed heavily for its development programs over the years; then it suffered severely as international interest rates increased. During the 1990s, Sudan's relationship with the IMF became increasingly strained as a result of continuing debt arrears dating back to 1984. In 1997, when the IMF threatened to expel Sudan from the fund, the government revised its economic policies and established a comprehensive economic reform and structural adjustment program with the assistance of the IMF. The program, which continued, sought to stabilize the macroeconomic environment, reduce the rate of inflation, strengthen the external accounts, increase growth through privatization and deregulation, reform the banking sector, liberalize trade, and revise investment and foreign-exchange controls.
Although some aspects of the program, including privatization, have been disappointing, the IMF has praised the government for its adherence to the reform agenda. The IMF lifted its “non-cooperation” order in 1999 and restored Sudan's voting rights in 2000. The reform program has been credited with significant improvements in the economy. Inflation fell from triple digits to hover around 10 percent, the currency stabilized, foreign investment rose, and there were several years of economic growth. Nevertheless, there were still many problems to overcome, especially the impact of the previous civil war and the conflict in Darfur, which continued to place a heavy burden on government finances and undermine investor confidence, and the external debt arrears, which hindered access to new foreign funding. The impending secession of South Sudan would also probably have a negative impact on the economy.

Structure of the Economy

Overview of the Economy

Information about the economy was based on official figures from the National Accounts, which might not be complete, however, because the civil war previously made certain areas inaccessible for statistical surveys. Thus, the main rural areas in the South were probably not included in the National Accounts from the mid-1990s to the end of the war, because it was impossible for the government to collect data in large areas that were controlled by the SPLM/A. Although a National Household Survey was conducted in 2009, the prior survey, which influenced the consumer price index for many years, was made in 1978, the previous weights for the consumer price index were based on that earlier household survey, and comparisons of the prices of goods and services had not been updated for many years. Moreover, information for the previous price index was gathered only for Khartoum. Although the Fifth Population and Housing Census was carried out in 2008, the previous one was made in 1993, and it was based partly on estimates because of limited access in the South, again making comparisons unrealistic. Similarly, estimates of the real value of production and GDP may not be accurate because of limited coverage. There had been no complete collection or analysis of data on the agricultural sector, which is very important in Sudan, since 1968. Thus, claims about the economy were probably not completely reliable.

Sudan is a poor country despite its considerable natural resources. Economic mismanagement and the disruption of years of civil war prevented economic development for many years. Agriculture is the most important sector of the economy, but the civil war interfered with it, causing farmers to leave their land and disrupting the flow of inputs
and the marketing of products (see Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry, this ch.). The poor road system and transport facilities also hindered distribution throughout the country (see Transportation and Telecommunications, this ch.).

Cotton was the leading cash crop in the past, much of it grown on the huge Al-Gezira irrigation project south of Khartoum. Production declined in recent years, largely as a result of low international prices. Sesame displaced cotton in 1996 as the leading revenue earner among agricultural exports. Livestock was the fastest-growing non-oil sector from 2002.

Although agriculture remains important, the development of the oil industry changed the structure of the economy (see Petroleum, this ch.). An oil-export pipeline from the Southern oil fields to the Red Sea opened in August 1999, and production rose to an average of 280,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2003. An expansion of the pipeline capacity allowed output to increase to an estimated 480,000 b/d in 2010. Oil-industry development increased foreign investment in the industrial sector, making petroleum and related products the most important export commodity, earning an estimated 95 percent of export revenue in 2008. It ended Sudan’s dependency on imported petroleum products, increased the country’s foreign-exchange earnings, and improved the balance of payments.

Sudan’s dependence on imports for much of its capital equipment and petroleum and its low export earnings, until oil exports began in 1999, led to trade deficits and a large international debt. In 1997 Sudan put in place an economic reform plan and worked with the IMF to reduce its debt and increase economic growth. The end of the civil war and the conclusion of the peace agreement of 2005 led Sudan to anticipate increased foreign investment and foreign assistance that would set it on the path to sustained economic development. However, violence and displacement in Darfur prevented that region from benefiting from any peace dividend.

Gross Domestic Product

GDP at market prices increased steadily over the years from US$12.2 billion in 2000 to US$27.3 billion in 2005, and an estimated US$54.2 billion in 2009. The preliminary government figure for 2010 was US$68.44 billion. GDP per capita also increased steadily from US$371 in 2000, to US$706 in 2005, and to an estimated $1,281 in 2009.

Real growth of GDP (at constant 1982 prices) averaged 6 percent a year after the IMF-monitored economic reform program began in 1997. According to foreign analysts, it continued at 6.3 percent in 2005. Growth rose to 11.3 percent in 2006 before slowing to 10.2 percent in 2007, to 6.6
percent in 2008, and to 4.2 percent in 2009 as the growth of the world economy also slowed. The government’s own figures showed an even lower growth rate for 2009 of 3 percent but projected an increase to 6.9 percent for 2010.

The primary sector of agriculture (composed of crops, livestock, fishing, and forestry) was always large, but its contribution to GDP declined steadily over the years as the contribution of the secondary sector began to grow. In 2004, the estimated contribution of the primary sector to GDP was 35.4 percent, but by 2010 its share had declined to an estimated 31.3 percent. The secondary sector of industry, composed of petroleum, other mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity and water, and construction, was the smallest in 2004, contributing only 26.6 percent to GDP. By 2008 that sector contributed an estimated 34.7 percent to GDP as a result of the development of the oil industry, but by 2010 it had fallen to a projected 24.5 percent as a result of slower growth in the petroleum sector. The tertiary sector of services contributed an estimated 38 percent in 2004. Its contribution declined to 34.2 percent by 2008 but was projected at 44.2 percent in 2010 (see table 2, Appendix).

The most recent figures available for GDP by expenditure were for the year 2008. Of the major components, private consumption was the largest at 52.8 percent, while government consumption was 13.2 percent. Investment totaled 18.2 percent. Net exports (the value of exports minus imports) were small, but positive, at 0.6 percent.
Prices and Inflation

During the 1970s, the government compiled monthly data on consumer prices in Sudan, based on data collected in the capital area's three cities, Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North. At the beginning of the 1970s, annual price rises were moderate, between 9 and 10 percent. From 1973 onward, the inflation rate grew because of continuing worldwide inflation, an increase in the money supply resulting from the central government's deficit financing and from borrowing by state corporations, shortages of consumer goods, problems of supply caused by transport deficiencies, and increased private-sector borrowing. By 1989 prices were increasing by 74 percent annually.

Inflationary pressures continued into the 1990s. Prices increased by more than 100 percent a year during 1991–94, with the rate reaching a high of 130 percent in 1996. Implementation of the IMF reform program in 1997, along with monetary reforms of the central bank and declining prices of imported non-oil commodities and manufactured goods, slowed inflation to less than 47 percent in that year, less than 20 percent in 1998 and 1999, and to single digits by 2000. Inflation was 7.2 percent in 2006. Although other countries in the region experienced recession-led declines in inflation in 2009, a surge in prices in the final months of that year pushed the rate of inflation in Sudan to an annual average of 11.2 percent and to 13 percent in 2010.

Privatization

Some privately managed projects in irrigation, water, and electricity supply were turned over to state management and control soon after independence. In the 1970s, the public sector continued to expand with the nationalization, confiscation, and “Sudanization” program. Many of the state-owned enterprises were poorly managed, however, and eventually became a financial burden on the economy, requiring budgetary subsidies and loans from the Bank of Sudan, guaranteed by the government. To reduce the drain on public finances, to fund infrastructure-development projects that were beyond the capacity of government resources, and to support growth in general, the government reversed its policy. By the beginning of the 1990s, it began to encourage local and foreign investment in sectors of the economy that previously were reserved for the state and to privatize state-owned enterprises.

The Public Sector Enterprises Disposition Bill of 1990 and the Privatization of State Corporations Act of 1992 selected 190 public corporations for sale. Some 72 enterprises were disposed of in various ways, including by liquidation. By 2002, however, fewer than 20 of the enterprises had been sold to the private sector. Negotiations were concluded
for the sale of the Real Estate Bank, Atbarah Cement Factory, Friendship Hotel, General Foundation for Printing Publications and Advertisements, Sudan Duty Free Zone Company, and Bridges and Roads Corporation. Steps were also taken toward the privatization of Sudan Airways, but some 30 large state-owned corporations, including the National Electricity Corporation, public banks, transport corporations, large-scale irrigation entities, and manufacturing industries, remained to be privatized.

There were some successes in the privatization process, such as the formation of the Sudan Telecommunications Company (SudaTel), which began as a joint public-private company in 1994. SudaTel oversaw the growth of both the land-line and mobile telephone (Mobitel) networks, and attracted investment from both domestic and foreign sources. In addition to Mobitel, the Bank of Khartoum, the Real Estate Bank, and the River Transport Corporation were sold in recent years, and the Sudan Shipping Line and Sudan Railways might be sold in the future. Private operators already provided passenger services on the railroad. In 2010, the government announced that it intended to privatize all the companies that it owned, starting in 2011.

Implementation of privatization was constrained by numerous factors, including the uncertainties of the war, the economic sanctions imposed by the United States since 1997, which isolated the country from international money markets, the compensation costs of affected workers, and the limited market of buyers. The dearth of technical expertise among senior officials who had to oversee the complex process of valuing the enterprises and managing the transactions was also a crucial concern. Potential investors were unwilling to take on the companies’ accumulated debts and were also aware of the substantial investment that many of the companies would require after years of neglect. Influential labor unions opposed privatization, recognizing that there might be job losses if the enterprises were operated on a profitable basis. Officials were also aware that prices might rise if the businesses had to generate profits without concessional funding. There were also accusations of corruption; government officials allegedly demanded payments, and senior members of the regime were reported to have bought state assets at bargain prices.

Foreign Investment

Foreign direct investment increased steadily after 1990. Passage of the Investment Promotion Act in 1990, with amendments in 1993, 1996, and 2000, helped to rationalize cumbersome financial procedures, offer incentives to private investors, and provide assurance of government support of private-sector development. The new law and the privatization program succeeded in attracting investments in various
sectors, especially oil and oil-related investments, but also in transportation, pharmaceuticals, and agro-processing. The expectation was that, provided that the nation’s division progressed peacefully, investments should increase in the non-extractive industries as well.

Investment flows into Sudan have increased from next to nothing in 1996 (US$400,000) to US$3.5 billion in 2006, or 10 percent of GDP, one of the highest ratios in the region, before dropping back to US$2.6 billion in 2009, about 5 percent of GDP (preliminary figures). Direct investments increased substantially in 1998, to US$370.7 million, when construction of the oil-export pipeline, the Al-Jayli refinery, and the Port Sudan terminal work began. With the success of those investments and the implementation of the IMF reform program, other sectors also received significant inflows. In 2001 a Chinese firm, Harbin Power Engineering Company, began building the 220-megawatt gas-fired power station near the Al-Jayli refinery, north of Khartoum. In late 2004, the government inaugurated a new 275-megawatt power plant outside Khartoum, constructed by a private foreign consortium led by a Malaysian company, DIT Power, which operated the US$200 million plant as an independent power project (see Energy, this ch.).

Many of the investments were in urban areas, especially Khartoum and Port Sudan. However, investments in food-processing industries, such as sugar factories, seemed likely to increase employment in rural areas as well. The successful expansion of the Kananah Sugar Company, with significant foreign investment, attracted more companies to the sector and led to the construction of the White Nile Sugar Company. Turkish and Persian Gulf investors also examined opportunities for further factories in Sudan and showed an interest in the financial sector and the telecommunications industry.

The government concluded agreements in 2008 to enable access to substantial agricultural land by Persian Gulf firms and states, in response to high international food prices. Continuing this trend, the Egyptian and Sudanese governments concluded a deal in September 2010 to give Egyptian private-sector companies access to 420,000 hectares (see Glossary) of Sudanese farmland in the well-irrigated Al-Gezira region south of Khartoum to cultivate wheat and other cereals to feed Egypt’s growing population.

The United States initiated trade sanctions against Sudan in 1997 and expanded them in 2006 to affect foreign investment throughout Sudan. The sanctions prohibited all transactions by U.S. persons relating to petroleum or petrochemical industries in Sudan, including in the South. In addition, they prohibited financial dealings of U.S. persons with Sudan (except for specified areas of the country), including the negotiation of any contract, including a financing contract, in support of an industrial, commercial, public utility, or government project.
Areas in the South that were outside of the control of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) had not had any foreign investment by 2010, although a company law was submitted by the SPLM to encourage investment in the area, and the peace agreement of 2005 offered incentives. The global recession, continued conflict in Darfur, and the uncertainty of the outcome of the 2011 referendum caused lower foreign direct investment throughout the country in 2008–10. However, GOSS did make a belated effort to increase foreign investment in the South as the referendum neared.

**Role of the Government**

**Development Planning and the Debt**

The government of Sudan drew up its first economic development plan in 1960, followed by many others over the succeeding years. Budget deficits and debt-service obligations were relatively insignificant in the early years, but from 1974 to 1977, large-scale borrowing occurred and new commitments were made. As the economy began to deteriorate in the late 1970s, the government began a series of reform efforts, although the first reforms covering 1978–84 were not fully implemented.

In 1978 Sudan failed to meet all of its debt-service obligations. In 1979 public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt increased to more than US$2.5 billion, requiring Sudan to seek relief from its creditors, as it was apparent that once again it would not meet its obligations. Acting through the Paris Club, a group of industrialized creditor countries that included the United States, Japan, and nine West European states, Sudan rescheduled an estimated US$400 million to US$500 million of the debt guaranteed by Western export-credit agencies. The agreed payments were to be made over a seven-year period, with an initial three-year grace period. In 1981 Sudan rescheduled another US$600 million in loans and interest, as its debt burden had increased to US$4 billion. Despite repeated rescheduling of Sudan's debt burden, both arrears and debt-service payments continued to increase.

Sudan's economy steadily weakened, as did its relations with the IMF and the Paris Club. In 1989 Sudan repaid the IMF only a token US$15 million and continued to resist IMF demands for further economic austerity measures. By mid-1990, total foreign debt had risen to US$13 billion, and debt arrears to the IMF totaled more than US$1.1 billion.

The IMF adopted a “Declaration of Non-Cooperation” in September 1990, as a prelude to expulsion of Sudan from the fund, citing continuing problems with the arrears of its external debt payments since 1984. In May 1991, an IMF delegation arrived in Khartoum for discussions with the government. Despite declarations by the Sudanese government that it
was determined to cooperate with international lending organizations, Sudan was declared ineligible for debt relief by the international financial community because of its inability to service its debt. In 1993 the IMF withdrew Sudan’s voting rights. In 1995 the country continued to struggle with a huge foreign debt as well as with high inflation, a serious shortage of foreign exchange, and declining foreign aid.

In 1997 Sudan put in place an economic reform plan that is credited with reestablishing long-term economic growth. Following the 1990 declaration, Sudan began to work with the IMF to develop a comprehensive economic reform and structural adjustment program. The initial structural reform agenda was implemented within the framework of the Comprehensive National Strategy (CNS) for the 1992–2002 period. The program included measures to reduce inflation; liberalize trade; strengthen the country’s external accounts by removing import and export restrictions, reducing customs tariffs, and rationalizing the tariff structure; reduce the size of the public sector and increase privatization and deregulation; reform the banking sector; and revise investment and foreign-exchange controls. It removed price subsidies and eliminated trade and non-trade barriers. The reform agenda was supported from 1997 by successive Staff-Monitored Programs (SMPs) of the IMF.

Except for a period during 2001, when Sudan failed to meet its obligations to the IMF (and in return the IMF temporarily suspended payments), the country adhered to the program. The IMF credited the reform program with providing significant improvements, including a sharp reduction in inflation from triple digits to around 10 percent, stabilizing the currency, bringing the budget closer to balance, increasing foreign investment, and generating substantial economic growth. According to the National Accounts, which might not have been very reliable, growth of GDP averaged 3.8 percent per annum during 1990–95, but with significant fluctuations attributed to weather-related cycles in agriculture. The growth rate increased to an average of 6.6 percent per annum during 1996–2000, slowed to an average of 5.6 percent per annum during 2001–5, and maintained 4.2 percent in 2009 as the world economy struggled.

External debt arrears remained a critical problem, but repayments and adherence to the economic reform program allowed the IMF to remove the declaration in 1999 and restore Sudan’s voting rights in 2000. Sudan slowly reintegrated into the international financial community.

Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005, delegations of the Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) launched a six-year recovery and development plan, the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development, and Poverty Eradication in Sudan. The plan was developed by a Joint Assessment Mission organized by the United Nations and the
World Bank. Sudan’s newly formed Joint National Transition Team presented the plan at the first postwar international donors’ conference in Oslo, Norway, in April 2005. As part of the peace agreement, a national unity government agreed to divide Sudan’s oil wealth equally between the North and the South.

The World Bank reopened its Sudan office in January 2005, after an absence of more than 10 years, to assist with the reconstruction plan. The bank originally expected to normalize relations within a year; however, Sudan would have had to reduce its debt to US$5 billion–US$6 billion before resuming relations. The government continued to pay principal and interest, but the debt continued to rise rather than decline. By the end of 2009, it had reached US$35.7 billion, an amount that the IMF described as unsustainable. Although Sudan had substantial repayment arrears to bilateral and multilateral lenders, creditors probably refused to grant debt relief in 2010–11 because of concerns about internal conflict and civil-rights abuses. Therefore, the government might have attempted to finance infrastructure projects and the fiscal deficit by increasing its debt to Gulf Arab countries, China, and India. Such credit was difficult to obtain, however, because of stringent credit conditions, which continued throughout the world in 2010–11, and also because the government made a commitment to the IMF to limit the amount of new non-concessional debt.

The government announced in May 2010 that the IMF had agreed to begin talks about potential debt relief, although it might be years before any relief materialized. The government also noted that while the total amount had grown by more than 25 percent from the 2005 level, the actual debt was just US$15.4 billion, while arrears and interest made up the remaining US$20.3 billion. The government sought debt relief under the IMF’s and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative or an alternative, but it was blocked by a combination of its arrears to the IMF and the objections of Western creditor governments because of Sudan’s conduct in the civil war and the Darfur conflict. When negotiations took place, eventually, they would have to consider how the debt would be managed or divided when the South seceded.

The Budget

The budget of Sudan was in deficit for many years, mainly as a result of extremely high defense expenditures. Official figures indicated that they were about one-quarter of total expenditures, but unofficial estimates suggested that they ran as high as half of total spending. Other drains on the budget were various subsidies and the support of poorly run state-owned enterprises. The war and corruption also disrupted the
tax-collection system. The 1997 IMF reform program, however, did lead to some improvements. The government managed to slow the increase in expenditures, restricting current spending by holding down public-sector wage increases, cutting some subsidies, and increasing fees for education and other services. The government also managed to increase revenues as a result of both the reform program and the development of the oil sector. These measures permitted an increase in government expenditures, especially an increase in capital expenditures. As a result of such reforms, the budget deficit declined from almost 13 percent of GDP in 1990, to less than 1 percent in 1997. By 2003, the budget had a surplus of SDD33.6 billion (for value of the Sudanese dinar—see Glossary), then worth US$0.1 billion.

A short-term increase in the deficit occurred after the transition to peace in 2005. Under a wealth-sharing agreement between the North and the South, the civil service increased in size, and the National Assembly also approved an increase in civil-service salaries. Military spending was not expected to decrease, and the government did not intend to increase taxes. A deficit of SDD1.2 billion (US$0.5 billion) occurred in 2005. Oil-export revenues increased from SDD9.0 billion (US$3.9 billion) in 2005 to SDG15.4 billion (US$6.9 billion) in 2008—SDG being the abbreviation for the Sudanese pound, introduced as the national currency to replace the dinar in 2005 (see Currency, this ch.). In the same period, total revenues increased from SDD14.7 billion (US$6.4 billion) to SDG24.0 billion (US$10.7 billion), and total expenditures also increased rapidly from SDD15.9 billion (US$6.9 billion) in 2005 to SDG26.5 billion (US$11. billion) in 2008. Thus, by 2008, the deficit had increased to SDG2.4 billion (US$1.1 billion).

**Foreign Aid**

Foreign capital played a major role in Sudan’s development. The great reliance on it and the general ease with which it was acquired were major factors contributing to the severe financial problems that beset the country after the mid-1970s. Sudan obtained public-sector loans for development from a wide range of international agencies and individual governments. Until the mid-1970s, the largest single source was the World Bank, including the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

The Arab oil-producing states, as their balance-of-payments surpluses grew in the 1970s following increases in world petroleum prices, also became significant suppliers of development capital through bilateral loans and Arab international institutions. The largest of the latter was the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), through which was proposed the 1976 program to develop
Sudan as a breadbasket for the Arab world. After the mid-1970s, Saudi Arabia, through its Saudi Fund for Development, became the largest source of investment capital, apparently convinced that Sudan’s development could complement its own, especially in making up its large food deficits. Unfortunately, the ambitious plans for Sudan's becoming the Arab world’s major food source faded by the mid-1980s as agricultural production declined sharply.

In 1977 the United States resumed economic (and military) aid to Sudan. This aid followed a 10-year lapse beginning with a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1967, with relations restored in July 1972. In 1977 the United States became concerned about geopolitical trends in the region, particularly potential Libyan or Marxist Ethiopian attempts to overthrow al-Numayri’s pro-Western government. In the five-year period 1977–81, U.S. economic aid amounted to almost US$270 million, of which two-thirds was in the form of grants. By 1984, when the United States had become Sudan's largest source of foreign aid, the country’s worsening economic and political situation, particularly al-Numayri’s domestic policies with regard to the South and the imposition of sharia on society, caused the United States to suspend US$194 million of aid. In 1985, following al-Numayri's visit to Washington, the United States provided Sudan with food aid, insecticides, and fertilizers. After al-Numayri's overthrow in April 1985 and Sudan's failure to make repayments on loans, the United States discontinued non-food aid, which had been administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This aid not only had included direct funds for projects and project assistance through commodity imports (mainly wheat under the Food for Peace Program), but it also had generated local currency to support general development activities. USAID continued providing humanitarian relief assistance to distressed regions in Sudan.

Britain also made substantial aid contributions to Sudan. In January 1991, however, Britain suspended its development aid, which amounted to US$58 million in 1989, while continuing humanitarian aid. This policy change was caused by a number of factors, including alleged terrorist activities by Sudanese agents against Sudanese expatriates in Britain. In addition to Britain, other countries, including France, Germany, Norway, and Japan, provided significant economic or humanitarian aid to Sudan. In early 1990, the Danish government cancelled Sudan’s outstanding debt totaling more than US$22.9 million.

Major financial assistance came from Arab countries, especially from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Economic cooperation was initiated with Libya in the 1980s. Saudi Arabia's assistance after 1980 mainly took the form of balance-of-payments support and petroleum shipments.
rather than project aid. Sudan’s support of Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War alienated the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, which sharply curtailed their economic aid to Khartoum. The increasingly close ties between Sudan and Iran in the early 1990s were another factor in diminished Arab financial aid to Khartoum.

Prior to the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China had been the most important communist provider of development funds. Sudan valued these loans because they were interest free and had long grace periods before repayments started. Economic cooperation with China has continued. Relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union improved markedly following al-Numayri’s overthrow in 1985, but the regime change did not result, as Khartoum had hoped, in Soviet economic assistance.

On December 31, 1991, the World Bank closed its Khartoum office. The closure resulted from the deterioration in relations between Sudan and international monetary bodies after Khartoum ceased repayment of debt to the World Bank and the IMF. In August 1999, however, the IMF dropped its sanctions after Sudan reduced its arrears and implemented an IMF structural adjustment program. Sudan regained full membership and voting rights in the IMF and became eligible for the World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.

In October 1997, the United States imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against Sudan as a result of the country’s continued support for international terrorism, continued efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and the prevalence of human-rights violations. This had a significant impact on foreign aid. In 2006 the United States expanded the provisions to block the property of persons connected with the conflict in Darfur. The United States later excluded GOSS from the definition of the government of Sudan, and exempted South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State, Abyei, Darfur, and marginalized areas in and around Khartoum (four official camps for internally displaced persons) from the trade prohibitions. The regulations were later amended to allow nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in humanitarian or religious activities to provide assistance in the specified areas of Sudan and to allow NGOs to apply to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control for permission to provide assistance in the non-specified areas.

In March 2000, Sudan signed two 25-year, concessionary (3-percent interest rate and seven-year grace period) loan agreements with AFESD for US$114 million to be used to build highways out of Khartoum and upgrade a dam for irrigation. Sudan also came to an agreement with AFESD about its arrears of US$214 million. At about the same time, Sudan signed for a loan from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) for
US$16 million to fund several water and research projects, and it received US$10 million from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development to upgrade the power sector. In 2001 the IDB also provided a loan of US$6.5 million for a project to assist refugees from the civil war in South Kordofan State with water projects, health centers, and primary schools.

Sudan continued its commitment to the IMF in 2001–2. However, the 2002 budget projected a deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP, exceeding IMF limits. In response, the IMF released a report in November 2002 that criticized military spending and government subsidies on goods such as food. To maintain Sudan’s commitment to the reform program, the IMF reduced the country’s payments to the fund to US$2 million per month in return for Sudan’s promise to reduce its budget deficit to 1 percent of GDP and to reduce military spending by 13 percent.

In January 2002, the European Union (EU) resumed aid to Sudan, providing an estimated US$155 million during the period 2002–7. In July the OPEC Fund for International Development promised US$40 million for various irrigation projects, 80 percent of the funds for the construction of a US$3 million bridge over the Nile in Atbarah, and US$5 million for new telephone exchanges. In August 2002, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development signed an agreement with the IDB to provide US$200 million for development projects, including renovation
of the Roseires Dam. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, the AFESD, Qatar, and other Arab and Islamic development funds agreed to provide US$1 billion for the construction of a hydroelectric plant at Merowe.

The United States had spent US$650 million in Sudan’s strife-torn Darfur region by 2005, as a result of special appropriations from Congress. In that year, Congress developed further plans to boost emergency food aid to Sudan as well as disaster relief and refugee aid, especially for Darfur.

Following the 2005 peace agreement, Sudan produced a six-year recovery and development plan. Implementation of the first years, 2005–7, required US$7.8 billion to establish a health-care system and build schools, roads, and railroads in areas neglected or destroyed by the civil war in the South. This amount did not include the funds required for peacekeeping operations in the South or for restoring stability in the Darfur region. Sudan requested international donors to provide US$2.7 billion (34 percent of the funds) and planned to provide US$5.1 billion (66 percent) from the country’s domestic oil revenues. Although the World Bank had just returned to Sudan and had not yet normalized relations, it had begun to provide technical advice on wealth sharing during the peace process, and it had agreed to manage foreign aid in a multidonor trust fund.

In March 2009, after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, Sudan expelled 13 international humanitarian aid organizations and shut down three national aid organizations. Those organizations had served as U.S. Government and UN implementation partners in the provision of water and sanitation, health care, and protection. The UN maintained that these actions affected 50 percent of aid delivery in Sudan. UN agencies and other remaining NGOs attempted to fill in to meet immediate humanitarian needs. The United States also led the international effort to support implementation of the CPA while providing for the humanitarian needs of conflict-affected populations throughout the country. Such assistance included food aid, provision of health care, water, sanitation, and hygiene, as well as programs for nutrition, agriculture, protection, and economic recovery.

**Money and Banking**

**Currency**

In 1992 the Bank of Sudan introduced the Sudanese dinar as a parallel currency at a rate of 1 Sudanese dinar (SDD1) equal to 10 Sudanese pounds (SDP10), and 100 piastres equal to SDD1. In 1992 and 1993,
notes of 50, 25, 10, and 5 dinars were introduced. In 1994 a 100-dinar note and in 1996 a 1,000-dinar note entered circulation as well. On March 1, 1999, the Sudanese dinar officially replaced the Sudanese pound, and the pound was withdrawn from circulation on July 31 of that year.

The Sudanese government informed the IMF in 2005 that it was opposed to circulation by the SPLM of an independent currency note, a new Sudanese pound, in SPLM-controlled areas. Nonetheless, the government did agree with the SPLM in February 2005 that it would officially replace the Sudanese dinar, which had been in circulation since 1992, with a new Sudanese pound (Southerners were opposed to the use of the Sudanese dinar because it symbolized Islamic culture). In January 2007, to mark the second anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Central Bank of Sudan introduced the new Sudanese pound. Each pound was divided into 100 piasters. One Sudanese pound (SDG1) was equal to 100 Sudanese dinars (or 1,000 old Sudanese pounds), and one piaster equaled 1 Sudanese dinar (or 10 old Sudanese pounds).

The official exchange rate was managed by the Bank of Sudan through a crawling peg to maintain an “appropriate” rate against the U.S. dollar. At the end of 2008, the exchange rate of Sudanese pounds and U.S. dollars was US$1 = SDG2.18. On July 31, 2011, the rate was US$1 = SDD2.67.

**Banking**

Sudan inherited its banking system from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1955). When the National Bank of Egypt opened in Khartoum in 1901, it obtained a privileged position as banker to and for the government, being a semiofficial central bank. Other banks followed, but the National Bank of Egypt and Barclays Bank in Britain dominated and stabilized banking in Sudan until after World War II. Postwar prosperity created a demand for an increasing number of commercial banks.

Before Sudanese independence, there were no restrictions on the movement of funds between Egypt and Sudan, and the value of the currency used in Sudan was tied to that of Egypt. This situation was unsatisfactory to an independent Sudan, which established the Sudan Currency Board to replace Egyptian and British money. It was not a central bank because it did not accept deposits, loan money, or provide commercial banks with cash and liquidity.

A three-member commission from the U.S. Federal Reserve System, established in 1956, provided recommendations for establishing a central bank in Sudan. In 1959 the Bank of Sudan succeeded the Sudan Currency Board, taking over the Sudanese assets of the National Bank.
of Egypt, and acting as the central bank of Sudan, issuing currency, assisting the development of banks, providing loans, maintaining financial equilibrium, and advising the government.

The Bank of Sudan used policy instruments, including interest-rate policies, to control the quantity of money in circulation from its establishment until 1984, when Islamic laws were introduced. After the complete Islamization of the banking system in 1992, the Bank of Sudan eliminated treasury bills and government bonds that carried interest rates. In their place, the bank issued financial certificates conforming to the Islamic system. To ensure that banking operations would be free of practices that might be deemed usurious, the Sharia High Supervisory Board became a part of the Bank in 1993.

Among the measures introduced by the 1997 IMF economic reform program was a system of Islamic open-market operations, with central bank short-term and long-term profit-sharing certificates sold at weekly auctions to control liquidity. The central bank also began to require commercial banks to comply more closely with minimum reserve requirements and established a discount window for short-term bank credit that increased the impact of the interest-rate policy. The bank abolished the extension of low-cost credit to the central government and state-owned institutions.

There were originally five major commercial banks (Bank of Khartoum, An-Nilein Bank, Sudan Commercial Bank, the People’s Cooperative Bank, and the Unity Bank), but the number subsequently grew. In 1970 the banks were nationalized and became controlled by the Bank of Sudan. As of 2003, however, there were once again private- as well as public-sector banks.

To encourage foreign capital investment, in 1974 foreign banks were urged to establish joint ventures in association with Sudanese capital. Banking transactions with foreign companies operating in Sudan were facilitated so long as they abided by the rulings of the Bank of Sudan and transferred a minimum of SDP3 million into Sudan. Several foreign banks took advantage of this “open-door” policy, most notably Citibank, the Faisal Islamic Bank, Chase Manhattan Bank, and the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development. In early 2011, two foreign banks had branches in Sudan, Abu Dhabi National Bank and Estates Commercial Bank.

In 2010 the Bank of Sudan had 14 branches, including the Bank of South Sudan, which remained a branch and continued to render conventional (non-Islamized) banking services within a dual banking system. There also were 23 commercial banks. In addition to commercial banks, the government also established numerous specialized banks. They included the Agricultural Bank, the Savings & Social Development Bank (owned by the public sector), and the Financial Investment
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Bank (owned by the private sector). The commercial and other specialized banks had 535 branches throughout the country.

The banking system had worked effectively until the late 1970s and 1980s, when the decline in foreign trade, balance-of-payments problems, spiraling external debt, increased corruption, and the introduction of Islamic banking disrupted the financial system. Some reforms were introduced in the IMF economic adjustment program, but further reform of the system was an important consideration while developing the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to end the civil war in Sudan. One of the decisions at that time was that Sudan would have a dual banking system. As a result, the North retained an Islamic banking system, whereas the South adopted interest-based banking. In 2005 the GOSS created a central bank, the Bank of South Sudan, which functioned as a branch of the Bank of Sudan and shared its monetary policies. Several foreign banks established branches in Juba.

Islamic Banking

The Faisal Islamic Bank, whose principal patron was the Saudi prince, Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Saud, was established in 1977. The open-door policy enabled Saudi Arabia, which had a huge surplus after the 1973 OPEC increases in the price of petroleum, to invest in Sudan. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see Glossary) and its political arm, the National Islamic Front, play a prominent role on the bank’s board of directors. It was the first sharia-based bank to open a branch in Khartoum. Other Islamic banks followed. As a consequence, both the Ansar (see Glossary) and Khatmiyyah (see Glossary) religious groups and their political parties, the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party, formed their own Islamic banks. At the time, both Islamic and conventional banking systems operated together. However, the Faisal Islamic Bank enjoyed certain privileges denied other commercial banks (full tax exemption on assets, profits, wages, and pensions) as well as guarantees against confiscation or nationalization.

Al-Salam Bank’s Sudan affiliate and Emirates and Sudan Bank (ESB), established in 2006, were the two newest foreign banks in early 2011. Al-Salam Bank Sudan was founded by a consortium of United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Sudanese investors. The Emirates and Sudan Bank was established as a result of the acquisition of 60 percent of the Bank of Khartoum by Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB). The government of Sudan had previously owned 99 percent of Bank of Khartoum, Sudan's first bank, dating from 1913. Both Al-Salam Bank Sudan and Emirates and Sudan Bank claimed to be the largest banks in Sudan, with operations fully sharia compliant. Both banks intended to open branches throughout the country to support development, including rebuilding
the southern areas of Sudan as well as other areas affected by the civil war.

By 1992 the Bank of Sudan eliminated treasury bills and government bonds, instruments on which interest was paid, and substituted financial certificates conforming to the Islamic system. The central bank continued to be the bank for the central and regional governments and for semigovernmental institutions. It also served as the lender to the government and lender of last resort to the banks.

The theory of Islamic banking was derived from the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad's exhortations against exploitation and the unjust acquisition of wealth defined as *riba*, meaning interest or usury. Profit and trade were encouraged and provided the foundation for Islamic banking. The prohibitions against interest were founded on the Islamic concept of property as resulting either from an individual's creative labor or from exchange of goods or property. Interest on money loaned fell within neither of these two concepts and was thus unjustified.

To resolve this dilemma from a legal and religious point of view, Islamic banking employed common terms: *musharakah*, or partnership for production; *mudharabah*, or silent partnership when one party provides the capital, the other the labor; and *murabbahah*, or deferred payment on purchases, similar in practice to an overdraft and the most-favored Islamic banking arrangement in Sudan. To resolve the prohibition on interest, an interest-bearing overdraft would be changed to a *murabbahah* contract. The fundamental difference between Islamic and traditional banking systems is that in an Islamic system deposits are regarded as shares, hence their nominal value is not guaranteed.

There were many government-sponsored Islamic initiatives in Sudan, resisted by the predominantly Christian South. However, the Islamic banks were apparently successful there, too, and avoided the controversy of other Islamic initiatives. The sector experienced rapid growth, expected to accelerate with future economic reconstruction and increased production in Sudan's oil fields.

**Labor Force, Wages, and Unions**

**Labor Force**

The size of Sudan’s labor force is difficult to determine because of the various definitions of participation in economic activity and the absence of accurate data from official sources. In rural areas, large numbers of women and girls engage in traditional productive occupations, but many probably are not included in calculations of the active workforce.
More than 7.9 million people were employed in Sudan in 1989, according to an International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimate. In the early 1990s, the employment scene was exacerbated by the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which resulted in the return home of thousands of Sudanese workers who had been based in Kuwait and Iraq, leaving many of their possessions behind. Sudan’s support of Iraq was also a factor in the departure of thousands of Sudanese workers from Saudi Arabia. By 2000, the total labor force of Sudan had grown to an estimated 12 million, of which the government counted 9.6 million as actively employed. Approximately 30 percent of the workforce was female.

Unemployment figures were affected by the severe drought that spread throughout Sudan in the 1980s. In 1983–84, for example, several million people migrated from the worst-hit areas in both Western and Eastern Sudan to Khartoum and other urban areas along the Nile. Many remained in these areas once the drought had eased, living in shantytowns and contributing to unemployment, underemployment, or employment in the informal sector in the cities. In addition, more than 2 million people from the South migrated to the North over the years, as a result of the civil war and famines in these areas. In 2009 the government estimated unemployment at about 20 percent, perhaps not an accurate figure, because a large proportion of Sudanese engaged in small-scale and subsistence agriculture.

The minimum working age in the early 2000s was 18 in theory; however, the law was not enforced, and some 27 percent of Sudanese children aged 10 to 14 were estimated to be in the labor force. For example, children as young as 11 or 12 years of age worked in a number of factories outside the capital that produced edible oils. Child labor was widespread in the informal economy, and children traditionally worked on the family farm from a young age. Sudan did not adhere to ILO Convention no. 182, the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The Child Act of 2010, among other laws, governed hours and working conditions of young people, but the law was not effectively enforced, particularly in the informal sector, where enforcement was especially difficult.

Agriculture was formerly the predominant activity in Sudan, although its share of the labor force gradually declined as other sectors of economic activity expanded. In the 1955–56 census, almost 86 percent of those then considered as part of the workforce were involved in agriculture, livestock raising, forestry, fisheries, or hunting. The ILO estimated that by 1998, the figure had declined to 70–80 percent. By 2008 the government claimed that the percentage was significantly lower. The services sector, which included a government workforce that grew about 10 percent a year in the 1970s, emerged as the second largest area of activity, encompassing an estimated 13–22 percent of those economically
active in 1998, compared with 4.6 percent in 1955–56. The industry sector, including manufacturing, mining, electric power, and construction, accounted for 7–9 percent during 1998, compared to 5.6 percent in 1955–56.

The proportions of the labor force in each of these sectors undoubtedly changed after the estimates were made in 1998, as the relative importance of these sectors altered in the succeeding years. It was difficult to determine the extent of the changes, however, as despite the oil sector’s great importance, it did not directly employ many people. Its impact on employment occurred as a result of the increased spending allowed to the government, which created new jobs, often in the public sector.

The 1998 constitution prohibited forced and bonded labor, although it did not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons. Nevertheless, there were credible reports that slavery persisted, particularly affecting women and children, and that the seizure and sale of women as domestic servants continued. All sides in the Sudanese conflict also conscripted men and boys forcibly into their fighting forces. In May 1998, the government formed the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children, which resulted in the identification and release of several hundred abductees, but the government did not police the laws on forced and bonded labor effectively. In November 2001, the government announced the establishment of special civilian tribunals in the border regions separating the South and the North of the country to prosecute persons involved in the abduction, transport, holding, and selling or exchanging of women and children from war zones. Even so, as late as 2010, the Committee surmised that possibly 10,000 or more abductees from groups such as the Misiriyyah and Rizayqat as well as South Sudanese were engaged in some form of forced labor in the border regions.

The Informal Sector

It is difficult to obtain data on the informal sector, even though it is a very large part of the Sudanese economy. However, a 1993 report indicated that with close to 60 percent unemployment in the cities as a result of high urbanization, only 10 percent of the population could find work in the formal sector. A later report indicated that by 1996, as a result of declines in the agricultural and services sectors, the informal sector accounted for 90 percent of total job opportunities created (1.6 million out of 1.8 million jobs).

Informal-sector activities in rural areas include labor on small farms (with payment in either money or food); selling firewood, charcoal, or grass for animal feed; collecting and selling wild fruits; carrying water and other low-status labor; or working as paid domestic labor. People
involved in the informal economy also create mechanisms to provide credit, wholesaling, and marketing and distribution services throughout the country where formal institutions do not exist.

In the urban areas, the informal sector includes not only the poor, but also many middle-class professionals who have to increase their income by working second jobs, often as traders or taxi drivers. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are also among informal-sector entrepreneurs. They, among others, are a source of cheap, casual labor, in areas ranging from labor in the construction industry to selling tea or cooked food along the streets. Some informal-sector work is also illegal, such as the production and sale of alcohol and prostitution. Another activity is the exchange of hard currency into Sudanese currency, either in Sudan or in currency markets outside the country. The remitted income is redistributed through family networks and supports a substantial portion of the population. The government has tried to suppress, control, or tax the informal sector but without success.
Most requirements for operating a business in Sudan, except for finance, can be met as easily by informal as formal, registered firms, and the market for labor is perhaps more flexible for informal than for formal firms. In addition, the costs and risks of informality are sometimes more manageable than the larger risks associated with formally paying taxes. Therefore, reducing the informal sector requires actions to significantly increase productivity in the formal sector, especially in the markets for finance, labor, and other inputs.

A number of organizations, especially nongovernmental organizations, work in the informal sector, particularly with IDPs, who have to change the way they make their living because in the refugee camps they no longer have access to agricultural land. The NGOs provide training in various technical skills and help participants establish small-scale businesses. In many communities, women have had to become self-sufficient, feeding themselves and their families, if their husbands were killed in the war or migrated to the cities in search of work. Some of the most successful projects in those areas train women in small-scale food-processing skills, such as production of pasta, dehydrated onions and garlic, artificially flavored juices, tomato paste, and jams, to help them become more competitive in local markets and to have food to eat when they otherwise might not. Other projects help organize women’s development associations to produce collectively for the market and also to provide various types of support for poor women in their areas.

Wages

Public-sector wages generally are higher than those of the privately employed, except in a few large private firms. Until late 1974, when the Minimum Standard of Wages Order (Presidential Order no. 21) was issued, there had not been a minimum wage in the private sector, although in a few occupations, such as stevedoring at Port Sudan, official wage orders had set certain minimums. The 1974 minimum, established at SDP16.50 a month, was equivalent to the minimum entry wage for public-sector jobs. It applied, however, basically only to workers in establishments having 10 or more employees in the Khartoum area, Al-Gezira, and certain other urban centers. Its geographical limitations together with important exemptions—employees below the age of 18, all those in enterprises having fewer than 10 workers, seasonal agricultural workers, and some others—excluded about three-quarters of all wage earners.

The Labor Act of 1997 replaced the Manpower Act of 1974 and set forth the organization of employment (including provisions for women and juveniles), contracts of service, wages, working hours and leave,
termination of employment, after-service benefits, and miscellaneous other provisions. It also listed categories of persons who were exempt from the act, among them domestic servants, agricultural workers other than persons employed in establishments that process agricultural products, and casual workers.

The minimum wage was established by a commission consisting of specialized members representing the state, workers, and employers, and enforced by the Ministry of Labor. Workers denied the minimum wage could file a grievance with their local Ministry of Labor field office. In April 2004, the Ministry of Labor and Administrative Reform, the Sudanese Businessmen and Employers Federation, and the Sudan Workers’ Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) agreed to raise the minimum wage to SDD12,500 (US$48) per month. By 2011 it had increased to SDG 265 (US$90) per month.

Unions

The labor-union movement originated in 1946 with the formation, by some Sudan Railways employees, of the Workers’ Affairs Association. Two years later, the Trades and Tradesmen's Union Ordinance of 1948, which was based largely on the British model and the concepts of voluntary association and limited government intervention in union affairs, gave official sanction to the unions. A proliferation of mostly small, ineffective bodies emerged. The major exception was the rail union, which became Sudan’s wealthiest and most powerful union. In 1949 the workers' association helped start the national Workers' Congress, which in 1950 became the Sudan Workers’ Trade Union Federation. The SWTUF was closely associated with the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), and its actions were strongly political. It failed to receive government recognition. After national independence, the federation had frequent confrontations with the new government, including a successful general strike in October 1958. That strike was one of the factors that contributed to the military takeover of the government the following month.

The SWTUF controlled roughly 70 percent of all labor-union membership by the 1958 coup. The new military government repealed the 1948 ordinance, dissolved all unions, and detained many of the federation’s leaders. Some union organization was again permitted after 1960, but it was prohibited for white-collar workers, and federations were not allowed. Upon restoration of the civilian government in 1964, the 1948 ordinance was reinstated, the SWTUF reemerged, and union membership increased rapidly. Most unions were small, financially weak, and generally not very effective. The few larger unions were in the public sector, led by the Sudan Railway Workers’ Union.
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SWTUF leadership remained in communist hands. The SCP was allied with the group that carried out the military coup of May 1969. Strikes, however, were prohibited by a presidential order issued shortly after the 1969 takeover. After the abortive communist coup in mid-1971, the government dissolved the SWTUF and executed a number of its leaders.

Late in 1971, the government promulgated the new Trade Unions Act, under which directives were issued in 1973 that established a list of 87 unions based along sectoral, occupational, and industrial lines. Somewhat more than half were “employees” unions (for white-collar employees), and the rest “workers” unions (for blue-collar workers). The existing unions were merged into the specified groupings. The act contained measures to strengthen unionism, including a provision for compulsory dues and employer-paid time off to serve as union officials. The SWTUF was reinstated for the workers’ unions, and the Sudanese Federation of Employees and Professionals Trade Unions was formed in 1975 for the white-collar group. Their representation of union interests was carried on within guidelines set by the government and the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the mass political party established by the government in 1972. In the late 1970s, the unions led strikes, which, although illegal, resulted in settlement of issues through negotiations with the government. Prior to 1989, the SWTUF, in its weakened state, included 42 trade unions, representing more than 1.7 million workers in the public and private sectors. The federation was affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity.

Following the 1989 coup, the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS) temporarily suspended the right to organize and bargain collectively and prescribed punishments, including the death penalty, for violations of its labor decrees. Many union leaders were arrested. Prior to the 1989 coup, leaders of the SWTUF formed a union in exile, the Legitimate Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation, which carried on secret trade union activities in Sudan.

The Trade Union Act of 1992 facilitated the government’s definition of the sectors, industries, and companies that could form trade unions, allowed it to intervene in the internal affairs of the unions and their elections, and provided for the suspension or dissolution of the unions. In 1993 the government amalgamated the 107 sectoral trade unions into 26 trade unions. In 1996 the number was reduced to 13 unions. The Labor Act of 1997 included a section on resolution of trade disputes and a requirement that employers negotiate with employees through a lawful trade union if they had such representation.

 Strikes and protests occurred in 1998 over the privatization of state corporations and public services, an action that had caused massive job
losses. In 1999 and again in 2000, teachers went on strike for several months, each time to protest the government’s failure to pay salaries.

The 1998 constitution provided the right of association for trade-union purposes, but in 2011 the government continued to restrict this right. Only the government-controlled SWTUF, the leading blue-collar labor organization with about 800,000 members, functioned legally. The government again imposed severe punishments, including the death penalty, for violation of its labor decrees. However, the International Labour Organisation frequently noted that the trade-union monopoly was contrary to the principles of freedom of association, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions continued to recognize the Legitimate Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation, the national trade-union organization that functioned prior to the ban and that continued to operate in exile.

The law allowed labor committees the right to organize and bargain collectively; however, in practice, the government’s control of the steering committees meant that it dominated the process of setting wages and working conditions. The law also did not prohibit anti-union discrimination. Moreover, strikes were considered illegal unless the government granted approval, which never occurred. Therefore, most employees who tried to strike were subject to employment termination, although workers who went on strike in recent years, including in 2008, were not terminated, and there were no reports of union leaders being detained or unfairly dismissed in 2011.

Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry

Agriculture and livestock raising were the main sources of livelihood for the Sudanese population in 2011. It was estimated that 80 percent of the labor force were employed in that sector, including 84 percent of the women and 64 percent of the men.

Agricultural products regularly accounted for about 80 to 95 percent of exports until the oil industry came on line. Total sector activities contributed an estimated 35.5 percent of GDP in 2006, a decline from the years prior to the development of the oil industry. Crop cultivation was divided between a market-oriented sector comprising mechanized, large-scale irrigated and rain-fed farming (mainly in central Sudan) and small-scale farming following traditional practices carried out in parts of the country where rainfall or other water sources were sufficient for cultivation.

Large investments occurred over time in mechanized, irrigated, and rain-fed agriculture, which together accounted for roughly two-thirds of Sudan’s cultivated land. The early emphasis on growing cotton on irrigated land decreased. Although cotton remained important, peanuts,
wheat, and sugarcane became major crops, and considerable quantities of sesame also were grown. Rain-fed mechanized farming continued to produce mostly sorghum, but the cultivation of sesame increased, and short-fiber cotton also was grown. Production in both subsectors increased domestic supplies and export potential. This gain appeared, however, to have been achieved mainly by expanding the cultivated area rather than by increasing productivity.

Most subsistence cultivators produced sorghum as their staple crop, although in the northerly rain-fed cultivated areas millet was the principal staple. Subsistence farmers also grew peanuts and sesame. Following food shortages in 2001, there was an attempt to increase land area for the production of food. The increase in food production, however, was at the expense of the production of export crops, although export crops increased in 2004 and the export of sesame and cotton continued to increase through 2008.

**Land Use**

The Ministry of Agriculture estimated that Sudan had 84 million hectares (see Glossary) of potentially arable land. The area under permanent crops was estimated at more than 19 million hectares in 2010, about 23 percent of potential arable land.

Substantial variations existed in land classified as actually used or potentially usable for livestock grazing. The Ministry of Agriculture and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) classified about 24 million hectares as pastureland. In 1975, however, a United Nations interagency mission to Sudan had estimated the total potential grazing land at between 120 million and 150 million hectares. Total forest area declined from 71.2 million hectares in 1990 to 61.6 million hectares in 2000. The use of some woodland areas for grazing, the dearth of rainfall during the 1980s, and the ecological damage from mechanized farming caused steady deforestation.

In 2011 Sudan still had a substantial amount of land suitable for future cropping. The 1975 UN mission believed that two-thirds of the potential area for livestock grazing, however, was already in use, and that proportion had probably increased over time with the rising numbers of livestock. In addition to land suitable for cultivation and livestock grazing, Sudan also had about 76 million to 86 million hectares of desert. An area of about 2.9 million hectares was covered by swamps and inland water, and additional land was occupied by urban settlements and other man-made features.
Land Tenure

The right to own property, to bequeath it to heirs, and to inherit it was established by the 1973 constitution (then known as the Permanent Constitution), although that right was suspended in 1985. Sudan has long had a system of land registration through which an individual, an enterprise, or the government can establish title to a piece of land. Such registration was extensive in Northern Sudan, especially in the then-states of Al-Khartoum, Al-Awsat, and Ash Shamali. Before 1970 all other land (unregistered) belonged to the state, which held ownership in trust for the people, who had customary rights to it.

The Unregistered Land Act of 1970 declared that all waste, forest, and unregistered lands were government land. Private land was limited to that registered before 1970 under a 1929 land ordinance and was limited to agricultural land along the Nile and a few areas along other water courses. Such land amounted to only about 1 percent of all land. Individuals could, however, lease land from the government and gain usufruct rights.

The government owned most of the land used by the modern agricultural sector and leased it to tenants (for example, in the Gezira Scheme) or to private entrepreneurs, such as most operators of large-scale mechanized
rain-fed farming. The lease rights were for specified periods of time; for example, leases rights for the large mechanized farms were typically for 25 years.

There were also many variants of land tenure. The communal land used for pasture and for subsistence cultivation was owned by the government but under the control of the community or local leader, who allocated it to households of the village or ethnic group for their exclusive cultivation. The rights to such land might be passed on to heirs, but ordinarily the land could not be sold or otherwise disposed of, nor used as collateral. The right was also retained to land left fallow, although in Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria there were communities where another individual could claim such land by clearing it.

Among the transhumant communities of the North, the rights to cultivated land were much the same, but the dominant position of livestock in community activities introduced certain other communal rights that included common rights to grazing land, the right-of-way to water and grazing land, the right to grass on agricultural land unless the occupier cut and stacked it, and the right to crop residues unless similarly treated. In the western savannas, private ownership of stands of hashab (gum arabic) trees could be registered, an exception to the usual government ownership of the forests, but dead wood for domestic fuel and the underlying grass were common property. Water, a matter of greatest importance to stock raisers, was open to all if free standing, but wells and the associated drinking troughs were private property and retained by the digger season after season. In Northern Sudan, especially in the western region where increasing population and animal numbers placed pressure on the land, violations of customary laws and conflicts between ethnic groups over rights to pasturage and water increased during the 1990s and early 2000s. These were major factors behind the warfare that began in Western Sudan in early 2003.

Agriculture

Irrigated Agriculture

Sudan had a modern irrigated agriculture sector totaling about 800,000 hectares in 2010, out of about 84 million hectares that were potentially arable. This was a slight decline from the prior year and well below the more than 2 million hectares of the early 1990s. The Nile and its tributaries were the source of water for 93 percent of irrigated agriculture, and of this, the Blue Nile accounted for about 67 percent. Gravity flow was the main form of irrigation, although pumps served part of the irrigated area.
The waters of the Nile in Sudan were used for centuries for traditional irrigation, taking advantage of the annual Nile flood. Such usage continued in the early 2000s, along with the traditional *shaduf* (a device to raise water) and waterwheel to lift water to fields in local irrigation projects. These devices were rapidly being replaced by more efficient mechanized pumps. Among the first efforts to employ irrigation for modern commercial cropping was the use of the floodwaters of the Qash River and the Barakah River (both of which originate in Eritrea) in eastern Sudan to grow cotton on their deltas. This project was started in the late 1860s by the Egyptian governor and continued until interrupted by the turbulent period of the 1880s. Cultivation resumed in 1896 in the Barakah Delta and after World War I in the Qash Delta. Between 1924 and 1926, canals were built in the latter delta to control the flood, but sandstorms made canals unfeasible in the Barakah. Between the 1940s and the 1970s, various projects were developed to irrigate land. Both deltas yielded only one crop a year, watered by the flood. Adequate groundwater, however, offered the eventual possibility of using pump irrigation from local wells for additional cropping or for supplementing any flood shortages.

The world’s largest agricultural irrigation project under single management in 2010 operated on land between the Blue Nile and White
Nile Rivers south of their confluence at Khartoum. This land has a gentle slope to the north and west, permitting natural gravity irrigation, and its soils are fertile cracking clays well suited to irrigation. The project originated in 1911 when a private British enterprise, Sudan Plantations Syndicate, found cotton suitable to the area and embarked in the 1920s on what became the Gezira Scheme, intended principally to furnish cotton to the British textile industry. Backed by a loan from the British government, the syndicate began to construct a dam on the Blue Nile at Sinnar (also seen as Sannar and Sennar) in 1913. Work was interrupted by World War I, and the dam was not completed until 1925. The project was limited by a 1929 agreement between Sudan and Egypt, which restricted the amount of water the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan could use during the dry season. By 1931 the project had expanded to 450,000 hectares, the maximum that could then be irrigated by the available water, although 10,000 more hectares were added in the 1950s. The project was nationalized in 1950 and operated thereafter by the Sudan Gezira Board as a government enterprise. In 1959 a new agreement with Egypt greatly increased the allotment of water to Sudan, as did the completion in the early 1960s of the Manaqil Extension on the western side of the Gezira Scheme. In 2010 the Gezira Scheme accounted for the great majority of the country's total land under irrigation.

The government set up a program in the early 1960s to resettle Nubians displaced by Lake Nubia (called Lake Nasser in Egypt), which was formed by the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. To provide farmland for the Nubians, the government constructed the Khashm al-Qirbah Dam on the Atbarah River, a Nile tributary, and established the Halfa al-Jadidah (New Halfa) irrigation project. Located west of Kassala, this project was originally designed to irrigate about 164,000 hectares. Part of the irrigated area was assigned to local inhabitants. The main commercial crops initially introduced included cotton, peanuts, and wheat. In 1965 sugarcane was added, and a sugar factory having a design capacity of 60,000 tonnes was built to process it (for value of the metric ton, see table 1, Appendix).

The multipurpose Roseires Dam was built in 1966, power-generating facilities being installed in 1971. Both the water and the power were needed to implement the Rahad River irrigation project located east of the Rahad River, a tributary of the Blue Nile. Work on the initial 63,000 hectares of the project began in the early 1970s, and the first irrigation water was received in 1977. As of 2009–10, the dam was being heightened in order to increase the amount of water for both irrigation and power generation.

Private irrigation projects using diesel pumps also began to appear in Al-Khartoum Province in the 1920s, mainly along the White Nile, to improve provision of vegetables, fruit, and other foods to the capital area.
In 1937 the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government built a dam upstream from Khartoum on the White Nile at Jabal al-Awliya to regulate the supply of water to Egypt during the August to April period of declining flow. Grazing and cultivated land along the river was flooded for almost 300 kilometers. The government thereupon established seven pump-irrigation projects, partially financed by Egypt, to provide the area's inhabitants with an alternative to transhumance. This irrigation project eventually proved successful, making possible large surpluses of cotton and sorghum and encouraging private entrepreneurs to undertake new projects. High cotton profits during the Korean War (1950–53) increased private interest along the Blue Nile as well, and by 1958 almost half the country's irrigated cotton was grown under pump irrigation. During the 1960s, however, downward fluctuations in world cotton prices and disputes between entrepreneurs and tenants led to numerous failures of pump irrigation projects. In 1968 the government established the Agricultural Reform Corporation and assumed ownership and operation of the larger estates. Subsequently, as leases expired, the corporation acquired smaller projects, until May 1970, when all outstanding leases were revoked. A considerable number of small pump operations that developed on privately owned land, chiefly along the main Nile but also on the Blue Nile, continued to operate.
Since the 1950s, the government has constructed a number of large pump projects, mostly on the Blue Nile. These have included the Junayd project on the east bank of the Blue Nile east of the Gezira Scheme. This project, with an irrigated area of about 36,000 hectares, went into operation in 1955 with the aim of providing an alternative livelihood for nomadic pastoralists in the area. It just produced cotton until 1960, when about 8,400 hectares were converted to sugarcane. A sugar factory built to process the crop (with a potential capacity of 60,000 tonnes of sugar a year) opened in 1962. In the early 1970s, the As-Suki project, partially funded by Japan and also of 36,000 hectares, was established upstream from Sinnar to grow cotton, sorghum, and oilseeds. In the mid-1970s, the government constructed a second project near Sinnar of about 20,000 hectares. In addition to cotton and other crops such as peanuts, about 8,400 hectares of the area were devoted to raising sugarcane. The cane-processing factory, with a design capacity of 110,000 tonnes of sugar a year, opened in 1976. Several smaller Blue Nile projects added more than 80,000 additional hectares to Sudan's overall irrigated area during this time.

In the 1970s, when the consumption and import of sugar grew rapidly, domestic production became a priority. Consequently, two major pump-irrigated sugar plantations were established on the White Nile in the Kosti area. The Hajar Asalaya Sugar Project, begun in 1975, irrigated an area of about 7,600 hectares. A sugar-processing factory opened in 1977, with a potential annual capacity of 110,000 tonnes. The Kananah Sugar Project, which opened in 1981 with a potential of more than 33,000 hectares, was one of the world's largest sugar-milling and refining operations. The project, unlike the country's four other government-owned sugar projects, was a joint venture among the governments of Sudan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Investment Company, the Sudan Development Corporation, Kananah Limited, and the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development; it also included local Sudanese banks.

The government's Dams Implementation Unit signed contracts in 2010 with two Chinese companies for a US$838 million project in northeastern Sudan. The Upper Atbarah Dams Complex Project would comprise two dams, on the Setit and the Atbarah, and the Upper Nile Dam. The project was part of the dam-construction program that included the building of the 1,250-megawatt Merowe Dam and the heightening of the Roseires Dam. The new dams were expected to contribute to the irrigation of some 210,000 hectares of agricultural land and to help revitalize land in the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme.
**Mechanized Rain-fed Agriculture**

Cultivation dependent on rainfall falls into two categories. Most Sudanese farmers had always relied on rain-fed farming. In addition to these traditional farms, a large modern mechanized rain-fed agricultural sector developed after 1944–45, when a government project to cultivate the cracking clays of central Sudan started in the area of Al-Gedaref (also seen as Al-Qadarif). Its prime purpose was to meet the food needs of army units stationed in British colonies in East Africa (present-day Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). The alkaline clays and loams in this area were not suitable for cultivation by hand or by oxen. An average of about 6,000 hectares a year was cultivated between 1945 and 1953, chiefly producing sorghum, under a sharecropping arrangement between the government and farmers who had been allocated land in the project. These estates proved costly, however, and in 1954 the government began encouraging the private sector to take up mechanized farming in the area, a policy that continued after Sudan gained independence in 1956. The government maintained several state farms to demonstrate production methods and to conduct research, but research activities were very limited because of staffing and funding problems.

The private-sector response was positive, and by 1960 mechanized farming had spread into other areas of the cracking-clay zone in central Sudan.
and eastern Sudan. The government set aside rectangular areas that were divided into plots of 420 hectares (later raised in places to 630 hectares) each. Half of these plots were leased to private farmers, the other half left fallow. After four years, the originally leased land was to be returned to fallow and the farmer was to receive a new lease for an adjacent fallow area. When the demand for land grew faster than it could be demarcated, areas outside the designated project limits were taken over by private individuals. The four-year lease proved unpopular because it meant new investment in clearing land every four years, and apparently much of the worked land continued to be cultivated while fallow land was also placed under cultivation.

The investment requirements for mechanized farming favored prosperous cultivators, and eventually most farms came to be operated by entrepreneurs who raised capital through mortgageable property or other assets in the urban centers. Through arrangements with other individuals, these entrepreneurs frequently managed to control additional plots beyond the legal limit of two. Their ability to obtain capital permitted them also to abandon depleted land and to move into newly demarcated uncleared areas, a practice that had a deleterious impact on the environment, deprived the indigenous inhabitants of work opportunities, and increased desertification. The government established the Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC) in 1968 as an autonomous agency under the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to expand the operator base and to introduce more control over land allocation, crops, and farming methods. With loans from the IDA, the MFC was able to provide technical assistance, credit for land clearing and machinery, and marketing aid to individual farmers and cooperative groups. The MFC also became the operator of state farms.

The area under this system of management by the late 1990s had spread to about 5.9 million hectares in the states of Al-Gedaref, Blue Nile, Upper Nile, White Nile, Sinnar, and South Kordofan. The farms were then usually well over 420 hectares as a result of combining leased plots and creating family partnerships. The government also allocated large plots of 21,000–420,000 hectares to Sudanese and Gulf state investors.

Only a few crops were suitable for cultivation in the cracking-clay area, principally sorghum. Sesame and short-fiber cotton also grew successfully but in relatively smaller quantities. Land preparation, seeding, and most threshing were mechanized on these farms, but some threshing, as well as weeding and harvesting, was done by seasonal labor.
Traditional Rain-fed Agriculture

Traditional rain-fed farming involves nomadic and seminomadic peoples and transhumance, as well as settled agriculture, which also includes significant numbers of livestock. Although almost all these systems exist in every state, they are most prevalent in the Kordofan and Darfur States, Sinnar, and the Blue Nile and White Nile States. Livestock, part of almost every farming system, serve as both a capital asset and a hedge against the risk of farming, particularly because of recurrent droughts.

Settled farmers usually produce a combination of food crops and cash crops, such as karkade (hibiscus), sesame, and watermelon, on 4.2 to 6.3 hectares. The total area under crops in the traditional rain-fed farming system in 2010 was estimated to be almost 12 million hectares.

South Sudan has three zones where traditional agricultural systems prevail. The Central Rainlands Zone in Upper Nile State receives less than 800 millimeters of rainfall per year. Vegetation in the zone is open grasslands, bush thickets, and thorn woodland where quick-maturing grains and oilseeds are produced. Semi-mechanized farming has begun to take over where farm size is large enough to break even on the investment.

The Flood Plains Zone includes the remainder of the Upper Nile State and also parts of Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria. Rainfall ranges from 800 to 1,000 millimeters per year, concentrated in six to seven months. Vegetation is open grasslands with acacia woodlands. The sudd (see Glossary), in this area, is a permanent or semipermanent swamp that mainly produces papyrus. Farming takes place on the high land; the lower land is the most important cattle-grazing land in the South.

The Equatorial Zone includes the Ironstone Plateau, the Central Hills, and the Green Belt in Equatoria. Rainfall is usually 900–1,300 millimeters per year, concentrated in six to eight months, although it is much higher in the Green Belt. Farm production includes perennial tree crops, such as coffee, tea, and oil palm, and annual crops, such as tobacco, cotton, corn, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, and vegetables. Tsetse-fly infestation makes it difficult to raise livestock in the area.

Crops

Cotton was traditionally the most important export crop and the major irrigated crop. The main types of cotton grown were medium-staple Akala, some long-staple Barakat, and a little long-medium staple Shambat B. A small amount of rain-fed, short-staple cotton was also grown. Cotton’s contribution to export revenue decreased from 53 percent in the 1970s to 1 percent in 2008. Exports of cotton provided US$134 million in earnings in 2008 but fell to an estimated US$40.4 million in 2010.
Sesame seed became Sudan’s prime agricultural export commodity in the mid-1990s, and it was also used domestically to produce oil for cooking. The yield varied in recent years, with a high of 416,000 tonnes in 1996. It was 350,000 tonnes in 2008 and about 248,000 tonnes in 2010 because of a decline in productivity. Sesame exports earned US$141 million in 1996, some 23 percent of export revenues. They decreased to US$93 million in 2007, constituting 1.2 percent of export earnings, but increased to US$167.3 million in 2010.

Gum arabic is the most important forest product of Sudan, which accounts for 80 percent of the world’s supply. It is collected from acacia trees in Darfur and Kordofan and used widely in industry for products ranging from mucilage (for postage stamps), to foam stabilizers, to excipient in medicines and dietetic foods. The Gum Arabic Company markets the product, with restraints placed on the right of any private company to independently export unprocessed gum arabic. The justification given for regulating its sale is that its quality would deteriorate and export quantities and prices would decline if sales were deregulated. Moreover, even though gum arabic requires minimal processing and packaging, the prices received by producers in 2000–2001 were only 21 percent of world market prices. Export markets for it are price sensitive, as there are synthetic substitutes and competition from Chad, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria. Production in 1994–95 was 84,000 tonnes. It declined to 16,000 tonnes by 2000 but surpassed 30,000 tonnes in 2010. Export earnings were US$40 million in 2003 and about US$24 million in 2010.

Peanuts were one of Sudan’s major cash crops until recently. In 1993 Sudan was the fourth largest producer in Africa, after Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo). Peanuts grow on rain-fed land in the far west and also under irrigation. They are both a domestic source of food and oil and a major export. Production had been decreasing as a result of low producer prices, low world market prices, disease, and drought, but conditions turned around in the early 2000s. Production was 1.2 million tonnes in 2003, although revenues remained low. Production declined to 716,000 tonnes in 2008 but rose to 942,000 tonnes in 2009, only to fall to an estimated 549,000 tonnes in 2010. Exports provided US$741,000 in 2007 and some US$200,000 in 2010.

Sorghum is the Sudanese staple food crop, but the yield varies, depending on weather conditions and the amount of irrigated land used for it. Production is also cyclical; when there are large surpluses of the grain, prices fall, discouraging production in the subsequent year. Output reached a high of nearly 5.2 million tonnes in 2003 but declined to 3.9 million tonnes in 2008 and to an estimated 2.6 million tonnes in 2010 as production continued to drop. Exports in 2010 realized an estimated US$200,000.
Wheat is also grown in irrigated areas as an import substitute. Its production varies in a pattern similar to that of sorghum, reacting to changes in prices. Production was 587,000 tonnes in 2008 but fell to 403,000 tonnes in 2010 because of a decrease in the cultivated area. Overall, grain production (sorghum, millet, and wheat) is insufficient for rising domestic demand, even with good harvests in recent years, requiring Sudan to depend upon imports, especially imports of wheat.

Sugar production began in the 1960s to replace the second most expensive import after petroleum. The largest of the parastatal sugar projects, the Kananah Sugar Project, opened in 1981 and was important in eliminating sugar imports by 1986. In 1999 plans were announced for a large production facility in the White Nile region, with major funding from the Chinese government. Sudan and the People’s Republic of China also agreed to build a sixth sugar plant. And, in May 2002, Sudan inaugurated a new facility at the state-owned Sudan Sugar Company in New Halfa, which by the late 2000s produced 60,000 tonnes of white sugar per year. In 2008 sugar cane production throughout Sudan totaled 7.5 million tonnes.

Livestock

Livestock raising is important throughout Sudan except in the extremely dry areas of the North and the tsetse-fly-infected area in the far South. It provides a large part or the entire livelihood of nearly half the population of Sudan, mainly in the traditional farming sector. In recent years, the government has encouraged commercial livestock production of camels, goats, sheep, and cattle for sale abroad. The range of offerings in the sector includes live animal exports, meat, hides and skins, and dairy products.

Livestock is of increasing importance in the agricultural economy, and it has become the fastest growing non-oil export sector. The Arab states of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, are the source of especially strong demand for Sudan’s livestock.

Sudanese cattle are of two principal varieties: Baqqara and Nilotic. The Baqqara and two subvarieties constitute the majority of the country’s cattle. This breed is found chiefly in the western savanna regions and in fewer, although significant, numbers farther to the east from Jonglei State north to Kassala. Nilotic cattle are common in the eastern hill and plains areas of southern East Equatoria State, which are free of the tsetse fly, and in those parts of West Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes, and Jonglei lying outside the tsetse-fly zone. Because of periodic rinderpest epidemics, the total number of cattle was relatively small until about 1930. A vaccination program begun about that time, and mass inoculations during the succeeding decades resulted in a great increase in numbers.
In the vast areas used by pastoral herders, cattle husbandry is conducted in an economic, cultural, and social context that evolved over generations. This includes an emphasis on increasing herd size as an investment for future family security. Small surpluses (usually bulls) are available for subsistence use, exchange, or sale for local consumption or export. Cattle are also used for marriage payments and for rituals. Numbers of cattle help to establish or increase status and power in a social system in which cattle are the measure of wealth.

Transhumant groups own most of the Nilotic variety of cattle, and their migrations, related to the wet and dry seasons, usually do not exceed 150–60 kilometers. The majority of Baqqara cattle belong to the Baqqara Arabs, who were once largely nomadic, but since at least the early 1900s usually maintained a settled base in which to cultivate crops. The farmers, their relatives, or their agents move the cattle over traditional migratory routes northward during the rainy season and southward to the area of the Bahr al-Arab as the dry season progresses. Migrations in either direction might amount to 400 kilometers.

The expansion of mechanized rain-fed agriculture in the region used by the Baqqara, continued government efforts to enlarge the cultivated area, and pressures on the land from the growing population gradually reduced grazing areas. At the same time, traditional cultural forces brought about a steady increase in cattle numbers. The result was a growing overstock and pasture depletion until the outbreak of civil war in 1983, which was followed by the devastating droughts of the 1980s and early 1990s that greatly reduced livestock numbers throughout Sudan.

Sheep are herded chiefly by transhumants in Darfur and Kordofan. Large numbers are found in the drier areas at greater elevations than the usual cattle zone. There were several breeds but the predominant and preferred one is the so-called desert sheep, which has both good weight and good milk yield. Villagers in Al-Gedaref and Sinnar also raise large numbers of sheep, mostly on a nonmigratory basis. Fodder comes from crop residues on irrigated and rain-fed farms and from vegetation along the rivers and canals.

Goats, of which there are three principal breeds (desert, Nubian, and Nilotic), are found throughout the country south of the northern desert areas. They are raised mainly by settled families for milk and meat. Goat meat, although less popular than mutton, forms part of the diet of most families, particularly the poorer ones. Goat milk is an important source of protein, and many families in urban areas keep a few goats for their milk.

Camels are largely concentrated in the desert and subdesert regions of northern Darfur, northern Kordofan, and southern Al-Gedaref. They
are kept almost entirely by nomadic and seminomadic peoples, for whom the animal represents the preferred mode of transport. Camels are also important for milk and for meat. Camel ownership and numbers are sources of prestige in nomadic societies.

Donkeys, horses, and a small number of pigs (kept by such non-Muslim peoples as the Nuba) are also raised in Sudan. Poultry is raised mainly by farm families and villagers, although a modern sector consisting of government commercial operations and some semicommercial private ventures has developed. A significant poultry industry exists in Khartoum, and beekeeping has also been introduced.

In 1983 Sudan’s more than 50 million animals comprised the second largest national herd in Africa, exceeded only by that of Ethiopia. By 1991 the herd had been reduced by perhaps one-third by the droughts of the 1980s–91, the August 1988 floods in the South, described as the worst in Sudan's history, and the ravages of civil war in the South. Many families and indeed whole ethnic groups, who traditionally survived on their cattle, sheep, goats, or camels, lost all of their herds and were forced to migrate to the Three Towns (Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North) in search of sustenance.

Total livestock production increased rapidly in the second half of the 1990s. The numbers of sheep quadrupled in the 1990s in response to the export market in the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. In 2000, however, exports were affected by an outbreak of Rift Valley fever in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government blamed the problem on livestock imported from East Africa, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states placed
a ban on imports from the region, which had a severe impact on Sudan’s livestock sector. By 2004, livestock had rebounded from the impact of drought, floods, and Gulf-state import bans, with sales in that year of US$134 million. Another outbreak of Rift Valley fever caused some losses once again in 2007–8 and resulted in temporary import restrictions against Sudanese livestock. Sales declined to US$80 million in 2007, and to US$42 million in 2008.

Total livestock numbered almost 142 million head in 2010, including nearly 42 million cattle, 52 million sheep, 43.4 million goats, and 4.6 million camels, as well as thousands of horses, donkeys, and mules. The same year, Sudan exported 91,700 head of livestock at an estimated value of US$136 million. Further growth of the sector was predicted as Gulf investors, particularly from Saudi Arabia, had committed to investment in new production facilities.

**Fisheries**

Fishing is largely carried out by the traditional sector for subsistence, although a number of small operators also use the country's major reservoirs in the more populated central region and the rivers to catch fish for sale locally and in nearby urban centers. There are also some modern fishing ventures, mainly on Lake Nubia and in the Red Sea.

Sudan's total production of fish, shellfish, and other fishing products had significant growth in recent years. Production averaged 58,000 tonnes by 2001, with estimates by the then-Ministry of Livestock Services of a potential yearly catch of 150,000 tonnes per annum from freshwater sources and 10,000 tonnes from the Red Sea. The principal source of fish is the Nile River system. In central and northern Sudan, several lakes and reservoirs were formed by the damming of the river and its branches: the 180-kilometer section of Lake Nubia on the main Nile in Sudan and the reservoirs behind the Roseires and Sinnar dams on the Blue Nile, the Jabal al-Awliya Dam on the White Nile, and the Khashm al Qirbah Dam on the Atbarah.

Production from Lake Nubia was initially far below its potential. Inhabitants around the lake, which had formed gradually in the 1960s, had no previous experience in fishing, and the first significant commercial exploitation of the lake’s resources was undertaken by the government’s Fisheries Administration. In 1973 a private company also started operations. Somewhat later, an ice plant and a cold-storage facility were built at Wadi Halfa with assistance from China. China also furnished fishing vessels and other fishing equipment. New cooling plants at Khartoum and Atbarah held fish transported from Wadi Halfa by railroad. Fish production from the lake reached 2,000 tonnes by 1997–99, but declined to 1,000 tonnes by 2000–2001.
The largest potential source of freshwater fish is in the South, where the extensive river network and flooded areas in Al-Sudd are believed able to provide 100,000 to 300,000 tonnes of fish on a sustained basis. Estimated production in 2003 was 68,000 tonnes.

The country’s second source of fish, the Red Sea coastal area, was relatively unexploited until the late 1970s. In 1978 the British Ministry of Overseas Development began a joint project with Sudan’s Fisheries Administration to raise output by making boats, motors, and equipment available to fishermen. A new ice plant at Sawakin (also seen as Suakin) provided local fishermen with ice for their catch. By 2000–2001, about 5,000 tonnes of fish, shellfish (including pearl oysters), and other marine life were taken annually.

The quantity of fish, crustaceans, and mollusks caught in Sudan in recent years amounted to between 57,000 tonnes in 2002 and 2006 and 72,000 tonnes in 2010. Aquaculture production reached a high of 1,950 tonnes in 2007.

**Forestry**

The forestry subsector embraces both traditional gatherers of firewood and producers of charcoal—the main sources of fuel for homes and some industries—and a modern timber and sawmilling industry, the latter government-owned. Forestry activities started with Condominum rule in 1899, when the government commissioned an Indian forester to produce a comprehensive report on the state of forests in the country. As a result, the Woods and Forests Ordinance was published in 1901, and the Department of Woodlands and Forests established. The First Forest Act replaced the ordinance in 1908, and legislation continued to evolve over the next century.

The Forests National Corporation (FNC) has coordinated forestry development in Sudan since 1989. The FNC emphasizes the development of a forestry information system and planning database for effective planning, policy analysis, and program implementation.

Extensive areas of woodland and forest have been converted to agricultural use since the early 1900s. In 2000, however, Sudan still had a large quantity of natural forest, much of which remained almost totally unexploited. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that forest areas, defined as land under natural or planted stands of trees, whether productive or not, occupied 61.6 million hectares, 25.9 percent of the total land area. Extensive as this was, it represented a loss of nearly 10 million hectares since 1990.

About one-quarter of the forestland is located in the dry and semi-arid regions of northern Sudan. The main value of these forests is as protection for the land against desertification, but they also serve as a
source of fuel for pastoral peoples in those regions. The continued population pressure on the land has resulted in accelerated destruction of forestland, particularly in the Sahel, because charcoal remains the predominant fuel. The loss of forestland in the marginal areas of northern Sudan, accelerated by mechanized farming and by drought, has resulted in the steady southward encroachment of the Sahara.

The productive forest extends below the zone of desert encroachment to the nation’s southern borders. It includes the savanna woodlands of the central and western parts of the country, which are dominated by various species of acacia, among them *Acacia senegal*, the principal source of gum arabic.

The principal area of productive forest and woodland is in the more moist southern part of the country. Covering an area of more than 200,000 square kilometers and consisting mainly of broadleaf deciduous hardwoods, it remains largely undeveloped. Timber produced by government mills in the area includes mahogany for furniture and other hardwoods for railroad ties, furniture, and construction.

Plantations established by the Forestry Administration totaled about 641,000 hectares of both hardwoods and softwoods in 2000; most were in southern Sudan. They included stands of teak and, in the higher elevations of the Imatong Mountains, exotic pines. Eucalyptus stands were established in the irrigated agricultural areas as windbreaks and to supply firewood. Several national parks and game reserves offered some protection of forest and woodland areas.

The second civil war of 1983–2005 disrupted forestry production in the South. During that time, looting of teak plantations, deforestation, and forest degradation occurred around major towns in Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal to a radius of 5–10 kilometers as people sought land for subsistence agriculture and for building poles and fuelwood. Along the northern border region of Upper Nile, there was large-scale tree clearance for mechanized rain-fed agriculture. However, the total impact of the civil strife on forests and wildlife was not known for certain, as surveys did not cover the areas affected by hostilities.

Sudan annually produced 2,173,000 cubic meters of industrial roundwood, and 16,700,000 cubic meters of fuelwood in 1999–2001, as well as 52,000 cubic meters of wood-based panels, and three tonnes of paper and paperboard. There was continued high demand for charcoal, the one major forest product not dependent on the South. Because wood of any kind could be turned into charcoal, the acacia groves of the Sahel were used extensively for this purpose, with a resulting rapid advance of deforestation in the area. Deforestation throughout the country was occurring at an unsustainable rate approaching 2 percent a year in the early 2000s, especially in the northern states and in Darfur.
There is potential for development of a timber industry, as about 30 percent of South Sudan is covered with forests and natural woodlands, including many exotic species. Some of that area is taken up by reservations under formal management, owned by communities, or a part of an official government forest reserve. The Government of South Sudan was working on a land policy and forest law. In the meantime, it had placed a moratorium on any extraction of major forest products.

Industry

Manufacturing

The development of modern manufacturing received little direct encouragement in Sudan during the Condominium period. British economic policies aimed at expanding the production of primary products, mainly cotton, for export. Imports and traditional handicraft industries met the basic needs for manufactured goods. Indirectly, however, the vast Gezira Scheme led to the construction of cotton gins, of which more than 20 were in operation by the early 1930s. A secondary development was the establishment of several cottonseed oil-pressing mills. During World War II, small import-substitution industries arose, including those manufacturing soap, carbonated drinks, and other consumer items. These operations did not survive the competition from imports after the war's end. Foreign private interests invested in a few larger enterprises that included a meat-processing factory, a cement plant, and a brewery, all opened between 1949 and 1952.

At independence the Sudanese government supported a private-sector industrial development policy. It adopted the Approved Enterprises (Concessions) Act of 1956, to encourage private Sudanese and foreign investment. The act placed few restrictions on foreign equity holdings. By 1961, however, the government had concluded that the private sector lacked either interest or funds to establish certain enterprises important to the national economy, so it entered the manufacturing field itself. The first government project was a tannery, which was followed by a sugar factory. In 1962 Khartoum formed the Industrial Development Corporation to manage government plants. Several additional government enterprises were built in the 1960s, including a second sugar factory, two fruit and vegetable canneries, a date-processing plant, an onion-dehydrating plant, a milk-processing plant, and a cardboard factory. The private sector also made substantial investments then, which resulted in factories making textiles and knitwear, shoes, soap, soft drinks, and flour. Other private enterprises included printing facilities and additional oil-pressing mills. Among the largest private undertakings was the foreign-financed and foreign-built oil refinery at Port Sudan, which opened in 1964. Well
over half the investment in the private sector during the decade came from foreign sources.

Direct government participation in the manufacturing sector increased dramatically after the 1969 military coup and policies aimed at placing the country's economic development in government hands, although private ownership continued. During 1970 and 1971, Khartoum nationalized more than 30 private enterprises. In 1972, however, to counter the drop in foreign private investment that followed, Colonel Ja’far al-Numayri announced that private capital would again be accorded favorable treatment, and the government passed the Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act of 1972, containing provisions that were more liberal than earlier legislation.

The economy remained dependent on private capital from developed nations, so the government incorporated further incentives in a 1974 revision of the industrial investment act and added provisions against arbitrary nationalization. Moreover, in 1972 Khartoum denationalized some enterprises and returned them to their former owners under a joint public–private ownership arrangement.

Throughout the 1970s, the government continued to establish new public enterprises, some state-owned, others in conjunction with private interests, and some having foreign government participation, especially by the Arab oil-producing states. The new plants included three sugar factories, two tanneries, a flour mill, and more than 20 textile plants. A joint venture with U.S. interests built Sudan’s first fertilizer plant south of Khartoum, which was in operation by 1986. Private investment continued, particularly in textiles.

Total manufacturing output declined in the 1980s. Capacity utilization was as low as 30 percent in many plants, and down to 10 percent at some textile factories in 1997, despite a ready local supply of high-quality cotton. About 85 percent of all factories in Khartoum’s main industrial area were operating below full capacity in 1998. A shortage of fuel in oil-fired power stations in Khartoum caused frequent power outages, which forced plant owners to install generators, but a shortage of foreign exchange for diesel fuel for the generators kept capacity utilization low. Obsolete equipment, lack of trained personnel, and uncompetitive costs also contributed to the slow growth of the sector.

Growth of the manufacturing sector increased in 1998 with the construction of an oil pipeline, a new refinery, and work on the terminal at Port Sudan. The development of the export oil industry provided foreign exchange for imported machinery. Reforms in the financial sector and privatization also contributed to growth. Telecommunications and food processing, especially sugar refining, gained from these changes, as well as from increased foreign investment. The manufacturing sector grew by 6 percent in real terms in 1999, by 11.5 percent in 2000, and by
5.7 percent in 2008, although it began from a low base. The government’s 1997 economic reform program facilitated this growth.

Food processing was the most successful category of investment, especially sugar refining. Production of refined sugar exceeded domestic demand, allowing Sudan to become the Arab world’s only net sugar exporter. There are five government-owned sugar producers, but the leading producer is the Kananah Sugar Company, the major part of which is privately owned. Its success attracted investment in the White Nile Sugar Company, which began production in 2011 and was expected to reach full capacity of 450,000 tonnes per year by 2012. A new refinery designed to produce 100,000 tonnes per year was also being planned in Sinnar State. The production of sugar reached 738,500 tonnes per year in 2009 but fell to 642,000 tonnes in 2010.

Government estimates suggest that the textile industry, which uses domestic cotton, could produce 110 percent of Sudanese requirements if it operated at full capacity. There are 75 small, privately owned companies and nine large state-owned factories producing spun yarn and fabric. The largest factory is the government-owned Friendship Textile Mill built by the Chinese in the 1960s, with a capacity of 2,100 tonnes of yarn per day and 16 million meters of fabric per year. The most important private-sector factory is the Sudan Textile Industries, with a capacity of 64 million meters per year. Although Sudan is an important producer of high-quality cotton, textile production declined continuously from 274 million meters in the 1970s to just 13.72 million meters in 2003, a capacity-utilization rate of just 5 percent.

Work began on the Red Sea Free-Trade Zone between Port Sudan and the port of Sawakin in July 1999. The project was designed to cover 600 square kilometers. The initial zone of 26 square kilometers included a warehouse and industrial and commercial areas. The original investors were from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In January 2000, a cooperation agreement was signed between the Red Sea Free-Trade Zone and the Free-Trade Zone of Jebel Ali, UAE, in which the UAE pledged to help Sudan establish free-trade zones in all of its border areas, thus linking trade between East Asia and Africa via Sudan. The UAE also promised to increase marketing and shipping activities and to exchange personnel and technical information. Saudi Arabia’s Jiddah Free-Trade Zone signed a similar agreement. The Red Sea Free-Trade Zone was opened in February 2000. Two years later, however, there were reports that only seven of the factories in the zone were still functioning; since then, the zone apparently has collapsed.

In October 2000, the US$450 million GIAD industrial city opened 40 kilometers south of Khartoum. As of 2010, it had 13 separate companies, including factories for manufacturing cables, electrical wires,
steel, and pipeline products. It also had large arms-manufacturing and automotive-manufacturing industries. Other factories assembled small autos and trucks, and some heavy military equipment such as armored personnel carriers and the proposed “Bashir” battle tank. The town also had housing, health, and education facilities.

There are other small-scale manufacturing sectors in Sudan. They include pharmaceuticals, electrical goods, cement, textiles, and paints.

**Energy**

The chief sources of energy in 2010 were wood and charcoal, hydroelectric power, and oil. Wood and charcoal were principally used for household cooking and heating. Substantial quantities of wood fuels were also used by commercial operations—chiefly baking and brick making and, to a lesser extent, tobacco curing. Other vegetable matter including sugarcane bagasse also came into use, meeting a significant part of the energy needs of the sugar mills. Cotton stalks were also used for household fuel. Consumption of wood and charcoal continued to increase as the population grew, and there was concern over the gradual depletion of forest and woodland resources serving the large towns. Overuse of the sparser vegetation in the semidesert grazing areas reportedly resulted in some fuel deficiencies in those regions, as well as in desertification.

A search for oil in the early 1960s along the Red Sea coast also discovered natural gas. In the mid-1970s, additional oil explorations revealed more gas finds, but development was not considered at the time to be commercially feasible. In October 1988, Sudan announced that natural gas production would start in one year. Although it was estimated in 2002 that there were 3 billion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, production had not yet begun by 2010.

Electricity generation began in 1908 when a private company constructed the first power station at Burri al-Daralsa near Khartoum. The modern system dates from 1925 with the establishment of the Sudan Light and Power Company, an enterprise financed and managed by British entrepreneurs but owned by the Condominium government. This company, acquired in full by the colonial government in 1952, was the precursor—through several name changes and reorganizations—of the National Electricity Corporation (NEC).

The Sinnar and Roseires dams were originally constructed to provide irrigation, Sinnar in 1925 and Roseires in 1966 (see fig. 11). Electric-power generating facilities were added only when increasing consumer demands made them potentially viable. The first hydropower station began operating at the Sinnar Dam in 1962, and a transmission line carried power to the Khartoum area. The main hydropower station began
producing electricity in 1973 at the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile, approximately 315 miles southeast of Khartoum. A plan for electricity production over the next 25 years evaluated the potential for hydro-generation on the Nile River and the locations for electricity generation.

The National Electricity Corporation and the Ministry of Energy and Dams are responsible for generation and supply of electricity in Sudan’s two interconnected grids, the Blue Nile Grid and the small Western Grid, although they cover only a small portion of the country around Khartoum and south to Blue Nile State, areas that include only about 30 percent of the population. Even in those areas, the supply is inadequate, with output around 500 megawatts for much of the 2000–2010 period, far below the demand for electric power, and unreliable; power outages were common, even in the capital. As a result, power production is dependent on small diesel-fired power stations and consumers’ oil-driven generators.

Sudan relies heavily on hydroelectricity. In 2006, the country had total installed capacity of 4,520 gigawatt-hours (about 115 kilowatt-hours per head), 41 percent of which was provided by hydropower stations. As a result, power tended to fluctuate according to the flow of the Nile. Until recently, the Roseires Dam was the largest of the hydroelectric facilities, with smaller ones existing elsewhere on the Blue Nile and the Atbarah River.

The sector deteriorated in the 1990s because of a lack of funding. In 2000, however, the NEC launched the Rehabilitation and Performance Improvement Program supported by a US$10 million loan from the OPEC Fund for International Development to upgrade the existing infrastructure and improve the reliability of the electricity supply. In 2001 the NEC announced that Sudan and Ethiopia had agreed to link their power grids, and a related report announced that Ethiopia had also agreed to export power to Sudan.

In January 2010, a contract was awarded to Norplan, a Norwegian organization, to design three new power stations on tributaries of the Nile in Ethiopia. This project would come under the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative, an organization promoting water cooperation among the Nile Basin countries. Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan would contribute to the cost of the power stations, and the electricity would be shared among the three countries. The stations were to be built at Kara Dubi (1,600 megawatts), Mendia (2,000 megawatts) and Bako Ambo (2,100 megawatts). The Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation was expected to be the main contractor, but Asian companies such as the Chinese firms that constructed the Merowe Dam were also likely to be involved. Construction work on a high-voltage electricity connection between Sudan and Ethiopia had already begun.
Several newly completed projects have increased installed capacity. The 257-megawatt diesel power station constructed by a Malaysian-led consortium outside Khartoum became operational in 2004. The Chinese firm Harbin Power Engineering Company built another power station near Al-Jayli refinery north of Khartoum (see Foreign Investment, this ch.).

The largest projects are the Kajbar and Merowe hydroelectric facilities. The Kajbar Dam, on the second cataract of the Nile, has a planned capacity of 300 megawatts. Sudan and China signed an agreement to build the dam in 1997, with China financing 75 percent of the project.
The 1,250-megawatt Merowe Dam, the most ambitious project, is located about 350 kilometers north of Khartoum on the fourth cataract of the Nile. The Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), a public body that reports to the presidency, was established in 2005, primarily to oversee construction of the dam. The China International Water and Electric Company was the main contractor for construction of the dam, and Harbin Power agreed to build seven substations and approximately 1,610 kilometers of transmission lines. Two consortia of Chinese, Greek, and Italian firms bid for the contract to build three packages of the civil works portion of the dam, which was estimated to cost US$1.9 billion. Several Arab funds (including the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, and the Saudi Fund for Development) agreed to provide US$600 million in concessional funding. The dam should more than double previous production after extensive investment in the two interlocking national grids and transmission systems. The project is also expected to create a large, new area of cultivable land, although it has already required evacuation of tens of thousands of residents from the reservoir area. The project also included other major construction work, including an international airport at Merowe, a bridge over the Nile at Kuraymah, and upgrading the local railroad line. In March 2009, President al-Bashir attended a ceremony to inaugurate the tenth and final electricity unit at the power station, which brought the Merowe Dam up to its full generation capacity. Its completion helped account for Sudan’s total power generation of 7,653.3 gigawatts per hour in 2010, of which 81.0 percent (6,199.3 gigawatts) came from hydropower.

Other projects in the program to increase output included a planned doubling of capacity at the oil-fired Khartoum North power plant, the construction of a 500-megawatt oil-fired power station in Kosti in White Nile state, construction of a dam on the Setit tributary of the Atbarah River in eastern Sudan, and further construction to heighten the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile in order to double its electricity-generating capacity to 560 megawatts. The DIU also had plans for water-harvesting projects in North Kordofan (a state that has no year-round flowing rivers), and proposals to build dams and water reservoirs in Sodiri, Al-Nuhud, and Hamrat al-Sheikh. There was no significant power-generating capacity in the South or West in 2010, although there were plans for hydroelectric projects and the electrification of 20 Southern towns with local diesel-powered grids, as well as for the extension of the national grid in the North to Darfur and Kordofan.
In January 2010, Taqa Arabia of Egypt entered a joint venture with ASEC Cement of Egypt and the Sudanese Pension Fund to build a 42-megawatt power station to provide electricity for the Takamol cement plant being built by ASEC at Atbarah, 200 kilometers north of Khartoum. The cement plant had a capacity of 1.6 million tonnes a year to help meet demand from the construction-related boom in and around Khartoum.

Mining

The mining industry contributed little to GDP until the discovery of commercially exploitable quantities of petroleum in the late 1970s offered hope that the sector would play an increased role in the economy in the future. Nonhydrocarbon minerals of actual or potential commercial value include gold, chrome, copper, iron ore, manganese, asbestos, gypsum, mica, limestone, marble, uranium, silver, lead, talc, tungsten, zinc, and diamonds.

Gold mining in the Red Sea Hills began in pharaonic times. Between 1900 and 1954, several British enterprises worked gold mines in the area and extracted a considerable quantity of the metal—one mine alone reportedly produced three tonnes of gold between 1924 and 1936. Gold was also mined along the borders between Sudan and Uganda and Zaire, but not in amounts that were commercially profitable. During the 1970s, the government's Geological Survey Administration located more than 50 potential gold deposits in different parts of the country. In recent years, most gold mining has resulted from joint ventures with Chinese or French companies. According to the government, gold mining amounted to about three tonnes per year as of the early 2000s, but output was declining steadily as reserves became depleted. Reserves were then estimated at 32 tonnes, concentrated around the Red Sea Hills.

Chrome ore is mined in the Ingesana Hills southwest of Al-Damazin. By 1983, when the civil war brought a halt to mining there, chrome production had declined from a high of 20,000 tonnes per year to half that amount. By 1994 it had declined to 3,000 tonnes per year, but by 2004 it had climbed to an estimated 24,000 tonnes. Production in 2010 amounted to 56,800 tonnes. Reserves are estimated to be 1 million tonnes. Asbestos of good commercial grade is also found in the Ingesana Hills area.

The Sudan Mining Corporation (SMC) produced about 20,000 tonnes of gypsum annually in the early 2000s from a quarry in the Red Sea Hills, with an estimated 500 million tonnes of reserves, and there has also been some mining of limestone, marble, mica, manganese, and iron ore. Uranium ores were discovered in the area of the Nuba Mountains and at Hufrat al-Nahhas in South Kordofan, and they might
also exist near the western borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Other untapped deposits of minerals include lead, talc, tungsten, and diamonds.

Another potential source of mineral wealth is the Red Sea bed, where zinc, silver, copper, iron, and other minerals were discovered. Explorations below the 2,000-meter mark indicate that large quantities of the minerals are present.

**Petroleum**

Prior to the discovery of oil, roughly 80 percent of the nation's energy requirement for industry, modern agriculture, transportation, government services, and households (in addition to fuelwood, charcoal, and the like) came from imported petroleum and petroleum products. Approximately 10 percent of those imports were used to generate electricity. Foreign-exchange costs for oil imports rose dramatically after 1973. The discovery of domestic petroleum deposits at the end of the 1970s and during the early 1980s thus promised to—and eventually did—lessen the dependence on expensive external sources.

The search for oil began in 1959 in the Red Sea littoral and continued intermittently into the 1970s. In 1974 the U.S. firm Chevron began exploration in southern and southwestern Sudan. Drilling began in 1977,
and the first commercial flow started in July 1979 at Abu Jabrah in South Darfur. In 1980 major finds occurred at the company’s Unity Field near Bentiu; by early 1981, drilling had brought in 49 wells having a combined flow of more than 12,000 barrels per day (b/d). Other oil companies—including some from the United States, Canada, and France—also obtained concessions, and by 1982 almost one-third of Sudan had been assigned for exploration. Oil exploration and production were hampered, however, by the almost total lack of infrastructure and by the civil war in the South.

The domestic processing of crude petroleum began in late 1964, when the Port Sudan oil refinery went into operation. The refinery, which was financed, built, and managed by the British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell companies—from July 1976 as a joint-equal shareholding project with the government—had a capacity of about 21,440 barrels per day. Its capacity was well in excess of Sudan's needs at the time it was built, and refined products were exported. As domestic demand increased in the 1980s, and with new petroleum discoveries, several plans were developed for a new oil refinery and an export pipeline. By 1986, however, those plans had been cancelled. Sudan had to import both gas oil (used in diesel motors and for heating) and kerosene for domestic use, although a substantial quantity of other products refined by the plant, in excess of Sudan’s own needs, continued to be exported.

Further seismic studies were undertaken in the swamps of Al-Sudd, but all of Chevron's exploration and development activities came to an abrupt end in February 1984, when rebels attacked the main Chevron base across the Bahr al-Ghazal from Bentiu, killing four Chevron employees. The company immediately terminated its development program and, despite repeated demands by successive Sudanese governments, refused to return to work its concession until the safety of its personnel could be guaranteed by a settlement of the Sudanese civil war. Total, the French oil company, shut down its operations several months later.

The Canadian firm Arakis bought the Chevron concession in the Muglad basin, north of Bentiu, and in March 1997 formed a consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the Malaysian state oil company Petroleum Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), and the publicly owned Sudan National Petroleum Corporation (Sudapet). In 1998 another Canadian firm, Talisman Energy, purchased the share of Arakis and then, under pressure from international nongovernmental organizations (which were opposed to the Islamist regime in Khartoum), sold it to a state-owned Indian oil company in 2003. Other companies that also
invested in concessions included the Qatar-based Gulf Petroleum and the French oil company Total. The Swedish company Lundin Oil and the Austrian firm OMV were also involved, but both withdrew from the country because of deteriorating security conditions.

Prior to 2005, the only concession producing petroleum was GNPOC. However, many other fields were under development, such as the concession being developed by the consortium led by CNPC, PETRONAS, Sudapet, Sinopec, and Cairo-based Tri-Ocean Energy. In 2003 and 2004, the consortium began construction of a new export pipeline and export terminal, as well as in-field production and transportation facilities. South Sudan’s national oil company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet), was also involved in allocating licenses.

In 2005 Sudan established the National Petroleum Commission to improve the development of the country’s oil resources. The commission allocates new oil contracts and ensures equal sharing of oil revenues between the national government in Khartoum and the Government of South Sudan (GOSS). It also resolved duplicate oil contract issues in which the GOSS allocated blocks that overlapped the contracts previously granted by the national government in Khartoum.

Intensive exploration by GNPOC resulted in known reserves of 800 million barrels in 2004. At that time, however, studies suggested that
production might eventually increase to more than 4 billion barrels, with recovery rates of 30–35 percent, and generate total oil income of about US$30 billion. Exploration was expected to continue not only in the South, but also in the North near Dongola, the East around Port Sudan, the West, and also offshore. As of 2009, proven oil reserves increased to 5 billion barrels, and there were proven natural gas reserves of 3 trillion cubic feet, although there was no production of natural gas by early 2011. The majority of the reserves were in South Sudan.

Additional refining capacity became essential as oil production increased. A US$600 million refinery at Al-Jayli, north of Khartoum, came online in mid-2000 with a capacity of around 60,000 b/d, which allowed Sudan to become self-sufficient in refined products. The export pipeline, which passed close to it, provided the resources for the refinery, which also produces a small surplus of refined goods, especially benzine, for export.

In addition to the refineries at Al-Jayli and Port Sudan, there are also some smaller refineries. They include Al-Obeid, with a capacity of 15,000 b/d, Abu Jabrah, with a capacity of about 2,000 b/d, and a topping plant built by Concorp with a capacity of 5,000 b/d.

Refining capacity increased in July 2006 as CNPC completed the expansion of the Al-Jayli refinery north of Khartoum to 100,000 b/d. An Indian energy company, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), had a contract to increase the capacity of the 40-year-old Port Sudan refinery from 21,000 b/d to 70,000 b/d, while PETRONAS was awarded a $1 billion joint venture with the government to build a second 100,000 b/d refinery in Port Sudan to process the new Dar Blend crude from its Melut concession in southeastern Sudan. This project had been postponed several times by 2010, however, and its status is unknown. Among other developments, Malaysia’s Peremba has begun construction of a marine export terminal, with a capacity of 2 million b/d, known as the Melut Basin Oil Development Project.

Domestic production of petroleum was about 480,000 b/d in 2008, and consumption was approximately 86,000 b/d, with the remaining 394,000 b/d exported to Asian markets, the majority to China, Japan, and Indonesia. Most of the oil was exported as crude, although some refined products were also exported. Sudanese Nile Blend oil is a medium, sweet crude, with low sulphur and metal content. It is sold at a discount to the Indonesian blend, Minas, the medium-sweet benchmark in Asia. Dar Blend is also exported to Asian markets, but its heavy, sour quality causes it to trade at a discount, often severe, to Minas crude. There has been a continuing trend of declining output of Nile Blend oil and increasing output of the less valuable Dar Blend, although total output remains relatively steady. The shift from Nile to
Dar, however, means that a larger share of Sudan’s oil is being produced in the South, about 78 percent.

Sudan’s minister for energy and mining indicated in May 2010 that there might be modest output increases over the next several years. He also indicated, however, that the recoverable reserves in the existing fields, using current technology, were only about 1.6 billion barrels, less than a decade of production at current output rates, and that production at those fields would only be a quarter of their current level by 2019. He was confident, however, that new recovery technology could increase the amount recoverable from the fields and that new fields would be discovered. He also was confident that production of natural gas would occur by that time.

Satellite photographs were available in 2011 that provided evidence of oil exploration taking place in North Darfur, although the consortium of Arab companies holding the concession had not confirmed the exploration or indicated whether oil was discovered there. This region has geological connections to the oil-producing regions in southeastern Libya.

In May 2006, Sudan was invited to become a voting member of OPEC. The country had had observer status since 1999 and was now qualified to join OPEC according to conditions set by the organization, although as of 2011 it had not yet become a member.

**Transportation and Telecommunications**

Sudan’s transport infrastructure in the early 2000s included an extensive railroad system that served the more-important populated areas except in the far South, a rudimentary road network (very little of which consists of paved, all-weather roads), a natural inland waterway (the Nile River and its tributaries), a national airline that furnishes international as well as domestic services, and several private charter airlines. Complementing this infrastructure were Port Sudan and Sawakin, two major deep-water ports on the Red Sea, and a small national merchant marine. Additionally, a pipeline transporting petroleum products extended from Port Sudan to Khartoum and another pipeline carried petroleum from the oil fields in the south-central area to the oil-export terminal near Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Overall, however, the transportation infrastructure was inadequate and constituted a major obstacle to economic development.

**Railroads**

The first segment of present-day Sudan Railways, from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamad, was built by the British for use in General Herbert
Kitchener’s drive against the Mahdiyyah in the late 1890s. The line reached Atbarah during the campaign and, after the defeat of the Mahdiyyah in 1898, extended to Khartoum. The line was built to 1.07-meter-gauge track, the result apparently of Kitchener’s pragmatic use of the rolling stock and rails of that gauge from an older line. This gauge was used in all later Sudanese mainline construction.

The rail line opened a trade route from central Sudan through Egypt to the Mediterranean and beyond. It became uneconomical, however, because of the distance and the need for transshipment via the Nile. In 1904 construction began on a new line from Atbarah to the Red Sea. In 1906 the new line reached recently built Port Sudan to provide a direct connection between Khartoum and ocean-going transport. During the same decade, a new line connected Khartoum southward to Sinnar, the heart of the cotton-growing region. A westward continuation reached Al-Obeid in 1911, when it was the second largest city and center of gum arabic production. In the north, a branch line that tied the navigable stretch of the Nile between the fourth and third cataracts into the transport system was built from near Abu Hamad to Kuraymah.

In the mid- and late 1920s, a spur of the railroad linked Taqatu Hayya, a point on the main line 200 kilometers southwest of Port Sudan, southward to the cotton-producing area near Kassala, then on to the grain region of Al-Gedaref, and finally to a junction with the main line at Sinnar. An extension connected Sinnar to Al-Damazin on the Blue Nile. Additional construction in the 1950s included an extension of the western line to Nyala (1959) in Darfur and a southwesterly branch to Wau (1961).

The railroads essentially had a monopoly on transportation for the export and import trade through the 1960s, and operations were profitable. Beginning in the 1970s, however, losses occurred because of declining operational efficiency. A gradual erosion of freight traffic followed. The 1980s also saw a steady loss of tonnage as a result of a combination of inefficient management, union intransigence, the failure of agricultural projects to meet production goals, the dearth of spare parts, and the continuing civil war.

Despite the rapidly growing use of roads, the railroads remained of paramount importance because of their ability to move a large volume of agricultural exports at lower cost and to transport inland the increasing imports of heavy capital equipment and construction materials for development, such as requirements for oil exploration and drilling operations. Efforts to improve the rail system in the late 1970s and the 1980s included laying heavier rails, repairing and purchasing new equipment, and improving training and repair facilities. Foreign governments and international organizations provided substantial assistance to fund these
projects. Implementation of much of this work was hampered by political instability, debt, the dearth of hard currency, the shortage of spare parts, and import controls.

By the late 1990s, the system was in poor condition and required substantial refurbishment and investment in new signaling systems, and addition of double tracks to increase both capacity and speed. The rolling stock had deteriorated as a result of poor maintenance, low investment, and age; as much as half the rolling stock was out of service. In 2006 the network carried only 1.3 million tonnes of freight and 61,000 passengers, a decrease from the previous year. Figures for 2010 were 1 million tonnes and 47,000 passengers.

The country has two railroads. The main system, Sudan Railways, which is operated by the government-owned Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC), provides services to most of the country’s production and consumption centers. In 2010 it consisted of 4,578 kilometers of narrow-gauge, single track running from Wadi Halfa, via Khartoum, Sinnar, and Kosti, to Al-Obeid. Tracks also ran from Khartoum to Port Sudan, from Al-Obeid to Nyala and to Wau, and from Sinnar to Port Sudan via Al-Gedaref and Kassala. However, there was no service on the tracks to Nyala and Wau in early 2011 because of poor relations between North and South (the Nyala line had only handled freight, not passengers). Short extensions ran from Sinnar to Al-Damazin and from Abu Hamad to Kuraymah. The other railroad, the 1,400-kilometer Gezira Light Railway, was owned by the Sudan Gezira Board and served the Gezira Scheme and its Manaqil Extension (see fig. 12).

The Gezira Light Railway, one of the largest light railroads in Africa, evolved from tracks laid in the 1920s during construction of the canals for the Gezira Scheme. At the time, the railroad had about 135 kilometers of 1.61-meter-gauge track. The railroad grew as the project area increased, and by the mid-1960s it consisted of a complex system totaling more than 716 kilometers. Its primary purpose was to serve the farm area by carrying cotton to gins and fertilizers, fuel, food, and other supplies to the villages in the area. Operations usually ceased during the rainy season.

The rehabilitation of the country’s main lines and rolling stock, announced in September 1997, was essential to transport petroleum. In May 1999, the SRC announced plans to privatize both passenger and cargo services, with the SRC retaining responsibility for management of the rails, the stations, and signaling equipment. The government claimed that it had received a number of inquiries from foreign private companies interested in managing and developing the network.

In April 2001, the IDB granted Sudan a loan of US$10.7 million to purchase 180 railroad cargo wagons. China announced that it was prepared to
finance the purchase of new Chinese locomotives and support repairs to
the network. In late 2000, the governments of Sudan and Ethiopia pro­
posed to build a US$1.5 billion, 2,200-kilometer railroad to link Port
Sudan with Addis Ababa. There was also talk of connecting with existing
lines south of Ethiopia to create a single route across much of Africa. No
funding was found for this project, although there was renewed interest in
it after the signing of the CPA in January 2005.

The government began an ambitious railroad rehabilitation program
in 2007 with the signing of a $1.2 billion contract with China to upgrade
the Khartoum to Port Sudan line to a double track and to provide new
locomotives and rolling stock. The government was also planning to improve the 830-kilometer northern sector of the network to Wadi Halfa. Limited service was available on the western and southern sectors of the network to Nyala and Wau as of 2010, but service on both lines was suspended by 2011.

**Roads**

Sudan remains heavily dependent on railroads, but the road network has played an increasingly important role since 1980. Estimates of the road network in 2009 ranged upwards from 55,000 kilometers, but it is an inadequate network for the size of the country. Asphalted all-weather roads, excluding paved streets in cities and towns, amounted to roughly 3,600 kilometers, of which the Khartoum–Port Sudan road, the most important highway, accounted for almost 1,200 kilometers. There were about 3,740 kilometers of gravel roads and an estimated 45,000 kilometers of mainly seasonal earth roads and sand tracks, about half of which were classified as feeder roads.

The roads were generally in poor condition in 2009–10 but usable all year round, although travel might be interrupted at times during the rainy season. Most of the gravel roads in South Sudan became unusable after being heavily mined by the insurgent forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

The government favored the railroads until the early 1970s, believing that they better met the country's requirements for transportation and that the primary purpose of roads was to act as feeders to the rail system. The railroads were also a profitable government operation. Disillusion with railroad performance led to a new emphasis on roads in a readjustment of the Five-Year Plan in 1973—the so-called Interim Action Program—and a decision to encourage competition between rail and road transport as the best way to improve services. Paving of the dry-weather road between Khartoum and Port Sudan via Al-Gedaref and Kassala was the most significant immediate step.

Other important road-paving projects of the early 1980s included a road from Wad Madani to Sinnar and an extension from Sinnar to Kosti on the White Nile completed in 1984. Since then the paved road was extended to Umm Rawabah and Al-Obeid. A number of main gravel roads radiating from Juba were also improved. These included roads to the towns southwest of Juba and a road to the Ugandan border. In addition, the government built a gravel all-weather road east of Juba that reached the Kenyan border and connected with the Kenyan road system. All of these improvements radiating from Juba, however, were vitiated by the civil war, in which the roads were extensively
New asphalt roads to the north and south of Khartoum had been completed or were under construction in the mid-2000s, as well as new roads in the oil regions and a road linking Sudan to Chad. Grants and concessionary loans mainly from the Islamic Development Bank, the Arab Monetary Fund, and other Arab development organizations financed these projects. The highway from Al-Gedaref to Gondar in Ethiopia was refurbished and reopened in 2002 to allow expansion of trade following improvement in diplomatic ties. A newly paved highway from Port Sudan to Atbarah, funded by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development at a cost of US$110 million, reopened in 2009. It reduced travel time by several hours between Port Sudan and Khartoum. The “Northern Lifeline” Khartoum–Atbarah–Abu Hamid–Merowe road was also newly paved, open, and continued northward in 2011, and a paved road went from Khartoum to Kosti and on southward. Road transport and bus services seemed likely to increase as improved roads were extended south of Khartoum in the country’s main agricultural areas.

In anticipation of the signing of the peace treaty in 2005, the World Food Programme appealed for US$64 million to clear the land mines and repair the roads in the South to facilitate the delivery of food to millions of people in the region and to allow another million people to safely return to their homes. Much work was being done to increase the network of all-weather roads there because many existing roads became impassable during the rainy season.

Other new roads under construction included access roads in the oil regions, and a road from Port Sudan to Egypt. New bridges were built over the Nile, all in Khartoum except for one that opened in 2007 in Merowe. One new road linking the North and South was planned, as part of the commitment of the CPA, although it had not been built by 2011. Construction was underway in 2009 to extend the small network of all-weather roads in the South; however, this work was still hampered by the presence of land mines.

**Inland Waterways**

The Nile River, traversing Sudan from south to north, provides an important inland transportation route. Its overall usefulness, however, has been limited by natural features, including a number of cataracts in the main Nile between Khartoum and the Egyptian border. The White Nile to the south of Khartoum has shallow stretches that restrict the carrying capacities of barges, especially during the annual period of low water, and the river has sharp bends. Most of these impediments
were eliminated by Chevron, which as part of its oil exploration and
development program dredged the White Nile shoals and established
navigational beacons from Kosti to Bentiu. Manmade features such as
the growing number of dams also restricts use of the river, and in the
South the White Nile meanders through Al-Sudd, a vast swamp with
continually shifting channels.

Sudan has 4,068 kilometres of navigable rivers overall, but only
1,723 kilometres are open throughout the year, making river transport
minimal. The most important route used to be the 1,436-kilometer
stretch of the White Nile from Kosti to Juba (known as the Southern
Reach), which provided the only generally usable transport connection
between the central and southern parts of the country. Such river traf­
cic ended in 1984 when the SPLA regularly sank the scheduled steam­
ers, but it began to recover following the signing of the CPA in 2005.

Transport services also ran at one time on tributaries of the White
Nile (the Bahr al-Ghazal and the Jur River) to the west of Malakal.
These services went as far as Wau but were seasonal, dependent on
water levels. They were discontinued during the 1970s because vegeta­
tion blocked the waterways, particularly the fast-growing water hya­
cinth. In early 2003, a tributary of the White Nile east of Malakal,
known as the Sobat River Corridor, reopened, improving the distribu­
tion of food aid in the region. On the main Nile, a 287-kilometer stretch
from Kuraymah to Dongola, situated between the fourth and third cata­
racts and known as the Dongola Reach, also has regular service, except
during the low-water period in February and March. Since 1981 the
government has tried to remedy past neglect and requested foreign assis­
tance to dredge the rivers, improve the quays, and provide navigation
aids.

The River Transport Corporation (RTC) operated as a parastatal from
1973 until 2007 when two private companies, the Nile River Transport
Corporation and the Sudan River Transport Corporation, took it over.
Before that, the latter companies were run by the Sudan Railways Cor­
poration essentially as feeders to the rail line. Another parastatal, the
joint Sudanese-Egyptian River Navigation Corporation, operated ser­
vices between Wadi Halfa and Aswan, but service often was disrupted
by political tension between Egypt and Sudan. Since the privatization
of the RTC, other private operators started providing services. There were
six private companies operating river vessels in 2009.

The government began in 2003 to expand the Sea Ports Corporation
in order for it to manage river services and river-navigation studies to
qualify three new ports at Malakal, Juba, and Al-Renk. In 2006 a
Kuwaiti group signed a preliminary agreement to redevelop the port of
Juba on the White Nile.
River cargo and passenger traffic varies from year to year, depending in large part on the availability and capacity of transport vessels. During the 1970s, roughly 100,000 tonnes of cargo and 250,000 passengers were carried annually. However, the closing of the Southern Reach in 1984 made river traffic insignificant. Cargo had declined to fewer than 44,000 tonnes and passengers to fewer than 5,000 per year by the early 2000s, but by 2010, inland waterways transported 114,000 tonnes and 13,000 passengers despite rapids, cataracts, a growing number of dams, and seasonal variations in water levels that continued to hinder river traffic.

Civil Aviation

Sudan Airways provides scheduled domestic air service. The company began its operations in 1947 as a government department, and it has operated commercially since the late 1960s. In 2010 Sudan Airways provided international services from Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Juba to countries in the Middle East, mainly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and to several countries in Africa. However, the European Union banned Sudan-based airlines from flying into member states, on the basis of safety assessments by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Sudan Airways had scheduled flights from Khartoum to 15 other domestic airports in 2010, of which Khartoum, Port Sudan, Al-Obeid, Al-Fashir, and Juba were the most important, and the only ones where night flights could operate. There were also airstrips at many other locations, especially in the South where they could be the only means of access during the rainy season, and there were airstrips at the oil fields north of Bentiu. Sudan Airways had a monopoly on domestic passenger flights in the North, although there were a number of private air-freight companies and airlines flying between the North and the South.

In May 2005, the government announced that a new $530 million international airport would be built some 45 kilometers southwest of Omdurman. The following month, Sudan's Civil Aviation Authority allocated $452 million to develop and upgrade 17 airports in the capital cities of the Sudanese states. Construction of the new international airport was underway in 2010 with completion expected in 2012.

Sudan Airways and Ethiopian Airlines signed an agreement in mid-2006 to cooperate broadly on fleets, joint operation of flights, maintenance, and ground handling. They would also cooperate on flights linking Khartoum with Bombay and Beijing.

The Sudan Airways fleet in 2010 consisted of four Airbus planes (three A300s and one A310), four Fokker 50s, and one Boeing 707 cargo plane. This fleet carried more than 479,000 passengers and 8,200
tonnes of air freight that year, slightly less than in 2004, when passengers were estimated at nearly 562,800 and air freight amounted to approximately 9,400 tonnes. In 2004 five companies provided charter freight services to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.

Sudan Airways operations generally showed losses in the past, and in the early 1980s the corporation reportedly was receiving a sizable annual government subsidy. In 1983 the government proposed to privatize the airline, but plans were put on hold following the coup in April 1985. Like the railroads and steamers, Sudan Airways suffered from a shortage of skilled personnel, overstaffing, and lack of hard currency and credit for spare parts and proper maintenance. Plans for privatization revived in 1991 and again in 1999, when Sudan contracted two Western companies to advise on the sale. In March 2002, the government announced its intention to sell up to 51 percent of the airline’s shares to local investors on the Khartoum Stock Exchange and to locate a foreign investor to manage the airline. By mid-2004 the minister of finance and national economy announced that the government would hold 30 percent of the shares in the new firm, while 21 percent would be offered to Sudanese businessmen and 49 percent to foreign investors. The privatization was completed in 2007.

**Marine Ports and Shipping**

Port Sudan, situated on an inlet of the Red Sea, is the country’s major commercial port, although about 20 percent of its traffic passes through Sawakin, 65 kilometers to the south. Petroleum is exported from Bashayir Marine Terminal near Port Sudan. Construction began in 1905 on Port Sudan, planned as the entry and exit point for the foreign trade that the railroad line was to carry between Khartoum and the Red Sea. It operated as a department of the SRC until 1974, when it became part of the Sea Ports Corporation, a public enterprise set up to manage Sudan’s marine ports. Facilities at the port eventually included 15 cargo berths, sheds, warehouses, and storage tanks for edible oils, molasses, and petroleum products.

Port traffic had reached capacity level by the mid-1970s. Physical expansion of the harbor and adjacent areas was generally precluded by natural features and the proximity of the city of Port Sudan. However, surveys showed that modernization and improvement of existing facilities and the addition of further cargo-handling equipment could considerably increase usage. In 1978, with the assistance of a loan from the IDA, work began on adding deep-water berths and providing roll-on roll-off container facilities. A West German group provided a loan to purchase equipment. In 1983 a US$25 million World Bank credit aided
another phase. Two of the major improvements made the port more readily usable by road vehicles and increased storage facilities.

Construction of another deep-water port at Sawakin had long been under consideration in response to the projected growth of port traffic in the latter part of the twentieth century. The port opened in 1991 and could handle some 1.5 million tonnes of cargo per year. The port at Bashayir was a storage facility and a tanker terminal, built to act as the country’s oil export point. It had five storage tanks and a capacity of around 2 million barrels following an expansion completed in 2007.

A national merchant marine, Sudan Shipping Line, was established in 1962 as a joint venture between the government and Yugoslavia. In 1967 it became wholly government owned. From the initial two Yugoslav-built cargo vessels, the fleet expanded to a total of 16 ships by 2003 and to 19 thereafter. Sailing, which had been mainly between Red Sea ports and northern Europe, included several Mediterranean ports. In 2010 the merchant marine transported 21,000 tonnes of goods, a decline (although only temporary) from the 33,000 tonnes carried in 2009.

**Pipelines**

Operational problems on the Port Sudan–Khartoum section of Sudan Railways had resulted by the early 1970s in inadequate supplies of petroleum products reaching Khartoum and other parts of the country. In 1977 an 850-kilometer oil pipeline from the port to Khartoum, parallel to the railroad line, relieved traffic pressure on the railroad. It reached its capacity of 600,000 tonnes a year by mid-1981, but the next year saw capacity boosted to 1 million tonnes. The pipeline carried only refined products, including gasoline, gas oil, kerosene, and aviation fuel, either from the refinery at the port or from import-holding facilities there. These products were moved to storage tanks at Khartoum, with some capacity offloaded at Atbarah. Rail tank cars released by the pipeline then carried increased supplies of petroleum products in the western and southwestern regions of the country.

In August 1999, GNPOC completed an oil-export pipeline connecting the South’s Unity and Heglig oil fields near Bentiu to the export terminal at Bashayir near Port Sudan, via Khartoum and the Al-Jayli refinery (see fig. 11). Oil exports began the next month. The 1,610-kilometer pipeline, the longest in Africa, had a design capacity of 450,000 b/d. First-phase capacity was 250,000 b/d, sufficient until new production fields came on stream in 2002. At that time, GNPOC increased the capacity of the pipeline to 300,000 b/d, completing work by the end of 2003, and taking capacity up to 400,000 b/d in 2004.
Sudan opened the 1,500-kilometer Petrodar pipeline in April 2006 to take crude from the Melut basin in the South to Port Sudan on the Red Sea; it had been scheduled to go online in August 2005 but was delayed by faulty foundation work. The new pipeline had an initial capacity of 180,000 b/d and its design allows for a future boost to 500,000 b/d. Short extensions connect outlying oil fields with the Petrodar and Bentiu lines. Petrodar is a partnership, mainly consisting of China's state-owned CNPC and Malaysian PETRONAS, and several smaller companies.

Pipeline potential in Sudan would exceed 1 million b/d if all existing pipelines were to be upgraded. Expansion was restricted by limited refinery capacity, among other restraints in 2011.

Telecommunications

Telecommunications in Sudan improved rapidly in the twenty-first century, although the country was only beginning to emerge from decades of government monopoly. In 1990 the entire nation had fewer than 75,000 telephones (a teledensity ratio of nearly 0.3 per 100 people), two-thirds of which were in the Khartoum area. In 2002 the Sudan Telecommunications Company (SudaTel), a monopoly formed from the old Ministry of Post and Telecommunications in 1994, initiated an expansion. Initially a parastatal, SudaTel eventually listed its shares on the Khartoum Stock Exchange and later traded them abroad, especially in the Gulf. UAE and Qatari telecommunications companies bought a substantial share, increasing capital to around US$300 million by the beginning of 2002. That capital subsequently supported development, including installation of a fiber-optic network, expansion of the system to more remote rural areas, and an increase in the number of telephones to 356,100 by 2008.

In 2004 the KanarTel consortium won the second license to provide landline-telephone service in Sudan after promising to invest US$200 million in the project in the first two years of operations. The main shareholder (40 percent) of the consortium was Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) from the United Arab Emirates. Other members included the Saudi Arabian group, Alrawabi, owned by Abdeleziz Ben
Turk, Swedish company Swedtel AB, and three Sudanese partners. South African payphone manufacturer Psitek also entered the market two years after its establishment in East Africa. In 2006 the firm received the necessary regulatory approvals for Sudan. However, there were still fewer than 5 landlines per 1,000 people in 2008.

SudaTel cofounded (with a 40-percent share) MobiTel, Sudan’s Global System for Mobile (GSM) network in Khartoum State in February 1997. By the end of 2003, there were more than 650,000 MobiTel mobile cellular telephone subscribers in 17 cities, a user rate of about two per 100 people, well below the average of 6.2 for Africa. However, SudaTel’s expansion plan increased the number of subscribers to 1.83 million by 2005. Zain, a Kuwait-based company, bought MobiTel in 2006 and increased its subscription base to 5 million by 2008. Its main competitors were Sudani, a subsidiary of SudaTel with 4 million subscribers, and Areeba (owned by a South African firm, MTN). In 2008 the total number of mobile phone subscriptions was 11.2 million, with a penetration rate of about 35 percent. Large areas of Sudan are not covered by mobile-phone networks, so satellite phones are also used.

SudaTel was also the majority owner of Sudan’s first Internet service provider, SudaNet, which began operation in 1998. Usage grew from 5,000 Internet users in 1999, to 30,000 in 2000 and 4.2 million in 2008. Several providers offered service by 2011, there being no barriers to foreign ownership. Although the number of users grew rapidly, the user rate is still well below that of neighboring Uganda and Kenya. Growth has been held back by the low number of personal computers in the country (just 300,000 in 2003), and by concerns about the quality of service provided. Users complain about slow and unstable connections and high cost relative to average incomes. Although personal computers are not yet in widespread use, cyber cafes are common, especially in Khartoum.

A domestic satellite system with 14 ground stations, supplemented by coaxial cable and a microwave network, linked telephone exchanges and broadcast facilities within the country in 2008–9. Eleven cities had amplitude modulation (AM) radio stations. Khartoum, Atbarah, and Wad Madani had television stations with broadcasts in Arabic seven hours nightly; Juba had a local station, TV Channel 1. The country had an estimated 7,550,000 radio receivers in 1997 and 8,500,000 television sets in 2000. In August 2005, the general manager of the Sudan Radio and Television Corporation announced that 46 frequency modulation (FM) and four short-wave (SW) radio stations would be set up to provide coverage in all Sudanese states. He also announced that 26 new television stations would be set up.
The Economy

The government controls TV and radio in the North, requiring that the media reflect government policies, and there is a permanent military censor of TV programming. The Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation provides government-run television services on two channels, and also via satellite. The Sudan National Radio Corporation broadcasts the government-run, national and regional networks in Arabic, English, and other languages. Mango 96 FM is a private, music-based station in Khartoum.

The Southern government controls telecommunications in the South, providing TV services from Juba, as well as Radio Juba programs. There are also several private FM stations in the South, and some foreign radio broadcasts. Miraya (Mirror) is operated by the UN mission from Juba, and Liberty FM broadcast from Juba and Yei. Radio Dabanga, founded in 2008 in the Netherlands, broadcasts three hours a day to the people of Darfur.

International Trade and Balance of Payments

International Trade

Sudan's exports in 2008 amounted to US$12.4 billion, and its imports totaled US$8.9 billion. Agricultural products dominated Sudanese exports until Sudan began to export petroleum and petroleum products. By 2000 the value of petroleum-based products surpassed the total of all other exports combined. By 2008, they had reached US$11.6 billion and have accounted for 80 to 94 percent of all export revenue since 2000, the result of expanded oil production, as well as higher oil prices. Because oil provides such a large proportion of export earnings, Sudan is now vulnerable to the volatility of the international price of oil.

Sudan had long been the world's second largest exporter of long-staple cotton. Cotton exports provided more than 50 percent of total export revenues in the 1960s but declined to only 1.1 percent of export revenues in 2008. Gum arabic was in second place until the 1960s, but its importance was even less than that of cotton in 2008. Livestock was the most important non-oil product in 2002, displacing cash crops. The government encouraged the increase in livestock production, especially camels, goats, sheep, and cattle, but the export of livestock declined dramatically thereafter, with proceeds providing only 0.3 percent of export revenues in 2008. Sesame increased in importance in the 1990s and displaced cotton as the most important export commodity in 1996, until petroleum exports became dominant. Sesame remained the most important agricultural export product, provid-
The share of machinery and transport equipment was 32.8 percent of the value of total imports in 2008. Large quantities of capital goods were imported, mainly for the development and expansion of the oil industry and the expansion of related infrastructure. Government plans for self-sufficiency through the development of import-substitution industries achieved only limited success, as manufactured goods still equaled 24.7 percent of the value of imports. Economic growth and the need for a peace dividend following the signing of the January 2005 CPA, led to increased import spending in 2004–6, meaning that there was a trade deficit during those years. The trade balance returned to a surplus in 2007.

In the early Condominium era, Egypt was Sudan’s main customer. The development of the Gezira Scheme, however, resulted in large-scale exports of cotton to Britain, which by the end of the 1920s was purchasing about 80 percent of Sudanese exports. At the time of Sudanese independence, Britain continued to be the largest customer. During the 1960s, India, West Germany, and Italy emerged as major buyers; late in the decade, Japan also became a major customer.

After the May 1969 coup, Khartoum took steps to expand trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Exports to the Soviet Union rose dramatically in 1970 and 1971 as that country became Sudan’s leading customer. After the abortive communist-led coup of 1971, however, relations deteriorated, and Soviet purchases dropped almost to nil.

Saudi Arabia became Sudan’s main export market in the late 1980s, buying sorghum and livestock. Britain also remained an important export destination. Other major customers were France and China. The United States, although not one of Sudan’s largest purchasers, became a major customer in the later 1980s, mainly buying cotton, gum arabic, and peanuts. Saudi Arabia continued to be the leading export market throughout the second half of the 1990s, purchasing 20 percent of Sudan’s exports, especially livestock. However, the development of the oil industry changed the direction of trade, with China and Japan purchasing 63 percent of Sudan’s exports in 2001. The trend continued as the oil industry developed further, with East Asia replacing the Middle East as the main export market. In 2007 China absorbed 67.9 percent of Sudan’s exports, followed by Japan (19.0 percent), South Korea (2.0) and Saudi Arabia (1.7 percent).

Sudan’s imports come from a wide range of countries, led by Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s. In 1989 Saudi Arabia supplied nearly 14.1 percent of Sudan’s total imports, with petroleum the chief import item. Britain was Sudan’s main import source until 1980; in the late 1980s, it became Khartoum’s second largest provider, supplying an estimated
8.3 percent of the country’s imports in 1989. Britain had well-established commercial and banking operations in Khartoum and a leading position in exporting manufactured goods, vehicles, tobacco, beverages, chemicals, and machinery to Sudan.

Iraq was a prime source of Sudan’s imports through 1978, because it was the principal supplier of crude petroleum, a function that was taken over by Saudi Arabia in 1979 after Iraq cut off oil supplies because Sudan backed Egypt in the latter’s peace initiative with Israel. In the last years of the al-Numayri government (1969–85), bilateral trade with Egypt declined sharply, but in April 1988, and again in June 1991, Sudan and Egypt signed large trade agreements.

Improved relations with Libya enabled Tripoli to become Sudan’s third largest import supplier in 1989. In January of that year, Sudan and Tripoli signed an agreement for Sudan to buy Libyan crude oil, and in December Sudan agreed to purchase Libyan fuel, chemicals, fertilizer, cement, and caustic soda.

China was the prime import supplier in 2007, having superseded Saudi Arabia in 2004. In 2007 China provided 27.9 percent of Sudan’s imports, followed by Saudi Arabia (7.5 percent), India (6.3 percent) and Egypt (5.6 percent). Libya, which previously had supplied most of Sudan’s imports, especially petroleum products, saw its exports decline dramatically from 15 percent of Sudan’s total imports in 1999, as demand for imported refined products ended.

**Balance of Payments**

An accurate presentation of Sudan’s balance of payments—the summary in money terms of transactions with the rest of the world—was hampered in the past by what foreign economists considered understatements in official statistics of imports and public-sector loans. The balance of trade from 1960 through 1999 usually showed a deficit, except for 1973, in the current account (covering trade, services, and transfer transactions). From 1973 until 2000 (when Sudan became self-sufficient in petroleum and petroleum products), the balance of trade was unfavorably affected by higher petroleum-import costs as well as by the higher costs of other imports that resulted from worldwide inflation caused by oil price increases. The impact on the balance of payments was especially serious because of its coincidence with the implementation after 1973 of an intensive development program that required greatly increased imports.

Beginning in 1999, export receipts increased dramatically as Sudan began to export oil. In 2000 export earnings increased to US$1.9 billion, with oil earnings accounting for 78 percent of the total. Revenues continued to increase to US$4.8 billion in 2005 as oil prices remained high.
The development of the oil industry not only increased export earnings, but also saved foreign exchange as Sudan became self-sufficient in refined petroleum products. The sum of those changes produced trade surpluses in 2000 and 2001—the first surpluses in recent history. The years 2005 and 2006 fell into deficit as surging imports and delays in bringing new oil concessions on stream had a negative effect on the trade balance. Although 2007 and 2008 produced trade surpluses once again, preliminary information for 2009 revealed a deficit produced by a decline in the value of oil exports (see table 3 Appendix).

The services sector (insurance, travel, and other) and investment income regularly experiences a net loss, which has increased since oil exports began. Service debits reached US$2.9 billion in 2007 and 2008, as a result of costs associated with the increasing volume of Sudanese imports, as well as the increasing costs of transporting the government’s share of oil to market.

Investment-income debits increased as a result of the repatriation of profits of the foreign firms that have developed the oil sector. In 2008 income debits reached US$5.7 billion.

Transfers usually had a positive balance, but they were insufficient to offset the usual deficit in trade and services. They were composed mainly of remittances from Sudan’s overseas workforce, exceeding US$20 million in 2007, according to official data. The growth of remittances reflected the strong economic growth in the Gulf where many Sudanese worked, and also the increased confidence in the Sudanese banking system, which encouraged expatriate Sudanese to transfer and convert remittances through official channels rather than by informal methods. Thus, part of the increase might also have reflected the capturing of flows that were previously unrecorded. Current transfers went temporarily into deficit in 2008, but preliminary data from 2009 indicate that they recovered.

The increase in the non-merchandise account raised net outflows to US$5.2 billion in 2008, continuing deficits in the current account. As the economy grew, however, the value of the deficits as a percentage of GDP declined on average, compared to the five years before oil exports began.

Net inflows and disbursement of foreign loans and other capital generally failed to cover the negative balance in the current account, and the overall balance of payments was regularly in deficit. The shortfall in 2011 was estimated at US$406 million.

**Prospects for the Future**

Sudan remains a poor country as a result of previous inadequate economic management; years of drought, which have had a negative
impact on the agricultural economy; and the disruption caused by civil war—all of which have blocked economic development over the years. One of the important steps that will be necessary in the future is to improve the long-term, overall management of the economy.

The economy continues to be based on agriculture, although the development of the oil-export industry has changed its structure. As oil became the most important export commodity, eliminating previous trade deficits and promising even greater revenues in the future, it has the potential to continue to stimulate economic growth. Development of the oil sector has increased foreign investment, which, in turn, has stimulated development in the industrial sector, with potential for further development and diversification henceforth.

Within the agricultural sector, livestock has become the fastest growing segment. As exports became established in the markets in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia, they also attracted foreign investment. Strong demand for livestock in the international market and government encouragement of commercial livestock production (with close attention to disease prevention) are likely to allow increased diversification from traditional crops within the agricultural sector.

Future development, however, must address the inadequate transport network. In particular, improving the road system is critical, especially increasing the infrastructure of paved, all-weather roads, to allow the distribution of food crops and other goods throughout the formerly united country and to neighboring nations. It will be especially important to reconstruct the roads that were destroyed in South Sudan during the civil war. The railroad infrastructure also needs upgrading, as it is in poor condition as a result of both its age and lack of maintenance and investment. The proposed rail link with Ethiopia would also increase communication between the two countries and would be especially beneficial to trade with South Sudan, were it ever to be built.

The most important key to economic development is a lasting peace supported by good governance. Whereas a peace treaty was signed in 2005 between the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan, it is important to find a way to end the conflict in the Darfur region as well. With peace, bilateral donors and international organizations would be more willing to assist North and South with development efforts, private investors more willing to risk their capital, and the governments of both countries would be able to use domestic resources, previously drained by war, for purposes of economic development.

The referendum in early 2011 determined that Sudan would become two separate countries. As separation proceeds, it is necessary to agree on the division of Sudan’s resources, especially since most of the known oil reserves are in the South, the region most in need of economic development. Above all, it is also important to maintain peace
throughout the area in order to sustain and increase the current momentum of economic development.

* * *

The economic and political upheavals that have characterized Sudan for many years have made statistical data difficult to obtain, unreliable, and often out of date. War with the SPLM/A has made it particularly difficult to obtain data for areas in Southern Sudan because of lack of access to those areas that have not been under central government control. Nevertheless, there are important texts that can be consulted for the background information to obtain an understanding of Sudan's economy.

Peter Woodward’s *Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State* describes the political, and, to some extent, the economic evolution of Sudan from the establishment of the Condominium until 1989. Tim Niblock’s “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan addresses the political, psychological, and economic impact of sanctions designed in response to Sudan’s transgressions during its civil wars. Douglas H. Johnson examines the historical, political, economic, and social factors involved in Sudan’s civil wars in *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*. The newest text is Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala’s *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, which examines the factors that have contributed to the civil wars and concludes with recommendations for political and economic reforms that will be required for lasting peace.

Some older materials continue to be valuable. These include Medani M. Ahmed’s *The Political Economy of Development in the Sudan*, Mud-dathir Abdel-Rahim’s *Sudan since Independence: Studies of the Political Development since 1956*, as well as P. P. van de Well and Abdel Ghaffar Muhammad Ahmed’s *Perspectives on Development in the Sudan: Selected Papers for a Research Workshop in The Hague*, and the discussion papers of the University of Bremen’s Sudan Economy Research Group.

Statistical information can be found in the Bank of Sudan’s annual reports as well as Sudan’s Central Bureau of Statistics. However, it is difficult to obtain access to official publications unless they have been posted on each agency’s Web site. Valuable international sources of data include the most recent *Africa South of the Sahara* yearbooks, and both the annual *Country Profile* and the quarterly *Country Reports* on Sudan published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, although publication of the *Country Profile* was discontinued after the 2009 issue. Other valuable sources include the publications of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank,
as well as those of UN organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Labour Organisation.

An excellent introduction to reach an understanding of Islamic banking in Sudan is to be found in Endre Stiansen’s “Interest Politics: Islamic Finance in the Sudan, 1977–2001.” More general works on Islamic banking include Fuad Al-Omar and Mohammed Abdel-Haq’s *Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice, and Challenges* and Mervyn K. Lewis and Latifah M. Algaoud’s *Islamic Banking*. Zubair Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor’s *Islamic Banking* is another influential study. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
The Presidential Palace in Khartoum, executive headquarters of the national government
EARLY IN 2005, SUDAN’S GOVERNMENT reached a significant milestone as Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9. After the signing, the SPLM leader John Garang de Mabior, since deceased, described the agreement as just and honorable, adding that it would change Sudan forever. The agreement officially ended a civil war that had resumed in the summer of 1983 and an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that began in 1993 and advanced in fits and starts. A major provision of the accord gave the people of South Sudan the right to vote for secession from Sudan at the end of a six-year period under a unified interim government. A protocol on power sharing divided power primarily between the National Congress Party and the SPLM, but it left some room for other Northern and Southern political parties to join the new government. Both sides experienced numerous obstacles in their efforts to implement this complex and far-reaching agreement.

The peace agreement with the SPLM did not deal with serious governance issues in Eastern and Western Sudan. The outbreak of violence in Darfur in February 2003 could be attributed in part to the success that the Southerners achieved as a result of their war with Khartoum. Conflict also increased in the area along Sudan’s eastern border with Eritrea, but a 2006 agreement brokered with the assistance of Eritrea significantly reduced tension in this region. Other marginalized groups throughout Sudan also sought a voice in national affairs. Territory that radiated about 300 kilometers north and south of Khartoum along the Nile River and extending a similar distance east and west of the Nile was the traditional heartland of Sudan. This was the area where the government exercised real control and devoted most of its resources. Outside this core region, government control decreased with distance. Most persons living at the peripheries of Sudan never felt they were an integral part of the country. It is not surprising that Sudanese in other parts of Sudan followed the Southerners by putting increasing pressure on Khartoum to share equitably both power and resources.

Sudan obtained independence from Britain and Egypt on January 1, 1956. It subsequently experienced political instability and a variety of regimes. Indeed, after independence, government in Sudan was characterized by the military periodically stepping in to seize power from civilian regimes only to find that it could not remain in control permanently.

Sudan’s latest experiment with democratic rule ended with another military coup on June 30, 1989, which brought Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir to power. His government was long characterized by autocratic
rule and an internal power struggle between those who supported him and those who favored the Islamist leader Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi. The al-Bashir government cracked down hard on opposition elements while permitting the trappings of democratic institutions, such as a new constitution, a national legislature, and national elections such as those in 1996 and 2000 that major opposition parties boycotted. Somewhat more meaningful elections occurred in April 2010 when al-Bashir again won the presidency, although several key parties boycotted them and most international observers found widespread discrepancies.

Relations between Sudan and the West, especially the United States, have been strained ever since al-Bashir took power. The United States has expressed concern over Sudan’s support for terrorist groups, unhappiness about its policies on human rights and sharia, and displeasure with its handling of the crisis in Darfur and with the war in the South until there was a cease-fire in 2002. Sudanese oil production also became an important feature of the political dynamic by the beginning of the twenty-first century. The People’s Republic of China, India, and Malaysia became major operators and buyers of Sudan’s oil, resulting in new allies for Khartoum. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda caused Sudan to reassess its links with terrorist groups and to increase cooperation on counterterrorism with Washington.

Early in 2011, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the war between the North and the South and the continuing but reduced violence in Darfur in Western Sudan were the overriding issues for the Khartoum government. Following signature of the CPA with South Sudan, Khartoum began the process of creating a new government that included significant Southern representation. As the process neared an end and with the prospect of an independent South Sudan, it still faced several serious challenges and unforeseen consequences. In the meantime, there appeared to be no early solution to the violence, displaced persons, refugees, and human-rights abuses in Darfur.

The al-Bashir Era

The leaders of the 1989 coup that installed Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir abolished executive and legislative institutions, suspended the constitution, arrested many prominent civilian politicians, banned political parties, and restricted freedom of the press. They purged hundreds of army personnel, senior civil servants, and teachers perceived as being insufficiently Islamic and announced in 1990 that sharia would be applied in the North. They established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which initially became Sudan’s legislative authority. The chairman of the 15-member RCC was al-Bashir, who immediately promoted himself to lieutenant general and served as prime minister, minister of defense, and
commander in chief of the armed forces. All members of the RCC were middle- and lower-ranking military officers. Many of them had personal and ideological ties to the Islamist political party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, who exercised enormous power in the government but had no official position until 1996. Although al-Bashir remained in charge of the government, it became increasingly apparent that al-Turabi led a shadow regime.

From the beginning, al-Bashir and al-Turabi used each other to achieve their objectives. Al-Bashir also played the al-Turabi faction of the NIF against another element led by Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha. The RCC appointed a Transitional National Assembly in 1992 as a legislative authority pending the election of a legislative chamber. The RCC dissolved itself in 1993 and appointed al-Bashir as president of Sudan. In 1995 al-Bashir approved a constitutional decree that provided for the election of a National Assembly and president of the republic. Elections in March 1996 confirmed al-Bashir as president and returned a parliament dominated by the National Congress Party (NCP), the successor to the NIF. Al-Turabi became the speaker of the new assembly. Sudan’s traditional political groups refused to participate in a process they judged to be illegitimate. Al-Bashir and al-Turabi effectively froze them out of any possibility of achieving power through the electoral process.

Three central objectives determined government policies in the early 1990s: to turn Sudan into an Islamic republic as soon as possible; to use military force rather than negotiation to end the war in the South; and to repress all dissent in order to maintain control. Sudan also stepped up
its support for international terrorist groups. Osama bin Laden moved his headquarters from Afghanistan to Sudan late in 1991 and remained until the government asked him to leave in mid-1996. These policies led to a decision by the United States in 1993 to add Sudan to the list of states that sponsor terrorism. Egypt and Ethiopia implicated Sudan in the attempted assassination of Egyptian president Husni Mubarak while he was visiting Addis Ababa in 1995. In addition, the government in Khartoum tried to export its Islamist ideology to neighboring countries. As a result, Sudan’s relations with Egypt, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea deteriorated sharply in the first half of the 1990s. They soon recovered with Egypt and later with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, following the outbreak of war in 1998 between the latter two countries.

The war in South Sudan dominated most of the 1990s, and the development of its oil resources by the end of the century began to provide Khartoum revenue to continue the civil war. The al-Bashir government also spent much of the 1990s defending its poor human-rights record and working to ensure that opposition groups could not achieve power. By 1996 al-Turabi sought to build alliances with social forces that would allow him to assume autonomous political power and cast himself as a reformist leader who expressed the voice of the people. As speaker of parliament and secretary-general of the NCP, al-Turabi was a growing threat to al-Bashir.

The power struggle between al-Bashir and al-Turabi reached a crisis by 1999. Al-Bashir suspended parts of the constitution, dissolved parliament and, hence, al-Turabi’s role as speaker, and declared a state of emergency. In May 2000, al-Bashir rescinded al-Turabi’s appointment as secretary-general of the ruling NCP and stated that al-Turabi and his followers were trying to undermine the government. Al-Turabi accused al-Bashir of leading the country down a dangerous path. In the December 2000 election, which was boycotted by most opposition parties, al-Bashir won an overwhelming victory. Continuing tension between al-Bashir and al-Turabi led early in 2001 to the arrest of al-Turabi and four of his aides for conspiring to depose al-Bashir. A few months later, al-Bashir released al-Turabi from prison and put him under house arrest. The two then patched up their differences, and al-Bashir released al-Turabi from house arrest in 2003 and allowed him to return to politics. Al-Bashir rearrested al-Turabi and about 70 key supporters in March 2004 for an alleged plot to topple him. He also banned political activity by al-Turabi’s party. Al-Bashir eventually released al-Turabi again.

Relations with Europe began to improve by the late 1990s. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States, Sudan decided to improve cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism. The most important change in Khartoum’s policy, however, was a decision to
negotiate an end to the war with the South. This process achieved success in January 2005 following two years of negotiations with the SPLM, when Sudan began to create a new government that included significant Southern representation. Implementing the CPA became, however, an enormous challenge for both Khartoum and the SPLM. In the meantime, the crisis that broke out in February 2003 in Darfur posed a serious new setback to internal stability and Sudan’s international standing. On the positive side, there was no return to war between Khartoum and South Sudan, and violence decreased significantly in Darfur. Controversial national elections in April 2010 kept the door open for the vote by Southerners in January 2011, in which they opted for independence from the North.

On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir as an indirect perpetrator or as an indirect co-perpetrator of five counts of crimes against humanity—murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape—and two counts of war crimes—intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population or against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging in Darfur between March 2003 and July 2008. The ICC later added the charge of genocide. Most Arab and many African governments stood by al-Bashir, although he has had to significantly limit his international travel so as to avoid arrest.

Institutions of Government

Following the military coup in 1989, there was significant change in Sudanese government institutions and in the movement of key persons who direct those institutions. One constant was President al-Bashir. Another was the critical role played behind the scenes by the military and security forces in maintaining the government in power. A third was the important and sometimes conflictive position that Islam held in a government representing a diverse society. Some experts believed the Islamist model had run its course; others were not convinced. Finally, there was the highly circumscribed role permitted for institutions and practices judged as democratic by Western governments. The impact of Sudan’s 1998 constitution and the federal system that it created, as modified by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, continued to unfold in the North in early 2011.

The primary institutions of the central government are the presidency, the National Council of Ministers, and the bicameral National Legislature, or parliament. The civil service is subservient to the central government; South Sudan had a separate civil service. Sudan also has an elaborate system of state and local government. The CPA between the central government and the SPLM signed on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi,
Kenya, was based on a series of individual protocols that significantly changed the system of governance in Sudan in the next few years. It also resulted in the new Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan and an Interim Constitution of South Sudan, both taking effect in 2005. Most importantly, it provided for national elections in 2009 (postponed until 2010) and a referendum on self-determination for South Sudan that occurred in January 2011.

Recent Constitutional Developments

The military coup of April 6, 1985, led to suspension of Sudan’s 1973 constitution and its replacement with an interim constitution later in the year. One of the first acts of the RCC after seizing power in 1989 was to abolish the interim constitution. Al-Bashir promised to prepare a new constitution. It was not until January 1998, however, that Sudan convened a constitutional conference to draft a constitution. It consisted of legal and political scholars representing different political groups sympathetic to al-Bashir’s rule. The Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party refused to participate. Most Southerners boycotted the conference. Voters in Sudan’s single-party system approved the constitution in a 1998 referendum, a process that raised questions about the degree to which the public accepted the document.

The constitution entered into force on July 1, 1998. A significant feature of the individual-rights provisions of the 1998 constitution was the frequent use of the qualifier “in accordance with law” attached to most freedoms. On the other hand, there was no requirement that only Muslims could hold public office, including the office of president. Non-Muslims were free to practice, convert, and doubt the main tenets of their religion as long as they did not interfere with the spiritual life of Muslims. There were, nevertheless, inherent conflicts between Sudan’s Islamic political system and the way in which Muslims applied the principles of shura (see Glossary). The constitution attempted to balance a strong preference for Islamic beliefs and a grudging acceptance of internationally accepted human rights. In 1999 dissenting members of the National Assembly tried to amend the constitution by restricting the president’s involvement in the selection of candidates for governors of the federal states. Speaker of the National Assembly al-Turabi supported the amendment, but the proposal led al-Bashir to dissolve the National Assembly (the lower house of the legislature) and declare a state of emergency under the constitution. These steps had the effect of suspending the decentralization process stipulated in the constitution and gave al-Bashir full authority over the states. Legislators supporting al-Turabi challenged the state of emergency before the Constitutional Court, which concluded that al-Bashir’s actions were constitutional.
On May 26, 2004, the government and the SPLM signed the Protocol on Power Sharing, later part of the CPA. The protocol provided for a National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) composed of representatives from the NCP, SPLM, other political forces, and civil society. It was charged with preparing a legal and constitutional framework based on the peace agreement and the 1998 constitution for adoption by the National Assembly and the SPLM. The result was the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, which the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council adopted on July 6, 2005. For its part, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) then adopted on December 5, 2005, an Interim Constitution of South Sudan that did not contradict any of the provisions contained in the Interim National Constitution. The NCRC prepared a model constitution for all 25 states, compatible with both the Interim National Constitution and the one for South Sudan. The states of South Sudan adopted their own constitutions, which had to conform to both interim constitutions. Before the end of the six-year interim period mandated by the CPA, the NCRC was also responsible for organizing an inclusive constitutional-review process. According to the Interim National Constitution, the crucial six-year interim period began officially on July 9, 2005.

Both the Interim National Constitution and the Interim Constitution of South Sudan authorized the 15 states in the North and the 10 states in South Sudan to have their own constitutions. States in the North began the constitutional drafting process in mid-2005 based on a model constitution drafted by a subcommittee of the National Constitutional Review Commission. The most controversial process was in Khartoum State where there were concerns about the rights of non-Muslims and human rights generally. Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, disputed areas that are also strategically located, posed problems for the constitutional-development process. The drafting of state constitutions in the South began later than in the North but was relatively uncontroversial because the SPLM held a 70 percent majority in the state legislatures and could largely control the outcome.

The Federal System

During most of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period (1899–1955), the British relied on a system called indigenous administration to control local governments in rural areas. Under this system, traditional tribal and village leaders held responsibility for administrative and judicial functions within their own areas and received financial and, when necessary, military support from the central authorities. The British abandoned this system in 1951 in favor of a system of local government councils. The councils were responsible to the minister of local government, whereas
provincial governors and district commissioners remained under the supervision of the minister of interior. This division led to many difficulties.

The Local Government Act of 1961 created a system of provincial commissioners appointed by the central government as chairmen of the provincial authorities, an executive body of officials representing Khartoum. Following the military coup of 1969, the new government abolished local and regional government structures and in 1971 created a pyramidal structure with local community councils at the base and progressively higher levels of authority up to the executive councils of the 10 provinces. Above the community councils was a second tier of local government structures that included rural and urban councils. A third tier consisted of sub-provincial district councils. At the top, a provincial governor appointed by Khartoum presided over the provincial commissions. In 1991 the RCC introduced a federal structure that divided the country into nine states, 66 provinces, and 218 local-government areas or districts. The RCC appointed a governor, deputy governor, and council of ministers for each state.

The 1998 constitution prescribed a federal system of government with the country divided into 25 states, each with its own capital. Each state had a governor, called a wali in the North, and a state assembly. The federal government exercised power over national security, international and state boundaries, foreign relations and trade, immigration, elections, judiciary, currency, federal taxation, land and natural resources, waterways and national electricity, and interstate transportation. The states had authority over state administration, taxes and fees, trade, land, water and electric power, and road maintenance. The federal and state governments had concurrent jurisdiction over a wide number of issues, including the civil service, local government, media, education, health, economic policies, industry, social welfare, environment, and tourism. The federal government derived its revenue primarily from customs duties, seaport and airport revenue, corporate taxes, profits from national projects, and taxes collected from Sudanese working abroad. The states obtained revenue from business profits, some of which went to local councils, a share of tax on state industrial production, state licenses, taxes and duties, and profits from state projects.

The 2005 Interim National Constitution, which drew many principles from the 1998 constitution and incorporated the provisions of the CPA, created a national government with authority to protect and promote the national sovereignty of Sudan. It permitted creation of a government in South Sudan exercising authority in respect of the people and states there. The decentralized system of government also established state and local governments throughout Sudan. The link between the national government and the states in South Sudan was through the
Government of South Sudan. All levels of government had to respect each others’ autonomy and assist each other in fulfilling their respective constitutional obligations. The constitution permitted freedom of religion and declared its respect for the promotion and development of all indigenous languages. At the national level, it established Arabic and English as the official working languages. In 2009, South Sudan passed the Local Government Act, which specified the different kinds of local government.

The Interim National Constitution contained an extensive bill of rights. It detailed the powers reserved to the national government, South Sudan government, states, and concurrent powers. The national government was responsible for, among other areas, security, defense, foreign affairs, nationality and naturalization, currency, national police, civil aviation, central banks, customs, national debt, national states of emergency, interstate transport, and national taxation and budget matters. The South established a Bank of South Sudan as a branch of the national Bank of Sudan. It offered conventional banking services within the framework of a single national monetary policy. GOSS controlled its own police, military during the interim period, legislation, borrowing of money, planning, and civil service relating to the administration of South Sudan. The Interim National Constitution also reserved numerous lesser responsibilities to GOSS. Other states in Sudan had somewhat lower responsibilities. They included control over the police, local government, the civil service at the state level, social welfare, cultural matters, regulation of religion, and a host of other issues. The national government, Government of South Sudan, and state governments had a number of concurrent powers, including tertiary education, health policy, commerce, delivery of public services, banking and insurance, traffic regulations, and gender policy.

On December 5, 2005, South Sudan adopted its own Interim Constitution, which was longer and more detailed than the Interim National Constitution. Like the latter, it proclaimed the boundary of South Sudan as the one that existed at Sudan’s independence on January 1, 1956. It divided the territory into 10 states to be governed on the basis of decentralization. It stated explicitly that South Sudan is a multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual, multireligious, and multiracial state. English and Arabic were designated as the official working languages, but all indigenous languages in South Sudan were to be considered national languages. It treated all religions equally and did not establish an official religion. The Interim Constitution of South Sudan separated religion and state. It underscored a provision in the Interim National Constitution, which stated that six months before the end of the six-year interim period there would be an internationally monitored referendum for the
people of South Sudan to either confirm the unity of Sudan or vote for secession.

Governance in Sudan had traditionally been seen as a North–South problem. By the 1980s, however, it became apparent that separatist tendencies were not confined to the South. The tensions in Darfur in the West and among the Beja in the East also threatened to pull the country apart. The Nubians along the northern Nile and the Nuba in South Kordofan also had significant grievances. For that matter, separatist tendencies began to develop within South Sudan after Southerners took charge of their own government. These separatist proclivities had long existed among ethnic groups in Equatoria in the far south and between the Dinka and the Nuer people.

The agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM provided an opportunity to solve the differences between the North and South, but it also raised serious challenges as Sudanese in both parts of the country tried to implement the CPA. The agreement shifted attention to peripheral regions, especially in Western Sudan and Eastern Sudan, which also requested new arrangements with Khartoum. It raised the question of whether federalism could prevent Sudan from disintegrating into a number of independent parts. In 2006 one key rebel group in Darfur signed a highly flawed peace agreement with Khartoum that did not end the violence. By late 2010, there were even more political factions in Darfur. The 2006 peace agreement in Eastern Sudan was more successful but also remained tenuous.

**Elections**

The interim military government of Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab authorized general elections in Sudan in April 1986. They were among the freest and fairest elections in Africa up to that time, except for the fact that civil war prevented balloting in most of South Sudan. Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma Party won the largest number of votes and formed a coalition government in June. Following al-Mahdi’s overthrow in 1989, the RCC appointed a Transitional National Assembly in 1992. The al-Bashir government held its first presidential and parliamentary elections in March 1996. Of the National Assembly’s 400 members, 125 had previously been selected during a national conference in February. About 900 candidates vied for the remaining 275 seats, although 51 of these seats were uncontested. Al-Bashir faced 40 challengers for president. All candidates ran in an individual capacity. Al-Bashir and his supporters won handily. Opposition groups boycotted the elections, claiming they were unfair. Because of the civil war, no voting took place in 11 Southern districts.
National elections took place again in December 2000. About 66 percent of Sudan’s eligible voters cast ballots. Major opposition parties, including Umma, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and Popular National Congress (later renamed the Popular Congress Party—PCP) led by al-Turabi, boycotted the elections, accusing the government of vote rigging. Only al-Bashir’s NCP and a small number of minority parties contested the elections. Al-Bashir received 86.5 percent of the votes cast for a five-year presidential term. Former President al-Numayri, who had returned to Sudan from exile in Egypt, polled 9.6 percent of the vote, and three other candidates received less than 4 percent among them. Voters also elected 275 members of the National Assembly to four-year terms. The ruling NCP won all but 10 seats; no other party contested 112 of the seats. Of the 90 specially selected positions, 35 went to women, 26 to university graduates, and 29 to trade union representatives. Women constituted about 10 percent of the legislature’s membership. An Organization of African Unity observer team concluded “that the overall exercise was an important step towards democratization and that it was conducted in a conducive atmosphere and in a satisfactory manner.” Political parties that boycotted the elections had a decidedly different view.

Following the CPA, elections initially did not play a role in determining the composition of the interim national government, the South Sudan government, or the state legislatures. An out of date national census and, in the case of South Sudan, a complete lack of infrastructure for conducting an election, rendered the electoral process moot. As a result, all government officials and all governing bodies consisted of appointed officials until the completion of a census in 2008 and national elections in 2010. The SPLM rejected the results of the census, claiming that it underestimated populations in the South. The National Elections Act of 2008 provided the legal framework for conducting elections in Sudan, South Sudan, and in each state. The National Elections Commission was responsible for developing the regulations, rules, and orders for the election of the national president, South Sudan president, state governors, National Assembly, South Sudan Legislative Assembly, and state assemblies.

Sudan held national elections on April 11–19, 2010. At the last minute, the Umma Party withdrew, and the SPLM candidate for the national presidency, Yasir Arman, declared he was no longer seeking the position. As the ballots had already been printed, however, their names remained. Al-Bashir won just over 68 percent of the vote for president. Yasir Arman won almost 22 percent, PCP candidate Abdullah Deng Nhial won almost 4 percent, and DUP candidate Hatim al-Sir took 2 percent. All of the other candidates obtained less than 1 percent each.
The SPLM candidate, Salva Kiir Mayardit, won 93 percent of the vote for the presidency of South Sudan, and his challenger, Lam Akol from the SPLM-Democratic Change, won 7 percent. Although monitors from the African Union and Arab League gave the elections a passing mark, those from the Carter Center and more than 4,000 Sudanese representatives of civil society in both the North and South declared the elections had serious flaws. The United States and European Union said they did not meet international standards.

**Corruption and Governance Issues**

Corruption has long been a problem throughout Sudan. The sharp rise in oil revenue contributed significantly to the challenge. Out of 180 countries ranked in 2009, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index placed Sudan in position 176, or fifth from the bottom. Sudan also scored poorly on the 2006 Global Integrity Index, which assesses the existence of anticorruption mechanisms that promote public integrity. Sudan ranked in the lowest quintile in the overall category. It fell in the lowest category that considered voting and citizen participation, the integrity of elections, and regulations concerning political financing; the lowest category for accountability across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government as well as the budget process; the lowest category for oversight and regulatory mechanisms such as a national ombudsman, auditing, taxes and customs, financial-sector regulation, and business licensing; and the lowest category for anticorruption and rule of law. It did better in the category considering administration and civil-service regulations, whistle-blowing measures, and regulatory processes around procurement and privatization. It also did somewhat better on anticorruption laws, its anticorruption agency, access to justice, and law enforcement. An auditor’s report on fiscal year 2008 found that unnamed persons embezzled US$2.3 billion from government institutions.

South Sudan was also plagued by corruption, which contributed to the collapse of the 1972 peace agreement with Khartoum. Probably recalling this history, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir launched a major anticorruption campaign following allegations of rampant corruption. He relieved a number of senior officials, including the minister of finance, of their posts and asked them to answer charges of embezzlement and bribery, including the alleged embezzlement of US$60 million transferred to the SPLM by the NCP soon after signing the CPA. South Sudan officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and corruption was a problem in all branches of the government.

In an especially embarrassing ranking, *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, looked at 12
economic, political, and military indicators in an evaluation of the world’s 60 most-failed states in 2010. They assessed state vulnerability to violent internal conflict and social deterioration. Sudan ranked number three, after Somalia and Chad. Sudan scored particularly low in the following categories: refugees and internally displaced persons, group grievance, delegitimization of the state, human rights, and external intervention.

The Presidency

Sudan has gravitated between elected presidents and those who seized power by force ever since it became independent in 1956. Some of the elections were highly suspect. Al-Bashir in 2011 had been Sudan’s only president since the military coup in 1989. Born in 1944, he was at the time of the coup the commander of a paratroop brigade in South Sudan. He returned to Khartoum with 175 paratroopers just a few days before the coup. Al-Bashir’s governing authority varied over time. He ruled initially through the RCC, declared himself president in 1993, and orchestrated elections in 1996 and again in 2000. His authority changed again after approval of the Interim National Constitution in 2005.

Under the Interim National Constitution, the presidency consisted of the president and two vice presidents. The elections of 2010 continued this arrangement; al-Bashir remained as president of Sudan and commander in chief of the armed forces. The president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, following the death of John Garang in a helicopter accident, became the first vice president of the new Government of National Unity effective on August 4, 2005. Salva Kiir also served as commander in chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. A Northerner, Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha, became the second vice president on September 20, 2005. The outcome of the referendum on self-determination meant that al-Bashir continued in office as president of the Northern government, and there would no longer be a Southerner as first vice president after mid-2011. Three other key officials in the presidency were senior advisers to the president. The most senior until December 2010 was Minni Arkoi Minnawi, a leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement in Darfur who signed the May 5, 2006, Darfur Peace Agreement. The two others were Nafie Ali Nafie, a Northerner who held numerous senior positions in the al-Bashir government, and Musa Mohamed Ahmed, an Eastern Front leader and special assistant to al-Bashir.

The people directly elect the president of Sudan. Eligible candidates must be of Sudanese nationality, of sound mind, literate, and at least 40 years of age. There are no religious or gender restrictions. The presidential term is five years, and a president can only be reelected once following the
2010 election. The president has wide-ranging power and serves as both chief of state and head of government. He is commander in chief of all security forces and supervises foreign relations, the judiciary, justice and public morals, constitutional institutions, and economic development of the country. The president appoints personnel for federal office, presides over the National Council of Ministers, summons or adjourns the National Legislature, can declare war and a state of emergency, approve death sentences and grant pardons, and initiate amendments to the constitution. The constitution gave the president, with the consent of the first vice president, the authority to declare a state of emergency. The declaration must be submitted within 15 days to the National Legislature for approval. Once approved by the National Legislature, the president can suspend the powers of states and take over those powers; he can suspend the provisions pertaining to individual rights, with several specified exceptions. The president, with the consent of the first vice president, has virtually unlimited power to deal with a state of emergency.

The president appointed two vice presidents in 2005–10, one from South Sudan and one from the North, who had to meet the same eligibility requirements as the president. The president was also able to appoint assistants and advisers and to define their functions and responsibilities. The first vice president acted in the absence of the president and was a member of the National Council of Ministers, National Security Council, and Presidential Council in the preelection period. The Presidential Council consisted of the two vice presidents and the speaker of the National Assembly; the council would assume the functions of the president if that office fell vacant. The second vice president acted in the absence of the president and first vice president and was a member of the same organizations as the first vice president. Should the office of the national president fall vacant, the second vice president would become commander in chief of the Sudan Armed Forces. The constitution had elaborate provisions in the event of a vacancy in the office of the president both before and after the elections.

Al-Bashir was not known for his ability to conceptualize. He tried to rule by consensus but ultimately made the key decisions. First Vice President Salva Kiir played a minimal role in the Government of National Unity in 2005–10 and instead focused his energy on governing South Sudan. Taha’s role as second vice president was significant but unclear, although he had had broad authority to negotiate the CPA with the SPLM.

Eligibility requirements for the president of South Sudan mirrored those of the Interim National Constitution. In addition to responsibilities in the national government, Salva Kiir was responsible for the security of South Sudan, presided over the South Sudan Council of Ministers, could summon or adjourn the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, declare a
state of emergency in South Sudan, and appoint advisers. South Sudan’s vice president, Riek Machar Teny, acted as president in the absence of the president and was a member of the South Sudan Council of Ministers and the South Sudan Security Committee.

**National Council of Ministers**

After the coup led by al-Bashir in 1989, the RCC appointed members of the National Council of Ministers, which was also known as the cabinet. The RCC gave al-Bashir authority to appoint and dismiss ministers, and he regularly reshuffled the cabinet. Before the CPA, it consisted of some 34 ministers he had appointed. Members of the ruling NCP dominated the ministerial positions. Al-Bashir served as the prime minister on the council. Less than 7 percent of the federal ministers and about 2 percent of state ministers were women. Because the ministers were appointed by the president, they were effectively subservient to him and the small group of personal advisers who exerted so much power behind closed doors.

Under the Interim National Constitution, the president, after consultation within the presidency, appointed the members of the National Council of Ministers. The president and two vice presidents were members of
the presidency and the National Council of Ministers. The presidency and the National Council of Ministers together constituted the highest executive body in Sudan’s government. The interim government had to allocate ministerial positions in accordance with a 70–30 North–South ratio: 52 percent of positions for the NCP (49 percent for Northerners and 3 percent for Southerners), 28 percent for the SPLM (21 percent for Southerners and 7 percent for Northerners), 14 percent for other Northern political forces, and 6 percent for other Southern political forces. The first iteration of this process was controversial and did not follow precisely this formula. Of the original 29 cabinet ministers, 16 were from the NCP, nine from the SPLM, and four from other opposition parties. There were 33 ministers of state or junior ministers. Southerners were especially unhappy that the ministries of energy and mining, finance and national economy, finance and planning, defense, interior, justice, and prosecutor general went to the NCP. The most senior ministry assigned to the SPLM was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Following the April 2010 elections, the Government of National Unity increased and reallocated ministerial positions. Al-Bashir announced the appointment of 35 federal ministers and 42 state ministers. The NCP received 24 ministerial positions while the SPLM obtained eight, including the elusive oil ministry. Other political parties received three positions. Each minister was responsible for his ministry and answerable to the president, National Council of Ministers, and National Assembly. Ministers were expected to plan state policy, implement the CPA, initiate legislation, and prepare reports.

South Sudan Council of Ministers

The president of South Sudan appointed the South Sudan Council of Ministers (SSCM) in consultation with the vice president and following approval of a simple majority of all members of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly. The president and vice president were members of the SSCM, which had a quota requiring that least 25 percent of the members should be women. The SSCM was the highest executive authority in South Sudan, and its decisions prevailed over all other executive decisions. SSCM responsibilities included planning and general administration; approving general policies; preparing reports; and negotiating international and regional agreements on matters of trade, investment, and foreign aid with foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations. It also implemented South Sudan legislation, initiated bills before the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, and mobilized the public to achieve the objectives of government policy. A further responsibility was keeping the South Sudan Legislative Assembly informed about the progress of the CPA.
The president appointed 23 ministers to the SSCM in 2005; the number of ministerial positions increased to 32 after the April 2010 elections. According to the Interim Constitution of South Sudan, 70 percent should have come from the SPLM, 15 percent from the NCP, and 15 percent from other South Sudan political forces. The SPLM assigned only two unimportant ministries to the NCP after the 2010 elections. The president was expected to select ministers with due regard to the need for inclusiveness based on ethnic and regional diversity and gender. Each minister was in charge of his or her ministry. Ministers could be removed by the president in consultation with the vice president, or the assembly could pass a vote of no confidence against a minister by a two-thirds majority, at which point the minister would have to resign or be removed from office.

National Legislature

During periods of military rule, Sudan’s legislature rarely served as an institution independent of the executive. When it seized power in 1989, the RCC dissolved the elected legislature. Al-Bashir suspended the National Assembly in December 1999 following a dispute with Speaker al-Turabi; it did not resume operation until February 2001.

The CPA significantly revised Sudan’s legislative structure. A bicameral National Legislature that consisted of a 450-member National Assembly (lower house) and a 50-member Council of States (upper house) replaced the former unicameral National Assembly that existed under the 1998 constitution. President al-Bashir, in consultation with First Vice President Salva Kiir, initially appointed the 450 (including about 80 women) members of the National Assembly according to a 70–30 North–South ratio using the formula laid out in the Interim National Constitution. President al-Bashir, following complex consultations, also appointed the two representatives from each of Sudan’s 25 states and two observers from Abyei Area to the Council of States.

In April 2010, nationwide elections determined the makeup of the National Assembly. The NCP won 189 and the SPLM 56 of the 270 geographic seats. Other parties or independents won 17 seats, and eight remained undecided. There were 68 seats on the list chosen from political parties; the NCP won 50, the SPLM 17, and the Popular Congress Party one. There were 112 seats on the list chosen from women; the NCP won 82, the SPLM 26, and other parties four. The NCP easily controlled the National Assembly with more than 320 seats compared to 99 for the SPLM while other parties controlled the remainder, and four were postponed.

The Council of States had two representatives from each of the 25 states, elected by the state legislatures in accordance with the National
Elections Act and regulations set forth by the National Elections Commission. Following the 2010 elections, the Council of States filled 46 of the 50 seats; NCP members accounted for 25 and the SPLM for 21. Four seats in Al-Gezira and South Kordofan remained unfilled. Abyei Area had two observers in the Council of States elected by the Abyei Area Council. Candidates for both houses had to be at least 21 years of age and literate. Both houses of parliament met in Omdurman (so close to Khartoum that it is really a suburb of the capital); representatives were elected for a term of five years.

Functions of the National Legislature included amending the constitution, approving a declaration of war, impeaching the president or first vice president, and authorizing resources and revenues. The National Assembly had the authority to approve the national budget, ratify international treaties, summon national ministers to present reports, and interrogate national ministers. The Council of States could initiate legislation of interest to the states, approve by two-thirds majority appointments of justices to the constitutional court, and issue resolutions and directives to guide all levels of government concerning certain articles of the constitution. Each chamber had a speaker and deputy speaker.

**South Sudan Legislative Assembly**

In accordance with the Interim Constitution of South Sudan, GOSS had its own parliament. The Transitional South Sudan Legislative Assembly (TSSLA) began in October 2005 with 170 members appointed by the president of South Sudan after broad consultation with relevant political forces and on the basis of the following percentages: 70 percent were to come from the SPLM, 15 percent from the NCP, and 15 percent from other South Sudan political forces. Eight political parties had at least one representative in the interim assembly, which met in Juba under the leadership of a speaker and deputy speaker.

South Sudan held its first elections for membership of the TSSLA in April 2010. There were 102 geographic constituencies, 25 seats from a political party list, and 43 seats from a women’s list for a total of 170 seats in the TSSLA. The SPLM won 161 seats, independents five seats, the SPLM–Democratic Change party, an offshoot of the ruling SPLM, three seats, and the NCP one seat.

Members were elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage to represent territorial constituencies for a term of five years. At least 25 percent of the members had to be women; all members were required to be at least 21 years of age and literate. Powers of the assembly include authority to amend the constitution, enact legislation on all matters assigned to it by the CPA, authorize resources and revenue, impeach the president and vice president of the Government of South Sudan, approve
annual budgets, interrogate ministers, and ratify bilateral technical cooperation agreements. The largest party or coalition of parties not forming part of the government elected the leader of the opposition from among members of the assembly. The leader of the opposition in early 2011 was from the SPLM–Democratic Change party.

Civil Service

Northern Sudan historically had one of the more effective civil services in Africa as a result of early British attention to development of the civil service and the premium it placed on educating government employees. Independent governments carried on this tradition, although public service became increasingly politicized. In fact, many Sudanese held civil-service positions or equivalent jobs in foreign countries, especially the Arab Gulf states, because of the reputation the civil service enjoyed. The 1998 constitution expressly provided for a civil service that was responsible for the administration of the country. It mandated a system based on merit and proportional representation from all areas of the country.

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs helped the government in 2001 lay the groundwork for implementation of the National Public Service Strategy that covered the early twenty-first century. This program was designed to change individual behavior and the work environment for all civil servants, establish a database and information system, conduct a survey of public-service training needs, and formulate a concrete plan for the first phase of the strategy. The government began restructuring the civil service in 2002 and increased the salaries of civil servants in 2003 by 20 percent.

Because of the long-running civil war and the lack of trained Southern civil servants, it was understandably difficult for the SPLM to establish a functioning bureaucracy in the South. The vast majority of senior administrators were ex-army officers appointed by the SPLM leadership. Merit-based recruitment was unknown, and administrative capacity was extremely limited. Until several years ago, the SPLM did not pay civil administrators but authorized them to collect a wide variety of taxes, such as a social services tax, personal income tax, customs and excise duties, vehicle registration, road tolls, market fees, cattle auction tax, fishing and game hunting licenses, etc. The nature of tax collection varied widely among states and counties. There were no financial management or control systems, little or no budgeting, and no financial audit systems. The management of the civil administration was highly personalized, hierarchical, and militaristic. Many South Sudanese viewed the administration primarily as an opportunity for the enrichment of its senior officers.
The Interim National Constitution created a national civil service that theoretically was based on merit, fair competition for jobs, affirmative action, and additional training for conflict-affected people. It established a National Civil Service Commission (NCSC) that advised the national government on the formulation and execution of policies related to public service employment. The NCSC was tasked to recruit Southerners into 20 to 30 percent of the national civil service positions. Not less than 20 percent of the middle- and upper-level positions in the national civil service, including undersecretaries, were meant to be filled by qualified Southerners within the first three years of the interim period, 25 percent within five years, and 30 percent at the end of the six years. This goal was overly ambitious in view of the relatively few Southerners trained to fill such positions and a history of highly questionable administration in the South. The constitution also called for a National Employees Justice Chamber to consider and determine grievances by national public-service employees. The national government passed the National Civil Service Act and the National Civil Service Commission Act.

The Interim Constitution of South Sudan established a broad set of values and guidelines for the civil service that, under the circumstances, constituted wishful thinking rather than reality. After years of civil war, South Sudan simply did not have sufficient trained personnel to staff the civil service, although the government was paying the salaries of 100,000 civil servants. The constitution established a South Sudan Civil Service Commission (SSCSC) to advise the government on the formulation and execution of policies related to public service, employment, and employees. Independent and impartial, the SSCSC had the power to investigate, monitor, and evaluate the organization, administration, and personnel practices of the civil service. It could propose measures to improve efficiency, review existing practices and guidelines, address imbalances in the civil service, and hear employee grievances. The constitution also established a South Sudan Employees Justice Chamber to consider grievances from South Sudan civil-service employees. South Sudan set up some 19 independent commissions and chambers, including the Anticorruption Commission, to support services provided to South Sudanese.

State and Local Government

Relations between the central government and local authorities have been a persistent problem in Sudan (see The Federal System, this ch.). The 1998 constitution prescribed 25 states. The national government subsequently added Lakes State in the South, increasing the number to 26. Following the 2005 CPA, South Kordofan State absorbed West Kor-
Government and Politics

dofan State, which returned the number to 25—15 states in the North and 10 in the South (see fig. 1). According to the Interim National Constitution, each state had its own legislative, executive, and judicial organs. All of these positions were appointed until the April 2010 elections.

The state-empowered local government and state constitutions determined the organization and electoral procedures for local government. Each state was headed by a governor and a state council of ministers. The governor, together with the state council of ministers, exercised the executive powers of the state in compliance with the schedule of responsibilities set forth in the Interim National Constitution. Each state had its own capital and was divided into several localities or provinces, which, in turn, were subdivided into administrative units.

The system in the North remained centralized, although governors were elected in 2010, and they appointed their own ministers. All 15 Northern governors were from the NCP except for the Blue Nile governor, who was a member of the SPLM. Revenue flowed upward to the federal treasury. Some levels of government became so small, however, that they did not have a solid financial base. Oil-rich and highly contested Abyei Area straddling the North–South border area had a special administrative status under the presidency. Residents of Abyei Area were citizens of both South Kordofan State in the North and North Bahr al-Ghazal State in the South. Eventually, the residents were to hold a referendum to determine if they wished to retain their special administrative status with the North or join the South, but it was repeatedly postponed.

The South Sudan president initially appointed all state governors in consultation with the vice president. All governors became elected officials in 2010; they were all from the SPLM except for the West Equatoria governor, who was an independent. Local government in South Sudan had three tiers: county, city, municipal, and town councils; the payam (district encompassing several villages) and block councils (coordinated administrative units); and the boma (one village) in the rural areas and a local neighborhood council in the urban areas. The Interim Constitution of South Sudan specifically incorporated traditional authorities and customary law in the local government system. Local governments had the power to levy, charge, and collect fees and taxes in accordance with the law.

There were significant differences between the organization of local government in the North and South. For example, Red Sea State in the North had four localities and 19 administrative units. Chiefs or traditional tribal leaders were in charge of the localities. South Darfur State had nine localities and was further divided into 10 urban and 33 rural administrative units. Commissioners were in charge of the localities. Because of a
lack of infrastructure and skilled personnel, local government in South Sudan remained a work in progress. Each of the 10 Southern states was divided into counties that ranged in number between seven and 13. Each state and county had a capital. For example, the capital of West Bahr al-Ghazal was Wau, and the state had seven counties. The capital of Upper Nile was Malakal, and it had 13 counties.

The Legal System

The basis for law in Sudan evolved over time. The legacy of British colonial rule had a significant impact even after independence. Most of the lawyers and judges were British trained and initially tended to rely on judicial precedent. Soon after independence, however, pressure began to build to change the legal system. By the time al-Numayri seized power in 1969, a commission had been working on recommendations for a new system, but he dissolved it and formed another commission dominated by 12 Egyptian jurists. Based on recommendations received from them, Sudan adopted a new civil code that looked much like the Egyptian civil code of 1949. The new system was controversial because it disregarded existing laws and customs and introduced many new legal terms and concepts from Egyptian law without source material to interpret the codes. In 1973 the government repealed these codes and returned the legal system to its pre-1970 common-law status. In 1977 al-Numayri agreed to consider a Muslim Brotherhood (see Glossary) demand that the system be based on Islam. He appointed al-Turabi as chairman of a committee to draft new Islamic laws. Al-Numayri accepted few of the proposals from this committee. He then established a small, new group in 1983 that developed a “cut-and-paste” version of sharia laws based on practice in other countries. In September 1983, al-Numayri issued several decrees, known as the September Laws, which made sharia the law of the land.

Secular Muslims and the predominantly non-Muslim Southerners strongly opposed the imposition of Islamic law. Even before issuance of the September Laws, however, SPLM leader John Garang had defected from the government and begun to organize Southern opposition to overthrow al-Numayri. The enforcement of hudud (see Glossary) punishment, which included flogging and amputation of hands and feet, aroused widespread opposition to the al-Numayri government. Following al-Numayri’s overthrow in 1985, the Siwar al-Dhahab government suspended the harshest hudud penalties. Both Siwar al-Dhahab and his democratically elected successor, Sadiq al-Mahdi, supported sharia but criticized its method of implementation by al-Numayri. By early 1989, a reluctant al-Mahdi expressed willingness to consider abrogation of the controversial sharia laws. This caused his coalition partner, al-Turabi and the NIF, to
resign from the government in protest. Al-Mahdi announced that the cabinet would consider draft legislation repealing the September Laws on July 1, 1989, and would meet with SPLM leaders to resolve peacefully an end to the civil war. The military coup of June 1989 led by al-Bashir occurred only 24 hours before the al-Mahdi government was scheduled to vote on rescinding the September Laws.

The al-Bashir government initially retained the official freeze on implementation of the sharia laws but unofficially advised judges to apply them in preference to secular codes. Al-Bashir asked al-Turabi to prepare new laws based on Islamic principles. In January 1991, al-Bashir decreed that Islamic law would be applied in courts throughout the North, but not in the South. The 1998 constitution specified that the source of law for Sudan was sharia and national consent through voting in addition to the constitution and custom. In practice, Sudan treated Islam as the state religion and expected it to inspire the country’s laws, institutions, and policies in the North. The Interim National Constitution was less emphatic on this point and stated explicitly that Sudan was a “multireligious country” where diversity meant coexistence. Nevertheless, the government continued to place restrictions on non-Muslims, non-Arab Muslims, and Muslims from tribes or sects not affiliated with the NCP.

The CPA significantly altered the judicial structure in the North and created a new legal system for South Sudan, the states, and the national capital of Khartoum. The Interim National Constitution established an independent national judicial authority headed by a chief justice. The chief justice served as the president of the National Supreme Court and was answerable to the president of the republic. Structures of the national judiciary included the National Supreme Court, national courts of appeal, and other national courts. Nevertheless, the judiciary remained largely subservient to the president or the security forces, particularly in cases of crimes against the state. The Interim Constitution of South Sudan created a separate, independent judiciary consisting of the Supreme Court of South Sudan, courts of appeal, high courts, county courts, and other courts or tribunals as deemed necessary. Lack of qualified personnel prevented full staffing of the judiciary in South Sudan.

The Courts

Since 1958 Sudan’s various military governments have interfered with the judicial process. Following the military takeover in 1989, for example, the RCC issued a decree that gave the president power to appoint and dismiss all judges. Al-Bashir dismissed many, apparently because they were insufficiently committed to applying sharia in their decisions, and replaced them with supporters of the NIF. The judiciary effectively became responsible to the president or security forces.
The National Supreme Court was the highest court in the land. It was the court of final appeal and review with respect to any criminal, civil, or administrative matter arising out of national laws or personal matters. It had criminal jurisdiction over the justices of the Constitutional Court and could review death sentences imposed by any court. The president of the republic appointed the chief justice and members of the National Supreme Court on the advice of the Supreme Judicial Council. The chief justice served as the president of the National Supreme Court and presided over the National Judicial Service Commission (NJSC), which was responsible for overall management of the national judiciary. The NJSC regulated relations between the judiciaries at the national, South Sudan, and state level. In the case of South Sudan, the NJSC consulted with the president of the Supreme Court of South Sudan. The National Supreme Court consisted of 70 judges operating through panels consisting of three judges. It reached decisions by majority opinion, subject to revision only if and when the chief justice concluded that a judgment infringed sharia laws. Four circuits of the National Supreme Court operated outside the capital in the Western, Central, and Eastern states.

A separate Constitutional Court of nine justices served as the custodian of the constitution. The court had jurisdiction to interpret the constitution and original jurisdiction to decide disputes that arose under the constitution and the constitutions of Northern states. It decided on appeals against the decision of the Supreme Court of South Sudan, the Interim Constitution of South Sudan, and the constitutions of states in the South. It heard cases involving human rights and fundamental freedoms and adjudicated the constitutionality of laws or provisions in accordance with the Interim National Constitution, the Interim Constitution of South Sudan, and relevant state constitutions. The Constitutional Court adjudicated constitutional disputes between levels and organs of government and had criminal jurisdiction over the president of the republic, vice presidents, speakers of the National Legislature, and the justices of the National Supreme Court and Supreme Court of South Sudan. The president of the republic appointed the president of the Constitutional Court and all justices upon recommendation of the NJSC and subject to approval of a two-thirds majority of all the representatives of the Council of States.

According to the Interim National Constitution, the number, competences, and procedures of the national courts of appeal would be determined by law. In 2010–11 Sudan had some 130 judges in courts of appeal that functioned in 28 appeal circuits throughout the country, each one consisting of three judges. They reached decisions by majority opinion and dealt with appeals against the preliminary and appellate decisions of the public courts and the preliminary judgments of first-level
courts in civil, criminal, and personal cases. National courts of appeal occasionally overturned decisions of lower courts in political cases, especially from the public courts, which consisted of a single judge. The public courts had appellate jurisdiction over judgments of magistrates of third and second grade in criminal cases.

In 2005 there were 133 public-court judges and 397 district courts of the first instance. Civil and criminal codes passed in the 1980s and 1990s prescribed their powers. There were 98 town courts, 67 intermediate courts, and 897 rural courts. Local citizens chose the members of these courts from among prominent residents such as tribal chiefs and local sheikhs. Their distinctive feature was the application of customary law so long as it was consistent with Sudan’s laws and public policy. These courts normally resolved problems through conciliation and dealt with disputes over pasture, water, and farmland. They tended to be located in remote areas where there were no district courts. Sudan theoretically abolished special security courts in 2003 only to create three special courts in Darfur under the state of emergency to try crimes against the state. For example, one of these courts consisted of a three-judge bench composed of two military personnel and a civilian prosecutor appointed by the armed forces. It followed military rather than civilian procedures. Military trials, which sometimes were secret and brief, did not provide procedural safeguards. These courts ceased functioning in 2009. The Special Courts Act (1989) created three-person security courts to deal with violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, and some sections of the penal code. Special courts, composed primarily of civilian judges, handled most security-related cases. Sentences usually were severe and implemented immediately.

In 2010–11 the judiciary in South Sudan was at an early stage of development. South Sudan traditionally drew on customary law and practice together with common and statutory law. The SPLM recognized traditional courts, known as courts of elders, which usually heard personal matters dealing with questions like marriages and dowries. Local chiefs usually presided over traditional courts where defendants had a right of appeal to a non-customary court, although this did not always happen in practice. They based their decisions on customary law. GOSS employed courts of elders, traditional chiefs’ courts, payam (district) courts, county judges, state judges, and a court of appeals.

The Interim Constitution of South Sudan authorized a Supreme Court of South Sudan with a president, deputy president, and five other justices. It was the court of final judicial instance in respect of any litigation or prosecution under South Sudan or state law. Its competences were similar to those of the National Supreme Court but applied only within South Sudan. There were three courts of appeal, which sat in
Malakal, Juba, and Rumbek. High courts, the highest courts at the level of a state in South Sudan, existed in all 10 states. Decisions of the high courts could be appealed before the courts of appeal. In addition, South Sudan had established county courts in all 10 states and several town and rural courts. Traditional courts were formalized and integrated into the judicial system. The court system did not function in some areas because of lack of infrastructure, communications, funding, and an ineffective police force.

**Sharia Law**

Sharia is not a fixed set of ideas. There are substantially different interpretations of sharia in Sudan and other countries concerning what it is or should be. During Sudan’s relatively brief independent history, Islamic authorities approached it from varying points of view. Long traditions of Sufism (see Glossary) and Mahdism (see Glossary) influenced these debates. In more recent decades, the impetus for sharia tended to come from the Muslim Brotherhood and the NIF led by al-Turabi. Other key political figures, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and former President al-Numayri, were also instrumental at various points in promoting sharia.

The U.S. Department of State 2009 *International Religious Freedom Report* on Sudan estimated the country’s Muslim population at 70 percent. Muslims constituted the overwhelming majority in the North, although there were sizable Christian communities in the major cities, especially Khartoum. Sudanese who believed in traditional religions and Christians predominated in the South. The 1998 constitution provided for freedom of religion but treated Islam as a state religion and cited sharia as one of the sources of legislation. Differences over the application of sharia for non-Muslims were one of the root causes of the civil war between the North and the South. As a result, with an end to the conflict, the Interim National Constitution underscored the diversity of religious beliefs in Sudan.

Sharia remained a source of legislation in the 15 states of the North. Sudan’s Code of Criminal Procedure, in accordance with sharia, authorized *hudud* punishments in the North, although the severest forms were not being implemented as of 2011. The consumption of alcohol was punishable by 40 lashes for a Muslim and 20 lashes for a Christian. Islamic family law applied to Muslims in Sudan. A Muslim woman did have the right to hold and dispose of her own property without interference, and women were guaranteed inheritance from their parents; but certain Islamic law provisions discriminated against women. A widow inherited only one-eighth of her husband’s estate; of the remaining seven-eighths, two-thirds went to the sons and one-third to the daugh-
It was much easier for men to initiate legal divorce proceedings than for women. Although a Muslim man might marry a non-Muslim woman, a Muslim woman could not marry a non-Muslim man unless he converted to Islam. Women were instructed to dress modestly according to Islamic standards, including wearing a head covering; but there was minimal enforcement of the dress code. Converting from Islam to another religion was considered apostasy under sharia and was punishable by death in the North. In practice, the penalty was not carried out; by the end of 2010, the last case of apostasy prosecuted was in 1985 under the al-Numayri government and involved a Muslim who questioned Islamic beliefs but did not attempt to convert to another religion.

The national government did condone some discriminatory practices against Christians living in the North. The government required, for example, that all students in the North study Islam in school even if they were not Muslim. In the twenty-first century, however, there was a general improvement in religious freedom in the North. The Government of South Sudan generally respected religious freedom in the 10 states in the South.

Human Rights

By almost all accounts, Sudan has had a poor record on human rights for many years. Criticism of Sudan’s legal framework for failing to protect human rights and concern over the actual situation in the country increased after the military coup in 1989. Suppressed civil-society organizations, opposition political parties, and trade unions were quick to underscore human-rights abuses after the coup. The government disbanded the independent Sudan Human Rights Organization (SHRO) in 1991 and replaced it with a government-controlled body under the same name. Its role and that of the Sudan Advisory Council on Human Rights was not to monitor rights compliance but rather to consider accusations against the government and advise it on human-rights issues. In the meantime, the independent SHRO relocated to Cairo, where it remained highly critical of the human-rights situation in Sudan. The national government enacted legislation in 2009 to create an independent National Human Rights Commission; it only appointed the commissioners in January 2011. The South Sudan Human Rights Commission was established under article 149 of the Interim Constitution of South Sudan. Its primary mandate was to monitor the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution. Many South Sudanese charged, however, that it was devoting too much effort to advancing the SPLM’s agenda.

Several political developments had an important impact on the degree to which outsiders focused on human-rights abuses in Sudan. A
civil war between the North and the South that resumed in 1983 and officially only came to an end in 2005 led to numerous abuses by government forces, by the SPLA, and by other Southern groups. Sudan’s support for Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, and its active involvement with international terrorist organizations until the turn of the century, encouraged the United States and some Western countries to be even more critical of Sudan’s human-rights practices than might otherwise have been the case. The crisis in Darfur that began in 2003 resulted in some of the most horrific human-rights abuse. The United States and most human-rights organizations labeled it genocide. Although the United Nations investigation of Darfur did not go that far, it was highly critical and said there were crimes against humanity that must be stopped.

The U.S. Department of State annual reports on human-rights practices in Sudan in recent years acknowledged improvements in some areas but noted the continuation of many serious problems. There had not been a peaceful change of government since 1986. Security forces and militias were responsible for extrajudicial killings and disappearances. They regularly beat, harassed, arbitrarily arrested, and detained incommunicado opponents or suspected opponents of the government. Sudan’s security forces and pro-government militias beat refugees, raped women abducted during raids, and harassed and detained persons. Prison conditions were harsh to the point of being life threatening, and prolonged detention remained a problem. The authorities did not ensure due process in civilian or military courts. There was some success in curbing serious abuses in the Nuba Mountains, however, and the situation in Darfur, although still bad, had improved.

While Sudan had a variety of daily newspapers that reflected different political views, restrictions on press freedom were common in 2010–11 (see Information Media, this chapter). The government controlled news reporting through the National Press Council (NPC) and security forces. The NPC licensed newspapers, set press policy, and responded to complaints from the government, which periodically suspended publications and closed newspapers. There were occasional arrests of editors and journalists who criticized or disagreed with government policy. The government directly controlled radio and television in the North. It also restricted freedom of speech, assembly, association, religion, and movement, and arrested and harassed those who exercised these rights contrary to government wishes.

As part of tribal custom, female genital mutilation was widespread in Sudan (see Women and the Family, ch. 2). Compared with other Muslim societies, however, women were relatively well represented in public life and accorded special attention in the primary health care system. In 2007, the State Department included Sudan as among the countries of greatest concern in the trafficking of men, women, and children
for purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. Many of these problems resulted from the effects of the North–South civil war and the conflict in Darfur. The State Department described Sudan’s antitrafficking law-enforcement efforts as negligible.

Antigovernment insurgent groups and associated militia forces committed numerous, serious human-rights abuses. The SPLM/A violated citizens’ rights in South Sudan; there were occasional reports of its responsibility for killings, beatings, rape, arbitrary detention, and forced military conscription of underage young men. The Sudan Liberation Army, Justice and Equality Movement, and other rebel groups in Darfur also violated numerous commonly accepted human rights.

One of the most emotional charges against the government was that it engaged in slavery (see Umar al-Bashir and the Islamist Revolution, ch. 1). Much has been written on this topic—most of it shedding more heat than light—the best account being the May 22, 2002, report of the International Eminent Persons Group, *Slavery, Abduction, and Forced Servitude in Sudan*. The report concluded that most of the allegations of slavery involved economic exploitation, ranging from debt bondage to benign relations of sponsorship or adoption rather than slavery. It found evidence, however, of exploitative and abusive relationships that, in some cases, did meet the definition of slavery as contained in international conventions. The group concluded that in a significant number of cases, abduction was the first stage in a pattern of abuse that fell under the definition of slavery in the International Slavery Convention of 1926 and the Supplementary Convention of 1956. Nevertheless, the group was unable to establish the scale of abduction and enslavement. Allegations of slavery encouraged by the government had nearly disappeared by 2011.

**Political Groups**

The traditional, and historically most important, political groups in Sudan were the Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and much smaller Sudan Communist Party. The National Islamic Front (NIF) led by al-Turabi came later and subsequently changed its name; many other parties have come and gone over the years.

Following the military coup in 1989, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) banned all political parties and arrested several political leaders, including the deposed prime minister and Umma Party leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi. The NIF, an outgrowth of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was the one political group that strongly influenced the al-Bashir government. The NIF changed its name to the National Congress Party (NCP), the current ruling party, in 1991. (Commentators often refer to the NCP inaccurately as the NIF.) Al-Bashir
eventually forced al-Turabi out of the NCP; in 2000 al-Turabi created the Popular National Congress, subsequently renamed the Popular Congress Party (PCP). Within a year of the NCP’s founding, however, the two most important Northern opposition parties, Umma and DUP, joined in alliance with the SPLM and a dissident Northern group known as the Sudanese National Alliance (SNA) and formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Most Northern NDA leaders were initially in exile in Cairo. In 1995 the NDA moved its headquarters to Asmara, Eritrea, where the government allowed it to occupy the former embassy of Sudan until Eritrea normalized relations with Sudan.

The al-Bashir government continued to restrict the activities of opposition political groups but did permit the official registration of political parties beginning on January 6, 1999. A number of their leaders began to return from exile. Former President al-Numayri returned from Egypt in 1999, formed the Alliance of the People’s Working Forces, but captured less than 10 percent of the vote in his run for president in 2000. Sadiq al-Mahdi returned in 2000, just before the presidential elections, but chose to boycott them. DUP leader Al-Sayyid Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani remained in exile in Cairo, although some of his Khatmiyyah (see Glossary) sect leaders became politically active in Sudan. The Sudanese National Alliance engaged the Sudan government in talks in Cairo in 2004 and subsequently returned to Sudan. The SPLM signed the CPA with Khartoum in 2005 and became part of the national government. Most Southern opposition groups joined the SPLM and, consequently, are also part of the national government. Some Southern parties remained in opposition and new ones formed. Following the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006, one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement joined the national government while other groups refused, and many new factions subsequently evolved.

The end of Sudan’s civil war led to passage by the national government of the Political Parties Act of 2007, which regulated the registration, operations, and dissolution of political parties. The National Constitutional Review Commission held consultations on this act with opposition political parties and civil society in 2007. The SNA remained troubled about the section that allowed for the dissolution of political parties. Other opposition parties continued to voice concerns about the commitment of both Khartoum and the SPLM to a free and fair environment for elections. The handling of the April 2010 national elections in both the North and South justified these concerns. The following discussion of political parties reflects the situation at the start of 2011.
National Congress Party

The National Congress Party (NCP) was one of two successor parties to the NIF and effectively served as Sudan’s ruling party under the control of al-Bashir. The NIF dissolved itself after the 1989 coup and emerged in 1991 as the NCP, the only legal political party at the time. Al-Turabi was highly influential in the NCP until May 2000, when al-Bashir suspended him from the position of secretary-general and removed most of his supporters from senior posts in the party. Al-Bashir subsequently banned al-Turabi and his Islamist followers from participating in any political activity. Al-Bashir’s assistant for political affairs, Professor Ibrahim Ahmad Umar, replaced al-Turabi as NCP secretary-general. The NCP considers consultation between the leadership and its political base at the grassroots level as its main political principle and Islam as the source of Sudanese culture. The NCP preferred to have a unified Sudan but was willing to go forward in January 2011 with a referendum on Southern secession.

The NCP’s base of support was small, and the party suffered from factionalism. It experienced continuing competition for political control and the future of the Islamist agenda. Disagreements over policy in Darfur exacerbated the situation within the NCP. Key persons in the
party included Sudan’s second vice president, Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha, and assistant to the president and former minister of federal relations, Nafie Ali Nafie. Faced with internal party problems, the government increasingly relied for its survival on a policy of dividing its domestic opponents and using offers of money and positions in the government. This practice contributed to splits in the Umma Party, DUP, and SPLM. Opposition groups collectively had more popular support than the NCP. As long as the NCP retained significant support in the security services and successfully implemented its divide-and-rule tactics, however, it was well positioned to retain power in the North.

**Popular Congress Party**

The Popular Congress Party (PCP) was the other successor to the NIF. The power struggle between al-Bashir and al-Turabi resulted in al-Turabi’s expulsion from the NCP. As a consequence, al-Turabi established the PCP (initially called the Popular National Congress) in August 2000 in opposition to the NCP. Al-Turabi has been a towering figure, sometimes operating as an éminence grise, in Sudanese politics since he helped found the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood in 1954. The Islamist movement started in universities and high schools as early as the 1940s under the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic Liberation Movement, a precursor of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, began in 1949. Al-Turabi then took control of it under the name of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. In 1964 he became secretary-general of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), an activist movement that served as the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, and was elected to parliament in the mid-1960s. He headed the Front of the Islamic Pact and the Party of the Islamic Bloc from 1964–69. Following the military coup in 1969, al-Numayri jailed al-Turabi for seven years. Released in 1977, he became attorney general in 1979 and then al-Numayri’s foreign affairs adviser in 1983. Al-Numayri put him back in prison in 1985; the new military government released him later the same year. Al-Turabi established the NIF in 1985 as a replacement for the ICF. Al-Turabi held several ministerial positions in the democratically elected Sadiq al-Mahdi government, which the NIF joined in 1988 as a coalition partner, but he was never comfortable with this arrangement. Following the military coup in 1989, the RCC briefly arrested al-Turabi even though it was widely believed the NIF actively collaborated with the RCC. Al-Turabi and his NIF supporters soon provided essential support to the military government as part of the new NCP, which replaced the NIF. Al-Turabi played a major role in the government, including his election as speaker of the National Assembly in 1996, until his falling
out with al-Bashir in 1999, when al-Turabi again began to spend time in jail or under house arrest. After al-Turabi created the PCP, al-Bashir’s security forces regularly harassed its meetings and arrested participants. In February 2001, the PCP signed a “memorandum of understanding” in Geneva with the SPLM. Among other things, the memorandum noted that self-determination is a legitimate right of the people of South Sudan. Al-Turabi saw the memorandum as a way to undermine al-Bashir and improve his own position; it resulted in al-Turabi’s arrest. After three months in prison, the government released al-Turabi from prison and put him under house arrest. PCP activity virtually came to a halt; al-Bashir dropped charges against PCP supporters near the end of 2001. Released from detention, al-Turabi was rearrested in March 2003 on charges of masterminding a coup attempt. The government dismissed these charges against al-Turabi and the PCP in December 2004 but continued to keep him in detention and banned party activity. Al-Turabi managed, however, to have a significant impact on political developments in Sudan from jail or house arrest and eventually was released. There is strong evidence that the PCP established an alliance with the rebel Justice and Equality Movement in Darfur in order to put additional pressure on the government. In the flawed April 2010 elections, the PCP candidate for president, Abdullah Deng Nhial, a Muslim from the Dinka tribe, received only 4 percent of the vote.

Al-Turabi by 2011 had been the leader of Islamists in Sudan for the last half century. Consequently, his philosophy deserves special attention.
He drew selectively from Sudanese, Islamic, and Western political thought to fashion an ideology for the pursuit of power. Al-Turabi supported sharia and the concept of an Islamic state, but his vision was not Wahhabi (see Glossary) or Salafi (see Glossary). He appreciated that the majority of Sudanese followed Sufi Islam, which he set out to change with new ideas. He did not extend legitimacy to Sufis, Mahdists, and clerics, whom he saw as incapable of addressing the challenges of modern life. One of the strengths of his vision was to consider different trends in Islam. Although the political base for his ideas was probably relatively small, he had an important influence on Sudanese politics and religion.

Young Sudanese, who provided much of his following, saw his ideas as modern and not a return to the past. In fact, his views on the role of women in society were relatively progressive. Al-Turabi had his greatest success in recruiting supporters from the educated and professional classes in urban areas. He attached fundamental importance to the concept of shura (consultation) and ibtila, his view of modernity, which he believed should lead to a more profound worship of God. Religion was regularly tested by the reality of ibtila. Al-Turabi also saw his religious theory as extending beyond Sudan. He created in 1991 the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) with himself as secretary-general. Its goal was to mobilize progressive Islamic movements against the West and to promote Islamic revolution within reactionary Muslim states. With al-Turabi’s fall from power in Sudan, the PAIC no longer functioned. Al-Turabi failed to achieve his goals in Sudan because it was ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse and probably not subject to unification by any form of Islamism. His model also relied heavily on authoritarian measures.

Umma

Established in 1945 with the goal of achieving independence from Britain and Egypt, the Umma Party obtained most of its support from the Ansar (see Glossary) Sufi order. Its supporters followed the religious teachings of the Mahdi (see Glossary), who ruled Sudan in the 1880s (see The Mahdiyyah, 1885–98, ch. 1). Although the Ansar were found throughout Sudan, most lived in rural areas of western Darfur and Kordofan. Sadiq al-Mahdi, a direct descendent of the Mahdi, became head of Umma and spiritual leader of the Ansar in 1970. Constantly in conflict with the military government, he was imprisoned by al-Numayri in 1983 because of his opposition to government policies, including the September Laws that institutionalized sharia. Umma was, however, an Islamic party dedicated to achieving its own political agenda for Sudan. Sadiq al-Mahdi did not object to sharia becoming the law of the land but rather to the “un-Islamic” method al-Numayri used to implement it.
After becoming prime minister in 1986, Sadiq al-Mahdi, working with NIF leader al-Turabi, began drafting new Islamic legal codes. Al-Bashir had al-Mahdi arrested after the 1989 military coup. Released early in 1991, he eventually went into exile and actively supported the Northern opposition coalition, the National Democratic Alliance.

The government, believing that it had successfully split the political opposition, invited the Umma Party leadership back to Sudan. Some Umma leaders returned to Khartoum in April 2000. Sadiq al-Mahdi went back late in the year, hoping to find al-Bashir more willing to permit truly democratic elections. On his return, Sadiq al-Mahdi reaffirmed Umma’s pledge of self-determination for South Sudan and disavowed an Islamic state in religiously and culturally divided Sudan. The government temporarily banned Umma from all political activity in the spring of 2005, claiming it had not been properly registered.

Sadiq al-Mahdi experienced severe frustration after his return to Sudan. Al-Bashir’s offer to Umma to join his government resulted in a split in the party. In 2002 a group led by Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi, Sadiq al-Mahdi’s nephew, broke from the party and created the Umma Reform and Renewal Party (URRP). This faction joined the al-Bashir government and occupied a number of senior positions. The URRP ended the two-year alliance with the government in late 2004, charging that al-Bashir had violated their original agreement. Most of the URRP ministers resigned, and al-Fadil opened discussions with Sadiq al-Mahdi in 2007 on rejoining the main branch of the Umma Party. This effort failed, and the al-Bashir government jailed al-Fadil for four months in 2007, allegedly for participating in a coup plot.

Upon his return to Khartoum, Sadiq al-Mahdi called for an all-party constitutional conference that would have given wider legitimacy to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD—see Glossary) peace process and brought all of Sudan’s political forces into the discussions. For this reason, Sadiq al-Mahdi opposed the CPA because deliberations leading to its signing effectively eliminated Umma from the political process. In addition, the CPA offered little opportunity for Umma to participate in Sudanese politics. Sadiq al-Mahdi said he would join the al-Bashir government only if it began the process of holding genuinely democratic elections. He also pressed for a government based on a religiously neutral constitution and not a theocracy. Sadiq al-Mahdi argued that Umma believed there could be no Islamic state under Islam, only the pursuit of Islamic principles.

Both Sadiq al-Mahdi and Mubarak al-Fadil announced their intention to run for president as representatives of their respective wings of the party in the April 2010 election. At the last minute, al-Mahdi withdrew his candidacy, although the names of both Umma leaders appeared on the ballots. Al-Mahdi received 1 percent of the vote and al-Fadil 0.5 percent.
Democratic Unionist Party

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) drew its support from the Khatmiyyah (see Glossary) religious order and for a long time competed with the Ansar order and Umma Party. The former National Unionist Party and People’s Defense Party combined to form the DUP in 1967. Historically, the DUP and its predecessors were plagued by factionalism, stemming largely from the differing perspectives of secular-minded professionals in the party and the more traditional religious values of their Khatmiyyah supporters. Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, the DUP leader and hereditary Khatmiyyah spiritual guide since 1968, tried to keep these tensions in check by avoiding firm positions on controversial political issues. He refrained from public criticism of al-Numayri’s September Laws so as not to alienate Khatmiyyah followers who approved of sharia. In the 1986 parliamentary elections, the DUP won the second largest number of seats and agreed to participate in Sadiq al-Mahdi’s coalition government. By 1988 DUP leaders had persuaded al-Mirghani that the Islamic law issue was the main obstacle to peaceful resolution of the North–South civil war. This conviction prompted al-Mirghani to meet with SPLM leader John Garang in Ethiopia, where they negotiated a cease-fire agreement based on a commitment to abolish the September Laws. Al-Mirghani argued that if Khartoum had accepted this agreement, it would have resulted in peace in Sudan.

Following the 1989 military coup, al-Mirghani took up exile in Cairo. The al-Bashir government then had some success in exploiting factionalism within the DUP by co-opting several of its leaders while al-Mirghani remained in Egypt. One of those leaders was Zayn al-Abdin al-Hindi, who applied to reestablish the DUP under Sudan’s 1998 Political Association Act. The DUP leadership in exile rejected his initiative. Al-Mirghani joined other Northern opposition leaders and the SPLM in a declaration in 1995 that led to the creation of the NDA, which then elected al-Mirghani as its head. Al-Mirghani subsequently played a key role in encouraging the failed joint Libyan-Egyptian peace proposal for ending the civil war. Al-Mirghani finally met with al-Bashir in September 2000. The DUP and Khartoum signed a bilateral agreement in February 2003, although the DUP sought a broader agreement between the NDA and the al-Bashir government on a complete solution to the “Sudanese problem.” Al-Mirghani continued contact with senior government officials, speaking for both the DUP and NDA. He met then-First Vice President Taha in Cairo in June 2004. Relations between al-Mirghani and the government remained delicate throughout these negotiations until the NDA and Khartoum signed an agreement in June 2005.
Al-Mirghani remained in Cairo, but the DUP resumed engagement in Sudanese politics. Its goal was to realign old and new opposition parties in a comprehensive way to confront broader issues such as national unity and the transition to democracy. It continued to see the NDA as a mechanism for achieving this goal. Hatim al-Sir ran for president as the DUP candidate in April 2010; he received 2 percent of the vote.

**National Democratic Alliance**

Established in 1995 by the SNA, DUP, Umma, and SPLM, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was intended to lead a “popular struggle against the new dictatorship in Sudan and the fundamentalist regime.” The government of Eritrea turned over Sudan’s vacant embassy (Eritrea broke diplomatic relations with Sudan in late 1991) for use by the NDA as its headquarters until Asmara reestablished diplomatic relations with Khartoum in 2000; the NDA then relocated its headquarters to another office in Asmara. DUP leader al-Mirghani was the chairman of the NDA from its creation through early 2011. Less important member organizations included the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party, Beja Congress, Sudan Communist Party, Federal Democratic Alliance, Free Lions, Sudan Liberation Movement, Sudanese National Party, and Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP). Umma suspended its membership in 2000. Once it became part of the national government, the SPLM also left the NDA.

At its leadership council meeting in 2003, the NDA decided to pursue a strategy that emphasized peace and affirmed its willingness to meet directly with the government. On behalf of the NDA, al-Mirghani in December 2004 praised al-Bashir’s promise to end the state of emergency following the signing of an agreement with the SPLM. In February 2005, the NDA executive bureau approved the Beja Congress and Free Lions as the official representatives of Eastern Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement of Western Sudan. It emphasized the need to establish a special forum to discuss issues related to the East and asserted that agreements reached with the SPLM and the Cairo talks with the NDA were complementary and historic. Khartoum and the NDA finally signed an agreement in Cairo in June 2005 that set the stage for resolving their differences. The parties agreed that the political system in Sudan should be pluralist, democratic, and peaceful, with a democratic transition of power, and with guaranteed freedom and respect for human rights. The NDA renounced violence and its members subsequently returned to Sudan as part of the political opposition.
Sudanese National Alliance

Formed in 1994 as a democratic, secular, non-regional party, the Sudanese National Alliance (SNA) was one of the four original members of the NDA, the coalition of Northern groups and the SPLM in opposition to the al-Bashir government in Khartoum. From the beginning, former general Abdel Aziz Khalid was the visible leader of the SNA, although Amir Babakr was the SNA chairman. During the 1990s, the Sudan Alliance Forces, the armed wing of the SNA, conducted a number of low-level military attacks against Sudanese forces inside the country. The Sudan Alliance Forces merged with the SPLA in 2002. Subsequently, the SNA joined the political process in Khartoum. Khalid ran as the SNA candidate for president in the April 2010 election and received 0.34 percent of the vote.

Sudan Communist Party

The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) once played a disproportionately important role in Sudanese politics. Founded in 1946, it was known originally as the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation. It founded the Sudan Workers’ Trade Union Federation in 1950 and had strong early ties with the organizations of railway workers and cotton growers. It changed its name in 1956 to the Sudan Communist Party. In 1967 the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in having the SCP outlawed as an atheist organization. Continuing its activities underground, the SCP did not regain its legal status until 1985. The al-Bashir government banned the SCP in 1989; it eventually joined the NDA. Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud was the secretary-general of the SCP from 1972 through 2010. Arrested in 1989 and then held under house arrest until 1994, he went into hiding until 2006. Nugud reemerged politically, but the SCP suffered from a dwindling membership after 1989. It still retained some support among workers, farmers, students, women’s groups, and minorities in the Nuba Mountains and in Darfur. It remained committed to a Marxist orientation. Nugud commented during an interview in 2007 that Marx’s analysis of capitalism in the nineteenth century was useful and the SCP used his methods as a tool. The SCP advocated socialism in a multiparty system, supported the right of the South to self-determination, and doubted that the NCP would allow free and fair elections. During his campaign for president in 2010, Nugud seemed to stress the unity of Sudan, called for a “correction of economic mistakes,” and urged a multi-party democracy. He won only 0.25 percent of the vote.
Other Northern Political Groups

The April 2010 elections generated a long list of additional Northern political parties, all of which fared poorly. Most of them will never be heard from again. Two of the parties merit mention, although their candidates for president each received less than 0.5 percent of the vote.

Munir Sheikh el-Din Jallab ran as the candidate for the New National Democratic Party (NNDP). He called for the unity of Sudan and rejected a possible secession of South Sudan. He vowed to design a solution for Darfur, give special attention to the concerns of youth, women, and children, and he emphasized the role of the free market.

The Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was the only legal political party in Sudan from 1971 until 1985, when the government of al-Numayri was overthrown. Professor Fatima Abdel-Mahmood, who served as Sudan’s first female minister during the presidency of al-Numayri and a former member of the NCP, headed the SSU in 2010. She was the first woman to run for president in Sudan.

Western Political Groups

In February 2003, two groups developed in Western Sudan that highlighted the grievances of the people in Darfur. One was the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), which began agitating for greater political and economic rights for Darfur within a united Sudan. Minni Arkoi Minnawi was the secretary-general of the SLM, and Abd al-Wahid Muhammad Ahmad al-Nor was head of the army. The SLA evolved from the Darfur Liberation Front, a secessionist group, and it drew support from the Fur, Masalit, and Zagawa peoples. Its vision for Sudan initially was close to that of the SPLM/A, and it had links with the NDA. Minnawi, a Zagawa, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with Khartoum in May 2006; al-Nor, a Fur, refused to sign. Their difference widened a preexisting split of the SLM/A and was followed by numerous other splits in the organization. Some SLA commanders who refused to sign the DPA joined with others to form the National Redemption Front. After signing the DPA, Minnawi became a senior assistant in the presidency of the national government but had minimal support in Darfur. Al-Nor, who claimed to lead the SLM rebel group, continued to call for unity of the SLM and a return to its original objectives. In spite of attempts to reunite the various SLM factions, the movement remained in disarray in early 2011.

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the second important group that began fighting against government forces in Darfur in 2003, drew support primarily from the Zagawa people. JEM was believed to have close ties with al-Turabi’s PCP and to have received support
from Eritrea and Chad. Its initial goal was regime change in Khartoum. Its chairman was Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad, formerly a mid-ranking official in the government who had good channels of communication with the Islamists. The JEM team was the most professional and disciplined during the talks in Abuja, Nigeria, that led to the signing of the DPA. JEM also faced splits and defections within its ranks. In 2008 JEM carried out a military raid that reached the outskirts of Khartoum before being defeated.

A third group, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), split from JEM in March 2004 and signed a cease-fire agreement with the government of Sudan in December 2004. It had support from persons living along a stretch of the Sudan–Chad border. Although its force was small, it resumed military operations against the government in 2005. The NMRD, the SLM, and JEM were among about 20 different rebel factions in Darfur. Some of them joined together as the Liberation and Justice Movement and were engaged in peace talks in Doha with the Sudan government in late 2010.

**Eastern Political Groups**

One of the oldest political parties in Sudan, the Beja Congress represents the Beja people, who inhabit the semidesert area along eastern Sudan’s Red Sea coast and the hill country behind it. The Beja Congress held its first provisional meeting in 1956 and formally established itself in 1958 to express unhappiness over the marginalization of its region. Khartoum banned political parties the same year, and the Beja Congress did not reemerge until 1964. As the Beja peoples became increasingly marginalized, they turned to military tactics. The Beja Congress launched an armed struggle in the 1990s with the support of several hundred fighters. It controlled a section of territory near Karora and Hameshkoreb. Its chairman in early 2011 was Umar Muhammad Tahir. Amna Dirar, from the Bani Amer branch and a lecturer at the Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman, headed the political wing. The Beja Congress sought self-determination in a federal system. Although it became an original member of the NDA, it wanted to be a partner at the negotiating table with Khartoum rather than be represented by the NDA or SPLM. It established links with the SLM/A in Darfur.

The Free Lions represented the political grievances of the Arab Rashaida nomads in eastern Sudan. Mabrouk Mubarak Salim, a graduate of Damascus University, became the chairman of its armed wing, the Free Lions Movement, after its formation in 1999. The group had several hundred fighters at its peak. The Free Lions had a strong relationship with JEM in Darfur. The Beja Congress and the Free Lions joined together as the Eastern Front (EF) and signed a peace agreement with the
national government in October 2006. The EF then served as the major Eastern opposition movement.

**Sudan People’s Liberation Movement**

The SPLM is the political arm and the SPLA the military wing of the organization. In 1983 the Sudanese army sent then-Lieutenant Colonel John Garang de Mabior to Bor in the South to quell a rebellion of Southern soldiers there. Instead, he sided with the mutineers. Fighting ensued between Southern and Northern troops; Garang went to neighboring Ethiopia and created the SPLM/A. By July 1983, there were about 2,500 SPLA soldiers in Ethiopia and another 500 in the field inside Sudan. The SPLM/A received strong support from, and was influenced by, the Marxist regime in neighboring Ethiopia until it collapsed in 1991. Garang, who received a B.A. from Grinnell College and his M.A. and Ph.D. in agriculture from Iowa State University, was the only leader the SPLM/A had until his death in July 2005.

From the beginning, the organization operated in a hierarchical fashion with a tendency toward authoritarianism. The SPLA was first and foremost an army and handled itself accordingly. It was not always clear what the SPLA was fighting for. Nearly all of the military commanders and most Southerners favored independence for South Sudan. Garang wanted a unified Sudan with significant autonomy for the South. He called for a “New Sudan” that would be democratic, pluralistic, and united. This lack of consensus within the organization contributed over the years to numerous splits and instability. For a long time, there was also concern that Garang’s Dinka tribe exercised disproportionate control over the SPLM/A. A major split occurred in 1991, when Riek Machar created another SPLM faction consisting primarily of supporters from the Nuer and Shilluk tribes. At one point, Machar even joined the government in Khartoum before breaking his ties and returning to the bush. Machar resolved his differences with Garang in 2002 and rejoined the SPLM/A. In early 2011, he was vice president of South Sudan.

In spite of major challenges, the SPLA began to have increasing success on the battlefield during the 1990s. It received significant support from neighboring Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, although this support dissipated following the outbreak of war in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea, when both countries sought better relations with Khartoum. Garang developed good relations with governments as diverse as the United States and Libya. By the late 1990s, however, Khartoum began benefiting from its oil wealth, which permitted larger expenditures for military equipment. After almost 20 years of fighting between the government and the SPLA, it became apparent to both sides that neither
one could win a military victory. This conclusion and the growing cost of the war led to serious peace talks under the aegis of IGAD, which resulted in the 2002 Machakos Protocol, named for the Kenyan town in which it was negotiated. In January 2005, the SPLM signed the CPA with the government of Sudan.

Until his untimely death in 2005, Garang supported a unified New Sudan and he attached much importance to the new combined army, which he saw as a symbol of unity and sovereignty during the six-year interim government called for by the CPA. Salva Kiir Mayardit, Garang’s former deputy and replacement, publicly supported Garang’s vision of Sudanese unity and a New Sudan as recently as mid-2009, but it became clear that this was not the prevailing view among the SPLM rank and file. Salva Kiir stated publicly that unity was no longer an option. The SPLM faced major challenges in the South because of limited infrastructure and lack of skilled personnel to run the administration. The issue of political factionalism also returned to haunt the SPLM. Even the crisis in Darfur led to different positions among the SPLM leadership. The SPLM secretary-general, Pag’an Amum, stated in mid-2007 that genocide was taking place in Darfur while Salva Kiir avoided using the term genocide.

In June 2009, Lam Akol Ajawin, a Shilluk who was previously the SPLM representative holding the position of minister of foreign affairs in the Government of National Unity, created a new party known as the SPLM–Democratic Change. He criticized the SPLM for not implementing John Garang’s vision of the New Sudan and condemned his former party for a wide range of failings. Early in 2010, Lam Akol announced his candidacy for president of South Sudan as part of an alliance with seven other opposition parties: Sudan African National Union (SANU), United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), United Democratic Party, Sudan National Labor Party, Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), South Sudan Democratic Forum, and South Sudan Democratic Front. During the presidential campaign, Lam Akol argued that secession of the South in the present circumstances would be “suicide” and result in “Somalization” of South Sudan. Lam Akol won only 7 percent of the vote in South Sudan; he immediately cried foul.

Other Southern Groups

South Sudan has had a long history of political and military groups independent from and even opposed to the SPLM. Many disappeared, and some joined the SPLM. Even those that still existed seemed to be constantly in flux. The government in Khartoum had a long history of supporting some of these groups for its own political purposes. The SPLM charged, for example, that the Southern States Coordination
Council, which seemed to be inactive, was simply a front for Khartoum. A number of small political parties had organized in the South in support of the CPA but were opposed to the SPLM. Andrea Agony Ajak, president of the Sudan National Labor Party, opposed secession of the South. USAP operated under the NDA umbrella and participated in the national government. USAP chairman Joseph Ukel Abango said the party preferred independence for the South and that it never supported John Garang’s concept of a New Sudan.

The most significant military organization outside SPLA control in the late 1990s was a faction of the South Sudan United Democratic Alliance (SSUDA) and dissident elements of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF). The SSDF was the military wing of the SSUDA. Created in 1997, the organization became an umbrella group that once brought together a variety of Southern militias and political groups, all of which were subject to regular defections and factional battles. The SSDF relied on logistical support from the Sudan army. The SSDF once fielded several thousand fighters, especially among the Nuer, and controlled much of Upper Nile, parts of North and West Bahr al-Ghazal, and much of East Equatoria. In addition to Nuer support, it drew from the Murle, Shilluk, Fertit, and Equatorian peoples. Paulino Matip, a Nuer and former major general in the Sudanese army, was SSDF chief of staff from 2001 until he joined the SPLM upon signing the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration on January 8, 2006. Matip also headed the Bentiu-based South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM), once the most important organization in the SSDF coalition. The SSUM and another SSDF-affiliated rebel
movement, the Rubkona-based South Sudan Independence Movement, joined the SPLM as a result of the Juba Declaration.

When Matip joined the SPLM in 2006, the military wing of the SSDF lost most of its support. It became more active on the Internet than on the ground. Its main grievance was that it had been excluded from playing a role in the Government of South Sudan. Gabriel Tanginya became the new leader of the SSDF. A breakaway faction of the SSDF announced late in 2007 that the SSDF had disbanded and become a political party called the South Sudan Democratic Front, which was then led by Bona Malwal. This faction promised to support the CPA. The leader of the United Democratic Salvation Front was Joseph Lagu, vice president of Sudan during the al-Numayri government in the mid-1980s.

The Equatoria Defense Force (EDF), which operated in the area around Juba and Torit, was perhaps the most politically effective group in the SSDF. Most of its fighters were Latuku and Lokoya. It was generally believed that Khartoum supported the EDF. The EDF signed a merger agreement with the SPLM/A in March 2004, although it was not clear how many EDF fighters accepted it. The Bor Group consisted primarily of SPLA defectors from South Bor. The governor of East Equatoria charged in 2006 that remnants of the EDF continued to carry out attacks and be a threat to security because they received arms from Khartoum.

Regional Dynamics and Conflict

Geographically, Sudan is the largest country in Africa. It is also located on an ethnic and religious fault line. The Northern population is largely Arab and Muslim. The people living in South Sudan are predominantly African and animist or Christian. Arabic is the principal language in the North; various indigenous languages, and English for the educated elite, prevail in the South. Consequently, Sudan has experienced a significant amount of conflict since independence. In fact, the only period of peace in the country occurred after the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended a civil war. Peace lasted until 1983 when war broke out again between Northerners and Southerners. Other parts of Sudan also have experienced periodic conflict: Darfur in the West; the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and South Blue Nile in the North–South border area; and occasional flare-ups in the East.

Sudan has not yet found the answer to accommodating these diverse ethnic groups, languages, cultures, and religions. The government of Sudan has never effectively controlled and administered the periphery of the country. The situation is exacerbated by a weak transportation infrastructure that fails to bind the country together (see Transportation
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and Telecommunications, ch. 3). Had it been possible for the country to remain united, meaningful federalism might have been the best solution. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement tested the willingness of the North and South to make a success of federalism in a unified Sudan, but as the referendum of January 2011 showed, the effort failed, preparing the way for Southern secession.

South Sudan

The colonial experience exacerbated tension between Northerners and Southerners, the latter lagging far behind in education, economic development, and involvement in the government. The British administered the South as a separate African region and encouraged the development of Christianity. As independence became increasingly likely, Britain and Egypt competed for close ties with Sudanese in the North. They saw no need to reach a genuine accommodation with Southerners, arrange a separate status for the South, or even insist on guarantees for the South in an independence agreement. At independence, Britain simply transferred the colonial structure to Northern Sudanese nationalists. In 1955, a year before independence, a mutiny of Southern soldiers attached to the Equatoria Corps started a process that led to the rise of South Sudanese nationalism. The dissidents, who eventually became known as Anya Nya, which means “snake poison” in several local languages, conducted a guerrilla campaign that forced the al-Numayri government to the negotiating table in 1971. The result was the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which permitted considerable autonomy for Southerners and promised much more development assistance. Al-Numayri soon began to renege on several key provisions in the agreement and effectively abrogated it by 1983. His actions led to the creation of the SPLM/A and a resumption of the civil war that only came to an end with the signing of the CPA by Khartoum and the SPLM in January 2005.

The conflict involving South Sudan was not strictly speaking one between the North and South or even between Muslims and non-Muslims. It was a conflict among peoples that had important implications for the rest of the country. The South encompassed an extensive diversity of people—at least 200 different ethnic groups. But there were also different views by Muslims in the North who have never reached a consensus on the future of Sudan. The situation in the North was further complicated by the fact that some 4 million internally displaced Southerners lived in the Khartoum region, and many of them remained there well into the implementation phase of the CPA. Some of the Southerners held significant positions as judges or served in the police force and army. It was this very diversity, in the North and particularly in the
South, which led to conflict in the first place and made it difficult to fully restore peace to Sudan. Divisions persisted in the South just as they had plagued the SPLM/A since 1983. The loyalty of younger Southerners to the SPLM/A, and the agreement it reached with Khartoum, was particularly suspect. The conflict was a combination of political, cultural, racial, economic, religious, linguistic, and developmental differences. A surge of ethnic violence resulted in the deaths of more than 2,500 people and forced 350,000 to flee their homes in 2009.

Sudan’s civil war had important implications for the wider region. Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Libya at various times gave strong support to the SPLM/A, whose military forces often took refuge in Ethiopia and Uganda. Eritrea offered its capital as the headquarters for the NDA, an organization in which the SPLM/A figured prominently. Egypt, Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia preferred a unified Sudan, although they were prepared to deal with an independent South Sudan. Uganda and Kenya, although they had not commented publicly before the referendum, probably preferred an independent South Sudan. In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces were also engaged in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire). Because of support by neighboring countries for the SPLM/A, Khartoum periodically assisted a variety of foreign opposition groups such as Eritrean Islamic Jihad, against Eritrea; an extremist Christian group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), against Uganda; and the Oromo Liberation Front and Benishangul Liberation Front, against Ethiopia. Khartoum’s support for all of these groups appeared to have ended by early 2011. Ethiopia, Libya, Uganda, and Eritrea normalized ties with Khartoum. The end to the conflict promised a major peace dividend for the entire region. Up to early 2011, however, the Government of South Sudan had squandered much of its oil revenue. Little of it had been devoted to development; more went into corruption and building military capacity.

The score card for implementing the CPA was decidedly mixed by January 2011. The cease-fire was holding, and Southerners still held their positions in the national government, although they demonstrated more interest in the future of South Sudan than in the national government. The basic constitutional framework envisaged in the CPA was in place. Khartoum was sharing oil revenue with the South. While the Abyei Boundary Commission had decided Abyei should be part of South Sudan, Khartoum argued that the commission had exceeded its authority, and the issue remained in stalemate. The border between the North and South had not been agreed upon, but some 80 percent of the demarcation had been completed. True power sharing never took place in South Kordofan as mandated by the CPA; the Nuba Mountains remained an orphan, with its future to be decided through consultations in the state legislature. The
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civil service never became the joint effort that had been envisaged in the CPA. Perhaps most importantly, neither side worked hard on the goal of “making unity attractive.”

Most outside observers doubted that South Sudan could successfully implement independence. When asked early in 2010 if South Sudan were sufficiently prepared to go it alone, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who knew the situation in Sudan well, replied “no.” Some experts believed there would be a balkanization of South Sudan. Nevertheless, al-Bashir, whose NCP still preferred unity, was on the record as saying that Khartoum would be the first to recognize an independent South Sudan.

Western Sudan

Western Sudan, especially Darfur, is located far from Khartoum, has a shortage of water and arable land, and is subject to periodic drought. Nearly all of the residents of Darfur, which is the size of France, are Muslim. There is a history of ethnic tension between those who are predominantly farmers and “African” and others who are mainly nomadic herdsmen and “Arab.” It would be inaccurate, however, to attach too much importance to this distinction. Although described as a conflict between Muslim Africans and Muslim Arabs, experts on the region insist this characterization is too facile. Local issues are involved, as well as severe competition over scarce resources and long-standing marginalization of the region by Khartoum. The conflict began in February 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) began attacks against the government (see The War in Darfur, 2003–11, ch. 5). The attacks may have been precipitated by an understanding that the SPLM/A might be on the verge of achieving success in its demands following a long military struggle against the North. Taken by surprise and lacking adequate military force in Darfur, the government mobilized local militias known as the janjaweed (see Glossary) to oppose the SLM/A and JEM. Joined by Sudanese security forces, the situation soon spiraled out of control and became a policy of ethnic cleansing or worse. Some Arabic-speaking groups participated in the attacks, but others did not. The attacks by the janjaweed, supported by government helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers, resulted in the eventual internal displacement of more than 2.7 million Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa and another 250,000 refugees in neighboring Chad (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Between 200,000 and 400,000 people died as a result of killing, disease, and hunger. Two-thirds of Darfur’s population required humanitarian assistance. The United States asserted in 2004 that genocide had occurred, but it was the only country to make that
assertion. A United Nations investigation of the killings acknowledged in its January 2005 report “that the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law.” It did not use the term genocide.

The conflict in Darfur had significant regional ramifications. Darfur borders Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Historically, Chadian rebels crossed the border into Darfur in order to mobilize for attacks against the Chadian government. The same ethnic groups live on both sides of the border. Chadian president Idris Deby was one of the first leaders to try, unsuccessfully, to mediate an end to the conflict. Libya was accused over the years of trying to stir up trouble in Darfur, although there was no indication it had done so in the current conflict. The African Union and United Nations had a joint peacekeeping force, the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), with about 22,000 personnel in Darfur. There was a significant reduction in violence, but both refugees and internally displaced persons were unwilling to return to their homeland, which was largely destroyed. Darfur settled into a confused, low-level conflict where everyone was against everyone else. Khartoum continued to charge that Hassan al-Turabi’s PCP was fueling the conflict in Darfur by supporting one of the most powerful factions, the Justice and Equality Movement.

There was substantial agreement by international experts on Darfur that only a negotiated political settlement could bring the conflict to an end. The highly flawed 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement remained at the heart of any settlement, but the peace process had to be made more inclusive. There also needed to be greater emphasis on dialogue among the conflicting parties within Darfur, which had become far more numerous. A number of them began negotiations with the Sudanese government in a process hosted in Doha. Implicitly, the experts acknowledged that a much larger peacekeeping operation alone would solve nothing.

**Eastern Sudan**

The grievances of groups in the East are similar to those in Darfur and the South. The Beja Congress, which represented many of the 2.2 million Beja people, and the Free Lions, which spoke for the Rashaida tribe, were marginalized by successive Sudanese governments. They wanted more medical services, better education, increased economic development, and more influence in the central government. They envied the success of Southerners and sympathized with the concerns of people living in Darfur. The Beja Congress had long been the voice of these grievances. It aligned with the NDA in 1995 and conducted military operations against the government. The Beja and the Rashaida
never sought secession, however; they only wanted to be part of a fed­
eral system and have access to an equitable share of the country’s 
wealth and development.

Following the killing of some 20 ethnic Beja at Port Sudan early in 
2005, Sudan announced that it would hold direct talks with the Beja 
Congress. Both the Free Lions and the Beja Congress had close ties 
with Eritrea. The Free Lions also had links with Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, 
and Saudi Arabia. In fact, Libya offered to mediate differences between 
disaffected Eastern groups and Khartoum. The Beja Congress and Free 
Lions announced in February 2005 a merger into one military move­
ment called the Eastern Front. As Khartoum faced increasing resistance 
in Darfur, the pressures of implementing the CPA with South Sudan, 
and the potential for new conflict in the East, it concluded the time had 
come to reach an agreement in the East. Eritrea played a crucial and 
helpful role in the process.

In October 2006, Khartoum and the Eastern Front signed the Eastern 
Sudan Peace Agreement. It stagnated largely because of internal power 
struggles within the leadership of the Eastern Front. A split among Beja 
factions of the Eastern Front prevented it from presenting a list of nom­
inees for the posts allocated to it under the agreement. The Eastern 
Front leadership requested mediation by Eritrea to help resolve the con­
flict among the Beja factions. Nevertheless, peace continued to prevail 
in the region and Khartoum remained optimistic about the implementa­
tion of the agreement and began preparations for the disarmament and 
integration of former Eastern Front combatants. This agreement had 
more to do, however, with normalizing relations between Sudan and 
Eritrea than it did in resolving the concerns of the Beja and Rashaida.

**Information Media**

Sudan had one of the most restrictive media environments in Africa in 
the early 2000s. The Interim National Constitution provided an unre­
stricted right to freedom of expression, dissemination of information, and 
access to the press without prejudice to order, safety, or public morals “as 
determined by the law.” It added that the state guaranteed freedom of the 
press and other media “as shall be regulated by law in a democratic soci­
ety.” Finally, the constitution stated that all media must abide by profes­
ional ethics, refrain from inciting religious, ethnic, racial, or cultural 
hatred, and must not agitate for violence or war. The constitution clearly 
left most of the implementation of press freedom to the passage of laws. 
The Interim Constitution of South Sudan had similar provisions except 
that it omitted the necessity of refraining from inciting religious, ethnic, 
racial, or cultural hatred and inciting violence or war.
Sudan’s print media since independence generally have served one of the political parties or the government in power, although there occasionally were outspoken independent newspapers. There was more press freedom under civilian governments than during military regimes. Radio and television were always under much firmer government control, irrespective of the type of government.

In 2003 al-Bashir proclaimed the lifting of censorship and the transfer of responsibility for monitoring the media from the National Security Organization to the 21-member National Press Council (NPC). The president of the republic selected seven members and the National Assembly chose five members. The Journalists’ Union elected seven members and leaders of the union selected the final two members. Transfer of responsibility for monitoring the media resulted in only marginal improvement because state security officials circumvented the NPC by relying on the government prosecutor in charge of subversive crimes. Khartoum continued to censor print and broadcast media, and journalists also practiced self-censorship. There were occasional reports of harassment of journalists in South Sudan. Internet service was developing, with a combination of government and private-sector involvement. The official Sudan News Agency, established in 1971, distributed information in Arabic, English, and French. The Middle East News Agency and Xinhua (New China News Agency) had offices in Khartoum.

Print Media

Before the 1989 coup, Sudan had a lively press. There were 22 daily papers, 19 in Arabic and three in English, published in Khartoum. Including those in Khartoum, Sudan had a total of 55 daily or weekly newspapers and magazines. The Revolutionary Command Council banned all of them and dismissed more than 1,000 journalists. Slowly, the al-Bashir government allowed private dailies to return to publication, although they were all subject to censorship. Some of them periodically experienced harassment, including the jailing of journalists, seizure of newspapers, and suspension of publication. After the announced end of censorship on all Sudanese newspapers in July 2003 and a brief improvement in press freedom, a number of independent publications again experienced intimidation, interruption, and arrest of their editors. Reporters Without Borders stated that the government ordered seven Arabic-language newspapers not to print certain articles “out of protection for journalists.” The government used as a pretext for this order the September 2006 murder of Mohamed Taha, the editor of the privately owned daily al-Wifaq. An Islamist extremist group claimed responsibility for the murder.
Estimated total newspaper circulation in 2005 was 23 papers for each 1,000 persons. In 2007 the leading English-language daily was the Khartoum Monitor, with a distribution of 3,000 to 3,500 copies per day. It experienced periodic harassment. This independent paper tended to reflect the views of Southerners. Sudan Vision was a progovernment paper with a daily circulation of about 3,200 copies. The Citizen supported the views of the SPLM and distributed about 2,000 copies per day. The Sudan Tribune was an Internet paper from Paris that tended to be critical of the NPC. In 2008 the NPC suspended the publishing license of both the Citizen and Sudan Tribune. In 2003 publication began in Kampala, Uganda, of the Sudan Mirror, which focused on South Sudan and relied on reporters in Southern towns. The print media were at a very early stage of development in South Sudan. The English-language weekly, Juba Post, remained the most widely circulated Southern paper with about 1,500 copies per week in Juba and another 500 in Khartoum.

The Arabic-language press was much more important than the English-language media. Authorities briefly suspended publication of a leading Arabic-language paper, Al-Sahafa, in 2003 for carrying an Ethiopian Airlines advertisement that mentioned the drinking of alcohol. Often critical of the government, Al-Sahafa distributed 25,000 to 27,000 copies daily. The government shut down the independent Al-Ayam in 2004, primarily for its reporting on the crisis in Darfur. Al-Ayam had a daily circulation of 18,000 to 20,000 copies per day. The Sudanese minister of justice ordered prosecutors in March 2004 to end indefinite closure of newspapers without trial. Nevertheless, Al-Sahafa, Al-Ayam, and other papers reported instances of harassment by security forces in 2006. The largest Arabic-language daily was Akhbar Al-Youn. It had strong links to the government and distributed 30,000 to 35,000 copies per day. Al-Rai Al-Aam, with a daily circulation of about 18,000, was an Islamist paper with strong links to the government but had columnists who were antigovernment. Alwan had a daily circulation of about 16,000 and generally supported al-Turabi’s PCP. The government funded Al-Hayat, which had close ties to Vice President Taha. Other Arabic-language dailies included Al-Wifaq (pro-government and anti-West), Al-Khartoum (linked to the DUP), Al-Sharia Al-Siyasi (pro-government), Al-Watan (independent), Al-Sudani (independent with a large readership in the diaspora), Al-Intibaha (anti-SPLM but supported secession of the South), Rai Al-Shaab (mouthpiece of al-Turabi’s PCP), and Akhir Lahza (usually pro-government). In 2010 security personnel shut down the offices of Rai Al-Shaab.
The government directly controlled radio broadcasting in the early 2000s. In a country as large as Sudan, radio was especially important in disseminating information. The Sudan National Radio Corporation, which dated back to 1940, broadcast a mixture of news, music, and cultural programs through national and regional networks in Arabic, English, French, and Swahili. There was only one private radio station in Northern Sudan; it was an FM station that broadcast music in Khartoum. Several opposition and clandestine radio networks operated until the early 2000s, although there were occasional reports of clandestine broadcasts from Darfur. The Voice of Sudan, operated by the opposition NDA, broadcast shortwave intermittently from neighboring Eritrea beginning in 1995 until the parties that made up the NDA returned to Sudan. The New Sudan Council of Churches had a weekly broadcast called the Voice of Hope produced in studios in Uganda and the Netherlands and transmitted via the Radio Netherlands relay station in Madagascar. In 2010, Sudan suspended the BBC’s license to broadcast in Arabic on local FM frequencies in four Northern cities, including Khartoum.

The SPLM/A, when it was fighting the government, periodically broadcast from clandestine transmitters in the region. Juba in early 2011 had several transmitting stations: BBC World, Capital FM, and Bakhita Radio. The state government in Central Equatoria where Juba, the capital, is located shut down the radio station Liberty FM, after a caller made a remark critical of the government during a call-in show. The Sudan Radio Service, developed by the Education Development Center, a U.S. nongovernmental organization financially supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, began broadcasting from Nairobi, Kenya, in July 2003. Sudanese producers broadcast programs in 10 Sudanese languages, focusing on civic education, health, agriculture, and education, as well as on music and entertainment, with the overall purpose of informing Sudanese about peacemaking, reconciliation, and economic development. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) operated Radio Miraya FM out of Juba in an effort to transmit reliable and accessible information about the peace process to a wider audience. UNMIS opened a repeater station in Rumbek early in 2007 and began work on four additional stations so that Radio Miraya could broadcast to remote areas of West Equatoria and East Equatoria States. In addition to news and CPA-related programming, Radio Miraya had some primary educational programs. In 2010 the minister of information and broadcasting accused Radio Miraya of inciting ethnic violence in South Sudan.
Sudan officially began television transmission in 1963. In the early years, it only reached a short distance from Khartoum. The Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation in 2011 operated two television channels; both reflected government policies. Sudan had a military censor to ensure that the news did not contradict official views. Satellite dishes were common in affluent areas and pan-Arab television stations were popular. In addition to domestic and satellite TV services, there was a subscription cable network, which directly rebroadcast uncensored foreign news and other programs. The government shut down the Al-Jazeera bureau late in 2003 and arrested the bureau chief for alleged false programming and poor analysis of atrocities in Darfur. The bureau chief went to prison, but Al-Jazeera subsequently reopened the office.

As of 2010–11, the government monitored Internet communications and the National Intelligence and Security Service read e-mail between private citizens. Some Web sites deemed offensive to public morality were blocked by the National Telecommunications Corporation, as were many proxy servers. There generally were no restrictions on access to news and information Web sites, although authorities regularly blocked access to youtube.com. Internet access was widely available in urban areas, but limited by lack of infrastructure in rural areas.

**Foreign Relations**

Sudan has had a testy relationship with many Western countries, especially the United States, since the 1989 coup put in power a government significantly influenced by Islamist militancy. More recent cooperation with the United States and other countries on countering terrorism temporarily improved ties, but they were subsequently set back by continuing violence in Darfur. The degree to which Sudan pushed an Islamist agenda beyond its borders and supported opposition groups in nearby countries tended to determine the quality of relations with its nine neighbors. When Sudan was respectful of its neighbors, relations were usually friendly; when it interfered with governments in neighboring states, they were poor. Sometimes, Sudan’s neighbors precipitated the hostility. On other occasions, developments between neighboring states led to improved relations with Sudan. The 1998–2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was a major windfall for Sudan. It resulted in better Sudanese relations with both countries as they sought to neutralize Sudan as an enemy in order to focus their enmity on each other.

The decision by the al-Bashir government in 1999 to remove al-Turabi, the Islamist leader, as the speaker of the National Assembly, and subsequently to arrest him, signaled a change in Sudan’s approach
to its relations with Western countries. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States and Washington’s strong reaction to them further encouraged Sudan to improve relations with the West. Growing cooperation on counterterrorism and the opening of serious discussions in 2003 between Sudan and the SPLM/A to end the civil war speeded up this process. But the international goodwill obtained early in 2005 by the signing of the CPA with the SPLM that ended conflict was significantly offset by Khartoum’s handling of the crisis in Darfur. Since the 1989 coup, Sudan has maintained generally cordial relations with other Muslim countries and with China, Russia, India, and Iran. It also has worked hard and largely successfully to retain support within the United Nations and African, Arab, and Muslim regional organizations.

Sudan considers itself as part of both the Arab and African worlds, although its foreign-policy leadership has always tended to look north, particularly to Egypt, and to some extent west and east, rather than south into tropical Africa. In order to ensure its own security, it accords special attention to relations with its nine neighbors. Although it has tried to develop cordial relations with all of these countries, it has sporadically supported opposition groups trying to overthrow governments in neighboring countries if it perceived those governments as a threat to Sudan. It has striven with considerable success to have a significant voice in regional and international bodies and establishes linkages with any state that would help deflect criticism of its internal and external policies. The neighbor of overriding importance to Sudan has always been Egypt. Occasionally described as a love–hate relationship, Sudan cannot ignore Egypt. A significant part of this tie is based on the fact that nearly all of the water reaching Egypt comes via the Nile and passes through Sudan, although little of it originates there. The Nile water question also affects Sudan’s relations with other riparian states, especially Uganda and Ethiopia. It will also be one of several major factors in relations with its newest, and tenth, neighbor, South Sudan, once it becomes independent in mid-2011.

Some Sudanese governments, especially those in which al-Turabi played a prominent role, emphasized support for Islamism. Al-Turabi created the now-dormant Popular Arab and Islamic Conference as a radical alternative to the Arab League, an association of 22 mainly Arabic-speaking countries dedicated to promoting common interests, and to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a group of 57 states that acts to safeguard Muslim values. As Sudan’s oil production increased, it also became of greater interest to countries such as China, India, and Malaysia. This situation gave Sudan added foreign-policy leverage and hindered the ability of the United States and the West generally to put greater pressure on Sudan concerning the crisis in Darfur.
Egypt

The triangular relationship among Britain, Egypt, and Sudan evolved during the period of Britain’s rule in the Nile valley between 1882 and 1955. Two imperial powers, Britain and Egypt, sought to control Sudan. This rivalry led to the rise of Sudanese elites who tended to split into anti-Egyptian and anti-British factions. The British, after relinquishing control at Sudanese independence, found it relatively easy to leave the Sudanese to their own devices. Egypt still shared a long border and continued to view Sudan as part of its backyard, a feature of the bilateral relationship that Khartoum found especially irksome.

The Nile, Egypt’s lifeline, flows through Sudan before reaching Egypt. An estimated 95 percent of all Egyptians depend on the Nile for fresh water. In 1959 the two countries agreed on a formula for sharing the water, whereby Sudan was authorized to use approximately one-quarter of the flow and Egypt about three-quarters. The division was predicated on a set annual flow, which varies enormously from year to year. There is usually a surplus above this amount. As a result, use of Nile water by other riparians had not, by 2011, resulted in a crisis with Egypt and Sudan. Nevertheless, none of the other eight riparian states was signature to, nor received any water allocation in, this 1959 bilateral agreement. Since 2000 Sudan had begun expressing an interest in changing the terms of the agreement so that it would be able to use a larger percentage of the flow. Seven of the eight other riparian states—Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—also pressed for a revised water-allocation formula. In 1999 the nine countries formed the Nile Basin Initiative as a forum for discussion about cooperating in the development of the Nile Basin. Since then, no agreement had been reached by 2011, mainly because Egypt and Sudan refused any reduction in their share of water. Egypt was also concerned that the 2005 CPA between Khartoum and the SPLM would result in another riparian state in South Sudan. Egypt had hoped for a united Sudan because South Sudan will be another state with which it might have to negotiate water rights. In 2010 there was a sharp division between seven of the riparian states, which reached their own agreement, and opposition to that agreement by Egypt and Sudan.

While Egypt and Sudan generally agreed on the Nile water question, they had failed to resolve a longstanding dispute over the location of their border near the Red Sea, an area called the Hala’ib Triangle. Egypt occupied the disputed territory, but the matter remained ripe for future conflict. Al-Bashir revived the controversy as recently as 2010 when he stated that Hala’ib was Sudanese and would stay Sudanese.
Relations between the two countries since the 1989 Sudanese coup have had their ups and downs. They reached a nadir in 1995, when elements of the Sudanese government were complicit in a plot by an Egyptian terrorist group, Gama’a Islamiyya, to assassinate Egypt’s president, Husni Mubarak, while he was en route from the Addis Ababa airport to an Organization of African Unity (now African Union) summit in Ethiopia’s capital. By the end of 1999, Egyptian anger toward Sudan had subsided, and President al-Bashir visited Egypt, where the two leaders agreed to normalize diplomatic relations. Al-Bashir returned to Cairo in 2002, at which time they expanded cooperation on a variety of practical issues. Mubarak repaid the visit by going to Khartoum the following year. In 2004 al-Bashir again went to Cairo, where the two leaders signed the Four Freedoms Agreement dealing with freedom of ownership, movement, residence, and work between the two countries. There has been cooperation on counterterrorism and development projects drawing water from the Nile, and the two governments agreed to establish a free-trade zone along the Sudan–Egypt border, where they would exchange commodities free of duty. Sudan has particularly appreciated Egyptian verbal and moral support for its policy in Darfur. Egypt also sent troops to the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur. Egyptian investments in Sudan reached US$2.5 billion by 2008 while Sudanese investments in Egypt totaled almost US$200 million. By 2010 Egyptian–Sudanese relations were better than they had been in many years, although several long-term contentious issues, such as the future status of South Sudan, ownership of the Hala’ib Triangle, and use of Nile water, remained unresolved.

Egypt nevertheless began preparing for the possible independence of South Sudan. In an effort to keep track of developments there, Egypt had about 1,500 military personnel assigned to UNMIS and had begun supporting a number of development projects in the South. It had a consulate in Juba, and Mubarak traveled there in 2008. Salva Kiir visited Cairo in 2009, when Egypt made clear it would accept the results of the January 2011 referendum on secession. In 2010, Egypt also offered a US$300 million grant for Southern water and electricity projects along the Nile.

Libya

Libya and Sudan share an isolated border along a corner of northwestern Sudan that neither government has ever fully controlled. This state of affairs left open the possibility for a variety of real and perceived activities in the region that caused Khartoum to suspect that Libya periodically acted against its interests. In addition, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi had a long history of providing financial support
to the SPLA. He had a lengthy, personal relationship with John Garang. During the civil war between Khartoum and the SPLA, this relationship raised serious questions among Sudanese leaders concerning Libya’s intentions. Libya also remained in contact with Northern Sudanese opposition figures and for many years had ties to dissidents in Darfur, causing concern in Khartoum that Libya might support the rebel movements that initiated the conflict.

In the early 2000s, Sudan and Libya made concerted efforts to improve relations. The last half of 2002 witnessed a series of high-level meetings between Libya and Sudan. The Sudanese foreign minister at the time, Mustafa Uthman Isma’il, and his Libyan counterpart agreed to work for peace in Sudan within the framework of Sudanese unity, establish a committee for political coordination, and take measures to implement agreements on customs, the Nile international fund, trade, taxation, and investment. Also in 2002, the Higher Ministerial Committee for Libyan–Sudanese Integration agreed on a number of political and practical issues, including condemnation of American threats to launch “unjustified aggression” against Iraq. In 2004, as the crisis in Darfur worsened, Libya hosted informal consultations between representatives of the Sudanese government and the rebel movements. The rebels rejected the Libyan initiative and insisted that the Joint Commission of the African Union serve as the principal interlocutor. This development did not deter First Vice President Taha in 2005 from urging al-Qadhafi to help find a solution to the Darfur crisis. Relations between Libya and Sudan were generally good but remained unpredictable, primarily as a result of the mercurial leadership in Tripoli.
Sudan saw al-Qadhafi as a periodic problem that needed to be contained. It was better to bring him into the tent than to try to exclude him. As a result, Sudan did not object to al-Qadhafi’s efforts to mediate both the Darfur conflict and the earlier conflict in Eastern Sudan. The two countries settled on a policy of coexistence.

Ethiopia and Eritrea

Sudan’s relations with Ethiopia date back to antiquity. One of Ethiopia’s principal trade routes ran west to Sudan and then to Egypt and the Mediterranean. Muslim merchants from Sudan have been an important part of Ethiopia’s trade for many centuries. Relations were not, however, always cordial. Military conflict broke out between Ethiopians and Sudanese in the 1850s. Sudanese Mahdists, or dervishes as they also were called, then advanced into Ethiopia in 1885, resulting in a series of battles between Sudanese Muslims and Ethiopian Christians over the next four years. Relations improved during the twentieth century. Emperor Haile Selassie, who had been in exile during the 1936–41 Italian occupation of Ethiopia, returned with the help of Ethiopian, British, and Sudanese forces from Sudan. Relations became tense again in the late 1950s as Ethiopia supported the South Sudanese Anya Nya rebels in their battle against Khartoum. Haile Selassie, however, helped broker the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the first civil war between North and South.

Ethiopia’s military government under Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974–91) strongly supported the SPLM/A against the government in Khartoum. The successor Tigray-dominated government, when it operated as a rebel movement, often took refuge in Sudan during its struggle to overthrow Mengistu. After taking power in 1991, it established cordial relations with Khartoum. This era of cooperation faded quickly as Islamic militants in Sudan tried to export their ideas to neighboring countries, including Ethiopia. Eritrea gained de facto independence from Ethiopia in 1991 and formal independence two years later. By the end of 1993, Eritrea had charged Sudan with supporting the activities of Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which carried out attacks against the Asmara regime. Eritrea broke relations with Sudan at the end of 1994, became a strong supporter of the SPLM/A, and permitted the opposition National Democratic Alliance to locate its headquarters in the former Sudan embassy in Asmara. Sudan’s relations with Eritrea reached a low in 1995 following Sudanese complicity in the attempted assassination of Egyptian president Mubarak as he was visiting Addis Ababa. At the urging of the United States, Ethiopia and Eritrea joined Uganda in the so-called Front Line States strategy, which was designed to put military pressure on Khartoum. In 1997 Ethiopian forces joined the SPLA in a
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cross-border attack that resulted in the capture of the border town of Kurmuk and a second small town in Sudan’s Blue Nile State.

Eritrea’s surprise May 1998 invasion of the Ethiopian-administered border village of Badme dramatically changed the political situation in the region. Operating on the axiom that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Ethiopia normalized relations with Sudan by the end of 1998, and Eritrea reestablished ties with Khartoum in 2000. Although Sudan and Eritrea continued to maintain diplomatic relations, real improvement in ties was short-lived. Sudan closed its border with Eritrea in 2002, and the Sudanese foreign minister charged in February 2003 that Eritrea had amassed forces along the border with Sudan. Khartoum also accused Eritrea of supporting rebel groups in Darfur. The presidents of Sudan and Eritrea met for the first time in five years in mid-2006 in Khartoum. Eritrea played a prominent role in brokering a peace agreement between Khartoum and Sudan’s Eastern Front. This put Sudan–Eritrea relations on a new, positive track, although Sudan remained worried about Eritrea’s activities in Darfur. The nations’ leaders met again in Khartoum near the end of 2006 and frequently in subsequent years. In 2007 President Isaias Afwerki also met with Salva Kiir in Juba. Isaias described relations with Sudan as resting on solid ground and having “bright prospects.” Eritrea seemed to have ended its contacts with Darfur rebel groups and become supportive of the NPC in Sudan. It also established a consulate-general in South Sudan’s capital of Juba, and its consul-general in May 2010 expressed support for the principle of self-determination. The same month, Yemane Ghebremeskel, a senior adviser to Isaias, commented that Eritrea hoped the January 2011 referendum would lead to the unity of Sudan.

Good relations between Sudan and Ethiopia continued in spite of Sudan’s improved ties with Eritrea. President al-Bashir visited Addis Ababa twice in 2001. During a visit to Khartoum in 2002, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Meles Zenawi, hailed Ethiopian–Sudanese ties. The two countries agreed to cancel entry visas and fees on traded commodities, and they stepped up plans to increase trade. Ethiopia began early in 2003 to import oil from Sudan. By 2009 Sudan supplied 80 percent of Ethiopia’s demand for oil. The two nations signed an agreement ending a dispute involving their 1,600-kilometer border, and landlocked Ethiopia made plans to make greater use of Port Sudan as a transshipment point. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Yemen formed a regional group early in 2003 that they said was designed to “combat terrorism” in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea insisted that it was an alliance aimed against the government in Asmara. It subsequently became inactive following Sudan’s improved ties with Eritrea. In May 2010, both Meles and Isaias attended the swearing-in ceremony in Khartoum for al-Bashir following his election.
Bilateral relations among countries in the Horn of Africa tended to be fickle. However, Ethiopia and Sudan continued to make progress on settling border issues. The Ethiopian prime minister and Sudanese president inaugurated a major new road link between Ethiopia and Sudan at the end of 2007. South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir also led a delegation to Ethiopia at the end of 2007 when the two sides signed technical-assistance and transport-sector agreements. There were frequent subsequent exchange visits by Ethiopian and Sudanese leaders. Ethiopia remained wary, however, of any effort by Sudan to return to a policy supporting Islamist militancy in the region. Although Ethiopia preferred a united Sudan, it shored up its relations with South Sudan on the assumption that it would opt for secession. Ethiopia began resupplying the SPLA with military equipment as early as 2008. Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea were periodic recipients of refugees from the other countries, another potential cause of friction. Agreement on usage of Nile water reemerged as an important issue between Addis Ababa and Khartoum, while Asmara supported the Sudanese position as another way to irritate Ethiopia. Ethiopia desired a revision of the 1959 water-sharing agreement that involved only Egypt and Sudan. Although not entirely happy with the 1959 agreement, Sudan wanted to leave the water-sharing provision in place.

**Chad and the Central African Republic**

Sudan’s border with both Chad and the Central African Republic had a certain “Wild West” quality to it in the early 2000s. The governments of both countries to the west of the border and that of Sudan did not have firm control over territory under their jurisdiction. Both sides of the Chad border have served as a launching pad for Chadian rebels trying to overthrow the government in N’Djamena. There was always considerable movement across this border; the ethnic groups on each side being related. As recently as 2003, there were only about 13,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad and virtually no Chadian refugees in Sudan. As a result of the crisis in Darfur, the number of Sudanese refugees in Chad jumped to more than 250,000, and large numbers of Chadians took refuge in Sudan. The two governments signed a series of agreements on political cooperation and security along their border. Chadian president Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa who came from the Sudan border area, worked hard but without success to mediate an end to the dispute between the government in Khartoum and the Darfur rebel groups.

Sudanese-Chadian relations significantly deteriorated in 2005 as both countries allowed their territory to be used for subversive activities against the other. Darfur and the situation along the border became part of a Zaghawa power struggle in Chad. Libya mediated the dispute
and convinced Chad and Sudan to sign the Tripoli Declaration and
Agreement of February 8, 2006. But an April 2006 attack by Chadian
rebels against the Déby government in N’Djamena nearly toppled it.
Déby accused Sudan of supporting the effort and broke diplomatic
relations with Khartoum. By November 2006, Déby declared that Chad
was in a state of war with Sudan. Following deadly clashes along the
Sudan–Chad border in April 2007, Chad’s foreign minister said it was
time to turn the page and improve relations with Sudan. The two coun­
tries set up a joint military committee to monitor the border and in May
the two presidents signed a reconciliation accord in Saudi Arabia. By
the beginning of 2008, however, relations had again deteriorated, with
the leader of each country accusing the other of conducting cross-bor­
der attacks. In March 2008, launching from Chad, a number of JEM
troops reached Omdurman on the outskirts of Khartoum. Further
efforts by both Libya and Qatar to improve relations between the two
produced a security agreement in late 2009 to control rebel movements
from Chad into Sudan. In February 2010, Déby visited Khartoum
where he and al-Bashir agreed to normalize relations. The first fruit of
these developments was a framework agreement between Khartoum
and the main JEM rebel group, signed in N’djamena on February 20,
providing for a cease-fire and for further negotiations in Doha, Qatar.
Al-Bashir then released more than half of the prisoners held since the
JEM attack on Omdurman. In 2010 Chad refused permission for the
leader of the JEM to land in N’Djamena. By late 2010, Sudan and
Chad had normalized their relations, and Déby publicly stated his
opposition to a North–South division of Sudan.

From Bangui’s perspective, the major long-term problem in relations
with Sudan was penetration of its wide open eastern frontier by cattle
raiders and poachers. Some of Sudan’s border with the Central African
Republic (CAR) is contiguous to territory that was under the control of
South Sudan in 2010. Even when the SPLM/A was at war with Kharto­
oum, the conflict did not discourage al-Bashir’s government from
engaging actively with the CAR. Sudan had cordial relations with former
CAR president Ange-Félix Patassé, who was overthrown in a military
coup by General François Bozizé in March 2003. Sudan initially estab­
lished good relations with the new leader. The two presidents met on a
number of occasions. The CAR, Chad, and Sudan signed joint security
agreements in December 2004 to monitor the situation along their bor­
ders, prevent infiltration, and combat illegal hunting. The conflict in Dar­
fur contributed to internal problems in the CAR, which accused Sudan in
2006 of trying to destabilize the country. A summit meeting in France
early in 2007 involving the presidents of Sudan, the CAR, and Chad
resulted in an agreement not to back insurgencies in their respective

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countries. The UN Security Council established in September 2007 the Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) to protect civilians, promote human rights and the rule of law, and promote regional peace. The UN Security Council shut down the mission, as agreed, by the end of 2010. In the early 1990s, there were as many as 36,000 South Sudanese refugees in the CAR. Nearly all of them returned to South Sudan.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Kenya

Khartoum did not control most of the territory bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) when South Sudan was in rebellion. The SPLA and the Khartoum-supported Equatoria Defense Force traditionally dominated this area. Nevertheless, the al-Bashir government conducted active diplomacy with the DRC. After Joseph Kabila succeeded his father as president, he visited Khartoum in 2002. The two countries agreed to consolidate bilateral relations, and there were a number of subsequent high-level meetings between the two governments. The end of war between the SPLM/A and the government in Khartoum offered the opportunity for stronger DRC–Sudanese ties, but increasingly Kinshasa’s contact will be with South Sudan authorities in Juba. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriated nearly all of the South Sudanese from the DRC to South Sudan. In December 2008, the DRC allowed armed forces from South Sudan and Uganda to enter its territory for a joint operation aimed at ridding the area of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Kinshasa is far from the Sudan border and the DRC remained preoccupied with internal conflicts.

During most of the time since the early 1990s, Uganda’s relationship with Sudan was determined by Kampala’s support for the SPLM/A and Khartoum’s assistance to various Ugandan rebel groups, especially the LRA led by Joseph Kony, whose goal was to overthrow the Ugandan government. Uganda severed ties with Sudan in 1995. Several parties, including Libyan president al-Qadhafi and the Atlanta-based Carter Center, worked hard to end the conflict between Sudan and Uganda. Early in 2002, Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, visited Khartoum and agreed to reestablish full diplomatic relations. Sudan said it was prepared to sell oil to Uganda, which subsequently discovered its own oil, and to cooperate in suppressing the LRA. As part of Uganda’s Operation Iron Fist, Sudan permitted Ugandan forces to enter South Sudan to track down LRA insurgents. President al-Bashir subsequently visited Kampala on several occasions in efforts to improve relations with Uganda. The two countries renewed a military protocol for this
purpose in 2006. Early in 2007, Uganda signed an agreement with the GOSS to provide military training and to upgrade infrastructure between the two countries. There were once about 250,000 South Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda; by 2010, most of them had returned to South Sudan. Uganda and South Sudan were improving their communication links and expanding commerce. Increasingly, it appeared that Uganda favored the independence of South Sudan.

Kenya and Sudan have had cordial relations since Kenya’s independence in 1963. Kenya also maintained close contact with the SPLM/A. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mandated Kenya to lead the effort to end the civil war in Sudan. After years of false starts and tepid interest by Nairobi, Kenya’s General Lazaro Sumbeiywo took charge of the process in 2002 and saw it through to completion in January 2005. Kenya benefited during the civil war because Nairobi served as the principal base for relief operations in South Sudan, resulting in millions of dollars of aid flowing through the country. The end to the conflict promised even greater benefits for Kenya. The SPLM/A opened talks with Kenya in 2004 on construction of a rail link between Juba and Kenya’s port of Mombasa. They also began discussion about construction of a pipeline from South Sudan to the Kenyan coast that would allow the export of oil to both Kenya and the international market. Al-Bashir visited Kenya early in 2005 to sign the CPA. There was a long-standing border issue that became more of a concern for Kenya’s relations with South Sudan. There had never been a resolution over the sovereignty of the Elemi Triangle, a small piece of land near the Kenya–South Sudan–Ethiopia tripoint claimed by both Kenya and Sudan. The Kenya–South Sudan border also had a long history of cattle raids and weapons trafficking.

Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan were all members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, a grouping of 20 African states created in 1994 to develop a free-trade area for the purpose of removing all tariffs and barriers. Kenya and Sudan would likely be the major beneficiaries of increased trade under this arrangement. Since the signing of the CPA, Kenyan businessmen and aid specialists have flocked to South Sudan. Kenya pledged US$3.5 million for the development and reconstruction of South Sudan and began to train the police. It expected to provide training in the areas of public administration, government operations, health, education, telecommunications, and aviation. South Sudan imported significant quantities of military equipment, including tanks, through Kenya’s port of Mombasa. In 2010 Kenya had more than 700 troops, police, and observers in South Sudan with UNMIS. Discussions were underway concerning unresolved border issues and refugee repatriation.
African Regional Organizations

Sudan was an active member of all pertinent African organizations and was a charter member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 and headquartered in Addis Ababa. During most of its time as a member of the OAU, it used its membership to keep the OAU out of the civil war. Even so, in 1994, the OAU mandated that negotiations toward ending the civil war be undertaken. Sudan consistently made its presence known in the OAU and continued to do so in its successor forum, the African Union (AU), created in 2002. In contrast to its policy of keeping the OAU out of the war in the South, Sudan accepted 8,000 AU troops in troubled Darfur, concluding that it was preferable to have an AU peacekeeping mission than one from the UN. However, Sudan both limited the number of AU troops and confined their role to monitoring the situation rather than engaging in more proactive peacekeeping. In mid-2007, al-Bashir finally agreed to allow UN forces to join AU peacekeeping operations in Darfur (see AU and UN Forces in Darfur, ch. 5). The crisis in Darfur prevented Sudan from taking its turn in 2006 to assume the chairmanship of the AU; most AU members wanted Sudan to make more progress in ending the Darfur conflict. Subsequent indictment by the ICC further complicated al-Bashir’s situation, and the AU has continued to pass over his name in selecting a chairman.

Sudan was a charter member of IGAD, established in 1996 as the successor to an earlier regional grouping. The focus of IGAD in the early 2000s was regional cooperation among its seven member states. IGAD played a critical role in ending the war between Khartoum and the SPLM/A but otherwise was not effective in mediating regional conflicts because of serious differences among its members, especially Ethiopia and Eritrea. Sudan was a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and was one of 11 COMESA nations that had joined in a free-trade area and agreed to eliminate tariffs on goods originating in member countries. Sudan joined the 28-member economic union led by Libya known as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. Sudan also belonged to the African Development Bank (ADB) and received significant assistance from that organization. It had been in arrears to the ADB since 1995 but had begun making payments in order to pay down the debt. Sudan was an active member of the Nile Basin Initiative, which brought the riparian states together to discuss technical and political cooperation related to Nile water issues.
Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen

During the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, Sudan maintained a careful balancing act, calling for a cessation of hostilities but sympathizing with Iraq. Sudan on several occasions offered to mediate the conflict. By 1988, Sudan called for an end to the war on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 598. Sudan supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, leading to a period of close relations with Baghdad. Iraq was believed to have supplied weapons to Sudan and in the mid-1990s agreed to help Sudan exploit its oil wealth. Although Sudan was trying to improve relations with the United States after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, it remained critical of the subsequent American-led invasion of Iraq. Following the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime, however, Sudan’s position on Iraq became more nuanced. On the one hand, it was quick to criticize the United States, which harshly condemned Sudan’s record on human rights, for its double standard in dealing with prisoners in Iraq. It also advised Sudanese not to work with U.S. contractors in the country. By late 2004, however, Sudan’s relations with the new Iraqi government had improved to the point that Iraq’s foreign minister visited Khartoum and met with al-Bashir. Subsequently, Sudan generally avoided commenting on Iraq.

Sudan had a long, if inconsistent, relationship with Iran, which deteriorated when Sudan supported Iraq during the 1990–91 Gulf War but began to improve by the mid-1990s. Sudanese–Iranian interaction increased significantly in 2004. The two countries signed a memorandum on security cooperation, and Sudan stressed Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. During the eighth session of the Iran–Sudan joint economic commission, the two sides agreed to increase technical, educational, and research cooperation in the agricultural sector. Iranian president Muhammad Khatami, during a visit to Sudan in October 2004, supported Khartoum’s controversial handling of the Darfur crisis and signed bilateral cooperation agreements on economic, agricultural, and banking issues. As Iran became an increasingly important actor in the Middle East, Sudan increased its interaction with Tehran. Al-Bashir visited Iran in April 2006. Sudan’s defense minister discussed Iranian weapons sales and training for Khartoum’s security forces during a visit to Tehran in January 2007. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Khartoum in February 2007, when he voiced strong support for Sudan and signed seven agreements. There continued to be high-level contact between Sudan and Iran. Sunni Sudan did not find forging close relations with Shia Iran an insuperable difficulty, and Sudan was arguably Iran’s closest friend in Africa.
Saudi Arabia had been an important source of financial support for Sudan prior to the 1990–91 Gulf War. Sudan’s support for Iraq adversely affected its relations with Saudi Arabia, and al-Turabi’s brand of Islamism was not in tune with Saudi Wahhabi philosophy. Riyadh suspended grants, project loans, and concessionary oil sales. This action had a devastating impact on Sudan’s budget and economy. The relationship normalized by 1995 and continued to improve. The two countries signed an agreement in 2004 to set up a political coordination committee. Al-Bashir visited Saudi Arabia in May 2004, and Saudi leaders subsequently supported Sudan’s handling of the crisis in Darfur. In 2005 the two countries signed two security agreements on combating crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. Saudi Arabia also began providing assistance for development projects in South Sudan. Significant numbers of Sudanese had for many years worked in Saudi Arabia, a factor that increased the importance of the relationship.

Relations between Yemen and Sudan were not particularly strong, but they took on added importance after Yemen, Sudan, and Ethiopia developed an alliance late in 2003. The leaders of the three countries subsequently met frequently; the focus of their concern was often Eritrea. This alliance took an interesting twist at the end of 2004, when Yemeni president Ali Abdallah Salih offered to mediate differences between Sudan and Eritrea. As Sudan–Eritrea relations improved, the tripartite alliance with Ethiopia became dormant. The heads of government of Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Somalia did meet in Addis Ababa early in 2007, where they focused on the situation in Somalia. Sudan and Yemen also signed 14 cooperative agreements in mid-2007. Sudan–Yemen relations were cordial in early 2011 but less significant than they had been several years before.

**Arab and Islamic Organizations**

Sudan joined the Arab League at independence in 1956 and used the organization over the years at every possible opportunity to support its policies. Following the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003 and sharp criticism of its policies by Western countries, Sudan relied on strong support from the Arab League. The Arab League opposed sanctions against Sudan, and several members provided humanitarian aid to refugees fleeing the fighting. By the end of 2004, the Arab League joined the cease-fire monitoring committee for Darfur. Al-Bashir served as the Arab League chairman in 2006. Sudan joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1969. It sought support in the organization for activities such as the reconstruction of war-ravaged South Sudan. Like the Arab League, the OIC supported Khartoum’s actions in Darfur. Sudan was also a member of a number of other Arab or Islamic
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regional organizations, including the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the Islamic Development Bank.

China, Russia, India, and Malaysia

Sudan established diplomatic relations with China in 1959 and was one of the first countries to back China’s admission to the United Nations. Sudan and China subsequently signed a series of commercial and assistance agreements. During a visit to China in 1995, al-Bashir underscored Sudan’s position that Taiwan is an integral part of China. Sudan’s foreign minister visited China in 1999, when the Chinese foreign minister thanked Sudan for its support of Chinese reunification and opposition to criticism of its human-rights record. China turned to Sudan as a source of oil in the late 1990s and became its most important petroleum partner. The number of agreements signed by the two countries increased exponentially. China obtained about 5 percent of its oil imports from Sudan and had invested about US$6 billion there by 2010. Sudanese exports of oil to China were more than half of its total oil exports. China developed several oil fields and built a refinery, a port, and a 1,610-kilometer pipeline from the oil fields to Port Sudan. China’s national oil company had a 40 percent stake in Sudan’s national oil company, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. China won a US$650 million contract to build a significant part of the hydroelectric dam at Merowe, on the Nile north of Khartoum; most of the managers, technicians, and engineers were Chinese. China thus became Sudan’s most important commercial and economic partner and its most important political partner outside Africa and the Arab world.

China was a major provider of military equipment, including fighter aircraft and artillery, and invested in Sudan’s arms manufacturing industry. The threat of a Chinese veto in the United Nations Security Council provided cover for Sudan during that body’s debate on Darfur. China threatened in 2004 to use its veto if the United States and others pushed for sanctions against Sudan because of its actions in Darfur. China subsequently urged Sudan to be more flexible in its policy in Darfur but still opposed the use of sanctions. On the other hand, China convinced Sudan to accept the UN–AU hybrid peacekeeping mission. China worked hard to establish cordial relations with South Sudan, where most of the oil is located. Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Sudan in February 2007. SPLM president Salva Kiir visited China in July 2007 to discuss China’s contribution to the development of South Sudan. China had about 450 military personnel with UNMIS in South Sudan and more than 300, mostly
engineers, assigned to UNAMID in Darfur. China opened a consulate in Juba and was financing development projects in South Sudan.

Following Sudanese independence, the Soviet Union established close relations with Sudan. The situation became more complicated when the Sudan Communist Party was implicated in coup attempts and Islamists began to assert authority in Sudan. The two countries ended military cooperation in 1971; it resumed in 1995, when a visiting Russian deputy foreign minister described relations between Sudan and Russia “as being below the required level.” Russia supported UN Security Council Resolution 1044 in 1996, which called on Sudan to extradite three persons believed to have been involved in the assassination attempt against President Mubarak during a visit to Addis Ababa the previous year. Two years later, however, Russia expressed “serious worries” about the American cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. Russia tended to be supportive of Sudan on issues that came before the UN Security Council. In 2010 President Dmitry Medvedev informed al-Bashir that Russia had agreed to write off Sudan’s debt.

Russia became Sudan’s biggest arms supplier. Sudan purchased tanks and artillery from Russia in 2000 and signed a deal for 12 MiG–29 Fulcrum fighters a year later. Russia delivered all of the aircraft before the end of 2004. Russia also gave Sudan the right to produce Russian battle tanks and sold it Mi–24 Hind attack helicopters. A Russian company in 2004 won the contract to build a 368-kilometer pipeline in the Melut basin in southeast Sudan. The two countries also agreed on a number of joint projects in Sudan in the fields of mining, petroleum, electricity, and irrigation. Russia continued to oppose UN sanctions on Sudan in connection with the Darfur crisis, arguing that it should be resolved exclusively by political means while maintaining Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia had about 150 military personnel assigned to UNMIS. Russia agreed in 2010 to sell Mi–17 transport helicopters to South Sudan.

Except for the 150-year-old presence of about 2,000 Gujarati traders, India was not a particularly important partner until 2003, when its national oil company, Oil and National Gas Corporation (ONGC), acquired a 25 percent share in Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company at a cost of US$650 million. The overseas investment arm of ONGC bought out Canada’s Talisman Energy, which left Sudan as a result of criticism from human-rights groups and pressure from the government of Canada. Indian investment in the oil sector was about US$1 billion and expected to rise. This engagement also led to economic cooperation in other fields. The Export–Import Bank of India extended a US$50 million line of credit to Sudan in 2004. ONGC signed a con-
tract in 2004 to build a 745-kilometer pipeline to carry petroleum derivatives from the Khartoum refinery to a new port on the Red Sea. India was scheduled to build part of a new railroad to Port Sudan. It was also in discussion with Sudan on training for the army, navy, and air force and on collaboration in the media and entertainment sector. India provided about 2,700 military personnel to UNMIS as of early 2011.

Malaysia was the second-largest shareholder in Sudan’s oil industry after China in the early 2000s. Its state-owned oil company, PETRONAS, had a 30-percent share of Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. Oil remained Malaysia’s primary interest in Sudan, although during an April 2007 visit to Sudan, Malaysia’s prime minister expressed a willingness to expand bilateral relations beyond oil and gas. He also supported Sudan’s policy in Darfur. Malaysia assisted with the resettlement of Darfur refugees and provided scholarships for Sudanese students to study oil and gas at Universiti Teknologi Petronas. Malaysia had fewer than 10 personnel assigned to UNMIS and more than 60 with UNAMID.

European Union, Britain, and France

The European Union (EU) served as an important barometer of Western political views toward Sudan’s policies and sometimes offset more critical American positions. The EU, for example, tended to be more understanding of the problems facing Sudan in resolving the crisis in Darfur. It also declined, unlike the United States, to call the killings in Darfur genocide. It engaged in constructive engagement with Sudan and was reluctant to impose sanctions, but it was willing to decrease or stop development aid in response to Khartoum’s crackdowns and had imposed an arms embargo. The EU’s principal concern in Sudan was humanitarian assistance, help with conflict resolution, and implementation of the CPA. Formerly, the EU collectively was the largest destination for Sudanese exports, mainly gold and gum arabic, but since at least 2000 Chinese and Japanese imports of petroleum from Sudan had surpassed the value of imports by the EU. Many EU countries had small numbers of military personnel assigned to UNMIS.

Although New Year’s Day 1956 marked Sudan’s independence, the British actually transferred power in 1954. Sudan set out almost immediately to broaden its relations with Arab and African states and then the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia. Britain continued to provide considerable assistance, including military aid. As the civil war in the South grew in intensity, Sudan routinely blamed “evil colonial policies” as one of the causes. Relations with Britain decreased in importance as those with the Middle East and Africa increased. Sudan broke relations with Britain in 1965 over Britain’s handling of
the unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Khartoum restored ties a year later but then severed them again in 1967 because of the Six-Day War between Israel and neighboring states. Relations resumed again a year later. Sudan alleged that Britain was linked to a failed coup attempt in 1976. By the late 1970s, the United States had replaced Britain as the predominant Western influence in Khartoum, a situation that continued until the overthrow of the Sadiq al-Mahdi government in 1989. Britain remained important for historical reasons and retained strong trade links. Together with the United States and Norway, Britain strongly supported the IGAD peace process that resulted in an end to conflict between Khartoum and the SPLM/A. British prime minister Tony Blair visited Khartoum in October 2004 but took a more critical position on Sudan’s policy in Darfur as the crisis dragged on. Of all EU members, the British position on Darfur was the closest to that of the United States.

France has had a long history as one of Sudan’s principal commercial partners. A French company was one of the prime contractors on the ill-fated Jonglei Canal (see Glossary). In the early 1980s, Sudan awarded a concession to the French oil company, TotalFinaElf, for development of the oil reserves in Block Five in South Sudan. Although the company stopped work there following the resumption of civil war, it retained the concession and initiated steps in 2004 to return. France also sided with Khartoum in 2004 when it asserted that the situation in Darfur should not be described as genocide. Chad, a former French colony and in recent years a country with which it had close relations, tended to influence France’s view of the situation in Darfur. French policy on Darfur became more critical following the election in 2007 of President Nicolas Sarkozy. France hosted in June 2007 the United States, China, and some 15 other countries at a major conference intended to launch a new international effort to end the atrocities in Darfur. Khartoum, angry that it was not consulted, boycotted the conference. In recent years, France has shown less interest in Sudan while its policy seemed to depend on which official was speaking. French oil companies have a continuing interest in the development of oil in South Sudan.

**United States**

The United States went from an unusually important and close relationship with Sudan in the early 1980s to one that began to deteriorate near the end of the al-Numayri government and then declined quickly following the 1989 military coup and the rise of Islamist leaders in Sudan’s government. Sudanese support for Iraq during the 1990–91 Gulf War helped ensure the downturn. The United States, pushed by domestic interest groups such as evangelical Christians and the Con-
gressional Black Caucus, expressed outspoken unhappiness over Khartoum’s handling of the war with the SPLM/A, the human-rights situation, including alleged government support for slavery, and its welcoming environment toward international terrorist groups. Washington put Sudan on its list of state supporters of terrorism in 1993, an action that resulted in additional U.S. sanctions against Sudan.

The administration of President William J. Clinton subsequently worked to isolate Sudan. During the mid-1990s, it instituted a Front Line States policy of pressure against Khartoum with the assistance of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Growing unhappiness over Sudan’s policies and terrorist threat information aimed at Americans in Sudan, much of which turned out to be false, caused the United States in the spring of 1996 to relocate all Americans from the embassy in Khartoum to the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. The embassy in Khartoum remained open but staffed by Sudanese and occasional Americans visiting from Kenya. At the urging of the United States, Sudan forced Osama bin Laden to leave the country in May of 1996, but Washington did not follow this development by trying to improve ties with Sudan. The low point in relations occurred in August 1998, just days after the bombing of the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, when a U.S. naval vessel launched cruise missiles against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum on the questionable grounds that it was linked to the production of chemical weapons.

At the end of the Clinton administration, the United States opened a dialogue with Sudan on counterterrorism, and Sudan was receptive. The George W. Bush administration generally continued a tough policy toward Sudan, but the events of September 11, 2001, had a dramatic impact on the relationship. The United States moved counterterrorism to the highest foreign-policy priority, and Sudan, taking advantage of this new situation, stepped up its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. President Bush nominated former Senator John Danforth as his special envoy for Sudan in 2001. Danforth focused on ending the Sudanese civil war, but the U.S. Congress and the evangelical community remained highly critical of Sudan. The United States pursued a policy of carrots and sticks. In October 2002, President Bush signed the congressionally initiated Sudan Peace Act, which provided for punitive financial and diplomatic steps against Sudan if Washington concluded that Khartoum was acting in bad faith at the peace talks. At the same time, Sudan offered significant cooperation on counterterrorism, a response appreciated in Washington.

The United States, working with IGAD, Britain, and Norway, played a key role in bringing the civil war in Sudan to an end. While this development had the potential to significantly improve Sudanese–American relations, Sudan’s botched handling of the crisis in Darfur that began in
2003 set back relations with Washington. In 2006, under pressure from Congress and domestic interest groups, the Bush administration named another special envoy for Sudan, Andrew Natsios, who resigned at the end of 2007 and was replaced by former diplomat Richard Williamson. The United States took the lead in requesting the UN Security Council to impose additional international sanctions against Sudan. Failing to convince the UN to institute broader sanctions, President Bush signed a bill at the end of 2007 that allowed state and local governments to cut investment ties with companies doing business with Sudan. At the same time, the United States committed US$2.7 billion in fiscal years 2005–6 for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping in Darfur, implementation of the CPA, and reconstruction and development in South Sudan. Khartoum continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism. The United States also was the single largest holder—in the amount of US$1.5 billion—of Sudanese debt. The United States supported full implementation of the CPA and the Darfur Peace Agreement and rapid deployment of more than 20,000 additional peacekeepers to Darfur.

The situation in Darfur dominated the United States–Sudan relationship until early in the administration of President Barack H. Obama. Obama named Scott Gration as the new special envoy for Sudan. He changed the tone of the dialogue with the government in Khartoum and began contact with Darfur’s highly fragmented rebel movements. He also concluded that the United States must give at least as much attention to successful implementation of the CPA as to resolution of the crisis in Darfur. He favored engagement with Khartoum over confrontation and proposed a policy of engagement that included rewards and penalties. Gration’s policy had support in the White House but detractors elsewhere in the U.S. government and some harsh critics on Capitol Hill and in the “Save Darfur Coalition” community. Late in 2010, the United States spelled out the conditions for the normalization of ties with Sudan. They included full implementation of the CPA and the holding of a referendum on the future of South Sudan in January 2011. The United States significantly increased the number of personnel devoted to an effort to assure this outcome. Washington also noted that there must be peace and accountability in Darfur.

United Nations

Sudan joined the United Nations in 1956, and its various institutions began almost immediately to assist Sudan. UN refugee assistance during Sudan’s first civil war began in the early 1960s. In 1965 one of the South Sudanese exile organizations unsuccessfully demanded the intervention of the United Nations to end atrocities. Sudan experienced frequent criticism...
in UN bodies throughout the first civil war that ended in 1972. Khartoum showed great skill in using the United Nations in pursuit of its own interests. One example occurred in 1976, when Sudan accused Libya at the United Nations of supporting a failed coup attempt.

Because the country was engaged continuously in a civil war in the South until 2005 except for the period 1972–83, Sudan was the subject of many UN resolutions. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme created Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1989 to deal with the problems created in the South by drought and the civil war. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a series of reports critical of the human-rights situation in Sudan. The Security Council imposed sanctions on Sudan in May 1996 after Khartoum refused to extradite three Egyptians to Ethiopia for their alleged involvement in the attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995. The mild sanctions reduced the number and level of Sudanese diplomats stationed abroad. The Security Council, with the United States abstaining, removed these sanctions in August 2001. In 2005, the UN Security Council agreed to a travel ban and asset freeze on persons suspected of committing human-rights abuses in Darfur and in 2006 imposed sanctions against four Sudanese involved in Darfur atrocities. Much to the consternation of the United States, Sudan in 2004 filled an African regional seat on the United Nations Human Rights Commission. A UN commission investigating atrocities in Darfur concluded in 2005 that genocide had not occurred. It did find, however, that Khartoum and government-sponsored militias engaged in “widespread and systematic” abuse that might constitute crimes against humanity. By late 2010,
the UN had two of its largest peacekeeping operations—UNMIS and UNAMID—in Sudan.

**Outlook**

In early 2011, Sudan confronted two major domestic issues: full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and an end to the violence in Darfur. Full implementation of the CPA would determine the future of Sudan’s North–South relationship, with the South having opted for independence. Because South Sudan, which had most of the country’s oil, chose independence, as was anticipated, Khartoum had to try to work out a revenue-sharing arrangement that would give it access to oil and the associated profits for years to come. If it failed to achieve this goal, a return to North–South violence was highly likely. Khartoum controlled the only pipeline capable of exporting oil to the international market. Although 22 years of conflict in South Sudan came to an end in 2005, treacherous days clearly lay ahead, as there would be considerable pressure from Northerners and Southerners alike to undermine the remaining provisions of the CPA.

In addition to the secession of the South, another urgent issue was the proposed referendum by the citizens of Abyei, an enclave administered since 2005 by the Northern state of South Kordofan but historically linked to South Sudan, whereby they would decide whether or not to return to South Sudanese administration. This was an important issue because considerable oil is located in this region. Popular consultations to determine the future of South Kordofan and Blue Nile were also needed.

Only a complete commitment to the CPA process by both the SPLM and the NCP and the goodwill of an overwhelming majority of Sudanese of all political persuasions would enable the country to escape renewed civil war. The referendum vote for the independence of South Sudan could only have been avoided if the national government had recognized and accepted the diversity of the Sudanese people and shared both power and wealth with all parts of the country on an equitable basis. It also depended on the willingness of Southerners to at least consider the possibility of unity. Neither of these developments occurred, with the consequence that the South was about to become a separate, independent entity.

In the meantime, the situation in Darfur cried out for compromise by both Khartoum and the numerous rebel groups, so that there could be a political settlement. Residents of Darfur had also to decide if they wanted to unify the three Darfur states and reconstitute the Darfur region that existed in the 1980s. The Darfur Peace Agreement promised a referendum on this issue by July 2010, a deadline that was missed.
was also important not to lose sight of successful implementation of the peace agreement in Eastern Sudan. If handled equitably and transparently, Sudan’s new oil wealth could help resolve all of these problems. The challenges for Sudan’s external relations were considerable as well, although there have been improvements in recent years in spite of the fact that the International Criminal Court indictment of al-Bashir significantly complicated Sudan’s situation. Clearly, the Sudanese government and people confronted huge challenges in early 2011 and would continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

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There are a number of solid studies that include some analysis of the political situation after the 1989 military coup. They include *Sudan*, by Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed; *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan* by Abdel Salam Sidahmed; *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, by Francis Mading Deng; *Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan*, by Amir H. Idris; *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, by Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala; and *Sudan*, by Richard A. Lobban, Jr. Three somewhat specialized accounts are *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, by Douglas H. Johnson; *The Phoenix State: Civil Society and the Future of Sudan*, edited by A. H. Abdel Salam and Alex de Waal; and *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya*, by Gabriel Warburg. Two former American ambassadors to Sudan have contributed useful volumes that focus on the time they served there. They are *Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy*, by G. Norman Anderson and *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe*, by Donald Petterson.

Four timely books dealing with Darfur include *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal; *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*, by Mahmood Mamdani; *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, by Gérard Prunier; and *Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State*, by Richard Cockett.

There are some excellent book chapters, recent journal articles, monographs, and special studies that deal with politics, government, human rights, and foreign relations. Book chapters include the one by Alex de Waal and A. H. Abdel Salam, “Islamism, State Power, and Jihad in Sudan”; Leenco Lata’s “Nation Building in Sudan”; and Peter Woodward’s “Sudan.” Good journal articles include the one by Ilias Bantekas and Hassan Abu-Sabieb, “Reconciliation of Islamic Law with Constitutionalism: The Protection of Human Rights in Sudan’s New Constitution”; Abdelwahab El-Affendi’s, “Islam and Human Rights: The Lessons from Sudan”; John Young’s, “Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace”; Christina Murray and Catherine Maywald’s, “Constitution-Making in South Sudan”; Adam Azzain Mohamed’s, “The
Problem of Uneven Regional Development in the Northern Sudan”; Alex de Waal’s, “Who Are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement”; and R. S. O’Fahey’s, “Does Darfur Have a Future in the Sudan?” Insightful monographs include Raymond Brown’s American Foreign Policy toward the Sudan: From Isolation to Engagement; Scott Lewis’s Rejuvenating or Restraining Civil War: The Role of External Actors in the War of Economies of Sudan; and Claes-Johan Lampi Sorensen’s The Islamic Movement in Sudan. Readers will find the following documents helpful: Slavery, Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan, by the International Eminent Persons Group; Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Power-Sharing; the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan; and the Interim Constitution of South Sudan. The International Crisis Group has produced a variety of excellent monographs that tend to focus on Darfur, the CPA, and the Eastern conflict. The regular reports on Sudan by the UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council are also valuable. There is an excellent collection of essays in Sudan—No Easy Ways Ahead edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

Particularly good Web sites include those of the governments of Sudan and South Sudan: www.sudan.net/government and www.goss-online.org/ (official Web site of the government of South Sudan). Others include: www.sudantribune.com (journalistic material); www.southsudan.net (South Sudan opposition opinion); www.state.gov (for annual human rights and religious freedom reports on Sudan and Background Note on Sudan); www.crisisgroup.org (for recent monographs that focus on conflicts in Sudan); www.usip.org/countries-continents/africa/sudan (for background documents and general information on Sudan); http://unmis.unmissions.org/ (reporting on Sudan by the UN Mission in Sudan); and http://unamid.unmissions.org/ (reporting on Darfur by the UN Mission). (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 5. National Security
Sudan’s national emblem, a prominent symbol in military insignia
SUDAN OCCUPIES A STRATEGICALLY SENSITIVE AREA in the Horn of Africa. The nation's military, developed during the British colonial era, has remained influential in independent Sudan. Domestic security problems have been the main sources of national defense concern. As of early 2008, Sudan was involved in ethnic strife on the Chad border, but the situation and relations with Chad had greatly improved by 2011.

Divisions based on culture and history between the Arab-dominated Muslim North and the African, non-Muslim South caused a 17-year civil war that ended in 1972. The war resumed in 1983 after President Ja’far al-Numayri abrogated the peace accord by redividing the South into three regions and imposing sharia law on the country. Major Southern ethnic groups such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk formed the backbone of the revolt. Many of these Southern groups also fought among themselves. For more than two decades, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and several other Southern rebel groups battled government forces, until the two sides signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 after several years of torturous negotiations.

Conflict also plagued Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and northeast Sudan in the 1990s and early 2000s. Aside from its regular forces, the government frequently used militias against its opponents. These militias often committed human-rights violations and exacerbated local intercommunal wars. As a result, millions fled their homes to escape the fighting and avert starvation.

Sudan’s growing instability notwithstanding, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) remained the most stable institution in a country beset by an array of political, economic, and social problems. However, throughout the period since 1989, the SAF itself has experienced varying degrees of ethnic and religious dissenion.

Many Sudanese accept the SAF as the state’s guardian nevertheless, especially when confidence in politicians falters. In 1985, for example, a group of SAF officers deposed al-Numayri. Then, in 1989, some mid-level officers, led by Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, seized power and dissolved the successor civilian parliamentary government (1986–89). The new government aligned itself with the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist party. The military clique purged the SAF of potential dissenters, arrested suspected opponents, and introduced harsh internal security controls.

During the 1990s, Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, an Islamist ideologue, helped create a religiously oriented politico-military militia called the
Popular Defense Forces (PDF) that eventually was supposed to replace the SAF but never did. Poor economic conditions made Sudan dependent on foreign aid to equip and maintain the SAF.

Many SAF troops fought in Southern Sudan against the SPLM/A and other ethnically based Southern rebel groups that sought a voice in the affairs of their country. Low morale and shortages of weapons and supplies eroded their capabilities. During the civil war in the South, much of the SAF’s equipment was not serviceable because of poor maintenance and lack of spare parts. Problems such as these were at least partially remedied after the late 1990s when funds from the sale of oil became available.

The SAF, numbering more than 109,000 in 2011, was responsible for maintaining internal and external security until the signing of the CPA, which provided for the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to assume security responsibilities in the South. Beginning in 2003 and continually thereafter, the Darfur war posed a politico-military challenge to the al-Bashir government as the international community escalated criticism of Khartoum’s harsh military strategy in that region. Despite internal problems and international pressure, al-Bashir remained firmly in control of the government and Sudan’s armed forces.

The Military in National Life

The warrior tradition was an important aspect of Sudan’s history, and military involvement in government continued in modern Sudan. Although Sudan inherited a parliamentary form of government from Britain, the Sudanese had become accustomed to a colonial system that was inherently military in nature. British military officers held senior administrative positions in both the provincial and central governments. At independence, Sudan faced difficult economic, political, and social problems that few believed could be solved by untested parliamentary rule in a country fragmented by competing ethnic, religious, and regional interests. It seemed natural to turn to a national institution like the army that could address these problems through a system of centralized enforcement and control. Such was the course of Sudanese national life after independence.

Early Development of the Armed Forces

Muhammad Ali Pasha, the viceroy of Egypt, conquered Sudan in 1821. He created a Sudanese military to help establish an Egyptian empire independent of the Ottoman sultan. Muhammad Ali also authorized the army to undertake slave raids in the South and the Nuba Mountains that allowed Egypt to import some 10,000 slaves annually. During 1822–23,
the army impressed some 30,000 males for military service. In 1863–67, an under-strength Egyptian-Sudanese conscript battalion (446 officers and men) served with the French army in Mexico.

Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, disbanded the Egyptian military, and created a new Sudan army. In 1896 Britain used about 8,000 Sudanese troops against the Khalifa, the military leader who succeeded the famed Mahdi (see Glossary; The Maddiyyah, 1885–98, ch. 1). There were seven Sudanese battalions by 1898 that the British deployed to maintain internal security throughout Sudan. Over the next decade, Sudanese soldiers participated in punitive expeditions against Muhammad al-Amin, a Moroccan mystic, in the Nuba Mountains in 1903, and against the rebel Abd al-Qādir Wad Habūba in what was then Blue Nile Province in 1908.

**World War I**

During the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1955), British officials developed a policy of administrative separation of the Muslim-dominated Northern Sudan from the mostly non-Muslim South. Participation of Southerners in Northern units of the Sudanese armed forces was all but eliminated. Sudanese troops in the North were commanded largely by British and Egyptian commissioned officers until an anti-British mutiny in 1924 caused Egyptian troops and commanders to be sent home.

Sudan’s military strength at the outbreak of World War I included 14,000–15,000 troops organized into four companies of British territorials and a British artillery detachment, all of them deployed in and around Khartoum. Egyptian army units, which manned 46 posts throughout Sudan, included 12 infantry battalions, four double companies of the Arab Battalion, six Camel Corps companies, a cavalry squadron, three mounted infantry companies, and some artillery. Additionally, Sudanese territorial units manned posts throughout Southern Sudan. These forces played no major direct role in World War I.

Despite Sudanese reluctance to become involved in the fighting, steps were taken to secure its borders. Two British destroyers patrolled the Red Sea. In 1917 Khartoum established a Reserve Corps that all British male subjects in Sudan had to join (with exceptions for reasons of age, health, and occupation). However, the Reserve Corps never conducted any military operations.

Sudanese soldiers played a modest role in World War I by serving with the Western Allies in East Africa. Sudanese troops also helped defend the Suez Canal from bases in Sinai and participated in the Dardanelles and Palestine campaigns. Some Sudanese mercenaries, by contrast, served with German forces commanded by General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck.
Sudan escaped the ravages of World War I, although British officials remained concerned about the prospects of fighting or subversion. There were fears that an Ottoman call for jihad would lead to a renewal of Mahdist fervor. The authorities therefore reconciled with Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, son of the Mahdi, in exchange for his declaration of loyalty. In September 1914, Governor-General Sir Reginald Wingate offered to deploy up to eight Sudanese companies to Nimule for service in Uganda to deter a German attack. Although the arrival in Uganda of reinforcements from India obviated the need for Sudanese troops, some Sudanese detachments established positions east of Nimule to stop Didinga raids into Uganda.

The Ottomans sought to gain control of Sudan by inflaming Islamist passions in Darfur, thereby undermining British authority. In February 1915, Turkey’s minister of war, Enver Pasha, dispatched a letter to Ali Dinar, the sultan of Darfur, imploring him to declare war on Britain. Turkey’s Committee of Union and Progress also launched an anti-British propaganda campaign that caused dissension in the Sudanese and Egyptian armies. In October 1915, the leader of the Libyan-based pro-Turkish Senussi Islamist movement hatched a scheme to encourage Ali Dinar to join a jihad against the British.

The British responded to these machinations by creating the Western Arab Corps in 1916 to facilitate the occupation of Darfur after Ali Dinar died in battle. Additionally, they created the Equatoria Corps in December 1917 to provide security in Southern Sudan and reinforced the Camel Corps in Kordofan Province. They also established a defense bureau and censored the mail of German and Austrian citizens residing in Sudan.

The Interwar Period

During the postwar period, nationalism became a factor in the armed forces. British officials feared that Egypt, where nationalist sentiment was rising, would encourage its soldiers to incite the Sudanese to revolt. In 1920 Sir Alexander Keown-Boyd, the oriental secretary to the high commissioner in Egypt, suggested that Egyptian units be withdrawn from Sudan. At about the same time, an army officer, Abdallah Khalil, founded the Sudan Union Society. Three years later, a Dinka army officer, Ali Abd al-Latif, established the White Flag League to imitate Egypt’s 1919 revolution. In mid-1924, this organization staged political demonstrations throughout Sudan. On August 9, armed cadets from the Military School demonstrated in Khartoum, and shortly thereafter, the Egyptian Railway Battalion rebelled and carried out various acts of sabotage. The British redeployed the Egyptian Railway Battalion back to Egypt in September, after its involvement in nationalist demonstrations. However, unrest continued in Shendi, Al-Obeid, Blue Nile Province, Dongola, and Malakal.
Governor-General Sir Lee Stack responded to this unrest on August 19, 1924, by proposing the immediate evacuation of all Egyptian forces. However, on November 19, an Egyptian nationalist assassinated Stack. A week later, the Egyptian minister of war ordered his forces to return home. The following day, six Sudanese officers and two platoons of the 11th Sudanese Battalion mutinied in Khartoum, but British forces quickly restored order. On January 17, 1925, the British established the Sudan Defence Force (SDF), which included British and Northern Sudanese troops. Southern participation in the SDF was limited to the Equatoria Corps, which was commanded by British officers.

The Italian–Ethiopian War and World War II

Sudan played a vital role in Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian military occupation and supported the Allied effort during World War II. Britain considered the October 3, 1935, Italian invasion of Ethiopia as a threat to its interests in Sudan and throughout East Africa, and not without cause. Italian military planners hoped to weaken British control of Northern Sudan by attacking Atbarah, Khartoum, and Port Sudan. If the Italians could occupy Atbarah, a railway junction between Port Sudan and Khartoum, they would disrupt the transport of British troops and supplies to the capital. The capture of Port Sudan would give Italy a strategic naval base for its Red Sea operations.

At the outbreak of the Italian–Ethiopian war, Sudan’s military strength included only some 5,000 troops organized into the SDF, including the Western Arab Corps, Eastern Arab Corps, Equatoria Corps, and Camel Corps; a few hundred police; and 2,500 British troops organized into three battalions that were stationed at Atbarah, Khartoum, and Port Sudan. Italy’s considerably larger military presence in the region included more than 100,000 troops with artillery, armored vehicles, and some 200 airplanes.

However, British fears of a large-scale Italian invasion of Sudan proved to be unfounded, as the occupation of Ethiopia had engaged the majority of its forces. As a result, Italian military forces only conducted low-level operations along the Sudan–Ethiopia frontier. Further, by 1936 Britain had reequipped the SDF and had increased its size by creating six armored mobile companies to protect Sudan’s eastern border. Police units also deployed to the frontier, while the Royal Air Force conducted antisubmarine patrols in the Red Sea; air defense missions over Atbarah, Khartoum, and Port Sudan; and close support operations for the army and Ethiopian resistance fighters known as the Patriots. The SDF’s successes on the eastern frontier led the British to deploy SDF units to North Africa to impede German advances toward Egypt and Libya.
Well before the defeat of Italian forces in mid-1941, the British had begun to develop an indigenous officer class among educated Sudanese, mostly from influential families in the North. Consequently, a growing number of Sudanese viewed the SDF as a national organization rather than as an instrument of foreign control. Even so, in the decade between the end of World War II and Sudan's independence, the SDF did not grow significantly in size, but Sudanese assumed increasingly important posts as British officers were reassigned or retired. However, the South's underdeveloped education system produced few qualified candidates, as most lacked fluency in Arabic, the SDF's lingua franca. The British had hoped to use the recruitment of Southerners into the SDF after World War II to spur their integration into Sudanese national life, but the paucity of qualified Southern candidates facilitated the Arabization of the armed forces.

In 1955 the SDF's Equatoria Corps—composed primarily of Southern enlisted men but increasingly commanded by Northerners as the British withdrew—mutinied because of resentment over Northern control of national politics and institutions. Northern troops quelled the rebellion, and Khartoum disbanded the Equatoria Corps after most of its men went into hiding and began a struggle to achieve Southern autonomy.

At independence on January 1, 1956, Sudan's 5,000-man army was a highly trained, competent, and apolitical force. However, its character gradually changed as it dealt with the Southern insurgency. The army expanded to 12,000 personnel in 1959 and to about 50,000 by the early 1970s. The military—particularly the educated officer corps—also became increasingly politicized as a growing number of personnel associated themselves with political parties and movements across the political spectrum.

**Role in Government**

Since independence, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have overthrown four civilian governments and imposed military rule. Military leaders introduced some stability but frequently restricted political activities. Many Sudanese mistakenly believed that military rule would dampen ethnic, religious, and social squabbling and would improve the economy, end the Southern civil war, and expand political rights. However, the military regimes were authoritarian and proved incapable of dealing effectively with the military and political problems that plagued Sudan after independence. The al-Bashir regime also fell into this pattern for most of its first decade in power. Thereafter, however, the country witnessed significant positive change, because of the discovery and export of oil after 1999 and because of a negotiated end to the long-run-

The military’s first intervention in politics occurred in 1958, when Major General Ibrahim Abbud seized power, ostensibly because the civilian leadership had failed to resolve the country’s economic, military, and political problems. It quickly became evident, however, that Abbud lacked the ability to resolve these problems. In 1964 public frustration manifested itself in large-scale antigovernment demonstrations in Khartoum that forced Abbud to step down.

The military initially supported the civilian regime that replaced Abbud, and many senior military officers held political appointments in the government (see The Abbud Military Government, 1958–64, ch. 1). Nonetheless, several field-grade officers, some of whom had been linked to Abbud's ouster, remained skeptical about the civilian government’s ability to resolve the country’s many problems. In 1969 a group called the Free Officers' Movement seized power and Ja’far al-Numayri, then a colonel, became Sudan’s new leader.

The new military government, known as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and composed of nine young officers and one civilian, exercised authority from 1969 until 1971 over a largely civilian cabinet. The RCC, which represented only a faction within the military, initially devised radical policies in cooperation with the Sudanese communists, including nationalization of economic institutions, escalation of the Southern civil war, violent repression of the Ansar (see Glossary) politico-religious sect, and suppression of democratic institutions. The authorities arrested or sacked more than 300 high-ranking SAF officers who opposed these policies. After this purge, only one general officer remained in the RCC. Squabbling in the RCC between nationalist officers under al-Numayri and leftist-oriented officers aligned with the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) resulted in an unsuccessful 1971 coup attempt.

The country was technically no longer under armed forces governance after the RCC’s dissolution in late 1971. Although al-Numayri’s mounting prestige enabled him to broaden his support base, especially among civilians, during the next decade the military establishment remained his major constituency and source of power. Many SAF officers served as ministers, undertook domestic and international missions, and helped to establish the country's sole political party, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Defense ministers (who were general officers) also became secretaries-general of the SSU. The National Security Council, whose membership was dominated by SAF officers, helped frame political and economic policies. The largely powerless People's Assembly had 18 seats reserved for armed services personnel. Al-Numayri justified the predominance of military personnel in senior government positions by claiming that they represented
the country’s most disciplined organization and that they were motivated by nationalist convictions.

By the early 1980s, al-Numayri increasingly acted as if the SAF was an instrument of his personal political dictates rather than the source of his political power. The armed forces remained largely loyal to al-Numayri despite numerous coup attempts, some of which were organized by dissatisfied military personnel. Nevertheless, there was a gradual deterioration in the relationship between al-Numayri and the SAF. In an extraordinary move in 1982, al-Numayri retired General Abd al-Majid Hamad Khalil—vice president, minister of defense, SAF commander in chief, SSU secretary-general, and generally regarded as the heir apparent—along with 22 other top-ranking officers.

Following this purge, al-Numayri assumed command of the SAF and briefly held the defense portfolio. In response to al-Numayri’s centrist and Islamist policies, Southern troops mutinied, and civil war resumed in 1983. This conflict, coupled with the country’s poor economy, eroded al-Numayri's popularity. The armed forces were of little help as resistance to al-Numayri’s policies precipitated demonstrations and strikes.

On April 6, 1985, Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab deposed al-Numayri in a bloodless coup. Al-Dahab established a 15-man Transitional Military Council (TMC) to govern the country for a one-year period, after which civilian rule was to be restored. The TMC honored this commitment; elections were held, and a civilian government took office in April 1986.

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi presided over a series of coalition governments from 1986 to 1989. His relations with the armed forces were often stormy, largely because of the ongoing Southern rebellion. In September 1986, he forcibly retired the SAF commander in chief and the chief of the general staff along with about 20 other officers. In February 1989, the SAF leadership demanded that Sadiq pursue the Southern war more vigorously or opt for a peace settlement, but he did neither.

The result was that on June 30, 1989, Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, a paratroop officer who had served in the South, overthrew the Sadiq government. A Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC–NS), consisting of 15 SAF officers led by al-Bashir, justified the coup by citing the Sadiq government’s neglect of the armed forces and its failure to resolve the country’s economic problems and to reestablish security in the South. Al-Bashir, who eventually became Sudan’s longest-serving president, was head of state, prime minister, and minister of defense in the new government. The RCC–NS vice chairman, a brigadier general, became deputy prime minister. Other senior SAF officers served as minister of interior, minister of justice, and attorney general.
Most Sudanese welcomed the establishment of al-Bashir’s government in hopes that it would end political turbulence, improve the economy, and end the Southern civil war. The Muslim Brotherhood and the NIF supported it. Like past military officers, al-Bashir justified the coup and his policies as the only alternative to civilian mismanagement. To secure its control, the regime suppressed political activities, treated its opponents harshly, and sacked or retired the army commander, 27 other generals, and some 500 other officers. In April 1990, the government executed 28 officers, including senior officers removed by the junta, ostensibly to prevent a coup against the regime. Its ruthless suppression of discontent frightened the internal opposition into silence. At the same time, military purges left the majority of active-duty officers silent for fear of being dismissed, jailed, or shot. Infiltration of informers into the SAF made dissident activity risky.

During the next two decades, al-Bashir successfully marginalized individuals or groups suspected of disloyalty to the regime. Nonetheless, the armed forces continued to be involved in coup attempts against the government. In April 1991, the security forces executed 20 SAF officers for their involvement in a coup attempt and sacked Minister of Interior Faisal Abu Salih and Brigadier General Uthman Ahmad Hassan. The following August, the police arrested 10 SAF officers and several civilians for a coup attempt ascribed to “foreign powers.” A military court sentenced the 10 officers to death, but their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment.

Another attempted coup occurred in March 1996, this one during a period when the government was trying to convince the population that Sudan had entered a period of “stability and reconciliation.” In August 1996, Egyptian-based Sudanese opponents of the al-Bashir regime reported that 11 SAF officers had been executed for participating in a conspiracy to occupy government facilities in Port Sudan, although the government denied that executions had taken place. Beginning in late 1999, al-Bashir faced a clear challenge to his authority from Hassan al-Turabi, a former ally in the NIF, and his sympathizers, some of them in the armed forces and militia groups (see The Al-Bashir Era, ch. 4). The following February, al-Bashir reassigned several senior army officers as a precaution, and al-Turabi was arrested. As late as March 2004, the government claimed to have uncovered plans for yet another coup, arresting a small number of army and police officers as well as members of al-Turabi’s political party. Despite such manifestations of discontent in Sudan’s armed forces, there was no indication in early 2011 that a new government, civilian or military, would replace the al-Bashir regime anytime soon.
The Armed Forces in Sudanese Society

The British created an indigenous officer corps that by World War II consisted largely of Sudanese who came from upper- and middle-class urban families. After that, greater numbers were drawn from the merchant sector and the civil service in urban areas, where formal elementary and secondary education was more easily obtainable. Officer cadets, who had to possess a fourth-year secondary-school certificate, were selected on the basis of competitive written and oral examinations. A requirement that cadets possess a good knowledge of Arabic eliminated many Southerners who had been educated in English. As of 1981, only 5–10 percent of all Sudanese officer cadets were Southerners.

The high quality of incoming officers during the period before independence diminished thereafter, largely because of an expansion in the size of the army, particularly during the 1968–72 surge in recruitment. The SCP, which was entrenched in the universities and trade unions during the 1960s, contributed to the emergence of a generation of officers who were predominantly anti-Western and radical. Many officers received initial training from Soviet military advisers. On July 19, 1971, a failed coup attempt against al-Numayri allegedly instigated by members of the SCP supported by the Iraqi Baath Party led to the dismissal of many officers with leftist leanings. As a result, the officer corps became increasingly rightist and supported al-Numayri’s shift toward strengthened relations with the West and Egypt.

The military faction that deposed al-Numayri in 1985 was not distinguished by any particular political orientation, although some members maintained links with social, religious, and ethnic groups. Despite al-Numayri’s Islamization program and, later, al-Bashir’s links to the NIF, no more than 5 percent of career officers in the early 1990s were thought to be Islamist activists. Most officers were modern in outlook, of middle-class and urban backgrounds, and inclined to be nonsectarian. However, by the late 1990s and early 2000s, a growing number of officers sought to further their careers by embracing or at least paying lip service to the government’s Islamist agenda.

Historical factors also influenced the SAF’s political and ethnic makeup. During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, many members of the Khatmiyyah (see Glossary) politico-religious sect and nomadic peoples of northeastern Sudan served in the military. By the 1980s, however, Sudanese from the northeast and the Nile Valley constituted no more than 20 percent of the military establishment, although they continued to be well represented in the officer corps. Many officers had ties to the Khatmiyyah group and to the al-Mirghani family and supported the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Under al-Bashir, Northerners
continued to dominate the senior leadership, although some Southerners held sensitive positions.

In the early 1980s, members of the Ansar and others from Darfur and Kordofan provinces accounted for approximately 60 percent of the SAF’s enlisted manpower. The Ansar and other Western Sudanese might have been more numerous in the uniformed services had not al-Numayri imposed recruitment restrictions on these groups because many were perceived to be opposed to his government.

The presence in the armed forces of non-Muslim black Southerners has been a source of contention since the condominium period. Until after World War II, Southerners served only in the Equatoria Corps and rarely alongside Northern Sudanese. Khartoum suspended recruitment of Southerners after the 1955 Southern mutiny. The following year, the SAF resumed recruitment of Southerners, but they were required to serve in the North under Northern officers.

Nonetheless, the civil war in the South discouraged many there from joining the SAF until the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. As part of that agreement, 6,000 former Anya Nya guerrillas were integrated into the SAF Southern Command to serve with 6,000 Northerners. By including Southern officers in senior positions in the Southern Command, the two forces appeared to have meshed successfully. A 1982 estimate
indicated that Southerners outnumbered Northerners 7,000 to 5,000 in the Southern Command. However, there were relatively few Southerners stationed in the North, and none held important commands. In 1983 al-Numayri transferred Southern troops to the North because of doubts about their loyalty. Southerners opposed this decision and used it to help justify a renewal of conflict in the South.

Given the state of war between the al-Bashir regime and the SPLM/A, there were only limited opportunities for Southerners in the SAF during the 1990s. As a consequence of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005, however, Southerners not only held high positions in the SPLM/A, but at least some positions in the SAF. Even so, it was clear that Arab officers from the northern Nile region continued to dominate the Sudan Armed Forces.

**External Security Concerns**

None of Sudan’s neighbors (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya) posed a serious threat to the country in early 2011. Since the 1960s, however, some 30 proxy wars have been waged in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Chad, Libya, and in Sudan. Moreover, most of Sudan’s neighbors provided cash, sanctuaries, or weapons to anti-Khartoum groups. In turn, Sudan gave similar support to insurgent groups in Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda.

**Relations with Neighboring States**

Sudan’s relations with its neighbors frequently vacillated between periods of tension and cooperation. On June 26, 1995, for example, nine Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood terrorists attempted to assassinate Egyptian president Husni Mubarak as he arrived in Addis Ababa to attend a meeting of the Organization of African Unity, now the African Union (see Sudan and International Terrorism, ch. 1). On September 1, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Sudanese security personnel of involvement in the attack. Addis Ababa also berated Khartoum for sheltering three of the alleged assassins.

A day after the failed assassination attempt, Sudanese and Egyptian troops clashed over the status of the disputed border region of Hala’ib. Two Sudanese died during the encounter while several troops on both sides sustained injuries. On June 28, Egypt ordered 70 Sudanese police who had been jointly guarding posts in Hala’ib to leave that enclave.

Sudanese vice president Salah Zubayr visited Cairo in January 1997 but received a cool reception from President Mubarak, who informed him that Egypt would not provide military aid to Sudan and chastised Sudan
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for “harboring militant Islamists.” Relations between the two countries warmed later that year, however, during another visit by Salah Zubayr, when Mubarak expressed willingness to “forgive and forget” because he feared a United States–backed partition of Sudan that could threaten the 1959 Nile Waters Treaty between Egypt and Sudan (see Economic Developments since Independence, ch.1). Sudan’s foreign minister, Mustafa Uthman Isma’il, also declared that 1998 would be the “year of normalization” because air and trade links between the two countries would be restored. More recently, the Egyptians, in dealing with Darfur, confronted the need to balance relations with the Sudanese government with those of other internal political actors. Among their contributions have been humanitarian aid and the deployment of Egyptian troops to the force of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

In the early 1990s, relations with Ethiopia and newly independent Eritrea were disturbed by such issues as support for insurgents in each other’s territories and by the militant Islamism of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the National Congress Party. Eritrean president Issaia Afwerki and Ethiopian president (later prime minister) Meles Zenawi met with President al-Bashir in Addis Ababa in July 1994. The two leaders told al-Bashir to “stop meddling with our Muslims and keep your brand of Islam within the borders of Sudan.” Al-Bashir denied any wrongdoing. However, al-Turabi, the influential Islamist who headed the NIF, believed that Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia would become an Islamic community much like the European Community (later European Union) and that borders would disappear, a belief that perhaps justified Sudan’s interest in its neighbors’ Muslims.

Eritrea sponsored a December 1994 meeting between the SPLM/A and several prominent Sudanese opposition groups, including the Umma Party, the DUP, and the Sudanese Allied Forces. In January 1995, President Issaia turned over Sudan’s embassy in Asmara to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of groups opposed to the regime in Khartoum. A reversal of affairs occurred on January 4, 2000, when Sudan and Eritrea signed a joint communiqué to restore diplomatic ties. The two countries agreed to reopen border crossing points, reopen embassies in both countries, and resume regular air service. By then, Eritrea wished to stabilize relations with Sudan because of the possibility of renewed conflict with Ethiopia after the two nations fought a war in 1998.

Eritrea and Sudan have enjoyed a more productive relationship in recent years. In May 2005, for example, the Eritrean and Sudanese presidents met on the margins of the Tripoli Summit on Darfur to discuss the peace process in Eastern Sudan. In mid-2006, Eritrea, which had supported the insurgents, began negotiations to end the conflict
between Khartoum and the Eastern Front. After signing a declaration of principles in June, the warring parties concluded a peace agreement in Asmara on October 14, 2006. Eritrea also deployed some 200 soldiers to help monitor the Sudan–Chad border. Between 2006 and 2011, the two governments enjoyed good relations.

Sudanese–Ethiopian relations also improved. In January 2006, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to strengthen development activities and prevent illegal trade in border areas. On December 6, 2007, President al-Bashir and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi inaugurated the Al-Gedaref–Doka–Gallabat–Matammah highway connecting Sudan and northwest Ethiopia, which facilitated trade, including in oil, between the two neighbors. In January 2008, the two countries also agreed to construct a road connecting Al-Damazin and Kurmuk with Assosa in Ethiopia.

Kenya and Uganda supported the SPLM/A with cash and weapons and welcomed the presence of SPLM/A personnel in their capitals from 1989 until 2005. Nairobi and Kampala shared harsh attitudes toward the Islamist regime in Khartoum. Nevertheless, Kenya played a key role in negotiations that eventually led to the signing of the CPA. Since 2005 Kenya and Uganda generally supported the South’s president, Salva Kiir, and his policies, and both benefited from substantial commercial and other ties with the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), despite the new nation having some serious disagreements with these two neighbors.

Sudanese–Chadian relations have experienced periods of tension because of instability in Darfur. The border between the two countries is difficult to control, and several Darfuri groups, namely the Fur, Masalit, Daju, and Zaghawa, reside on both sides of it and have long engaged in cross-border raids in support of their kinsmen when in conflict with one or the other central government. Repeated attempts at reconciliation between Chad and Sudan had borne fruit by 2011.

During much of the 1980s, Chadian rebels mounted operations against N’Djamena from bases in Darfur. Additionally, Libyan troops and Libyan-supported units of the Islamic Legion (a pan-Arab paramilitary force sponsored by Libya) frequently deployed to Darfur in search of rebels or to participate in fighting between Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups. Khartoum lacked the capabilities to prevent the well-equipped Libyan-backed units from occupying parts of Darfur during their Chadian campaigns.

Another Chadian war began in December 2005. The conflict involved Chadian troops and several rebel groups, including the United Front for Democratic Change, the Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of West Sudan, janjaweed (see Glossary), as well as the Sudanese government, which supported the rebels. On February 8, 2006, the Tripoli Agreement
ended the fighting for approximately two months. The Chadian government estimated that 614 Chadian citizens had been killed during the fighting.

A rift between the Zaghawa and Tama groups developed in 2007, in which the Zaghawa, to which Chad’s president, Idriss Déby, belongs, accused Sudan of supporting members of the rival Tama group. The Chadian government repeatedly accused Sudan of providing cash and weapons to the United Front for Democratic Change, and in December 2007 it accused Sudan of giving rebels airtime on Sudanese state television. After a second attack on the Chadian border town of Adré, Sudanese citizens were among the attackers taken prisoner. Fighting persisted thereafter among armed groups supported by each government against the other, punctuated by several attempts at renewed peace agreements until 2009, when Chad and Sudan began a process of diplomatic and military rapprochement.

Sudan’s security relationship with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC—formerly Zaire) has focused primarily on the small-arms trade between the two countries. Weapons flowed primarily from South Sudan to the DRC—a traffic that grew as eastern Zaire experienced civil war in the later 1990s. Serving and former SPLM/A soldiers conducted trade in an array of weapons, including AK–47s, recoilless rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, and pistols. Demand for such weapons was and remained greatest in the Ituri and North Kivu regions of the DRC; demand was far lower farther west among the Azande, many of whom relied on traditional weapons or their own, often inherited, arms.

During the second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005), thousands of SPLM/A members went to the Central African Republic (CAR) to find food or safe havens during times of drought or military offensives. During the 1990s, the CAR served as a staging area for SAF attacks against SPLM/A units in western Bahr al-Ghazal. These clashes caused some 36,000 Sudanese to flee to CAR as refugees. Some of these individuals belonged to the SPLM/A, who brought some 5,000 weapons with them. By 2004, the SPLM/A supposedly occupied towns as far as 200 kilometers into the CAR.

Sudan established transit routes through northern CAR in early April 2006. The Darfur-based United Front for Democratic Change crossed through northeastern CAR on route to attack N’Djamena. The CAR government responded by closing its border with Sudan. However, Sudanese Antonovs flew to a CAR airfield with a cargo of weapons and some 50 uniformed men. Despite such provocations, Sudanese–CAR relations have remained relatively good.

In the late 2000s, relations among Sudan, the CAR, and the DRC were troubled by the presence of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
Originally a messianic movement in Uganda that became known for kidnapping, maiming, and killing, the LRA fled Uganda in the mid-2000s and relocated to South Sudan and the DRC. Since then, the LRA has committed atrocities in northeastern DRC, southeastern CAR, and southeastern Sudan. Its forces have operated in small parties that easily escape pursuers. In more recent years, the LRA was responsible for killings in Darfur. As of 2010–11, it was most active in West Equatoria, where its sporadic raids involving burning, looting, and killing constitute a security problem for GOSS.

**United States–Sudanese Relations**

Apart from Sudan’s neighbors, the United States was the country pursuing the most aggressive policy toward Sudan. In December 1994, Washington supported elements hostile to al-Bashir—primarily Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda—to help create the Asmara-based National Democratic Alliance (NDA). This organization enabled the SPLM/A to cooperate with other groups opposed to al-Bashir, such as the Umma Party, the DUP, and the Sudanese Allied Forces.

Washington launched the so-called Front Line States policy in early 1995 to facilitate the downfall of the al-Bashir regime (see United States, ch. 4). To accomplish this goal, the United States provided US$20 million worth of military equipment to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Each of these countries deployed a limited number of troops to Sudan, but given Sudan’s size, this strategy failed to accomplish anything.

The campaign to isolate Sudan peaked in January 1996, when the UN Security Council, strongly supported by the United States, adopted Resolution 1044, which condemned Sudan as a threat to regional peace. Washington also moved most of its diplomats from Khartoum to the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, leaving only a small number of locally hired Foreign Service personnel on duty in the embassy in Khartoum, with occasional support from visiting U.S. diplomats then based in Kenya. In April 1996, the UN Security Council, with U.S. support, imposed additional sanctions on Sudan, including restrictions on foreign travel of Sudanese government officials and a ban on holding international conferences in Sudan. Such tactics failed to alter Sudan’s policies and regional activities.

The bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum North in August 1998 marked the nadir of U.S.–Sudanese relations. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes in New York City and Washington, however, the U.S. view of Sudan became somewhat more nuanced. Although sanctions remained in force and Washington continued to condemn the wars in the South and in Darfur, the George W. Bush administration came to view Sudan as a
potentially useful source of intelligence on terrorists, especially Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. For their part, the Sudanese sought removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions. Contacts between the two countries about terrorist activities in the Middle East advanced to the point that the head of Sudanese intelligence, Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, was received in Washington in 2005, according to reports in U.S. media. This cooperation in intelligence sharing, confirmed in 2007 by high-ranking Sudanese and U.S. officials, demonstrated that despite their profound differences over Darfur and human rights, Sudan and the U.S. had found common ground in the effort to counter international terrorism. Even so, Sudan remained on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and subject to U.S. economic sanctions.

Civil Warfare in the South and West

Except for a period of tenuous peace from 1972 to 1983, Sudan experienced continual armed rebellion in the South between 1955 and the early 2000s. The protracted struggle pitted the mostly Muslim North against the partly Christian and animist South. It claimed an estimated 2 million lives—mostly noncombatants—and forced millions of others to flee the South in search of food and to escape the violence. Both sides committed massive human-rights violations against civilians. In the 1980s and 1990s, rebel forces controlled parts of the South and occasionally attacked SAF garrisoned towns. By the late 1990s, it had become clear that neither side was capable of scoring a decisive military victory. After years of agonizing negotiations, government and rebel forces signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to end the conflict in January 2005.

First Southern Civil War, 1955–72

In August 1955, troops of the Equatoria Corps, together with police, mutinied in Torit and other towns in the South. The SAF suppressed these mutinies although some rebels escaped to rural areas and formed guerrilla bands. However, they were poorly armed and organized and presented no threat to the government. The later emergence of a Southern secessionist movement led to the formation of the Anya Nya guerrilla army, composed of remnants of the 1955 mutineers and recruits among Southern students. Initially active only in Equatoria (present-day East Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and West Equatoria), Anya Nya carried its rebellion across all of Southern Sudan between 1963 and 1969 (see fig. 6, ch. 1). In 1970 a former army lieutenant, Joseph Lagu, united the ethnically fragmented guerrilla bands to support a new political movement called the
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Southern Sudan Liberation Front (SSLF). The first Southern war ended on February 27, 1972, when the warring parties signed the Addis Ababa Agreement that established autonomy and religious rights for South Sudanese and a single regional government, the Southern Sudan Provisional Government, with defined powers. The document also established four subregional governments based on ethnicity as part of a federal system of governance in the South. Ironically, many Sudanese outside the country accused Southern leaders of collaborating with Khartoum.

Second Southern Civil War, 1983–2005

The SAF absorbed Anya Nya fighters into its ranks under the terms of Addis Ababa Agreement, although many Southern units opposed the agreement by defecting or taking refuge in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa aided Sudan's independent rebel bands because Khartoum had provided support to Eritrean rebels. The Sudanese rebel forces gathered further recruits, predominantly among the Nuer people but also among the Dinka, the largest groups in the South, and eventually adopted the name of Anya Nya II. Those original Anya Nya who had been absorbed into the SAF after the 1972 agreement fought the guerrillas on behalf of the national government. However, when al-Numayri redivided the South and imposed Islamic law, the loyalty of Southern soldiers wavered. Uncertain of their dependability, al-Numayri introduced more Northern troops into the South and attempted to transfer the former guerrillas to the North. In mid-1983, SAF units in Bor, Pibor Post, Pochala, and other Southern garrisons mutinied. In July 1983, Anya Nya II and mutinous army personnel met in Ethiopia and formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka, served as its military-political commander. But Southerners failed to achieve unity under Garang, whose forces eventually defeated Anya Nya II dissident units. Thereafter, the defeated remnants, still calling themselves Anya Nya II, cooperated with the SAF against the SPLM/A.

The SPLM/A's tactics initially included ambushes of military vehicles and assaults on police stations and small army posts, mainly in the Nuer and Dinka areas of what were then A'ali an-Nil and northern and eastern Bahr al-Ghazal. An SPLM/A attempt to invade eastern Al-Istiwai in early 1985 met stiff resistance from the SAF and government militias (see fig. 7, ch. 1). In 1986 the SPLM/A occupied Rumbek in southern Bahr al-Ghazal for several months and attacked Wau, the provincial capital. During 1987, the SPLM/A took Kurmuk, Pibor Post, Qaysan, and Tonga in A’ali an-Nil. By early 1988, the SPLM/A had captured several towns on the Ethiopian border.

Many communities in Al-Istiwai Province, where the Dinka and their Nuer allies were unpopular, opposed the SPLM/A. The SAF,
with support from a militia of the Mandari (also seen as Mundari) people, gradually consolidated its position in eastern Al-Istiwai. By 1988, the SPLM/A controlled the countryside around Juba, the major Southern city. Some 10,000 SAF troops were cut off from supplies except for what could be delivered by air. From May to October 1989, an informal truce prevailed. After the conflict resumed, the areas being contested were principally in western Al-Istiwai, focusing on the Juba and Yei government garrisons. The fighting frequently consisted of SPLM/A ambushes of government convoys moving supplies from the North. Captured weapons and arms imported from Ethiopia and other African countries enabled the SPLM/A to acquire armored vehicles and artillery, but the Southern forces avoided conventional engagements against SAF units.

Anya Nya II began to crumble in the late 1980s, as many units and their commanders deserted to the SPLM/A. Government-supported militias had become active by then in areas where opposition to the Dinka- and Nuer-dominated SPLM/A was strongest. These militias played a major role in the fighting and were partly responsible for the ravages the civilian population endured. The arming of tribal groups inflamed existing intercommunal conflicts and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of noncombatants.

Millions of villagers fled their homes as a consequence of the fighting and the depredations of militias, the SPLM/A, Anya Nya II, and the SAF.
Devastation of northern Bahr al-Ghazal by roving murahalin (Arab militia groups) forced many people to evacuate their homes in 1986–87 and seek refuge in Northern Sudan to escape the fighting and starvation (see Militias, this ch.). Raiding decreased in 1988–89 as a result of depopulation of the land and a stronger SPLM/A presence in northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Nevertheless, migrations continued because of severe food shortages. By 1989, some 1 million Southerners had settled in Khartoum, while hundreds of thousands had moved to other cities and towns. Additionally, some 350,000 Sudanese registered as refugees in Ethiopia. At least 100,000 had sought refuge in Juba and approximately 28,000 in Uganda.

On August 28, 1991, Riek Machar, a Nuer, and Lam Akol, a Shilluk, sent a radio message, which subsequently became known as the Nasir Declaration, announcing that SPLM/A commander John Garang had been deposed. Machar claimed that he had taken over as interim leader. According to Major General Clement Wani, governor of Central Equatoria, the al-Bashir regime provided Machar with more than 10,000 weapons. These arms allowed cattle herders to protect their livestock from raids by the SPLM/A, but they also fueled conflict between the Lou Nuer of present-day central Upper Nile and the Jikaan Nuer of eastern Upper Nile.

Machar enlisted Nuer youths, who covered themselves with white ashes to protect themselves from insects, to form the backbone of the “White Army.” His strategy was to attack the SPLM/A heartland, thus exposing Garang as a weak leader and a poor military commander. The fighting focused largely on the Bor Dinka. Reportedly, the White Army killed thousands of Bor Dinka, looted villages, and stole thousands of cattle. However, Machar’s offensive failed to defeat Garang. As a result, the stature of the Nuer diminished considerably, but the White Army continued some operations thanks to additional arms from Khartoum.

Garang announced a new military strategy on March 18, 1995, whereby the SPLM/A, in cooperation with Northern Sudanese opposition groups, would carry the war to the North. This strategy failed largely because the Northern groups lacked the military capabilities to go on the offensive against Khartoum. Nevertheless, on October 21, 1995, the SPLM/A and an array of Northern groups that included the Army Legitimate Command, DUP, SCP, and Umma Party signed the National Democratic Alliance charter. This coalition called for “opening up new fronts (in the East or West, or both) and preparing for a revolutionary insurrection in the North.” However, the NDA, which was headquartered in Asmara, Eritrea, posed no threat to the al-Bashir government, as it failed to launch any significant military operations.

The government ordered a unilateral cease-fire throughout Southern Sudan on March 3, 1996, but Garang refused to accept it. Instead,
the SPLM/A attacked towns along the Sudanese–Ethiopian border. However, on April 10, 1996, Khartoum signed a peace accord with the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the SPLA–Bahr al-Ghazal Group led by Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, a former SPLM/A deputy commander. Both groups pledged to preserve Sudan’s national unity and to develop war-torn areas of South Sudan, but they failed to achieve either goal.

The SAF started rounding up young men in Khartoum for military service in March 1997; in late May, the government announced that all male secondary school leavers were subject to compulsory military service. On April 21, 1997, the government signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Equatoria Defense Force, South Sudan Independence Group, SSIM, SPLA–Bahr al-Ghazal Group, SPLA–Bor Group, and Union of Sudan African Parties. The agreement guaranteed “freedom of movement, assembly, organization, speech and press and...an equitable representation of southerners at all levels with Sudan.”

Conflict continued in South Sudan over the next six years, despite ongoing regional peace talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD—see Glossary). Then, on July 20, 2002, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed the Machakos Protocol, named for the Kenyan city in which they met, which provided for a referendum on self-determination for the South after a six-year transitional period. On October 17, the two sides agreed to a cease-fire throughout all Sudan, made permanent in a subsequent protocol of December 2004. A second round of talks in Machakos in November 2002 resulted in the signing of an agreement that proposed a structure for an interim government, an accord signed into final form in May 2004. On January 9, 2005, the warring parties finally signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended one of Africa’s most costly and devastating wars.

Security Provisions of the CPA

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 2005, consisted of both military and political provisions (see Recent Constitutional Developments, ch. 4). The military provisions were contained in the Agreement on Permanent Cease-fire and Security Modalities. There also were special political and security arrangements for the areas of Abyei, Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan. These three regions bore the brunt of hostilities during the second civil war. Given their strategic location and wealth, including oil, they were deemed critical to long-term stability in Sudan and hence were accorded special status.
The CPA called for an internationally monitored cease-fire in the South and East (Darfur was not included in this arrangement). The forces of each side were to disengage and redeploy to their home areas on either side of the North–South border as defined on January 1, 1956. Both were to downsize proportionately, and if the South had voted for unity in the 2011 referendum on self-determination, they would have combined into a new national army. The CPA required Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs) to be formed by equal numbers of soldiers from both North and South, to ensure security in strategic areas and give practical effect to the principle of unity, and to become the nucleus of a national army, were there to be one after mid-2011. A Joint Defense Board composed of chiefs of staff and their deputies from both North and South was established to coordinate their respective forces and to command the JIUs.

The two sides agreed to create an Assessment and Evaluation Commission to ensure that both parties lived up to the CPA’s provisions. They also created a Cease-fire Political Commission and a Cease-fire Joint Military Committee to oversee implementation of the cease-fire agreement. Finally, the two sides called for the United Nations to send a peace-support mission to Sudan to monitor and verify the implementation of the security provisions, to oversee the national demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration campaign involving soldiers on both sides, and to support implementation of the CPA in general.

The CPA enjoyed some success in ensuing years, but resolving security issues and problems between the al-Bashir government and the SPLM/A remained problematic. For example, the cease-fire in the South and East was implemented with a corresponding degree of security in the former war zones, and the redeployment of troops also occurred, albeit on a delayed schedule. In other undertakings, however, the cooperation between North and South foreseen in the CPA was elusive if not wholly absent.

The experience of the JIUs illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of the CPA’s security provisions. The JIUs were intended to enhance security in contentious areas during the six-year interim period prior to the 2011 Southern referendum on secession and to demonstrate that both sides were committed to national unity. The JIUs were also to serve as a confidence-building measure that might lead to the establishment of a post-referendum national army. They were to be funded by the presidency rather than through the SAF and the SPLM/A, an arrangement designed to eliminate pay irregularities and preclude any appearance of favoritism.

The authorized troop level for the JIUs was 39,600 troops, divided equally between the SAF and the SPLM/A. JIU deployed forces included
24,000 in South Sudan, 600 in Abyei, 6,000 in the Nuba Mountains, and 3,000 in Khartoum. Another five JIU divisions were deployed in Al-Damazin, Juba, Kaduqli, Malakal, and Wau. There was also a JIU headquarters element in Juba, an independent brigade in Khartoum, and an Abyei Area Independent Battalion.

The JIUs enjoyed some minor successes aside from their formation and deployment, including the creation of standard operating procedures, some joint patrols, and a commitment to establish a weapons-free zone in Wau. Nonetheless, the JIUs faced a daunting array of problems, including repeated deployment delays, poor command and control, and inadequate integration of the SAF and the SPLM/A forces.

The operational limitations of the JIUs became evident in Abyei in mid-May 2008. A meeting point between the Dinka and Missiriyya peoples that is also a major oil-producing area, Abyei had been a potential flash point between North and South since the signing of the CPA. A boundary-demarcation proposal that had been accepted by GOSS but rejected by the al-Bashir government, together with disputes over the division of oil revenues, set the stage for local clashes in mid-May between the SPLM/A and the SAF and their allied militias. In days of fighting between SPLM/A and SAF, the soldiers in the JIU split into JIU–SAF and JIU–SPLM/A and joined their respective sides in fighting that devastated the small market town of Abyei. By July
both sides had recommitted themselves to a unified JIU in Abyei, but neither the JIUs nor UN peacekeepers were able to prevent renewed clashes between the local Ngok Dinka and Missiriyya nomads in 2010 and early 2011. Problems of a different nature arose within JIUs in the southern part of Upper Nile State in early 2011. In this instance, Southern militia men, formerly aligned with Khartoum but after 2005 drafted as SAF units into the JIUs of Upper Nile State, mutinied when Northern commanders ordered them to surrender their heavy weapons and relocate to the North. The mutiny was contained, but the basic issues remained unresolved.

The UN secretary-general on January 31, 2005, had recommended the deployment of a peace-support operation for South Sudan to be known as the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), a recommendation the Security Council adopted on March 25. The force was to consist of a maximum of 10,000 military personnel, including 750 military observers and 715 civilian police. By April, four African and 22 non-African countries had pledged troops, who were to observe the cease-fire in South Sudan, aid and monitor the formation of the JIUs, and facilitate disarmament and demobilization. Additionally, they were to restructure the national and Southern police forces, promote human rights and the rule of law, support efforts to prepare for the 2011 referendum, ease the return of refugees and displaced persons, and carry out demining activities.

To facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, the CPA called for establishment of a national DDR council that would oversee separate DDR commissions in both North and South. Each of these commissions was charged with the design and implementation of the demobilization program in its respective region. The UN was to provide financial and technical support through several of its agencies, principally UNMIS. The multi-year DDR process began in Blue Nile State in mid-2005 with a group of more than 5,600 elderly and disabled veterans and associated children and women, with a goal of demobilizing some 90,000 soldiers, half from each side. This number was subsequently raised to 180,000, again evenly split between Northern and Southern excombatants. By September 2010, nearly 28,000 soldiers had been demobilized according to UNMIS, a figure that had risen to 38,440 by January 2011—more than 27,000 of them from the North.

**The War in Darfur, 2003–11**

Darfur historically has been one of Sudan’s most marginalized and troublesome regions, being a meeting ground between nomadic Arabs in the North and African agriculturalists in its center and South. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the February 2003 war surprised Washington,
other Western and non-Western countries, and international organizations such as the African Union and the United Nations.

Darfuris have long felt marginalized by the central government. In 2000, their grievances were starkly enumerated in *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan*, allegedly written by Darfuri rebels. The book documented what its authors said was the near monopolization of positions in the national government by the Arabs of the northern Nile—a dominance that, based on the mid-1980s ministerial and population data, for example, amounted to almost 69 percent of positions, or “national representation,” on the part of Northerners, who at the time constituted only 5.4 percent of the national population. It was this dominance that constituted one of the major grievances of the Darfuri against the central government and that they used in part to justify armed rebellion.

Additional grievances included unequal access to the judicial system, poor roads, inadequate schooling, and woefully inferior health care. Resource problems, such as shrinking pastureland, chronic drought, and poor cultivation and animal-breeding practices, facilitated the outbreak of hostilities, as did the conviction that the only way to deal with the central government was by force, as the Southerners had done.

Khartoum’s perspective was that trouble in Darfur had nothing to do with ethnic problems between the region’s African and Arab populations. According to the government, disputes in Darfur had always been resolved by local reconciliation conferences. The al-Bashir regime maintained that the Darfur war occurred because Darfuri rebels “created relations with categories, organizations, and societies in Europe,” all of whom hoped to manipulate the Darfur crisis to stir up trouble for Khartoum.

The main combatants included the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), but there also were a proliferation of smaller Darfur rebel groups. Members of sedentary groups belonged to the non-Arab Muslim Sudanese population. Their adversaries included the SAF and pro-government militiamen called *janjaweed*, local nomadic Arabic-speaking tribesmen (Afro-Arabs), most of whom in the early years of the conflict were Abbala (camel herders) or Baqqara (cattle herders).

The Darfur war began on February 26, 2003, when a 300-man SLM/A force attacked the garrison town of Golu in West Darfur and killed some 200 government troops. The following month, SLM/A rebels captured Tini, a town on the Chad–Sudan border, and took possession of the garrison’s supply of weapons and ammunition. On April 25, a joint SLM/A–JEM force assaulted Nyala and the Al-Fashir airport, where the rebels destroyed helicopters, killed scores of government troops, and seized weapons and vehicles. In May, the SLM/A killed about 500 soldiers and
seized some 300 others. Two months later, a second SLM/A operation resulted in the deaths of about 250 soldiers. On August 1, the SLA/M occupied Kutum, a town northwest of Al-Fashir, and killed members of the garrison. On September 4, the SLM/A and Khartoum agreed to a cease-fire; shortly afterwards each side accused the other of violating the accord. On October 7, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that more than $16 million was needed to care for the Sudanese who had fled to Chad. In early December, janjaweed fighters carried out numerous raids against villages in Darfur, killing untold numbers of civilians and raping a great many women.

The janjaweed intensified their attacks during a one-week period in late January 2004, which caused some 18,000 refugees to flee to Chad. On March 30, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that daily janjaweed attacks had occurred across Darfur. A few days later, Jan Egeland, the UN Security Council undersecretary-general, reported that “a scorched earth coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing” was affecting parts of Darfur. Similar reports occurred with increasing frequency over the next months. On April 11, Khartoum and the SLM/A–JEM agreed to a 45-day “humanitarian cease-fire,” which permitted the deployment of AU observers and the distribution of food aid to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, on May 24, the cease-fire ended as government forces and rebels blamed each other for launching attacks on a village south of Nyala that resulted in the deaths of 45 civilians. At about the same time, the UN estimated that more than 1 million of Darfur’s population had become internally displaced because of SAF–janjaweed attacks. Some 65,000 more Darfuri refugees had fled to Chad.

UNHCR reported in August 2004 that some 1.2 million internally displaced people remained in Western Sudan. The UN World Food Programme attempted to provide food aid to some 800,000 conflict-affected persons in Sudan and Chad but lack of security and seasonal rains hampered that effort. Chronic instability and fighting continued as a mainstay of life in the region.

U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes Pierre Prosper reported on June 24, 2004, that there were “indicators of genocide” in Darfur. On July 3, the UN and Sudan signed a joint communiqué that required the warring parties to stop fighting. Khartoum also promised to disarm the janjaweed, protect IDP camps, punish those responsible for human-rights violations, resume peace talks with the rebels, and facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid. Shortly thereafter, Sudan deployed a 1,025-man police force to “maintain security, law, and order” and to “uphold the sense of nationhood.” However, on July 18, the SLM/A–
JEM withdrew from peace talks in Addis Ababa until SAF forces withdrew from Darfur and disarmed the janjaweed.

The U.S. House of Representatives declared the Darfur conflict to be a genocide on July 22, and on September 9, Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that “genocide has been committed in Darfur.” The first contingent of the expanded AU cease-fire observation force arrived in Darfur on October 28. A few months later, AU observers reported that the Sudan Air Force had bombed villages in South Darfur and that the security situation had deteriorated over the past four months. In January 2006, Physicians for Human Rights released a report that underscored the genocidal nature of the Darfur conflict. The following June, the International Criminal Court reported evidence of large-scale massacres and rapes in Darfur to the United Nations Security Council. Meanwhile, on May 5, the Sudanese government and one branch of the SLM signed what they termed the Darfur Peace Agreement, which brought that group’s leader, Minni Arko Minnawi, into the central government as a senior assistant to President al-Bashir, but other rebel groups refused to join the agreement and continued military action. Another attempt to make peace took place in late October 2007 in Sirte, Libya, but the rebel groups were too disunited to engage in serious negotiations, and nothing was accomplished.

Beginning in the second half of 2005, concern over the peace talks grew among local militias and paramilitaries allied with the government. Their concerns were borne out when the peace agreement, once signed, committed Khartoum to “neutralize and disarm the janjaweed–armed militias” as a first step to peace. Additionally, the government agreed to accept 5,000 rebels into the regular army, including officers, with training for another 3,000 men. In response, some militias explored the possibility of signing their own agreements with rebel groups. Such agreements, first signed in 2005, ranged from military alliances with the SLA to nonaggression pacts with JEM. Two such agreements involved the powerful Mahamid leader of North Darfur, Musa Hilal, and the militia chief of South Darfur, Muhammad Hamdan. In March 2006, Hamdan signed a mutual nonaggression agreement with JEM; two months later, Musa Hilal did the same. Another agreement involving segments
of the Mahamid and Mahariyya militias resulted in these militiamen becoming fully integrated into the SLA in pursuit of demands from the government for security and services for nomads, including hospitals and schools.

Violence continued in Darfur after 2007, although at a significantly reduced level. In May 2008, in a show of strength, JEM fighters launched a daring raid on Khartoum, fighting their way into Omdurman before being turned back. Peace negotiations resumed in 2009, hosted by Qatar. The talks led to a cease-fire in February 2010 between the government and JEM, with a tentative agreement to pursue further peace initiatives, although such proposals soon faltered over accusations of government raids. A protocol on border security that Chad and Sudan signed in January 2010 reopened the border for the first time since 2003 and established a 3,000-man joint border-patrol force, provisions that contributed to stability in Darfur. Even so, renewed fighting between government forces and JEM and SLM led the UN’s secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, to point out in early 2011 that efforts toward peace remained frustrated by the fragmentation of Darfur’s armed groups and by ongoing conflict, which continued to uproot civilians and cause further suffering for the people of the region.

The UN estimated that as of January 2011, at least 300,000 people had been killed, and more than 2 million had been driven from their homes since the war erupted in February 2003. The Sudanese government, however, disputed these figures, particularly the number of those killed, maintaining that only 10,000 had died. In either case, some analysts distinguished between those killed as a result of direct military action or as a result of intercommunal strife.

Despite the number of armed groups in Darfur, most of the international community blamed the Sudanese government for the war and the atrocities associated with it. This sentiment was formally expressed on March 4, 2009, when the International Criminal Court (ICC), seated in The Hague in the Netherlands, issued an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir on five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape) and two counts of war crimes (pillaging, and directing attacks against civilians) as a result of his policies in Darfur between March 2003 and July 2008. The warrants resulted in a split of world opinion, with the United States and many Western governments supporting the ICC move, while other African and Arab countries as well as China denounced the decision. The court had earlier issued indictments for violations of human rights against two other Sudanese government officials, and in November 2008, it had issued indictments for war crimes against three leaders of Darfuri militias for attacks on UN peacekeepers. One of the Darfuris voluntarily answered a
court summons in May 2009, but none of the government officials did; indeed, al-Bashir denounced the tribunal and refused to recognize the validity of the arrest warrant issued against him.

**AU and UN Forces in Darfur**

The outbreak of the Darfur war in February 2003 prompted the international community to create the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as a way to end the conflict. The African Union approved the deployment of 120 unarmed monitors to oversee a cease-fire that was never implemented. Subsequently, the AU approved the deployment of an additional 300 armed troops from Nigeria and Rwanda to protect the monitors. The European Union provided 12 million euros to support the deployment.

AMIS was charged with several tasks. It was to implement the April 2004 cease-fire between the JEM, the SLA, and government forces; establish safe routes for combatants returning to their homes; assess requirements for mine-clearing operations; and adjudicate and then report cease-fire violations to AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Unfortunately, these tasks were beyond the capabilities of the AU and AMIS. By October 2004, there were only 80 monitors in Darfur. Attempts to facilitate a lasting cease-fire failed; safe routes were problematic; inadequate manpower hampered mine clearance; and adjudication of cease-fires was spotty because AMIS reports sent to AU headquarters were months out of date and consequently of no use to those trying to monitor current military developments in Darfur.

That same month, the AU agreed to establish AMIS II, a new monitoring group that would consist of 450 observers, 641 unarmed troops, 1,700 protection force troops, 815 civilian police, and a 164-man civilian support staff. Although AMIS II was a significant improvement over the prior force, its numbers were still woefully inadequate for the task of stabilizing Darfur, a region about the size of France. In late October 2004, the United States began airlifting troops from Nigeria and Rwanda to Al-Fashir, while Germany agreed to provide logistical support to AMIS II. In November, South Africa agreed to deploy an infantry company, an ordnance disposal team, and additional observers and staff officers.

The international community welcomed these advances, but Darfur’s security situation remained perilous. AMIS II functioned poorly because of understaffing, poor infrastructure, an unclear mandate, and the unwillingness of government and rebel forces to end the fighting. As a result, in April 2005, the AU approved the establishment of AMIS III. Authorized personnel levels expanded from 3,600 to 7,800, including 700 military observers; 5,500 troops; and 1,600 civilian police, but even
this expanded force proved unable to police Darfur or to defend itself. On April 15, 2007, rebel troops attacked and killed some AU peacekeepers. On September 30, 2007, a more serious incident occurred in which rebels overran an AMIS base, killing 10 peacekeepers.

In view of continued raiding and killing, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan called for deployment of an 18,000-man peacekeeping force to replace the AU contingent. On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to deploy 17,300 troops to Darfur. The Sudanese government adamantly opposed this action, and it was not until July 31, 2007, after difficult negotiations with Sudan, that the UN announced that a joint UN–African Union force projected at 26,000 soldiers and police officers would replace AMIS by December 31. At Sudanese insistence, the force was to be composed mostly of African troops, the first units of which joined the beleaguered peacekeepers already in Darfur in early January 2008. This joint force, the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), numbered almost 7,500 by mid-March and was expected to reach full strength by the end of 2008, but like the AMIS mission, it was so short of communications and logistics equipment as well as personnel that prospects for its success were in doubt.

Nonetheless, UNAMID’s strength rose until it stood at 22,061 military personnel in October 2010 and at 23,096 uniformed personnel on July 31, 2011, a force that included 17,759 troops, 4,526 police officers, 311 military observers, plus UN civilian staff. They were supported by more than 4,000 civilians. With its mandate extended to July 2012, it was the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. By then, the intensity of conflict between nomadic Arab pastoralists on the one hand and farmers from the Fur, Masalit, and Zagawa communities on the other had declined measurably from levels of fighting in the early years of the war.

The Sudan Armed Forces

The military services of the national government are known as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). As of 2010, the SAF’s personnel strength was more than 109,000, plus associated militias. Men and women aged 18–30 years were subject to compulsory military service for two years, although some sources suggested the term of service was three years. The army numbered 105,000 officers and enlisted men. The navy had an estimated 1,300 men, and the air force had a complement of about 3,000. Paramilitary units totaled 102,500 security personnel.

Lieutenant General Umar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, Sudan’s president since the June 1989 coup, was also commander in chief of the SAF and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), a paramilitary reserve component of the SAF. The National Defense Council, which was responsible
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for planning, operated through the Ministry of Defense. By early 2008, General Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn served as the minister of defense and was still in this post in 2011. The SAF chief of staff was in immediate command of the armed forces. The general staff also included the army chief of staff and his three deputy chiefs of staff, one each for operations, administration, and logistics, who held the rank of lieutenant general. The commander of the air force, the commander of air defense forces, division commanders, and most military governors held the rank of major general. The actual responsibilities and influence of senior officers depended greatly on their political status, ethnic affiliation, and other factors in addition to their positions in the chain of command.

In February 2004, Sudan joined 12 regional states to form the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) of the African Union’s planned African Standby Force. Other members in 2008 were Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. The brigade was intended for rapid military deployment in East Africa and the Horn in situations requiring observer missions and peacekeeping. It had been expected to reach interim operational capability by mid-2010 but its formation was behind schedule.

Army

The Sudan Army, in early 2011 numbering 105,000 personnel, was a light infantry force supported by specialized elements. The main army units included one armored division, one mechanized infantry division and one independent brigade, six infantry divisions and seven independent infantry brigades, three artillery brigades, one reconnaissance brigade, one airborne division, one engineers division, one border guard brigade, and five special forces companies.

The al-Numayri government introduced compulsory military service in 1972. The army was conscript-based, and all males aged 18 to 30 were subject to two years of compulsory national service. In 1989 the law was revised. In 1992 the al-Bashir regime introduced the National Service Law, which contained a religious and ideological agenda that sought to instil recruits with the “spirit of jihad,” disseminate the “models of martyrs,” reject the “spirit of relaxation,” and promote discipline. Evasion was commonplace, however, and the army frequently resorted to roundups of males in major cities. Normally, there were some 20,000 conscripts in the army and another 5,000 in training.

Operational control extended from general staff headquarters in Khartoum to the six regional commands (central, eastern, western, northern, southern, and Khartoum), each of which comprised three infantry brigades. Each regional command was organized along divisional lines.
Thus, the Fifth Division was at Al-Obeid in Kordofan (Central Command), the Second Division was at Khashm al-Qirbah (Eastern Command), the Sixth Division was assigned to Al-Fashir in Darfur (Western Command), the First Division was formerly (before the CPA) at Juba (Southern Command), and the Seventh Armored Division was at Ash Shajarah near Khartoum (Khartoum Command). The Airborne Division was stationed at Khartoum International Airport. The Third Division was based in the North, although no major troop units were assigned to it. Each division had a liaison officer attached to Khartoum general headquarters to facilitate the division's communication with various command elements. The PDF and an assortment of tribal and rebel militias supported SAF operations in Darfur, as they formerly did in South Sudan.

The army lacked a general headquarters and functioned under the deputy chief of staff for operations. Headquarters and training facilities were near Khartoum for most specialized corps. These included the armored, artillery, signal, and medical service administrations; the transportation and supply corps; and the engineers division. Support elements included the military police, the brigade of border guards, and the general armories.

The army’s inventory of armaments reflected its shifting military relations with other nations that sold or supplied weapons. At different times, Belarus, Britain, China, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Poland, Russia, and the United States have provided training and weapons to the army (see table 4, Appendix). Prior to the exploitation of Sudan’s oil reserves, much military equipment delivered to Sudan had fallen into disrepair or had become obsolete. Moreover, Sudan lacked the foreign exchange to pay for maintenance and spare parts, a situation that reduced the army’s military capabilities. During the 1980s and the early 2000s, some army units lacked such basics as food, ammunition, fuel, and health care.

Sudan continued to rely on foreign loans to purchase military equipment despite its growing oil wealth. In March 2005, China and Russia approved UN Resolution 1591, which banned Sudan from making weapons transfers to Darfur without the Security Council’s permission, but both nations failed to honor this obligation. In 2005, for example, Sudan imported $83 million worth of military hardware from China and $37.4 million from Russia, both of which denied selling arms to Khartoum. In October 2006, Sudan asked Russia for a $1 billion military equipment loan to purchase more aircraft. In 2007 China and Russia broke a United Nations arms embargo by supplying Sudan with attack helicopters, bombers, and other weapons for use against civilians in Darfur. Additionally, Chinese aircraft and Russian helicopter gunships were photographed at three Darfur airports. China also sold six K–8 training aircraft to Sudan's air force, which could be used for ground attack missions. Subsequently, Sudan purchased another six K–8s.
Air Force

The 3,000-man Sudan Air Force had two main bases, which were located at Khartoum International Airport and at Wadi Sayyidna Air Base north of Omdurman. Other air bases were at Al-Fashir, Al-Junaynah, Juba, Kassala, Khashm al-Qirbah, Kosti, Nyala, Port Sudan, and Al-Obeid. The air force historically suffered from poor maintenance and a lack of investment in new aircraft. As a result, the operability of most aircraft was low despite the fact that foreign technicians periodically provided maintenance assistance. Iraqi and Iranian technicians were employed through the 1990s. More recently, Russian firms were expected to provide maintenance, support technicians, and spare parts. By the mid-2000s, Sudan’s air arm was assigned to support land forces, particularly in fighting rebel forces in the South and West of the country. Before 2005, counterinsurgency operations focused primarily on Juba and since then on Darfur.

Combat aircraft included MiG–29SE Fulcrums; A–5C Fantans; and SU–25 Frogfoots. Sudan also had numerous helicopters in its inventory, including Mi–24 Hinds, Mi–171s; and an array of transport aircraft, including C–130H Hercules, An-26 “Curls,” An-30 Clanks, An-74TKs, and SAC Y–8s (see table 5, Appendix).

The inventory did not include “bombers,” but the air force employed its few light turboprop transport An-26 Curls to drop oil drums filled with explosives, although targeting was very poor and resulted in little damage. Nevertheless, anti-Khartoum activists constantly reported that “waves of bombers” regularly attacked targets during the wars in Darfur and South Sudan; however, most credible observers discounted these reports. The air force had some helicopter gunships, which could inflict limited damage on small groups of rebels. Aerial attacks, however ineffective, usually caused villagers to flee their homes. In that sense, air power was a useful psychological weapon.

The Air Defense Command maintained its headquarters at Port Sudan and a secondary command post in Omdurman. One of its two brigades was equipped with antiaircraft guns, and the other was armed with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The SA–2 SAM battalions were introduced to provide high- and medium-altitude air defense for Port Sudan, Wadi Sayyidna, and Khartoum. During the 1970s, technicians regularly serviced the missiles and associated radar, but the current operability of these weapons was doubtful.

The other air defense brigade was deployed to the Western Command and the Southern Command to provide tactical air defense. Its inventory formerly included U.S.-supplied Vulcan 20mm self-propelled guns and other weapons. France, Egypt, and the United States formerly provided fire control and acquisition radar and other systems. The Air Defense
Command performed poorly in the past, as evidenced by a 1984 daylight attack by a Libyan Tu-22 bomber that dropped bombs in the vicinity of the national radio station at Omdurman at a time of tension between al-Numayri and al-Qadhafi. The current status of the Air Defense Command was unknown in 2011, but most observers believed that the unit might no longer be operational.

**Navy**

The Sudan Navy, formed in 1962, is the smallest branch of the country's military establishment. Yugoslavia helped create the navy by transferring four armed coastal patrol boats, river patrol boats, landing craft, and auxiliary vessels. Until 1972, there also was a Yugoslav training staff in Sudan. In 1975 two 70-ton patrol craft and four 10-ton patrol craft, transferred from Iran and armed with machine guns, replaced the Yugoslav patrol boats. In April 1993, Sudan and Egypt terminated naval-training agreements. Since then, Cairo has reported the presence of Iranian naval advisers. There also have been reports that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel, in addition to regular Iranian officers, were involved in training. By the late 1990s, Iranian personnel had returned home.

The navy's personnel strength was an estimated 1,300 officers and enlisted personnel with 15 inshore vessels in early 2011. The service was divided into two commands. The Red Sea Command, headquartered at Port Sudan, was responsible for coastal defense and for deterring smuggling along the Red Sea coast, and the Nile River Command, headquartered at Khartoum, was responsible for patrolling the Nile. Aside from headquarters, the navy also maintained bases at Flamingo Bay on the Red Sea and at Kosti on the White Nile south of Khartoum.

The naval inventory included the 15 inshore patrol craft (four Kurmuk and four Sewart class, all under 100 tonnes each, and seven armed patrol boats), plus seven amphibious landing craft, two of them Sobat tank-capable craft and five for personnel and vehicles (see table 6, Appendix). The lack of maintenance and spare parts undermined the navy's capabilities. Auxiliary vessels reportedly were in a state of disrepair.

**Personnel**

The SAF’s personnel needs did not strain the nation's manpower resources. According to U.S. government estimates, in 2010 there were 10.3 million males between the ages of 16 and 49, of whom 6 million were fit for military service. The number reaching the military age of 18 annually was about 500,000. Females available for military service
totaled 9.9 million, while those fit for duty totaled 6.2 million. Women who reached military service age annually totaled about 490,000.

After independence, recruitment notices attracted 10 applicants for each vacancy. Poorer Sudanese, particularly Southerners and Westerners, joined the SAF in great numbers. Selection of enlisted troops depended on the applicants’ character, education, physical condition, and ability to read and write. A good record enabled them to reenlist for further three-year periods until they had served 20 years, at which time a soldier retired at his/her highest rank. Soldiers who received technical training could be required to sign up for a nine-year tour. In the late 1980s, SAF morale suffered as many soldiers disliked serving in the South because of food shortages, lack of supplies, and the seemingly endless fighting. Some SAF troops who had homes in the South defected to the SPLM/A.

Sources have conveyed varied accounts of current conscription practices. According to a January 2007 British government report, Sudan's recruitment and conscription practices involve “the relevant authority putting an advertisement in the local media calling for young people to sign up.” A January 2005 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General noted that local tribal leaders and sheikhs helped mobilize and recruit conscripts into the PDF forces. A senior PDF commander, cited in the report, stated that military training in each state took place locally and that basic training, including use of weapons and discipline, took approximately two weeks. According to this report, PDF conscripts were eventually integrated into the SAF.

The report noted that in 2005, Sudan forcibly conscripted Sudanese citizens for national military service. The report also alleged that the PDF conscripted teenagers from government-run “reformation camps” established for “vagrant” children. These conscripts allegedly experienced “hardship and abuse” during military service. A May 15, 2006, article in Sudan’s Al-Watan newspaper reported that there had been protests about conscription and desertions of conscripts at national service camps. The article also noted that conscripts had protested against “mistreatment by the trainers and harshness of the training routine.” According to a 2006 UN report on children and armed conflict in Sudan, two recruits died during military training in Darfur.

The actions of SAF troops and of Southern and Darfuri rebels were often excessive. Human-rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Africa Watch have long reported on the heavy-handed tactics of combatants on all sides. Execution of prisoners was commonplace in the SAF and the SPLM/A. The ongoing Darfur war was a human-rights catastrophe. Forced removal of noncombatants, rapes, torture, and indiscriminate killing characterized much of the fighting. All sides in that conflict committed widespread human-rights violations.
Every annual U.S. Department of State human-rights report states that all Sudanese governments since independence have had “poor” human-rights records and have engaged in varying degrees of human-rights violations. However, much of the international community remained silent about the SPLM/A’s excesses. In February 1984, for example, the SPLM/A killed some 150 passengers on a Nile steamer, an attack that halted all rail and river transport in the South, and, in August 1986, shot down a Sudan Airways aircraft near Malakal, killing 60 passengers and crew. In June 2001, the Roman Catholic Church in Sudan estimated that an SPLM/A attack in West Bahr al-Ghazal had displaced some 57,000 people. Ironi­cally, at about the same time, SPLM/A commander John Garang accused Khartoum of being a “terrorist state” and of committing “gross human-rights violations.” Meanwhile, Garang described himself as a “freedom fighter” and the SPLM/A as a “human-rights movement.” He also dismissed allegations of SPLM/A human-rights violations and characterized them as “mistakes that happen.”

**Training**

The SAF trained its personnel in several institutions. The Sudan Military College at Wadi Sayyidna was the premier institution for officers since its opening in 1948. After graduating from a two-year political and military science program, a cadet received a commission as a second lieutenant in the SAF. In the late 1950s, some 60 cadets graduated each year. In 1972, after the outbreak of the first civil war in the South, 500 cadets passed through the Sudan Military College. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some 120–150 officers graduated each year. Students from other Arab and African countries also trained there. In 1982, for example, 60 Ugandans graduated from the Sudan Military College as part Khartoum’s effort to help rebuild the Ugandan Army after Idi Amin’s downfall. In 1990 about 600 NIF members attended the Sudan Military College to help fill the ranks of the officer corps depleted by resignations or dismissals.

The Sudan Military College’s course of study had the reputation of being weak in scientific and technical instruction. On a more positive note, however, the SAF allowed junior officers to continue their education at the University of Khartoum. Many SAF officers also studied abroad in Britain, Egypt, Germany, the United States, and numerous Middle Eastern countries. After independence, most senior naval officers trained at the Yugoslav naval academy, while midlevel officers attended courses in several Persian Gulf countries.

Since the early 1970s, the Staff College in Omdurman has graduated 55 to 60 majors and lieutenant colonels annually with a master’s degree in military science. Officers from Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates as well as some Palestinians also attended the Staff College. Since 1981, Sudan’s war college, the High Military Academy in Omdurman, offered a six-month course on national security issues to prepare colonels and brigadier generals for more senior positions.

The SAF also operated several technical schools for junior and noncommissioned officers, including artillery, communications, engineering, infantry, ordnance, and armored schools, all of which were located in Khartoum. An air force training center at Wadi Sayyinda Air Base trained technicians in aircraft maintenance, ground control, and other skills.

No detailed current information about training in the SAF was available in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, the institutions mentioned above remained active, and most of them upgraded their courses to stay abreast of advances in military science and training. Limited numbers of foreign officers from the Middle East and Gulf states continued to attend Sudan’s military schools. The High Military Academy also continued to produce strategic reports for senior SAF officers.

**Defense Expenditures**

Little information was available about Sudan’s defense expenditures. Reliable estimates of the defense budget in Western military sources varied from 1.3 percent to 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in recent years. Oil revenues enabled Khartoum to increase defense spending; for example, the defense budget was estimated to have risen from US$405 million in 2003 to US$500 million in 2006, in large part in response to rising oil revenues. Actual defense outlays, however, almost certainly exceeded these figures.

Although the specific components of military spending were not available, it was generally agreed that the principal category of the defense budget was personnel-related costs. Historically, most large arms purchases were financed with credits from the supplying countries, principally China, Iran, Russia, Ukraine, and some Arab countries. However, in recent years, Sudan’s growing oil wealth has enabled the al-Bashir regime to finance an increasing number of weapons purchases. Funding for military procurement was available through loans, grants, direct purchases, and barter arrangements.

**The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army**

John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka born into a Christian family, earned a B.A. degree in economics from Grinnell College, Iowa. He then attended the University of Dar es Salaam. Garang returned to the United States,
where he attended a company commanders’ course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Subsequently, he received an M.A. and a Ph.D. in economics from Iowa State University.

The SPLM/A formed in 1983 when Garang, then a lieutenant colonel in the SAF, was sent to Bor to quell a mutiny of 500 Southern troops who refused to be rotated to the North. Instead of ending the mutiny, Garang encouraged mutinies in other garrisons and assumed leadership of the Southern rebellion. By 1986, the SPLM/A had an estimated 12,500 troops organized into 12 battalions and equipped with small arms and a few mortars. SPLM/A recruits received training in Ethiopia. By 1989, the SPLM/A's strength had reached 20,000 to 30,000; by 1991 it was estimated at 50,000 to 60,000. Many SPLM/A members continued their civilian occupations, serving in individual campaigns when called upon. By then, at least 40 battalions had been formed, bearing such names as Tiger, Crocodile, Fire, Nile, Kalashnikov, Bee, Eagle, and Hippo.

Apart from Garang, other senior officers included a field commander, a chief of staff, and a chief of staff for administration and logistics. Most officers, as well as zonal commanders, held the rank of lieutenant colonel, while captains or majors served as battalion commanders. Promotion was based on seniority and number of battles fought. Most senior leaders and field commanders belonged to the Dinka group, a situation that many non-Dinka groups resented, particularly those who were Nuer or Shilluk.

The SPLM/A claimed that, during its early years, its arms came from captured government stocks or were brought by troops deserting from the SAF. However, Garang admitted to receiving a considerable amount of support and matériel from Libya before 1985 because of Libyan hostility toward al-Numayri. The SPLM/A, which had bases in Ethiopia, denied receiving arms from Addis Ababa, but such denials were highly improbable. Ethiopia wanted to weaken the Sudanese government, and the only way to achieve this goal was to supply the SPLM/A with cash and weapons. The SPLM/A's weapons inventory included U.S., German, and Soviet assault rifles. The SPLM/A also reportedly had 60mm mortars, 14.5mm antiaircraft guns, and Soviet SA–7 shoulder-fired SAMs. Other sources claimed that the SPLM/A had acquired howitzers, heavier mortars, BM–21 truck-mounted rocket launchers, jeep-mounted 106mm antitank recoilless rifles, and some 20 armored vehicles. The SPLM/A also had a supply of land mines that were widely used.

Amnesty International and Africa Watch reported that the SPLM/A killed captured SAF and militia prisoners and executed civilians believed to be informers or opposed to the insurgency. By mid-1989, the SPLM/A held about 300 government troops; after the capture of Bor, there were reports that the SPLM/A might have shot hundreds of surrendering soldiers. Indiscriminate SPLM/A rocket and mortar attacks on government-held towns resulted in many civilian casualties.
In August 1991, the SPLM/A fragmented when Riek Machar, a Nuer, and Lam Akol, a Shilluk, demanded Garang’s removal as commander. The two accused Garang of being “autocratic” and “dictatorial” and of having turned the Southern struggle into a “reign of terror.” Moreover, Garang opposed Southern self-determination and advocated a “New Sudan” that was democratic, pluralistic, and united. Machar and Akol assumed command of the so-called SPLM/A–Nasir faction and established links with the al-Bashir regime to obtain weapons and other military supplies, which Khartoum supplied in the belief that such aid would weaken the SPLM/A. Garang responded to this challenge by renaming what remained of the SPLM/A as SPLM/A–Torit; he subsequently changed the name to SPLM/A–Mainstream. Shortly thereafter, Garang’s deputy, William Nyoun, left and formed another faction called SPLM/A–Unity. In November 1992, these animosities resulted in clashes between the Garang group and its Southern opponents, fighting that resulted in the deaths of at least 2,000 fighters.

In March 1995, Garang announced that he planned, in cooperation with Northern opposition parties, to take the war to Khartoum by organizing the “New Sudan Brigade.” This initiative never materialized, but on March 27, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter persuaded the Sudanese government to declare a two-month cease-fire. The SPLM/A and the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) also pledged to honor the
cease-fire, soon extended for another two months. However, on June 26, Garang’s soldiers attacked two villages in the Ganyiel region, killing 210 villagers, looting and then destroying more than 1,000 households, and seizing 3,500 cattle. The following month, the SPLM/A and the SSIM clashed in western Upper Nile Province. In May 1996, the two rebel groups merged but, a month later, they resumed hostilities which lasted for months. On April 21, 1997, the SSIM, led by Riek Machar, signed a separate peace with the central government. The al-Bashir regime responded by providing cash and weapons to the SSIM.

Several thousand SPLM/A rebels attacked areas northeast and south of Wau on January 28–29, 1998. In May, the SPLM/A launched an offensive against government garrisons in southern Blue Nile Province. Similar attacks and political squabbling between the al-Bashir regime and various factions in the South and in Khartoum continued for the next several years.

The Southern war ended on January 9, 2005, when Garang and the Sudanese government signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that, among other things, made Garang vice president of Sudan. Garang had hardly settled into office, however, before he died in a helicopter crash on August 1, 2005, while returning to Juba from a visit to Uganda. Salva Kiir Mayardit, a deputy with the reputation of being a soldier’s soldier, then assumed leadership of the SPLM/A. Unlike Garang, who was popular and influential in Washington, Kiir has made few visits to the U.S. He has, instead, concentrated on extending his influence in South Sudan and on implementing the provisions of the peace agreement.

South Sudan lacked a realistic political-military strategy in early 2011. Among its many shortcomings were corruption, budget shortfalls, and inadequate planning by the military as well as by the Southern government. Moreover, GOSS has failed to transform the SPLA into a conventional army. Despite these problems, President Kiir authorized the purchase of a large number of tanks, which require constant maintenance, activity likely to test the capabilities of the SPLA.

Paramilitary Groups and Forced Migration

Militias

During the Southern civil war, many government-supported militia groups served as adjuncts to the SAF forces; indeed, the al-Numayri government created the first militias in 1983. During the next 25 years, Khartoum armed and financed numerous paramilitary forces, the most important of which was the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), established in November 1989 to fight the SPLM/A.
This umbrella group of militias, which was under SAF control, was modeled on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The PDF was frequently referred to as the paramilitary wing of the NIF. According to the Popular Defense Forces Act (1989), an organization called the Council of the Popular Defense Forces advised the commander in chief on all matters affecting the PDF. PDF training was compulsory for all male and female government employees over the age of 33, but there were reports that the PDF recruited children under the age of 18. PDF training also has been compulsory since 1992 for all male and female students in institutes of higher education. Female prisoners could, in theory, secure their release by attending PDF training for 45 days. The PDF provided arms, training, and uniforms to recruits after they came under army command. The size of the PDF was difficult to determine, but as of 2010, military analysts estimated PDF strength at some 17,500 active-duty personnel and about 85,000 reservists. The governor of Khartoum State in a public address in early 2011 cited a state figure of 37,000, presumably both active and reserve personnel, a lower number than many independent estimates.

The PDF supposedly relieved the SAF of local defense duties, thus allowing the armed forces to concentrate on holding major garrisons and undertaking offensive operations against the SPLM/A. The PDF was active in Darfur from the outbreak of hostilities in 2003 (see Internal Security Agencies, this ch.). In August 2004, there were reports that some janjaweed militiamen were being incorporated into the PDF and the police force. According to various human-rights organizations, the PDF has been responsible for indiscriminate killings of civilians, abduction, occasional enslavement of women and children, and looting of cattle and other property, offenses also associated with the janjaweed.

The Anya Nya II group originally formed in the late 1970s among army mutineers from the South. Some later split off from the rebel movement, obtained weapons and training from the SAF, and became a major factor in the war from 1984 to 1987. Predominantly from the Nuer, the second largest ethnic group in the South, Anya Nya II fought on behalf of the government in rural areas of what was then A’ali an-Nil Province. Anya Nya II emerged as a significant factor in that province, disrupting SPLM/A operations and interfering with the movement of its recruits to the Ethiopian border area for training. The government established an Anya Nya II headquarters in Khartoum to promote the group as an alternative to the SPLM/A. Beginning in late 1987, SPLM/A military successes caused morale problems in Anya Nya II and induced major units to defect to the SPLM/A. By mid-1989, only one Anya Nya II faction remained loyal to the government and retained its political base in Khartoum after the al-Bashir coup.
Some of the most devastating raids and acts of banditry against the civilian population were perpetrated by militias known as murahalin formed among the Rizayqat, Rufaa al-Haj, Misiriyyah, and other groups, all members of the cattle-raising Baqqara Arab nomad tribes in Darfur and Kordofan. These Arab communities traditionally competed for pastureland with the Dinka of northern Bahr al-Ghazal and southern Kordofan. Raiding by the murahalin during the period from 1985 to 1988 displaced many Dinka civilians in Bahr al-Ghazal. The murahalin received ammunition, arms, and some covert training from the SAF and carried out some joint counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with government forces. According to Amnesty International, raids carried out by the murahalin resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians; the abduction of women and children, who were forced into slavery; the looting of livestock; and the burning of houses and grain supplies. By late 1988, the growing SPLM/A presence had reduced the murahalin threat against villages and cattle camps. Even so, pro-Khartoum militias continued to attack Dinka refugees moving north to escape famine and raids.

The Rizayqat murahalin committed some of the worst atrocities of the war when they retaliated for losses suffered in an engagement with the SPLM/A by killing more than 1,000 unarmed Dinka at the Al-Du’ayn rail junction, most of them burned to death. Misiriyyah murahalin tactics included ambushes of refugees and attacks on villagers in northeastern Bahr al-Ghazal. In 1986 the government armed the Rufaa al-Haj militia, after the SPLM/A appeared in southern Al-Awsat Province (present-day Blue Nile State) to recruit followers among non-Arab peoples. In early 1987, combined operations by the SAF and Rufaa al-Haj militia against non-Arab populations in retaliation for an SPLM/A offensive resulted in many atrocities.

The government also armed as militias a number of Southern non-Arab tribes opposed to the SPLM/A. In 1985 Khartoum recruited members of the Mandari in Equatoria to help counter the growing SPLM/A threat in that area. Most of the Mandari dissociated themselves from the militia, however, as the presence of the SPLM/A strengthened in that province. In Bahr al-Ghazal, hostile relations between the Fertit militia, which was concentrated around Wau, and the Dinka spawned considerable violence, culminating in August–September 1987 in massacres of Dinka who had taken refuge in Wau.

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi proposed in February 1989 that the murahalin militia be institutionalized as popular defense committees. However, other political groups in Khartoum opposed this recommendation because they feared that the murahalin would become allied with Sadiq’s Umma Party. In October 1989, the al-Bashir government
promulgated the Popular Defense Forces Act, seemingly to give legitimacy to the militias as SAF auxiliaries. The act led to the establishment of a new paramilitary body, the Popular Defense Forces. It did not, however, result in the disappearance of the existing militias, which throughout the 1990s and early 2000s continued to act in concert with the SAF, against the SPLM/A and civilians in the South and in Darfur.

None of the militias active in the early 2000s were more notorious than the janjaweed. Reportedly organized and armed by the central government, they were heavily involved in the fighting in Darfur from 2003 and were widely accused of committing atrocities against the civilian population. Janjaweed militia members were normally armed with rifles, relied on camels or horses to move about the Darfur region, and in the early stages of the war were usually drawn from the Irayqat (also seen as Ereigat), Um Jalul, and Mahariyya, all divisions of the Abbala Rizayqat Arabs of North Darfur. The janjaweed constituted an arm of the SAF and fought against rebel groups such as the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. As the Darfur conflict evolved, however, the membership of the janjaweed broadened. As of 2011, the term had come to apply to any of the ethnically based armed groups as well as to the brigands that continued to raid and plunder in Darfur, not just to the Abbala or other government-supported groups.

Forced Migration

Sudan has historically been a generator of forced migration and internally displaced populations. For instance, during the first Southern civil war (1955–72), perhaps 1 million Southerners were forced to migrate. Aside from war, internal migration was further exacerbated with the discovery of oil in the late 1970s, as, for example, in the early 1980s when President al-Numayri sought to redraw Southern borders to bring the oilfields into a newly created Unity State under his control. In 1985–86 Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi relied on tribal militias to move Southerners away from oil-rich areas.

President al-Bashir pursued a scorched-earth policy against Southern populations in the 1990s, using SAF troops, proxy militias, and Nuer warlords who had turned against the SPLM/A, to ensure their departure from oil-rich areas. The militias attacked, burned, looted, and abducted women and children. The central government then moved loyal populations onto the land. Such tactics were applied, for example, in Upper Nile Province against both Nuer and Dinka populations as well as against an estimated 100,000 Shilluk around Malakal.

Beginning in 1992 in the plains and mountains of southern Kordofan, the government began to seize Nuba farmland as part of a strategy to expel populations whose loyalty was suspect. In this area, fertile land in the
plains was converted to mechanized agriculture. Many Nuba were gradually forced to retreat into higher, less-productive elevations, whereas others became refugees in Khartoum and elsewhere. Of an original population estimated at 1.5 million, only about 400,000 remained in their homeland by the early 2000s.

The January 2005 peace agreement notwithstanding, hopes of a “peace dividend” and of the eventual return of refugees and displaced people to South Sudan remained largely unfulfilled several years later. Moreover, GOSS lacked the capabilities to build infrastructure, establish an effective administration, and devise a viable strategy to absorb returnees, all of which worked to deter returnees. By October 2005, only a small number of refugees in neighboring countries had returned voluntarily to South Sudan, along with some 250,000 of the internally displaced. The central government sought to obstruct the flow of returnees by using force to demolish homes and by harassing agencies that sought to help and protect them. The increasing availability of small arms, population growth, and the central government’s determination to cleanse areas located in and around Southern oil fields ensured that recurring disputes about access to fertile land and water or over stolen cattle would probably continue for the foreseeable future.

**Foreign Military Assistance**

Sudan historically has relied on an array of Western and non-Western suppliers for military equipment and training. The proliferation of small arms in Sudan originated during the occupation of the country by Ottoman and Egyptian forces and by the colonial powers, especially Britain and France, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Small arms continued to flow into Sudan after independence, supplemented, however, by much larger military hardware.

Sudan had only a limited arms industry until the late 1990s, except for a production line for small-caliber ammunition. Consequently, foreign sources for weapons, equipment, ammunition, and technical training have been indispensable. After independence, British advisers helped train the Sudan Army and Sudan Air Force, and British equipment predominated in the ground forces. Diplomatic and military relations with Britain and other Western nations were broken after the June 1967 Arab–Israeli War, and the breach was filled by close military cooperation with the Soviet Union. Soviet assistance coincided with a dramatic expansion in Sudan Armed Forces personnel from 18,000 in 1966 to nearly 50,000 by 1972. The bulk of the equipment used by the ground and air forces throughout the 1970s until the early 1980s was of Soviet manufacture, including tanks, artillery, and MiG combat aircraft.
A settlement for displaced persons on the outskirts of Khartoum, late 1990s
A camp on the outskirts of Khartoum for Sudanese displaced by land reallocation, 2004
Copyright Lillian Craig Harris
Relations with the Soviets cooled in the late 1970s, and Sudan turned to China and Britain for training and equipment as well as to Yugoslavia, which was instrumental in the founding, training, and supply of vessels for the Sudan Navy. In addition, Sudan received financing from Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, for the purchase of Western military equipment. Until 1985, however, Sudan’s closest military ties were with Egypt, defined by a 25-year defense agreement signed in 1976. The accord provided for shared planning and staffing; the Egyptians also supplied Sudan with ammunition and various types of weaponry, such as antitank missiles and armored personnel carriers. Al-Bashir reaffirmed the pact after his 1989 coup, but the Egyptians declined to supply additional military aid after Sudan refused to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and in view of al-Bashir’s repressive policies at home.

U.S. military aid to Sudan initially consisted primarily of training a small number of Sudanese officers. Soon after agreeing in November 1976 to provide Sudan with selected arms, the United States sold Sudan transport aircraft, a purchase financed by Saudi Arabia, followed several years later by F–5 combat aircraft. Between fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1979 and FY 1982, military sales credits rose from US$5 million to US$100 million. Apart from aircraft, the United States provided Sudan with artillery, armored personnel carriers, Commando armored cars, and M–60 tanks. U.S. grant aid reached a peak of US$101 million in FY 1982. Sudan granted the United States naval port facilities at Port Sudan and gave the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) some airport-prepositioning rights for military equipment for contingent use. In 1981 and 1883, Sudanese and American forces participated in Bright Star joint maneuvers.

The United States reduced military grants and credits when the Southern Sudanese civil war resumed in 1983. After FY 1987, no assistance was extended with the exception of less than US$1 million annually for advanced training for SAF officers and maintenance for previously supplied equipment. Washington suspended military aid in 1989 under a provision of the United States Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits assistance to countries in arrears on interest payments on previous loans. In March 1990, the United States invoked a provision of the act barring aid to regimes that overthrow a democratic government. The United States terminated arms sales to Sudan in late 1992, while the European Union instituted an arms embargo against Sudan in 1994. These actions, however, had no impact on Sudan’s ability to replenish its arsenals.

According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Sudan obtained about US$350 million in military arms and equipment between 1983 and 1988. The United States was the largest supplier, accounting for US$120 million. China and France each provided US$30
million and Britain, US$10 million. About US$160 million came from unidentified sources, probably largely from Egypt and Libya, and as purchases from other Western suppliers financed by Arab countries.

Various Middle East and Gulf countries, particularly Iran and Libya but also Egypt, provided more than US$2 billion in “economic aid” in the 1970s, much of which Khartoum used to buy weapons. Additionally, each of Sudan’s neighbors provided weapons and/or sanctuary to various anti-Khartoum rebel groups and militias. Since the early 1990s, at least 34 countries have exported ammunition, light arms, and small arms to Sudan. In more recent years, reliable sources have suggested that there were between 1.9 and 3.2 million small arms in Sudan. About one-fifth of these weapons were held by the Sudanese government and/or pro-Khartoum militias.

Sudan constituted one of Africa’s major consumers of weapons in the early 2000s. As was the case in earlier decades, Sudan continued to rely on an array of suppliers, among them Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran, Romania, Russia, Poland, and South Africa, for ammunition, armored vehicles, helicopters, howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, attack and fighter aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, main battle tanks, and transport aircraft. Additionally, China supervised arms assembly and assisted in the construction of weapons factories.

Sudan manufactured at least a small amount of ammunition for light weapons in the early 1960s, but the country’s capacity to produce arms greatly expanded with the opening of the GIAD industrial city south of Khartoum in October 2000 (see Manufacturing, ch. 3). Under the auspices of the Military Industry Corporation within the Ministry of Defense, engineering and industrial enterprises produced or imported a range of equipment and technology for ground and air forces. Although information was limited, in the early 2000s this equipment included heavy and light artillery, antitank and antiaircraft guns, machine guns and small arms, tanks, and armored personnel carriers, as well as ammunition for these weapons; the country also had acquired the ability to assemble and maintain aircraft, including fighter and cargo airplanes and helicopters.

The SPLM/A, under the late John Garang’s leadership, regularly accused the SAF of using chemical weapons in South Sudan, but these allegations were never substantiated. The same was true of the U.S. charge in 1998 that the Al-Shifa Pharmaceuticals Industries factory in Khartoum North was developing chemical weapons or precursor chemicals, a claim that led to the United States bombing of the plant. Similarly, news reports in 2004 that Sudanese and Syrian troops had tested chemical weapons against civilians in Darfur were never confirmed. Some independent observers maintain that Garang on his part used the chemical-weapons issue as a disinformation campaign against Khartoum and Washington.
Internal Security Agencies

Domestic order in Sudan, except in the South, was a shared responsibility of the SAF, the national police force, and security organs of the Ministry of Interior. The authorities relied on the police, SAF, and martial law to maintain peace in unstable regions.

The Sudan Police Force

The British army assigned a captain to the central administration for police duties in 1898. He commanded 30 British army officers and helped to organize provincial police forces. In 1901 the authorities decentralized the police to improve efficiency. The government assumed responsibility for administrative control of the police in 1908, but provincial governors retained operational control of the forces. In 1928 the British established the Sudan Police Force (SPF) under the Ministry of Interior. Throughout the colonial period, the police lacked the resources and manpower to deploy officers throughout Sudan. Instead, the government gave tribal leaders authority to maintain order among their people and to enlist a limited number of “retainers” to help them in law-enforcement duties. This communal security system remained in effect until the early 1970s.

The Sudan Police College opened in Khartoum in 1937 to train all policemen and administrators in a one- or two-year course. Graduates could transfer between the two services initially, but by 1948 training had become too specialized to allow this practice. In 1969 the authorities built a police laboratory to enhance criminal-investigation capabilities.

The SPF faced several challenges during the colonial and early postcolonial periods. On June 4, 1951, a group of police officers met to discuss recent labor unrest in Khartoum, North Khartoum, and Omdurman. The British commandant broke up the meeting. The police officers then staged a demonstration that resulted in the dismissal of the ringleaders, who refused an order to return to barracks. On June 8–9, companies from the Camel Corps and the Eastern Arab Corps arrived in Khartoum from Al-Obeid and Kassala to prevent further unrest while the SDF disarmed the police. A few days later, the authorities allowed 670 police officers to return to duty but sacked 222 others. The British released a report in July that blamed the unrest on incompetent British officers who commanded the police and on wretched housing conditions. In the aftermath of this report, workmen built new housing and renovated old barracks.

The SPF and army worked together from 1965 to 1969 to quell the unrest caused by the rebellion in the Southern provinces. By 1970, SPF headquarters included administration, immigration, nationality, public affairs, training, and security administration. These divisions also existed at provincial levels. Each provincial police force had about 2,000 officers.
Khartoum frequently modified the command and administration of the SPF.

Prior to 1977, women served in the police after learning basic administrative duties and working on criminal cases involving women as witnesses or defendants. In 1977 four women completed the two-year course at the Sudan Police College and became the first females to join the ranks. A limited number of women served in the SPF and generally worked in administrative sections, on juvenile delinquency matters, or criminal cases that involved female Sudanese witnesses or defendants.

The police reported to the minister of interior until 1979, when that post was abolished, and various ministers became responsible for different areas of police work. This arrangement proved unwieldy, however, and the Police Act of 1979 instituted a unified command in which the head of the force reported to the president. After al-Numayri's fall, the cabinet position of minister of interior was restored, and the director general of police was made responsible to the minister.

Central police headquarters in Khartoum was organized into several divisions—such as administration, training, and security affairs—each commanded by a police major general. The main operational elements included the traffic police and the riot police. The 1979 legislation brought specialized police units, such as one for the Sudan Railways, under the SPF’s authority. Khartoum headquarters maintained liaison and cooperated with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and agencies involved in combating international drug trafficking.

The government's new administrative system delegated many powers to the regional level, but law enforcement outside major urban areas was organized at the state level. Thus, the SPF was subdivided into state commands, which were organized according to the same divisions found in the national headquarters. Local police directors reported to state police commissioners, who in turn were responsible to the SPF director general in Khartoum. Each provincial command had its own budget.

The SPF expanded from roughly 7,500 officers and men in 1956 to about 18,000 in 1970 and 30,000 by 2005. As of 2010, internal security was divided up among an array of organizations, including the United Police Forces (UPF), Popular Police Forces (PPF), Popular Defense Forces, and Border Intelligence Guard.

The United Police Forces had an estimated 30,000 personnel who were responsible for civil defense, criminal investigations, immigration and customs, passport control, traffic control, and wildlife protection. Police divisions normally operated within state commands. State police commissioners reported to the director general of police in Khartoum, who answered to the minister of interior. The UPF inventory included 40 Fahd armored fighting vehicles, 20 Panhard M3 armored fighting
vehicles, and 30 armored personnel carriers. The serviceability of these vehicles was unknown. Generally, the UPF had not deployed significant numbers of officers to South Sudan. After 2004, an unknown number of UPF personnel deployed to Darfur. Human-rights advocates accused the UPF of committing an array of human-rights atrocities.

The Popular Police Forces, created in 1989, were estimated to have at least 35,000 members who technically were under the supervision of the director general of police. In fact, the PPF was little more than an Islamist vigilante group that supposedly assisted the UPF. It operated as a politicized militia that sought to enforce “moral standards” among the country’s Islamic population. The PPF, not surprisingly, had a poor human-rights record.

Sudan lacked a true border guard. The UPF was responsible for passport control, immigration, and customs at border-crossing points, although the SAF and the PDF might also undertake border-control duties. However, there was a Border Intelligence Guard that operated outside the SAF chain of command; it reported directly to SAF military intelligence officers in the area of operations. The Border Intelligence Guard was active during the Southern civil war. In 2002–3, the guard recruited sources in Darfur to gather information about political and military conditions. Some observers accused the guard of recruiting for the janjaweed.

No information was available about training in the al-Bashir era, but formerly police officer cadets usually received two years of training at the Sudan Police College near Khartoum. The institution provided theoretical and practical instruction and served as a training school for military personnel who required police skills in their assignments. In addition to recruit training, the college offered courses in criminal law, general police duties, fingerprinting, clerical work, photography, and the use of small arms. Enlisted recruits usually underwent four months of training at state headquarters.

State police traditionally enjoyed good relations with the local communities, but in Khartoum if not elsewhere, police treatment of arrested persons could be harsh. During the 1990s and early 2000s, public-order campaigns in Khartoum often resulted in roundups of thousands of people, who were then charged with illegal street vending or loitering. In urban areas, police abused refugees, particularly Southerners, by stealing from them or beating them for minor infractions. The police also administered floggings for drinking alcohol or for curfew violations. Refugees seldom had recourse to the legal system when attacked by the police. Partly as a result of such actions, the al-Bashir government earned a reputation for poor treatment of prisoners.
Security and Intelligence Apparatus

The Sudanese internal security and intelligence apparatus evolved into a feared and hated institution after al-Numayri came to power in 1969. When the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) held sway, from 1969 to 1971, military intelligence began to investigate domestic opposition groups. After the RCC was abolished, the organization focused on evaluating and countering military threats to the regime. It also provided a 400-man Presidential Guard.

The government established the Office of State Security in the Ministry of Interior in 1971. The new agency evaluated information gathered by the police and military intelligence and administered prisons and passport control. The president also had the authority to order the police and military intelligence to undertake secret missions. In 1978 the government formed the Sudan Security Organization (SSO). Under the minister of state’s direction, the SSO became a prominent feature of al-Numayri’s regime, employing about 45,000 persons and rivaling the armed forces in size. The government disbanded it in 1985.

Surveillance of antigovernment organizations and individuals intensified after the 1989 coup. Sudanese intelligence personnel frequently prevented contact between Sudanese and foreigners, harassed suspected dissidents, monitored church services, and supervised the activities of journalists. Neighborhood “popular committees” used their control over the rationing system to monitor households.

The al-Bashir government created a new security body, known as Islamic Security or Security of the Revolution. A member of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation commanded the organization, which was staffed by NIF supporters. It protected al-Bashir against a coup and monitored the activities of other security forces and the SAF. Critics accused the organization of indiscriminately arresting suspected regime opponents and torturing them in so-called ghost houses before turning them over to prison authorities for further detention. According to human-rights advocates, political repression was this organization’s primary mission. The status of Islamic Security in the early 2000s was unknown, but there were indications that it might have been disbanded or incorporated into other agencies. A similar organization, Youth for Reconstruction, mobilized younger Islamist activists.

Sudan’s security and intelligence apparatus played a significant role in keeping the regime in power. Among other things, security and intelligence personnel participated in Sudan’s civil wars, supported pro-government militias in South Sudan and Darfur, managed informer networks, and purged the civil service of disloyal elements. External and military intelligence services also sought to destabilize Sudan’s internal and external enemies, primarily by providing financial and military aid to countries
and rebel groups that were willing to do Khartoum’s bidding. Sudan’s two intelligence agencies, for internal security and external security, merged in 2002 to form the National Security Organization (NSO).

Following the signing of the peace agreement in January 2005, the NSO changed its name to the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). The agreement stipulated that there would be one NISS with a mandate for giving advice, information gathering, and analysis. Skeptics expressed concern that Khartoum would continue to use the intelligence apparatus to silence critics and would dominate the NISS, while GOSS would play a lesser role in the organization. By mid-2006, only 50 Southern Sudanese had joined the NISS. A Southerner also became the NISS deputy director general. The objective was to train 100 Southerners every month and then assign them to NISS positions. However, it was certain that whatever happened, key positions would be filled by al-Bashir loyalists. In November 2007, the Sudan Organization Against Torture reported that the NISS continued to harass human-rights defenders and journalists in Khartoum and to obstruct the activities of the organizations for which they worked.

The NISS was subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 2010. The act did not provide for protection of basic human rights. Rather, it maintained earlier grants of extensive powers of arrest and detention and gave NISS agents immunity from prosecution and disciplinary action. A 2010 Amnesty International report said of the act, “It remains faithful to the government’s vision of the national security force as a body whose function is to maintain it [i.e., the government] in power . . .”

No information was available about NISS personnel strength, although it was substantial. Security and intelligence agents were normally deployed throughout Sudan and were often present in small towns and villages, but the agency’s external capabilities were weak. Several businesses and organizations had links to it. Arbitrary arrest and detention, intimidation, torture, and media censorship were commonplace. As a result, most ordinary Sudanese remained fearful of the NISS and other security agencies. Ironically, several nations, including Egypt, Britain, and the United States, relied on Sudanese intelligence for information about terrorists in the Middle East. In August 2009, General Muhammad Atta al-Mula was appointed head of the NISS in place of Salah Abdallah Gosh, who became a presidential adviser.
The Criminal Justice System

Criminal Courts and Laws

The administration of justice traditionally was regarded by Arabized Sudanese and a number of Southern ethnic groups as the most important function of government. In precolonial times, supervision of justice was solely in the hands of the ruler. In the North, most cases were actually tried by an Islamic judge, or qadi, who was trained in one of the Sunni Islamic legal schools. Crimes against the government, however, were heard by the ruler and decided by him with advice from the grand mufti, an expert in sharia, who served as a legal adviser.

The Muslim influence on Sudanese law remained important, but the long years of British colonial rule meant that by the mid-twentieth century the primary legal influence was British, because of the weight given to British legal precedents and because most of the lawyers and judges were British trained. Much discussion took place at independence on the need to reform or abrogate the system inherited from the British. Under al-Numayri in the early 1970s, an attempt was made to introduce new civil, commercial, and penal codes based in part on Egyptian laws, but the measures were repealed in 1973 in the face of resistance from the legal profession and a public wedded to existing laws and customs.

Acting under the strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood (see Glossary) and its secretary-general, Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, in 1977 al-Numayri appointed a committee charged with revising the legal code to bring it into conformity with the sharia. Only one of the committee’s recommended bills was ever enacted, but following al-Turabi’s appointment as attorney general in November 1981, the Islamization of the legal system proceeded in earnest. This process culminated in 1983 with the issuance of several decrees known as the September Laws that were based on sharia. Included in the bills was a new penal code based on hudud (see Glossary) that prescribed corporal punishment for crimes such as murder, theft, drinking alcohol, prostitution, and adultery. Hudud punishments ranged from flogging and amputation to stoning and execution and were applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, a fact that aroused bitter resentment among secularized Muslims and non-Muslim Southerners. During the final 20 months of al-Numayri's rule, the authorities amputated the arms or legs of at least 90 persons convicted of theft.

The military and civilian governments succeeding al-Numayri between 1985 and 1989 retained the September Laws, but only flogging sentences were actually carried out. Action on a new Islamic penal code to replace the September Laws was suspended by the legislature pending a future constitutional convention that would include the SPLM/A.
Although flogging, normally 40 lashes, was limited to offenses involving sex or alcohol, it was often inflicted summarily. In 1989 the new military government extended flogging as a punishment for a much wider range of offenses but refrained from extreme *hudud* sentences, such as amputations.

The regular criminal court system featured extensive guarantees of due process for accused persons in the mid- to late 1980s. Trials were held in public, but the defendant could request a closed trial. The accused had to be brought before a court within 48 hours of arrest, informed of the charges, and provided with access to an attorney of his or her choice. There were legal aid services for the poor, but they were apportioned except in some capital cases. Defendants had the right to speak, to present evidence on their own behalf, and to appeal judgments.

After the 1989 coup, the military regime initially retained the official freeze on implementation of the September Laws, but in January 1991, al-Bashir decreed that Islamic law would be applied in courts throughout the North but not in the South. The regular civilian courts continued to handle ordinary criminal offenses, including theft and some capital crimes. The court system had a serious backlog, however, and the judiciary was less independent of the executive than previously.

The regime established special security courts in November 1989. Regional military governors and the commissioner of the national capital formed these courts, which had three-member panels of military and civilian judges. They tried persons accused of violating constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, and some portions of the criminal code, notably drug crimes and currency violations. The new security courts did not extend normal protections to the accused and gained a reputation for harsh sentences. In areas of the South affected by the war, units of the armed forces and militias ruled by force of arms. In many cases, the accused were summarily tried and punished, especially for offenses against public order.

Sudan’s court system consisted of four types of courts in the early 2000s: regular, military, special, and tribal. Regular courts encompassed both civil and criminal courts, appellate courts, and the National Supreme Court. Most proceedings of civil courts and criminal courts were governed by their respective legal codes. Both types of court in turn were governed by provisions of the Interim National Constitution (see The Legal System, ch. 4). Punishments for criminal offenses were determined according to sharia, including *hudud* punishments, in the Northern states but not in the 10 states of the South.

The interim constitution provided for fair and prompt trials, although this provision was often not honored in practice, according to the U.S.
Department of State. In civil and criminal courts, defendants had the right to legal representation, and courts were obligated to provide counsel to the indigent in cases punishable by life imprisonment or death, but again, such rights reportedly were not universally respected. Even in instances where defendants had legal counsel, their lawyers in some instances could only offer advice and were not permitted to address the court directly. Testimony given under duress was often admitted as evidence. Defendants appeared only before judges, there being no provision for juries. Trials were open or closed to the public at the discretion of the judge(s). All decisions were subject to appeal.

Military personnel were tried in military courts and not entitled to the same rights as defendants in civil or criminal courts, such as the right of appeal. Three-person special security courts heard cases involving constitutional issues, emergency regulations, some sections of the penal code, and offenses involving drugs and currency violations. Other special courts handled most security-related cases. Defendants were entitled to legal representation, and attorneys could address the court directly. Sentences in special courts could be harsh and were usually carried out immediately, although defendants had the right to appeal. All death sentences were automatically referred to the chief justice and the head of
Three special criminal courts heard cases involving crimes against the state in the three states of Darfur. According to Amnesty International, these courts reportedly suffered from the same legal shortcomings as the regular criminal courts (see The Courts, ch. 4).

The judicial system in the South was still being constructed in early 2011. It consisted of a hierarchy of courts at the local, district, county, and regional level, and it suffered from a severe shortage of communications, funding, infrastructure, and trained personnel. In addition to these regular courts, GOSS incorporated traditional courts or courts of elders into its judicial system over which local chiefs usually presided. Traditional courts tried domestic matters and criminal cases according to customary law, but defendants had the right of appeal to the regular courts. The criminal code of South Sudan provided for the death penalty for the most serious crimes. Death sentences could be appealed to, and commuted by, the courts of appeal. In some areas of the South as well as in the Nuba Mountains where civil administration did not exist, the judicial order consisted solely of customary courts. In some instances, local military units reportedly took judicial matters into their own hands, especially for offenses against the civil order.

The Prison System

Only limited information was available on prisons in Sudan at the start of 2011, and no information was available on the incidence of crime. General supervision of the Sudan Prison Service was carried out by the director general of prisons, who was responsible for the country’s central prisons and reformatories. State authorities managed detention centers and jails in their administrative jurisdictions. As of the early 2000s, Sudan had four federal prisons, Kober in Khartoum North, Shallah in Al-Fashir, Al-Junayn in West Darfur, and Port Sudan on the Red Sea; 26 government prisons; and three open prisons. The total prison staff was estimated at 7,500, all of whom were attached to the police force. Correction officers underwent training at the police college and the police academy; prison wardens received little or no training. Additionally, there were four juvenile centers, and a female prison in Omdurman. Prisons and other detention facilities were dilapidated and in need of expansion and replacement, no new major prisons having been built since the 1950s.

According to government officials, the estimated prison population was 14,000, but the country’s prison capacity was only 4,300. Crowding resulted from a judiciary that provided for no alternative to incarceration except flogging in some cases. Men and women were held in separate quarters, and political prisoners were segregated from criminal offenders. Prisoners were not registered; nor were they separated by age or according to the severity of offense. Consequently, minor offenders, including
juveniles, were often housed with hardened criminals and might be subject to abuse. Access to legal aid was generally unavailable except for those individuals able to afford the legal fees; however, some nongovernmental organizations, a Bar Association committee, and the Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Department provided some legal assistance to prisoners. The death penalty remained in effect; however, both the chief justice and the president had to approve all executions. Muslim women could be executed for adultery.

According to UN and other sources, prison conditions were harsh, overcrowded, and lacking in health care, sanitary facilities, or even food for inmates apart from that provided by relatives. There were reports that abuse, such as beatings and deprivation of food, water, and other necessities, was routine. Some prisoners allegedly died from lack of health care or from generally poor prison conditions. Women and vagrant children were detained, often for minor offenses; they were also subject to abuse within the penal system. The Child Law of 2004 represented an attempt by the state to adhere to international standards with regard to treatment of incarcerated children, but the extent of its implementation remained unclear. In any case, few if any staff in prisons and correctional institutions were qualified to deal with juvenile offenders.

The Government of South Sudan, after signing the CPA in January 2005, was faced with establishing and expanding the region’s police service and prison system, part of the Security Sector Reform program in the South. At the time, there were about 5,000 police officers in the South Sudan Police Force. Most of them had little, if any, training, and the force lacked operational equipment and transport. About 4,000 of these officers had been transferred from the SPLM/A. Other recruits were demobilized SPLA combatants, few of whom had police skills, and police of the Government of Sudan formerly stationed in South Sudan. Police stations were few in number, understaffed, and without qualified officers.

In 2006 GOSS organized these groups into the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and placed the service under the jurisdiction of its Ministry of Interior. Since then, demobilized SPLA soldiers continued to be enrolled in the police force and prison service without formal training or experience in their duties. The SPSS continually suffered from lack of funding, a suitable legal framework for its activities, and an effective organizational structure. Because of poor recordkeeping and a constant influx of personnel, the size of the SSPS was difficult to determine, but by 2008–9, GOSS sources estimated it at around 20,000 officers, a figure that was expected to grow as more SPLA soldiers swelled its ranks. Aside from public-security duty, the police also had the mission of protecting wildlife in the region’s six national parks, six game reserves, and fisheries along the Nile.
To improve the training of the force, GOSS relied on assistance from international agencies. In December 2006, the UN reported that its police technical advisers continued to train officers and to improve SSPS capabilities. They also provided support to the Community Policing Committee that had been established in Juba. In October 2007, Uganda agreed to begin training police officers as soon as qualified personnel could be found. UNMIS, among other UN agencies, was also involved in capacity-building of the SSPS.

There were few prisons in the South Sudan Prison Service in 2005. Those that existed lacked the most basic facilities, management staff, and the capacity to ensure humane treatment of prisoners, including provision of health care and food. These conditions improved somewhat during the next four years, by which time separate quarters were provided for male and female offenders, and juveniles were usually housed in separate cells. The UN reported acts of abuse and torture in jails maintained by the SPLA in some regions.

In May 2007, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed a US$5.3 million agreement known as the South Sudan Police and Correctional Service Support. Under this accord, UNDP agreed to build a network of police stations and training centers, provide equipment and training to the SSPS, and improve prison facilities and the treatment of male and female inmates. The project was part of a three-year US$45 million effort to improve security in South Sudan by restoring a quarter of the police stations and seven central prisons and by providing training to personnel.

In June 2007, the UN reported that it had launched the South Sudan Police Service Database to help police keep data on discipline, pay, personnel information, promotion, retirement, and training. In September, the UNDP inaugurated the Lologo Regional Training Center as a venue for instruction in the South Sudan Prison Service; a second center was under construction at Rumbek. At the same time, the UNDP initiated a training program for 550 SPLM/A soldiers who were being transferred to the prison service, the first of approximately 1,500 combatants to be transferred. Some 880 SPLM/A combatants graduated as prison personnel in November 2007. In February 2010, South Africa joined Germany and GOSS in a partnership to train correctional services officers, judges, and legal affairs personnel, part of the continuing effort to build a credible security-services sector in South Sudan.

Future Prospects

Sudan’s armed forces have played an outsized role in both security and governmental affairs since the country gained independence in 1956. Indeed, for almost the whole of this period, the country has been
subject to military governance, the most recent episode of which began on June 30, 1989, when Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir led the latest in a series of coups against a civilian government. Although many Sudanese might view the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as a source of stability, neither civilian nor military leaders have been able to devise policies that would address the major issues of governance and of sharing of resources that lie at the root of Sudan’s troubled history as an independent state.

During most of that era, Sudan’s armed forces confronted armed insurrection in the South, which pitted the SAF first against the Anya Nya and other groups for more than a decade after independence, and then against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) from 1983 to 2005. The cost of the second civil war of more than two decades of fighting between the SAF and the SPLA was enormous in terms of both people and resources: an estimated 2 million deaths, mostly civilians, with millions displaced within Sudan or forced to flee to neighboring countries. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9, 2005, brought the North–South conflict to an end. While the accord succeeded in implementing a cease-fire, mutual troop withdrawals, and establishing an international monitoring force, efforts at military and political cooperation between North and South as well as at negotiating governance and security arrangements in three border enclaves—Abyei, southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile State—proved difficult or failed entirely. At the end of a six-year period during which North and South had attempted to work together to build a peaceful and united country, Southerners voted in 2011 to secede and form an independent country with their own government and armed forces.

In the meantime, in 2003, rebellion against the government in Khartoum had arisen in Darfur over the issues of political marginalization and economic neglect, the same issues that bedeviled North–South relations. The war in Darfur pitted the SAF and allied militias against Darfuri forces in a seemingly intractable conflict involving atrocities and human-rights violations on a continual and massive scale. Repeated attempts at peacemaking came to naught. Discontent also flared in the East, but it was addressed, at least temporarily.

The military situation in Sudan in early 2011 was cause for serious concern. Although the country faced no external threats, within the country the SAF confronted active or potential conflict. Most immediately, the looming breakup of the country held the prospect for renewed North–South war. Aside from problems concerning oil production and border demarcation, there was the very real possibility of confrontation involving Abyei, southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile State, whose status the CPA left for future negotiation. In the West, the fighting in Darfur
had declined in intensity but seemed unlikely to be settled anytime soon. In the East and along the northern Nile, Khartoum faced latent discontent. In addition, there were divisions among officers in the army that had surfaced in the recent past as well as disagreements over policy within the al-Bashir regime. Given the number and nature of these problems, it was unlikely that peace would come to Sudan anytime soon; consequently, the armed forces were certain to remain actively engaged in Sudan’s internal affairs in the near future.

Details on military units and equipment are available from The Military Balance, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, as well as in Jane’s International Defence Review and Jane’s Intelligence Review. Reports by groups such as Africa Watch, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, and the Small Arms Survey are essential for understanding current developments in Sudan. The Africa Contemporary Record volumes also contain information about the SAF and the SPLM/A. Mansour Khalid’s War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries contains a wealth of information about political and military developments in Sudan. Robert O. Collins has published numerous books and articles about Sudan’s history. Some of his recent publications include Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan, Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster, and A History of Modern Sudan. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars by Douglas H. Johnson and Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster by J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins are essential to understand recent developments. Alex de Waal has also published prolifically on Sudan. His more recent efforts include War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, and Darfur: A Short History of a Long War, which is co-authored by Julie Flint.

United States–Sudanese military relations are recounted in Jeffrey A. Lefebvre’s “Globalism and Regionalism: U.S. Arms Transfers to Sudan” in Armed Forces and Society. Information on the criminal courts system and the record of the al-Bashir government with respect to judicial processes and human rights can be found in the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published by the United States Department of State. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Appendix

Table
1  Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
2  Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 2010
3  Balance of Payments, 2006–10
4  Major Army Equipment, 2010
5  Major Air Force Equipment, 2010
6  Major Navy Equipment, 2010
Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When you know</th>
<th>Multiply by</th>
<th>To find</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millimeters</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centimeters</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometers</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hectares</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square kilometers</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic meters</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>cubic feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liters</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilograms</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metric tonnes</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>long tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>and add 32 degrees Fahrenheit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Sector—Agriculture</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sector—Industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Handicrafts</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Water</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and Construction</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Sector—Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotels, Restaurants</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, etc.</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Institutions</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and other Social Services</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import Duties</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Sudan, *50th Annual Report, 2010*, Chapter 7, Table 7-1, and Appendix, Table 11-A (preliminary figures). The source gives no sub-sectoral analysis for agriculture.
Table 3. Balance of Payments, 2006–10
(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009¹</th>
<th>2010²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Account</td>
<td>-5,542</td>
<td>-5,812</td>
<td>-5,240</td>
<td>-7,043</td>
<td>-5,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>-1,291</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>-694</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, f.o.b. (free on board)</td>
<td>5,813</td>
<td>8,902</td>
<td>12,480</td>
<td>7,834</td>
<td>11,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exports</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>8,443</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>7,131</td>
<td>10,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-oil products</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports, f.o.b.</td>
<td>-7,105</td>
<td>-7,722</td>
<td>-9,907</td>
<td>-8,528</td>
<td>-9,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>-656</td>
<td>-723</td>
<td>-1,177</td>
<td>-1,428</td>
<td>-1,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>-364</td>
<td>-256</td>
<td>-626</td>
<td>-423</td>
<td>-455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and transport equipment</td>
<td>-3,785</td>
<td>-4,099</td>
<td>-3,674</td>
<td>-2,173</td>
<td>-2,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured goods</td>
<td>-1,444</td>
<td>-1,709</td>
<td>-1,705</td>
<td>-2,151</td>
<td>-2,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other imports</td>
<td>-855</td>
<td>-935</td>
<td>-1,917</td>
<td>-2,353</td>
<td>-2,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (net)</td>
<td>-2,689</td>
<td>-2,934</td>
<td>-2,945</td>
<td>-2,465</td>
<td>-2,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments</td>
<td>-2,890</td>
<td>-3,319</td>
<td>-3,438</td>
<td>-2,856</td>
<td>-3,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: oil-transportation costs</td>
<td>-602</td>
<td>-813</td>
<td>-789</td>
<td>-723</td>
<td>-775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (net)</td>
<td>-2,952</td>
<td>-4,640</td>
<td>-5,662</td>
<td>-4,940</td>
<td>-5,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-oil payments</td>
<td>-749</td>
<td>-857</td>
<td>-937</td>
<td>-1,177</td>
<td>-1,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: interest cash payments</td>
<td>-94</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>-89</td>
<td>-213</td>
<td>-303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-related expenses³</td>
<td>-2,292</td>
<td>-3,967</td>
<td>-4,769</td>
<td>-3,821</td>
<td>-4,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current transfers (net)³</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>1,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private transfers</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>-686</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transfers</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Account</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Account (net)</td>
<td>4,257</td>
<td>4,092</td>
<td>3,745</td>
<td>4,669</td>
<td>5,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amortization</td>
<td>-336</td>
<td>-219</td>
<td>-382</td>
<td>-188</td>
<td>-553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: cash payments (excluding IMF)</td>
<td>-213</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>-241</td>
<td>-89</td>
<td>-342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term capital flows and other assets (net)³</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign assets of commercial banks (increase -)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-95</td>
<td>-209</td>
<td>-101</td>
<td>-124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI and portfolio investment (net)</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>2,628</td>
<td>2,615</td>
<td>2,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Errors &amp; Omissions</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL BALANCE</td>
<td>-1,250</td>
<td>-1,375</td>
<td>-907</td>
<td>-1,882</td>
<td>-406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3. Balance of Payments, 2006–10 (Continued)
*(In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2010&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financing (- indicates inflow)</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in net international reserves</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>-560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foreign reserves (increase-)</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>-115</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in arrears</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing Gap</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Memorandum Items:**

| Current Account (in percent of GDP) | -15.2  | -12.5  | -9.0    | -12.9            | -8.3             |
| Current account, cash basis (in percent of GDP) | -13.5  | -10.9  | -7.7    | -11.5            | -7.1             |
| Net international reserves (end-period)<sup>5</sup> | 1,576.0  | 1,139.0  | 978.0  | 390.0            | 950.0             |
| (in months of next year’s imports) | 1.8    | 1.2    | 1.1     | 0.4              | 1.0              |
| Sudanese crude oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel) | 54.4   | 58.0   | 81.3    | 44.8             | 66.4             |

| Nominal GDP | 36,401.0 | 46,531.0 | 58,028.0 | 54,644.0 | 66,595.0 |

**Notes:**

<sup>1</sup>Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup>Projected.

<sup>3</sup>Includes payments to oil companies related to profit-sharing arrangements.

<sup>4</sup>Net short-term trade and other credit facilities of the government and commercial banks.

<sup>5</sup>SDR125.8 million (special drawing rights of the International Monetary Fund—IMF) allocation not included.

**Source:** Based on information from International Monetary Fund, *Country Report no. 10/256*, June 2010, 27 (from Fund staff estimates based on information provided by the Sudanese authorities).

### Table 4. Major Army Equipment, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Battle Tanks</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-60A3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-59/59D</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54/55</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Bashir (Type-85-IIM)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Light Tanks</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-62</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-63</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reconnaissance Vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML-90</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-1/BRDM-2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferret</td>
<td>50–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1114: HMMWV</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saladin</td>
<td>30–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored Fighting Vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP-1/2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4. Major Army Equipment, 2010 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored Personnel Carrier</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC (T):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-113</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-50</td>
<td>20–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC (W):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-150 Commando</td>
<td>55–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-70</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-80A</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-152</td>
<td>50–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT-62</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT-64</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walid</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-92</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2S1 Carnation, 122mm</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK F3, 155mm</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-101, 105mm</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-30, D-74, M-30, 122mm</td>
<td>16+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-46 / Type-59-I, 130mm</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-114A1, 130mm</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-63, 107mm</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM-21, 122mm</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saqr, 122mm</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-81, 122mm</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortars</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM-49, 120mm</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-43, 120mm</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm, 82mm</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antitank Weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swingfire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-3 9K11 Sagger</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-40A1, 106mm Recoilless Rifles</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 Knout, 73mm Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIS-3, 76mm/ M-1944, 100mm Guns</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-44, 85mm Guns</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air-Defense Weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMS</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GUNS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-163 Vulcan, 20mm</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3 VDAA, 20mm</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPU-2/ZPU-4, 14.5mm; Type-63,37 mm;</td>
<td>740+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-60,57mm; M-1944, 85mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-167 Vulcan, 20mm</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZU-23-2, 23mm</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1939, 37mm</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unserviceable, 37mm</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>40mm</td>
<td>60</td>
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### Table 4. Major Army Equipment, 2010 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infantry Weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols (9mm): Helwan, H&amp;K P9S, FN35</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles (7.62mm): SKS, G3, AK-47, AKM</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-machine guns (9mm): Sterling, H&amp;K MP5, Berretta M12, UZI</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns (7.62mm): HK21, RPD, RPK, RPK-46, M60, SGM, MG3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.a. = Not available.


### Table 5. Major Air Force Equipment, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighter Ground Attack Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A–5C Fantan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-29SE Fulcrum</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-29UB Fulcrum</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-23BN</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F–7 (MiG-21)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenyang J-6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-25 Frogfoot</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-26 Curl (modified for bombing)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C–130H Hercules</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHC–5D Buffalo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y–8 SAC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-30 Clank</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-74TK-200/300</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falcon 20 (VIP)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falcon 50 (VIP)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker-27 (VIP)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K–8 Karakorum (combat capable)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack: Mi-24V Hind (combat capable)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support: Mi-8/Mi-171</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAR–330 (SA–330) Puma</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-operational Pumas</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Defense</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMS: Towed: SA–2 Guideline</td>
<td>90</td>
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### Table 6. Major Navy Equipment, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and Coastal Combatants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat, River (all less than 100 tonnes):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurmuk</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewart</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashroora</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boat, Inshore:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft (Tank):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft (Vehicles and Personnel):</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Chapter 1


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**Chapter 5**


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Glossary

Ansar—A name given in the nineteenth century to the followers of the Sudanese Mahdi. Used today for members of the Umma Party.

dinar—See Sudanese dinar.

fiscal year (FY)—An annual period established for accounting purposes. The Sudanese fiscal year extends from July 1 to the following June 30.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A measure of the total value of goods and services produced by a domestic economy over a fixed period of time, such as a year. GDP is obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation of physical assets (consumption of capital). GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. In developing countries, estimates of the value of non-formal economic activity, such as farming, herding, and informal trading, may be included.

gross national product (GNP)—Total market value of all final goods and services produced by an economy during a fixed period of time, such as a year. Consists of gross domestic product plus income received by residents from investments and possessions abroad, minus payments remitted abroad by nonresidents. GNP is the broadest measure of the output of goods and services by an economy.

hectare—a unit of area commonly used for land measurement in many parts of the world. 1 hectare = 2.47 acres or 10,000 square meters.

hudud—Punishments for severe crimes under Islamic law. Punishments include flogging, amputation of limbs, and stoning.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—The subregional grouping of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda that is focused on economic development but that more recently has concentrated on ending the civil war in Sudan and the conflict in Somalia. Before 1996 it was known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD).

janjaweed—Armed men or roving bandits who use horses, camels, or light trucks to carry out attacks in Darfur. In 2003 and 2004, the janjaweed were usually identified with the Abbala Arabs of North Darfur who
were armed and sponsored by the central government to attack rebels. Since then, the term has come to apply to any of the lawless raiders and bandits who fight and plunder in Darfur, regardless of ethnic or political affiliation.

Jonglei Canal—A diversion canal intended to carry water past the White Nile swamps in Southern Sudan. The canal was to extend 365 kilometers from the Sobat Camp, where the Sobat River joins the White Nile, to Bor. Construction began from the northern terminus in 1978 and proceeded south for 265 kilometers until the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army attacked the giant digging machine in 1984 and terminated the project.

Khatmiyyah—A Muslim brotherhood established in the early nineteenth century by Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani. It became the best organized and most politically powerful brotherhood in Eastern Sudan. The al-Mirghani family continues to exercise control over the brotherhood.

Mahdi—A messianic figure expected to come at the end of time to institute an Islamic society of peace and justice. In Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad ibn al-Sayyid Abdallah of Dongola declared himself to be the Mahdi in about 1880.

Mahdism—A movement similar to a religious order founded in the late nineteenth century. Mahdism and its adherents, the Ansar, sought the regeneration of Islam.

Muslim Brotherhood—Founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in the 1920s, it was originally conceived as a religious revivalist movement seeking a return to the fundamentals of Islam in a way that would be compatible with the technological innovations introduced from the West. It has been active in Sudan since 1949. Disciplined, highly motivated, and well financed, “the Brotherhood,” as it is known, became a powerful political force during the 1970s and 1980s, although it represented only a small minority of Sudanese. Following the 1989 coup, the Brotherhood exerted influence through the National Islamic Front, which held several cabinet portfolios. Its members are now split between the National Congress Party and the Popular Congress Party.

Sahel—A narrow band of land bordering the southern Sahara and stretching from Senegal in the west into Sudan in the east. It is characterized by an average annual rainfall of between 150 and 500 millimeters and is mainly suited to pastoralism.
Salafi—Refers to the early generations of Muslims. Salafist Muslims believe that the closer a generation was to the time of the Prophet, the more correct was its understanding of Islam.

Shi’a (from *Shiat Ali*, the “Party of Ali”)—A member of the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shi’a supported the claims of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s son-in-law, and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community. On this point, they divided from the Sunni (*q.v.* in the first great schism within Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among the Shi’a over the identity and number of their imams, spiritual leaders descended from Ali. There are no Shi’a in Sudan.

*shura*—A consultative body that can give advice and counsel. It may take the form of a parliament. Islamists reject the notion of popular sovereignty, which belongs only to God. Hence, a *shura* does not express sovereignty but only the principle of community consensus.

Sudanese dinar (SDD)—The unit of currency from May 1992 until July 1, 2007, when it was replaced by the (new) Sudanese pound (*q.v.*).

Sudanese pound (SDG)—Until 1992, the unit of currency was the Sudanese pound (SDP), consisting of 1,000 millimes = 100 piasters = 1 Sudanese pound. In May 1992, the al-Bashir government replaced the pound with the dinar (SDD), at SDD1 = SDG10. The dinar existed in parallel with the pound until the dinar officially replaced the pound in March 1999. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005 called for a new unit of currency to replace the dinar, which Southerners associated with the regime’s Arabization policies. On January 9, 2007, the Bank of Sudan put the new Sudanese pound, divided into 100 piasters, into circulation. The new pound equals 100 dinars, or 1,000 old Sudanese pounds. As of July 1, 2007, the exchange rate was USS1 = SDD204 = SDG2. As of that date, the dinar was no longer legal tender in Sudan. On September 1, 2014, the exchange rate was USS1 = SDG5.68.

*sudd*—Arabic term for “barrier” or “obstruction.” With lower case, the term designates clumps of aquatic vegetation that block the Nile channel; with upper case, the term Al-Sudd is used loosely for the entire White Nile swamps in Southern Sudan.

Sufism—Islamic mysticism. Brotherhoods of Sufis, or mystics, exist throughout the Muslim world. In Sudan, the Khatmiyyah, the Qadiriyyah, and the Tijaniyyah are examples of major brotherhoods.

Sunnī (from the Arabic *sunna*, meaning “custom,” giving the connotation of orthodoxy in theory and practice)—A member of the larger of the two great divisions of Islam. Sunnis supported the traditional method
of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyads, whose dynasty succeeded the Prophet Muhammad. On this issue, they divided from the Shi’ā (*q.v.*) in the first great schism within Islam. There are no Shi’ā in Sudan.

Three Towns—Sudanese reference to the cities of Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman. Located in close proximity to the juncture of the White Nile and Blue Nile Rivers, they form a single metropolitan area.

Wahhabi—Reformist reactionary Islamic group, named after its founder, Ahmed Abd el-Wahhab (1703–92), son of a theologian from the Najd region of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is the official Islamic creed of Saudi Arabia.
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